Select Legal Ethics Cases

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In Re Argosino

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

R E S O L U T I O N

PADILLA,J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993.

The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction

for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the

death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September

1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not

guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial

pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11

February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment

of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for

probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6

April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's

discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to

take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P.

Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to

the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the

requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admissionto the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than

fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators,

five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner

likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had beenestablished in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint

efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of

Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's

oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to

the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense

therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took

advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,

taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the

accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on

Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,

crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that

the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his

son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death o

his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped

would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely

demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for

admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion

of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict

intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instrument

in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of

this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the

noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits

from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image o

lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than

irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the

reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice o

law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted eviden

absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they

were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physica

behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the

participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed o

good moral character.1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to

consider de novo the question of whether petitioner

has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to

above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of AttyGilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic

experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in

cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but

due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a

struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven

the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptiona

for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for

forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state i

petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner ACaparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and

practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes tha

Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the variou

certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for

civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for

the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the

doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash

temerarious and uncalculating.


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We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or

formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his

actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's

oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's

oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice

will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance

he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better

position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members

of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby

ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign

the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug

Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ.

concur.

Footnotes

1 Resolution, p. 8.


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Tapucar vs Tapucar

[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,vs. ATTY. LAURO L.

TAPUCAR, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios

Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar,

on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a

certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1]

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged

four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative

Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge

of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without

pay,[2]

while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were

consolidated,[3]

this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from

service of respondent.[4]

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar

Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were married on October

29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They

established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children

were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato

(Now General Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he

practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on

January 30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent

began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte.

On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia

Sembrano Pea.

In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an

administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation,

the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was

meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena,

giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such

as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral

conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court

ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6]

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his

ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September

20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he

completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.

Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo,

Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992,

respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by

Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was

done while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on

record shows the dissolution thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America

upon her retirement from the government service in 1990. However, he

children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly

suffered because of their fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against

them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in

1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under

the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children from

the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured theassistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represen

her in this case.

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matte

was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a

thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C

Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be

stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that

notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable

Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]

In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting

the charges against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a

mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay

in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my

wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double

jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple

jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners

recommendation, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above

titled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and

finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on

record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is

hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as

approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to

justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the

recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b)of the

Rules of Court.*We are in agreement that respondents actuations merit the

penalty of disbarment.

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition

precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in

order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored

fraternity.[9]

There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in

which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[10]

The Code o

Professional Responsibility mandates that:
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Rule1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoralor

deceitful conduct.

Rule7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on

his fitness to practice law, nor should he,whether in public or private

life,behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal

profession.*

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the

standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals

and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers

must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including

honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the

scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to

state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would

have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member

of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this professional infractions. For having

occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to

be free from any appearance of impropriety.[11]

For a judge is the visible

representation of the law, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens

consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the

law.[12]

Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his

actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13]

Surely, respondent

could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral

imperatives.[14]

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical

conduct,[15]

an attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and

lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court,

lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is

administered with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is

expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due

regard for public decency in an orderly society.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the

legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the

courts and to his clients.[16]

Exacted from him, as a member of the profession

charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right,

are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have

been compendiously described as moral character. To achieve such end, every

lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his

profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the

administration of justice.

On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for

misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to

be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus

proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17]

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution,

and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and

character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of and member of the

bar.[18]

For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto fu

opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure

the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering

justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the

Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19]

a complaint for disbarment wa

filed against a member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had

abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a

married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the

evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Inanother case,

[20]a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and

cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held tha

respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and

required of a member of a bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanction

imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman

other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to

investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the

contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges

against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he stil

merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved

the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduc

abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress

entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well aabandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show hi

disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers

oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a seriou

flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the

community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could no

but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the

administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate

disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar i

hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the

Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan

Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, andQuisumbing, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.

Purisima, J., no part.
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Sebastian vs Calis

[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999]

MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oathas lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.

