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Seeing Blue in Black and White: Race and Perceptions of Officer-Involved Shootings
Hakeem J. Jefferson Fabian G. Neuner
Josh Pasek University of Michigan
Version: April 14, 2017
Abstract: Following racially charged events, individuals often diverge in their perceptions of what happened and how justice should be served. Examining data gathered shortly after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri alongside reactions to a novel officer-involved shooting, this study unpacks the processes by which racial divisions emerge. Compared to Black Americans, Whites disproportionately sought information that supported claims of a justified shooting and regarded that information as important. Conversely, Blacks preferred information that implied that the officer had behaved inappropriately. These differences stemmed from two distinct processes: a form of identity-based motivated reasoning and belief updating based on racially distinct priors. Differences in summary judgments were larger either when individuals identified strongly with their racial group or when expectations about the typical behaviors of Blacks and the police diverged. The findings elucidate processes whereby individuals in different social groups come to accept differing narratives about contentious events.
Hakeem J. Jefferson (corresponding author; [email protected]) and Fabian G. Neuner ([email protected]) are PhD candidates in the department of political science at the University of Michigan. Josh Pasek is an assistant professor of communication studies at the University of Michigan and a faculty associate in the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research ([email protected]).!
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Recent incidents involving Black Americans’ interactions with law enforcement officials
have garnered international attention. When Florida neighborhood watch coordinator George
Zimmerman was acquitted after killing Trayvon Martin, 49% of White Americans reported being
satisfied with the verdict compared to only 5% of Blacks (Dimock and Doherty 2013). When
Officer Darren Wilson fatally shot Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, 64% of Whites agreed
with the grand jury’s decision not to press charges, whereas 80% of Blacks disagreed (Doherty,
Motel, and Weisel 2014). And when New York City police officers were not charged following
the chokehold death of Eric Garner, 70% of Blacks reported that recent decisions decreased their
confidence in the legal system compared to only 35% of Whites (Marist Poll 2014). These racial
divides in opinion, as we demonstrate in the current project, are not limited to summary or value
judgments, but manifest in response to a question central to the cause of justice: What, given the
evidence, do individuals believe transpired in the interaction between an agent of the state and
the citizen that agent is sworn to protect and serve?
Evidence that Americans diverge in their perceptions of these events calls out for an
explanation. How could Blacks and Whites, simply because of their racial categorization, come
to widely differing conclusions on cases that occupy such a central place in our political
conversation? Two overarching sets of explanations present themselves. The first centers on the
possibility that individuals receive qualitatively different bodies of information as a function of
their race. The other is that, despite similar information environments, Blacks and Whites
process the information they receive differently. And, to the extent that Blacks and Whites are
processing the same information differently, we will try to understand why.1
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 In this paper, we use “biased processing” to suggest that individuals who occupy different social categories will come to diverging views following exposure to the same set of information. Importantly, in the current case – as, we believe, in much of life – it is difficult to
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To examine these questions, we control the information environment surrounding a
fictitious officer-involved shooting and examine the role race plays in producing diverging
beliefs and opinions among Black and White respondents. If divides emerge in this controlled
setting, we can reject the explanation that racial differences are mere products of exposure to
distinct information environments. Instead, we contend that two distinct processes explain the
patterns we observe. First, building on the theory of partisan motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990;
Lodge and Taber 2013), we explore whether race-based motivated reasoning accounts for the
racial divide. That is, we test whether Blacks and Whites diverge in their responses to officer-
involved shootings because they interpret event-relevant information in a way that protects or
bolsters the image of their racial group.
Alternatively, we examine the possibility that differences in responses among Whites and
Blacks are less about the maintenance of social identities, but instead reflect average differences
in prior beliefs and expectations regarding police bias and the likely culpability of Black victims
(Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). These priors, themselves informed by race, may guide how
individuals process new information involving law enforcement officers and citizens of color.
This explanation, unlike one situated in a motivated reasoning framework, does not require that
Blacks and Whites are motivated by some identity-protective goal, but simply that they have
sufficiently different bases upon which to evaluate new information. Much of the existing work
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!identify some objective truth about the state of the world. Thus, we cannot conclude that some group of people holds “accurate” perceptions whereas some other group’s perceptions are “inaccurate.” We also want to avoid attributing differences in perceptions to any particular psychological process; indeed, one of the principal purposes of this paper is to distinguish between two processes that could ostensibly result in these sorts of diverging perceptions. Notably, our use of the term “bias” is purely technical and should not be regarded as suggesting that any particular viewpoint or interpretation of events is necessarily invalid (cf. Gerber and Green 2003). Indeed, contradictory perceptions of facts may sometimes be equally legitimate interpretations of ambiguous evidence.
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on biased information processing in political science fails to appreciate or at least fully account
for the differences in these two approaches (see Bullock 2009). One of our chief goals is to
carefully adjudicate between these related, though theoretically distinct, explanations.
To set the stage, we first leverage a study fielded shortly after the highly contentious and
internationally covered officer-involved shooting in Ferguson, Missouri to understand the sorts
of racial differences that emerge. We then discuss how these differences might come about,
focusing on the potential roles of (1) motivated reasoning shaped by racial identification2 and (2)
belief updating from racially-informed priors. In so doing, we pay particular attention to
unpacking the precise mechanisms that could underlie the racial divide. We proceed to describe
the study we used to assess how perceptions differ when individuals are presented with identical
information and run tests that allow us to compare competing explanations for how racial
differences manifest in this context. Besides demonstrating clear racial divides in response to a
novel event, our findings shed light on the mechanisms underlying these divides. We conclude
by discussing the implications of this work.
A Motivating Case
In August of 2014, Darren Wilson, a White police officer with the Ferguson, Missouri
Police Department, fatally shot Michael Brown, an 18-year-old Black man. Just as they had
following the 1991 beating of Rodney King by officers with the Los Angeles Police Department
and the 1995 acquittal of O.J. Simpson on charges that he was responsible for the death of his
wife and her friend (Newman et al. 1997), Black and White Americans diverged in their
impressions of what happened and whether justice was served. In a survey conducted by the Pew
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2 We use “racial identification” to refer to the strength with which one associates with a given racial category. When “racial categorization” is used, we simply mean that an individual belongs to a given racial group.
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Research Center shortly after Michael Brown’s death, 80% of Black Americans asserted that the
event “raise[d] important issues about race,” compared to only 37% of Whites (Drake 2014). In
contrast, the plurality of White Americans (47%) stated that “race [was] getting more attention
than it deserve[d].” Consistent with these perceptual differences, Whites and Blacks also differed
in their confidence in the investigations of Brown’s death: only 18% of Blacks interviewed were
confident in the investigations compared to 52% of Whites.
Table 1 - Perceptions of Ferguson by Racial Categorization
Whites Blacks Difference in Percentage Points
Wilson Should Be Charged (Probably or Definitely)
42.2% 90.9% -48.7 ***
Brown Attacked Wilson (Very or Extremely Likely)
37.3% 11.5% 25.8 ***
Brown Had Weapon (Probably or Definitely) 22.8% 4.4% 18.5 ***
Role of Race In Shooting (Large or Enormous)
35.9% 73.6% -37.7 ***
Average Absolute Difference 32.7 N 2,939-2,946 250-252
Note: Numbers represent the proportion of respondents selecting the top two response categories for each question (listed on left). Variation in Ns is due to nonresponse. *** p<.001 differences, two-tailed t-test.
