RULE 7 ( Digest)

8/9/2019 RULE 7 ( Digest)

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RULE 7

PARTS OF A PLEADING

Section 1. Caption.

The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title

of the action, and the docket number if assigned.

The title of the action indicates the names of the

parties. They shall all be named in the original

complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it

shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on

each side be stated with an appropriate indication

when there are other parties.

Their respective participation in the case shall be

indicated.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February 15,

2000

Topic: Rule 7, Section 1. Caption


This petition for review on certiorari arose from an action for

reformation of instrument and damages originally filed with

the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, the

decision on which was reviewed and reversed by the Third

Division of the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, Supreme

Court reversed the CA and upheld lower RTC s decision.


FACTS:

Petitioners were the registered owners of a 225-square

meter parcel of land located in Antipolo, Rizal and the same

property was mortgaged to Florencio and Nestor Carlos in

the amount of P150,000.00.

About a year later, the mortgage obligation had increased to

P500,000.00 and fearing foreclosure of the property,

petitioners asked their son-in-law, herein private respondent

Ricardo delos Reyes, for help in redeeming their property.

Private respondent delos Reyes agreed to redeem the

property but because he allegedly had no money then for

the purpose he solicited the assistance of private

respondent Josefina Cruz, a family friend of the delos

Reyeses and an employee of the Land Bank of the

Philippines.

It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale

conveying the mortgaged property in favor of private

respondent Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing

loan with Land Bank, using the subject property as collateral.

It was further agreed that out of the proceeds of the loan,

P500,000.00 will be paid to the Carloses as mortgagees, and

any such balance will be applied by petitioners for capital

gains tax, expenses for the cancellation of the mortgage to

the Carloses, transfer of title to Josefina Cruz, and

registration of a mortgage in favor of Land Bank. Moreover,

the monthly amortization on the housing loan which was

supposed to be deducted from the salary of private

respondent Cruz will be reimbursed by private respondent

delos Reyes.

Eventually, Land Bank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of

the Carloses, informing them that Cruzs loan had been

approved and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165009 was

cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 229891 in the

name of Josefina Cruz. The mortgage was discharged.

Now, sometime in 1993, petitioners notified privaterespondent delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the

property but the offer was refused. Aggrieved, petitioners

filed a complaint for reformation of instrument and damages

with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner averred that the

deed was merely a formality to meet the requirements of

the bank for the housing loan, and that the real intention of

the parties in securing the loan was to apply the proceeds

thereof for the payment of the mortgage obligation.

Furthermore, they alleged that the deed of sale did not

reflect the true intention of the parties, and that the

transaction was not an absolute sale but an equitable

mortgage, considering that the price of the sale was

inadequate considering the market value of the subject

property and because they continued paying the real estate

taxes thereto even after the execution of the said deed of

sale.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.

They decided that (1) the Deed of Absolute Sale dated

October 21, 1992 did not reflect the true intention of the

parties, and (2) the transaction entered into between

petitioners and Cruz was not an absolute sale but an

equitable mortgage, considering that the price stated in

the Deed of Absolute Sale was insufficient compared to the

value of the property, petitioners are still in possession of

the property, and petitioners had continued to pay the real

estate taxes thereon after the execution of the said deed of

sale.

CA reversed the above decision, finding that private

respondents were denied due process by the refusal of the

trial court to lift the order of default against them, and that

the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was one of

absolute sale, not of equitable mortgage. Also, the Court

of Appeals found petitioners action for reformation

unmeritorious because there was no showing that the

failure of the deed of sale to express the parties true

intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable

conduct, or accident.It also held the RTC decision to be

constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and distinctly

state the facts and the law on which it is based. Thus,

petitioner brought the case to Supreme Court.


ISSUE:

Whether the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was

one of absolute sale or of equitable mortgage.


RULINGS:

The true arrangement between petitioners and private

respondent Cruz was an equitable mortgage.

Based on the provision found under Article 1602 of the Civil

Code, the Court finds that the true intention between the

parties for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to

convey ownership of the property in question but merely to

secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a

direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to be


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immediately applied to their outstanding mortgage

obligation to the Carloses.

Also, it will be recalled that the instant petition originated as

a complaint for reformation filed before the RTC of Antipolo,

Rizal. The Court of Appeals found petitioners action for

reformation unmeritorious because there was no showingthat the failure of the deed of sale to express the parties

true intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable

conduct, or accident. Indeed, under the facts of the present

case, reformation may not be proper for failure to fully meet

the requisites in Article 1359 of the Civil Code, and because

as the evidence eventually bore out the contested Deed of

Absolute Sale was not intended to reflect the true

agreement between the parties but was merely to comply

with the collateral requirements of Land Bank. However,

the fact that the complaint filed by petitioners before the

trial court was categorized to be one for reformation of

instrument should not preclude the Court from passing

upon the issue of whether the transaction was in fact an

equitable mortgage as the same has been squarely raised

in the complaint and had been the subject of arguments

and evidence of the parties.

Thus, SC held that it is not the

caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that

determine the nature of the action, and the Court shall

grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof

even if no such relief is prayed for.


Sec. 2. The body.

The body of the pleading sets forth its designation,

the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the

relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading.

(a) Paragraphs. - The allegations in the body of a

pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so

numbered as to be readily identified, each of which

shall contain a statement of a single set of

circumstances so far as that can be done with

convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its

number in all succeeding pleadings.

(b) Headings. - When two or more causes of action

are joined, the statement of the first shall be prefaced

by the words "first cause of action," of the second by"second cause of action," and so on for the others.

When one or more paragraphs in the answer are

addressed to one of several causes of action in the

complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words

"answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the

second cause of action" and so on; and when one or

more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to

several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by

words to that effect.

