SC 77C

SC 77C -- EMC: High PowerTransient Phenomena and SmartGrid Implications

Seattle, USA24 October 2010

Dr. William A. RadaskyChairman IEC SC 77C

Metatech CorporationGoleta, CA USA

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SC 77C

Outline

Introduction to High Power EM (HPEM)

IEC SC 77C Scope

Examples of HEMP and IEMI

Standards Prepared by SC 77C

Smart Grid and HPEM

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SC 77C

Definition of HPEM

High Power Electromagnetics (HPEM) has been defined todescribe high level electromagnetic fields and their effects onsystems, including Lightning EM Pulse fields (sometimes referred to as

LEMP) Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) Radar fields (sometimes referred to as HIRF) EM pulsed fields in power substations due to arcing

events High altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Intentional use of EM weapons against civil systems

(IEMI) The interest in SC 77C is to primarily deal with the threats of

HEMP and IEMI

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SC 77C Comparison of Different Typesof HPEM Environments

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SC 77C

IEC SC 77C Scope - 1

Standardization in the field of electromagneticcompatibility to protect civilian equipment, systemsand installations from threats by man-made highpower transient phenomena including theelectromagnetic fields produced by nucleardetonations at high altitude

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SC 77C

IEC SC 77C Scope - 2

The IEC has been developing High-altitude ElectromagneticPulse (HEMP) standards and reports since 1989 SC 77C was formed in 1991

Initial emphasis was to provide the means to protect civilelectronics equipment from the effects of HEMP generated byhigh-altitude nuclear bursts

Scope of work in SC 77C expanded in June 1999 to includeman-made High Power EM (HPEM) transient threats withemphasis on IEMI

High power in SC 77C refers to radiated fields or conductedvoltages which have the capability to disrupt electronic systems(e.g., greater than 100 V/m or greater than 100 V, respectively)

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SC 77CThe Effects of HEMP (oldtechnology)

First reported during Starfish test conductedby the US in 1962 400 km burst altitude (exo-atmospheric)

and 1 MT yield Above Johnston Atoll (1400 km to Oahu,

Hawaii) In Hawaii from Starfish:

Estimated field strength of 5.6 kV/m• Burglar alarms and air raid sirens went off• Some streetlights extinguished while

others came on• Several fuses blown

Soviet Union exo-atmospheric tests in 1962 Wired communications failures 600 km

from ground zero Damage to power line insulators Diesel generators failed Antenna systems affected Ref: IEC 61000-1-3

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SC 77C

Coupling Paths for RadiatedIEMI Fields

Network

Window

Mobile EMTransmitter

Communication& Data lines

CommercialPower

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SC 77C

Membership of SC 77C

Objective is to provide voluntary standards for civil systems toprotect against man-made high power EM (HPEM) transientsincluding a HEMP event

Secretariat is held by UK: Dr. Richard Hoad is Secretary Chairman is Dr. William Radasky, USA Participating Nations (P-members) -- China, Egypt, Finland,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, Norway,Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland,Thailand, United Kingdom and USA (17)

Observing Nations (O-members) -- Austria, Belgium, Brazil,Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland,Israel, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, andUkraine (16)

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SC 77C

Publications Produced by IEC SC 77C

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SC 77C

HPEM IEC SC 77C StandardsSummary

The IEC has been very active for 20 years in producing basicstandards and other publications dealing with the protection of civilsystems from HPEM (HEMP and IEMI) 20 publications have been produced 2 additional publications are being maintained New projects are being considered

SC 77C is working with the ITU-T to coordinate the HEMP and IEMIprotection of telecommunications centers

Data from SC 77C publications are being used to support thestandardization work in the IEEE and CIGRE

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SC 77C

Smart Grid:Impacts of HPEM on the Power Grid

E1 HEMP (initial part) Damage to power distribution insulators on lines Damage to electronic equipment inside substation buildings and

power plants Damage to building power transformers and telephone panels

in control centers E3 HEMP (last part)

Voltage collapse of the public power grid and damage to EHVtransformers

Impacts due to power harmonics injected into buildings,affecting UPS and backup power systems

IEMI (local threat) Upset and damage to control and communications equipment in

substations Upset and damage to computers in control centers and power

plants

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SC 77C

Impacts of HPEM on Smart Metersand Demand Response

E1 HEMP (initial part) Damage to Smart Meters Damage to electronic appliances inside the home Damage to Smart Grid communications systems

E3 HEMP (last part) Voltage collapse of the public power grid and damage to EHV

transformers resulting in long term power outage Impacts due to power harmonics injected into homes and

offices affecting UPS and backup power systems IEMI (local threat)

Upset and damage to Smart Meters, home appliances andSmart Grid communications systems

Upset and damage to computers in control centers and powerplants

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SC 77C

HEMP Burst Over Ohio

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SC 77C

Large Electric Generation PlantsExposed (10,370 - 74%)

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Smart Grid Implications

Current power grids are vulnerable to a HEMP or IEMI attack In the U.S. efforts are being evaluated to protect the existing

power grid Introduction of more electronic equipment to control the Smart

Grid requires strong EMC and HPEM immunity standards Current home electronics are vulnerable to a HEMP or IEMI

attack, although older non-solid state meters are expected tosurvive Some existing home electronics will fail due to connections to

the low voltage power network and the penetration of EM fieldsinside the home

Introduction of solid-state smart meters and demand responseappliances will create more vulnerabilities unless strong EMCand HPEM immunity standards are applied

Useful EMC and HPEM standards can be found in TC 77 and itssubcommittees (including those discussed in this briefing)