In original data we collected three weeks after Brown’s death, similar patterns emerged –
Blacks and Whites diverged in both the summary judgments they rendered as well as in beliefs
about what transpired between Brown and Wilson.3 When asked whether Brown had a weapon,
how likely it was that Brown attacked Wilson, how much of a role race played in the shooting,
and whether Wilson should be charged, Blacks and Whites answered differently. When these
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 These data were collected between August 29th and September 8th, 2014 in the first wave of a panel study. 3,729 respondents were recruited by Qualtrics from the ClearVoice Surveys panel to complete an online survey. Full details about the sample and question wording can be found in Online Appendix A. For reference, Michael Brown was shot on August 9th of that year.
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questions were dichotomously coded, Black and White respondents diverged by an average of
32.7 percentage points (See Table 1). Moreover, Black and White respondents who reported
having heard the most about Ferguson diverged most in their opinions about whether Brown
attacked Wilson and whether Wilson should be charged. Figure 1 illustrates this divide by
estimating a predicted value for a Black or White respondent depending on how much they
reported hearing about the incident.4
Figure 1
That individuals differed in their reading of Ferguson is not particularly surprising nor
even normatively problematic; we expect differences in opinion among citizens in a diverse
society. Similarly, it is hardly novel to point out that respondents in different racial groups report
different beliefs and attitudes. Previous research has uncovered gaps between Whites and Blacks
in opinions about the fairness of the criminal justice system (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005),
perceptions of biased policing practices (Weitzer and Tuch 2005), support for policies perceived
to benefit African Americans (Hutchings 2009; Kinder and Winter 2001), support for the death
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4 We also replicated this finding in the first wave of our 2016 study. Blacks and Whites who reported having heard the most about Ferguson continued to have the most discrepant views regarding whether Brown had a weapon, whether Brown committed a crime before his encounter with Wilson, and whether Wilson sent racist emails in the weeks prior to the event. The figures present raw data without controls, though the results are robust to controlling for demographic variables and partisanship. See Online Appendix C.
a) Wilson Should Be ChargedBy Amount Heard About Ferguson and Race
Amount Heard About Ferguson
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b) Brown Attacked WilsonBy Amount Heard About Ferguson and Race
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penalty (Bobo and Johnson 2004), beliefs about the disproportionate imprisonment of African
American men (Unnever 2008), reactions to racial profiling in airports (Sirin, Villalobos, and
Valentino 2016) and even reactions to natural disasters that have a disparate racial impact
(Huddy and Feldman 2006), among other issues. What makes this scenario important and
distinct, however, is that the differences between Blacks and Whites appeared organically, in real
time, in information environments that should have been relatively similar.5
Unpacking Race
To be sure, political scientists have long recognized that race constitutes an important
variable guiding political behavior. Relatively few studies, however, have sought to unpack why
this is the case (but see Kinder and Winter 2001). In a recent article, Sen and Wasow (2016)
attribute this to the difficulty of identifying causal connections between race and various socio-
political outcomes. Race, the authors argue, is generally considered immutable from birth; it
therefore cannot be manipulated and researchers cannot properly attribute its effects.
Nonetheless, recognizing the powerful role race appears to play in the American political system,
scholars often include a “race dummy” in their empirical models predicting attitudes and
behavior. In the same vein, scholars, media outlets, and survey firms frequently publish evidence
that demonstrates the persistence of “the color line” in American public opinion (Kinder and
Sanders 1996). Although pervasive across domains of American life, the tendency to simply note
the association between race and a given outcome is particularly problematic in discussions of
Americans’ responses to officer-involved shootings, which often bring to the fore questions of
race and justice.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5 Of course, the fact that the Ferguson study was conducted shortly on the heels of the incident does not preclude the possibility that individuals found out about what happened through very different sources (Garrett and Stroud 2014; Stroud 2011).
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This robust relationship between race and politically relevant outcomes should not be
taken for granted, but we caution against an approach that fails to take seriously the nuanced and
varied ways that the meaningfulness of race can manifest in any given context. “Dummifying”
race not only leads to problematic interpretations of the meaning of this important social
construct; this approach also fails to distinguish the effects of race as an expressive social
identity (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015) from the effects of race as a social category that,
irrespective of one’s psychological attachment to the group, affects experiences and worldviews.
Indeed, different racial experiences might be expected from individuals embedded in what
sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997) terms a racialized social system. As we argue in more
detail in the pages that follow, these theoretical explanations are not merely two sides of the
same coin; they call out for different interventions that reflect the qualitatively distinct
mechanisms at play in forming the basis for this persistent racial divide.
Race as a Motivating, Expressive Social Identity
If the effects of race in response to officer-involved shootings emerge because of
individuals’ psychological attachments to racial in-groups, the existing literature on motivated
reasoning offers a useful starting place for understanding why Blacks and Whites diverge both in
their summary judgments and beliefs about the particulars of these events. Kunda (1990) argued
that individuals’ perceptions were influenced by both accuracy and directional goals. Scholars
have since shown that group membership, in the form of partisan affiliation, is a principal source
of directional motivation (Lodge and Taber 2013). That is, when presented with new
information, partisans engage in defensive processing, discounting claims that contradict party
orthodoxy (Lebo and Cassino 2007) by arguing against it (Eagly and Chaiken 1995) and even
accepting inaccurate messages that bolster existing viewpoints (Miller, Saunders, and Farhart
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2015). Work on the cognitive processes underlying motivated reasoning suggests that this occurs
as a subconscious affective response to new information (see Westen et al. 2006). People
evaluate new information in line with prior attitudes and group memberships by spontaneously
generating a positive or negative interpretation of a new claim and processing the claim in line
with that interpretation (Lodge and Taber 2005; 2013; Nyhan and Reifler 2010).
Recent scholarship on motivated reasoning suggests that this operates along partisan lines
more than on positions about particular issues. This fits well with the notion that partisanship
facilitates motivated reasoning in its role as a prominent social identity, rather than as a catchall
for some set of political opinions (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Greene 2004; Iyengar,
Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Because individuals derive meaning from membership in salient social
groups (Tajfel 1974), group memberships play an important role in shaping how individuals
perceive and engage with the world (D. Abrams and Hogg 1990). This implies, as Lodge and
Taber (2013) found, that the strength of one’s identity and the salience of that identity in a given
context should be key determinants of the extent to which individuals engage in motivated
processes.
Despite a focus on partisan identity for the vast majority of the literature, similar
differences in processing should occur for all sorts of social identities (Kahan 2010a). Although
in the contemporary political environment more and more issues are divided along party lines
(Fiorina and Abrams 2008), there remain many issues for which other identities are more salient
(see e.g., DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Hutchings and Valentino 2004). We argue that
officer-involved shootings constitute issues that divide chiefly not along partisan, but racial lines.
And though the racial divide in America is, as Kinder and Sanders argue, “a divide without peer”
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(1996, 27) , studies of motivated reasoning on the basis of social identities other than
partisanship have been relatively rare (Kahan 2010b; Kunda and Sinclair 1999).
In the context of officer-involved shootings, race, like partisanship, might well act as a
social identity that motivates individuals’ processing of event-relevant information. Such racially
motivated reasoning might be particularly prevalent when situational ambiguity allows
individuals to privilege directional goals (i.e. identity bolstering) over accuracy-oriented ones (cf.
Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner 2002; Lawrence 2000). That is, insofar as there are competing
claims about the details of an officer-involved shooting that can be viewed as supporting the
White officer or the Black victim, individuals may discount information that threatens to
denigrate their social group while advantaging information that protects the group’s image.
