ROTFW - Israel - Chronos

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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1580, MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

05TELAVIV15802005-03-17

10:10

2010-11-28

18:06SECRET

Embassy Tel

Aviv

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The fulltext of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001580

SIPDIS

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EO 12958 DECL: 03/15/2010TAGS PGOV, PREL, KWBG, IR, IS, COUNTERTERRORISM, GOI EXTERNALSUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIGNFIGHTERS BEGINNING TO LEAVE IRAQ

Classified By: Pol/C Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) an d (d).

1. (S) Summary: Mossad Chief Meir Dagan told CODEL Corzine March

13 that Israeli and U.S. thinking on Iran largely tracks, addingthat he believes the EU dialogue with Iran will ultimately fail.Dagan said that Israel has evidence that some foreign fightershave returned home from Iraq, perhaps indicating that the tidemay be starting to turn in the U.S. battle against the insurgencythere. He worried however, that these militants countries oforigin -- in particular Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Sudan --are ill-equipped to control the returning jihadis, who might thenpose a threat to stability in the region and, ultimately, toIsrael. End Summary.

----Iran----

2. (C) Senator Jon Corzine, accompanied by Senate staff member

Evan Gottesman, the Ambassador, Pol/Res and Poloff (notetaker),met with Mossad Chief Meir Dagan March 13. Acknowledging thatthere are at times differences in analysis of the facts, Daganstressed that it is similarities rather than differences that areat the heart of the GOI-U.S. intelligence relationship,particularly on Iran. The facts themselves are not in dispute,Dagan continued, adding that the U.S. and Israeli assessments ofIrans intentions and plans are largely in accord. Iran hasdecided to go nuclear, Dagan said, and nothing will stop it.Dagan predicted that the EU dialogue with Iran will not succeedand that the issue of Irans nuclear ambitions would eventuallygo to the UNSecurity Council.

-------------------------------------Iraq - Foreign Fighters Heading Home?-------------------------------------

3. (S) In response to the Senators question, Dagan said that

the tide may be starting to turn in Iraq with regard to foreignmilitant activity. Dagan said Israel has evidence that foreignfighters originating from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria and Yemenhave arrived back in their home countries, and he assumes thatsome had returned to Saudi Arabia as well. Dagan predicted that,as with men who fought in Afghanistan during the 80s and 90s,these returning militants would stay in touch with each other,forming a network based on their common experiences in Iraq.

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4. (S) Stressing that Israel has no assets in Iraq other than a

friendly relationship with the Kurds, Dagan said that Israelsinterest is more in the impact the jihadis from, for example,Jordan and Saudi Arabia, will have once they return to theircountries of origin. Although he predicts Egypt and Jordan willdo all right, Dagan said he is less confident that governmentsin Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Sudan are sufficiently well-equipped to face down the domestic challenge these returningmilitants will pose. The combination of their military trainingand the absence of strong governments willing and able toconfront these men could have a devastating impact on Israel bycausing chaos in their home countries, he added. Dagan predictedthat these jihadis will have less of a direct impact onPalestinians, because Palestinians are already well aware ofmilitant views and opinions via Internet chat rooms. Furthermore,Dagan said he feels that most Palestinians are not searching forforeign flags, such as al-Qaeda, under which to rally, becausethose inclined to do so are already being well-mobilized underexisting groups in the West Bank and Gaza.

-------Lebanon-------

5. (C) Dagan opined that Hizballah will never make the

transition to a purely political party in Lebanon, since theorganization remains very dependent on its jihadi orientation.Noting that even the recent Hizaballah-sponsored march in Beiruthas not deterred the Lebanese from pressing for a full Syrianwithdrawal, Dagan advised the U.S. to remain firm in its demandfor a complete pullout, and attributed the willingness of theLebanese people to rise up to U.S. action in Iraq.

--------------------------------------------- -------------Essential to Use All Assets in the Fight Against Terrorism--------------------------------------------- -------------

6. (C) Dagan said it is essential to combine all types of

intelligence assets, rather than relying exclusively on humanintelligence or signal intercepts, to counter terrorist threats.Terrorist organizations have been seeking to obtain WMD as amatter of course and, unlike countries that wish to acquire theseweapons as a deterrent, non-state actors would be more inclinedto actually use them, in Dagans opinion. Asked about therelationship between illicit activities such as narcotic or armstrafficking and terrorism, Dagan confirmed that terroristorganizations try to fund their activities by criminal means,adding that credit card fraud and counterfeiting are also methodsfavored by these groups. Weapons originating from Yemen and Sudanare smuggled into the territories through Egypt for sale, as wellas for use by militants, Dagan said.

