SCIT

Minimizing Losses from Zero Days – A New Layer of Defense (SCIT)

Next Generation Server Security Technology

Arun Sood Ph. D. Dept of Computer Science & International Cyber Center, SCIT Labs

Inchttp://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit

http://www.scitlabs.com+1703.347.4494

Game-Change Concepts: Moving Target + Exposure Management

SCIT

Multi-National Security Breach

• http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7118452.stm

• “A huge campaign to poison web searches and trick people into visiting malicious websites has been thwarted.”

• If a user searched Google for terms such as– "hospice", "cotton gin and its effect on slavery", "infinity" and many more – The first result pointed to a website from which malicious software was

downloaded and embedded on user system.

• Criminals in country A created domains that were mostly bought by companies in country B and hosted in country C. Tens of thousands of domains were used.

• These domains tricked the indexing strategy of Google to believe that these web pages were good and reliable source of information.

Our focus: targeted and organized attacks.

SCIT

Anatomy of an Hack

Foot print analysisWho is

NSLookupSearch Engines

Enumeration

ScanningMachines

PortsApplications

ExploitationBuffer Overflow

SpoofingPassword

DOS

Damage“Owning” IP Theft, Blackmail, Graffiti,

EspoinageDestruction

Analyze publicly available info. Set scope of attack and identify key targets

Check for vulnerabilities on each target Attack targets using

library of tools and techniquesFoot print analysis

Who isNSLookup

Search EnginesEnumeration

Automated ScanningMachines

PortsApplications Deliver Payload

Custom TrojanRootkit

Damage“Owning” IP Theft, Blackmail, Graffiti,

EspoinageDestruction

Attack targets using installed software

Richard Stiennon, May 2006, http://blogs.zdnet.com/threatchaos/?p=330

Manual A

pproachA

utomated A

pproach

• Identify Target

• Install Malicious Code

• Hack Other Machines

• Take over Domain Controller

SCIT

Attacking a Multi-tier ArchitectureWeb-App-DB-Domain Controller

• Step 1: Identify Target– Network address ranges– Host names– Exposed hosts– Applications exposed on those hosts– Operating system and application version information– Patch state of both the host and of the applications– Structure of the applications and back-end severs

• Step 2: Initial Compromise– Web pages are always exposed – opportunity for ingress

• Step 3: Elevate Privileges– Become a privilege user – like internal user on the target system

• Step 4: Hacking Other Machines– Own the network.

• Step 5: Take over Domain Controller

Jesper Johansson and Steve Riley , Protect Your Windows Network: From Perimeter to Data, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2005.

SCIT

The Problem

• Verizon Business (DBIR2009): 285 M records compromised for 90 sites. Customized malware hard to detect. Intrusion persists for days, weeks, months.– Network Solutions, Wyndham Hotels.

• Symantec produced 920,000 malicious signatures in 2009.

• 50% of all vulnerabilities in web apps.

• Half of disclosed vulnerabilities had no fixes.

• Recovery from a breach is costly: $6.3M [Ponemon Inst]

• Focus on targeted and organized attacks.

Current reactive approaches are inadequate.We introduce intrusion tolerance – a new paradigm.

SCIT

Verizon (DBIR2010): Time Frame

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SCIT provides Intrusion Tolerance for servers…

Enterprise Server Firewall Hacker (Actual Photo)

SCIT Virtual Server

SC

IT V

irtual P

artitio

n

Every minute SCIT software cleans and restores the virtual server to its pristine state

The SCIT Solution

…using virtualization to restore the OS and application to a pristine state after attack!

SCIT

Defense in Depth Approach to Security

• Multi layered Approach to Security: Best if layers operate independently

• Firewalls depend on inspection of incoming packets

• IDS/IPS depend on inspection of incoming and outgoing packets– With increasing bandwidth and more matching requirements, the

cycles devoted to packet inspection will keep increasing

• Threat independent approaches are needed for protection against zero-days

• Other approaches should be included in the mix, including approaches that do not rely on packet inspection and have potential for threat independent performance:– White list of software– Time-dependent recovery-based intrusion tolerance

Cross Sector Cyber Threats Strategy

SCIT

The SCIT Solution

• Static Servers Converted to Dynamic Environment– Facilitates Incorporation of Diversity

• Threat Independent

• Rapid Recovery: Work Through an Attack

• Mission Resilience

• Emphasize Temporal Dimension

• Virtualization as a New Framework for Server Security

Cross Sector Cyber Threats Strategy

SCIT

How Does SCIT Provide Additional Security?