Likewise, a theory of racially motivated reasoning would expect that, when given the
opportunity to expose themselves to new information, Whites and Blacks will choose
information consistent with the position of their in-group member (cf. Hart et al. 2009; Stroud
2011). Generally, Whites should be expected to select information that supports the officer’s
claims that the shooting was justified, with Blacks choosing, on average, to seek information that
undermines these claims. Importantly, if racially motivated reasoning is responsible for the
divides observed, the tendency to engage in these defensive processes should be more
pronounced when racial identity is made more salient and should emerge more for highly
identified Blacks and Whites than for their less strongly identified counterparts (cf. Leeper and
Slothuus 2014; Lodge and Taber 2013).
An Alternative Explanation: Racially Distinct Priors
Though compelling, this theory of racially motivated reasoning must contend with an
equally plausible alternative explanation that can lead to similar, if not identical divides in Black
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and White responses to officer-involved shootings. As others have argued, much of what we
think of as biased processing based on ego-protective considerations may instead result from
differences in information updating (Bullock 2009; Gerber and Green 1998). In work focused on
partisan responses to the Lewinsky scandal, for example, Fischle (2000) acknowledges that
“individuals may well arrive at ‘congenial’ conclusions not because they were motivated to do
so, and selectively processed the evidence accordingly, but simply because those judgments are
plausible given the individual’s prior beliefs and expectations” (141). Like Fischle, we concede
that it is challenging to distinguish the effects of identity-based motivated processes from ones
that derive from individuals’ different prior beliefs and expectations (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).
Race, arguably more than any other social category, structures and stratifies American
life. Whites and Blacks not only frequently live in different communities and occupy different
social networks (Massey and Denton 1993); they have experiences, both personal and vicarious,
that shape their worldviews and inform their interactions in the social world (Peffley and
Hurwitz 2010). This reality is historically situated and reflects the ways in which race continues
to influence the lived experiences and life outcomes of this country’s citizens. With respect to the
criminal justice system, long-standing divides shape the experiences of Black and White
Americans. Blacks receive harsher sentences for committing the same crimes as Whites
(Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998), are stopped more frequently by police (Epp,
Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014), and are more likely to report that their interactions
with the law enforcement community are negative (Browning et al. 1994; Theobald and Haider-
Markel 2009). Compounding these factors, the most prominent cases of police brutality often
involve Black victims (Lawrence 2000), suggesting a pattern of mistreatment toward Black
Americans not experienced by Whites. Given these differences, Blacks and Whites hold different
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attitudes toward the criminal justice system, with Blacks much less trustful of law enforcement
than Whites (Nunnally 2012). In this manner, racialized social experiences can result in different
perceptions of police bias and, by extension, the likelihood that a law enforcement officer would
shoot a Black victim without justification.
Just as citizens may base their perceptions of an incident on what they expect from the
police, they may also condition their responses on expectations of members of the purportedly
victimized group. Though it may seem strange to treat them as such, racial attitudes are
inherently priors that guide the processing of information. That is, people make inferences about
missing information based in part on expectations derived from stereotypes about a target’s
social group (Hamilton, Sherman, and Ruvolo 1990). When evaluating an officer-involved
shooting, prejudiced individuals may tend to identify fault in the victim’s behavior, thereby
justifying the use of force. Hence, to the extent that Blacks and Whites differ both in their beliefs
about the prevalence of police bias and in beliefs and expectations about the likely culpability of
the victims, they should also differ in the judgments rendered in response to these events. The
question here is whether and to what extent differences in these expectations – rather than more
defensive processes associated with motivated reasoning – account for the racial divide (cf.
Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).
As we stress in the discussion section, distinguishing between these two theoretical
explanations is no mere act of academic pedantry; the distinction, we believe, matters. But given
the nature of the current project and its potential to inform a larger conversation about officer-
involved shootings in the US (as well as state-citizen conflict elsewhere), we want to note from
the outset that, insofar as individuals are processing the same novel information in ways that lead
to racially diverging judgments, either explanation constitutes a social problem that demands
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resolution.
The Current Study
Beyond their contemporary relevance, officer-involved shootings provide a
straightforward case for examining how race shapes information processing. To understand
racial gaps observed in response to such events, we focus primarily on individuals’ treatment of
event-relevant information regarding a novel incident. That is, when presented with information
about an officer-involved shooting for which the facts of the case remain somewhat ambiguous
(as they often are, see Lawrence 2000), how do individuals arrive at their beliefs about whether
the officer’s actions were justified? And, when Blacks and Whites disagree on this question,
what accounts for their disagreement?
In line with our observations following the incident in Ferguson, we expect that beliefs
held by Black and White Americans will differ in response to the scenario we present. On
average, Black respondents are expected to view the officer’s actions as less appropriate than
their White counterparts and, consistent with this view, should support punishing the officer.
Beyond these divides in summary judgments, we expect similar divergence in response to
questions about the facts of the case. Compared to Black respondents, Whites should be more
likely to believe that the victim was armed and to assert that he attacked the officer yet less
willing to adopt the belief that race played a significant role in the shooting.6
H1: Blacks and Whites will differ in both (a) summary judgments about the shooting and
(b) beliefs about what happened during the event.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6 Admittedly, these outcomes represent at least two classes of evaluations, namely responses that can be deemed subjective judgments as well as responses that speak to more objective assessments. We contend that both are interesting in their own right but acknowledge that divergence in response to questions focused more on factual elements of the case provide more compelling evidence for a motivated reasoning framework, which we discuss in subsequent hypotheses.
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In line with notions that race alters how individuals process this information, we expect to
observe differences in which pieces of information respondents view as most important and
accurate as a function of their race. In general, we hypothesize that:
H2: Whites will, on average, privilege information that defends the officer’s actions,
whereas Blacks will privilege information that appears to support claims of a wrongful
death.
Collectively, evidence for these hypotheses would provide a strong basis for concluding
that individuals are engaging in biased processing. Notably, however, these hypotheses are
agnostic to the mechanism yielding attitude divergence. As we argued previously, differences
between Blacks and Whites – both in summary judgments and assessments of event-related facts
– could emerge as a function of either identity-based motivated reasoning or the different
expectations members of these groups have about interactions between citizens and law
enforcement. To adjudicate between explanations, we propose two sets of hypotheses derived
respectively from an identity-based motivated reasoning process and a process guided principally
by prior expectations and beliefs.
Motivated reasoning. If differences in perceptions of the novel scenario stem from
racially motivated reasoning, the extent to which this process operates should depend on the
salience of racial identity for those evaluating the incident. Racial identity salience could emerge
either as a product of some external cue or as a function of individual-level differences in the
strength of racial identification. This latter expectation builds on prior evidence that motivated
reasoning is moderated by attitude strength (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Lodge and Taber 2013).
We thus expect:
H3: When racial identity is primed, summary judgments will differ between Black and
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White respondents to a greater degree than when racial identity is not primed.
H4: Racial differences in perceptions will be similarly moderated by measures of racial
group identification including (a) identity strength, (b) group closeness, and (c) linked
fate.7
Moreover, a motivated reasoning explanation further posits that individuals will seek out
information selectively in ways that reinforce their existing views (cf. Garrett and Stroud 2014;
Iyengar and Hahn 2009).
H5: Given the opportunity to seek out further information about the event, Blacks and
Whites will seek different, identity-consonant information.
Finally, the motivated reasoning framework suggests that additional information should not
influence summary judgments once an initial judgment has been rendered. Therefore, evidence
that individuals consider and incorporate new information after rendering an initial judgment
would provide evidence contrary to a purely motivational account.
