8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

1/25

1

Economic engagement entrenches neoliberalism- This designates any hindrance

to the market as requiring elimination.

Essex, Windsor political science professor, 2008

(Jamey, The Neoliberalization of Development: Trade Capacity Building and Security at the US

Agency for International Development, Antipode, 40.2, March, ScienceDirect)

The term TCB is relatively new, and is meant to mo ve the international system beyond the impasse between discredited but inst itutionally entrenched

projects of development and aggressive efforts at global trade liberalization. Initially emphasized by developing states in the context of the WTO's 2001

Doha Round of negotiations, TCB has been operationalized in ways that reinforce and extend

neoliberalization, focusing development resources on building political and economic capacity

to participate in liberalized trade and globalizing markets. In this view, the ability to prosper through free trade

drives economic growth and allows the greatest possible flowering of freedom an d democracy. States and civil society must be

brought into line with market mechanismscivil society through active cultivation and states

through limiting their functions to market facilitation and security provision. Phillips and Ilcan

(2004) describe capacity building as one of the primary political technologies through which

neoliberal govermentality is constructed and spatialized. They define neoliberal governance as the ways ofgoverning populations that make individuals responsible for changes that are occurring in their communities, with responsibility exercised and

enforced through markets, which increasingly emphasize skill acquisition, knowledge -generation, and training programs (Phillips and Ilcan 2004:397).

This perspective highlights the ways in which discourses and practices of capacity building

center on the creation and reproduction of social categories that mark off populations as

either responsible members of open, market-based communitiesmoving toward development, or

irresponsible and potentially dangerous outliers (see Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003). Moving from the

latter group to the former depends on acquiring the skills and knowledge that permit

individuals to practice responsible behavior and allow for discipline via the marketplace.

Diffusion of skills, knowledge, and traininginvestments in socialcapitaland human

capitalare the driving forces of neoliberalizing development (Rankin 2004). It is in this context, Jessop ( 2003)points out, that the networks praised by b oth Castells (1996) and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) become a seductive but ultimately empty (a nd even

celebratory) metaphor for understanding and challenging neoliberalization and neoimperialism. A more critical and useful analysis goes beyo nd

recognizing the re-categorization of populations and places along axes of responsibility, a nd, as noted in the above discussion of the strategic -relational

approach to the state, also considers the role of class -relevant social formations and struggles in the expansion and maintenance of political and

economic power. A closer examination of how USAID has instituted TCB, and what this means for state institutions' strategic selectivity relative to

development and securitization, is one way to analyze the process o f neoliberalization and its significance for development and security. For USAID,

adopting TCB comprises one means to revise the agency's mission and align it with th e unique combination of neoliberal and neoconservative doctrines

that dominate US trade and foreign policies. With development understood as a national security issue, USAID and its implementation of TCB have

become central to the US state's articulation of t he relationship between development, trade, and security. In a 2003 report on TCB, USAID (2003b:3)

outlined a three-part framework for enacting successful development through TCB: participation in trade negotiations, implementation of trade

agreements, and economic responsiveness to new trade opportunities. USAID portrays this as the most effective way to incorporate developing states

into processes of globalization. This also poses new challenges for states, firms, and non-governmental organizations, however, as the rewards for

good policies and institutionsand the negative consequences of weak policies and institutionsare greater than ever, while economic globalization

has also created the need for better coordination and harmonization (USAID 2004 b:7). USAID's three-part definition repositions development as a

form of infrastructure, institution, and network building that can ensure the success of trade liberalization efforts. Defining developmentas the successful and total integration of a state and its economy into the fabric of neoliberal

globalization represents a significant change in the cartography of development through

which USAID works, and over which it has great strategic influence. Though national states remain at the heartof this new cartography, USAID development programs now pivot on building state institutions capable (primarily) of enacting and reproducing

neoliberal economic policies within the context of capitalist internationalization. As the agency stated in its 2001 TCB repo rt, US development policy is

committed to working in partnership with developing and transition econo mies to remove obstacles to development, among which are barriers to

trade (USAID 2001:3). The 2003 report likewise singles out trade negotiations as a po werful growth engine for developing countries, so long as they

are supported by sound institutions t hat can ensure transparency and predictability in economic governance, reinforcing ec onomic reforms that are

critical for successful development (USAID 2003b:7). This follows from and reinforces the idea that state-managed foreign aid and assistance, the

staple of past USAID programs, must be supportive of, and no t a substitute for, trade and economic self- help by developing countries. This position

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

2/25

echoes what USAID proclaimed at the development project's height, as discussed above, and relies on the idea that development pro gress is first and

foremost a function of commitment and political will directed at ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and investing in people (USAID 2004b:11).

USAID defines ruling justly as governance in its various dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and abs ence of violence; government

effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption, while investing in people involves bolstering basic education and basic

health services (USAID 2004b:11, fn 8). This language draws from existing discourses o f social capital and state effectiveness long favored by

Washington Consensus institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (Fine 2001; Peet and Hartwick 1999). How closely on-the-ground implementation

of TCB hews to these conceptualizations is rather more problematic. The invocation of political will, just rule, and state

efficiency are hallmarks of neoliberal rhetoric, and suggests that TCB is the latest in a long line

of strategies designed to further capital internationalization and the reproduction of the US-

dominated international state system.Yet the vague, catch-all character of TCB in practice indicates that it is less a fullycoherent strategic blueprint than the repackaging of existing development activities, meant to bring USAID in line with state a nd hegemonic projects

predicated on the neoliberal doctrine of free trade and the neoconservative obsession with security. A USAID official remarked that initial attempts to

institute TCB cast a very wide net: [In the field] you would get these surveys from Washington, and they would say, we're tryi ng to conduct an

inventory of all our trade capacity building activities. And in the beginning and I don't know how this has evolvedbut in the beginning of those

surveys, I mean, it was sort of ludicrous because virtually anything that we were doing in the economic growth sphere could b e described as trade

capacity building (interview with the author, December 2004). The broad practical definition of TCB, coupled with the i ncreased emphasis on

international markets as a means of alleviating poverty and spurring economic development, belies the continuity between the current focus on trade

liberalization and previous development programs. The same USAID official continued: My understanding was that *developed countries] would ask

the developing countries, what do you need in terms of trade capacity building, to get you ready to participate in the WTO and globalized trade

regimes? And they would give these long laundry lists that would run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and the developed countries would go,

whoa, we can't do all this So we started developing these inventories of all our trade capacity building investments , and one of the objectives o f

those inventories was so we could talk to the developing world and tell them, look, we're doing all this stuff in trade capacity building already

(interview with the author, December 2004). Despite this, there are two important changes that have occurred with the agency' s adoption of TCB. The

first relates to the institutional relations through which USAID operates; the second c enters on changing understandings and practices of security and

state weakness. As stated above, the emphasis now placed on ensuring that development isideologically and institutionally subordinate to trade liberalization places the onus for

successful development on responsible states that can adequately facilitate capitalist

accumulation via free trade.This shift has necessitated that USAID alter the character and intensity of the partnerships through whichit plans and implements capacity building and other development programs (see Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, on USAID's subcontracting activities).

