Filing # 9110690 Electronically Filed 01/13/2014 07:49:34 PM RECE1VED, 1/13/2014 19:53:54, John A. Tomasino, Clerk, Supreme Court

Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Monday, July 29, 2013 2:04 PM To: Miles A. McGrane Subject: RE: Notice of Forrnal Charges.pdf

When you get a case #, please send it to me. Thx

-----Original Message----From: Miles A. McGrane (mailto:miles(&mcgranelaw.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 24, 2013 8:10 AM To: Larry Stewart Subject: Re: Notice of Formal Charges.pdf

Please do not forward to anyone until this afternoon. I want to insure its on the SCt docket before you do.

Sent from my iPhone Miles McGrane

On Jul 24, 2013, at 9:39 AM, "Miles A. McGrane" wrote:

> Filed this AM > > > > > > Miles McGrane > The McGrane Law Firm > 9100 South Dadeland Blvd. > Suite 1500 > Miami, Florida 33156 > 305.374.0003 office > 305.213.4812 cell

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2013 10:52 AM To: Miles A. McGrane Subject: Usura watson

It's out. The Daily Bus Review and the Sun Sentential both had stories today. Thinking of our conversation yesterday, Watson's plea for mercy because she is "broke" reminds me of the story of the child who murdered his parents and ther) threw himself on the court begging for mercy because he was an orphan.

Watson's "I-washed-my-hands-of-it" claim (and others were at fault) is something that she came up with late in our trial when backed into a corner after having admitted that we did nothing wrong (to warrant our discharge) and she knew that the secret settlement had serious ethical problems. I don't believe it for one minute. Not only was this the biggest settlement in her lifetime but she totally controlled the law firm. While it was called Watson & Lentner, she and Lentner were married and Lentner was listed both as a "partner" and an officer in the firm, she retained 100% of the stock. She even claimed in our trial that she did a lot of work on the bar-faith part of the case and was entitled to a credit for that work. This is not someone who would just walk away in the middle of the settlement process.

An interesting possibility is, however, raised by this claim. We heard a rumor that the reason Lentner had no stock was to hide assets from his former wife. We could not pursue that because it was not relevant to our case. On the other hand, if Watson makes the "I-didn't-know-what-was-going-on" claim before the JQC you can confront her with the above points. That may push her again into a corner and she might blurt out that the reason Lentner had no stock was because of his marital problems. If she says that, it will implicate her in fraud on Lentner's former wife.

also don't believe the "poverty" claim. When she was running for judge she touted her "successful" law practice and said she could afford to self-finance her campaign. You have her Financial Disclosure and Response to the Miami Herald Questionnaire which contains those claims. Since the election she has been

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drawing a judge's salary. So, if she didn't lie during the campaign, there is no way that she is now all of a sudden destitute.

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Wedriesday, August 07, 201s 12:28 AM To: Miles A. McGrane Subject: L. Watson

Laura Watson's diatribe against the JQC made me think of some info I wanted to pass along for your consideration. Remorse or acknowledgment of guilt and acts of restitution (or failure to do so) should be factors in the ultimate outcome ofher case. I am not sure you know this but, quite apart from any remorse, immediately after J. Crow's judgment Watson sued us for malicious prosecution, abuse ofprocess and libel and slander (for remarks I made about the judgment). It is reminiscent of the same type of intimidation that she is now seeking to bring to bear on the JQC, a position that is inconsistent with any level of remorse.

In addition, although the verdict has been affirmed up the line, Watson is doing everything possible to avoid making restitution for her wrongdoing. She is objecting to any discovery of assets or attempt to collect the judgment. In other words, there is no thought of restitution and absolutely no remorse For example, we garnished some small Watson & Lentner bank accounts. Of course they went (or are in the process of going) to final judgment and yet she has appealed. In addition, she is fighting tooth and nail to prevent any discovery of other assets, actions that are totally inconsistent with restitution and hardly a picture of remorse. Quite the opposite, Watson is acting as though the judgment against her firm is invalid, contrary to all the court decisions.

And, you have the agreement that she made with Lentner in which she agreed to be personally responsible for half ofjudgment against her law firm. Obviously she has done nothing to try to satisfy any part of that judgment or to compel Lentner to pay his portion under their agreement.

I can testify to all this.

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: To:

Friday, August 09, 2013 10:41 AM Miles A. McGrane

Subject: Watson's "Demand"

Watson is like the Everyready bunny - she just keeps on ticking. And the gall is astounding. Complaining about the fact that the events happened "ten years ago" [actually it was just over 9 years ago] is the height of hypocrisy. She and her codefendants did everything possible to delay the State Court trial. Then when the grievance was filed, they demanded that it be held in abeyance until after the appeals were over. More of "l-am-an-orphan-so have-mercy."

She also seems to have conveniently forgotten about her unjust enrichment and the fact that had she treated the clients equally they would have all gotten compensation for the bad faith conduct of Progressive. It was only because of her (and her co-defendants) greed that did not happen.

Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 4:11 PM To: Miles A. McGrane Subject: Outline and other info Attachments: MilesM Memo.docx

Miles: Attached is the outline/order of proof you requested.

I previously sent you my schedule for the rest of the year. Here is an update and I have also included Jan.:

Sept 19, 20 i am teaching a Master Class in Trial Advocacy in Gainesville at the U/F Law School.

Oct 16 - 18 American Law institute meeting in New York

Oct 30 - Nov 14 I will be out of the country (in S.E. Asia) on an International Academy of Trial Lawyers trip

Nov 21,22 American Law institute meeting in Philadelphia

Dec 9 - 14 PIP Lawyer Grievance Trial

Jan 9 -11 RAND Bd of Govs Meeting in California

Jan 15 -17 American law institute meeting in Philadelphia

As you can see, the PIP Lawyer trial is the week of Dec 9'". If possible, it would probably be good to have the Watson trial before then.

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September 16, 2013

TO: Miles McGrane FROM: Larry Stewart RE: Watson

I think you are on the right track to make the wrong to the clients the primary focus ofthe Watson case and the wrong to us secondary. In that regard, Watson had multiple conflicts of interest at the client level:

1. First, there was the conflict that was created when Watson and her partner, Lentner, made a secret side deal with Drs Fishman and Stashak, promising them half of the Bad Faith recovery.

2. Then there was the conflict that Watson and her cohorts created when then settled both the PIP and Bad Faith claims and tried to put all the settlement proceeds into just the PIP claims, to enable Watson and her cohorts to take much larger attorney fees. That conflict was not solved by the arbitrary reallocation of the proceeds to put a small amount into the Goldcoast case.

3. There was also the violation of the "aggregate settlement rule" (Rule 41.8(g)- failing to get advance approval/permission for the settlement -which is designed to avoid such conflicts.

4. There was also the conflict that was created between the clients in the Goldcoast case (41) and the rest ofthe clients (400) insofar as their bad faith claims were concerned when Watson and her cohorts excluded the 400 non-Goldcoast clients from sharing in any Bad Faith recovery. [Watson will claim that the 400 did not have perfected Bad Faith claims but some did and, in any event, when they changed the method of allocation of the Goldcoast proceeds, they counted unperfected claims.]

5. Finally there was the conflict between Drs Fishman and Stashak (Goldcoast Orthopedics) and the rest (40) of the Goldcoast Plaintiffs which was created when Watson and her cohorts had to change the method of allocating the Goldcoast recovery so as to get DRs Fishman and Stashak appropriately half of the recovery. For Fishman and Stashak to get more, the others had to get less.

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In each instance, Watson resolved the conflict in her favor, acted in her own interest to maximize her gain to the detriment ofher clients or preferred some of her clients over other ofher clients.. She will claim that various ofthese acts were done by others without her knowledge but the evidence will show that she and the other PIP lawyers acted in lockstep and concert throughout (so that the act ofone was the act of all) and that she never once objected to anything thus ratifying it all.

On top ofthose conflicts, Watson and her cohorts kept the clients in the dark, failing to provide them with closing statements and admonishing them to not discuss the settlement with anyone. And, in an effort to isolate them, Watson and her cohorts lied about us and misrepresented key aspects of our work on the cases. Because the clients were not adequately informed about the settlement, it made it easier for Watson and her cohorts to take advantage of them.

Of course, as you know, when it came to us there was also a conflict of interest and again Watson acted to maximize her gain, in essence stealing what rightfully belonged to us. Beyond that Watson also violated the Trust Account Rules (Rule 5-1.1(f) when she failed to hold the disputed funds in trust. [Watson will point out that she did hold the attorney fees attributed to the amount that was arbitrarily allocated to the Goldcoast case but all the funds were in dispute, not just that small portion.]

My approach to trials generally is to keep it short and simple and this case is no exception. In keeping with that strategy, to prove Walton's misconduct, my suggested Order ofProof is as follows:

1, Judge Crow's Final Judgment in Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. et al v. Marks & Fleischer, P.A., et al, Case No. 50 2004CA006138XXXXMB AO in the 15040hJudicial Circuit Court of Florida. As you know Judge Crow's Final Judgment was affirmed by the Fourth District Court ofAppeal ofFlorida at 85 So. 3d 1112 and the Florida Supreme Court has now denied review. [Watson may argue that the Final Judgment is not binding and therefore not relevant since it required only a preponderance of evidence but this is an administrative hearing where the rules of evidence are not strictly followed and, in any event, The Florida Bar v. Gwynn, 94 So.3d 425 (Fla.2012) holds that a

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Final Judgment alone is sufficient to sustain the Bar's burden ofProof in a grievance prosecution.]

