Security Cooperation Policy Update
FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
Mr. Jonathan NgMultinational Strategy and Plans Division
5 November 2013
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Why am I here?
To update you on policy efforts that… • better translate regional and functional strategies into effective
security cooperation guidance, and• ensure that tools and resources are targeted toward DoD priorities.
Discuss key questions about security cooperation• What is security cooperation, and what is the Policy office's role?• What are some key elements of DoD strategy-to-resources
processes?• How do I influence strategies and plans for security cooperation?• How can I ensure that the security cooperation investment is
tailored and prioritized toward what DoD wants to achieve?• How can I get more information and seek assistance?
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Security Cooperation (SC)
DoD activities that encourage and enable a partner to provide things or do things (or not) that help the USG achieve its strategic objectives• Conflict prevention/deterrence• Steps to mitigate crises before US forces are required • US or partner ability to respond in a contingency
The USD(P) disseminates SECDEF security cooperation goals and priorities and provides accountability (oversight)• What are we trying to achieve in the region or across the function?• What are the roles of the partner?• How should we be engaging the partner?• What’s really important?• Did we actually spend time/money/effort on our priorities?
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Defense/Military contacts• Exchanges• Strategic communication
Intelligence Cooperation/Information Sharing Equipment Sales/Financing/Provision Education &Training (incl. on-the-ground training,
ministerial advising, and classroom instruction) Facilities/Infrastructure Support Humanitarian Assistance Exercises
What does SC look like in practice?UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
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SC Strategy and Planning Importance
Security cooperation activities define the defense relationship and influence partner decisions
Partnerships will increasingly become more important in the current defense budget environment
Security cooperation resource investment is driven by country objectives (in a context)• Resources are shrinking, so it’s more important to target
resources toward priority policy objectives• Absent clear country objectives, component actions may not
support SECDEF intent, resources may or may not address priorities
• Someone needs to mind the store
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SC Highlights of the Strategic Guidance
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“Provide a Stabilizing Presence” “sustainable pace of presence
operations…including bilateral and multilateral training exercises.”
“build the capacity and competence of US, allied, and partner forces…”
“…require creative and innovative solutions…”
“Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches…”
“…with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these operations.”
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What Thoughtful Choices? Ask the tough questions
• What are we trying to accomplish?• Is the requirement defined?• Is it a priority?• How much is enough?• Will it work to achieve our objectives? • Are they partners or clients?• What are the risks?
Do the right things• Sweet spot: State, DoD, Partner • Specific & Measureable IMOs (or Phase 0 Shaping requirements)• Articulate the role we need partner to play• Political will and institutional capacity prerequisite to DOTMLPF• Regional over bilateral
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SC Distributed Management System
Guidance comes from the top, e.g. GEF, DPG Security cooperation values deliberately distributed
by competency + authority + priority• Functional in some cases• Regionally in others• Span of control limited at top
Resources distributed per broader system• Services (most)• State (some)• Agencies (some more)
Execution distributed by competency + proximity• Services (most, mainly through Components)• COCOMs (many)• Agencies (several)
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FABRIC
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
Policy
Oversight
Planning and Resourcing
Execution
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GEF/JSCPOSD and JS
communicate higher level intent and priorities to
COCOMsTheater/Functional Plans
COCOMs communicate prioritized intermediate
objectives and corresponding partner roles to resource providers and executors
Support PlansServices and Agencies communicate resource
application intent to COCOMs and sub-
componentsActivity Plans + Risk
AssessmentCOCOMs synchronize and deconflict
activities with resource providersCOCOMs communicate to OSD/JS
risk to intermediate objectives because partners will be unable to
execute desired role
Risk ManagementOSD and JS adjust
risk, provide resource reallocation
recommendations to resource providers, or
provide guidance change
recommendations to leaders
Resource DecisionsComponents accept recommendations or issue papers / senior
engagement
Security Cooperation Cycle
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Partner Interaction
FOUO
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Influence and validate country objectives• Partner buy-in• Interagency buy-in• 3rd party collaboration
Ensure that country objectives are incorporated into bi-lateral and multilateral exchanges
Ensure that validated country objectives are followed in resource allocation forums• FMF/IMET roundtables• Service support plans conference output• Security Cooperation event planning
conference output
Security Cooperation Cycle: OSD/JSUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
Theater/Functional PlansCOCOMs communicate prioritized intermediate
objectives and corresponding partner roles to resource providers and executors
FOUO
If you get the objectives right, a
lieutenant can write the strategy.