The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Disciplineof the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),[1]in its Report, are as follows:

Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she wasreferred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required forcomplainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos(P150,000.00).

On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in theamount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wifeof the respondent for which a rece ipt was issued.

From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences withthe respondent regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate theprocessing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos(P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer withthe Commission on Human Rights.

On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issuedPlanters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five ThousandPesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of saidamount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S.Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be askedduring interviews.

When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she willbe assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as salesmanager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was furnished documents to supporther assumed identity.

Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demandedthe return of her money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing toworry about for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promisethat her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.

Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required feewhich was paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her.

When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that itwill be given to her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On saiddate complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P.Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were alsorecruits of the respondent.

Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Beloand Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurioustravel documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas telephone calland informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant wasdetained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.

On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines andrespondent fetched her from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A TresMarias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainants passport with a promisethat he will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to

pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of OneHundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds oP15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.

On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter torespondent for the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand

Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.

Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wifeinformed her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.

In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out thathe respondent had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions toevade responsibility.

Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid bycomplainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviewsreceipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the complainant together withdemand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Peso(P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent.[2]

Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or commenon the complaint, there was no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend thescheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by therespondent.[3]As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of threspondent to comply with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against himproceeded ex parte.

On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on thecase, finding that:

It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for

the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention ojob placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the respondenengaged in illegal recruitment.

The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant undean assumed name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part othe respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the feespaid by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding addresindicates his attempt to escape responsibility.

In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct forviolating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides thaa lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTYDOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member of the bar until he fully refunds the feepaid to him by complainant and comply with the order of the Commission on Bar Disciplinepursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.[4]

Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative casewas elevated to the IBP Board of Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution[5]dateDecember 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with amendment the recommendation othe Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, theReport and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled caseherein made part of this Resolution/Decisions as Annex A; and, finding therecommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws andrules, with an amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis beDISBARRED for havingbeen found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral odeceitful conduct.
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We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendationcontained in its Resolution dated December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.

After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find theresolution passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the findingof the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was not established becausecomplainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact she did not mentionany particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The only service ofthe respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the UnitedStates.

We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that hereinrespondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could giveher visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward wouldhappen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her thefees and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material gain.

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful anddishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. Alawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of goodfaith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath isnot mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keepinviolable.[6]The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person ofgood moral character.[7]This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to thepractice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of

law.[8]

We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in hisprofessional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member ofthe Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]

It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and libertyof complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victimsof unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign landsbecause they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded thepersonal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not onlyare respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His

utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration ojustice.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those whoshow that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for theconferment of such privilege.[10]We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilegeburdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during goodbehavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared b

judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[11]

Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the

orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP arecontemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation inremoving respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethicalunscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.

Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 shepaid the respondent is in order.[12]Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return thecomplainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in holding on to itunmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.

WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name isordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED tothe IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal records ofrespondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately theamount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing theamount he collected from her.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, PardoBuena, Gonzaga-Reyes, andYnares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., andPanganiban, J., on official leave.
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In Re Arthur Cuevas

B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.

R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO,J.:

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1.

His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated

August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject

to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to

take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous

conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction

stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX

TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW,

sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a

result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner

applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged

from probation and his case considered closed and terminated.

In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that"he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient

time"2attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and

certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character

issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) theOfficer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of

Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP

Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral,

San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish

of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on

petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father

of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In

compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his

comment which states as follows:

1

He fully appreciates the benign concern given bythis Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the

pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the

lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine

gratitude to such gesture.

2 He conforms completely to the observation of the

Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar

Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical

injuries which approximately led to the death of the

unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate(rather than

merely accidental

or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws

on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is

consistent with his stand at the outset of theproceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner

and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for

the crime of homicide but murder, since they took

advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless

condition when they were "beaten and kicked to death

like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of

abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior

strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).

3 He, however, has consented to the accused-

students' plea of guilty to the lesser offense of reckless

imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the

petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant

wife of the accused who went together at his house in

Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for

forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991

and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they

reported that the father of one of the accused died o

heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in

the case.