2. The Memorandum Opinion and Final Judgments of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District ofFlorida, Case Nos. 09-01838 EPK, 0901839 EPK, 09-15557 EPK and 09-15558 EPK, cited at In re Kane, 470 B.R. 902 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2012), together with the opinion ofthe U.S. District Court for the Southern District ofFlorida in Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., 485 B.R. 460 (S.D. Fla. 2013). There is compelling language in both opinions. [Watson will argue that these are not binding or relevant because she was not a party but the Kanes had the same incentives to defend these matters and you will establish through my testimony that at all times all ofthe PIP lawyers acted in concert so the acts of one are the acts of all. It should therefore be at least

persuasive that a judge hearing the same evidence came to the same conclusions.]

3. The Memorandum Opinion and Order Dismissing Chapter 11 Cases of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District ofFlorida, Case No. 08-27452-EPK. This was the dismissal of the Chapter 11 proceedings. Pm not sure there is anything helpful in this opinion insofar as Watson is concerned.

4. Witness: Larry Stewart. In connection with my testimony you should list as an exhibit "All Plaintiffs' Exhibits introduced into evidence or marked for identification in Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. et al v. Marks & Fleischer, P.A., et al, Case No. 50 2004CA006138XXXXMB AO in the 15th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida." There are a number you will want to use on direct and, depending on what Watson claims, there may be others. You have some of those exhibits and we can make you a complete set. There are a couple ofhundred exhibits in total although you will probably only want to use a small number. I suggest listing them all however so as to not be cut off ifWatson goes off on some tangent.

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I can cover basically all the violations. Don't be concerned about how I will do. I am a very experienced witness, she will not get under my skin or get me upset and I will present a very dispassionate story. Remember both Judge Crow and Judge Kimball expressly found my testimony credible.

In addition, I can be qualified and give expert opinions on:

a. Watson's ethical violations. I have background and experience in ethics having written the ATLA Code ofConduct

b. The grossly excessive nature of Watson's attorney fees. I examined 500 ofthe PIP fees and gave my onions at the trial in front of Judge Crow. He accepted my testimony and based his damage calculations on it.

5. I suggest we also have some doctor/client testimony. In that connection I recommend the following:

a. As an exhibit: The Amended Complaint and affidavits ofDrs Fishman and Stashak from Fishman and Stashak, M.D.'s P.A. v.Laura Watson, et al, Case No. 502010CA011298XXXXMBAF in Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach, Florida. The affidavits are devastating.

b. Deposition excerpts from the Following Drs:

i. Eric Fishman 5090 PGA Blvd., Ste 304 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33418

561-659-1200

ii. James J. Kirvin, III 4440 Beacon Circle, # 100 West Palm Beach. FL 33407 561-845-6000

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iii. Alan Mandel 20334 NW 2"d Ave. Miami, FL 33169

iv. Michael Rosenberg 7015 Beracasa Way Boca Raton, FL 33433 561-394-0944

v. Alan Shaff 4801 Linton Blvd. Delray Beach, FL 33445

vi, Joshua Smith 1155 Main St., Ste 105 Jupiter, FL 33458

I would not list Dr Stashak as a witness. He lied at the trial and we proved that he was lying. For that reason you should not call him as a witness. I do not envision calling any of these witnesses live, with the possible exception ofDr. Fishman. The Bar is now fmding out whether he is willing to cooperate. As to the others and even for Dr. Fishman ifhe is not willing to cooperate, I can give you depo excerpts from the depos taken in our case that should be admissible as "Former Testimony" under FS 90.803(22), especially since the rules of evidence are relaxed.

6. Letter Agreement of 4/19/2001 between Laura M. Watson, P.A., Laura Watson and Darin Lentner and Final Judgment Dissolving Marriage in the matter ofLaura Watson v. Darin Lentner, dated 11/30/2005, Case No. 05-016219(37)(90) in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, FL. This goes to lack of remorse; Watson and Lentner made a deal on how to pay for the judgment and yet they have done nothing in that regard. In fact, Watson has resisted in every way possible to pay the judgment.

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7. Testimony ofLaura Watson. This would be in the form of excerpts from her trial and deposition testimony in the Stewart case. I would list as exhibits "Trial and Deposition Testimony ofLaura Watson in Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. et al v. Marks & Fleischer, P.A., et al, Case No. 50 2004CA006138XXXXMB AO in the 15th Judicial Circuit Court ofFlorida." I can prepare the excerpts for you. Let me know if you want complete copies ofher trial and depos.

7. Other potential witnesses are:

a. William C. Heron 1 S.E. 3'd Ave., Ste 3000 Miami, FL 3313 305-579-0673

b. Todd S. Stewart 824 W. Indiantown Rd. Jupiter, FL 561-743-2002

d. Darin Lentner

e. Amir Fleischer

f. Gary Marks

g. Chris Searcy 2139 Palm Beach lakes Blvd. West Palm Beach, FL 33409 561-686-6300

h. Greg Barnhart 2139 Palm Beach lakes Blvd. West Palm Beach, FL 33409 561-686-6300

However, with the exception ofBill Hearon and/or Todd, I would not call any of the others.

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I am sure you will have questions so call me. Also let me know what documents you would like to have. I return to Florida on 9/11 and it would be better if delivery could wait until after then so that I could directly supervise the copymg.

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 11:59 AM To: 'miles@mcgrenelaw.com' Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 21-30 Attachments: stewart appeal vol 21 092807.ptx; stewart appeal vol 21 092807.txt; stewart appeal vol 22

100107.ptx; stewart appeal vol 22 100107.txt; stewart appeal vol 23 100107.ptx; stewart appeal vol 23 100107.txt; stewart appeal vol 24 100207.ptx; stewart appeal vol 24 100207.txt; stewart appeal vol 25 100207.ptx; stewart appeal vol 25 100207.txt; stewart appeal vol 28 100307.ptx; stewart appeal vol 26 100307.txt; stewart appeal vol 27 100307.ptx; stewart appeal vol 27 100307.txt; stewart appeal vol 28 100407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 28 100407.txt; stewart appeal vol 29 100407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 29 100407.txt; stewart appeal vol 30 100507.ptx; stewart appeal vol 30 100507.txt

From: Mary Masferrer Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 1:52 PM To: Larry Stewart Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 21-30

Let me know if you want me to print any of these. I have saved all of these volumes in the STFB file under pleadings/appeal.

Mary Masferrer Assistant to David W. Bianchi Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. One S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 358-6644 Direct Line: (305) 358-5776 Fax: (305) 358-4707

From: Leslie A. Kopp [mailto:lak@flappellatelaw.com] Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 11:49 AM To: Mary Masferrer Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 21-30

From: Phlip M. Burlington Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 9:14 AM To: Leslie A. Kopp Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 21-30

From: David Pakula imailto:david@pakulalawfirm.com] Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2010 7:31 PM To: Phlip M. Burlington Subject: Stewart, vols 21-30

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mailto:imailto:david@pakulalawfirm.commailto:mailto:lak@flappellatelaw.commailto:miles@mcgrenelaw.com

David B. Pakula, Esq. Board Certified by The Florida Bar m Appellate Practice

David B, Pakula, P.A. 1806 N. Flamingo Road, Suite 410 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33028 Tel.: (954)217-5123 Fax: (954)217-6990 Email: dgvid@p

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 11:59 AM To: 'miles@mcgranelaw.com' Subject: FW: Stewart v. Kane Transcripts Attachments: stewart appeal vol 1 091107.ptx; stewart appeal vol 1 091107.txt; stewart appeal vol 2

091209.p1x; stewart appeal vol 2 091209.txt; stewart appeal vol 3 091207.ptx; stewart appeal vol 3 091207.txt; stewart appeal vol 4 091407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 4 091407.txt; stewart appeal vol 5 091407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 5 091407.txt; stewart appeal vol 6 091707.ptx; stewart appeal vol 6 091707.txt; stewart appeal vol 7 091707.ptx; stewart appeal vol 7 091707.txt; stewart appeal vol 8 091807.ptx; stewart appeal vol 8 094807.txt; stewart appeal vol 9 091807.ptx; stewart appeal vol 9 091807.txt; stewart appeaf vol 10 091907.ptx; stewart appeal vol 10 091907.txt

Miles: Here are Vols 1-10. I will be sending the others in batches of 10. There are 2 versions for each volume: "ptx" and "txt." Use the "txt" version.

