Safeguards-by-Design Experiences from New Nuclear Installations · Safeguards-by-Design Experiences...

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN

RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY

Safeguards-by-Design

Experiences from New Nuclear

Installations

Olli Okko

Tapani Honkamaa, Antero Kuusi, Juha Rautjärvi

IAEA, Symposium, November 2010



Safeguards-by-Design Initiative

• Proliferation resistance activities of GEN-IV

and INPRO

• Safeguardability concept

• IAEA TRS 392 “Design Measures to

Facilitate Implementation of Safeguards at

Future Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants”

• Similar experiences from on-going GEN-III

nuclear projects in Olkiluoto, Finland



Nuclear Installations in Olkiluoto

Geological Repository

under construction

New Reactor (OL-3)

under construction

Enlargement of the Spent

Fuel Storage at the NPP



Preliminary Design Information for a New

Nuclear Facility

Preliminary Design Information for new nuclear facilities should

be provided to the Agency "As soon as the decision to

construct or to authorise construction has been taken,

whichever is earlier".

At the authorisation moment, the information is on a very general

level, even the type or location of the facility may be known.

The need to update PDI is obvious, but not well-regulated.



BTC/DI for the Nuclear Facility

Basic Technical Characteristics / Design Information

such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.

As early as possible versus 180/200 days before NM received

Geological Repository (DiP for concept 1983, for site 2001): BTC to be prepared after nuclear licensing, scheduled for 2012, updates to be expected before NM by 2020

OL-3 (DiP 2002): BTC prepared in advance 2008 in order to facilitate C/S measures to take place by 2010 - 2011

Implementation needs early submission of BTC/DI

AP declaration 2a(x) plan => 2a(iii) site with a facility.

National regulators have to understand international safeguards requirements when granting nuclear licenses.



Safeguards for Underground Repository

DiP 2001 by Government

Challenge:

Store the spent fuel

environmentally safely and

non-accessibly forever.

Re-verification is not

possible.

Introduces new

safeguards challenge during

the whole lifetime of the

underground repository.

It is planned to excavate the yellow part

(ONKALO) before nuclear licensing takes

place by 2012; emplacement of NM is

scheduled to begin by 2020.



Planned locations for emplacement areas of the

spent fuel from new reactors in the repository (Environmental Impact Assessment, Posiva 2008)



Safeguards Issues for the Construction of an

Underground Repository

Long life time from research, to construction, operation, disposal and closure

Recommendations generated in the IAEA’s Programme for Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories.

Already at the pre-nuclear phase there are two needs/requirements:

• Verification of the excavated rock space (DIV)

• Credible assurance about the absence of undeclared safeguards-relevant activities at or near the repository.

Site-specific (geological and geographical) challenges:

- Geophysical exploration methods may be adopted for safeguards (geology)

- New surveying techniques e.g. 3-D laser scanning may be applied (geology)

- Visibility in satellite imagery (geography: northern latitudes)

- Continuity of knowledge must be maintained (records owing to geology)

State-specific challenges:

- National licensing and international agreements

- Implementation under the IS framework (state as a whole)



Safeguards during Underground Construction

National safeguards requirements

• to verify that the Repository has

been built as declared by the

operator

• to verify that there are no

undeclared nuclear activities in

Finland

Expected experience: annual changes

in the design to be reported Onkalo layout in 2010

4,3 km (brownish access tunnel)

excavated October 2010



Milestones in Olkiluoto Repository Safeguards

• STUK’s letter to IAEA presenting ”pertinent DI”, November 2003

• IAEA nominates contact person, June 2004

• Underground excavations begin, June 2004

• Finland’s Initial AP Declaration, July 2004

• IAEA delegation visit to Olkiluoto Repository, October 2004

• ...

• Posiva’s responsible person for safeguards approved, July 2005

• Posiva’s Nuclear Material Handbook 2005 (updated 2006 and 2008)

• ...

• Interim reports, AP Declaration updates 2a(x), IAEA visits 2005 ... 2008

• Assignment of MBA code W0LF to ONKALO, January 2008

• ...

• SAGSI: DIQs and ISAs for repositories and conditioning plants, May 2008

• ASTOR: DIQs and ISAs for repositories and conditioning plants, September 2008

• IAEA-COM-FIN-SWE meeting; agreement how to proceed, field trial, December 2008

• ICOM: preparation of DIQ/BTC form Annex for Commission Regulation, January 2009

• FIN: submission of BTC Field Trial, December 2009 => IAEA/COM DIV March 2010

• FIN: repository construction declaration under AP 2a(iii), May 2010 => CA June 2010



Preliminary Design of the Encapsulation Plant



Preliminary Design of the Encapsulation Plant

already Assists the Planning of C/S

Adjustments from 2006 design to 2009 design, to be finalised in

2012 nuclear construction license application and in BTC/DI.



Milestones in Olkiluoto Encapsulation Plant Safeguards

• Decision-in-Principle, i.e. State Authorisation, 2001

• STUK safeguards concept for the final disposal, FINSP Report 2002

• STUK’s letter to IAEA presenting ”basic information”, November 2003

• ...

• Posiva’s responsible person for safeguards approved, July 2005

• Posiva’s Nuclear Material Handbook 2005 (updated 2006 and 2008) Preliminary facility design updates 2006, 2009

• ...