H6: Respondents’ reactions to witness statements will not be related to final summary
judgments after accounting for initial summary judgments.
Racial priors. If differences in summary judgments result from differing expectations
and experiences across groups, the role of race should diminish once these uncommon priors are
accounted for. We focus on perceptions of police bias and perceptions that Black Americans
violate social norms as scaffolds for interpreting new information about encounters between
members of these groups. This can also be understood in a mediation context, whereby the effect
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7 Independently, these three measures of racial identification derive from different theoretical and conceptual bases. Here, however, we treat them each as a proxy of how attached an individual is to her racial group. For a more complete discussion of identity and its role in shaping individuals’ responses in political contexts, we recommend Huddy (2001; 2003).
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of race operates through differences in these underlying beliefs. Thus, the influence of racial
categorization (i.e. the “race dummy”) on summary judgments as well as reactions to
information would be expected to diminish when we account for prior beliefs and expectations.
H7: Respondents’ (a) perceptions of police bias and (b) racial attitudes should mediate
the relationship between racial identification and summary judgments as well as
evidence weights.
Methods
Data
To test these hypotheses, we fielded a two-wave study using Qualtrics Panels. Qualtrics
recruited respondents to complete an online survey using targeted emails sent to members of the
ROI Rocket online panel (see Online Appendix D). In the first wave, fielded between June 15
and June 20, 2016, 1,430 U.S. respondents completed a survey that queried them about their
demographics, perceptions of the criminal justice system, experiences with racial bias, racial
attitudes, and recall about the incident in Ferguson in 2014 (see Table 2). Quotas were used to
gather a sample that would be approximately 50% Black and 50% White at the end of wave 2.
Respondents to the first wave were re-contacted one week later to take part in a second study,
which ran from June 27 to August 5, 2016. The vast majority of the participants responded
within one week, though the survey was kept open with the hopes of re-contacting 1,000
respondents. In total, 895 respondents completed the second wave of the study, for a re-contact
rate of 62.6%.
For the current study, we only report data from respondents who completed the second
wave before July 5, 2016, when Alton Sterling was shot by a police officer in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. This incident – along with subsequent widely publicized shootings in St. Paul,
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Question Description of measures used in study Administration Notes / RandomizationWave 1 (N=1430) June 15-20 2016Demographics sex; race; age; educationIdeology/Partisanship party identificationFairness of Police and Criminal Justice System criminal justice system fair; police treatment of Blacks vs Whites (5)
Questions About Ferguson -[Note: these were a replication of the results from the 2014 Ferguson study]
Racial ResentmentOthers overcame prejudice without special favors; generations of slavery created current conditions; Blacks gotten less than deserve; Blacks not trying hard enough
Wave 2 (N=895; 726 before cutoff) June 27-August 5 2016 (July 5 cutoff used)Introduction to ScenarioNon-Racial Demographics -Racial Identification Measures importance of race; linked fate; group closeness Groups A and B OnlyExperiences with Police - Group B OnlyPolice Chief Statement Pro-Officer - Overview of Events
Mr. Davis Statement Pro-Taylor - Was in a heated argument with Mr. Taylor when events transpiredOfficer Silver Statement Pro-Officer - Statement from the officer involved in shootingPartway Summary Judgments Officer's actions appropriate; should officer be charged Randomly assigned to 1/2 of respondents
Mrs. Walker Statement Pro-Officer - Woman who called police to report argument, did not see shootingMrs. Thomas Statement Pro-Taylor - Character witness for Mr. Taylor, did not see shootingMrs. Williams Statement Pro-Taylor - Was walking dog and saw events transpireMr. Anthony Statement Pro-Officer - Was driving home and stopped to watch events transpire
Selective Exposure TaskIdentify which additional statements respondent would like to read from one-sentence excerpts
1/2 of respondents see all 8 statements, 1/2 see a randomly assigned set of 4
Summary Judgments Officer's actions appropriate; should officer be chargedSummary Beliefs Taylor attacked officer; officer had weapon; race role in shootingRacial Identification Measures importance of race; linked fate; group closeness Group C OnlyExperiences with Police - Groups A and C Only
Notes - Scenario statements are bolded; each was followed with an open-ended response and three questions about how the statement should be weighted by a jury, how accurate the statement was, and how biased/objective the statement was. Only measures used in the current study are described. Descriptions with "-" are not evalutaed in the current study. See Online Appendix F for question wording, response options, and coding of all measures.
Table 2 - Overview of Relevant Measures from 2016 Study
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Minnesota and Dallas, Texas – had the potential to alter attitudes on issues measured in the
study.8 Among the 726 respondents who completed both the first and second waves of the study
before July 5, 370 identified as Black and 356 identified as White.9 Outside of the goal of
ensuring racial balance, no quotas were used for the current study.
Procedure
In the second wave of the study, which was designed to appear unrelated to the first
wave, respondents were told that they were being contacted “on behalf of a local municipality
where a police officer was recently involved in a controversial incident.” They were asked to
“put [themselves] in the role of a local citizen who may be selected to serve on a grand jury
deciding whether the officer should be indicted for acting inappropriately or whether he acted in
good faith.” Unbeknownst to respondents, this was a fictitious scenario that existed only in the
context of this study. To aid in deception, respondents were also told that we had anonymized
details of the event, including the name of the city where the event had taken place, and provided
pseudonyms for relevant actors and all witnesses (see Online Appendix E for the full
language).10
In a recent article focused on partisan motivated reasoning, Leeper and Slothuus argue
that “experiments where motivations are primed are the best—and perhaps only—way to clearly
distinguish the effects and mechanisms of motivated reasoning” (2014, 149). Therefore, before
reading the scenario, respondents were assigned randomly to one of three conditions aimed at
priming racial self-identification (to assess H4; cf. Steele and Aronson 1995). Respondents in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8 Including data collected beyond this period yields slightly stronger results, though we decided a priori to exclude these data. See Online Appendix H for results. 9 Individuals who identified as both Black and White (N=13) were excluded from all analyses. 10 At the conclusion of the study all respondents were fully debriefed and informed about the fictitious nature of the case.
! 19
group A were asked to identify their racial identities and to assert how close they felt to members
of their racial group at the start of the survey to prime their racial identities (Identity Prime; see
Table 2). Respondents in group B were asked these questions alongside an additional battery of
questions that gauged whether they had had various encounters with the criminal justice system
(Identity and Experience Prime). The remaining respondents proceeded directly to the scenario
and answered all identity-related questions at the end of the study (Control; group C).
Scenario. The controlled information environment began when respondents were
presented with seven statements related to the incident.11 To mirror the kind of information
typically available to the public when these events occur, participants received statements that
either supported or called into question the actions of Officer Silver, who was responsible for
shooting Mr. Taylor in our scenario. Collectively, the statements also generate a sense of
ambiguity that so often characterizes these events (see Lawrence 2000). All respondents
encountered the same series of seven statements about the hypothetical event, and these
statements were always presented in the same order (bolded items in Table 2). The first
statement, from the city’s police chief, provided an overview and introduction to the events. In
that statement, respondents were told that Mr. Taylor was an “African-American male in his
mid-twenties.” The race of the police officer and other witnesses was never stated.
Across the statements, respondents learned that a neighbor, Mrs. Walker, called police
when two men, Mr. Taylor and Mr. Davis, were arguing on the sidewalk. As a patrol car
responded to the scene, Mr. Taylor fled and was pursued by Officer Silver. After a short
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11 Although it was important that our scenario was plausible, creating a fictitious event allowed us to constrain the information environment from which respondents could gather information. Differences in perceptions and attitudes about the case thus cannot be attributed to differences in media exposure or exposure to different characterizations of the event. Instead, they must be attributed to some element of information processing.