-- George C. Marshall
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
SC Activity
Security Cooperation Planning
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Partner Political Action• Political Communication• Votes
Partner Access Provision• Territory• Resources• Information/Intelligence• Research & Development
Partner Capacity/Capabilities Application• Internal defense (may be tied to access provision)• Expeditionary• Coalitions• Consistent with norms of accountability, transparency, legitimacy
SC Ends: Desired Partner RolesUNCLASSIFIED
For each country, DoD should have a coordinated set of
prioritized objectives that articulate the
desired partner roles
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
Coming
Guidanc
e
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Desired Bandaria Roles Support US in UN and regional Forum Leadership publicly condemns violent extremism Provides contingency access to secure port Shares information on internal challenges Deploys one peacekeeping battalion to UN mission Secures sea lanes out to 300 miles Does not employ force against innocent civilians
SC Ends: Desired Partner RolesUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
Desired partner role: Actions or absence of action by an international partner that supports
U.S. strategic goals and objectives.
FOUO
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Conflict prevention/mitigation• Provide Human Security• Deter adversaries
Contingency • Act in lieu of US forces in a contingency• Work alongside US forces in a contingency• Enable US forces in a contingency
US force development• Provide access to training areas• Provide cultural/linguistic opportunities• Participate in exercises
SC Ends: Deriving Partner RolesUNCLASSIFIED
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Ties the desired partner role to the global or regional strategy, intermediate military objectives, and contingency plans
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Will
Institutional Capacity
Operational Capability
SC Ends: Required Partner ConditionUNCLASSIFIED
Leadership Consensus Civil Society Consensus
Legitimacy and Legal Leadership and Planning Information and DecisionsResource Management Human Resources Equipment and Logistics Integrating Mechanisms
Doctrine Organizations Competencies Materiel/Equipment Logistics Human Capacity/Leadership Facilities/Infrastructure Integrating Mechanisms
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release FOUO
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SC Ends: Required Partner ConditionUNCLASSIFIED
Leadership Consensus Civil Society Consensus
Legitimacy and Legal Leadership and Planning Information and DecisionsResource Management Human Resources Equipment and Logistics Integrating Mechanisms
Doctrine Organizations Competencies Materiel/Equipment Logistics Human Capacity/Leadership Facilities/Infrastructure Integrating Mechanisms
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
Desired Partner Role: Bandaria deploys a peacekeeping battalionPolitical leadership supports deploymentsPublic supports deployments
Constitution permits/corruption lawsGen Staff can plan a PKOInformation to support ministerial decisionsPPBE-like process will sustain capabilitiesTrained personnel do not disappear into systemPKO can be sustained at a regional distanceForeign ministry linked into processes
PKO doctrine exists PKO battalion designationAssigned personnel are proficient in line with METLPKO battalion has necessary equipment/can sustainPKO battalion is capable of communicating needsLeaders are well-trained, selected on meritPKO battalion has access to training facilitiesPKO battalion can communicate with coalition forces
FOUO
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Specific defined partner condition tied to clearly defined role Measurable (observable progress) Achievable (articulated assumptions about resources, will) Relevant (to theater or functional IMOs or regional strategies) Time-Bound (3-5 year horizon at most)
Key collateral questions• Partner will? • Interagency buy-in?• Competing U.S. objectives?• Necessary sequencing?• Sustainment?
Setting meaningful objectivesUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
An objective is something to be accomplished
Objective (ends): The store has apples for sale by the opening of business on Friday.