• SAGSI: DIQs and ISAs for repositories and conditioning plants, May 2008

• Safeguards approach and design information to be developed

– Location of the plant not decided yet, transfer route not fixed

– IAEA C/S & NDA requirements are needed for facility design and national licensing

– Construction expected after licensing by 2015



OL-3 Reactor to be Constructed

Decision-in-Principle, i.e., Authorisation 2002

Bidding phase, several reactors reviewed

License application 2003 with preliminary design

Foundation construction works, manufacturing started 2004

Safety assessment, nuclear construction license granted 2005



New OL-3 Reactor under Construction

Safeguards reviewed in the national nuclear safety assessment process

for the competence for non-proliferation control at the new unit

Safeguards milestones during

construction:

-Draft BTC/DI 2007, internal

discussion about missing design of

fuel handling system etc.

-Presentation of draft DI at STUK HQ

in 2007, discussion of missing

approvals for details (to be) designed

- Submission of draft DI, June 2008

- Layout animations for camera

locations and views on site Oct. 2008

- Waiting until the buildings can be

seen and visited on-site

- Site visit March 2010



New OL-3 Reactor under Construction

Lessons learned in 3 years, (at repository in 10-30 years)

-Camera locations readjusted in

reactor building and in fuel building

- Need to penetrations and cables for

safeguards instrumentation

-Fuel identification and transfer routes

difficult to have under continuous C/S,

acceptable solutions discussed

-Additional design for safeguards

instrumentation, unexpected costs,

delays etc. agreed between 5 parties

present

-Early involvement by the safeguards-

authorities in desired



Experience from Nuclear Construction Work

Lessons learned in 3 years at reactor, in 30 years at repository

- Construction begins before

nuclear licensing

- Generation of Design Information

continues during construction and

manufacturing

- Safeguardability and proliferation

resistance should be added to the

design requirements

- All stakeholders should be

addressed for safety, security and

safeguards precautions before

national licensing



Extension of the Spent Fuel Storage Building

Construction project launched for 2009 - 2013

According to Safeguards-by-Design principles?

Our first SbD success story?



Extension of the Spent Fuel Storage Building

Example of “Good Practices” according to Facility Attachment

- Application submitted in due time (December 2009) in order to

have acceptance from all (civil and nuclear) stakeholders.

- Planned changes (3 new SF Pools) in Design Information

presented to the IAEA and EC, site visit arranged March 2010.

- Safeguardability and proliferation resistance addressed.

- Basic application revised March - May 2010.

- Foundations excavated Summer 2010.

- Construction contracted 23 September 2010.

- Detail design to be reviewed and granted during construction.

- Commissioning in 2013.



Nuclear Renaissance? New Facilities to Finland!

Three Decision-in-Principles, i.e. Authorisations, 2010

1. Construction of new

Olkiluoto-4 reactor

2. Expansion of the

underground geological

repository at Olkiluoto

3. Construction of a new

reactor at a new location

in Finland



Prepared for these New Facilities?

Practical implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design Initiative:

1. National legislation: Nuclear Energy Act and Degree updated in 2008

to cover international treaty provisions in the planning, construction and

operation

2. Finnish suggestion to revise IAEA Safety Standard Series (DS414) to

cover 3S in Design, implementation with progress of new facilities.

3. Owing to our experience, next steps will be:

- Selection of site, facility type, vendor and supply organisations

- Construction may start before nuclear licensing

- Generation of Design Information will continue for years

- Safeguardability shall be dealt with safety assessment before national

licensing

Do we have the new cost-efficient, user-friendly safeguards approach ?



New Facilities to Finland:

Opportunity for the practical implementation of the Safeguards-

by-Design Initiative:

Construction of proliferation resistant and safeguardable new facility calls

for new safeguards culture and early co-operation between all

stakeholders as requested both by the NPT and the UN Security

Council.



New Safeguards Culture at all Stakeholders:

SSAC: not only IAEA, State, Operator

The national authorities have the task to control the sub-contracted

design phase to improve security and safeguardability of facilities in

co-operation with the designers, operators, the IAEA and RSSAC

The UN 1540 requires for every State to ensure that export

controls, border controls, material accountancy, physical

protection are efficiently taken care of and calling all States to

develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and

the public regarding their obligations.



Nuclear Renaissance Gives new Perspectives

for Nuclear Business

• Senior Nuclear Project Managers (to be recruited in Sept. 2010)

• X is a global consulting and engineering company dedicated to balanced sustainability. We offer our clients integrated management consulting, total solutions for complex projects and efficient, best-in-class design and supervision. Our in-depth expertise extends to the fields of energy, industry, urban & mobility and water & environment. X has 7000 experts operating in about 50 countries, locally and globally. X's Energy Business Group offers to its Clients a wide range of technical consultancy and engineering services to develop and construct new Power Plants. As there is an increasing demand for these services related to new Nuclear Power Plants both in domestic and global markets, X will in the future have a strong focus on Nuclear Energy.

Designers, manufacturers, supply organisations, etc.

are looking for new international nuclear markets.

Our duty to expand safeguards culture beyond the traditional

SSACs to new stakeholders, like to the Company X below



Safeguards-by-Design

Experiences from New Nuclear Installations

Summary:

The interaction between the IAEA, designers and local regulators is desired

much before the Design Information is available after the authorisation

We should not miss this opportunity to create a proliferation resistant facility,

authorised 2010:

Date post:	05-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	dinhanh
View:	217 times
Download:	1 times

Safeguards-by-Design Experiences from New Nuclear Installations · Safeguards-by-Design Experiences...

Documents