• SCIT servers – Regularly restored to a known state and remove malicious software installed by

attackers. – Provide protection while manufacturer is developing a patch, i.e. SCIT servers

are protected in the time period between vulnerability detection and patch distribution. 

– Gives data center managers an additional level of freedom in developing a systematic plan for patch management.

• SCIT DNS servers – Domain name / IP address mapping is protected from malicious alteration, thus

avoiding improper redirection of the traffic.

• SCIT Web servers – Protect the corporate crown jewels, front ends for sensitive information, e.g.

customer or employee data sets, IP, and informational web sites.  – Regularly restores the sites to known states, and makes it difficult for intruders

to undertake harmful acts such as deleting files. – Avoid long term defacements.– Reduces the risk of large scale data ex-filtration.

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Key Intrusion Tolerance Approaches

OASIS (DARPA) MAFTIA (EU) SCIT (GMU)

Fault Tolerance Based: Intrusion Detection First

Recovery Based

Structure Based Structure Based Time Dependent

Packet Inspection Yes Yes No

Voting Algorithm Yes Yes No

Deterministic No No Yes

Performance Impact

Yes Yes Yes

Diversity Required RequiredOptional. Diversity will

make scheme more robust

RecoveryPerformed upon

detecting intrusion.Performed upon

detecting intrusion. Built in automatic periodic

recovery.

See IEEE Security and Privacy paper for details

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Comparison of IDS, IPS, SCIT

Issue Firewall, IDS, IPS Intrusion tolerance

Risk management. Reactive. Proactive.

A priori information required.

Attack models. Software vulnerabilities. Reaction rules.

Exposure time selection. Length of longest transaction.

Protection approach. Prevent all intrusions. Impossible to achieve.

Limit losses.

System Administrator workload.

High. Manage reaction rules. Manage false alarms.

Less. No false alarms generated.

Design metric. Unspecified. Exposure time: Deterministic.

Packet/Data stream monitoring.

Required. Not required.

Higher traffic volume requires.

More computations. Computation volume unchanged.

Applying patches. Must be applied immediately.

Can be planned.

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Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3 offline servers

Server Rotation

Offlineservers; inself-cleansing

Online servers;potentiallycompromised

Servers-Virtual-Physical

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Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3 offline servers

Server Rotation

Offlineservers; inself-cleansing

Online servers;potentiallycompromised

Servers-Virtual-Physical

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Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3 offline servers

Server Rotation

Offlineservers; inself-cleansing

Online servers;potentiallycompromised

Servers-Virtual-Physical

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Server State Transitions

Additional States Planned for Analysis and Archiving

Current

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SCIT Supports Session Persistence

• SCIT does not require changing the application server or application code

• SCIT servers support session persistence but do not migrate state

• Session data is stored in shared memory or shared by multicasting among the virtual servers

• Session info is data and not executable

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SCIT - Intrusion Tolerance Approach

• Increase security by reducing exposure window– Exposure window is the time a server is online between rotations– Optimizes application-specific exposure windows to servers

• Decreasing available time for intrusion, reduces potential losses

• No packet inspection; No signatures; No detection

• SCIT does not eliminate vulnerabilities or prevent intrusions, but makes it difficult to exploit the vulnerability

• Additional layer of defense– Integrated system: prevention, detection, tolerance

• Reduce managed services cost

• Adaptive SCIT

• Increase availability – reduce down time for upgrades – fewer reboots

Loss Curve

Intruder Residence Time

Lo

ss

T

T

Co

st

SCIT

Transaction Length in Multi-tier Architecture

Layer Implementation Transaction Length

Client Layer Web site, DNS service Short

Middle Layer Authentication, Single Sign On Short

VPN, Streaming Media Long

Back End Layer Transaction Processing Short

File Access Mixed

Complex Database Queries Long

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Exposure Time Reductions

Application Current Server SCIT Server

Websites – Windows Server 1 day to 3 month 60 seconds

Websites – UNIX Server 1 month to 6 months 60 seconds

DNS services – Linux Server 3 months to 1 year 30 seconds

In the following slides we show that:

Reducing Exposure Time Significantly Reduces Expected Loss

SCIT

Security Risk Assessment

Threat Probability

Criticality Factor

Effort Required

Risk Factor(Criticality/Effort)

Threat Level(Threat Probability x Risk Factor)

Vulnerability Factor

Asset Priotiy

Impact (Loss Factor)

Exposure Factor (EF)(Threat Level x Impact)

Single Loss Expectancy(SLE)