This has meant changes in how USAID serves as both site and s trategy for class-relevant social forces institutionalized in and by the state. The most

important partners with which USAID has strengthened or pursued relations to advance capacity building programs have been the Office of the US

Trade Representative (USTR), USDA's trade-focused Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), and internationalizing fractions of capital. TCB therefore must be

analyzed not as technocratic jargon, but as a new means of repro ducing and re-institutionalizing class-relevant social struggles in and through the

national state. The danger USAID faces in so tightly intertwining itself with market-oriented state

institutions and capital arises from the continual narrowing of the agency's strategic

selectivityneoliberal doctrine serves as the basis for agency work, and further

neoliberalization is the intended outcome . The benefit comes in the form of larger budgets and e ven the reproduction ofUSAID itself, and the agency has received large appropriations to implement TCB (see Table 1). While these numbers s till represent a small portion of its

total budget, TCB has moved quickly up the list of agency priorities, and has gained prominence as a gu idepost for continued and intensified

neoliberalization (USAID 2004a). It is important to note, however, that even as USAID funding for TCB projects has steadily i ncreased, the agency's

proportional share of overall US government spending on such activit ies has decreased, due to increases in TCB funding channeled into sect or-specific

trade facilitation activities or into WTO accession, areas where capital and USTR command greater expertise. Geographi cally, USAID has concentrated

TCB funding in states where acceptable neoliberalization is already underway, in areas of geostrategic importance, particularly the Middle East, Eastern

Europe, and the former Soviet Union (USAID 2001:6, 2003c:2), and in those countries eager to engage in free trade agreements. Since 2001, the

agency's TCB funding to countries with which the US is pursuing Free Trade Agreements (Morocco, the Andean Pact, CAFTA, and SACU) more than

tripled, with much of this funding targeted a t building institutions compatible with the requirements of WTO accession or specific features of bilateral

and regional agreements with the US (USAID 2004a).1 This differs from the geopolitical criteria previously underlying USAID d evelopment funding

primarily in that trade policy has moved to the center of agency strategies, though this is complicated by emerging national security discourses focused

on counter-terrorism and failing or failed states. The second strategically and institutio nally important change accompanying USAID's adoption of TCB

rests on the altered relationship between development and security, as outlined in the 20 02 and 2006 NSS. Here, development b olsters weak states

that might otherwise become havens for terrorist and criminal networks, which could then pose a threat to American interests abroad and

domestically. USAID, the State Department, and the White House have therefore identified development, along with defense and diplomacy, as the

three pillars of US security strategies (USAID 2004b:8; White House 2002, 2006). The focus on strengthening weak states in new development

schema demonstrates how the neoliberal understanding of states as rent-s eeking regulatory burdens on market relations becomes strategically

intertwined with the security concerns and objectives of neoconservatism (USAID 2004b:12; on neoconservatism, see Lind 2004). Two points stand out

here. First, recalling that neoliberalization does not only or even primarily imply the r olling back of the state apparatus, the emphasis on TCB demands

that weak states be strengthened by removing trade barriers and making economic and social policy sensitive to liberalized global market signals.

Second, weakness here stems directly from states' inability or unwillingness to properly

insinuate themselves into the networks, flows, and institutions of neoliberal capitalism.

Distanciation and disconnectedness from internationalizing capital is not only economically

wrongheaded, but is the source of political and social weakness, producing insecurity that

threatens continued capitalist accumulation under the rubric of neoliberalization. Roberts, Secor andSparke (2003:889) thus identify an emphasis on enforced reconnection with the global capitalist system, mediated through a whole repertoire of

neoliberal ideas and practices. TCB offers a potential and enforceable technical fix for disconnectedness, as being outside neoliberalization is to be

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

3/25

against neoliberalization, and thus to pose a security risk. USAID Administrator Andre w Natsios made this clear in a May 2003 speech: For countries

that are marginalized, that are outside the international system, that are ou tside development, that are not developing, that are not growing

economically, that are not democratizing, look at the different factors that lead to high risk in terms of conflict. Income level is one of the highest

correlations between marginalized states and risks in terms of conflicts (USAID 2003a:np). The agency's 200 4 White Paper expanded on this to provide

a more detailed strategic framework for development and aid programs, establishing a loose taxono my of states according to the need for

development assistance, the commitment to initiate neoliberalization, and the degree to which states are capable and fair p artners in the use of

development resources (USAID 2004b). This geographic categorization was updated and expanded further with the agency's 2006 Foreign Assistance

Framework, which bases its categories on criteria developed from the Millennium Challenge Cor poration, a new (and thoroughly neoliberal)

development institution established in 2004 (USAID 2006; see Table 2). In these frameworks, USAID identifies relatively weak institutions, particularly

those necessary to establish and maintain market openness an d political stability, as the crux of underdevelopment. Running across such taxonomies isa consideration of strategic states, a designation that depends less on USAID objectives than on the geostrategic and forei gn policy goals of the US

executive and Congress. The agency recognizes that the determination of which developing states are considered strategic is a matter for oth er US

state institutions, but also notes: Increasingly, the primary foreign policy rationale for assistance may be matched by or in distinguishable from the

developmental or recovery objectives. Thus, the strategic allocation of ESF [Economic Support Fund] and like resources will begin to benefit from the

same principles of delineation, selectivity and accountability proposed in this White Paper (USAID 2004b:21).2 Incorporating

developing states into networks of neoliberal globalization is, in this view, the essence of

producing and maintaining security in line with US foreign policy objectives . This understanding of thelink between development, trade, security, and state weakness is echoed in the strategies o f other US state institutions, mos t notably the US Trade

Representative (see US Trade Representative 2001). USAID articulates development progress and improved security in terms of the facilitation of

liberalized market relations by stable developing state institutions. While more candid interviews with USAID officials indicate that not everyone at the

agency is on board with this approach, it has nonetheless become official strategy, and presents a serious contradiction, as development comes to

depend on internationalizing and liberalized market forces, even as these remain dominated by predatory finance capital (Harv ey 2005; McMichael

1999, 2000a). Internationalizing market relations are fundamentally unstable and, as a means of

achieving security outside the narrow concerns of capitalist accumulation, completely

insecure. A brief examination of how food security fits into USAID strategies r egarding trade, security, and state weakness demonstrates this.

Neoliberal engagement of Latin America results in inequality, oppression, and

militarymoral obligation to put those sacrificed at the center of decision

making.Makwana 6(Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html, ZBurdette)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all

barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services.In thisscenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the

few, writes Rajesh Makwana. The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic

globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the

IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global

resource allocation.Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources. There has been much international attention

recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin Americaand

its moral basis is now widely questioned.Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the

neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries. The neoliberal experiment has failed to

combat extreme poverty , has exacerbated global inequality , and is hampering international

aid and development efforts.This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries. Introduction After the SecondWorld War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on t heir government in the US and Europe.

Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and s trengthened the welfare state.

Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and

supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government

intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven

by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive

the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and

affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy. The policies were most ardently enforced in the US

and Europe in the1980s during the ReganThatcherKohl era.These leaders believed that expanding the free-market andprivate ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided

http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.htmlhttp://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.htmlhttp://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.htmlhttp://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

4/25

fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and in fluence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the

world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives. There is a

consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in

most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their

position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank

and WTO),and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from withinmany UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.

There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its

proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some

people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty

who are most in needof financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries

between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere

0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy.

(Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its

economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.) Neoliberalism has also

been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income

inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries.Between 1980 and 1998, theincome of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including

China). The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic

disasters suffered by countries in Latin Americaand South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left

with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial

problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since

rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have

favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the

provision of healthcare and education.They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical

expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world. The dramatic

economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being

demonized by the US.Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger

to freedom and the American way of life, Cuba has been subject to intense US political,

economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and themainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at

Venezuelas president Chavez.This over-reaction by Washington to economic nationalism is

consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past

150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USAs

main economic objective. According to Maria Pez Victor: Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer

than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American

countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any

significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and

expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the regions most vicious dictators such

as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet. As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countriesare forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank a nd IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve globalbusiness opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project

contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model. So influential a re corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered

a Global Compact with the United Nations, the worlds foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of econ omic ideology, it is no coincidence that the

assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same as sumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy. However,

there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the

world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of

barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most

protected in the world.Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign marketsand investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infan t industries. Instead economically

dominant countries are kicking away the ladder to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs. The US and EU also provide huge

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

5/25

subsidies to many sectors of industry. These deva state small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods i n

international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most capitalist countries have increased their

levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has

increased. The requirement is to do as I say, not as I do. Given the tiny proportion of

individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the

economy and what serves the public good is growing fast .Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the

public, and the national s overeignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs. Below we

examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.Economic Growth Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the

commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of

global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP

continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty. Logically, however, a model for continual financial

growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth

in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is

dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each

second by profit hungry corporations. Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in

developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests

that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty,

representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth

addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assess ments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits ofeconomic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the sta tistical measures employed. The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for

corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause

of the growing inequalitiesseen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at

the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are

both likely causes. Free Trade Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its

current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and

their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as

affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures.Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries bylevying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and reven ue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low,

effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development. With this self int erest driving globalization, economically powerful

nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalismthat gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its

implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services,

increased inequality and caused environmental destruction. In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generatingjust 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers

to the tune of 30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be. The General Agreement on Trade and Services

(GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers

to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a governments sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential nat ional services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade

Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and

services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework. These examples represent modern free trade

which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local

economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of

international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of

national and global governance to further the free trade agenda. Liberalization The World Bank, IMF and WTO have

been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied bycorporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global

economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies. According to neoliberal ideology, in order for

international trade to be free all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely

open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing

countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.

Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign

products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which

have artificially low pricesas they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency

speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

6/25

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

7/25

niches (or destroy old ones), commodify social relationships, alter traditional uses of land, water, or natural resources, and shift the scale or locus of

public policymaking. Second, what new social and political actors have emerged, and how do they res pond to the multifaceted changes associated with

market restructuring? Traditional actors may enter into decline, but new ones invariably arise; we must ask, then, how these new actors are

constituted, how they adapt to market oppo rtunities and insecurities, and what strategies they follow when they try to enter the political arena,

redefine the policy agenda, and contest public authority. Third, and finally, to what extent do these actors and t heir responses provide the building

blocks for new paths of social, economic, and political development that might be more equitable and inclusive than those tha t have characterized the

neoliberal era? What lies "beyond neoliberalism" is unlikely to be determined by grand ideological

visions or political blueprints; instead, it will be constructed piece by piece, from below,

through the grassroots participation and decentralized experimentation of new popular

subjects. This volume offers no simple answers to these complex questions, much less a new theory of neoliberal politics. Instead, it offers a seriesof portraits written from a variety of disciplinary perspectives about ho w people adapt and respond-both individually and co llectively-when their

economic moorings shift and the social fabric is torn asunder. These portraits are har dly comprehensive; they do not cover ev ery country in Latin

America, much less all the stations in the region's heterogeneous and fragmented sociocultural landscape. The editors do not claim that the particular

set of actors and issues included in this volume is t he best or the only one that could have been chosen. Nevertheless, we have selected topics based on

their importance and the quality of research they have generated, and we believe our portraits jointly illuminate the diverse experiences of social

actors during the neoliberal era. These portraits provide compelling evidence that capitalism is, as Schumpeter (1950) aptly characterized it, a force of

"creative destruction" that simultaneously breaks down and reconfigures various fields o f social interaction. Our chapters are replete with examples of

the dialectical interplay between capitalism's advance and the social, cultural, and political responses it elicits-tho ugh not, as will become evident, in

the manner classically envisioned by Marx. These responses, whether deliberate or reactive, bear the seeds of what may in fact lie beyond

neoliberalism, a horizon that remains opaque but is increasingly being sketche d by a diverse array of popular movements in the region. As explained

later, the various dimensions of this dialectical interplay lie beyond the scope of any single academic discipline, making an interdisciplinary approach

vital to a more comprehensive understanding. An Integral Approach to Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Response Social and political

changes in Latin America have long been conditioned by patterns of economic development. This can be seen, for example, in the nineteenth-century

association between oligarchic politics and agro-export development models, or in the rise of populist social and political mobilization during the early

stages of industrialization in the middle of the twentieth lower class groups. These demands were typically funneled through the corporatist

intermediary channels of mass party and union organizations, which brokered exchanges between states and organized societal interests. I n short, lSI

encouraged groups-defined primarily in terms of class categories-to self-organize in or der to advance their interests in a policymaking environment

where states increasingly penetrated and regulated social and economic relationships, including labor markets and land tenure arrangements.

Together, these two processes encouraged strong labor and, in some cases, peasant movements to develop, which in turn pro vided a social foundation

for Latin America's first mass party organizations. The social, cultural, and political construct ion of popular subjects duri ng the lSI era was thus anchored

in the favorable combination of rapid industrialization, state interventionism, and social reform. These linkages between state-led industrialization and

grassroots organization were frayed, however, by economic pressures and political polar ization in the 1960s and 1970s (O'Donnell 1973), and they

were largely severed by the debt crisis of the 1980s. While neoliberal structural adjustment policies helped restore economic stability in the aftermath

of the debt crisis, they exacerbated-indeed, they often institutionalized-the s ocial dislocations wrought by the crisis itself. Changes in labor markets -in

particular growing informalization, a greater reliance on subcontracting and temporary labor, and flexible rules for hiring a nd firing-made collective

action in the workplace increasingly difficult to sustain, leading to a sharp decline in tr ade union density in most of the r egion. Likewise, the

parcelization of landholdings and the penetration of market relations in the countryside undermined historic patterns of peasant mobilization for land

reform in much of the region (Kurtz 2004). The retreat of the state subjected new sectors of the economy and so ciety to market discipline, undermining

the rationale and effectiveness of collective action aimed at eliciting state redress . Historic labor-based parties entered into decline or adapted in part

