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February 28, 2017 Japan-Norway Hydrogen seminar, ‘‘Collaboration within hydrogen future market and value chain”
Safety assessment of hydrogen refueling stations
Yokohama National University Assistant Professor Junji Sakamoto
Session: Safety, regulations, and standards
Outline
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Current status of HRSs in JAPAN
Accident analysis of HRSs in JAPAN
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Risk identification of HRSs using Hazard identification (HAZID) study
Introduction of SIP Project (cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation promotion Program )
‘‘Safety assessment of energy carrier’’
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Current status of HRSs in JAPAN
Type of energy carrier Off-site On-site
H2 LH2 LPG MCH NH3 These types of HRSs are operated. Laws, regulations and codes are constructed.
These types of HRSs are not still operated.
Laws, regulations and codes are still under construction.
* http://www.netinform.net/H2/H2Stations/H2Stations.aspx?Continent=AF&StationID=-1
Off-site H2 type HRS
Off-site LH2 type HRS
About 80 HRSs*
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SIP (Cross-Ministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion Program)
A. Miyake Research Director, Professor K. Noguchi Professor T. Nakarai Visiting Professor T. Takehana Visiting Professor T. Shibutani Associate Professor N. Kasai Associate Professor K. Saito Lecturer J. Sakamoto Assistant Professor Y. Izato Assistant Professor S. Hienuki Research Fellow J. Nakayama JSPS Research Fellow
Yokohama National University
K. Tsunemi Group Leader S. Kubota Group Leader K. Yoshida Invited senior researcher K. Ono Senior researcher R. Makino Senior researcher T. Saburi Senior researcher
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Hiroshima University M. Fuse Associate Professor M. Tsukai Associate Professor C.Y. Lam Assistant Professor
‘‘Safety assessment of energy carrier’’ (One of SIP project) Period: 2014.09~2019.03 Purpose: To assess the safety of HRSs using new energy carrier Cooperation company: JX Nippon Oil & Energy
① Risk definition ② Risk identification (Risk in HRSs) ④ Risk evaluation
② Risk identification (Risk on transportation of energy carrier)
③ Risk analysis (severity and possibility analysis)
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Purpose and approach
Type of energy carrier Off-site On-site
H2 LH2 LPG MCH NH3 These types of HRSs are operated. Laws, regulations and codes are constructed.
These types of HRSs are not still operated.
Laws, regulations and codes are still under construction. Off-site H2 type HRS Off-site LH2 type HRS
About 80 HRSs*
Clarification of the safety critical elements Identification of the accident scenario
HAZID study, FMEA, HAZOP, ETA, FTA Accident analysis
Contribution of revision of the laws, regulations, and codes
Clarification of the safety issues of current HRSs in Japan
Contribution of construction of the laws, regulations and codes
21 accidents in Japan (2005-2014)
Outline
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1
2
Current status of HRSs in JAPAN
Accident analysis of HRSs in JAPAN
Risk identification of HRSs using Hazard identification (HAZID) study
Introduction of SIP Project (cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation promotion Program )
‘‘Safety assessment of energy carrier’’
2-1
2-2
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Accident analysis of HRSs
In Japan, handling high pressure gas is restricted by High Pressure Gas Safety Act. 1) to regulate the production, storage, sale, transportation and other matters related to the handling of high pressure gases 2) to encourage voluntary activities by private businesses. 3) to secure public safety by preventing accidents and disasters caused by high pressure gases.
Notification report of the leakage accident
When an accident has taken place with respect to the high pressure gas, all who handle high pressure gas shall submit a notification report of the accident to the government (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry).
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Statistical analysis of HRS accidents
Total Accidents (21)
Leakage (19)
Type I (3) Fatigue (3) Design error (3)
Type II (14) Joint (12)
Inadequate torque (7) Inadequate sealing (4) Manufacturing error (1)
Valve (1) Inadequate sealing (1) Seal (1) Inadequate sealing (1)
Type III (2) Operation (1) Human error (1) External factors (1) Natural disaster (1)
Explosion (1) Design error (1) Fracture (1) Fatigue (1) Design error (1)
Japan (2005–2014) Type I: Leakage due to degradations of components Type II: Leakage from flanges, valves and seal Type III: Leakage due to other factors
① Most of the accidents and incidents of HRSs in Japan are leakage. ② Type I leakage is caused by design error (poorly planned fatigue). ③ Type II leakage Japan occurred mainly on screw joints.
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② ③
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Apparatus & parts of HRS accidents
◆Offsite liquid hydrogen
Dispenser
FCV
Compressor Accumulator
LH2 lorry
Filling hose (3)
◆On-site hydrogen
Valve (1) Screw joint (3)
FCV’s filling port (1)
Screw joint (1)
Screw joint (1)
Screw joint (1)
Screw joint (2)
Joint (1)
Joint (1)
Highly compressed hydrogen energy generator (1)
Joint (1)
Screw joint (2)
(Number of incidents)
About 50% of accidents occurred on screw joints.
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Summary of accident analysis
1. Most of the accidents and incidents of HRSs in Japan are leakage.
2. Leakage due to the damage and fracture of main bodies of apparatuses and pipes in Japan is caused by design error, that is, poorly planned fatigue. Considering the present incidents, adequate consideration of the usage environment in the design is very important.
3. Leakage from flanges, valves, and seals in Japan is mainly caused by screw joints. If welded joints are to be used in hydrogen fueling stations in Japan, strength data for welded parts should be obtained and pipe thicknesses should be reduced.
A high-strength austenitic stainless steel (HRX19) was developed.
NEDO (New Energy and industrial technology Development Organization)
Strength data of HRX19 for welded parts has been obtained.
Japanese steel company
Recent developments Screw joint? or welded joint?
