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Testing the role of accountability in teachers’ school placement decisions: Findings from an experimental study
Sabine Glock Florian Klapproth
Sabine Krolak-SchwerdtMatthias BöhmerUniversity of Luxembourg
This research was funded by Grant C08/LM/02 from the Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg (FNR).
Background• countries with tracking
– tracking is not solely based on achievement levels
– students with low socioecomic status and immigration background are disadvantaged (e.g. Bos et al., 2007; Burton et al., 2004)
Luxembourgish school system
• school types in Luxembourg
– Enseignement secondaire – university entrance
– Enseignement secondaire technique – vocational qualification
– Régime preparatoire – limited vocational qualification
Tracking procedure
• council makes the tracking decision
– primary school teacher (has two votes)– one teacher from each secondary school type– responsible school inspector
• parents have to follow the decision
Tracking procedure
• tracking should be based on performance related cues
– school grades– scores in standardized achievement tests– working and learning habits
Thill, 2001
Theoretical background
• dual process models of impression and judgment formation (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990)
– heuristic judgment formation
– rule-based judgment formation
Theoretical Background
• motivation determines the use of the different strategies
– high motivation rule-based– low motivation heuristic
• accountability moderates motivation (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992; Tetlock & Kim, 1987)
Hypotheses
• teachers with high accountability performance related cues
• teachers with low accountability non-performance related cues
• teachers as a member of the council? non-performance related cues
Accountability manipulation
• three different experimental conditions
– high accountability– low accountability– council condition
material• seven cues
– below or above average school grades– below or above average scores of standardized
achievement tests– positive or negative working and learning habits– positive or negative social behaviour – high or low SES– with or without immigration background - nationality– female or male - gender
Procedure and participants
• procedure
– instruction– reading and judging
each student – tracking decisions
• highest• middle• lowest school track
• participants
– 54 primary school teachers– 38 years old– 14 years of teaching
experience– 31 teachers gave
instructions in the sixth grade
Manipulation check
60
65
70
75
80
85
high council low
perceived accountability in percent
F(2,49) = 3.45, p2 = 0.12, p < .05
Results: school placement decisions
Lowaccountability
Council Highaccountability
school grades 85.18** 31.86** 50.67**
test scores 14.01** 12.32** 10.26**
nationality 3.21** 1.84* 1.68
SES 1.20 1.54 1.53
working and learning habits 2.42* 2.01* 2.81**
social behavior 1.52 1.38 1.50
gender 2.04 2.11 1.56
*p < .10; **p < .05; odds ratios
Discussion
• teachers with low accountability
non-performance related cues • teachers as a member of the council
non-performance related cues• teachers with high accountability
only performance related cues
accountability improved tracking decisions
General Discussion
• high accountability induced rule-based judgment formation
• making teachers aware of the importance of the decision
• introducing the need to justify tracking decisions
• We conducted an experimental study providing minimal information about each student. Thus, our results are limited in their ecological validity. How could validity be improved in experimental settings?
• We provided text information about our students. However, teachers see, hear, and communicate with their students. Do you think that providing information about students in another modality (i.e. video tapes or pictures) would have influenced the results of our study?