(c) Relief. - The pleading shall specify the relief

sought, but it may add a general prayer for such

further or other relief as may be deemed just or

equitable.

(d) Date. - Every pleading shall be dated.


PHIL CHARTER vs. PNC CORP

G.R. NO. 185066 OCTOBER 2, 2009


FACTS:

Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)

conducted a public bidding for the supply of labor, materials,

tools, supervision, equipment, and other incidentals

necessary for the fabrication and delivery of 27 tollbooths to

be used for the automation of toll collection along the

expressways. Orlando Kalingo (Kalingo) won in the bidding

and was awarded the contract. conducted a public bidding

for the supply of labor, materials, tools, supervision,

equipment, and other incidentals necessary for the

fabrication and delivery of 27 tollbooths to be used for the

automation of toll collection along the expressways. Orlando

Kalingo (Kalingo) won in the bidding and was awarded the

contract.

On November 13, 1997, PNCC issued in favor of Kalingo

Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 71024L for 25 units of tollbooths

for a total of P2,100,000.00, and P.O. No. 71025L for two

units of tollbooths amounting to P168,000.00. These

issuances were subject to the condition, among others, that

each P.O. shall be covered by a surety bond equivalent to

100% of the total down payment (50% of the total cost

reflected on the P.O.), and that the surety bond shall

continue in full force until the supplier shall have complied

with all the undertakings and covenants to the full

satisfaction of PNCC.

Kalingo, hence, posted surety bonds Surety Bond Nos.

27546 and 27547.

Both surety bonds contain the following conditions: (1) the

liability of PCIC under the bonds expires on March 16, 1998;

and (2) a written extrajudicial demand must first be

tendered to the surety, PCIC, within 15 days from the

expiration date; otherwise PCIC shall not be liable

thereunder and the obligee waives the right to claim or file

any court action to collect on the bond.

On March 3, 4, and 5, 1998, Kalingo made partial/initial

delivery of four units of tollbooths under P.O. No. 71024L.

However, the tollbooths delivered were incomplete or were

not fabricated according to PNCC specifications. Kalingofailed to deliver the other 23 tollbooths up to the time of

filing of the complaint; despite demands, he failed and

refused to comply with his obligation under the POs.

On March 9, 1998, six days before the expiration of the

surety bonds and after the expiration of the delivery period

provided for under the award, PNCC filed a written

extrajudicial claim against PCIC notifying it of Kalingos

default and demanding the repayment of the down payment

on P.O. No. 71024L as secured by PCIC Bond No. 27547, in

the amount ofP1,050,000.00. The claim went unheeded

despite repeated demands. For this reason, on April 24,

2001, PNCC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Mandaluyong City a complaint for collection of a sum ofmoney against Kalingo and PCIC.

PCIC, in its answer, argued that the partial delivery of four

out of the 25 units of tollbooth by Kalingo under P.O. No.

71024L should reduce Kalingo's obligation.


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The trial court ruled in favor of PNCC and made no ruling on

PCICs liability under PCIC Bond No. 27546, a claim that was

not pleaded in the complaint.

On appeal, the CA, by Decision of January 7, 2008, held that

the RTC erred in ruling that PCIC's liability is limited only to

the payment of P1,050,000.00 under PCIC Bond No. 27547

which secured the down payment on P.O. No. 71024L. The

appellate court held that PCIC, as surety, is liable jointly and

severally with Kalingo for the amount of the two bonds.


ISSUE:

Whether or not PCIC is liable for payment of the security

bond not alleged in the complaint for collection of money.


HELD:

No.

The issue before us calls for a discussion of a courts basic

appreciation of allegations in a complaint. The fundamental

rule is that reliefs granted a litigant are limited to those

specifically prayed for in the complaint; other reliefs prayed

for may be granted only when related to the specific

prayer(s) in the pleadings and supported by the evidence on

record. Necessarily, any such relief may be granted only

where a cause of action therefor exists, based on the

complaint, the pleadings, and the evidence on record.

Each of the surety bonds issued by PCIC created a right in

favor of PNCC to collect the repayment of the bonded down

payments made on the two POs if contractor Kalingo

defaults on his obligation under the award to fabricate and

deliver to PNCC the tollbooths contracted for.

Concomitantly, PCIC, as surety, had the obligation to comply

with its undertaking under the bonds to repay PNCC the

down payments the latter made on the POs if Kalingo

defaults.

It must be borne in mind that each of the two bonds is a

distinct contract by itself, subject to its own terms and

conditions. They each contain a provision that the surety,

PCIC, will not be liable for any claim not presented to it in

writing within 15 days from the expiration of the bond, and

that the obligee (PNCC) thereby waives its right to claim or

file any court action against the surety (PCIC) after the

termination of 15 days from the time its cause of action

accrues. This written claim provision creates a condition

precedent for the accrual of: (1) PCICs obligation to comply

with its promise under the particular bond, and of (2) PNCC's

right to collect or sue on these bonds. PCICs liability to

repay the bonded down payments arises only upon PNCC's

filing of a written claimnotifying PCIC of principal Kalingos

default and demanding collection under the bond within

15 days from the bonds expiry date. PNCCs failure to

comply with the written claim provision has the effect of

extinguishing PCICs liability and constitutes a waiver by

PNCC of the right to claim or sue under the bond.

The records reveal that PNCC complied with the written

claim provision, but only with respect to PCIC Bond No.

27547.

Under the circumstances, PNCCs cause of action with

respect to PCIC Bond No. 27546 did not and cannot exist,

such that no relief for collection thereunder may be validly

awarded.