! 20
distance, Mr. Taylor turned around and was shot by the officer. In addition to Mr. Davis and
Officer Silver, respondents read statements from five additional individuals, two of whom also
witnessed the events: Mrs. Williams, who was walking her dog, and Mr. Anthony, who had been
driving down the street. These eye-witnesses disagreed about the circumstances under which Mr.
Taylor turned toward the officer. The other three statements came from the chief of police, Mrs.
Walker, and Mrs. Thomas – a character witness for Mr. Taylor (see Online Appendix E for the
full text of all statements).
After the first three statements, half the respondents were asked to provide an initial
judgment on two summary judgement variables described below (This manipulation is used to
assess H7).12 Respondents then read each of the remaining four statements. Collectively, the
seven statements provided evidence that could be used to support the notion that the officer’s
actions were appropriate or that the actions were inappropriate.
Upon reading all seven statements, respondents were presented with one-sentence
excerpts from either four or eight additional statements (Selective Exposure Task in Table 2).13
They were then asked which additional statements they would be interested in reading, though
the full statements were never provided. Finally, respondents were asked about their overall
perceptions of the case.
Key Measures
Statement evaluations. Respondents were asked a series of questions about each
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12 Only half of respondents were given this manipulation because we wanted to test whether that the act of rendering an initial judgment altered the later judgments that respondents conferred. We did not find significant differences in later judgments based on respondent condition. 13 Respondents were randomly asked to evaluate either eight statements or only four statements (randomly sampled from the eight) for a separate analysis on whether providing additional information might alter perceptions. Limiting the results of the current study to the subset of respondents who were asked all eight statements did not alter any conclusions.
! 21
statement. First, they provided an open-ended reaction.14 Second, they were asked how much
weight they think jurors should place on the statement, using a 5-point scale ranging from “None
at all” (coded 0) to “A great deal” (coded 1). Respondents were then asked to assess both how
accurate and how objective or biased they thought the statement was. Full question wordings,
response options, and coding for all measures is provided in Online Appendix F.
Summary judgments. For half of respondents after the third statement and for all
respondents following the reading of the seven statements and the selective exposure task,
respondents answered a series of questions evaluating the officer’s actions. First, they were
asked, “Given what you have read, how appropriate do you think Officer Silver’s actions were?”
Response options ranged from “Not at all appropriate” (0) to “Completely appropriate” (1) on a
5-point scale. Next, respondents were asked, “Given what you have read, do you think that
Officer Silver should be charged with a crime?” with response options ranging from “He
definitely should NOT be charged” (0) to “He definitely should be charged” (1) on a 4-point
scale.
Summary beliefs. Beyond these questions focused on summary judgments, respondents
were asked questions related to the facts of the case. Here, respondents were first asked, “Given
what you have read, how likely do you think it is that Mr. Taylor attacked Officer Silver?” with
response options ranging from “Not at all likely” (0) to “Extremely likely” (1) on a 5-point scale.
They were then asked, “Do you happen to recall whether Mr. Taylor had a weapon?” Response
options ranged from “He definitely did NOT have a weapon” (0) to “He definitely did have a
weapon” (1) on a 4-point scale. Lastly, respondents were asked, “How much of a role do you
think race played in the shooting?” Here, responses ranged from “No role at all” (0) to “An
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 This paper relies on responses to closed-ended questions only.
! 22
enormous role” (1) on a 5-point scale.
Racial identification measures. In addition to these case-related measures, we rely on
several other measures to examine the processes underlying the racial divide. To assess whether
the divide is a function of identity-based motivated reasoning, we generated three measures that
tap racial identification: group importance, group closeness, and linked fate. These measures
were coded to range from 0, for the least racially identified, to 1 for the most strongly identified.
To ascertain whether the divide emerges as a consequence of different prior beliefs and
expectations, we rely on a battery of five questions meant to capture beliefs about police bias15 as
well as the standard 4-item measure of racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and
Sears 1981).
Results
Racially Biased Processing
Our first set of hypotheses posited the existence of a racial divide in response to our
fictitious scenario. Evidence of such a divide would suggest that Black and White individuals
were indeed processing information differently, not simply encountering different information.
To assess this, we compared Black and White respondents in the answers they gave to the
questions about summary judgments and beliefs (H1) as well as in the importance and accuracy
they accorded to the various scenario statements (H2). We also we explored whether their ratings
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15 The questions that made up this index were as follows: 1) In general, do the police treat Whites better than Blacks, treat Blacks better than Whites, or treat them both the same? 2) Do the police stop Whites more than Blacks, Blacks more than Whites, or do they stop them both equally? 3) How often do you think the police use more force than is necessary under the circumstances when dealing with White people? 4) How often do you think the police use more force than is necessary under the circumstances when dealing with Black people? 5) How common do you think racial or ethnic prejudice is among police officers? The resulting index variable is rescaled 0-1, such that higher values indicate a greater sense that the criminal justice system is biased.
! 23
of statements were correlated with their summary judgments and evaluations of the event.
Table 3 - Perceptions of Novel Incident by Racial Self-Identification Whites Blacks Difference Officer's Actions Appropriate .52 .28 .25 *** Officer Should Be Charged .35 .67 -.32 *** Taylor Attacked Silver .31 .15 .16 *** Taylor Had Weapon .36 .22 .14 *** Role of Race in Shooting .32 .59 -.27 ***
Average Absolute Difference .23 N 355-356 368-370 Note: Numbers represent mean values for respondents on each outcome. Variation in Ns is due to nonresponse. All variables were coded to range from 0 to 1. *** p<.001 differences, two-tailed t-test.
Blacks and Whites, who encountered identical information in our scenario, diverged
significantly in their summary judgments about whether the officer’s actions were appropriate
and whether he should face criminal charges; they also differed in perceptions of what occurred
during the encounter between the Officer Silver and Mr. Taylor (H1; Table 3). Whites were more
likely than Blacks to believe that Officer Silver’s actions were appropriate (difference=.25,
t=11.0, p<.001), that Mr. Taylor attacked Officer Silver (difference=.16, t=7.8, p<.001) and that
Mr. Taylor had been armed during the encounter (difference=.14, t=7.6, p<.001). In contrast,
Blacks were more likely than Whites to think that Officer Silver should be charged (difference=-
.32, t=-13.9, p<.001) and that race played a role in the encounter (difference=-.27, t=-11.4,
p<.001). The average measure differed between Blacks and Whites by .23 on a 0-1 scale. These
results mirror the discrepancies observed shortly after the events in Ferguson. Differences
between Blacks and Whites thus appear to be largely attributable to differential processing of the
same information.
! 24
Table 4 - Statement Ratings by Racial Categorization Statement Weight Statement Accuracy Statement Bias Whites Blacks Difference Whites Blacks Difference Whites Blacks Difference Police Chief (Pro-Officer) .62 .54 .08 *** .64 .46 .18 *** .37 .58 -.21 *** Mr. Davis (Pro-Taylor) .51 .66 -.15 *** .44 .59 -.15 *** .51 .43 .08 *** Officer Silver (Pro-Officer) .61 .51 .10 *** .59 .40 .20 *** .43 .62 -.19 *** Mrs. Walker (Pro-Officer) .41 .46 -.05 + .56 .54 .02 .41 .47 -.06 * Mrs. Thomas (Pro-Taylor) .36 .55 -.19 *** .45 .59 -.14 *** .61 .50 .11 *** Mrs. Williams (Pro-Taylor) .62 .76 -.15 *** .58 .73 -.15 *** .41 .33 .07 ** Mr. Anthony (Pro-Officer) .52 .43 .09 *** .51 .39 .12 *** .37 .53 -.16 ***
Average Absolute Difference .12 .14 .13 N 356 368-370 355-356 366-370 356 368-370 Note: Numbers represent mean values for respondents on each outcome. Variation in Ns is due to nonresponse. Statements are listed in order of presentation. All variables were coded to range from 0 to 1. + p <.10 | * p<.05 | ** p<.01 | *** p<.001 differences, two-tailed t-test.