4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and

his co-defendants in the criminal case for the death ohis son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he

has high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed

him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and

the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life

This he cannot forget.

5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether

petitioner, since then has become morally fit for

admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely

submits this matter to the sound and judicious

discretion of the Hon. Court. 3

At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and

commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D

Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether

petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea

to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious

discretion of the Court.

The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for

disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law

His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless

neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence o

that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of

law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards o

intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the

entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been

admitted but have become a

disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner

a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosinopetitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath.4

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any

infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications

attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he

has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character

and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is

prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the

general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5Le

it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere

formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before

the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himsel

beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the

Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's

comment in the sister case of Re:Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's

Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that"Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his

community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render lega

and other services to the more unfortunate members of society"6.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.

Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a

date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let

this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the

Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.


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Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.


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Nunez vs Astorga

A.C. No. 6131 - February 28, 2005

EDUARDO L. NUEZ, EUGENIO O. NUEZ, ELISA NUEZ-ALVARICOand IMELDA L. NUEZ, complainants, vs.Atty. ARTURO B.

ASTORGA,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:

Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe forms ofdisciplinary action; thus, they should be imposed with great caution. They should

be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges. 1

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit 2filed with theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) byEduardo L. Nuez, Eugenio O. Nuez, Eliza Nuez-Alvarico and Imelda L.

Nuez. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga was charged therein with conduct unbecoming amember of the bar. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by

the IBP-CBD as follows:

"Complainants allege that sometime on June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda.De Nu[]ez executed a Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of Eugenio O.

Nu[]ez Lot No. 106 covered by OCT No. 2651 (now TCT No. 8955) containingan area of 384 sq. ms. for a consideration of P400.00. In the said contract, thestipulated time of repurchase was ten (10) years from the date of execution thereofor until June 5, 1978. That said period of vendors right to repurchase expiredwithout any agreement of extending said period of repurchase. To date, even theheirs of the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez have not exercised[d] their right ofrepurchase. A year after the execution of the said pacto de ret[r]o sale, the lateMaria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez and her son Ricardo Nu[]ez, as the surviving heirsof the late Eleuterio Nu[]ez, extrajudicially partitioned his estate, among others,the subject [L]ot No. 106 was adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[]ez which eventuallywas the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 8955 in the name of Ricardo Nu[]ez.Eugenio O. Nu[]ez [has] occupied and possessed said Lot No. 106 for more than

40 years up to the present and it is also where his children, Eduardo, Elisa andImelda, all surnamed Nu[]ez, grew and [are] presently residing.

"By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late spousesRicardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez appointing respondent as administrator, aswell as on the alleged judicial confirmation of respondents wife, as acknowledgednatural child of Ricardo Nu[]ez, respondent, on the pretext of administering the

properties of the late spouses, had been disturbing the peaceful occupation andpossession of complainants of Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants have noright over the same. With our desire to peaceably settle the controversy,complainants agreed to buy Lot No. 106, and respondent, who, without beingappointed by the court as administrator of the intestate estate of the late spousesRicardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez, sold and conveyed to Imelda Nu[]ez andElisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No. 106 they were occupying. Afterwhich Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against

respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed asCriminal Case No. R-4013-A.

"Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent went tothe house of Eduardo L. Nu[]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts.,Baybay, Leyte and threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[]ez by uttering the wordsipaposil ta ka which means Ill have you shot. A complaint for Grave Threatsdocketed as Case No. R-4012-A was filed by Eduardo L. Nu[]ez beforeMunicipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte." 3

In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with their counsel, whilerespondent was represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As respondent had not yetfiled his answer to the Complaint despite a previous Order dated December 7,

2001, he was granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. Thehearing was thus reset to June 26, 2002. 4

On June 26, 2002, only respondents counsel, Atty. Arnold Logares, was presentRespondent filed a Motion seeking a cancellation of the scheduled hearing andanother extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his answer. He was thusgranted a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. 5