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7. (U) CODEL Corzine did not have an opportunity to clear this

message.***************************************************************** Visit Embassy Tel Avivs Classified Website:http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telavivYou can also access this site through the State DepartmentsClassified SIPRNET website.***************************************************************** KURTZER

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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1593, C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING TH










Discussing cables




05TELAVIV15932005-03-17

14:02

2010-11-28

18:06SECRET

Embassy Tel

Aviv

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The fulltext of the original cable is not available.


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015TAGS: PARMPRELMNUCKNNPEUIRISGOIEXTERNAL

SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THEIRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: STATE 26053

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and(D).

1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to

its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the "point ofno return" for Tehran's nuclear weapons program. The GOIbelieves that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such assanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying theEU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement.The Israelis support a unified international front but areconcerned that the USG may move toward the EU position.Despite the GOI's focus on the diplomatic track, public andprivate speculation about possible Israeli air strikescontinues. In weighing the military options, the GOI isaware of significant differences from its successful strikeagainst Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, including anuncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalitionforces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities toretaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changedstrategic environment. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------- ----------The Iranian Threat, "Point of No Return," and Timelines--------------------------------------------- ----------

2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran "the main threat to Israel" and

has recently expressed concern that some states are "gettingused to" the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Othersenior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran'snuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagancalls an "existential threat" that alters the strategicbalance in the region.

3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December,

Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of theenrichment cycle as the "point of no return" for the Iranianprogram, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. MossadChief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranianprogram will be unstoppable once it no longer requiresoutside assistance to complete the enrichment process. Atthe technical level, the director for external affairs at theIsrael Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that thecritical step would be Iran's operation of a centrifugeenrichment cascade.

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4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when

they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. InFebruary, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes thereis still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the windowof opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautionedthat Iran is "less than one year away," while the head ofresearch in military intelligence estimated that Iran wouldreach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at theIAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capabilitywithin six months of the end of the suspension agreement. Afew GOI officials admitted informally that these estimatesneed to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA'sstrategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998at the latest.

--------------------------------------------Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3--------------------------------------------

5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintainingdiplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA andEU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSCsanctions, e.g. on Iran's airlines and trade, as noted below.President Katsav has said that Tehran is "very conscious ofinternational opinion." Other MFA and NSC officials point tothe current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonoscase as proof that diplomatic pressure can affectdecision-making in Tehran.

6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3

efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharontold reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to"play for time." In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, andmilitary leaders have all complained that the Europeans are"too soft." Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned thatIran will "cheat" on any commitments it makes. MFA stafftold poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effortwill be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension orthat the Europeans will support effective sanctions againstIran.

7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the

Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI wouldlike a clearer and more detailed listing of all activitiescovered by the suspension, along with timelines for eachstep. Second, they want more robust verification measuresand greater focus on Iran's denial of access to IAEAinspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any finalagreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure thatnoncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level.Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that

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would signal a failure of the process, and to identify theconcrete consequences of such failure.

8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans

to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, butnoticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press onMarch 10 that "it would probably not be advisable to imposean oil embargo on Iran," PM Sharon advocated trade and flightrestrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these stepscould include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe,limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, andsuspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines withinthe EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreignaffairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S.for a "complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycleprogram." In the short term, this means a full suspension ofall enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactorconstruction, and related R&D activities.

--------------------------------------------- --

Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement--------------------------------------------- --

9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the

Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action bythe UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue itsefforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing totake Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead withthe Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, includingsanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to "waitfor the Europeans."

10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the

extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomaticfront. The IAEC's director for non-proliferation admittedthat the GOI sees "little we can do" to increase pressure onIran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement.The MFA's office director for the Gulf states said thatIsrael would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities,such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence materialrelated to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believesthat any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to asurge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention onIsrael's own nuclear activities.

11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the

President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials askedif the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSAfor foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move isprobably necessary to build international consensus fortaking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed

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concern that the USG would be influenced by what he calledthe EU's habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to fullcompliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were alsodisquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG isre-examining its position on Hizballah.

------------------------------------------The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak------------------------------------------

12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli

officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possiblemilitary options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed theimportance of the "political and economic" track. During arecent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF DeputyChief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutzsimilarly said "we don't want to go there." In February,President Katsav told the Secretary that "the military optionis not necessary -- bring the issue to the Security Council."