Annual Loss Expectancy(ALE)

x Asset Value (AV)

x Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO)

Follows SecurityFocus.com (Symantec), Microsoft

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Risk Shaping by Exposure Time

SCIT

Multi Tier Example

Zone 1

DatabaseServer

Zone 3

Content Management Server

Workstation

Un-trusted domain

High Risk

Corporate Trusted domain

Medium Risk

Private domain

Low Risk

Zone 2

SCIT

SCIT vs Traditional Cumm Single Loss Expectancy

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

$70,000

$80,000

SCIT Exposure Time

Reducing Exposure Time Significantly Reduces Expected Loss

Multi Tier Architecture

Web serverDNS server

Content ManagerDatabase server

SCIT

Avoidance is Better Than Cleaning

• You cannot clean a compromised system by – patching it. – removing the back doors. – using some vulnerability remover. – using a virus scanner. – reinstalling the operating system over the existing installation.

• You cannot trust – any data copied from a compromised system. – the event logs on a compromised system. – your latest backup.

• The only proper way to clean a compromised system is to flatten and rebuild.

• CLEANING COMPROMISED SYSTEMS IS DIFFICULT. IT IS BETTER TO AVOID HACKING.

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Case Study: Payment Card Industry

• Cost per exposed accounts (legal and professional fees, customer contact, post event clean up and improvements)

– More than 1M accounts compromised: $50 per account– Few (1500) accounts compromised: $1500 per account

• Cost for protecting data – 100,000 customers

• Bottom Line: Cost of exposed accounts >> Cost of protection

• Reducing Exposure Time provides additional layer of defense - makes it more difficult to exploit vulnerabilities and steal data.

Method $ per customer Comments

Year 1 Recurring

Encrypt data at rest $5 $1 Application Changes

Host IDS $6 $2 False Alarm management

Continuous security audits $3 - $4 $3 - $4 Vulnerability scanning

Source: Rapid 7 – Vulnerability Management Trends. Also Gartner Group

SCIT

Sample Requirements Met by SCIT Servers

• Web site should not be defaced longer than 1 minute

• DNS tables should be restored within 1 minute

• System should reduce data ex-filtration – when combined with IDS the volume of data that can be maliciously retrieved can be computed

• To ensure clean servers, remove malware every minute

• Change the face of the website every minute

SCIT

Randomized Defensive Strategies

• Current servers are static and overexposed -almost sitting ducks

• Randomly change the exposed face of the target– Hide, obscure, alter, move target

• Develop approaches that are effective in server farms and at the point of the spear

• Issues to address:– Impact on system administration– Scalability

SCIT

Comparing 4 Architectures

IDS

NIDS + HIDS NIDS + SCIT

SCIT

SCIT

Results of Simulation

Parameters used in the simulationSimulation Metrics

Value (units)

Number of queries used

50,000

Intruder Residence Time (IRT)

0 minutes to 2 months

Mean IRT – Pareto distribution

48 hours

Exposure Time – 2 cases

1. 4 hrs 2. 4 mins

Data Ex-filtration rate

675 records/breach

Results of the simulationCase Total

damage (records)

No. of breaches

Mean Damage (records/breach)

NIDS 245,962 (100%)

192 1,281

SCIT: ET 4hrsSCIT: ET 4 mins

55,364 (23%)1,015 (0.4%)

508508

1092

NIDS + HIDS 210,578 (86%)

164 1,284

NIDS + SCIT(ET 4 hrs)NIDS + SCIT(ET 4 mins)

20,931 (9%)

383 (0.16%)

191

191

110

2

SCIT

Target Applications

• E-Commerce payments – long session of multiple short transactions

• Streaming media

• VPN• Complex Database Queries• Back end processing

Tra

nsa

ctio

n L

eng

thLo

ng

S

hort

Low HighValue for Exposure Window Management

• Web servers• DNS services• Single Sign On• Firewalls• Authentication (LDAP)• Transaction Processors

• File Transfer (size dependent)

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Collaboration with Systems Integrators

• Lockheed Martin– Testing and validation of SCIT servers.– Funded SCIT research

• Northrop Grumman– Testing and validation of SCIT servers.– Matching partner – Virginia CTRF project

• Raytheon– Collaborated on SBIR proposal

SCIT

OverallThe SCIT platform does reduce exposure time and confuses attacker efforts.There is a slight performance degradation as exposure time is reduced.

Component Test Objectives FindingsBasic Web Server with Session persistence

Defacement (recovery)System Compromise (limit effects)Data Corruption (recovery)Data ex-filtration (limit effects)

The resilience of the underlying VM architecture proved effective at thwarting any long term or permanent damage to the platform as a result of malicious activity.