Hence, the trial courts decision finding PCIC liable solely

under PCIC Bond No. 27547 is correct not only because

collection under the other bond, PCIC Bond No. 27546, was

not raised or pleaded in the complaint, but for the more

important reason that no cause of action arose in PNCCs

favor with respect to this bond. Consequently, the appellate

court was in error for including liability under PCIC Bond No.

27546.

PNCC might be alluding to Section 2(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of

Court, which provides that a pleading shall specify the relief

sought, but may add a general prayer for such further or

other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under

this rule, a court can grant the relief warranted by the

allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought

by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may

justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with

the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the

complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.

We find PNCCs argument to be misplaced. A general prayer

for "other reliefs just and equitable" appearing on a

complaint or pleading normally enables the court to award

reliefs supported by the complaint or other pleadings, by the

facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by

the parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed

for in the complaint. We cannot, however, grant PNCC the

"other relief" of recovering under PCIC Bond No. 27546

because of the respect due the contractual stipulations of

the parties. While it is true that PCICs liability under PCIC

Bond No. 27546 would have been clear under ordinary

circumstances (considering that Kalingo's default under hiscontract with PNCC is now beyond dispute), it cannot be

denied that the bond contains a written claim provision, and

compliance with it is essential for the accrual of PCICs

liability and PNCCs right to collect under the bond.


Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013


Facts:

On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan ofP45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and

secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square

meter property located in

Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate

ofTitle (TCT) No. V-12296. When the debt became due,

respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand.

BODY OF THE COMPLAINT

The RTC filed a Complaint praying that respondents be

ordered:

(a)To pay [petitioner] the principal obligation of P45,000.00,with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, from 02

March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.

(b) To pay [petitioner] actual damages as may be proven

during the trial but shall in no case be less than P10,000.00;

P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fee, plus P2,000.00 per

hearing as appearance fee.


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(c)To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public

auction of the aforementioned parcel of land, and for the

disposition of the proceeds [thereof] in accordance with

law, upon failure of the

[respondents] to fully pay [petitioner] within the period setby law the sums set forth in this complaint.

(d) Costs of this suit.

Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the

premises are likewise prayed for.

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent

Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny)

Despite the requested extension, however, respondents

failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of

the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed

petitioner

to present her evidence ex parte

The RTC granted petitioners Complaint and awarded a

monthly interest of 5% per annum. Respondents then filed a

Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside

Execution Sale

dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not

agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner

merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her

Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly

interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full

payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of theexorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001

ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.

In an Order dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted

respondents motion and accordingly modified the interest

rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can grant relief not

prayed for in the complaint?


HELD:

NO.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in

the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the

party. They cannot also grant a relief without first

ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due

process considerations require thatjudgments must conform

to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence

presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines

v. Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is

improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief

sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the

opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to

the proposed relief. The fundamental

purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint

must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise

to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the

right to due process of a defendant who

was declared in default than of a defendant who

participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to

the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties

under the Rules.

But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared

in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court

comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by

the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint.

It provides:

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered

against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be

different in kind from that prayed for nor award

unliquidated damages.

The raison dtre in limiting the extent of relief that may be

granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant

would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in

default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a

relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in

the Complaint.

No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the

Rules of Court is to safeguard defendants right to due

process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment.

This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of

due process. It embodies the sporting idea of fair play and

forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant

was not given the opportunity to be heard In the case at

bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not

supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the

evidence on record. The Real

Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include

any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her

Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents

borrowed from her the sum of FORTY -FIVE THOUSAND

PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12%

per annumand sought payment thereof. She did not allege

or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did

she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the

RTCs award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks

basis and disregards due process.

It violated the due process requirement because

respondents were not informed of the possibility that the

RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of

reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting

evidence as they were made to believe that the

complainant [petitioner] was seeking for what she merely

stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be

considered subsumed by petitioners general prayer for


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*o+ther reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the

premises x x x.

To repeat, the courts grant of relief is limited only to what

has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto,

supported by evidence, and covered by the partys cause of

action.

Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or

60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven

during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and

ought to be

equitably reduced in accordance with applicable

jurisprudence. It is understandable for the respondents not

to contest the default order for, as alleged in their

Comment, it is not their intention to impugn or run away

from their just and valid obligation.

Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never

be construed as waiver to contest patently erroneous award

which already transgresses their right to due process, as well

as applicable jurisprudence.


Sec. 3. Signature and address.

Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel

representing him, stating in either case his address

which should not be a post office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by

him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of

his knowledge, information, and belief there is goodground to support it; and that it is not interposed for

delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect.

However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such

deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the

same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended

for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned

pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule,

or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or

fails to promptly report to the court a change of his

address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinaryaction.


Navarro v. Jarson Development, G.R. No. 142627, January

28, 2008


FACTS:

Spouses Mariano

and Estrella Najarro (spouses Najarro), petitioners, are the

registered owners of a residential building constructed onLot 1394-C of the Banilad Friar Lands located on V. Sotto

Street, Cebu City. Respondent Jarson Development

Corporation (JDC), on the other hand, is a corporation

registered and existing under Philippine laws. It is engaged

in the business, among others, of acquiring and managing

real estate, buildings and other

structures. Among JDCs various projects is the develop

ment of RichmondPlaza, a 12-story commercial building

located at Lot 1394-B, also of the Banilad Friar Lands,

adjacent to Lot 1394-C owned by petitioners.Jose

P. Mabugat and Engineer Eliseo C. Galang, respondents, are

the project designer and the project engineer, respectively,

of the Richmond Plaza project.