On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer. 6He denied that hehad utilized his profession to circumvent the law and averred that there werealready several pending cases involving the same issues raised by complainants inthe present administrative action:

"2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by the late MariaOrtega Vda. De Nuez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in nature and can be besthreshed out in the amended complaint of Civil Case No. B-2001-10-27, entitled[]The Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez, et al versus SpouseBonito D. Alvarico, et al[] for Rescission of Contract[.] [T]he original complainwas filed in October 2001 at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leytean amended complaint of which is filed where one of the issues is the declarationof invalidity of the foregoing questioned deed of sale with right to repurchase

because if this document is really valid and existing then why did complainanEugenio Nuez [affix] his signature as one of the instrumental witnesses in theDeed of Extra-Judicial Partition among Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez and Ricardo

O. Nuez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would have protested at the time of theexecution thereof because he is the temporary owner of Lot No. 106, one of theproperties subject of partition. Why did he allow the late Ricardo O. Nuez to takcontrol and full possession and ownership of Lot 106 to his exclusion after the

partition in 1969?

x x x x x x x x x

"[3] b) It is not only the authority of the Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and PaternaBaltazar that herein respondent is relying as administrator of the said intestateestate but the same had been duly confirmed by the judicially declared daughter oRicardo O. Nuez, namely, respondents wife Dr. Linda Teresa Tan-Nuez whoconfirmed undersign[ed]s authority as administrator of the aforenamed estate;

"[3] c) With the discovery of the aforenamed deed of sale with the right to

repurchase only recently, the complainants were

emboldened to actively [question] [the] estate as they now [refuse] to recognizethe ownership and long time possession of the real properties forming part of theaforenamed [estate] to belong to the offspring of the late Ricardo O. Nuez;

"[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not utilize his profession to circumvent thelaw. Complainants Elisa L. Nuez and Imelda L. Nuez are actually renting thecornermost portion of the consolidated Lot Nos. 106 and 107 of the BaybayCadastre with an area only of 201 square meters, more or less, and whenrespondent was trying to eject them, complainants negotiated with the respondento buy their area of Lot No. 106 they rented and in fact actually advanced part ofthe agreed consideration until their father Eugenio Nuez discovered an existingdocument of sale with right to repurchase when they, ill-advised by their counsel[started] filing [a] series of criminal, civil and administrative cases againsrespondent and his wife at the instigation of their lawyers, the late Atty. Jose CModina and their current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a way of pressuringrespondent and wife to give up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot No106[,] including [the] portion which complainant Eduardo Nuez is now renting oLot No. 89;

"4. That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby admit thependency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally filed by Elisa LNuez without the intervention from any government prosecutor but said case ino longer pending in the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte when then samewas recommended for dismissal x x x. Later it was ordered dismissed by the AsstProvincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero and approved by Provincial ProsecutoTeresita S. Lopez on February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated the casefor review to the Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of thiscriminal case with the Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question now exist[s
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whereby this administrative case should be suspended until the resolution of thatpetition for review by the Department of Justice;

"5. That respondent specifically denies the material allegations of paragraph 8, 9and 10 of the complaint, the truth of the matter is that Amado Caballes at theinstigation of the complain[an]ts and their counsel filed Criminal Case No. R-4011-A with the Municipal Trial Court, Baybay, Leyte which is pending pre-trial.Like Criminal Case No. R-4013-A, the same was filed at the instance of AmadoCaballes, x x x. But before the filing of this present action initiated by Mr.Caballess counsel and complainants Eduardo Nuez and Eugenio Nuez requiredMr. Caballes to execute a document of resale on August 14, 2001 despite knowingthat the same has already been long redeemed by respondent x x x. Despite legalredemption, and despite Amado Caballes having executed x x x a Deed of Resalewhich was witnessed by complainant Eugenio Nuez x x x, the complainantsconvinced Amado Caballes to file Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] x x x. That byvirtue of the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a prejudicialquestion and that further hearing of the present administrative action should besuspended until the outcome of this criminal case;

"6. That respondent is duly authorized to negotiate for the disposal of any part ofthe Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar x xx.