Things you do (ways): Bob drives a truck full of apples to the store.
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Setting meaningful objectivesUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
Not-so-smart objective Smarter Objective
Build air domain awareness in Bandaria Bandaria can maintain air domain awareness over 60% of its territory by 2013 and has the organizations, personnel, and management structures to sustain this capacity.
Bandaria develops peacekeeping capacity By 2015, Bandaria can deploy one battalion of peacekeepers under UN standards to a regional contingency and sustain the force for 12 months. It has systems in place to sustain this capacity (trained personnel, equipment, UN interface) for at least 15 years.
The US military has a good relationship with Bandaria
USG interactions with Bandaria indicate that Bandaria would provide access to its ports in the event of a regional contingency for at least the next three years absent a major political shift in the country.
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SSA PPD Implementation Concept
National SSA Guidance
Department Regional & Functional
Strategies & Plans
Department Regional & Functional
Strategies & Plans
Department Regional & Functional
Strategies & Plans
Department Regional & Functional
Strategies & Plans
Department Regional & Functional
Strategies & Plans
Integrated Country Strategies
Regional Interagency SSA Assessments (as required)
Country Interagency SSA Assessments (as required)
National Security Strategy/Presidential Policy Directive/Sector Strategies/ Initiative Strategies
DoD Country Objectives
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State-DoD SC PlanningUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
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Best Practice: Partner-based Approach
Type of government and source of legitimacy• How are decisions made?
Structure and roles of state security institutions• Interior? Border guards? Gendarmerie? Elite political units?• Ministry of Defense power and status
Existing or traditional military capabilities (or lack of)• Niche roles?• Traditional strengths?• Culture of maintenance? Deployment?
Economic and budgeting capacity? Threats, external and/or internal government stability Incentives for seeking security relationship with US Counterpart personnel: source, experience, incentives Effect on regional dynamics, other partners
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Key System Interlocutors
OSD Policy Country Director Embassy Security Cooperation Officer (SCO/SDO) State Department Country Desk Officer Geographic COCOM Country Desk Officer Joint Staff Country Desk Officer Service Country/Regional counterpart DSCA Country Desk Officer
…and in some cases
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NSS IPC coordinator Functional regional strategists AT&L USDI
State (PM, INL, ISN)
DTSA DTRA Service functionals Congressional staffers
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Defense/Military contacts• Exchanges• Strategic communication
Intelligence Cooperation/Information Sharing Equipment Sales/Financing/Provision Education &Training (incl. on-the-ground training,
ministerial advising, and classroom instruction) Facilities/Infrastructure Support Humanitarian Assistance Exercises
Security Cooperation WaysUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
Activities that facilitate a relationship
…but the relationship is not an end, just another way toward the
desired partner roleFOUO
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Assistance for the Policy AOUNCLASSIFIED
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Authorities• Title 22 authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act• Title 10 authorities
Inherent to DoD (e.g., meetings, discussions, exercises) Special authorities (e.g,. 1206, 1208, CTFP, ASFF, Global
Lift and Sustain, CCIF) Funding
• State appropriation• DoD appropriation
Capability• US Forces• Civilian forces• Programs
Security Cooperation MeansUNCLASSIFIED
Authority + Funding + Capability = Tool
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Validate the activities that occur in the country• Focused on DoD objectives• Sequenced• Sync’d with political objectives
Identify unacceptable risk or overmatch • Tie required partner condition to
desired partner role• Recognize opportunity costs
Review IPLs and Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CCMD assessments)
Security Cooperation Cycle: OSD/JSUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
Activity Plans + Risk Assessment
COCOMs synchronize and deconflict activities with resource providers
COCOMs communicate to OSD/JS risk to intermediate objectives
because partners will be unable to execute desired role
Risk ManagementOSD and JS adjust
risk, provide resource reallocation
recommendations to resource providers, or
provide guidance change
recommendations to leaders
FOUO
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UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
Determining Resource & Capability Requirements To Achieve
Security Cooperation End States
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Security Cooperation Cycle: AMEUNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA ReleaseFOUO
“Really? My question is: Did we agree on what impact we expected before climbing up here?”
