SAF/IARM – Africa Engagement Primer

SAF/IARM – Africa Mission Focus

Cultivating alliances and partnerships to provide complementary capabilities

Capabilities not just defined in terms of aircraft, weapons, sensors, but also… Concepts of Operations Interoperability Training Tactics Logistics Maintenance

Support regional COCOM Campaign Plans Develop and source 1206 proposals Advocate increased IMET priorities Assess capabilities of partner air forces Develop partnerships through FMS cases that result in…

Interoperability Personnel exchanges Aircraft commonality Institutionalized training Access

Developing Air Force Relationships in Africa

Economic challenges: The Poor Most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations lack economies that can support a

robust air force Lack of an industrial base has implications beyond economic vibrancy What limited funds there are usually go to ground forces Lack of industrial base hinders ability to self-sustain air force fleets (LOX,

component repair, machine tools, culture of maintenance) Many SSA air force outsource maintenance, aviation training and air

control functions, some outsource the flying itself An Air Force requires a well-educated populace for its labor pool

Developing Air Force Relationships in Africa

Economic challenges: The Resource Rich Nations that can afford military hardware usually have positive current account

balances from petrol and mineral exports (Chad, Nigeria, Libya, Botswana, RSA, Algeria…)

Such nations have difficulty in reallocation of oil wealth and become systemically unstable (exception: Botswana)

Stability in low Gini Coefficient nations gained through: patronage, repression, or force Modern Air Forces are secondary to strong armies that can be used to

maintain or project power internally Air Forces are often seen as the way to get the Army to the fight or UN-PKO

Developing Air Force Relationships in Africa

Diplomatic challenges: Authoritarian governments Authoritarian nations have position of being able to fund military spending, but must guard

against having same armament used against themselves in a coup Libya 1969, Morocco 1972, Ghana 1979, Chad 1990, Rwanda 1994, Nigeria

Many successful coups led by AF officers Autocratic nations hesitant of weapons that can be turned on own governments Very difficult to get State / Congressional support for military sales to nations with mixed

commitment to human rights, internal development, and sporadic elections (Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Nigeria) Major oil reserves may or may not constitute exceptions (No: Chad, Eq-Guinea Yes: Libya, Nigeria,

Saudi Arabia) China and France will fill gap and enjoy the commercial and strategic ties that ensue Major lost opportunities for US will be felt for decades

Developing Air Force Relationships in Africa

Diplomatic challenges: Democratic governments Democratic African nations wisely are reluctant to fund military as scarce capital

is need for infrastructure, development or IMF requirements Airlift is an exception

Seek independence from contract airlift to UN-PKO (Rwanda, Nigeria) Humanitarian relief and civil transport (Ghana, Botswana) DV transport (Ghana, Ethiopia) Poor roads and vast distances makes airlift best option to move ground forces to

hot spots quickly (Nigeria, Congo, Chad)

Challenges for AF Relationships in Africa

US policies focus must move beyond lens of GWOT GWOT does not sell in Africa…stability does

“With us or against us certitude” works against engagement Moralizing that alienates friends (desire for US to map standards on partners) China offers aircraft at rock-bottom prices and they sell to anyone

US quality, total-package approach, openness, and transparency viewed with favor

Not all nations can pass political litmus test for an FMS relationship State Department is the gatekeeper for engagement Congress has the final approval authority for FMS engagement

Developing Air Force Relationships in Africa

US Opportunities: English is widely spoken (Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, RSA, Botswana,

Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda) US does not have colonial baggage We market a relationship, not airplanes; everyone wants to be associated with

the world's greatest Air Force…aircraft are the centerpiece USAF engagement offers a conduit for military professionalism that can affect an

entire nation Long term training, NCO development, industrial development Flatten Gini Coefficient, civilian rule, national planning

A small investment goes a long way Small aircraft can be purchased on one-year 1206 funds ($2-14M) Small MTTs and JCETs can vector an entire air force (6 SOS, AF/CWIC, NGB-SPP) Refurbishing one C-130 doubles size of some airlift forces (PDM=$1-4M)

Relations with the US are transparent and offer nations to step away from “Dash” Can initiate a culture change away from individual drain to institutional gain

FMS Opportunities in Africa

Airlift C-130, C-27J, C-208

Light Attack AT-6C, F-50 Counter insurgency a problem in Niger Delta, Chadian border Helicopter gunships are the weapon of choice. Why? That's what the Russians and

Chinese market. Expensive to operate and maintain Light attack aircraft are more economical to operate and maintain; offer greater loiter

time and protection Pilot Training

T-6C Most SSA nations do not have organic pilot training (ex: Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria, RSA)

UPT is expensive Most want western-style military training (Ghana, Nigeria) Forces SSA nations to spend on outsourced civil training

Morocco model