From: Mary Masferrer Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 1:45 PM To: Larry Stewart Subject: FW: Stewart v. Kane Transcripts

Mary Masferrer Assistant to David W. Bianchi Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. One S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: {305) 358-6644 Direct Line: (305) 358-5776 Fax: (305) 358-4707

From: Leslie A. Kopp [mailto:lak@flapoellatelaw.com] Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 11:48 AM To: Mary Masferrer Subject: FW: Stewart v, Kane Transcripts

From: Phlip M, Burlington Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 9:14 AM To: Leslie A. Kopp Subject: FW: Stewart v. Kane, et al

From: David Pakula [mailto:david@oakulalawfirm.com] Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2010 7:27 PM To: Philp M. Burlington Subject: Stewart v. Kane, et al

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mailto:mailto:david@oakulalawfirm.commailto:mailto:lak@flapoellatelaw.commailto:miles@mcgranelaw.com

Hi Phil,

I cracked open the boxes of transcripts that had been shipped to me and behold, I discovered that there are CDS of the trial transcript. They are not big files, but of course there are a lot of them. I may be able to email them to you and I will test this idea by trying to attach the files containing volumes 1-10 to this email to see if it works. If so, I will email the remainder to you. There are 5 CDs with 62 volumes.

For each volume, there are two different types of files with .ptx and .txt extensions. I was able to easily open the .txt files with a basic wordpad application, but the other file needs a more specific application to open and i don't know what it is but Ithink it could be found pretty easily on an internet search.

So here goes, let's see if it works. Your feedback on this process would be helpful.

Best regards,

David B. Pakula, Esq. Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Appellate Practice

David B. Pakula, P.A. 1806 N. Flamingo Road, Suite 410 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33028 Tel.: (954)217-5123 Fax: (954)217-6990 Email: david@pakulalawfirm,com

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 12:00 PM To: 'mHes@mcgranelaw.com' Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 31-40 Attachments: stewart appeal vol 31 101507.ptx; stewart appeal vol 31 101507.txt; stewart appeal vol 32

101507.ptx; stewart appeal vol 32 101507.txt; stewart appeal vol 33 101607 .ptx; stewart appeal vol 33 101607 .txt; stewart appeal vol 34 101607.pix; stewart appeal vol 34 101607.txt; stewart appeal vol 35 101707.ptx; stewart appeal vol 35 101707.txt; stewart appeal vol 36 101707.ptx; stewart appeal vol 36 101707.txt; stewart appeal vol 37 101807.ptx; stewart appeal vol 37 101807.txt; stewart appeal vol 38 101807.ptx; stewart appeal vol 38 101807.txt; stewart appeaf vol 39 101907.ptx; stewart appeal vol 39 101907.txt; stewart appeaf vol 40 101907.ptx; stewart appeal vol 40 101907.txt

From: Mary Masferrer Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 1:54 PM To: Larry Stewart Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 31-40

Saved in the STFB/pleading/appeal. Print any?

Mary Masferrer Assistant to David W. Bianchi Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. One S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 358-6644 Direct Une: (305) 358-5776 Fax: (305) 358-4707

From: Leslie A. Kopp imailto:lak@tlappellatelaw.coml Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 11:49 AM To: Mary Masferrer Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 31-40

From: Phlip M. Burlington Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 9:14 AM To: Leslie A, Kopp Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 31-40

From: David Pakula fmallto:david@pakulalawfirm.com] Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2010 7:32 PM To: Phlip M. Burlington Subject: Stewart, vols 31-40

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mailto:fmallto:david@pakulalawfirm.commailto:mHes@mcgranelaw.com

David B. Pakula, Esq. Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Appellate Practice

David B. Pakula, PA 1806 N. Flamingo Road, Suite 410 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33028 Tel.: (954) 217-5123 Fax: (954)217-6990 Email: david@pakulalawfirm.com

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 12:00 PM To: 'miles@mcgranelaw.com' Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 41-50 Attachments: stewart appeaf vol 49 102907.ptx; stewart appeal vol 49 102907.txt; stewart appeal vol 41

102207.ptx; stewart appeal vol 41 102207.txt; stewart appeaf vol 42 102207.ptx; stewart appeal vol 42 102207.txt; stewart appeal vol 43 102307.ptx; stewart appeal vol 43 102307.txt; stewart appeal vol 44 102307.ptx; stewart appeal vol 44 102307.txt; stewart appeaf vo!45 102407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 45 102407.txt; stewart appeat vol 46 102407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 46 102407.txt; stewart appeal vol 47 102507.ptx; stewart appeal vol47 102507.txt; stewart appeal vol 48 iO2507.ptx; stewart appeal vol 48 102507.txt; stewart appeal vol 50 102907.ptx; stewart appeal vol 50 102907.txt

From: Mary Masferrer Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 1:48 PM To: Larry Stewart Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 41-50

Mary Masferrer Assistant to David W. Bianchi StewartTilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. One S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 358-6644 Direct Line: (305) 358-5776 Fax: (305) 358-4707

From: Leslie A. Kopp [mailto:iak@flanpellatelaw.com] Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 11:49 AM To: Mary Masferrer Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 41-50

From: Philp M. Burlington Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 9:14 AM To: Leslie A. Kopp Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 41-50

From: David Pakula fmailto:david@pakulatawfirm.com] Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2010 7:34 PM To; Phlip M. Burlington Subject: Stewart, vols 41-50

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mailto:fmailto:david@pakulatawfirm.commailto:mailto:iak@flanpellatelaw.commailto:miles@mcgranelaw.com

David B. Pakula, Esq. Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Appellate Practice

David B. Pakula, P.A. 1806 N. Flamingo Road, Suite 410 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33028 Tel.: (954)217-5123 Fax: (954)217-6990 Email: david(abakulalawfirm.com

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http:david(abakulalawfirm.com

Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 12:01 PM To: 'miles@mogranelaw.com' Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 51-62 Attachments: stewart appeal vol 51 103007,ptx; stewart appeal vol 51 103007.txt; stewart appeal vol 52

103007.ptx; stewart appeal vol 52 103007.txt; stewart appeal vol 53 103107,ptx; stewart appeal vol 53 103107.txt; stewart appeal vol 54 103107.ptx; stewart appeal vol 54 103107.txt; stewart appeal vol 55 112007.ptx; stewart appeal vol 55 112007.txt; stewart appeal vol 56 112007.ptx; stewart appeal vol56 112007.txt; stewart appeal vol 57 112107.ptx; stewart appeal vol 57 112107,txt; stewart appeal vol 58 112107.ptx; stewart appeal vol 58 112107.txt; stewart appeal vol 59 112607.ptx; stewart appeal vol 59 112607,txt; stewart appeal vot 60 112707.ptx; stewart appeal vol 60 112707.txt; stewart appeal vol 61 112709.ptx; stewart appeal vol 61 112709.txt; stewart appeal vol 62 112807.ptx; stewart appeal vol 62 112807.txt

From: Mary Masferrer Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 1:42 PM To: Larry Stewart Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 51-62

Mary Masferrer Assistant to David W. Blanchi Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A, One S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 358-6644 Direct Line: (305) 358-5776 Fax: (305) 358-4707

From: Leslie A. Kopp [mailto:lak@flapoellatelaw.com] Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 11:50 AM To: Mary Masferrer Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 51-62

From: Phllp M. Burllngton Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 9:14 AM To: Leslie A, Kopp Subject: FW: Stewart, vols 51-62

From: David Pakula [mailto:david@pakulalawfirm.coml Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2010 7:35 PM To: Phlip M. Burlington Subject: Stewart, vols 51 62

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mailto:david@pakulalawfirm.comlmailto:mailto:lak@flapoellatelaw.commailto:miles@mogranelaw.com

David B. Pakula, Esq. Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Appellate Practice

David B. Pakula, P.A. 1806N. Flamingo Road, Suite 410 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33028 Tel.: (954) 217-5123 Fax: (954) 217-6990 Email: david@pakulalawfirm.com

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 12:03 PM To: 'miles@mcgranelaw.com' Subject: FW: Stewart, vol's 11-20 Attachments: stewart appeal vol 11 091907.ptx; stewart appeal vol 11 091907.txt; stewart appeal vol 12

092007.ptx; stewart appeal vol 12 092007,txt; stewart appeal vol 13 092007.ptx; stewart appeal vol 13 092007.txt; stewart appeal vol 14 092107.ptx; stewart appeal vol 14 092107.txt; stewart appeal vol 15 092407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 15 092407.txt; stewart appeal vol 16 092407.ptx; stewart appeal vol 16 092407.txt; stewart appeal vol 17 092507.ptx; stewart appeal vol 17 092507.txt; stewart appeal vol 18 092507.pix; stewart appeal vol 18 092507.txt; stewart appeal vol 19 092707,ptx; stewart appeal vol 19 092707.txt; stewart appeal vol 20 092707.ptx; stewart appeal vol20 092707.txt

From: Mary Masferrer Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 1:47 PM To: Larry Stewart Subject: FW: Stewart, vol's 11-20

Let me know if you want me to print any of these.

Mary Masferrer Assistant to David W. Bianchi Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. One S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 358-6644 Direct Line: (305) 358-5776 Fax: (305)358-4707

From: Leslie A, Kopp imailto:lak@flappellatelaw.com) Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 11:49 AM To: Mary Masferrer Subject: FW: Stewart, vol's 11-20

From: Philp M. Burlington Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 9:14 AM To: Leslie A. Kopp Subject: FW: Stewart, vofs 11-20

From: David Pakula [mailto:david@pakulalawfirm.comi Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2010 7:30 PM To: Phlip M. Burlington subject: Stewart, vol's 11-20

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mailto:david@pakulalawfirm.comimailto:imailto:lak@flappellatelaw.commailto:miles@mcgranelaw.com

David B. Pakula, Esq. Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Appellate Practice

David B. Pakula, P,A. 1806 N. Flamingo Road, Suite 410 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33028 Tel.: (954) 217-5123 Fax: (954)217-6990 Email: david@pakulalawfirnicom

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Larry Stewart

From: Larry Stewart Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2013 1:48 PM To: Miles A. McGrane oc: william C. Hearon: Todd Stewart Subject: Case Mgt Hearing Attachments: Goldman 1111-14-08 Ltr Requesting Deferral Pending Appeal.pdf; Goldman 74642 Ltr Supp

Response Requesting Dismissal.pdf

I have read the transcript of the Case Mtg hearing and there are a few points to mention,

1. On p. 17 Watson claims she was "personally exonerated" by Judge Crow. Nothing could be further from the truth. Judge Crow found her conduct to be wrongful and unethical. She personally escaped liability only because she was acting through a Professional Corporation but it was her acts that resulted in a judgment against her corporation. And it was also her acts that resulted in her referral to the Bar.