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SC Policy Focus Areas
Be more strategic about what we are trying to achieve (regional and functional strategies)
Improve policy demand signal• Focus attention on better articulating the “ends”
Improve SC dialogue • Identifying ends, gaps & significant risk • Managing resource & legislation expectations
Continue to advocate for shared responsibility and joint formulation with State Department• Pilot, experiment, manage expectations
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SC Planning and Process Focus Areas
Enable SC strategists and planners to:• better translate regional and functional strategies into effective
security cooperation guidance and• ensure policy priorities have tools and resources targeted• provide a more accurate activity demand signal to resource
providers
Improve Technology Security/Foreign Disclosure Processes• Develop anticipatory policies• Streamline decision-making bureaucracy
Provide better customer service to partner nations• Further reduce FMS case timelines
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Security Cooperation Initiatives
CCMD Security Cooperation Outreach • Identifies security cooperation gaps • Facilitates remedies• Team approach
Team Patchwork• “Helping security cooperation strategists, planners and executors
navigate the patchwork of tools and authorities to develop and sustain partner capacity and access”
Security Cooperation Authorities Working Group• Informal DoD-wide working group• Resource and prioritization challenges vs. authority gaps• Helps Policy build recommendations
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Security Cooperation Initiatives (2)
Country planning frameworks and collaboration• Spring/Summer 2013 VTC-based workshops• Lessons learned from divergent CCMD approaches
Policy planner & strategist seminars• Army SC Planners Course• DISAM SC Planners Course• Policy SC Oversight Course• PME integration
Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)
Security Sector Assistance IPC• PPD-23, Interagency Planning Process• National SSA priorities
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A New Kind of SC Planner Hero Critically & skeptically assesses country, plan, activities Keeps regional priority perspective Targets strategic objectives before individual activities Considers range of capability & activity options Builds contiguous logic chains: role to equipment/activity Finds sweet spot: OSD/JS, CCMD, Service, State, partner
• Various institutional objectives• “Righteous events” vs. “random acts of security cooperation”
Manages expectations
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Strives to get the most bang for the buck, not just the most bucks
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Questions?UNCLASSIFIED
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DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release
OSD/JS Panel
FOUO
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GEF/JSCPOSD and JS
communicate higher level intent and
priorities to COCOMsTheater/Functional
PlansCOCOMs
communicate prioritized intermediate
objectives and corresponding partner
roles to resource providers and
executors
Support PlansServices and Agencies communicate resource
application intent to COCOMs and sub-
components
Activity Plans + Risk Assessment
COCOMs synchronize and deconflict activities with resource providers
COCOMs communicate to OSD/JS risk to
intermediate objectives because partners will be unable to execute
desired role
Risk ManagementOSD and JS adjust
risk, provide resource reallocation
recommendations to resource providers, or
provide guidance change
recommendations to leaders
Resource DecisionsComponents accept recommendations or issue papers / senior
engagement
Security Cooperation Cycle
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Partner Interaction
FOUO
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“Another area there the Air Force can save some money is in the realm of cooperative engagements with other countries,” US Air Forces in Europe chief Gen. Mark A. Welsh III said. “We can take a hard look at” activities that fall under building partnership capacity, Welsh said. “We do an awful lot of work in that area. ...I think we do too much, so I think that's a place we can reduce." He said the Air Force engages in too many activities with emerging air forces and "not enough with near-peer" air arms.