13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikesusually focuses on the differences from the Israeli AirForce's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. In private,GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors wouldmake any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission.A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy thatthe GOI does not know where all of the targets are locatedand said that any attack would only delay, not end, theIranian program. The MFA's office director for the Gulfstates noted that potential target sites are well dispersedthroughout the country, with several located in built-upcivilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russianassistance in restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and saidthat any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russiancasualties and endanger Moscow's cooperation.

14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets

and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raiseadditional complications. An Israeli assault wouldnecessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq,they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliationthroughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA andNSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicita strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians,effectively freezing the peace process.

15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military

strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 andthe IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran'sability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks byits regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed thatHizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of

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reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA'soffice director for the Gulf states said that she believedthat Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups inIsrael and the Occupied Territories.

16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also

creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelisfelt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqithreat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranianproblem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, "I donot think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into anIsraeli problem -- it is a matter of concern for the wholeworld."

--------------------------------------------- --Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but ...--------------------------------------------- --

17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic

channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very realconcerns about the feasibility of military strikes againstthe Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has showntime and again that it will act militarily if it believesthat its security is threatened, and the IDF is mostcertainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israelipress reported that in February PM Sharon's Security Cabinethad given "initial authorization" for an attack on Iran. Thepress reports cited an unnamed "Israeli security source," whoclaimed that the USG would "authorize" an Israeli attack.Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparationsfor any military strike. Air defense operations would posenearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Forceactivities preceding any attack. Due to both the extremesensitivity of the issue and the GOI's near inability toprevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held,probably even from many members of PM Sharon's Cabinet.

18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its

interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying atthe highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3effort is on track and backed by a solid international front.We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. positionmay move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we shouldrecognize that Israeli intelligence briefings willunderstandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may notmatch current USG assessments.

*****************************************************************Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

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You can also access this site through the State Department'sClassified SIPRNET website.*****************************************************************KURTZER

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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV64, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-










Discussing cables




07TELAVIV642007-01-08

16:04

2010-11-28

18:06SECRET Embassy Tel Av

VZCZCXRO2156OO RUEHROVDE RUEHTV #0064/01 0081638ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 081638Z JAN 07FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8615INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017TAGS: PRELPTERPGOVISKWBG

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15VISIT TO ISRAEL

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders

have intensified since your last visit and have reached thepoint that there appears to be little coordination or even

dialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we willneed to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring onefaction over another. The divisions at the top here are partof an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruptionallegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growingsense of political failure despite Israel's strong economyand a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks.Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percentin the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across thepolitical spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of publicconfidence in the country's leadership at a time when

Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to facethe threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.

OPTIMISM ERODING----------------

2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis.

The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayedDecember 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipatedunder the weight of reports of a new settlement in the JordanValley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket

attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging onboth sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lackof progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and theunpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubaraksummit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raidin the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians werekilled.

3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the

IDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister ofDefense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of

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coordination between Israel's military and its civilianleadership. When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealingwith Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military ismilitary, civilian is civilian and never the twain shallmeet! Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as apeace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arabwillingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding,and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it willneed to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the

streets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results ofthe Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon warhangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert,Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General StaffHalutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated thatthey will resign if the Commission holds them responsible forserious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert hasrefrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting theresults of several separate investigations involvingcorruption allegations, any one of which could further damagehim severely, if not force his resignation.

4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift

of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's reporthas been allayed by statements by you and the President,there continues to be deep uneasiness here that theBaker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things tocome in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. publicsupport for the Iraq war is eroding and are following withinterest the President's upcoming articulation of therevamped policy, but they are deeply concerned thatIsraeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American

minds to creating a more propitious regional environment forwhatever steps we decide to take to address the deterioratingsituation in Iraq.

5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great

anxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across thepolitical spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threatsto wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear inhis public comments that Israel cannot tolerate anuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphaticallyby opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran to

Nazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments ofIsraeli intelligence, however, there is a range of viewsabout what action Israel should take. The MFA and some ofthe think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined tostate that military action must be a last resort and aretaking a new interests in other forms of pressure, includingbut not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran toabandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however,srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward amilitary strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the

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only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful

TEL AVIV 00000064 002 OF 003

Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Irandid not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland,the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons wouldcompletely transform the Middle East strategic environment in

ways that would make Israel's long-term survival as ademocratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. Thatconcern is most intensively reflected in open talk by thosewho say they do not want their children and grandchildrengrowing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.