! 25
White and Black Americans also diverged in the value that they accorded to the various
statements (H2; Table 4). Across all measures, Whites placed more value on information
suggesting the officer’s actions were appropriate than did Blacks. In contrast, Blacks put more
weight on statements critical of the officer and reported that these measures were less accurate
and more biased. For example, when Black and White respondents read a statement from the
victim’s neighbor (Mrs. Thomas) suggesting he “was a good boy” who would “never hurt
anybody,” Blacks accorded the statement the same amount of weight they gave the police chief’s
statement. Whites, however, thought it was the least relevant among the statements provided.
The only statement that did not demonstrate this pattern was from Mrs. Walker, who called
police to the scene of the argument, but did not witness subsequent events (Table 4, row 4). With
Mrs. Walker’s statement again serving as the sole exception, the weight respondents associated
with the various statements predicted their summary judgments in the expected direction (see
Online Appendix G).
Racially Motivated Reasoning
A second set of hypotheses examined whether racial differences were the product of
identity-motivated processes. To test this, we first compared respondents in experimental groups
A, B, and C (see Table 2), to determine whether priming racial identity and experiences with
police would exacerbate the perceptual divide (H3). We also examined whether self-reports of
identity strength, group closeness, and linked fate served a similar moderating role (H4). Because
motivated reasoning is expected to result in selective exposure, we next assessed whether Blacks
and Whites privileged different pieces of information in the selective exposure task (H5).
Finally, in line with the notion that motivated reasoning is goal-oriented, we tested whether
individuals ceased to incorporate new information once they had heard enough to render a
! 26
summary judgment. To do this, we limited our sample to the randomly selected set of individuals
who rendered summary judgments twice, once after the first three statements and once at the end
of the study. Here, we examined whether the weights associated with statements 4 through 7
accounted for changes in the summary judgments individuals made between these two time
points. Evidence that these statements were uniquely related to final judgments even controlling
for initial judgments would suggest that individuals were continuing to rely on new information
and thus were not acting as pure motivated reasoners (H6).
To the extent that respondents were behaving with the goal of bolstering their identities,
we should find that priming racial identity will exacerbate racial divides (H3). Column 1 of
Figure 2 shows the effect of our primes on all outcomes. Contrary to expectations, answering
additional questions about race did not lead respondents to answer summary judgement or belief
questions differently.
If racially biased processing results from motivated reasoning, more strongly identified
individuals should diverge the most in their perceptions of the incident (H4). Here we found
mixed results. Compared to respondents who reported that their racial identities were not very
important, Blacks and Whites who reported that their racial identities were important diverged
more in their summary judgments (Figure 2, column 2, rows 1-2), but not in their perceptions of
what happened in the incident (rows 3-5). Similar patterns emerged when racial identification
was measured as perceived closeness to one’s racial group (column 3) or as linked fate with
other group members (column 4). Collectively, these results imply that more highly identified
individuals diverged most on subjective measures, but not more factual ones.
Work on motivated reasoning and selective exposure suggests that motivated individuals
will seek additional information that reinforces their prior beliefs when given the opportunity to!
! 27
!Figure 2 – Summary Judgments and Beliefs by Condition and Racial Identification
a) Priming ConditionF=.27(2,701)
Racial Priming Condition
Control Identity ID + Exp
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Com
plet
ely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
Offi
cer's
Act
ions
App
ropr
iate
b) Identity StrengthF=4.92(1,698)*
Identity Importance
Not at all A little Moderately Very Extremely
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Com
plet
ely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
c) Group ClosenessF=7.42(1,703)**
Closeness to Racial Group
Not at all A little Somewhat Very Extremely
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Com
plet
ely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
d) Linked FateF=.91(1,700)
Sense of Linked Fate
None Not much Some A lot
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Com
plet
ely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
e) Priming ConditionF=.75(2,699)
Racial Priming Condition
Control Identity ID + ExpDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
Offi
cer S
houl
d Be
Cha
rged
f) Identity StrengthF=4.52(1,696)*
Identity Importance
Not at all A little Moderately Very ExtremelyDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
g) Group ClosenessF=9.06(1,701)**
Closeness to Racial Group
Not at all A little Somewhat Very ExtremelyDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
h) Linked FateF=10.92(1,698)***
Sense of Linked Fate
None Not much Some A lotDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
i) Priming ConditionF=2.05(2,699)
Racial Priming Condition
Control Identity ID + Exp
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Extre
mel
y
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
Taylo
r Atta
cked
Silv
er
j) Identity StrengthF=.64(1,696)
Identity Importance
Not at all A little Moderately Very Extremely
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Extre
mel
y
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
k) Group ClosenessF=.79(1,701)
Closeness to Racial Group
Not at all A little Somewhat Very Extremely
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Extre
mel
y
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
l) Linked FateF=.24(1,698)
Sense of Linked Fate
None Not much Some A lot
Not a
t all
Littl
eSo
mew
hat
Very
Extre
mel
y
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
m) Priming ConditionF=.23(2,698)
Racial Priming Condition
Control Identity ID + ExpDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
Taylo
r Had
Wea
pon
n) Identity StrengthF=1.18(1,695)
Identity Importance
Not at all A little Moderately Very ExtremelyDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
o) Group ClosenessF=.39(1,700)
Closeness to Racial Group
Not at all A little Somewhat Very ExtremelyDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
p) Linked FateF=1.74(1,697)
Sense of Linked Fate
None Not much Some A lotDefin
itely
not
Prob
ably
not
Prob
ably
Defin
itely
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
q) Priming ConditionF=.22(2,698)
Racial Priming Condition
Control Identity ID + Exp
No a
t all
Littl
eM
oder
ate
Larg
eEn
orm
ous
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
Role
of R
ace
In S
hoot
ing
r) Identity StrengthF=.85(1,695)
Identity Importance
Not at all A little Moderately Very Extremely
No a
t all
Littl
eM
oder
ate
Larg
eEn
orm
ous
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
s) Group ClosenessF=3.51(1,700)+
Closeness to Racial Group
Not at all A little Somewhat Very Extremely
No a
t all
Littl
eM
oder
ate
Larg
eEn
orm
ous
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
t) Linked FateF=1.19(1,697)
Sense of Linked Fate
None Not much Some A lot
No a
t all
Littl
eM
oder
ate
Larg
eEn
orm
ous
WhiteBlackWhiteBlack
Perceptions by Race and
! 28
do so (H5). When presented with additional excerpts in our selective exposure task, Black and
White respondents indeed expressed interest in reading different accounts. For four of the eight
excerpts provided, this divide was significant (Table 5). For example, 49 percent of White
respondents wanted to read the following statement: “If he was trying to surrender to the officer,
the way he turned around is not the way to do it” (Excerpt 3) whereas only 33 percent of Blacks
expressed a similar interest. In contrast, given the opportunity to read Excerpt 7, which suggested
that Officer Silver had a history of engaging in racially biased policing, 55 percent of Black
respondents wanted to read the statement, compared to only 42 percent of Whites. These results
provide evidence of selective exposure by race, consistent with the motivated reasoning
framework.