2. On p. 38 Watson also said that Judge Crow found she didn't breach her fiduciary duty. Again nothing could be further from the truth. Judge Crow found only that Watson did not owe a fiduciary duty to co-counsel. He made no finding that her conduct was not wrongful Indeed, quite the contrary; Judge Crow referred Watson to the Florida Bar for multiple breaches of conflicts of interest involving her clients.

3. On p. 38 Watson also said that all "my clients were happy" and "No client filed a Bar complaint." That is a very misleading half-truth. First, Watson (along with the other PIP lawyers) kept the clients in the dark about what she was doing so they didn't understand how they were being mistreated and abused. And, when her main clients, Fishman and Stashak, found out about what she had done, they sued her (and the other PIP lawyers).

It also appears that Watson's subject matter jurisdiction argument conflates a separate affirmative defense of statute of limitations expiration. SOL is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. The expiration of a SOL does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear the case; just the contrary, the court has jurisdiction to consider the matter on the merits, including the SOL defense. Thus, her argument

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that the JQC has no subject matter jurisdiction because the acts occurred more than 2 years ago, is off base, indeed, since the acts occurred on or after November 2, 1966 it seems clear that the JQC does have subject matter jurisdiction.

As far as the length of time that has expired, the delay in prosecution has been at Watson's request. The initial Bar grievance was timely filed with the Florida Bar. Thereafter, the prosecution was delayed at Watson's request. Attached are two letters seeking that delay. Had the grievance been prosecuted when initially filed, Watson would have been disbarred years ago and never been qualified to run for judge. Watson cannot seek and take advantage of a delay in prosecution and then claim that a SOL has expired which prevents her from being finally prosecuted.

Finally, at the hearing Watson complained about the allegations that she acted with the other PIP lawyers and the descriptions of the other PIP lawyers actions. The acts of her co-conspirators are, however, highly relevant. The findings of Judge Crow and Judge Kimbail (the bankruptcy judge) - although the bankruptcy case involved only Kane & Kane - describe joint conduct in which Watson acted in concert with the other PIP lawyer Respondents. Indeed, during the trial before Judge Crow, he made a specific ruling to the joint conduct at pp 413 -414 (which meant that there was no hearsay objection to the words of the other PIP lawyers. As described by Judge Crow at pp 2-11of the Final Judgment and by Judge Kimball at pp 4 - 17 of the Memorandum Opinion all of the PIP lawyers, including Watson, acted jointly in handing the claims of the 441clients and in secretly settling those claims. Under the concerted action doctrine and/or as joint venturers the acts of each is imputed to all. Under the concerted action doctrine it is not necessary that each defendant commit each act comprising the tort, but only that, pursuant to a common plan, each defendant take part in it, further it, or aid or assist in its commission. See, e.g., Ray v. Cutter Laboratories, Div. Of Miles, Inc., 744 F.Supp. 1124, 1127 (M.D. Fla. 1990); accord, e.g., Acadia Partners, L.P. v. Tompkins, 759 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Roos v. Morrison, 913 So. 2d 59, 68 n.1(Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Additionally, as described in Judge Crow and Judge Kimball's findings it is beyond dispute that Watson was a joint venturer with the other PIP lawyers. See, e.g., Schutzer v. Springmeyer, 989 F.Supp. 833, 837 (S.D. Tex. 1998); in re Johnson, 552 N.E. 2d 703, 707 (111. 1989); Duggins v. Washington, 632 So.2d 420, 427 (Miss. 1993); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 9, Comment. A joint venture is governed by the rules relating to

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partnerships. E.g., Hayes v. H.J.S.B.B. Joint Venture, 595 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Under the Uniform Partnership Act, and in particular sections 620.8305, 620.8306(1) and 620.8307(2), each partner is responsible for the acts of his or her co-partner, even if entirely innocent himself and even if he has no knowledge that the acts were occurring. Finally, Watson knowingly participated in the global settlement and accepted its benefits, thereby ratifying the tortuous misconduct that produced it and making the acts of all the PIP lawyers her own. Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So.2d 65, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001

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BROAD wo CASSEL PETER 2. COLDMAN, ESQ. DIRter LiNE:(954) 764-7060ATTORNEYS AT LAW

DIRECT FACslM1LE:(954) 7134976 EMAiu pgoMmanbrontlandensaekcom

November 14, 2008

Alan Anthony Pascal The Florida Bar Cypress Financial Center, Suite 900 5900 North Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309

Re: Laura Marie Watson The Florida Bar File No: 2008-51, 564 (17B)

Dear Mr. Pascal:

This letter is being sent in connection with my initial response dated August i1, 2008. In my prior response, I indicated I would supplement our initial response after the Court decided all post-trial motions.

Please allow this letter to inform you that the Court, after approximately 8 weeks of deliberation, denied all post-trial motions. A copy of the Order on Motions for Rehearing is enclosed. We also enclose a copy of Laura M. Watson P.A.'s Notice of Appeal and wish to advise you that Laura M. Watson P.A. intends to fully prosecute an appeal of the same judgment which serves as the basis for the above-referenced complaint,

We respectfully submit that consideration of the complaint should be deferred until such time as the complex factual and legal issues presented in connection with this matter are fully and finally decided by the appellate court(s).

Sincerely yours, BROAD AND CASSEL

. o dman, Esq. cc: Larry Stewart, Esq.

William Heron, Esq. Christian D. Searcy, Esq. Irwin R. Gilbert, Esq. John P. Seiler, Esq.

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Pia email GWrightMuir@ffabar.org

GheneteMuirWright, Esq. The Florida Bar Cypress Financial Center, Suite 900 5900 North Andrews Avenue Pott Lauderdale, Florida 33309

Re: Complaint against Laura M. Watson The Florida Bar File No:2008-51, 564 (17B)

Dear Ms.%ight

Please again note my appearance in the above captioned matter on behalf of Lama M. Watson ("Ms. Watson"). The Florida Bar (%e Bar") graciously gave Ms. Watson through and including July 16,2012, to respond to the above-referenced 2008 complaint '(%e Complaint"), The Bar postponed further proceedings on this matter in 2008 because, at the time the extension was given, a Motion for Rehearing of Judge Crow's Final Judgment dated April 24, 2008 (%e Final Judgment") was pending and set for hearing on July 24, 2008. The post-trial proceedings were then followed by an appeal to the Fourth District. The civil matter is now before the Florida supreme Court. (The Florida Supreme Court's "acimowledgement ofnew case" is dated June 26, 2010).. Ms. Watson is providing this responseto the Complaint with the expectation of supplementing it when all appellate proceedings, including those omrently before the Florida Supreme Coutt) are concluded. For purposes ofthis response, the underlying civil proceeding is occasionally referred to as "the bad faith case" or %e Gold Coast case."

Theundeceigned is awate that the Board ofGovemora and the Florida Bar has enacted a policy that disposition of bar complaints should be addressed at the final conclusion of any pending civil proceedings involving the same issues. ht the Final Judgment, Judge Crow, himself, candidly acknowledged how he had "struggledwith this case...." The underlying case was indeed complicated and involved novel questions of law that have never been decided by another Florida Court. There were, quite simply, many pending legal issues, never decided by any Florida appellate comt until the Fourth District's decision affirming Judge Crow, which arguably re-wrote or changed Florida law on unjust emichment and did not squarely addreas the issue of who Complainants represented and how that representation was undertaken in

There is a recentbankruptcy decision that solely involved %eKanes"and, because Ms. Watson was not a party to those pmceedings, the bankruptcy coutt's findings should not be considered in connection with the complaint againsther,

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accordance with Rule 4-1.5. These are some ofthe reasons why the case is being appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.

For the above reasons and those which follow, we would again urge that the Complaint be dismissed or, in the alternative, tabled until the Florida Supreme Court proceedings are concluded

One of the issues likely to be the subject of the further appeal is precisely which clients Messrs. Larry Stewart and Mr. Willirn Hearon ("CompMmmte) represented and whether that representation was properly undertaken. In the undedying litigation, Complaitiants testified under oath that they represented every single PIP client (ofwhich their were hundreds) that Ms. Watson and the other Respondents represented. The question of who the Complainanta represented (the 36 named plaintiffs in the bad faith litigation or the universe of the Respondents* PIP clients) bears directly on ethical issues raised by the Complainants. Neither Judge Crow nor the Fourth District has ever squarely addressed this ctical issue (i.e., the precise scope ofComplainants'representation).