E-Commerce Application Defacement (recovery time)System Compromise (limit effects)Data Corruption (recovery)Data ex-filtration (limit effects)Shopping Cart Price manipulation

The findings were the same as the basic web server and the shopping cart was not subject to manipulation

Single Sign-On SQL injectionSystem CompromiseUnauthorized access

Due to effective firewall and authentication input filtering the SSO architecture proved immune to O/S Corruption and Database Exploitation attack vectors. The underlying rotation of SSO Virtual Machine instances proved transparent throughout the entire course of testing.

Testing by Northrop Grumman

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Lockheed Testing

• The overall security features of the SCIT system performed as advertised. This tool is very effective in ensuring application availability and the integrity of the web server itself. It provides a stable platform on which an enterprise can host web applications.

• “…The evaluators found that the first step, port scanning, was successfully accomplished. However, the Nessus software just hung when establishing sessions with the open ports it found. This was probably because the rotation of the servers deleted the session information that Nessus left on the servers. “

• Recovery from DoS attack– Verify that the system will automatically recover from a website defacement attack.– Verify that the system will automatically recover if the service is made unavailable.

• Resiliency– Verify that if the vulnerabilities were executed they would not seriously impact the overall

system

• SCIT does not fix app/OS vulnerabilities; does not protect against the integrity, and confidentiality of the user’s session and sensitive data; these properties are the same as that of the application.

• Current SCIT implementations do not change the application code.

SCIT

Quick Review + Road Map

SCIT: Why? How? Scope. Independent Validation.

Performance.

DOD Network. Specific Server: SCIT – DNS.

Scalability.

Plans.

Demo

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Performance & Functionality Stress Tests

• Workload: number of user sessions/minute (50,100,125)

• User session: – Series of request and response from server

– Select item from drop down list and add it to persistent storage

• OpenSTA is used to generate workload– 3 runs per case.

• Duration of run = 3 * Exposure time for the run– each VM is tested at least once

• Workload consists of N requests every 10 secs.

• Exposure times of 2,3 and 4 minutes, No Rotation

• Stand alone web server for Non-SCIT test.

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Performance Test Results

SCIT Server Environment

• Entry Level DELL System•Dual processor – 4 cores each•Memory: 4 GB

• Slackware OS• Apache, Tomcat,

Shopping Cart (Java)

Exp Time (minutes) User Sessions Avg. Response Time (secs)

STD Dev

2 m 50 6.16 0.07

2 m 100 6.24 0.01

2 m 125 6.27 0.02

3 m 50 6.10 0.04

3 m 100 6.15 0.02

3 m 125 6.31 0.05

4 m 50 6.08 0.04

4 m 100 6.15 0.02

4 m 125 6.14 0.02

No Rotation 50 6.03 0.01

No Rotation 100 6.03 0.00

No Rotation 125 6.04 0.00

SCIT04/19/23 38

• Sustaining Networks • SCIT provides additional layer of defense.

• Tactical Networks• SCIT provides continuity of operations, automatic recovery.

SCIT and DoD Networks

Network Relative Size Frequency of Change

Security Support Staff

Sustaining Network

Many servers. Worldwide.

Slowly changing. Large & talented support

Tactical Network

Fewer servers. Smaller region.

Potential for rapid change.

Limited support. Frequent staff rotations.

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• DODI 8500.2Enclave and Computing Environment IntegrityECID-1 Host Based IDSHost-based intrusion detection systems are deployed for major applications and for network management assets, such as routers, switches, and domain name servers (DNS).

• Payment Card Industry Data Security StandardConsumer Data Protection RequirementCompensating Control

Standards and Compliance Requirements

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• Web site/ Ecommerce• Commercial Data Centers• Government Critical Infrastructure sites

(e.g. Emergency preparedness)• Database server protection• DNS servers• SSO servers • Cloud Computing Services

Potential Target Audience

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DNS & DNSSEC & SCIT-DNS

• DNS is an essential part of Internet. – Used where names are used – web, email, web services, etc– DNS was designed for trusted environment.

• DNSSEC adds end-to-end security to DNS.– OMB has mandated DNSSEC.– “.. represents an infinitesimal presence .”

(http://dns.measurement-factory.com/surveys/200910.html) – Particularly challenging in some environments, like tactical.