Outline
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Current status of HRSs in JAPAN
Accident analysis of HRSs in JAPAN
Risk identification of HRSs using Hazard identification (HAZID) study
Introduction of SIP Project (cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation promotion Program )
‘‘Safety assessment of energy carrier’’
2-1
2-2
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HAZID study and its purpose
Research Conceptual
Design Basic
Design Detailed Design Construction Operation
1) ISO17776, Petroleum and natural gas industries –Offshore production installations– Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment.
HAZID Study FMEA, HAZOP, ETA, FTA
• is a method of qualitative hazard analyses at an early stage in process lifecycle. • helps to detailed risk analyses at later stages. • can effectively eliminate or reduce hazards for inherent safety.
HAZID Study ≒ Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)1)
Process Lifecycle
1. To identify the scenarios 2. To clarify the safety critical elements
Purpose of HAZID Study
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Procedure of HAZID study of HRS
• Representative scenarios are identified. • Safety critical elements are determined.
1 • Definition of a HRS model
2 • Determination of guide words & safety measures
3 • Determination of risk definition
4 • Identification of possible scenarios
5 • Risk evaluation
Output
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Guidewords ① Natural hazard (24 types) ex. Earthquake, Tsunami, Typhoon ② External event hazard (15 types) ex. Airplane crash, Terrorism, Automobile collision ③ Station layout hazard (3 types) ex. Evacuation
④ Process hazard (21 types) ex. Combustible material, Explosion
1 •Definition of a HRS model
2 •Determination of guide words & safety measures
3 •Determination of risk definition
4 • Identification of possible scenarios
5 •Risk evaluation
HAZID study ~2. Determination of guide words & safety measures~
63 guidewords are employed for HAZID study.
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Safety measure Effect Apparatus & parts
1. Material selection Consequence severity (S)
1. High pressure hydrogen equipment 2. High pressure hydrogen pipe
2. Seismic design S All facilities
3. Water drain S 1. Lorry stoppage location 2. Between the hydrogen and gasoline dispensers 3. Between the Public road and HRS
4. Isolation valve Probability (P) 1. MCH system 2. High pressure hydrogen facilities 3. Gasoline facilities 4. Lorry
5. Atmospheric dispersion S Outdoor units and pipes
6. Fire protection wall S 1. Station 2. MCH system
7. Safety barrier S 1. Accumulator 2. High pressure hydrogen compressor
1 •Definition of a HRS model
2 •Determination of guide words & safety measures
3 •Determination of risk definition
4 • Identification of possible scenarios
5 •Risk evaluation
HAZID study ~2. Determination of guide words & safety measures~
20 safety measures are determined for HAZID study.
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Risk definition Probability
1 2 3 4
Improbable (1/1000 years)
Remote (1/100 years)
Occasional (1/30 years)
Probable (1/10 years)
Cons
eque
nce
seve
rity 5 Catastrophic
(Death of third party) High High High High
4 Severe loss (Death of employee and customer)
Middle High High High
3 Major damage (Prolonged hospital treatment)
Middle Middle High High
2 Damage (Medical treatment)
Low Low Middle High
1 Minor damage (Minor injury)
Low Low Low Middle
HAZID study ~3. Determination of risk definition~
1 •Definition of a HRS model
2 •Determination of guide words & safety measures
3 •Determination of risk definition
4 •Identification of possible scenarios
5 •Risk evaluation
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HAZID study ~4. Identification of possible scenarios~
1 •Definition of a HRS model
2 •Determination of guide words & safety measures
3 •Determination of risk definition
4 •Identification of possible scenarios
5 •Risk evaluation
HAZID sheet consists of ① No. ② Guideword ③ Cause ④ Effect ⑤ Risk level without safety measures (Consequence severity, Probability and Risk) ⑥ Safety measures ⑦ Risk level with safety measures ⑧ Additional actions
No. Guideword Cause Effect
Risk level without safety measures Safety
measures
Risk level with safety measures Additional
actions Severity Probability Risk Severity Probability Risk
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Combustible materi
al
Toluene leakage from pipe failure, corrosion, fatigue or hydrogen
embrittlement
1. Toluene leakage
2. Dispersion 3. Ignition 4. Explosion 5. Loss of
people and equipment
5 3 3
(1) Material selection
(2) Flame detector
(3) Isolation valve
(4) Fire protection wall
(5) Safety barrier
(6) Inspection
3 1 2
An example of HAZID sheet
648 scenarios were identified.
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Safety Critical Elements
1 Material selection
2 Seismic design
3 Water drain
4 Isolation valve
5 Atmospheric dispersion
6 Fire protection wall
7 Safety barrier
8 Leak detector
9 Double shell measures
10 Lightning rod
11 Fire detection
12 Safety valve
13 Gas detector
14 Emergency shutdown system
15 Emergency detachable coupler
16 Distance between facilities
17 Ventilation
17 safety critical elements were identified.
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Future work
Consequence severity analysis Possibility analysis
1. Representative scenarios identification
2. Detailed analysis
Blast wave of explosion of H2
Bayesian estimation Thermal radiation of a pool or jet fire of toluene or MCH
FLACS software
ALOHA
Event tree analysis
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Summary
A part of the SIP Project ‘‘Safety assessment of energy carrier’’ was introduced.
The accidents of HRSs in Japan was analyzed. Most of the accidents and incidents of HRSs in Japan are leakage. Leakage due to the damage and fracture of main bodies of
apparatuses and pipes in Japan is caused by design error (poorly planned fatigue).
Leakage from flanges, valves, and seals in Japan is mainly caused by screw joints.
Regarding the HRSs with an on-site hydrogen production system using MCH, a hazard identification study (HAZID study) was conducted. The accident scenarios were identified. The safety critical elements were clarified.
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Thank you for your attention
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