And, it is ironic that Complainants now claim various Bar violations when Respondents were the first to raise the issue of whether Complainants' failure to comply with certain Bar Rules impacted their right to recover a fee and whether their failed compliance therewith should be part of the "totality of the circumsfances" the Court would have to consider in awarding any damages in the underlying action. Examples of how the Complainants' own potential rules' violations impacted the undedying civil proceedings and created the.very ethical dilemmas about which they now complain cannot be ignored and, therefore, are addressed below.

Informed Consent

Perhaps the most basio, fundamental tenet inherent in the attorney-client relationship is the obligation ofthe attorney to obtain the "informed consent" of the client This obligation is so fundamental that it is set forth in the comments to the Preamble to the Rules ofProfessional Conduct. "Infonned consent"is defined,inpertinent part, as follows:

ny of the Rules of Professional conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client or other person... before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct.. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes the disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the clients or other persons options and alternatives... A lawyer who does not personally

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inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or the other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. Obtaining infonned consent will usually require an affirmatve response by the client or other person, In general, a lawyer may not asstune consent from clients where other persons are silent.

Ahhough "infonned consent" and communication with the client(s) is fundamental and critical to any attamey-client relationship, it becomes even more critical when lawyers, as the Complainants' purportedly did heres seek to undertake "representation of multiple clients in a single matter...." and seek to add additional plaintiffs as the case progresses. It is beyotd dispute that, in such instances as exist here (i.e. staged multiple representation of clients), not only is more "informed.consent"required.but it is also absolutely irnperative that each and ever effected client receive and give "informed consent" at every critical stage of the proceeding. This on-going, never ending duty is covered in the comment to Rule 4-1,4, simply entitled "Communication." That comment provides, in pertinent part,

Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessaTy for the client to effectively participate in the representation. If these ndes require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, Subdivision(a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent pylor to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take~.. The client should have suffielent information to participate intelligently in decisions conceming the objectives of the representation and the means by which they ate to bepursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so.

Complainants do not even contend that they ever attempted to comply with Rule 4-1.4 or obtain and secure the informed consent that would have been an absolute prerequisite to their ability to settle any claims on behalf of a universe of claimants (whether PIP claimants or bad faith claimants), let alone actually try a case to a jury verdict on behalf of such "clients " Complainants conveniently attempt to ciremnvent the "informed consent" obligation inherent in every attorney-client relationship by suggesting that this responsibility was delegated to the Respondents (i.e., delegated to the referring attorneys*with no had faith expertise who were

What this dispute probably teaches more than anything else - - at least in retrospect - -is that the nature ofthe representation contemplated here was way too convoluted and complicated to undertake in a mannet that would allow meaningful compliance with the applicable rules of professional responsibility. As discussed below, the conflict between the tWo primaty categories ofPlaintiffs, perfected Plaintiffs versus unperfected Plaintiffs, could not be effectively or practically managed.

Respondents were not even counsel of record in the Gold Coast case, until the conclusion of the case.

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therefore reliant upon Complainants' providing the informed consent)is flat out wrong. As the comment to the Preamble of the Rules of Professional Conduct states, "every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rides of Professional Conduct? Complainants, not Respondents, not only had the obligation to provide informed consent but the requisite expertise to do so under the unique circumstances oftbishighlycomplex, multi-layered case.

Mr. Stewat testified before the trial in the civil proceeding that he was engaged by only thhty-six olients. But, Mr. Stewatt then testified his representation subsequently "matured" into a representation of the universe of PIP clients in knuary 2004. Only in retrospect did the Complainants contend that there was an "assumed" representation by proxy (Le. proxy by and through the Respondents) from day one of the entire universe of Respondents' P]P clients. During the course of the Gold Coast representation, Mr, Stewart, on at least two occasions, noted that he could only "ethically" act on behalf ofclients with whomhe had a fee agreement. Ifhe is to be held to his own words, Complainants' "assumed" representation byproxy ofa universe of PIP claimants with whom they had no fee agreements was, accordmg to Mr. Stewart, "unethicaL" Complainants handled the Gold Coast case as ifthe clients were beside the point-a necessary evil and nuisance. Based on Dr. Stashak's testimony at frial, this is precisely how Mr. Stewart made Dr. Stashak (one of the bad faith clients) feel at mediation - - like he was a nuisance. Although thete was a fee agreement confirming the existence of an attomey-client relationship with Gold Coast, there was, according to Dr. Stashak (the client), no real substance to that relationship, Tab L Dr, Stashak testified that Complainants never once asked him how he - - the client -- wanted to proceed. M

Mr. Stewart claims he had one brief telephone conversation with Dr. Stashak prior to undertaking the representation. For the next two years until the 4/19/04 Gold Coast mediation, Mr. Stewart, the self-described "captain ofthe ship"and lead counsel of record in fbe Gold Coast case did not spend a single second with Dr. Stashak or any ofhis purported other clients (neither those with whom he had a fee agreement and those with whom he did not). The absence ofany communication between the lead ettorneys (the Complainants)and their clients contributed to the fatally flawed nature ofthe purported universahepresentationfrom the outset.

Mr. Stewart conceded in deposition the Gold Coast case was bs first "group aofion." Although acknowledging, as he had to, that he was govemed by the Rules of Professional Conduct requiring the provision of "informed consent" and the duty to explain the consequences, good and bad, ofmultiple representation, it is clear that Complainants were not aware of these duties, and, consequently, failed to discharge them. See Rules 4-1.7(c) and 4-1 8(g).. Knowing that there is not a shred of evidence that the requisite informed consent, advice or consultation was ever undertaken in the Gold Coast representation, the Complainants conveniently blame Respondents (the referring attorneys who reIIed on Complainants for their bad faith expertise), claiming "they were supposed to communicate with the clients " The notion that a lead lawyer can discharge his most basic fundamental, ethical duties to a "referring attomey" (who is not even counsel of record and lacks expertise in the matter at hand) is, to put it mildly, misguided. See Huber v. Taylor, 2007 WL 124 7117 (W.D.PA. 2007) (the fiduciary duty owed

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clients by their attomeys is a non-delegable, fiduciary obligation that is jointly shared by and between all co-counseL..). Complainants cannot even make the claim (because it would be uutme) that they periodically provided information to Respondents along the way for the express purpose of allowing the Respondents to keep the Gold Coast clients reasonably informed about the representation.

To give you on understanding ofjust how detached the lead lawyers (i.e., Complainants) were fmm their own clients, Ms. Watson would note that the mediation sammary Complainants prepared was never even sent to the Respondents or their joint clients. Mr. Stewartnever even attempted to inform his clients (yes -his clients}ubout the value oftheir case until May 28,2004 (after the mediation). If the Complainants genuinely believed that delegating their basic attorney responsibilities to the Respondents was proper, which is hard to believe, then they were the architects of the plan ibat ensured that appropriate and Bar rule-compliant reptesentation of the Gold Coast clients would never be undettaken.

The Gold Coast representation was also fatally flawed because there was no viable, comprehendible way that the contemplated "lump sum" verdict or settlement Claimants claned to be pursuing could be shared by the actaal named Plaintiffs in the Gold Coast case, let alone a universe of claimants. The original fee agreement provides for division based upon "actual losses," despite the fact that none of the named Plaintiffs had any "actual losses " By defmition, a perfected bad faith Plaintiff is one who has been made whole, i.e., one who has no actual losses.

Complainants, who drafted the Gold Coast fee agreement, never considered how to divide a lutnp sum recovery based on the tenns of the Gold Coast fee agreement they drafted, There clearly was no viable basis' apon which to divide a lump sum recovery and the Complainants, themselves, recognized this in 2004 when they abandoned the "actual loss" recovery provision and suggested, instead, that any settlement would have to be split however 90% of the claimants agreed, and not based upon the flawed, unworkable original fee agreement Complainants prepared. Tab 6. konically, the notion that it would be left to the claimants (441 of them according to Complainants) to decide how to split a recovery was rejected and labeled by Complainants in 2002 as unworkable ~ and it clearlywas!

Complainants claim about a secret side-deal is a red-herring and contradicts the position they took in the underlying case. Complainants steadfastly contended, dilution, through addition ofPlaintiffs, as the case progressed, was not a concern. Complainants had to take this positions knowing that dilution through adding Plaintiffs put them in a conflict. So, according to Complainants, every additional Plaintiffadded to the case would innrementally add (like another drop in a pond) to the value of the case. If dilution was a non-issue, as Complainants insisted, then all the discussion about Mr. Leniner's secret side deal letter to Dr. Stashakis a red-herring, as Dr. Stasbak's interest in the litigation was but "one drop hi the ever increasing pond," which meant Dr. Stashak's interest (and pro-rata recovery) could never drop below where it started on day one. In shoit, the alleged, secret side deal could not hapact any other Plaintiffs, at least

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according to the Complainants, because each additional plaintiffwould rise the tide for all boats (i.e, for all clients). Further, Ms. Watson was not involved is, and had no knowledge of, the letter allegedly reflecting a secret skle deal.