• SCIT – DNS– DNSSEC is the preferred solution.– SCIT-DNS provides near DNSSEC trust with DNS convenience– Focus of Army SBIR

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SCIT – DNS

Trust Degradation With Time

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Time

Tru

stDNS SCIT-DNS DNSSEC

SCIT04/19/23 43

SCIT in Server Farms

Scalability Issues

•Can SCIT be incorporated in Enterprise environments?– Many servers– Many applications

•Can SCIT work in a multiple apps per server environment?

•Can SCIT VMs be distributed across the server farm?

•Can SCIT effectively exploit multi-core architectures?

Version 1 Objectives

•System Admin Function– Many apps and servers– Monitoring of the system state– Diagnostics

•Deployment of VMs– App related VMs are assigned to

the servers• Distribute after testing at a

staging server• System captures VM map to

facilitate deployment

•Distributing the sever load – Prelim simulation model– Resource Allocation model

SCIT

Staging Server

04/19/23 44

Pristine Image VM

SCIT Configuration & Construction

SCIT04/19/23 45

Current Status• Validated the scalability of SCIT: Developed SCIT Infrastructure

System (SIS)– Monitor server farm from a single point– Diagnostics from a single location– Automate the staging, testing and deployment of SCIT apps

• Pristine images, clones, dispatcher, controller• Specified the key management requirements• Configuration

– Simulation of SCITized multiple application server farm

• Independent validation at Lockheed units– Testing at Gaithersburg, Omaha, Rockville – Capture new use cases: upload and download of files taking 3 to 4 minutes: Share

Point

• Independent validation at Northrop Grumman Triad Labs - Colorado

• Moving target defense

• SCIT DNS

• SCIT SSO – SAML compatibility

• Community of interest: pubs, invited presentations and workshops

• Parallel Effort: Development, Quantitative, Simulation

SCIT04/19/23 46

Way Ahead

• Further Validation and Certification– Seeking Pilot project opportunities

• Examine long duration applications– Up to 5 minute uploads

• SCIT improvements– Dispatcher is static; can this be rotated; what about apps distributed

across server boxes– Dynamism enables diversity in deployment: OS, App, Memory Image– Multi-level rotations: apps, OS, hardware

• SCIT reconnaissance

• SCIT in cloud computing, Virtualized Desk Top Infrastructure

• Multiple apps per server

• Adaptive SCIT; Memory image based IDS; Hardware Enabled SCIT

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IP Protection and Recognition

Issued Patents:

• " Self-Cleaning System“, US 7549167. Issued 6/16/2009. Inventors: Yih Huang and Arun Sood

• "SCIT-DNS: Critical Infrastructure Protection through Secure DNS Server Dynamic Updates", US 7680955. Issued 03/16/2010. Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang and Arun Sood.

• “Single Use Server System", US 7725531. Issued May 25, 2010 Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang and Arun Sood.

Pending Patents

• "Data Alteration Prevention System", Utility Patent Application No.: 11/419,832, 5/23/2006, Docket No.: GMU-05-037U. Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang, and Arun Sood.

• Two additional patents applied in 2010.

Research Support: • Army (TATRC), NIST/CIPP, SUN, CTRF/Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin

Awards:

• Winner Security Technologies for Tomorrow – GSC and CNI-Expo competition 2 June 2010.• 2nd place GSC Cyber Security Challenge 13 Novermber2009. GSC=Global Security

Challenge, associated with London Business School.

SBIR:• Army – SCIT DNS with focus on tactical environment.

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Benefits of SCIT

• SCIT removes malware every minute without detection– “.. 85 percent of the 285 million records breached in the year were

harvested by custom-created malware.” Verizon.

• SCIT reduces data ex-filtration– Data ex-filtration is slow gradual process to avoid IDS detection &

SCIT interrupts the flow every minute

• SCIT does not rely on signatures and is threat independent– IPS / IDS depend on signature matching and focus on known

threats. SCIT relies on exposure time control.

• SCIT automatically recovers from defacement or software deletion attacks: mission resilient

• SCIT reduces intrusion response (alerts) management cost– SCIT provides an additional dimension to separate false alarms.

SCIT

SCIT: Additional Capability

• Apply hot patches– Operating Systems– Applications

• Potential for fast recovery from bad patches

• Technology that converts a static system (“sitting duck”) into dynamic system– Different types of diversity: admin cost – security trade off

• Explicit use of time in secure system design

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SCIT Publications + Contact Info

• SCIT technical publications

• Links to media reports

• Links to demo videos

http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit

http://www.scitlabs.com

Questions?Arun Sood

{asood@scitlabs.com, asood@gmu.edu}

+1703.347.4494