Sometime in November 1993, respondent JDC

started excavation and construction works on

the Richmond Plaza project. However, during the

excavation, slippages or cave-ins of soil occurred

on Lot 1394-C causing massive cracks on the wall and floor

of petitioners residential building. It became unsafe for

human habitation. Hence, petitioners left the same.On May

26, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 58, Cebu City, a petition for injunction with damages

against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 60680.

Before the start of the hearing on July 1, 1994,

the parties agreed to dispense with the issue of injunction in

view of respondents undertaking to reconstruct petitioners

damaged residential building and to completely restore the

foundation of the soil that caved-in to its original condition.

On August 28, 1995, petitioners filed a motion

for execution of the July 11, 1994 Order. However, it was

denied by the trial court in its Order of November 23,

1995 on the ground that the motion should be resolved

when the case shall be decided.On February 22, 2000, the

Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration.

On December 12, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion

for Entry of Finality of Judgment. Respondents filed their

Opposition thereto alleging that they and their counsel did

not receive a copy of the February 17, 2005 Decision of the

Court of Appeals.

On March 17, 2006, the appellate court rendered

a Resolution granting petitioners Motion for Entry of

Finality of Judgment and declaring that its Decision dated

February 17, 2005 has become final and executory and

ordering that such judgment be entered in the book of

entries of judgments.


ISSUE: WON the decision dated February 17, 2005 has

become final and executory.


HELD: the Court of Appeals found that copies of the Notice

of Judgment and its Decision were sent through registered

mail to petitioners counsel at M.B. MahinayBldg. (3rd

Floor),

F. Sotto St., Cebu City. Said counsel received the same. The

latter admitted that through inadvertence, he did not file

with the Court of Appeals a formal notice of his change of

address.

The Court of Appeals, in granting respondents Motion for

Entry of Finality of Judgment, held:

Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

Sec. 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be

signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in

either case his address which should not be a post office

box.

x x x


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Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs

a pleading in violation of this Rule or alleges scandalous or

indecent matters therein, or fails to promptly report to the

court a change of his address, shall be subject to

appropriate disciplinary action.

Clearly, it is the duty of the counsel to promptly inform the

court of a change of his address. The contention of

defendants-appellants counsel that his failure to inform the

Court of his change of address was due to the fault of his

legal secretary in not including the instant case in the

inventory of his cases is a lame excuse and deserves no

consideration. It has to be stressed that it devolves upon

every counsel to take full responsibility in supervising the

work in his office with respect to all the cases he handles

and he should not delegate this responsibility to his legal

secretary.

x x x

Sad to say, the negligence of defendants-appellants counsel

in failing to inform the Court of his change of address which

resulted to his non-receipt of Our Decision when the same

was served to him in his old address, which is the address of

record when the said judgment was promulgated, binds

defendants-appellants.

x x x

The service of our Decision to defendants-appellants

counsel at his address of record on March 2, 2005 was valid.

It follows that the reglementary period of fifteen days within

which the defendants-appellants may file a motion for

reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari to the

Supreme Court on Our Decision shall be counted from such

date or defendants-appellants had only until March 17, 2005

to file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review on

certiorari to the Supreme Court. Apparently, when

plaintiffs-appellees filed the motion for entry of finality of

judgment on December 12, 2005, Our Decision had already

attained finality as no motion for reconsideration or petition

for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court was ever filed

by defendants-appellants within the reglementary period, or

on or before March 17, 2005.

x x x

Suffice it to state at this point that the Court of Appeals did

not err in granting petitioners motion. They and their

counsel are deemed to have received a copy of its

Decision. Indeed, the latters failure to file with the Court of

Appeals a notice of change of address is fatal to petitioners

case.


Sec. 4. Verification.

Except when otherwise specifically required by law or

rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or

accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant

has read the pleading and that the allegations therein

are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a

verification based on "information and belief," or

upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a

proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned

pleading.


G.R. No. 191906 June 2, 2014

JOSELITO MA. P. JACINTO (Formerly President of F. Jacinto

Group, Inc.),Petitioner,

vs.

EDGARDO* GUMARU, JR.,Respondent.


"When a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond

review",1and "there are no more proceedings to speak of

inasmuch as these were terminated by the satisfaction of

the judgment."2


Facts:

On December 6, 2004, a Decision was rendered in favor of

respondent Eduardo Gumaru, Jr. and against petitioner

Joselito Ma. P. Jacinto and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. Petitioner

and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. filed an appeal with the National

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). However, the appeal

was not perfected for failure to post the proper cash or

surety bond. Thus, the December 6, 2004 Decision became

final and executory. a Writ of Execution was issued in the

labor case. By virtue of such alias writ, real property

belonging to petitioner was levied upon, and was scheduled

to be sold at auction on June 27, 2008 or July 4, 2008. The

Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying petitioners Extremely

Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul Levy on Execution.

Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters June 26,2008 Order

to the NLRC, which, set aside the same. Petitioner went up

to the CA on certiorari, assailing the November 28, 2008 and

July 27, 2009 Resolutions of the NLRC. the CA issued the first

assailed Resolution, which denied and dismiss the petition.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that

a verification signed by counsel constitutes adequate and

substantial compliance under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; verification is merely a formal,

and not jurisdictional, requisite such that an improper

verification or certification against forum-shopping is not a

fatal defect. Petitioner attached a copy of an Affidavit.