As Jim Tighlman (Mr. Stewart's partner) noted from day one, the mixing of perfected with unperfected claims (Complainants' plan and strategy) created a "conflict" and "inherent tension" and, thus, represented yet another flaw in the Gold Coast case they were in charge of prosecuting. The unnamed, unperfected claimants were the only ones who could theoretically claim "actual losses," as perfected claimants had been madewhole through the resolution oftheir PIP claims. On the other hand, the perfected claimants could take the position that the unperfected claimants had no bonafule claim until their respective claims were perfected and were not part of the lawsuit (taking no risk, devoting no time). This inherent and obvious conflict and tension (at least obvious to Mr. Tighlman) was not one that was (or could ever have been) overcome, as 5/6 of the so-called "universe" consisted of unperfected claimants. This created the anomaly that the unnamed, mperfected claimants could easily outvote the named bad faith plaintiffs in any decision about splitting a recovery, Complainants' own trial expert, Mr. Burman, acknowledged yet another conflict: no recovery could be divided with unnamed Plaintiffs without the consent of all named Plaintiffs. Dr. Stashak testified he would never have agreed to this. So did all of the other bad faith clients. Tab 2. All of this put in place the train wreck to come. But, the Complainants were driving the train.

Diego Asencio, an attorney who specializes both PIP and bad faith cases, unlike either the Complainants orRespondents, testified in depositionin the Gold Coast as follows:

And I saw what Larry Stewatt's approach was. Just keep adding more Plaintiffs. And that is what created the house ofcards because yon can't manage that kind of litigation that way. He was tr/mg to tum a PIP, bad faith into a quasi41ass action and you can't do that.... because you can't control it. When youhave that many Plaintiffs there is going to be disagreement. There is going to be conflict. There is going to be difficulty in communicating to the client, You are going to eventually have the thing implode on itself which it eventually did in this case.

Plainly, the Complainants' strategy for prosecuting the Gold Coast case was legally and ethically flawed from day one but, nevertheless, serves as the basis for their civil claim and Bar complaint. Complainants were the architects and builders of the house of cards they claim came crushing down,

With respect to releasing bad faith claims, it must be noted that the bad faith case, which settled for $L75 million, was, probably worth next to nothing. The bad faith case was seeking purely punitive damages (i.e., no compensatory damages) and was, on its best day, theoretically subject to the $2 million punitive damage cap under the Florida Tort Reform Act. The $2 million figure was, itself, unmalistic, as punitive damages are usually capped at three times

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actual losses and there were no actua11osses claimed by the Gold Coast plaintiffs. Moreover, one Piorida Appellate court had held - at the time of the Gold Coast mediation - - that the conduct serving as the basis for the bad faith case was totally proper and legal, which meant there was no merit to the bad faitli case, In addition, the Supreme Court's landmark punitive damage decision in State Farm v. Campbell (which said an 8-1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was the outer botmds of what might be constitutional) gutted the bad faith case, and was so devastating, it caused Complainants to thteatento withdraw.

Trrespective of what Claimants may now contend, the bad faith case had not just the usual one or two problems that every case has but a multitude of potentially fatal defects. Those defects include, but are not limited to, the follovng: the Gold Coast case was always subject to, at any point prior to trial, being severed into 36 separate suits (destroying the contemplated lump sum recovery plan), as there were unique issues to each and every claimet that the jury would have to independently consider, including who insured them, the viability of what Plaintiffst labeled as "risky assignments," whether they had a "good" or "weak" perfected claim, as described by Mr. Stewart, whether any savings, by whatever Progressive entity may have provided the insurance, was subsequently exhausted by the insured, resulting in no savings to Progressive, the amount of actual damages (if any) suffered by each claimant, the fact that the Gold Coast case relied upon statutory bad faith notices which Claimants detaanined were Jegally insuflicient. The trial court had not even approved the bringing ofa punitive damage claim, the only claim the Gold Coast plaintiffs were interested in pursuing. The Gold Coast Plaintiffs also had to overcome the fact that their primary target, Progressive Corporation, was not even an insurer, which is the only type ofparty that could be liable for had faith.

On the issue punitive damages, the following personal experienced-based observations of Mr. Asencio are compelling.

What rm telling you is you don't get to punitives on a case like this. There's no outrage here, there's no reprehensibility, there is not even a proven violation of law. The issue is still up there. Nobody really knew whether or not yon even had to have a P.P.O. policy. It hadn't been tested. Nobody knew whether or not the courts were going to have any problem with the carriers using computer programs. And in fact the tamd, ifyou follow PIP, law, was that the courts were tired ofPlP. litigation, there was too much PIP, litigation. The trend was in tort reform against PIP. litigafion and that starting 1998 and its been going on ever since, The courts are sick and tired of the fact that there are so many lawyers suing for PlP. benefits representing chiropractors and all kinds ofentities, clinies and what have you. And the juries are not all that receptive to arguments that you even win a PIP. case. Now, when you do try a PIP. case and win a PIP., case, if the jurors know that on top ofwhat you've whacked the insurance company for a hefty load of attomey's fees they would be appalled. Now, you go into the bad faith with that. All the actual damages have been paid plus they whack them for a hefty amount of attomey's fees. But you know what, they haven't been punished

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enough because they were trying to save money using a computer program, don't know how you can convince ajury that that'areprehensible.

On the other hand, all parties agreed at trial that the underlying PlP cases were not only winnable but that the Respondents were winning those cases (both benefits and fees). Complainants acknowledge that Ms, Watson was winning virtually 100% of her cases and obtaioing full benefits plus interests for all_clients. This also meant that Ms. Watson's accrued fees were earned and would eventually be paid by Progressive and, consequently, were not tenuous like the bad faith case. With their eyes wide open, the Complafnants agreed, from day one, they would have no interest in Respondents* eamed PIP fees, the most valuable aspect of the dispute with Progressive,

The GoldCoast fee agreements made clear that the Plaintiff firms were NOT going to share in the Defendant firms' PIP fees. The Gold Coast fee agreements provide as follows:

This contract does not apply to the breach of contract PIP cases brought separately by KANE & KANE, MARKS & FLEISCHER, PA and/or LAURA M. WATSON, PA, d/b/a WATSON & LENTNER on behalf of FISHMAN & STASHAK, M.D., PA; d/b/a GOLD COAST ORTHOPEDICS also d/b/a GOLD COAST ORTHOPEDICS AND REHABILITATION.

It is contemplated by the parties that PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY and/or any of its divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates or related entities

. may propose a settlement that could include the resolution of clahns filed pursuant to this Agreement and other claims that were not broughtpursuant to this representation. In such an event, it is agreed that this Agreement shall not incInde that portion of any settlement that Is attributable to those other claims or lawsuits including but not Ilmited to contract benefits damages for breach of contract, interest and any statarory attorneys fees that KANE & . KANE, MARKS & FLEISCIER, P.A., LAURA WATSON, PA d/b/a WATSON & LENTNER would be due en such separate claims,'

The real conflict occurred when Claimants realzed the case they were pursuing was a lot less valuable than the PIP claims Respondents were pursuing but which Claimants had no interest in.

AII parties at trial confirmed that the understanding that the Clahnants would not share in the PIP fees continued through the March/April 2004 time frame, i.e. just before mediation, At that tirae, all parties are also in agreement that Larry Stewart broached the subject of the Plaintiff firms being compensated if they could secure a settlement of the PIP cases. The parties then

A reference to this PIP fee carve-out, representing the parties understanding from day one, was conspicuously absent from the Final Judgment,

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agreed that, ifMr. Stewart could achieve such a result, his percentage of the bad faith recovery would increase from 60% to 75%. This understanding was memorialized with written addenda to Gold Coast fee agreements, On page 8 of its Final Judgment, the Court, consistent with these facts, finds and concludes,

The Defendant law firms authorized Plaintiffs to negotiate the settlement of the PIP claims and also agreed to Inorease the attorney's fees to the Plaintiffs from the bad faith portion ofany recovery.

Ironically, when Complainants and Respondents were on the same side, Complainants had nothing butpraise for Ms. Watson's work ethic and effectiveness in resolving the underlying PIP cases. Plaintiffs used WatsonS information (as opposed to the other PIP finn's information) because it was the most thorough and complete - - it also centered actual fee awards! At trial, Watson once again demonstrated that her infonoation was thorough and complete by presenting what was referred to as the "phone book," a composite exhibit the size of a phone book containing volumes of information about her experience, reputation, expertise and prior fee awards in the PIP field. Tab 95. Mr. Stewart also testified at the injunction hearing (at the commencement of the case with Respondents) that the Respondents would not be "unjustly enriched" if they received the value of their PIP fees as a result of their settlement with Progressive. Mr, Stewart also grudgingly admitted that Progressive pushed Watson "to the bitter end" in all her cases before resolving them and Mr. Hearon confirmed that it appeared that Progressive was trying to put Watson out of business. It is beyond dispute that Progressive took the Respondents to the proverbial "mat."

It simply cannot be understated that Ms, Watson had 770 PIP files (and attending fee and cost claims) as part of the oveall dispute that were settled. Some ofthese were already settled witb fees awarded but not paid. The Judges in South Florida, who actually decided Ms. Watson's fee claims, appreciated that Ms. Watson camed her PTP fees. In one ofthe fee orders accepted into evidence by Judge Crow, Judge Pratt found and noted the following about Ms, Watson: Tab 3.