Table 5 - Desire to Read Additional Excerpts by Racial Self-Identification Whites Blacks Difference sig
Excerpt 1 Pro-Officer 0.33 0.30 -.02 (.04) Excerpt 2 Pro-Taylor 0.43 0.49 .06 (.04) Excerpt 3 Pro-Officer 0.49 0.33 -.15 (.04) *** Excerpt 4 Pro-Officer 0.20 0.18 -.02 (.03) Excerpt 5 Pro-Officer 0.37 0.25 -.12 (.04) ** Excerpt 6 Pro-Taylor 0.15 0.25 .10 (.03) ** Excerpt 7 Pro-Taylor 0.42 0.55 .14 (.04) ** Excerpt 8 Pro-Officer 0.41 0.33 -.06 (.04)
N 251-264 263-291 Note: Numbers represent mean values for respondents on each outcome. Difference column is calculated using a logistic regression controlling for whether respondents randomly saw four or eight statements. Variation in Ns is due to nonresponse and due to the fact that half of respondents saw four excerpts and half saw eight. All variables were coded to range from 0 to 1.** p<.01 | *** p<.001 differences, two-tailed.
Finally, a pure motivated reasoning account would suggest that, after rendering an initial
judgment, subsequent information should have little to no additional influence on future
! 29
judgments on the same question. Alternatively, we could imagine that individuals continue to
update their beliefs even after rendering an initial judgment. If this were the case, we would
instead find that the weights respondents accorded to new pieces of information (after they
rendered their first judgment) would explain unique variance in their eventual summary
judgments over and above the explanatory power of their initial judgments.16
When individuals were asked to render two sets of summary judgments – one partway
through the statements and one at the end – information provided after their initial evaluations
continued to influence their assessments (H6, Table 6). In particular, respondents’ ratings of the
statements by the two bystanders – Mrs. Williams and Mr. Anthony – continued to have a strong
and statistically significant influence on eventual judgments about whether the Officer’s actions
were appropriate and whether he should be charged. We see this as some evidence that
respondents were not merely rendering a snap judgment but rather, contrary to H6, subsequent
information still has a significant bearing on their views.
Collectively, the evidence presented here provides mixed support for the claim that
individuals engage in motivated reasoning along racial lines in response to officer-involved
shootings. We found that individuals whose identities were more salient were more likely to
polarize in their subjective assessments, but not on more factual questions. We also found that
individuals tended to seek additional information that might reinforce their predispositions. Yet,
we had no success attempting to experimentally manipulate the salience of racial identities and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16 To test this explanation, causal ordering is important. From a motivated reasoning perspective, we would expect individuals to report that summary-judgment-confirming information was more important than disconfirming information. But these reports should be driven by the summary judgments, rather than the credibility of the new information. This means that the new information would not have a unique influence on later summary judgments. Instead, the weights for the information would serve as an expression of the already-rendered judgments. In contrast, evidence that new information influenced summary judgments over and above initial judgments would instead imply that the information was changing people’s views.
! 30
found that individuals continued to respond to new information even after they had rendered a
summary judgment. It therefore seems likely that at least some other mechanism accounts for the
biased perceptions we observed.
Table 6 - Do Respondents Update Beliefs with New Information? Officer's Actions Appropriate Should Be Charged
All Weights
Including Partway
Evaluation
All Weights
Including Partway
Evaluation
Coef. s.e.
Coef. s.e.
Coef. s.e.
Coef. s.e.
Intercept .36 (.05) *** .07 (.04) + .44 (.05) *** .06 (.04) Partway Evaluation
.75 (.04) ***
.80 (.04) ***
Police Chief (Pro-Officer)
.06 (.05)
--
-.09 (.06)
-- Mr. Davis (Pro-Taylor)
-.25 (.06) ***
--
.35 (.07) ***
--
Officer Silver (Pro-Officer)
.43 (.06) ***
--
-.39 (.06) ***
-- Mrs. Walker (Pro-Officer)
.02 (.05)
.03 (.04)
.00 (.05)
-.03 (.04)
Mrs. Thomas (Pro-Taylor)
-.10 (.05) +
-.01 (.04)
.29 (.06) ***
.11 (.04) **
Mrs. Williams (Pro-Taylor)
-.26 (.06) ***
-.09 (.04) *
.21 (.06) ***
.10 (.04) *
Mr. Anthony (Pro-Officer) .27 (.05) *** .17 (.04) *** -.27 (.06) *** -.10 (.04) * N
349
350
349
350
R-squared !! .44 !! .66 !! .47 !! .72 Note: + p <.10 | * p<.05 | ** p<.01 | *** p<.001 differences, two-tailed.
Prior Beliefs and Expectations
To explain the biased updating we observed, we test the possibility that differences in
responses between Blacks and Whites result from a process that is not necessarily identity-
driven, but rather emanates from the fact that Blacks and Whites encounter officer-involved
shootings with differing expectations based on sets of uncommon priors (H7). Two sets of priors
seemed likely to alter the weights that respondents accorded to the various statements as well as
their summary judgments: their expectations from Blacks and their expectations from police
officers. These were measured using racial resentment and perceptions of police bias,
! 31
respectively. To assess whether these variables mediated the effect of racial category on
outcomes and statement weights, we compared the coefficient for the racial dummy variable
across two sets of regressions – one controlling for demographics alone and one controlling for
demographics and priors (Table 7). Coefficients for the racial dummy measures are presented in
columns 1 (demographics only) and 2 (controlling for moderators). Coefficients for the two
mediators are shown in columns 3 and 4. And a Monte Carlo test of the difference between the
two racial dummy measures is shown in column 5.
Prior beliefs about Blacks and police bias largely mediated relations between racial
categorization and outcome measures. When race was simply included alongside demographic
controls (Table 7, column 1), we observed significant relations between race and all outcome
variables. When prior beliefs were included, however, the magnitude of the coefficients for race
decreased substantially, losing significance in many cases (column 2). This decrease was usually
itself statistically significant (column 5). Further, the coefficients on prior beliefs were often
strong and significant unique predictors of the outcomes (columns 3 and 4). Indeed, for seven of
13 outcomes, racial categorization was no longer a significant predictor of outcome measures
once racial resentment and perceptions of police fairness were controlled. These results suggest
that racial differences in perceptions stem from attitudes and expectations informed by lived
experiences that themselves differ across racial lines.
Moreover, if we insert prior beliefs and the average of the three racial identification
measures simultaneously into a set of regressions similar to those in Table 7, we find no residual
difference between Blacks and Whites for any of the outcomes we examined. This implies that
the motivated reasoning and prior belief models we examined collectively fully explain the
differences in information processing (Online Appendix G).
! 32
Table 7 - Explanatory Power of Prior Beliefs for Predicting Summary Judgments and Evidence Weights Model Demographics
Only Regression Regression Controlling for Demographics and Prior Beliefs Difference in
Black Coefficients Variable Black Black Racial
Resentment Police Fairness (Monte Carlo)
Outcome Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e.