LIVNI RISING------------

6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continued

refusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on

polls showing her popularity at over double the level of thePrime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in lateDecember that she would challenge Olmert for the primeministership if he continued not to give her his fullbacking. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline ofher thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead withthe Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement withthe Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serveas the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asadtakes steps to end support for terrorism and distanceshimself from Iran. Livni's policy adviser has confirmed to

us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions withPalestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livnitold Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a finalstatus agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, andtherefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so thatit could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us thatLivni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated.She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concernthat some EU member-states are wobbly on this point.Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she haslittle to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is

she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert).Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become moreserious once the report's preliminary conclusions arereleased next month.

SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA-----------------------

7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria

would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the

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international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand inLebanon. While they see public relations downsides todismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continueto insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syriareduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct stepsto secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas andHizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view byMossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrianintentions. A significant part of the security

establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusionthat it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions --possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and toseek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in thatview by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party andthe Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford torefuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, oftencomparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticizeddecision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then ledto the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 statedthat the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that

he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, atimeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews ofU.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as toclearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions andcapabilities vis a vis Hamas.

PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS----------------------

8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party

leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely

disconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz' telephoneconversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the tworeportedly barely speak to each other. Television newsreports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decidedto remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him withformer Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announcedplans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership inlate May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister's Officealmost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubthere that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much ofthe Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as

Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz'popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor

TEL AVIV 00000064 003 OF 003

members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which theysaw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers tointervene in their party's leadership contest. In any event,the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree

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of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top ofthe GOI.

PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS--------------------------------

9. (C) Notwithstanding the GOI's internal discord, there is

some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI towardimprovements in Palestinian quality of life issues. Despitehis political woes, Peretz has proven himself a seriouspartner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movementand Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady pushby the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reducebarriers to Palestinian movement and to revive thePalestinian economy. Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh,who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emergedas the point man for these efforts. Sneh shares Peretz'conviction that Israel's security stranglehold on thePalestinians is "winning the battle but losing the war," butSneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military

governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit,and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both anintimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combatcommander's credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorelylacks. Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity toexpress appreciation for his and Sneh's efforts and toencourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrantelements in the IDF to heel. The more progress we canachieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier itwill be to achieve meaningful results with both parties inthe coming year.


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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV1114, CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION

LEADER










Discussing cablesIf you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its uniquereference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible bycopying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messagesfor social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash



07TELAVIV11142007-04-18

06:06

2010-11-28

18:06CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy Tel

Aviv

VZCZCXRO8870OO RUEHROVDE RUEHTV #1114/01 1080655ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 180655Z APR 07FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0564

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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001114

SIPDIS

CODELSIPDIS

H PLEASE PASS TO REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017TAGS: PRELPGOVKNNPEFINIRKPALIS

SUBJECT: CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION LEADERBINYAMIN NETANYAHU: ECONOMIC SQUEEZE ON IRAN AND HAMAS;SCENARIOS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT; RIGHT OF RETURN AS ACIDTEST OF ARAB INTENTIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 1086

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

1. (C) Summary. Representative Gary Ackerman (D, New York),

Chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee ofthe House International Relations Committee, accompanied bythe Ambassador, met with Opposition Leader Binyamin Netanyahuat the Knesset April 11. The discussion covered Netanyahu'sideas on how to pressure Iran in order to block its nuclear

program and topple President Ahmadinejad; Netanyahu's viewson dealing with the Palestinians; his critique of PrimeMinister Olmert's handling of the Second Lebanon War; andNetanyahu's analysis of Israel's domestic politicalsituation. On Iran, Netanyahu advocated intensified financialpressures, including a U.S.-led divestment effort focusedlargely on European companies that invest in Iran, as thebest way to topple Ahmadinejad. On the Palestinians,Netanyahu did not object to supporting President Abbas butsaid Israel and the U.S. should first focus more on"strangling" Hamas. Netanyahu asserted that Israel's

mishandling of the Lebanon war had strengthened Israel'senemies. He predicted that Olmert would not be able to stayin power much longer, then described several differentmechanisms for forming a new government. Netanyahu expressedconfidence that the Israeli public recognized that he hadbeen right, that unilateral withdrawals were a mistake, andthat the priority now must be stopping Iran. Netanyahu notedthat he thought dropping the "right of return" was the acidtest of Arab intentions and insisted that he would neverallow a single Palestinian refugee to return to Israel. EndSummary.