-- Managing a Drawdown...and a War, Air Force Magazine, November 11, 2011
Service PerspectivesUNCLASSIFIED
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DoD/JS Panel: Expectations of Services
Assist in the development of Theater and Functional ends (IMOs, country objectives)• Army institutional objectives
Ensure that Army leaders communicate messages consistent with US goals (country objectives)
Assess partner capacity for LOEs where Army has functional expertise• Recommend areas where SC activity can make a difference
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DoD/JS Panel: Expectations of Services
Enable CCMDs to develop SC plans for LOEs where Army has functional expertise• Activities tied to theater and country desired ends• Discontinue and reinvent Army SC activities
Monitor partner progress• Enter partner assessment and recommendations for future
activity into G-TSCMIS• Provide feedback direct to embassy and CCMD desk officers
Evaluate the efficacy of Army activities• Identify Army SC capability gaps
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Intermediate Military Objective• What is the goal I want to achieve in the region?• How will I know that I am achieving the goal?
Desired Role of Country• What do I want the country to do/not do in support of the IMO?
engage in a political act provide access to territory, information, resources apply capabilities/capacity
Required condition of a country to play the desired role• political will• institutional capacity• operational/tactical capabilities
If the country does not play the desired role, why does it create substantial risk?
Improve the Narrative: Requirements
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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What activities must the USG conduct to encourage and enable partner to play desired role?• What activities* will encourage and enable the partner to reach the
required condition?• What activities can be conducted by interagency and international
partners?• What activities has the GCC requested other DoD components to
conduct? What activities will not be conducted? Why will those activities not be conducted?
• Capability (We don’t have the right tool in the toolbox.)• Authority (We can’t expend USG funds to conduct the activity.)• Resource (We can’t divert the tool from other commitments.)• Collaboration (We can’t get ambassador clearance, it’s a seam
issue.)
Improve the Narrative: : Gaps
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
* Activities includes transfer of defense articles and services
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What actions do we take to address significant or unacceptable risk?
Capability• Tee up a new capability requirement to the Force Capability Board
(FCB)• If necessary, develop an issue paper to fund the new capability
Authority• Verify that authority does not exist• Develop a legislative change proposal/socialize with State
Improve the Narrative: Solutions
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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What actions do we take to address significant or unacceptable risk?
Resource• Work with appropriate component to realign resource allocation (out
of court settlements)• If necessary, develop risk mitigation policy guidance for components• If necessary, develop issue paper (or tee up senior level interagency
engagement) to fund risk mitigation plan
Collaboration• Tee up the issue at an IPC• Facilitate a phone call or email to State or other entity• Develop a multi-COCOM approach to a seam issue
Framing the Discussion: Solutions
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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Examples of linked objectives—national strategic level
Assumptions
Goal Defend the homeland
Objective VEOs are unable to conduct operations that affect the U.S. homeland
VEOs are a credible threat to the homeland
Desired effect Country X supports U.S. operations to disrupt and defeat VEOs
Country X’s support will degrade VEOs’ ability to conduct operations in the U.S.
Activities • Increase the capacity of Country X’s CT units to counter VEOs
• Government officials in Country X regularly allocate sufficient money toward CT training
The reasons why Country X cannot currently support U.S. operations to disrupt and defeat VEOs is that it lacks the capacity and government investment in resources
44Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses
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Examples of linked objectives—theater strategic level
Capacity Willingness AssumptionsGoal Country X supports U.S.