"7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint[,] this is a matter ofexistence and pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not be a part of thiscomplaint because this will be threshed out in another hearing[.] [T]he truth of thematter is that respondent had been already acquitted in Crim. Case No. CBU-

29395 x x x.

"8. That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuezes, there is alsofiled Crim. Case No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by complainant Eduardo Nuezand now pending in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte despite the lack ofwitnesses x x x. Again, the pendency of this case will constitute a prejudicialquestion which necessarily will suspend further hearing of the presentadministrative action until the final outcome of the aforesaid Crim. Case No. R-4011-A;"

x x x x x x x x x. 7

On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their Reply. 8Thereafter, IBP-CPDCommissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala scheduled the case for hearing onDecember 11, 2002. On this date, respondent requested and was a granted a period

of fifteen (15) days to file his rejoinder. The parties agreed to file simultaneousmemoranda on January 15, 2003, after which the case was to be consideredsubmitted for resolution. 9

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report, 10Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found respondent guilty ofserious misconduct. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended hissuspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.

In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors ofthe IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court

for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.Respondent also filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,to set aside Resolution No. XV-2003-346 of the IBP Board of Governors.

The Courts Ruling

We disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP, but findrespondents offensive language against complainants and their counselunbecoming an attorney.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers shall noengage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neitheshall they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a scandalous manner tothe discredit of the legal profession. 11In gr_Gonzaga v. Villanueva,12this Courtciting Tucay v. Tucay,13held thus:

"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patendisregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Amongthe grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceitmalpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of acrime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required totake before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawfuorder of a superior court;

corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authorityto do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enoughas to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits inhis professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wantingin probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrancto the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membershiptherein." 14

However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are severe forms odisciplinary action and must be imposed with great caution. 15The allegations inthe Complaint were not substantiated by clear evidence; they were bereft ofconvincing proof of respondents deceit and gross misconduct.

The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending againshim does not ipso facto constitute serious misconduct. His contention that the

pending cases against him pose a prejudicial question that will bar the instanadministrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is the findingof the IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existenceof the same pendingcases constitute serious misconduct on the part of respondent.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is aground for disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as amatter of course, upon a finding that the crime a lawyer has been convictedoinvolves moral turpitude. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit touphold the administration of justice and is no longer possessed of good moracharacter. 16In the present case, however, while respondent has been charged withseveral criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of anyof them.

Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedlyconstituted serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal chargecannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of respondent. To hold otherwiswould open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing onumerous criminal cases against them.

Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated when the IBPinvestigating commissioner failed to conduct a formal investigation. 17As born

by the records, Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala conducted hearingon the case on June 5 and June 26, 2002, during which counsel for respondentAtty. Logares, appeared. Respondent was allowed to file his Answer, as well ashis Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself appeared at the December 112002 hearing when the parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda, after whichthe case was deemed submitted for resolution. Records show that respondent filedhis Memorandum on January 29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim that he was no

given ample opportunity to rebut the charges filed against him.

While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and convincinglyproven the charges of serious misconduct, we do, however, note the use ooffensive language in respondents pleadings. The Code of ProfessionaResponsibility mandates:

CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candotoward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics againsopposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which isabusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
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In his Memorandum18dated January 15, 2003, the opposing counsel, Atty. NorjueI. Juego, points out the manner and tenor of the language in the Answer 19and theRejoinder of respondent. 20The latter suggested that complainants and theircounsel had caused the filing of several baseless suits, including the presentcharge, merely to harass and place him in a bad light. 21He hurled insultinglanguage in describing the opposing counsel 22and cast doubts on the lattersintegrity by implying that the lawyer had instigated the filing of the so-called

baseless suits, violated the rules on non-forum shopping and committedmalpractice. 23

Indeed, these statements, particularly the words "who he is despite x x x hisshortness not only in size but in arrogance," constitute conduct unbecoming amember of the legal profession and cannot be countenanced by this Court.