attesting that he caused the preparation of the CA Petition,

and that he read the contents of the CA Petition and affirmthat they are true and correct and undisputed based on his

own personal knowledge and on authentic records. In said

Affidavit, petitioner further certified that he has not

commenced any other action or proceeding, or filed any

claims involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court

of Appeals, or any Division thereof, or in any other court,
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tribunal or agency; to the best of his knowledge, no such

other action, proceeding, or claim is pending before the

Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any division thereof, or

in any court, tribunal or agency; if there is any other action

or proceeding which is either pending or may have been

terminated, he will state the status thereof; if he should

thereafter learn that a similar action, proceeding or claim

has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, Court

of Appeals, or any division thereof, or in any court, tribunal

or agency, he undertakes to promptly report the fact within

five days from notice thereof. Petitioner explained further

that he was out of the country, and could not return on

account of his physical condition, which thus constrained

him to resort to the execution of a sworn statement in lieu

of his actual verification and certification as required under

the Rules. Petitioner likewise ratified Atty. Daoss acts done

on his behalf relative to the labor case and the filing of the

CA Petition, and implored the appellate court to reconsider

its November 5, 2009 Resolution and excuse his procedural

oversight in respect of the improper verification and

certification in his CA Petition.

respondent contends that with the dismissal of petitioners

certiorari petition by the CA, it is for all intents and purposes

deemed to have never been filed, and thus may not be

corrected by resorting to a Petition for Review under Rule

45. Respondent reiterates the view taken by the CA that

certiorari under Rule 65 is a prerogative writ that is not

demandable as a matter of right.


ISSUE:whether or not THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT

HAVE DISMISSED THE SUBJECT PETITION


Ruling: The Court finds that the Petition has become moot

and academic.

It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for reasonable or

justifiable reasons he is unable to sign the verification and

certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition, he

may execute a special power of attorney designating his

counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf.

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in

capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already

reflected above respecting noncompliance with the

requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and

certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliancewith the requirement on or submission of defective

verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or

submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally

defective. The court may order its submission or correction

or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are

such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed

with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when

one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the

allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,

and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in

good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-

compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in

verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent

submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to

relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or

presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed

by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those

who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.

Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as

when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common

interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense,

the signature of only one of them in the certification against

forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be

executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. H,

however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-

pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of

Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his

behalf.30 (Emphasis supplied)

However, while the Court takes the petitioner's side with

regard to the procedural issue dealing with verification and

the certification against forum shopping, it nonetheless

appears that the Petition has been overtaken by events. In a

May 24, 2011 Manifestation, respondent informed this

Court that the judgment award has been satisfied in full. The

petitioner does not dispute this claim, in which case, the

labor case is now deemed ended. "It is axiomatic that after a

judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed

terminated once and for all."And "when a judgment has

been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being

the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or

satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces

permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment

debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the

judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.


Mahinay v. Gako, G.R. No. 165338, November 28,2011


Facts:

Constantina H. Sanchez, Josefina H. Lopez and Susan

Honoridez are the registered owners (the owners) of a

parcel of land known as Lot 5. Mahinay filed a


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complaint[11]

for specific performance against the owners and

one Felimon Suarez (Suarez), to compel them to

convey Lot 5 to him. This is based on allegation that the

owners violate Mahinays preferential right by selling the

property to Suarez.

The court ruled in favour of Mahinay. The owners and

Suarez moved for reconsideration.[22] On November 22,

1996, however, the RTC denied the same.

Whereupon, Mahinay filed a Motion to Issue an Order

Directing Sorensen (the current holder of the title) to Turn

Over the title to him. This drew Sorensens Opposition.

On December 12, 2003, Judge Gako issued the assailed

Resolution denying Mahinays motion. Mahinay filed a

reiteratory motion. Apparently persuaded by Mahinays

formulations, Judge Gako granted his Reiteratory

Motion. Soseren appealed.

In a Resolution[55]

promulgated on April 24, 2007, however,

the CA outrightly dismissed Sorensens petition for her

failure to state that the allegations in her petition are true

and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but

also based on authentic records.

Sorensen filed a Motion for Reconsideration[56]

and to

remedy the defect in her petition submitted an Amended

Petition[57]

with corrected verification. But the CA was not

moved by Sorensens subsequent compliance and,

consequently, denied her motion. Hence this petition.


Issue:

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI FOR FAILING TO STATE IN ITS VERIFICATION PORTION

THE PHRASE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AS REQUIRED

IN SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE AS

AMENDED BY AM NO. 00-2-10-SC [E]SPECIALLY SO WHEN

PETITIONER HAD ALREADY FILED AN AMENDED PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI WITH THE CORRECTED VERIFICATION PORTION THIS

TIME CONTAINING THE PHRASE BASED ON AUTHENTIC

RECORDS;


Ruling:

The rule requiring certain pleadings to be verified is

embodied in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It

reads:

SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise

specifically required by

law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or

accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant

has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are

true and correct of hispersonal knowledge or based

on authentic records.


verification based on information and belief, or upon

knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper

verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any

legal importance. It is intended to secure an assurance that

the allegations contained in the pleading are true and

correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have

been made in good faith.[81]

A pleading may be verified by

stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in their

petition and that the same are true and correct based either

on theirpersonal knowledge or authentic records, or based

both on theirpersonal knowledge and authentic

records. While the rule gives the pleaders several ways of

verifying their pleading, the use of the phrasepersonal

knowledge or authentic records is not without any legal

signification and the pleaders are not at liberty to choose

any of these phrases fancifully. Hun Hyung Park v. Eung

Won Choi[82]

teaches us when to properly use authentic

records in verifying a pleading:

*A+uthentic records as a basis for verification bear

significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the

allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in

the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on

the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate,

petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his

personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his

petition before the CA that at the pre-trial conference

respondent admitted having received the letter of demand,

because he (petitioner) was not present during the

conference. Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records

to confirm its veracity.