operations to disrupt and defeat VEOs
Country X supports U.S. operations to disrupt and defeat VEOs
Objective Country X’s CT units have the capacity to counter VEOs
Government officials in Country X regularly allocate sufficient money toward CT training
(Above)
Desired effect Country X’s CT units have the capacity to analyze networks
Government officials see countering VEOs as a national priority
• The capacity to analyze networks will increase the capacity of CT units to counter VEOs
• Government officials do not currently invest in CT training because they do not see countering VEOs as being in their interest
Activity Train Country X’s CT units to analyze networks
Conduct high-level meetings between US and MoD officials to discuss reasons why Country X does not prioritize countering VEOs
• Training CT units to analyze networks will result in increased capacity to analyze networks
• Understanding why MoD officials in Country X do not prioritize countering VEOs will help the US change Country X’s prioritization of this issue
45Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses
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Examples of linked objectives—country operational level
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Capacity Willingness AssumptionsGoal Country X’s CT units have the
capacity to counter VEOs Government officials in Country X regularly allocate sufficient money toward CT training
Objective Country X’s CT units have the capacity to analyze networks
Government officials see countering VEOs as a national priority
(Above)
Desired effects Country X’s CT units are trained in network analysis
The US understands why MoD officials do not prioritize countering VEOs
(Above)
Activity Conduct multiple training events focused on network identification that reaches 50% of CT units in Country X
Conduct meetings with specific MoD officials that are responsible for crafting Country X’s national security strategy
• Training 50% of CT units on network identification will contribute to training all CT units in Country X on network analysis
• Conducting meetings with these stakeholders will help the US understand why MoD officials do not prioritize countering VEOs
Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses
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Examples of linked objectives—country tactical level
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Capacity Willingness AssumptionsGoal Country X’s CT units have the
capacity to analyze networksGovernment officials see countering VEOs as a national priority
Objective Country X’s CT units are trained in network analysis
The US understands why MoD officials do not prioritize countering VEOs
(Above)
Output 50% of Country X’s CT units are trained in network analysis
US officials have met with specific MoD officials that are responsible for crafting Country X’s national security strategy
(Above)
Activity Training teams engage with 10% of Country X’s CT units over a two week time frame and use practical and theoretical training to teach them network analysis
Specific US official travels to Country X to meet with 3 specific MoD officials to discuss countering VEOs
• US training teams will be able to impart necessary knowledge in identified time frame and format
• The US official will have positive interactions and learn from Country X MoD officials
Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses
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Back-Up
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security cooperation. Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. (DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Related to Security Cooperation.)
security force assistance. DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (DODI 5000.68 , Security Force Assistance)
DefinitionsUNCLASSIFIED
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security assistance. A group of programs authorized by Title 22 by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease. The Department of Defense does not administer all security assistance programs. Those security assistance programs that are administered by the Department are a subset of security cooperation. (DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Related to Security Cooperation.)
building partnership capacity. Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners. (QDR BPC Execution Roadmap, May 2006)
DefinitionsUNCLASSIFIED
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partner capacity. The ability and will of an international partner to take political action, provide access to territory, information, or resources, or apply its capabilities consistent with United States strategic objectives. Partner capacity is the desired outcome of security cooperation activities. (proposed)
DefinitionsUNCLASSIFIED
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security cooperation policy guidance. Goals and objectives for DoD security cooperation efforts and the corresponding priorities and direction for resource allocation. (DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Related to Security Cooperation.)
security cooperation program guidance. Management procedures for planning, programming, budgeting, executing, and assessing security cooperation programs. (DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Related to Security Cooperation.)
DefinitionsUNCLASSIFIED
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Encourage common or complementary views of shared security responsibilities (partner buy-in)• Defense contacts, education, exchanges, conferences.• Support to public diplomacy
Encourage and enable the development of partner capabilities and capacity needed to share security responsibilities• Education, training• Equipment and materiel provision, maintenance
Encourage and enable the interoperable or complementary employment of partner capabilities• Combined planning• Combined exercises• Familiarization activities
Enable partner participation in operations• Transportation provision• Operational support (e.g., operational advising, medical support, intelligence,
consumables)
Building Capacity UNCLASSIFIED
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A New Concept for Doing Business?
Three-year pilot program and model for interagency collaboration jointly managed by State and DoD
State and DoD may pool resources for security sector assistance across the military, police, and justice lines• Transfer authority of up to $250M (Min 20% from State)• Comprehensive approach to security sector challenges
Agile response to emerging challenges & opportunities• Potentially a new way of organizing the interagency for planning and
implementation of assistance POCs: ODASD(PSO) & State/PM Key Words: pilot, joint formulation, top-down priorities,
transfer authority, shared responsibility for outcomes, under construction
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FY12 NDAA, Section 1207: The Global Security Contingency Fund
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Authorizations and Appropriations
Authorizations• Defense contacts• Familiarization• Exercises
Appropriations• Foreign Assistance in the
State Budget• DoD foreign assistance
“exceptions”
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Security Cooperation: State PlanningUNCLASSIFIED
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Security Cooperation: State PlanningUNCLASSIFIED
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A New Concept for Doing Business?