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2. (U) House Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee

Chairman Gary Ackerman, accompanied by the Ambassador, PolCouns, Subcommittee Staff Director David Adams, and Staffmember Howard Diamond called on Opposition and Likud PartyLeader Binyamin Netanyahu at the Knesset April 11. Netanyahuwas joined by foreign policy adviser Dore Gold and MFA NorthAmerican Department Congressional liaison Eyal Sela.

Toppling Ahmadinejad--------------------

3. (C) Representative Ackerman told Netanyahu that in his

meeting the day before with Egyptian President Mubarak, hehad asked Mubarak if military action were necessary toprevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, should thestrike be carried out by the U.S. or Israel? Mubarak hadresponded that if it came to that, the U.S. should do it andIsrael should stay out. Netanyahu said he took Mubarak'spoint, but commented that he thought the Iranian regime, orat least President Ahmadinejad, could be toppled by economicpressure, including a divestment campaign. Noting thateconomic sanctions lose their effect over time, but can bepowerful in the short term. The goal should be to encourageAhmadinejad's political rivals to remove him from power.Afterward, if the pressure could be maintained it might bepossible to bring down the entire Iranian regime, but thatwould also entail identifying alternative leaders. The ideawas to use economic pressure to create a public sense ofregime failure. Netanyahu said he had consulted with notedhistorian Bernard Lewis, who believed that Iran would be lessdangerous once Ahmadinejad was removed.

4. (C) Netanyahu said there were three bills in Congress

designed to divest U.S. pension funds from investing in about300, mostly European, companies currently doing business inIran. Divestment would immediately bring down the creditratings of these companies, thus forcing them to respond.Netanyahu urged Congress to support the divestmentlegislation, adding that he also planned to use a visit tothe U.S. to raise the issue with Wall Street fund managers.His approach was to tie in Darfur to expand the scope ofanti-genocide divestment and link it to U.S. policy goals.Netanyahu said he was unsure that financial pressures wouldbe enough to stop Iran's nuclear program, but he wasconfident they would succeed in bringing down Ahmadinejad.He commended Dore Gold's efforts to put Ahmadinejad on agenocide watch list as part of a broader effort todelegitimize the Iranian President. Asked about the qualityof U.S. and Israeli intelligence on Iran, Netanyahu said hisnightmare was that we had missed part of the Iranian program.He added that if the current intelligence was correct, it

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would take Iran a few more years to develop a nuclear weapon.He agreed with Ambassador Jones' assessment that

TEL AVIV 00001114 002 OF 003

Ahmadinejad's announcement of a breakthrough in Iran'scentrifuge program was probably exaggerated. It would becritical, Netanyahu stressed, to target companies investing

in Iran's energy sector.

Bring Down Hamas----------------

5. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked Netanyahu for his views on

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu said Abbaswas a "nice man who means well," but he added that Israel andthe U.S. should focus on "bringing down Hamas" through an"economic squeeze." Netanyahu asserted that eight monthsago, the Hamas government had been on the brink of collapse,

but had become stronger because Israel became weaker as aresult of the Lebanon war. Without elaborating, Netanyahusaid it would be easier to weaken Hamas than to strengthenAbbas.

6. (C) Netanyahu commented that Shimon Peres had admitted to

him that the Oslo process had been based on a mistakeneconomic premise, and as a result European and U.S.assistance to the Palestinians had gone to create a bloatedbureaucracy, with PA employees looking to the internationalcommunity to meet their payroll. Netanyahu predicted thatPalestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he candeliver the money. He suggested putting in place an"economic squeeze with an address," so that Hamas wouldreceive the popular blame. Asked if Fatah knew how toconduct an election campaign, Netanyahu said the Palestinianpatronage system should be forced to collapse, which wouldhave an immediate impact since the entire Palestinian economywas based on graft and patronage. Instead, he asserted, theopposite was happening. Hamas was also handling the prisonerrelease issue well since they had created the impression thatHamas was in control of the process and "sticking it to the

Israelis."

7. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked if Abbas would survive

politically. Netanyahu said he was unsure, since politicswere stressful, especially Palestinian politics. The policy,he added, should be to starve the NUG. If any money isgiven, it should go directly to Abbas. Netanyahu said it wasnot clear the GOI has a policy, there was a general climateof weakness.