Nonetheless, the Rules[84]

and jurisprudence on the matter

have it that the court may allow such deficiency to be

remedied. InAltres v. Empleo,[85]

this Court pronounced for

the guidance of the bench and the bar that non-compliance

x x x or a defect [in the verification] does not necessarily

render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order

its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the

attending circumstances are such that strict compliance withthe Rule may be dispensed with in order that the needs of

justice may be served thereby.

Pitted against this test, we sustain the CA for not taking a

liberal stance in resolving Sorensens petition for certiorarias

the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect her substantive

rights.


Vallacar v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2012


Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and

the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No.

T06041348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as

a regular bus driver of petitioner.

On January 27, 1994, respondents husband, Quintin

Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete

City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee,

Teddy Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving

the motorcycle. While approaching a curve at kilometers 59

and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving tenwheeler

cargo truck by crossingover to the opposite lane, which was

then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by

Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction. When the two

vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown from

the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was

thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the

hospital. On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with

reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide in Criminal
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Case No. M1594 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

(MCTC) of ManjuyodBindoyAyungon of the Province of

Negros Oriental. After preliminary investigation, the MCTC

issued a Resolution on December 22, 1994, dismissing the

criminal charge against Cabanilla. It found that Cabanilla was

not criminally liable for the deaths of Catubig and Emperado,

because there was no negligence, not even contributory, on

Cabanillas part.

Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for

Damages against petitioner.

Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that

the proximate cause of the vehicular collision, which

resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the

sole negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook

another vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane of

the road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner

asked for the dismissal of respondents complaint for not

being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of action, as

there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the

selection or supervision of its employee driver.

On January 26, 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision

favoring petitioner. Respondent appealed to the Court of

Appeals. The appellate court held that both Catubig and

Cabanilla were negligent in driving their respective vehicles.

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration

of petitioner.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review.


Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners complaint for damages is

dismissible on the ground of the latters failure to verify the

same.


Rulings:

No. Respondent filed her complaint for damages against

petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the 1964 Rules of Court

was still in effect. Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of

Court provided:

SEC. 6. Verification.A pleading is verified only by an

affidavit stating that the person verifying has read the

pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own

knowledge.

Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon

"knowledge, information and belief," shall be deemed

insufficient.

On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect.

The foregoing provision was carried on, with a few

amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of

Court, viz:

SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically

required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,

verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read

the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and

correct of his knowledge and belief.


verification based on information and belief, or upon



The same provision was again amended by A.M. No.

00210, which became effective on May 1, 2000. It now

reads:

SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically





correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic

records.


verification based on information and belief or upon



The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by

A.M. No. 00210, clearly provides that a pleading lacking

proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading

which produces no legal effect. However, it also just as

clearly states that *e+xcept when otherwise specifically


verified or accompanied by affidavit. No such law or rule

specifically requires that respondents complaint for

damages should have been verified.

In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a

pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule

specifically requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that

require verification are: (1) all pleadings filed in civil cases

under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; (2)

petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the

Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule 41,

Section 2; (3) petition for review of the decision of the

Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42,

Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasijudicial bodies

to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition

for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section

1; (6) petition for annulment of judgments or final orders

and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7) complaint for

injunction under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for

preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under

Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a

receiver under Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for

supportpendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition

for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or

resolutions of constitutional commissions under Rule 64,

Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari,prohibition , and

mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for

quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint forexpropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for

indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the

1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions involving

intra corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of

Procedure on IntraCorporate Controversies; (17) complaint

or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment

under the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and

(18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void


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marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well as

petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code.

In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the

rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional,

requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance

that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are

true and correct and not of mere speculation. When

circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the

correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive

strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of

justice may thereby be served.


Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, September 3,

2012


Facts:

Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered

owners of a parcel of land. The subject parcel of land was

occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993,

as a lessee. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged

that she bought on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of

land from GALIGA.ANGELES, sent a letter to SALVADOR

demanding that the latter vacate the subject property,

which was not heeded by SALVADOR. ANGELES, thru one

Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment in

MeTC.

The complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of

respondent, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the

verification and certification dated October 12, 1994,alleging therein that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact.

There was, however, no copy of any document attached to

the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding the

authority supposedly granted to him.

In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she

alleged, among others, that DIAZ, who filed the complaint

for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from

respondent-appellee ANGELES at the time of filing of the

suit.


Issue:

Effect of Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure

to present proof of his authority to represent respondent

(plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint.


Ruling:

InTamondong v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically

stated that "[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the

plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the

complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint

does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should

dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no

jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff." This ruling

was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper

Insurance Company, where the Court went on to say that

"[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose of the

case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the

subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction

over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be

bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the

court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was

ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire

jurisdiction over the person of respondent [plaintiff before

the lower court]."


Estel v. Diego, G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012


Facts:

The present petition originated from a Complaint for

Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for

Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents

Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. with the

Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Gingoog City,

Misamis Oriental.

Respondents alleged that on April 16, 1991, they entered

into a contract of sale of a 306 square-meter parcel of land

with petitioner; after receiving the amount of P17,000.00 as

downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical

and material possession of the subject property to

respondents and had been in actual, adverse and

uninterrupted possession of the subject lot.

At around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995, petitioner,

together with her two grown-up sons and five other

persons, uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot,

after which they entered its premises and then cut and

destroyed the trees and plants found therein.

Respondents prayed for the restoration of their possession,

for the issuance of a permanent injunction against petitioner

as well as payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs of

suit.

On July 26, 1995, the MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining

Order against petitioner and any person acting in her

behalf.