by distancing themselves from labor and other organized mass constituencies. This trend that was propelled both by the struct ural conditions of

neoliberal capitalism and by technological advances in political communication (most prominently, television) that rendered mass party organizations

increasingly dispensable for electoral mobilization. Following the restoration of democratic rule in most of Latin Ameri ca in the 1980s, U.S.-style media-

based advertising and campaign tactics diffused rapidly across the region, allowing candidates to appeal directly to voters without the mediation o f

mass membership party organizations. Latin America entered the new millennium, th en, largely devoid of the mass social and party organizations that

dominated the landscape during the populist/lSI era. Labor movements had been downsized an d politically marginalized, and they were less capable of

representing the diverse interests and identities of a precarious and in formalized workforce. Likewise, where they su rvived at all, mass parties were

transformed into professionalized or patronage-based electoral machines (see, e.g., Levitsky 2003); elsewhere, they were displaced by inde pendent

personalities and populist outsiders. The dominant trends pointed toward a fragment ation and pluralization of civil society-with a multitude of

interests, identities, and decentralized groups struggling to make t heir voices heard (Ox horn 1998a)-and a deinstitutionalization of pol itical

representation, as evidenced by extreme levels of electoral volatility and the rise of personality-based, antiparty candidates. A bottom-up

perspective is thus essential to understand how the demise of lSI and the transition to

neoliberalism realigned the social landscapein ways that disarticulated the class-based popular subjects of the lSI era.

Such a perspective is also essential, however, for explaining popular responses to market

liberalization and the openings that eventually emerged for the construction of new types of

collective subjects that bear the seeds of what may lie beyond neoliberalism.Neoliberal

reforms are directed-indeed, often imposed-by state officials in collaboration with(or under the pressure of)

transnational power centers, but civil society and grassroots actors are hardly passivebystanders(Arce 2005). These actors invariably seek to exploit, resist, evade, or cope with state

initiatives, and their responses often produce outcomes that are quite different from those

envisioned by policymakers and economic elites . In particular, grassroots actors employ a variety of measures to alleviatematerial hardships and reduce exposure to market insecurities; as Karl Polanyi (1944) argues, there are s ocial and political limits to the commodification

of social relationships, and these limits may be quickly breached in contexts of egregious inequalities such as those prevail ing in contemporary Latin

America. Popular responses thus attempt to reweave a social fabric torn by economic crisis and

market dislocation. These responses are often local, decentralized, and territorially based,

building on traditions of communitybased organizing, or focused on ethnic and cultural claims rather than the

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

8/25

class/corporatist patterns of interest representation that were hallmarks of the lSI era. Although new popular subjects may not initially target public

authorities or policymaking arenas, grassroots activism often becomes politicized over time, posi ng the formidable challenge analyzed by Benjamin

Goldfrank in chapter three-that of translating local initiatives into nationallevel political alternatives. This challenge highlights t he importance of a

bottom-up perspective in the construction of new popular subjects in the neoliberal era. The primary objectives of t his volume, then, are to develop an

interdisciplinary perspective on the multiple forms of societal responses to market liberalization and to assess their effects. We do this in four principal

fields where neoliberalism has altered the social landscape: electoral politics, ethnic mobilization, environmental governance, transnational migration.

In each area we explore new patterns of social interaction, identify various responses, and analyze the po tential impact of emerging popular subjects.

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

9/25

2

TEXTTHE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO BINDING

CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

OVER AN OFFER THAT THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENT THE

CROSS-BORDER TRADE ENHANCEMENT ACT

CHINA WILL SAY YES TO EFFORTS TO REDUCE US-MEXICO BORDER COSTS, B/C

IT IMPROVES VALUE OF CHINESE EXPORTS TO MEXICO

[Robert R. Editor, Business Mexico Online Commentary: China sees Mexican

trade deals as stepping stones to other markets; Mexico beware! Business

Mexico Online JUNE 7, 2013 [http://business-mexico-online.com/commentary-china-sees-mexican-trade-deals-as-stepping-stones-to-other-markets-mexico-

beware/]

The price China is likely to exact will be twofold: 1) Using Mexicos numerous free tradeagreements with other countries as a platform to export Mexican-made-or-assembled Chinesegoods around the world, and 2) reducing obstacles and tariffs on Chinese exports. Peas great

mistake is in thinking that Mexico and China are equals It is a mistake for Mexico to buy intothe Chinese propoganda that both countries are in similar situations as developing nations, and soshould work together in a fraternal alliance. China has the second-largest economy in the world,

and is a world power, militarily, economically, politically and commercially. Although Chinamay have many problems similar to those of a developing country, such as pollution and rural

poverty, those are due to decades of obtrusive communist policies and unrestrained governmentdevelopment at all costs. That is very different from the progressive maturity of true developingcountries. Mexico is a true developing nation, struggling to pull itself up by its bootstraps, with

all the advances and stumbles along the way that a poor country trying to democratize tends tosuffer. Peas great mistake is in thinking (at least in public rhetoric, if not in private) that Mexico

and China are equals that can work together to leverage each other into the First World.Undoubtedly China will cold-heartedly pursue its own national interests, and it is Chinese

economic growth rather than Mexican growth that will be Chinas priority. This does not meanthat Mexico will inevitably be harmed by Chinas aggressive international trade policies, but anycarelessness or lack of long-term planning by the Mexican government could cause the Sino-

Mexican relationship to tip dangerously in Chinas favor. Current Mexico-China balance of tradefigures indicate that China exports nearly 10 times more products to Mexico than Mexico exports

to China, so it has to be understood from the outset that any new trade agreements are not startingfrom a level playing field. The agreements reached during Chinese President Xis visit to Mexicothis week reveal some of Chinas underlying interests: 1) Access to Mexican oil to fuel Chinasexpanding economy. 2) Access to the United States market through Mexicos NAFTA agreementwith the United States and Canada. 3) Access to the European Union and other regions and

countries through Mexicos other free trade agreements 4) Reducing the risk of Chinese productsbeing subject to higher tariffs or anti-dumping measures.

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

10/25

GENUINE CONSULTATION ON REGIONALHOTSPOTS NECESSARY TO BUILD A

FRAMEWORK OF TRUST NECESSARY TO SAVE US-SINO RELATIONS, IMPACT IS

WORLD PEACE

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 12

[Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun at the Eighth Lanting Forum of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs Stay committed to peaceful development and win-win

cooperation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: 28

December 2012 Westlaw]China and the United States, one the world's largest developing country and the other the biggest developed one, are also the

two largest economies in the world. That makes their relationship one of the most important yet complex in the world.