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Lebanon War Failures--------------------

8. (C) Turning to the Second Lebanon War, Netanyahu said the

problem was not the war's goals but rather the disconnectbetween goals and methods. If the IDF had used a flankingmove by a superior ground force, it could have won easily.Instead, Israel "dripped troops into their gunsights," anapproach he termed "stupid." The top leadership had lacked asense of military maneuver. In addition, they had beenafraid to take military casualties, but instead got manycivilian casualties. If Olmert had mobilized the reserves inten days, seized ground, destroyed Hizballah in southernLebanon, and then withdrawn, he would be a hero today.Instead, Netanyahu predicted, Olmert will not lastpolitically. Olmert's current public support levels of threepercent were unsustainable.

A New Government?-----------------

9. (C) Netanyahu said the pressure on Olmert was

accumulating as a result of corruption investigations as wellas the impending release of the Winograd Commission's interimreport. Olmert could be pushed out as a result of arebellion within the Kadima Party. Kadima members arerealizing they cannot allow Olmert to stay in power, butKadima itself might collapse since it was a "fake party."Netanyahu described several options, including Kadimareplacing Olmert, a new coalition formed in the Knesset, orNetanyahu's preferred option, new elections. New elections,he stated, are supported by sixty-five percent of the public.Netanyahu insisted he was in no rush since he was "enjoyingthe time with his family" and rebuilding the Likud Party.Likud was reaching thousands of new supporters, includingmany highly educated professionals and high techentrepreneurs, through the internet.

10. (C) Netanyahu asserted there was a growing sense in the

public that he had been right in the last election.

TEL AVIV 00001114 003 OF 003

Unilateral "retreats" (i.e. such as the withdrawals from Gazaand southern Lebanon) were the wrong way to go. Israel hadallowed an Iranian enclave to establish itself in Gaza.Syria was arming itself for the first time in 20 years,Hizballah had rearmed since the war, and Gaza was beingturned into a bunker. Egypt was not doing on a twelve milefront along the Gaza border what Jordan was doing on a150-mile front. The way out was to stop Iran, thereby

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dealing with the octopus, not just its tentacles.

Right of Return the Acid Test-----------------------------

11. (C) Netanyahu stated that a return to the 1967 borders

and dividing Jerusalem was not a solution since furtherwithdrawals would only whet the appetite of radical Islam.Ackerman asked if the Palestinians would accept peace basedon the 1967 lines. Netanyahu said he would not agree to sucha withdrawal since the 1967 lines were indefensible, but headded that the "right of return" was the real acid test ofArab intentions. Instead of Israel making more step-by-stepconcessions, Israel should insist that further concessions belinked to reciprocal steps toward peace. The Palestiniansmust drop the right of return and accept Israel's right toexist. The Arab initiative did not meet this standard sinceit keeps the right of return open. Israel will only have apeace partner when the Palestinians drop the right of return.Asked whether Israel could accept case by case exceptions,

Netanyahu insisted not one refugee could ever return. Israel,after all, was not asking for the right of Jews to return toBaghdad or Cairo.

12. (C) Netanyahu said UNSCR 242 was not a bad formula since

it did not specify precisely from which territories Israelwould withdraw. After the withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon,there was deep disillusionment among Israelis about theprinciple of land for peace. Even the noted Israeli leftistwriter AB Yehoshua had said in a recent interview that hedespaired about peace because the Arabs wanted all of Israel.From 1948 to 1967, the conflict had not been about occupiedterritories, but that point had been obscured by "effectivepropaganda." The root of the conflict was an Arab desire todestroy Israel, which had now become part of the largerambitions of radical Islam.

13. (C) The 1967 borders were not the solution since Israel

was the only force blocking radical Islam's agenda ofoverrunning Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu proposed thatIsrael offer to work with the Saudis against Iran. If Iranwas not stopped, there would be no agreement with thePalestinians, and the peace treaties with Jordan and Egyptwould come under tremendous pressure. There could be nodeterrence against "crazies" such as Ahmadinejad. Netanyahuadvised Congress to expedite the legislative effort fordivestment. If that did not work, we could reconsider otheroptions. Congressman Ackerman said that if Netanyahu came toWashington, he would hold a hearing on divestment.

14. (U) CODEL Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear

this message.

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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2280, APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA

REGION WITH













07TELAVIV22802007-07-26

13:01

2010-11-28

18:06SECRET

Embassy Tel

Aviv

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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY


SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017TAGS: PTERPRELKNNPKWBGEFINIRIS

SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITHMOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (BD).