In her Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and

Counterclaims, petitioner denied the material allegations in

the Complaint contending that respondents were never in

physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted

possession of the subject lot; full possession and absolute

ownership of the disputed parcel of land, with allimprovements thereon, had always been that of petitioner

and her daughter; the agreement she entered into with the

wife of respondent Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. for the sale of the

subject lot had been abrogated; she even offered to return

the amount she received from respondents, but the latter

refused to accept the same and instead offered an

additional amount of P12,000.00 as part of the purchase

price but she also refused to accept their offer; the subject

of the deed of sale between petitioner and respondents and

what has been delivered to respondents was actually Lot 16

which is adjacent to the disputed Lot 19; that they did not

destroy the improvements found on the subject lot and, in

fact, any improvements therein were planted by petitioner's

parents.5

On February 16, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision in

favor of the plaintiffs [herein respondents], dismissing

defendant's [herein petitioner's] counterclaim.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog City

and rendered its Decision affirming the assailed Decision of

the MTCC.
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Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA

wherein it affirmed the Decision of the RTC.Petitioner filed a

Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its

Resolution dated August 10, 2006.


Issue:

Whether or not a verification should be based on personal

knowledge or authentic record and not simply upon

knowledge, information and belief.


Ruling :

The Court does not agree.

Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court

again notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC.

Even granting that this matter was properly raised beforethe court a quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural

defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of

respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the

requirement regarding verification.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.

No. 00-2-10-SC provides:

Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically





correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic

records.


verification based on "information and belief" or upon

"knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper


A reading of respondents verification reveals that they

complied with the abovequoted procedural rule.

Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in

the Complaint which were true and correct based on their

personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best"

before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not

violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being

sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations

in the complaint are true and correct based on their

personal knowledge.

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as

in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear

to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition

signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the

petition have been made in good faith or are true and

correct.

The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.


Spoused Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 192615,

January 30, 2013


FACTS:

On January 26, 1999, respondent Bank of the Philippine

Islands (BPI) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, a complaint for collection of

money with prayer for preliminary injunction against the

petitioners. The verification and certification against forum-

shopping attached to the complaint were signed by

Francisco R. Ramos (Ramos), then BPI Assistant Vice-

President and Mindanao Region Lending Head.

On April 22, 1999, the petitioners moved to dismiss BPIs

complaint on the ground that there was a pending action for

foreclosure proceedings before the RTC of Ozamis City, filed

by BPI against Philcompak,. The RTC found that the present

complaint and the pending action for foreclosure

proceedings involved different causes of action; hence, the

RTC denied the petitioners motion to dismiss4and the

subsequent motion for reconsideration.

On May 26, 2008, the petitioners filed another motion to

dismiss, this time, on the ground that there had been a fatal

defect in the verification and certification against forum

shopping attached to BPIs complaint. They argued that the

verification and certification did not state or declare that

Ramos was filing the subject complaint in a representative

capacity or as an authorized officer of BPI; nor did it state

that Ramos was authorized by BPIs Board of Directors to file

the complaint through a board resolution made specifically

for the purpose.

The RTC denied the petitioners second motion to

dismiss9and the subsequent motion for

reconsideration.10

The petitioners assailed these orders of

denial in the petition for certiorari11

they filed with the CA.

In a decision dated February 26, 2010,12

the CA dismissed

the petitioners certiorari petition. The petitioners moved to

reconsider the assailed decision but the CA denied their

motion, hence, the filing of the present petition for review

on certiorari13

with this Court.


ISSUES:

a. whether the CA gravely erred when it affirmed

the RTC in not dismissing BPIs complaint against

the petitioners due to the alleged lack of

authority of Francisco R. Ramos to file the BPI

complaint and sign its attached verification and

certification against forum shopping;

b. whether the Special Power of Attorney and

Corporate Secretarys Certificate that BPI

belatedly submitted constituted substantial

compliance with the requirements under the

rules on verification and certification.


RULING:

We note that, at the time the complaint against the

petitioners was filed, Ramos also held the position of

Assistant Vice-President for BPI Northern Mindanao and was

then the highest official representing the bank in the

Northern Mindanao area.23

This position and his standing in
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12/21

the BPI hierachy, to our mind, place him in a sufficiently high

and authoritative position to verify the truthfulness and

correctness of the allegations in the subject complaint, to

justify his authority in filing the compla int and to sign the

verification and certification against forum shopping.

Whatever is lacking, from the strictly corporate point of

view, was cured when BPI subsequently (although belatedly)

issued the appropriate SPA.1wphi1

In any case, it is settled that the requirements of verification

and certification against forum shopping are not

jurisdictional.24

Verification is required to secure an

assurance that the allegations in the petition have been

made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely

speculative.25

Non-compliance with the verification

requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally

defective,26

and is substantially complied with when signed

by one who has ample knowledge of the truth of the

allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters

alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are

true and correct.27

On the other hand, the certification

against forum shopping is required based on the principle

that a party-litigant should not be allowed to purse

simultaneous remedies in different for a .28

While thecertification requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a

defect in the certification could be cured by its subsequent

correction or submission under special circumstances or

compelling reasons, or on the ground of "substantial

compliance.


Swedish Match v. Treasurer, v. G.R. No. 181277, July

3, 2013


FACTS:

On 20 October 2001, petitioner paid business taxes in the

total amount of P470,932.21. The assessed amount was

based on Sections 14 and 21 of Ordinance No. 7794,

otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, as amended

by Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011. Out of that

amount, P164,552.04 corresponded to the payment under

Section 21.

Assenting that it was not liable to pay taxes under Section

21, petitioner wrote a letter dated 17 September 2003 to

herein respondent claiming a refund of business taxes the

former had paid pursuant to the said provision. Petitioner

argued that payment under Section 21 constituted double

taxation in view of its payment under Section 14.