Whether the two countries will live amicably with each other is an issue whose significance

goes far beyond the bilateral scope and which concerns peace, stability and prosperity of

the whole world. Some regard it a law of history that there have always been fierce clashes,

at times, conflicts and wars, between an established power and an emerging power. But we

reject such fatalism.In our view, inthis globalized era when countries are inter-dependent with

their interests closely linked, there has been a major shift in international relations. In the faceof frequent global challenges, all countries would want to stick together to meet challenges together and pursue common

development. This is an unstoppable historic trend. Those who go along with it will prosper and

those against it perish. We are sober-minded on this and it is from this perspectivethat we view and

approach China-US relations.We are committed to seeking new answers to old problems

and are determined to foster a new major-country relationship based on mutual respect

and win-win cooperation. What has happened in China-US relations shows that both sides stand to gain fromcooperation and lose from confrontation. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Shanghai Communique

and the resumption of contact between the two countries. China-US relations have entered a stage where

they should no longer have doubts about further growth of this relationship. Over the past 40years, great progress has been made in China-US relations. In particular, the two presidents have reached important

agreement to build a new type of major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, heralding a

new, historic starting point for China-US relations. Two-way trade has surged from nearly zero at the time of resumption ofcontact to 446.6 billion US dollars last year and is expected to exceed 500 billion US dollars this year. The two sides, once in

estrangement and confrontation, now engage in dialogue and cooperation. We have hadthe Strategic and Economic

Dialogues (SandED), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange and a total of more than 90consultation mechanisms covering political, economic, trade, security, defense, scientific,

technological, people-to-people, cultural, energy, the environment and many other fields.

This is not commonly seen in major-country relations and speaks volumes about the

dynamism and potential of China-US relations. More than 3.5 million visits are taking place between the two

countries every year, nearly 10,000 every day on average. The two countries have maintained close

communication and coordination oncounter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and regional

hotspot issues. That being said, China and the United States still differ significantly in social system, development stage,history, culture and tradition and still face major and sensitive issues including Taiwan and Tibet-related issues. These issues,

if not handled properly, will upset or even seriously damage the bilateral relationship. To dispel strategic mistrust

and build a new type of major-country relationship is a demanding task which calls for

unflinching efforts from both sides.At the current stage, I believe it is important for the two countries to do the

following: First, they need to have candid and in-depth communication so as to avoid strategicmisjudgment.China and the United States have maintained close high-level contacts and exchanges through quite anumber of mechanisms of dialogue and communication including the SandED, the Strategic Security Dialogue and the

Consultation on Asia-Pacific Affairs. Given the profoundly changing and complex international and

regional landscape and the growing destabilizing factors and uncertainties, to have in-

depth, candid discussions to find solutions and to strengthen coordination and cooperation

will help reduce mutual suspicion and boost strategic mutual trust.Apart from increasing dialogue,

coordination and cooperation on global issues and international and regional hotspot

issues, it is also important that the two sides truly follow the principle of mutual respect,

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

11/25

understand each other's national condition and public opinion, respect each other's choice

of social system and development path, and refrain from imposing one's own will on the

other side.

THESE REGIONAL HOTSPOTS INCLUDE LATIN AMERICA

Beijing Xinhua 09[Xinhua: 1st Round Sino-US Strategic, Economic Dialogue Concludes in

Washington World News Connection July 29, 2009 Westlaw]IV. On Sino-US Cooperation on International and Regional Issues The two sides discussed the common

international challenges facing the two countries. They were resolved to maintain close

communication and coordination and work together with the rest of the international

community for the settlement of conflicts and reduction of tension that trigger regional and

global instability. The two sides noted that traditional and nontraditional security threats are intertwined, andsituations in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and African require combined efforts. The two sides reaffirmed the

importance of the Six-Party Talks, the continuing efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the

maintaining of peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. They emphasized the importance of implementing UN

Security Council Resolution 1874 and resolving the nuclear issue on the Peninsula through peaceful means. The two sides

agreed to exert greater efforts for the early realization of the aforementioned goals. The two countries also pledged to increasecoordination to jointly promote stability and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They agreed that senior officials from

both countries with responsibilities for Iran and the Middle East should continue to consult closely on these issues. The two

sides expressed their willingness to increase coordination and consultation on the issue of Sudan to jointly seek an early and

enduring political settlement of the Darfur issue and promote the peace process between the north and the south of Sudan.

BOTh sides pointed out their shared opposition to terrorism and pledged to work collaboratively to strengthen global non-

proliferation and arms control regimes. They reiterated their respective nuclear policies and discussed the upcoming 2010

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference and the Conference on Disarmament. The t wo sides also exchanged

views on the Global Nuclear Security Summit proposed by the US side and reiterated the importance of existing dialogues on

security, arms control, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism issues. The two sides intend to further enhance dialogue and

cooperation to combat transnational challenges, such as cross-border crimes, terrorism, the illegal drug trade and piracy. The

two sides agreed to enhance consultation on policy planning, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia,

and Latin America within the Strategic Dialogue framework, with a view to broadening and

deepening cooperation on issues of mutual concern. V. On Mechanism for China-US Strategic and EconomicDialogue The two sides expressed their shared view that the SED will continue to advance China-US relations in tandem with

other existing bilateral mechanisms. The Dialogue represents a major initiative to further developChina-US relations in the new era, and offers an important platform for the two countries to

deepen understanding, enhance mutual trust, and promote cooperation. In order to more fullyexplore shared solutions on a wide range of common challenges, the Chinese and US delegations look forward to further

discussions on specific matters raised at the dialogues through special representatives of the two presidents, working groups,

and existing bilateral dialogues.

OUR IMPACT IS THE BIGGEST EVERY IMPACT SCENARIO CAN BE

SOLVED BY SINO-US RELATIONS

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Beijing Xinhua in English China's official news service for English-

language audiences (New China News Agency)] Xinhua 'Commentary':World Has Every Reason To Closely Watch Obama's China Visit

11/17/09 Westlaw]As American geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski said at a January seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the two countries'

diplomatic ties, China and the United States have become important forces in global political and

economic stability. Since the ice-breaking visit by late U.S. President Richard Nixon to China in 1972 against the

backdrop of the Cold War, bilateral cooperation has expanded to the areas of politics, economy,

military and culture. BOTh countries are aware of the importance of their relations. Though Obama won thepresidential election under the banner of "Change," he decided to keep the U.S.' China policy of communications and

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

12/25

cooperation unchanged, according to Harry Harding, a leading China specialist in the United States who has advised several

presidents. President Hu Jintao also stressed more than once that healthy development of Sino-U.S. relationsis

not only in the fundamental interests of both countries, but isalso conducive to peace, stability and

prosperityinthe Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Given the interwoven relations that China

and the United States share in a global village, both nations see huge potential in seeking

their common interests through expanded cooperation. And major challenges, such as the

global economic downturn, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change, cannot betackled by a single country on its own. Instead, they need the joint efforts of the

international community, where the United States and China, as two influential countries,

should play exemplary roles. Obama's visit to China offered an opportunity for China and the United States to reach

understandings and agreements and seek solutions to a variety of global issues. China served as an important

engine to drive forward global economic recoverywhile the United States saw its economy reverse the

trend of recession in the third quarter of this year. To reinforce the positive economic momentumand

promote global development in a steady, orderly manner, the United States and China need to join hands in the

spirit of mutual support.Among all of the issues, global warming is a problem of immediate

consequence. Earlier this month in Barcelona, representatives from more than 40 small-island countries warned during afive-day convention on climate change that any delay in a solution to the problem would increase the possibility of their homes

being flooded. As the world's two major greenhouse gas emitters, how the United States and

China will cooperate and assume responsibility is a concern with global ramifications.Undoubtedly, China and the United States still,and will always, have disagreements, especially in the

fields of trade, currencies, greenhouse gas emissions, and political and military trust. But disagreements provide

room for talks, improved communications and enhanced cooperation.