Plaintiff's counsel, Laura Watson, reasonable [sic] expended 41.4 hours representing Plaintiff in this case, which encompassed 2 1/2 years of litigation. An hourly rate of $250.00 per hour is on the lower end of reasonable for Ms. Watson, considering ber experience, reputation and superior ability and the sldll requsite to perform the legal services properlym. This was not an ordinary PIP case but was one of several hundred raising the complex issue of PPO reductions. The evidence showed that taking on these cases precluded other employment and counsel bad to work quickly in initiating the cases becanse ofthe statute of limitations. Plaintiff recovered $2,865.00 for the client in this suit,

s Watson is separatelyproviding the "telephone" book submitted into evidence proving that she camed all her fees,

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which was one of several hundred involving claims of a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. Unlike the situation where risk of loss may be mitigated by having a volume of similar suits from a client with some easy and some difficult cases mixed in, all of Plaintiffs cases were going to be time consuming and unique. Thus the contingency risk was not mitigated in any way, but was aggravated.~, The fact remains in this case that Ms. Watson knew at the outset that these cases would not settle like the majority of PIP cases do; that the cases would consume a lot of her firm's resources, and there was no way to mitigate this risk. Although there are a number of firms doing PIP cases, few are handling PPO suits in 2001, plus few have the resources to jhigge_ hundreds of cases simultaneously on multiple fronts,... Having detennined to apply risk factor, the court finda a multiplier of L75 to be appropriate,,,. The comt has set the hourly rate at the lower end of the reasonable range here in enticipation of the application of a multiplier. If the court were not applying a multiplier, then it would have set the hourly rate at the higher end ofthe range given the facts ofthe case as described herein.

t

Ms. Watson testified - which testimony was completely cooborated by time records, fee awards and other documentary evidence'- - that the lowest hourly rate she was ever awarded was $250.00 per hour, that she had a fee award of $300.00 per hour (without a multiplier) and the above-described fee award of $250.00 per hour plus a 1.75 multiplier, which comes out to $437.50 per hour, Ms. Watson father testified, again fully supported by evidence presented at trial, that her average fee award in the 2003/2004 timeframe was $13,998.15. Ms. Watson estimated that her firm (meaning all lawyers and paralegals in the fmn), had reasonably expended 24,000 hours on the prosecution of4 years of PIP cases that wem ultimately resolved in June of 2004, At rates of $200, $250 and $300 per hour, the Coutt would anive at $400.000, $6,000,000 and $7,200,000, respectively, as the reasonable value of the Ms. Watson PlP work subsumed in the Progressive settlement. Moreover, at the time of the settlement with Progressive, Ms. Watson had been awarded, imt not paid, $300,000,00 by one court, alone, had 53 fee hearings set to determine the amount she was owed, and another 122 cases where entitlement had already been decided in the Watson firm's favor. All of these fee claims, including the $300,000.00 the Watson firm was awarded but not paid, were subsumed in the settlement with Progressive. Put another way, Ms. Watson already had the right to recover more than a million in fees she would have received even without any settlement with Progmssive.

At the injunction hearing in the Gold Coast case, Mr. Stewart testified, "By far the lawyers had the biggest stakes. To give you an idea, at one point and time we did an analysis and the typical benefit claim was less than $1,000.00 whereas the typleal fees were over $5,000.00 ... in the later years the fees because more time had gone, the fees were getting up close to $10,000.00 - - averaging $10,000.00 a claim, At $10,000.00 per file, per Mr. Stewart's estimates, Ms. Watson's fee claims were worth $7.7 million.

6 Her calendars show thousands ofhearings across the state, She also had 73 appeals.

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Watsorts firm however, realized $2,522J92,90 in PIP fees from the Progressive settlement, a substantial seven-flgure discount of the fees she earned over four years in hard fought litigation withProgressive. The Bar should also be mindful of the fact that Ms. Watsods clients received 100% of their benefits, Interest and a release from Progressive, which was aggressively pursuing Ms. Watson's clients for overpayments. Every single PIP ellent of Ms. Watson's was made 100% whole and was released from threatened overpayment claims! See rabs 7 and 8. Yes, they also released bad faith but that - - releasing bad faith as part of a release ofa first party insurance claim~ is standani practice and the absolute norm in the South Florida commaity.

As to Ms, Waton's bad faith clients, each one of them signed affidavits (Tab 2), stating the following:

In April of 20041 am told that a mediation was held in the Fishman/Stashak case, I was not invited to attend the mediation even though I was a named plaintift I was not told of any strategy for the mediation and I was not asked to authorize any particular deal. I am told that at the mediation, Larry Stewart made a demand for a sum ofmoney to settle not just the claims ofthe thirty six plaintiffs in the Fishman/Stashak case, but of more than four hundred other health care providers that were not in the case. I am also told that an offer was supposedly made by Progressive at the mediation which was to be divided between approximately 440 different health care providers, even though there were only thirty six plaintiffs in the case. I was not asked if I wanted to accept that offer. I am told that Latty Stewart rejected Progressive's offer without consulting with any of the named plaintiffs other than Drs. Fishman and Stashak.

SETTLEMENT OF THE BAD FAITH CASE In May of 2004 I was contacted by my lawyers and advised that there was an opportunity to settle all of my remaining PIP cases with Progressive if I was willing to drop my bad faith claims. I Was willitig to do this and authorized Watson & Lentner to enter into such a settlement. Subsequently, I was advised that a settlement on those terms with Progressive had not been approved by all of the health care providers. My lawyers then relayed a settlement offer from Progressive for the bad faith case whereby I would abate $1,750,000.00 with the thhty five other named plaintiffs in the bad fnith case. In addition, in a separate setdement of outstanding P]P cases, I would receive full payment of all outstanding PIP claims together with interest and costs of litigation. In this arrangement, Watson & Lentner settled on the amount of attomeys fees they would receive for their work on our PIP cases. I received a letter from Larry Stewart which I understood to be in his advice that I not settle the bad faith case. I also received a letter from Watson & Lentner whch explained that there was a disagreement between Lany Stewart and

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Watson & Lentner about how to handle the bad faith case and whether it should be settled.

These affidavits contradlet virtuaHy aH of the Complainants' aHegations about what Ms. Watson's clients were told about the settlement.

The Failed Mediation and Subsennent Settlement

Complainants attended mediation, technically representing only the thirty six named plaintiffs in the bad faith case. But, only one of those clients, Dr. Stashak, was notified of the mediation, Dr. Stashak best describes how Complainants (mis)treated him at mediation. Tab1.

The mediation failed and Mr. Stewart advised Respondents (but not the clients) that the case was going to trial and that Progressive acted in bad faith at mediation. Mr. Stewatt also represented to Judge Stettin that the mediation was a waste of an entire day. Progressive then approached Marks & Fleischer (but not Ms. Watson) in an attempt to settle the claims. An offer was made by Progressive to Mr. Fleircher that included a global number to settle all PIP benefits, claims. attamey fees and costs. This initial settlement process was commenced and undertaken without Ms. Watson's knowledge.

After Progressive reached a settlement with Marks & Fleischer, it asked Amir Fleischer to contact Ms. Watson to see if she would be interested in resolving her cases, Progressive also asked Mr. Fleischer to approach Kane & Kane about settlement and all Respondents eventually agreed to msolve their cases with Progressive. Meanwhile, Mr. Stewart authorized Progressive a attorney to negotlate a settlement directlywith Respondents.

Following the agreement on the settlement amount, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was drafted detailing the settlement, The MOU did not assign any amount for the bad faith case. However, all Respondents wanted to ensure that their clients and Complainants were compensated and immediately met with Mr. Stewart in his office to tell him this in person. The settlement structure was discussed with Complainants who questioned the ethical nature of the settlement. Ms. Watson agreed that the first attempt to settle this matter presented an ethical dilemma because of the nature of the offer and she made it clear to Pmgressive that the frst settlement was unenforceable. Ms. Watson, at that point, removed herself from the settlement process. Respondents then jointly sought advice ofcounsel, Irwin Gilbert, who was amember of a Florida Bar Grievance committee. Mr. Gilbert advised the other Respondents that the case had to be renegotiated from scratch and settled the bad faith case first for a specific negotiated dollar amount, Ms. Watson was not involved in this process or in communicating whh the clients, a task undertaken by her husband, Datin Lentner.

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Notification to Clients

After the settlement ofthe Bad Faith case, a settlement ofall of Ms. Watson's fitm's PIP suits against Progressive was obtained. A second, revised MOU was drafted. A detailed letter explaining the negotiations and, the previous offers and events was provided to the olients. Ms. Watson played no part in negotiating or drafting the second MOU. See Affidavits at Tab 2 and commmdcations at Tab 4 Mr. Lentner, on behalf of Ms. Watson's firm, spoke to clients about the settlement, Tab 7.

With respect to the post-mediation "circumstances? which are far from ideal. Mr. Stewart must ancept some responsibility along with the Respondents. He, after all, is the one who authorized Progressive to discuss resolution directly with the Respondents. Mr. Stewart testified that Respondents let Progressive put them in a irresolvable conflict by entering into an unallocated, settlement but he was the one who elected to allow Progressive to deal directly with the Respondents and then madeno bona fide effort to intervene (other than filing a charging lien) and stop the settlement from going forward after finding out about the settlement which allocated zero dollars to bad faith, Mr. Stewart admits he took no action. with the presiding judge to stop the settlement from going forward and, strangely never even picked up the phone to discuss the matter with Progressive, If, at the time, Mr. Stewatt were 1mly concemed that the clients (as opposed to the lawyers) were being victimized by Respondems, he could have brought a motion before the Court seeking an order to show cause why the Comt should not stop the settlement from going forward. But, the only thing Claimants did was seek to enjoin distribution of fees.