1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the

President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC),met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a generaldiscussion of regional security threats. On the Iraniannuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic aboutthe effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On most

other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticismregarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that theSyrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and arguedfor a concerted international effort to enforce UNSCresolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria fromIranian influence. In Dagan's personal opinion, presentattempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister SalamFayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with thePalestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyedpolitical developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf,and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand the

challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran--------------------------------------

2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting

with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctionsagainst Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact onthe Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutions

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had been particularly successful through their indirectconsequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranianbusinesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from beingconnected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USGcooperation on this front, and added that domestic economicproblems were creating additional pressure on the regime.

3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the

Iranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" thatthey have mastered the uranium enrichment process. Thereality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and theyare paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for somethingthey have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy inRussia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said theIranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them ofsupporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan'sview, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranianleadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), butthere is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting aretaliatory position against the West and others favoring new

policies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength ofthe moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers ofPresident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to targetsupporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.

--------------------------------------------- -Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran--------------------------------------------- -

4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf

States all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the jobfor them." Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state ofaffairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chiefaccused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "verynegative role." He also pointed to the recent visit of theSaudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first andturning point for relations between the two countries.Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense ofurgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as"a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoyingeveryone." In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides --Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and

some degree of independence. "I think you should remove yourbases from there...seriously," said Dagan. "They haveconfidence only because of the U.S. presence." Daganpredicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the nextcause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders(specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic stepsto shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personallyresponsible for its provocations.

----------------------------

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Syria Taking Dangerous Risks----------------------------

TEL AVIV 00002280 002 OF 003

5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an

Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level ofreadiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention ofattacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliateover even the smallest incident, which could lead to quickescalation. Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliancewith Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad viewsthese policies as both "successful and just." There is atendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran,said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakeningHizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: byenforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts todisarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the

glue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutionswould put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being triedfor the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Haririabove all else. The advantage of such an approach, continuedDagan, is that the legal ground is already in place foraction by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficientlyfrighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural alliesin the Arab League.

---------------------------------------------Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians

---------------------------------------------

6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed

his personal opinion that after more than a decade of tryingto reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians,"nothing will be achieved." Only Israeli military operationsagainst Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expandingcontrol beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatahwould fall within one month and Abbas would join his"mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar. Offering what hebelieved to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6

billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since1994. "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more

people to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan. Although heexpressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said thatthe Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as aparty would have to completely reorganize itself in order toregain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they haveturned once again to the "old guard." The Mossad Chiefsuggested that a completely new approach was required, butdid not provide Townsend any additional details.

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--------------------------------------Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns--------------------------------------

7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour

of the region, comparing notes on countries critical tocombating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled byradical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal ashis biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad"groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once inpossession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do notcare about the well being of states or their image in themedia. "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf inpower," said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended thatQaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on theright track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, saidDagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats andruns foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reasonQaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was

that he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regimechange. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as moreserious, with the south of the country becoming increasinglydangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radicalIslamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues"in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to takelittle interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said thatIslamists there are not of the same cloth as others in theregion, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking downthe secular character of the state and could become moreradical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish military

received more direct support from the United States, it wouldbe better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.


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********************

TEL AVIV 00002280 003 OF 003

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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2652, U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI

MOSSAD













07TELAVIV26522007-08-31

12:12

2010-11-28

18:06SECRET

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017TAGS: PRELPTERMARRMASSKNNPUNSCPKIRIZZP

JO, EG, RS, CH, LE, SY, ISSUBJECT: U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD

CHIEF MEIR DAGAN

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

-------SUMMARY-------

1. (S) In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir

Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support ofIsrael as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU

that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in securityassistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment ofthe Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressingIsrael's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being,(b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and(c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon areunstable with unclear futures ahead of them. Dagan probedfor more detail about XXXXXXXXXXXX U.S. military assistanceto the Gulf states, and -- while signaling agreement with theU.S. approach to the Gulf states vis-a-vis Iran -- cautionedthat

they may not be able to absorb significant military assistance.Dagan reviewed Israel's five-pillar strategy concerningIran's nuclear program, stressed that Iran is economicallvulnerable, and pressed for more activity with Iran'sminority groups aimed at regime change. Dagan urgedcaution in providing assistance to the Siniora government inLebanon, noting Syrian and Iranian efforts to topple the GOL.