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

13/25

3

INTERP - PREDICTIONS MUST HAVE A CLAIM, A WARRANT, AND STRONG DATA

TO GET A DEFAULT 100% PROBABILITY, ANYTHING LESS GETS 0%.

STRONG DATA REQUIRES (1) EXPLICIT DISCLOSURE OF (2) QUANTIFIABLE

RESEARCH METHODS

QUANTIFIABLE RESEARCH METHODS MUST SPECIFY SAMPLE SIZE, THE MODEL

AND VARIABLES USED, T STATISTICS, OLS COEFFICIENTS, R-SQUARED

Wooldridge

02[Jeffrey Professor of Economics, Michigan State University, previously Associate Professor of

Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. Economics, UCSD; Introductory

Econometrics: A Modern Approach 2nd Edition. Pages 150-1]

We end this chapter by providing a few guidelines on how to report multiple regression results

for relatively complicated empirical projects. This should teach you to read published works in

the applied social sciences, while also preparing you to write your own empirical papers. We will

expand on this topic in the remainder of the text by reporting results from various examples, but

many of the key points can be made now. Naturally, the estimated OLS coefficients should

always be reported. For the key variables in an analysis, you should interpret the estimated

coefficients (which often requires knowing the units of measurement of the variables). For

example, is an esti- mate an elasticity, or does it have some other interpretation that needs

explanation? The economic or practical importance of the estimates of the key variables shouldbe discussed. The standard errors should always be included along with the estimated

coefficients. Some authors prefer to report the t statistics rather than the standard errors (and

often just the absolute value of the t statistics). While nothing is really wrong with this, there is

some preference for reporting standard errors. First, it forces us to think carefully about the null

hypothesis being tested; the null is not always that the population parameter is zero. Second,

having standard errors makes it easier to compute confidence intervals. The R-squared from

the regression should always be included. We have seen that, in addition to providing a

goodness-of-fit measure, it makes calculation of F statistics for exclusion restrictions simple.

Reporting the sum of squared residuals and the standard error of the regression is sometimes a

good idea, but it is not crucial. The number of observations used in estimating any equation

should appear near the estimated equation. If only a couple of models are being estimated, theresults can be summarized in equation form, as we have done up to this point. However, in

many papers, several equations are estimated with many different sets of independent

variables. We may estimate the same equation for different groups of people, or even have

equations explaining different dependent variables. In such cases, it is better to summarize the

results in one or more tables. The dependent variable should be indicated clearly in the table,

and the independent variables should be listed in the first column. Standard errors (or t

statistics) can be put in parentheses below the estimates.

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

14/25

THEY DON'T MEETTHEY ARE WEAK DATA

Rosekind 09

[Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D Kevin B. Gregory Alertness Solutions The MoebusAviation Report on "Scientific and Medical Evaluationof Flight Time

Limitations": Invalid, Insufficient, and Risky Alertness SolutionsJanuary 2009]

While the extensive scientific literature on fatigue has definitively established its role in reducing

alertness, performance, and safety, there remains a significant and critical gap in the scientific

data available to address policy issues and provide specific solutions. There are few studies that

have specifically tested an alertness strategy/fatigue countermeasure or compared an

established regulatory policy to an alternative or quantified the benefits of implementing an

Alertness Management Program (AMP)/Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). Regulatory

authorities continually confront this gap between the science establishing fatigue as a significant

safety issue and having data to address policy issues or provide specific solutions in their effortsto address fatigue risks through policymaking. EASA's request for scientific and medical

evaluation of 18 specific flight time limitation questions is one more example of such an effort.

However, the resulting MAR addressing the 18 posed questions is invalid, insufficient, and risky.

The following highlights some of the most significant and relevant issues in each of these areas.

I. Invalid

a. No data. In 13 of the 18 questions posed there is direct acknowledgement that no data is

available to address the question or the data that are cited do not specifically address the

question posed. Therefore, 73% of the questions do not have any data or relevant,appropriate

data to provide an evaluation of the issue identified (e.g., #1, 6, 10, 13).

b. Recommendations without data . Though acknowledging no data or no relevant data are

available, specific recommendations are still made to address the questions posed. The primarytask identified was to provide a scientific and medical evaluation of the questions posed,

however, the MAR goes beyond this tasking to provide specific recommendations intended for

policy making .These recommendations were not data-driven and relied on generalizing from

other information to fill the "data gap" . However, the recommendations are presented in a

manner to suggest that they could be used for data based policies.

c. Subjective data sources . A significant number of the scientific citations used to substantiate

specific points were studies that utilized only subjective , self-reporting measures. Subjective,

self-report measures can be discrepant from objective measures of alertness and performance,

biased, and influenced by varied sources. It is critical that scientific data used as a basis for

policy making be based on objective , measurable outcomes related to performance, relevant

operational variables, behavioral actions,errors, incidents, accidents and appropriate safety

measures. Subjective measures can complement these other varied objective outcomes but are

highly questionable as the exclusive source for an evaluation or recommendation. For example,

the MAR cites previous NASA research related to a subjective survey on sleep quantity and

quality in onboard crew rest/bunk facilities (1). Yet the MAR does not include a complementary

NASA study that included objective physiological measures of sleep quantity and quality in

onboard rest facilities during actual operations involving two different flight patterns and three

different aircraft (2).

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

15/25

d. Ignores operational experience and safety history. While a scientific and medical evaluation of

the 18 questions posed is relevant, equally relevant is the operational experience and safety

history of the activities being addressed. Policy making to address established safety issues

could consider safety data, operational experience, relevant scientific findings, and where

appropriate, economic factors. When the MAR goes beyond scientific and medical evaluation to

make "practical" recommendations, it enters a realm where these other relevant factors (safety

data, operational experience, 'economics, etc.) become significant considerations.

e. No quantification of risk/benefit . In policy-making efforts, it is critical to go beyond

documentation of an effect to quantifying specifics of the risk . Regarding fatigue, this translates

into both quantifying the risk and identifying the specific areas where these risks are expressed.

First, this allows decisions about what specific fatigue-related risks to address and their priorities

. Second, it provides a basis for determining expected,quantifiable benefits and outcomes that

could be measured by implementing policies and activities . The MAR expert panel made an

effort to use this approach in a couple of its responses (e.g., #2, 12). However, the quantification

of risks and subsequent, quantifiable benefits of implementing policies and recommendations

should be the lead issue in addressing all of the questions posed .