There Was No Failure to Eserow Settlement Proceeds

The bad faith case resolved for $1.75 million dollars. Recall, the bad faith case was purely one for punitive damages, which (i.e., the punitive damage claim) the judge had not even permitted when the case was resolved. The $1.75 million amount was extraordinarily generous. Nevertheless, sixty percent of that amount was distributed to the clients. The attorney fees from that settlement was 40%, which was supposed to be split between the Respondents' law firms and the Complainants' law firms. At the commencement of the case between claimants and Respondents, the trial court conducted a four day injunction hearing where the Court was specifically asked by Complainant, to order Respondents to keep all of the disputed funds in escrow pending the outcome of the case but the Comt did not so enjoin Respondents, Nevertheless, the entire fee for the $L75 mtDion settlement was placed in a special escrow account Ms. Watson's trust account created. Complainants know this but omitted it from their Bar complaint. The fee escrow was subsequently made subject to Court Orders (Tab 5) providing as follows:

ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPF1RRLEASE OF ESCROW FUNDS THIS CAUSB, came before the Comt on Defendants, Marks & Fleischee,

P.A.., Gary Marks, and Amit Fleischer's, Motion to Compel Release of Escrow

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Funds and the Comt, having heard argument of counsel and being otherwise advised in the premises,

FINDS, ORDERS AND ADJUDGES as foHows: The Court has been advised by counsel that, in 2004, Defendants

placed $710,000.00 in escrow in connection with the settlement of the case captioned Fishman & Stashak, M.D. v, ne Progressive Corporation et. al ("the Progressive Action"). According to Defendants, this escrow account was created specKicaHy for the purpose of setting aside an amount equalto a 40% contingent fee in connection with the settlement of the Progressive Action. The Court is further advised that $515,000.00 was recently transferred from the Laura Watson Escrow Account to a trust account of one of the Plaintff Law Firms, leaving a balance in the Laura Watson Escrow Account of rongbly $222,704.42. The Court is further advised that there is now a dispute between the Defendant Law Firms concerrdng how the balance of the funds in the Laura Watson Escrow Account should be disbursed and who has the right to control and direct how those funds are disbursed and ultimately distributed. Defendants, Laura Watson and Laura Watson, P.A., have, in view of this dispute, offered to make all future disbursements or distributions from the Laura Watson Escrow Account subject to Court control. Accordingly, the Court ordets that no further distributions or disbursements from the Laura Watson Escrow Account shall be made without further order of this Court.

Ms. Watson did not receive one dime of the SL75 million settlemant.

E Response to Specific Alleged VIolations

A. Rule 4-L8(g). Settlement of Claims for Multiple Clients. No client of Ms, Watson's firm has ever claimed a violation ofRule 4-L8 (g).

The settlement of the bad faith case was in fact "an aggregate settlement" as contemplated by the rule 4-LS(g). Ms. Watson was not involved in communicating with clients in connection with the settlement, which Mr. Lentner undertook, Mr, Lentner complied with this rule by informing each client the total settlement amount, how the settlement was going to be divided amongst the clients and how the fees were going to be divided, in addition, each client was informed of the Complainants' demand and oEer that had occurred at the earlier mediation as well as the method by which the settlement demand and oHers were derived. As noted above, each of the 36 bad faith clients executed an affidavit stating the complete satisfaction with the settlement and confirming what was disclosed to them. Tab 2.

The settlement ofMs. Watson's PIP claims was not en aggegate settlement. Each client retained her firm to recover unpaid PTP benefits only. Tab 7 and S. No client's recovery was affected by how much the attorney or other clients received. Each client had differing amounts owed, depending upon the number ofpatients, how amch and what kinds ofservices each client

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billed and the date the services were performed, In the settlement each client recovered and received 100% of the PIP benefits owed and the interest owed them by Progressive. Further each client was advised that, in order to receive the benefits owed them by Progressive, they would have to give up any "potential" bad faith claim they might have. Tab 2. Each client was explained this and all of Ms. Watson's clients chose to accept the offer to waive any potential bad faith claims. Tab 7 and 8. As noted above, insurance company settlements always (or almost always)involvereleases ofbad faith as a matter ofcourse.

B. Rule 7-L7(a)-(c). Conflict ofInterest. No clientofMs, Watson has ever claimed a violation ofRule 4-L7(a) through (c).

No contllot of interest existed. These were two distinct classes of clients that were involved in two distinct settlements. Ms. Watson represented numerous health care providers in hundreds of PIP suits. Each ofthese clients retained Ms. Watson to represent thmn on PIP suits only. Tab & Each of these clients teceived 100% of the PIP benefits and interest owed them by Progressive and knowingly agreed to forgo any potential bad faith claim. Tab 2, 7. 8. The second distinct class ofc]ients were those clients that retained Ms. Watson's firm to represent themio a bad faith case. These clients and these clients alone controlled the bad faith case and ultimately settled their case against Progressive. See Tab 2. Ms. Watson has received no fees from the bad faith case and sacrificed well over a million dollars in PIP fees in connection with the Progressivesettlement.

C. Rule 4-L8(a), AcquirIng Interest Adverse to Client,No client ofMs. Watson has ever claimed a violation ofRule 4-L8 (a).

See Responseto A and B, above, and Tab2, 7 and 8.

D. Rule 4-L4{b). Duty to Explain Matters to Client, No client ofMs, Watson has ever claimed a violation ofRule 4-1.4 (b).

See Response to A and B, above. Ms. Watson would also refer the Bar to the deposition testimony (Tab 7) of Dr. Cimerberg, who testified that Mr. Leutner personally discussed and disclosed the settlement to him and to the deposition of Peggy Mullen, who confirmed that her medical practice was completely satisfied with the representation1t received from Ms. Watson's firm and had no interest in knowing the amount of FIP fees camed so long as they were inade whole, i.e., received the benefits and interest due and owing, which always occurred. (Tab 8),

E, Rule 4-4.L TruthfnIness in Statement to Others. No client ofMs. Watson has ever claimed a violation ofRule 4-4.1

See Response to A and B, above and Tab2, 7and 8,

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F. Rule 4-L5(f)(5). No client ofMs, Watson's firm has ever claimed a violation ofRule 41.5(f)(5).

The PIP clients received 100% ofthe PlP benefits and interest owed them by Progressive. No funds were deducted from the client's recoveryt as such, no closing statement was requred for these PIP, breach of contract claims. See Tabs 7 & B. The bad faith clients received a detailed break down ofhow the had faith settlement was distributed Tab4. Of the SL75 million settlement, the clients combined share was 60% and they were paid this amount. This 60% was not reduced by costs nor any other amount. The fonnula used to divide this 60% amongst the bad faithclients was fully explained and disclosed to them. Tab 4; 7andB

G. Rule 4-L15. Compliance With Trust Accounting Rulesi Rule 5-1.1(f), Disputed Ownership of Trust Funds. No client of. Watson's fam has ever claimed a violation ofRule 5-Ll(f)nor Rule 4-1.15.

The entire fee for the bad faith settlement was placed in a special escrow account created by . Watson. This money has only been disputed to Complainants. Ms, Watson has not received any fees from the bad faith settlement. No client's money was improperly commingled and no trust for Mr. Stewart was ever requimi or ordered by a court. . Watson has complied with all comt orders addressing the escrowed funds. Tab 5. . Watson has never received, nor taken, a fee from the bad faith settlement. The Court's ruling rejecting a constructive tmst ref1cets Complaluants had no proprietary interest in the damages awarded in the undedying civil proceeding.

E Judge Crow% Referral. Judge Crow appears to have gone out ofhis way to note ethical concems as to only "some of the Defendant attemeys._" Judge Crow was not critical in his detailed twenty-threepage Final Judgment of a single thing. Watson ever did. The only thing Judge Crow questioned and cballenged, with aspect to . Watson, was the amount of time she claimed to have spent on theProgressive PIP cases, The specific Bar mles Judge Crow cites on the last page of the Final Judgment bear no relationship to the on-going dispute overthe amount and value of the time spent by . Watson. Ms. Watson submits that Judge Crow was clearly signg that she was not one of the attorneys he had in mind in referring his Final Judgment to the Bar. Moreover, appellate courts are not shy about referring attomeys to the Florida Bar. See e.g, JP Morgan Chase vs. Hernandet - - SoJd - 3 2011 WL 2499641 (Pla.3dd DCA 2011) (making specific referral to Bar for detennination of whether disciplinary proceedings were warranted). No refercal was made by the Fomth District here.

Conclusion

Ms, Watson will conclude by focusing on what is conspienously missing from this complaint; that is, a single complaint or challenge by any of the many healthcare providera who were involved as either bad faith clients or PIP clients. Many ofthese healthcare providers were dragged into this process as, either deposition or trial witnesses, and are fully aware of what