Officer's Actions Appropriate -.17 (.03) *** -.05 (.03) .21 (.05) *** -.62 (.09) *** .12 ** Officer Should Be Charged .23 (.03) *** .13 (.03) *** -.29 (.05) *** .37 (.09) *** -.11 ** Taylor Attacked Silver -.11 (.02) *** .00 (.03) .14 (.05) ** -.58 (.08) *** .10 ** Taylor Had Weapon -.11 (.02) *** -.04 (.02) + .08 (.04) + -.41 (.08) *** .07 * Role of Race in Shooting .20 (.03) *** .06 (.03) * -.27 (.06) *** .68 (.09) *** -.14 ***
Police Chief (Pro-Officer) -.05 (.02) * .01 (.03) .19 (.05) *** -.18 (.09) * .06 + Mr. Davis (Pro-Taylor) .11 (.02) *** .09 (.03) *** -.07 (.05) .11 (.08) -.03 Officer Silver (Pro-Officer) -.06 (.02) * .01 (.03) .22 (.05) *** -.23 (.09) ** .07 * Mrs. Walker (Pro-Officer) .06 (.03) * .11 (.03) *** .00 (.06) -.34 (.10) ** .05 Mrs. Thomas (Pro-Taylor) .16 (.03) *** .13 (.03) *** -.12 (.05) * .08 (.09) -.03 Mrs. Williams (Pro-Taylor) .10 (.02) *** .03 (.03) -.07 (.05) .43 (.09) *** -.07 * Mr. Anthony (Pro-Officer) -.07 (.03) ** .00 (.03) .12 (.05) * -.31 (.09) *** .06 + Note: Difference column tests whether the influence of the Race Dummy differed significantly between the demographics only model and one where prior beliefs were controlled. Significance for these comparisons was tested using a Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000 resamples. All models control for age, education, sex, income, and partisanship. Analyses were limited to the 696 cases with no missing data on any of these measures. + p<.10 | * p<.05 | ** p<.01 | *** p<.001 two-tailed.
! 33
Discussion
The goal of the current study was to examine the mechanisms that underlie a persistent
divide in Americans’ responses to officer-involved shootings. First, we show in both a study
conducted shortly after Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri as well as in a novel
scenario that attitudes pertaining to these cases diverged along racial lines. The fact that
differences emerged in the second study, where all respondents were presented with the same
information, suggests that this divergence was not simply the result of Blacks and Whites
occupying different information environments. Instead, Americans in different racial groups
perceived the same evidence differently.
In light of this conclusion, we tested two explanations for the racial divide. First, we
examined the possibility that social identity – in the form of racial salience – shapes how
individuals make sense of a racialized incident. We found mixed evidence for this suggestion
that these perceptual differences represented a form of racially motivated reasoning. In support
of this notion, we found that individuals expressed an interest in acquiring new information
likely to bolster their racial identities in a process akin to partisan selective exposure (Stroud
2011). We also found that racial identification measures moderated relations between racial
categorization and some summary judgments. Challenging this explanation, we found that
priming racial identity and experiences did not exacerbate racial divides,17 that racial
identification did not account for racial differences in factual beliefs about the incident, and that
individuals continued to update their beliefs even after forming an initial summary judgment. It
therefore appears that racial salience can motivate processing, but that this comprised at best a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17 While it is possible that the battery of additional items failed to prime race, earlier studies have found success with similar techniques (Steele and Aronson 1995). It is therefore likely either that race was inherently primed by the scenario or that the processes observed simply were not driven by motivational goals.
! 34
partial explanation of the diverging perceptions we observed.
We also found support for a second explanation, whereby individuals in different racial
groups interpreted novel information in ways that were shaped by preexisting beliefs and
expectations (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). Here, we found that differences in summary judgments
and beliefs across racial groups corresponded with respondents’ racial attitudes and perceptions
of police bias. Combined with results suggesting that individuals were updating their beliefs in
line with new evidence, this implies that some of the racial divide is a product of information
updating from racially divergent priors (cf. Bullock 2009; Gerber and Green 2003). That is,
insofar as there are racial differences in response to officer-involved shootings, these differences
largely reflect average differences in prior beliefs and expectations related to the fairness of
policing and the culpability of Black victims.
Results from this study not only inform on-going conversations about officer-involved
shootings in the United States, they also complicate scholarly discussions related to biased
information processing. For one, the current project takes race seriously as a social construct (cf.
Sen and Wasow 2016) and argues that previous work on motivated reasoning in the political
domain should be extended to social identities beyond partisan identification. Yet, we cannot
attribute all differences in evaluations and attitudes between social groups to identity preserving
goals. That is, it appears that racial differences are informed not only by directional motivations
(cf. Kunda 1990), but also by different pre-existing beliefs and expectations.18
As we state at the outset, the implications and remedies differ depending on whether we
ascribe these differences to a psychological tendency to arrive at identity-consistent conclusions
or whether they stem from expectation-guiding priors that themselves differ across racial lines.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18 Notably, however, these different priors could themselves have resulted from earlier motivated processes.
! 35
To address the former, we would need to somehow diminish the salience of race as a
consideration when evaluating officer-involved shootings. Not only is this difficult to
accomplish, but it precludes a range of potential interventions. The suggestion that lived
experiences and associated beliefs are underlying causes of the divide, however, yields more
tangible remedies. Though perceptions of police bias and racial resentment are clearly linked to
race, they may themselves be manipulable. Specifically, efforts to promote positive interactions
between police officers and Black community members could improve intergroup expectations,
resulting in less-polarized perceptions when incidents occur (cf. Pettigrew 1998).
As a final note, the reader will likely recognize that we have been careful throughout not
to expect differentially biased information processing from members of one racial group and not
the other. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that both Whites and Blacks are similarly
susceptible to the tendencies to engage in identity-protective strategies or to update based on
existing beliefs and expectations. But the presence of similar psychological processes should not
be construed to imply that the effects of biased perceptions are somehow racially neutral. To the
contrary, the presence of the sorts of biases we identify can instead serve to exacerbate racial
tensions and to induce additional inequities.
Left unchecked, the perceptual biases we identify would be expected to result in a vicious
cycle of distrust between Blacks and the criminal justice system. When officer-involved
shootings are adjudicated in court, convictions may be structurally unlikely. As White jurors and
Black jurors consider the evidence, we would expect them to seek out information that confirms
their existing perspectives and build on pre-existing beliefs to arrive at diverging judgments. This
may make it difficult to achieve a unanimous conviction and may leave Black communities, in
particular, feeling that justice has not been served. And these differences in perceptions could
! 36
also have larger implications in a society stratified by race, where Whites maintain greater
influence over many of our social and political institutions.
Conclusion
It is no secret that White and Black Americans hold different attitudes on a range of
political issues. In this paper, we do more than merely note the presence of this racial divide in
the context of officer-involved shootings. Using data collected in response to an actual shooting
and data from a fictitious event, we not only show that Whites and Blacks differ in their
judgments and beliefs, but that these differences emerge as a consequence of biased information
processing. Our results offer two explanations for how this biased processing occurs. First, we
find some evidence that Whites and Blacks arrive at their opinions as a function of identity-
motivated processes. Yet, this identity-driven explanation does not capture the full scope of the
racial divide. We also find that Black-White differences emerge as a function of different prior
beliefs and expectations, that are themselves informed by race.
Our findings have important implications for debates both within and outside the
academic realm. Specifically, these results suggest that when individuals come to deliberate
about officer-involved shootings and other racially charged events, the information they
prioritize and draw upon will differ along racial lines. By attending to differences in beliefs,
expectations, and motivations when assessing the effects of race, scholars and policymakers can
more effectively understand the work that race is doing in the criminal justice world and beyond.
Whether the goal is to further explicate the meaning of race for an academic audience or to
understand its complexities to design effective interventions that aid in the administration of
justice, future scholarship must do more than simply note that race matters; it must take up the
much more difficult task of understanding why.
! 37
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