THE REASON TO PREFER IS EDUCATIONSTRONG DATA IS KEY TO GOOD

POLICYMAKING

Saks 86

[Michael J. Prof of Law at Arizona State University, cited in a Supreme Court

opinion and thousands of articles. B.A., B.S., Pennsylvania State University,

1969; M.A., 1972; Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1975; M.S.L., Yale Law School,

1983. *63 IF THERE BE A CRISIS, HOW SHALL WE KNOW IT? 46 Md. L. Rev. 63

Fall, 1986]

I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSESOne of the most important aspects of this as well as related earlier articles by Professor Galanter[FN2] and his colleagues [FN3] is that they inquire into the degree to which relevant empirical

evidence supports the claims made concerning a litigation explosion, and they share with us thefindings of that inquiry. The explosion appears to be more rhetorical than real.Those offering wholesale condemnation of our civil justice system, and counseling a variety ofreforms ranging from tinkering to *64 radical alteration, are confident they know a serious

problem exists and, what is more, they know its causes . [FN4] Their language is so strong and

so clear that one hesitates to doubt the accuracy of their vision. But in support of their views, theygenerally offer little more than unsupported assertions or anecdotes , examples of whichProfessor Galanter has cited. Mere assertion is simply that, and repeating something often or

enlarging the chorus does not make it any more true.

As I have noted elsewhere, [FN5] government by anecdote is a bad idea not because theanecdotes are untrue or are not evidence (though sometimes they are untrue and therefore are notevidence), [FN6] butbecause they contribute so little to developing a clear picture of the

situation we are concerned about. It makes a difference if for every ten anecdotes in which anundeserving plaintiff bankrupts an innocent defendant, zero, ten, one hundred, one thousand, orten thousand equal and opposite injustices were done to deserving and innocent plaintiffs . [FN7]

The proportion of cases that results in some sort of error , [FN8] and the ratio of one kind oferror to the other, ought to be of greater interest to a serious policy-maker than a handful of

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

16/25

anecdotes on either side of an issue. After all, the reforms to be adopted are intended to changethat ratio and the tens of thousands of anecdotes it summarizes.

This brings us, then, to the kind of information that should form the core of the debate: data . Ifthe explosion is real and the *65 crisis serious, it should not be difficult to find data confirmingthose fears. In this regard, Professor Galanter makes two important contributions to the liabilitycrisis debate. He summarizes some important data, and he helps us to think about what they

mean. Conscientious policy-makers will be interested to learn that 98% of civil litigation goes onin state courts, that those filings have declined in the past several years, and that even tort filingshave increased only 1 % more than population growth. [FN9] Those urging reform, when they do

point to data, usually point to the 2% of litigation that is handled by federal courts. ProfessorGalanter helps us to interpret the meaning of those federal data, [FN10] which show a 123%increase in filings over the past decade.

First of all, he notes that an increase in filings is not necessarily a reflection of an increase inplaintiffs' litigiousness. Changes in filing rates are equally a reflection of defendants' resistance

to resolving disputes short of litigation. The filing rate reflects, as well, the volume oftransactions, the number of actionable injuries resulting from those transactions, lawyers' case-

screening practices, and, no doubt, numerous othervariables. [FN 1 1] Any real understanding ofwhat is going on requires knowing what lies behind and gives rise to any change (or stability) in

filing rates.Moreover, Professor Galanter shows us that the 123% increase *66 means something other thanappears at first blush. By disaggregating those cases into the categories supplied by the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Professor Galanter finds that it is the federalgovernment itself that has added by far the largest fraction of the increase in litigation, havingincreased its filings (of over-payment recoveries) by 6,683%! [FN12] Except for products

liability (of which one-fourth were asbestos claims, now waning), the federal caseload for tortcases has been fairly stable.

These are but a few illustrations of the way Professor Galanter, and other empirically orientedlegal scholars, force us to deal with the evidence of the world we propose to reshape through lawreform. We need not limit policy debates to a mutually uninformative swapping of anecdotes or a

heated exchange of quotations. In my view, it is enormously helpful to inform ourselves about

our world empirically , and to think intelligently about the alternative interpretations of therelevant empirical data. [FN13]That the topographic map of vociferous reformers is not consistent with the most fundamentalfeatures of the landscape over which they presume to reign should give us all pause. If their

assessment of our conditionthe easiest part of problem-solvingcan be so inconsistent withthe evidence, we might well be hesitant to accept their diagnosis of causes and their prescribedtreatment.

ITS A VOTER FOR PRECEDENT

Sterba 06

[Sonya K. Department of Psychology University of North Carolina at Chapel HillMisconduct in the Analysis and Reporting of Data: Bridging Methodological and

Ethical Agendas for Change ETHICS & BEHAVIOR, 16(4), 305318 2006]In conclusion, ethical and methodological specialists gatekeeping effortsin the area of data

analysis and reporting have remained strikingly disparate and insular to date. They neithercoordinate with each other nor involve the research community in outreach efforts aimed atengendering self-monitoring. Their independent efforts have led to insufficient examinationof the prevalence of overt and covert misconduct, and to inconsistent standards that are

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

17/25

unreliably enforced. Yet the quality control of data analyses and reporting practices is ofprime importance . Thus, I propose three tactics to improve the prevention, detection, and

deterrence of analysis and reporting misconduct that each involve melding of themethodological and ethical arenas. First, psychologists need to better coordinate ethical andmethodological standards pertaining to data analysis and reporting. Publishedmethodological standards can lack the ethical imperative to motivate change, and published

ethical standards can lack the specificity to direct that change. One first step towardcoordinating standard setting across ethical and methodological specialties is offered here.Methodologists could be included on the committees of psychologists who create and reviseresearch ethics codes and who respond to allegations of research ethics misconduct. In turn,committees disseminating methodological guidance, such as the APA Task Force onStatistical Inference, could include psychologists with research ethics expertise to aid in

integrating an ethical perspective. Second, we need to increase app lied researchers access tocoordinated training in quantitative methods and research ethics. This will afford them the

detailed methodological knowledge and the ethical imperative to better selfmonitor theirown analysis and reporting. Specifically, a cross-fertilization of ethics and methods

instruction needs to take place throughout undergraduate and graduate training , and also atthe faculty level. Currently, statistical and methodological courses are typically devoid of

research ethics discussions, and vice versa. In fact, these ethics courses and methods coursesare typically offered in different departments, by faculty members who rarely interact.Faculty guest lectures from the companion discipline can begin to bridge these fields. In

addition, short quantitative workshops (such as those offered by the InteruniversityConsortium for Political and Social Research) and ethics workshops (such as thosesponsored by the APA Ethics Committee) are outlets for reaching researchers who may not

have access to methodological or ethical specialists at their home institutions. (Neither theInteruniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research nor the Ethics Committee

currently lists ethics in data analysis and reporting as a topic area covered in their educationaloutreach efforts.) It is essential that undergraduate and graduate psychology students bemade mindful of the intersection of their methodological practices with ethical imperatives

as they begin to conduct their own investigationsbefore poor habits become ingrained. We

cannot expect students to completely autonomously make the connections between ethicaland methodological imperatives; we need to scaffold them in this endeavor. This type ofblended educational effort would increase the pool of journal and grant reviewers qualified todetect and enforce standards for analysis and reporting conduct. This, in turn, would render

the field s examination of data analysis and reporting practices more pervasive and morereliable . Third, psychologists need to more consistently implement strategies for preventingand deterring data analysis and reporting misconduct. Random auditing of analyses inarticles submitted for peer review, and perhaps also systematic surveying of peer reviewsthemselves, are potential preventative deterrents (Kimmel, 1996). These deterrents would

essentially be an expansion of the Codes mandate to keep data available for potentialreanalysis. If an audit of a given analysis reveals errors or discrepancies, the response would

not be to try to determine whether this error was intentional or accidental. Instead, journal

editors and reviewers would take it as their responsibility to inform authors of the ethical ormethodological standards that were violated and issue a penaltysuch as a request forreanalysis or replicationregardless of intent. This removes some of the professionalhesitancy, fear of reprisals, and time involved in trying to prove intentional misconduct. This

suggestion is in line with Snows (1959) argumentthat if we do not penalize falsestatements made in error, we open up the way, don t you see, for false statements byintention (quoted in Kimmel, 1996, p. 273).