2. (S) Under Secretary Burns cited the MOU as tangible

evidence of the USG's commitment to Israel, and stressed thatthe U.S. would support all of its friends -- Arabs included

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-- in the Middle East, and will remain engaged in the regionfor the long term. He described U.S. efforts to support theMusharraf and Karzai governments as they face opposition fromAl-Qaeda and the Taliban, and explained that the GulfSecurity Dialogue is meant to bolster Gulf states facingthreats from Iran. The Under Secretary reviewed U.S. effortsto isolate Iran and increase pressure on it, stressing thatthe U.S. is currently focused on the diplomatic track. Heshared USG thinking about the Siniora government in Lebanon,

and urged that the U.S. and Israel continue to consult onLebanon. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL'S QME--------------------------------------------

3. (S) Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU on

security assistance could not have come at a better time, andstressed that Israel appreciated America's support. TheUnder Secretary agreed about the timing, noting that the

U.S., Israel and like-minded countries were facing multiplethreats around the world, and that the Middle East is a verydangerous region. He said that the MOU serves as a concretereminder that the U.S. stands by its long-term securitycommitments to its friends, and is ready to help them withtheir needs. The Under Secretary noted that the Middle Eastis now at the heart of American interests. Because Egyptalso plays a vital role in the region, the U.S. would alsorenew its security assistance commitment to that country.U.S. relations with the Gulf states were longstanding, andAmerica would stay true to those friendships, as well. The

Under Secretary stressed that the USG is committed toIsrael's QME. He noted that the majority of systems andequipment that the U.S. would sell to Egypt and other Arabpartners would replace items that had been sold to thosecountries in the past.

-------------------------------------------DAGAN REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST, PAKISTAN, TURKEY-------------------------------------------

4. (S) Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in

the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which thefate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another.Dagan then said he was concerned about how long PakistaniPresident Musharraf would survive: "He is facing a seriousproblem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capabilitycould end up in the hands of an Islamic regime." Turning toIran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period.There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani andAhmadinejad and their respective supporters. Instability inIran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic

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minorities. This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities,and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in

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their lifetimes. As for Iraq, it may end up a weak, federalstate comprised of three cantons or entities, one eachbelonging to the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias.

5. (S) Dagan said that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are

concerned about the growing importance of Iran and itsinfluence on them. They are taking precautions, trying toincrease their own military defensive capabilities.Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warnedthat these countries would not be able to cope with theamount of weapons systems they intend to acquire: "They donot use the weapons effectively."

6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down

threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egyptis struggling with the question of who will replace PresidentMubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, andthat Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees onlyinstability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and seesIslamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, ishow long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defenderof Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.

7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough,

Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a"very negative role" in the region. He observed that all ofthese challenges have to be addressed globally -- they couldnot be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as anexample, he noted that the more than one million Iraqirefugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, andforcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. Thisis evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan,which implies greater understanding between the Jordaniansand the Saudis.

----------------------------------------DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE----------------------------------------

8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan

said that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states "isthe right direction to go," especially as they are afraid ofIran. Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor inthe region. Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S.security assistance to America's Arab partners. He expressedconcern, nevertheless, about the current policies of those

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partners -- especially with regards to Syria and Iran. Daganadded that if those countries must choose between buyingdefensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he wouldprefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bringthem closer to the U.S.

9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now

is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, andpointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying toplay all sides. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S.is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issuesfrom a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in aunified way. Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressedunderstanding for Israel's frustration with how the regionlooked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did notengage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation wouldbecome much worse. It is critical to get the Gulf statesfocused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approachto countering it. Encouraging and supporting theircounterproliferation efforts would be crucial. Dagan said he

agreed with this approach, stressing that the threat ofradical Islam is real.

--------------------------------------------- ----IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL'S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY--------------------------------------------- ----

10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the

U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning whenIran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarifiedthat the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetableis purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considersother factors, including the regime's determination tosucceed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still timeto "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iranis making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability:"The threat is obvious, even if we have a differenttimetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a

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nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effortourselves."

11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of

five pillars:

A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iranbefore the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuitof a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged thatpressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone

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will not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetablefor political action is different than the nuclear project'stimetable.

B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed notto discuss this approach in the larger group setting.

C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need toprevent know-how and technology from making their way to

Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.

D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had sofar been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the vergeof collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwideimpact. Ir

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