On 17 October 2003, for the alleged failure of respondent to

act on its claim for a refund, petitioner filed a Petition for

Refund of Taxes with the RTC of Manila in accordance with

Section 196 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The

Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-108163.

On 14 June 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21

of Manila rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 03-108163

dismissing the Petition for the failure of petitioner to plead

the latters capacity to sue and to state the authority of

Tiarra T. Batilaran-Beleno (Ms. Beleno), who had executed

the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

In denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC

went on to say that Sections 14 and 21 pertained to taxes of

a different nature and, thus, the elements of double taxation

were wanting in this case.

On appeal, the CTA Second Division affirmed the RTCs

dismissal of the Petition for Refund of Taxes on the ground

that petitioner had failed to state the authority of Ms.

Beleno to institute the suit.

The CTA En Banc likewise denied the Petition for Review,

ruling as follows:

In this case, the plaintiff is the Swedish Match Philippines,

Inc. However, as found by the RTC as well as the Court in

Division, the signatory of the verification and/or certification

of non-forum shopping is Ms. Beleno, the companys

Finance Manager, and that there was no board resolution or

secretary's certificate showing proof of Ms. Belenos

authority in acting in behalf of the corporation at the time

the initiatory pleading was filed in the RTC. It is therefore,

correct that the case be dismissed.


ISSUE: (Related to the topic RULE 7, SEC. 4 VERIFICATION)

Whether Ms. Beleno was authorized to file the Petition for

Refund of Taxes with the RTC


HELD:

YES. Ms. Belino was authorized to file the Petition for Refund

of Taxes with the RTC.

Anent the procedural issue, petitioner argues that there can

be no dispute that Ms. Beleno was acting within her

authority when she instituted the Petition for Refund before

the RTC, notwithstanding that the Petition was not

accompanied by a Secretarys Certificate. Her authority was

ratified by the Board in its Resolution adopted on 19 May

2004. Thus, even if she was not authorized to execute the

Verification and Certification at the time of the filing of the

Petition, the ratification by the board of directorsretroactively applied to the date of her signing.

On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner

failed to establish the authority of Ms. Beleno to institute

the present action on behalf of the corporation. Citing

Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards

Association of the Philippines (PAL v . FASAP), respondent

avers that the required certification of non-forum shopping

should have been valid at the time of the filing of the

Petition. The Petition, therefore, was defective due to the

flawed Verification and Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping, which were insufficient in form and therefore a

clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Consequently, a verification signed without an authority

from the board of directors is defective. However, the

requirement of verification is simply a condition affecting

the form of the pleading and non-compliance does not

necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court

may in fact order the correction of the pleading if

verification is lacking or, it may act on the pleading although

it may not have been verified, where it is made evident that

strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with so

that the ends of justice may be served.

A distinction between noncompliance and substantial

compliance with the requirements of a certificate of non-

forum shopping and verification as provided in the Rules of

Court must be made.22

In this case, it is undisputed that thePetition filed with the RTC was accompanied by a

Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping signed

by Ms. Beleno, although without proof of authority from the

board. However, the Supreme Court finds that the belated

submission of the Secretarys Certificate constitutes

substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
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13/21

Clearly, this is not an ordinary case of belated submission of

proof of authority from the board of directors. Petitioner-

corporation ratified the authority of Ms. Beleno to represent

it in the Petition filed before the RTC, particularly in Civil

Case No. 03-108163, and consequently to sign the

verification and certification of non-forum shopping on

behalf of the corporation. This fact confirms and affirms her

authority and gives Supreme Court all the more reason to

uphold that authority.


Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.

The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath

in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting

a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed

thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that

he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed

any claim involving the same issues in any court,

tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his

knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending

therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or

claim, a complete statement of the present status

thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the

same or similar action or claim has been filed or is

pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days

therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid

complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements

shall not be curable by mere amendment of the

complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be

cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,

unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after

hearing. The submission of a false certification or

non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein

shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without

prejudice to the corresponding administrative and

criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel

clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum

shopping, the same shall be ground for summary

dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct

contempt, as well as a cause for administrative

sanctions.


Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5,

2014 (Supra.)


THE FACTS

On August 28, 1997, the CA4ruled that among the Plaza

siblings, namely: Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano, and

Barbara, Barbara was the owner of the subject agricultural

land.

The decision became final and executory and Barbara's

successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de

Martinez and Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have continued

occupying the property.

They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from

unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the

subject property.

According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from

Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and

winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of

Butuan on December 27, 1996.

Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was

disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section

89 of the Local Government Code of 1991.5

As Tuazons participation in the sale was void, she could

have not transferred ownership to the petitioners.

Equally important, the petitioners merely falsified the

property tax declaration by inserting the name of the

petitioners father, making him appear as a co-owner of the

auctioned land.

THE RTCS RULING

In its December 14, 1999 order,6the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5, reconsidered its earlier

order,7denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation

of the land be returned to the respondents.

The RTC found that the auction sale was tainted with

irregularity as the bidder was a government employee

disqualified in accordance with Section 89 of the Local

Government Code of 1991.

The petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the

contrary, they were in bad faith for having falsified the tax

declaration they redeemed the property with.

THE CAS RULING

While the petition for review on certiorari was pending

before the CA, the petitioners filed an action for specific

performance8against the City Government of Butuan.

According to the petitioners, they acquired possession and

ownership over the auctioned property when they

redeemed it from Tuazon. The City Government of Butuan

must therefore issue them a certificate of sale .9

The CA, after legal analysis, similarly concluded that for

being disqualified to bid under Section 89 of the Local

Government Code of 1991, Tuazon never obtained

ownership over the pro

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