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

18/25

AND VOTE NEG ON PRESUMPTIONTHE AFFS HARMS AND SOLVENCY HAVE

ZERO PROBABILITY BECAUSE THEY ARE WITHIN THE STATISTICAL MARGIN FOR

ERROR

Zellner 07

[Arnold Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago Philosophy and

objectives of econometrics Journal of Econometrics Volume 136, Issue 2,

February 2007, Pages 331-339]On the relation of science and econometrics, I have for long emphasized the unity of science

principle, which Karl Pearson put forward as follows: the unity of science is a unity of methodsemployed in analyzing and learning from experience and data. The subject matter discipline may

be economics, history, physics, or the like, but the methods employed in analyzing and learning

from data are basically the same. As (Jeffreys, 1957) and (Jeffreys, 1967) expresses the idea,There must be a uniform standard of validity for all hypotheses, irrespective of the subject .Different laws may hold in different subjects, but they must be tested by the same criteria ;otherwise we have no guarantee that our decisions will be those warranted by the data and not

merely of inadequate analysis or of believing what we want to believe . Thus the unity ofscience principle sets the same standards for work in the natural and social sciences. For example,this range of considerations is particularly relevant for those in economics who cross-correlatevariables and assert causation on the basis of such correlations alone (See Zellner (1979a) forconsideration of such tests and of alternative definitions of causality) or those who carelessly test

all hypotheses in the 5% acceptreject syndrome. Also, we must emphasize the importance of ageneral unified set of methods for use in science and the undesirability of unnecessary jargon andad hoc methods.Given that we take the unity of science principle seriously, we may next ask what are the main

objectives of science. As Karl Pearson, Harold Jeffreys, and others state, one of the mainobjectives of science , and I add of econometrics, is that of learning from our experience anddata. Knowledge so obtained may be sought for its own sake, for example, to satisfy our curiosity

about economic phenomena and/or for practical policy and other decision purposes. One part ofour knowledge is merely description of what we have observed; the more important part is

generalization or induction, that is thatpart which ... consists of making inferences from pastexperience to predict future [or as yet unobserved] experience,as Jeffreys puts it.Thus there are at least two components to our knowledge, description and generalization or

induction. While generalization or induction is usually considered to be more important,description plays a significant role in science, including economics. For example, Burns and

Mitchell's monumental NBER study Measuring Business Cycles is mainly descriptive butvaluable in providing general features of business cycles about which others can generalize .While some have damned this work as measurement without theory , the opposite sin of

theory without measurement seems much more serious. In fact there are too manymathematicaleconomic theories which explain no past data and which are incapable of making predictions

about future or as yet unobserved experience. Such economic theories are mathematical denk-spielen and not inductive generalizations to which I referred above. Further, I shall later mentionanother important role for description in connection with reductive inference.

In learning from our experience and data, it is critical that we understand the roles and nature ofthree kinds of inference, namely, deductive inference, inductive inference, and reductiveinference.As regards deductive inference, Reichenbach (1958) explains, Logical proof is called deduction;the conclusion is obtained by deducing it from other statements, called the premises of the

argument. The argument is so constructed that if the premises are true the conclusions must also

8/11/2019 Round 2 1NC

19/25

be true. ... It unwraps, so to speak, the conclusion that was wrapped up in the premises. Clearly,much economic theory is an exercise in deductive inference. However, the inadequacies of

deductive inference for scientific work must be noted. First, traditional deductive inference leadsjust to the extreme attitudes of proof, disproof, or ignorance with respect to propositions. There isno provision for a statement like A proposition is probably true in deductive inference or logic.This is a deficiency of deduction for scientific work wherein such statements are very widely

employed and found to be useful. Second, deduction or deductive inference alone provides noguide for choice among logically correct alternative explanations or theories. As is well known,for any given set of data, there is an infinity of models which fit the data exactly. Deduction

provides no guide for selection among this infinity of models.Thus, there is a need for a type of inference which is broader than deductive inference and whichyields statements less extreme than deductive inference . This type of inference is called

inductive inference by Jeffreys. It enables us to associate probabilities with propositions and tomanipulate them in a consistent, logical way to take account of new information. Deductive

statements of proof and disproof are then viewed as limiting cases of inductive logic whereinprobabilities approach one or zero, respectively.

Jeffreys (1967), who has made major contributions to the development of inductive logic in hisbook Theory of Probability states that inductive inference involves making inferences from past

experience to predict future experience by use of inductive generalizations or laws . And givenactual outcomes, the procedures of inductive inference allow us to revise probabilities associatedwith inductive generalizations or laws to reflect the information contained in new data .

Note that for Jeffreys induction is not an economical description of past data, as Mach suggestedsince Mach omitted the all-important predictive aspect of induction. Further, predictive inductiveinferences have an unavoidable uncertainty associated with them, as Hume pointed out many

years ago. For example, it is impossible to prove, deductively or inductively that generalizationsor laws, even the Chicago quantity theory of money , are absolutely true . Even Newton's laws,

which were considered absolutely true by many physicists in the nineteenth century, havebeen replaced by Einstein's laws. Thus there is an unavoidable uncertainty associated with laws inall areas of science, including economics. Inductive logic provides a quantification of this

uncertainty by associating probabilities with laws and providing logically consistent procedures

for changing these probabilities as new evidence arises . In this regard, probability is viewed asrepresenting a degree of reasonable belief with the limiting values of zero being completedisbelief or disproof and of one being complete belief of proof.For Jeffreys, Bayesian statistics is implied by his theory of scientific method. Thus, Bayesian

statistics is the technology of inductive inference. The operations of Bayesian statistics enable usto make probability statements about parameters values and future values of variables . Also,optimal point estimates and point predictions can be readily obtained by Bayesian methods.Probabilities and/or odds ratios relating to competing hypotheses or models can be evaluatedwhich reflect initial information and sample information. Thus, many inference problems

encountered in induction can be solved by Bayesian methods and these solutions are compatiblewith Jeffreys's theory of scientific method. See, e.g., Berry et al. (1996), Box and Tiao (1973),

DeGroot (1970), Fienberg and Zellner (1975) and (Zellner, 19