Three-year pilot program and model for interagency collaboration jointly managed by State and DoD
State and DoD may pool resources for security sector assistance across the military, police, and justice lines• Transfer authority of up to $250M (Min 20% from State)• Comprehensive approach to security sector challenges
Agile response to emerging challenges & opportunities• Potentially a new way of organizing the interagency for planning and
implementation of assistance POCs: ODASD(PSO) & State/PM Key Words: pilot, joint formulation, top-down priorities,
transfer authority, shared responsibility for outcomes, under construction
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FY12 NDAA, Section 1207: The Global Security Contingency Fund
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PPD provides a framework for the interagency to organize SSA efforts toward national priorities• Defines SSA core missions as partner support for U.S. interests, strengthening
collective security arrangements, sustaining partner capacity to address common challenges, and promoting universal values
• Prescribes interagency roles, responsibilities, and collaborating principles for development and implementation
• Establishes policies and procedures for strategy, assessment, and planning
New directive responds to CCMDR concerns raised during a 2009 POTUS meeting• CCMDRs asked for DoD flexible multi-year authorities and resources to support
their TCP and BPC missions• NSS reviewed SSA policy and developed recommendations to improve:
1) its integration with overall national objectives and across the interagency, 2) the effectiveness of the assistance, and 3) responsiveness of assistance to urgent and emerging challenges
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
SSA PPD Overview
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Ensure consistency with broader national security goals
Foster USG policy coherence and interagency collaboration
Build sustainable capacity through comprehensive sector strategies
Be more selective
Initiate, adapt, or terminate SSA activities expediently and responsibly
Inform policy with rigorous analysis and assessments
Use resources for the greatest impact
Analyze, plan, and act regionally
Coordinate with other donors
Ensure short-term interventions are consistent with long‑term goals
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
SSA PPD Policy: Key Guidelines
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NSS issues biennial national-level priorities• Prioritizes countries, regions, and functional areas for integration into agency and
department-level regional and functional strategies
State leads the interagency SSA planning process• Co-chairs an oversight board with DoD to monitor interagency SSA efforts and the
execution of high-priority SSA programs• Leads Integrated Country Strategy development, including the development of pre-
activity assessments for planning• Leads development of interagency plan for SSA assessments, planning, and
evaluation, including the criteria for program changes
All agencies participate in the SSA process• Affirms DoD’s role to provide assistance to address defense objectives• Calls for continued security cooperation reform for more efficiency/responsiveness
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SSA PPD Guidance Provisions
POLICY
Be on the look out for new SSA PPD implementing guidance• Policy will issue guidance as interagency implementing products become available;
stakeholders will have an opportunity to review and provide comments
Proactively engage DoD Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) interlocutors at embassy to ensure defense objectives are included and properly prioritized• Although the ICS will come for a TBD "Washington review" communicating priorities
at the start will facilitate an easier review.
Inform PSO of areas where the interagency process is not consistent with the principle of "joint formulation and shared responsibility" and not being quick, agile, and responsive• Track timelines and report on gaps not addressed via concrete examples
Consider ways DoD can better work to improve interagency integration of assessment, planning, program design, implementation, and evaluation of efforts
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What You Should Do Now
POLICY
PPD implementation will occur on a crawl, walk, run approach• Process and procedures need to be developed for review and coordination by
agencies and the SSA PPD IPC
Not all parts of interagency will embrace PPD principles at the same rate• Be a leader, but recognize limits• Multiple stakeholders driven by mission interests and equities
DoD needs to give other departments and agencies time to embrace strategic planning• Encourage and enable, but don’t force any actions
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The Reality