A lawyers language may be forceful, but should always be dignified; emphatic,but respectful as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, shouldbe gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should use such language asmay be properly addressed by one gentleperson to another. 24

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga isACQUITTEDof the charge of seriousmisconduct, but is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney andisFINEDtwo thousand pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia,JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

Nunez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,38the Court held that the mere existence opending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground fodisbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door toharassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal casesagainst them.
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In re CARLOS S. BASA

December 7, 1920

Pedro Guevara for respondent.Attorney-General Feria for the Government.

MALCOLM,J.:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of AttorneyCarlos S. Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars ofCalifornia and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court ofFist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, wasfound guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge ofFirst Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,eleven months and eleven days ofprision correccional. On appeal, this decision wasaffirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the SupremeCourt.[[1]]

TheCode of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar maybe removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by

reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The solequestion presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, aspunished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary tojustice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by

numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided theexact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involvemoral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against goodmorals and the accepted rule of right conduct. ( In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisionsof the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be

taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly.

On the one hand, theviolation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passedover. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion tothe uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shalbe discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one yearSo ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
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13/17

Burguete vs Mayor

G.R. No. L-6538, May 10, 1954

PABLO BURGUETE, petitioner,vs.JOVENCIO Q. MAYOR, as Provincial Governor of Romblon, and ESTEBAN B. MONTESA,as Acting Municipal Mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, respondents.

Aguedo F. Agbayani, Cirilo C. Montejo and Felix B. Morada for petitioner.Francisco H. Marcial, Provincial Fiscal of Romblon, for respondents.

JUGO, J.:

The petitioner, Pablo Burguete, is the municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon,and was elected for that position in November, 1951; the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor,is the provincial governor of Romblon; and Esteban B. Montesa, the acting municipal mayorof Badajoz, Province of Romblon.

On August 21, 1952, a criminal complaint for serious slander was filed against Burguete inthe justice of the peace court of Badajoz.

On October 7, 1952, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Romblon.

On November 13, 1952, Jovencio Q. Mayor suspended the petitioner as mayor on theground that a criminal case against him was pending, and that it was the "standing policy ofthe Administration to the place under suspension any elective official against whom acriminal action involving moral turpitude is pending adjudication before the competentcourt."

The Governor directed Esteban B. Montesa, the vice-mayor, to act as mayor.

Burguete now files in this Court a petition for mandamusand quo warrantoagainst Mayorand Montesa.

The case for serious slander against Burguete is still, pending in the Court of First Instance.

Burguete has filed a motion to quash, but it was denied. The case could not be tried on themerits on account of the non-appearance of the witnesses for the prosecution.

No administrative investigation by the provincial board has been conducted under section2188 of the Administrative Code.

The questions raised in this case are not new, as they have already been decided in thecase of Lacson vs. Roque,*(49 Off. Gaz., 93). There it was held that the mere filing of aninformation for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him.The same may be said w ith regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Libeldoes not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient tofile a criminal complaint or information against a municipal mayor for the purpose ofsuspending him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely, according to the timethat would elapse before the criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or acquittal. Itis unnecessary to elaborate here on the reasons given for the principle, as they are setforth extensively in said decision.

Our conclusion is that the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

In view of the foregoing, the respondent Jovencio Q. Mayor is ordered to reinstate PabloBurguete in his office as municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, and to oust the respondentEsteban B. Montesa, as such officer, with costs against the respondents. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, andConcepcion, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

*92 Phil., 456.


14/17

Villanos vs Subido

G.R. No. L-23169 May 31, 1972

CONCHITA G. VILLANOS, petitioner-appellee,vs.THE HONORABLE ABELARDO SUBIDO, Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent-appellant.

Raymundo R. Armovit for pe titioner-appellee.

The Solicitor General for respondent-appellant.

BARREDO, J.:p

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI, in its CivilCase No. 53309, declaring null and void the decision of the respondent-appellantCommissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido, dated February 7, 1963, in AdministrativeCase No. R-23917, dismissing from the government service the petitioner-appelleeConchita G. Villanos. The last two paragraphs of the lower court's decision read as follows:

Premises considered, the Court holds that the action of theCommissioner of Civil Service in decision (deciding) theadministrative case against the herein petitioner without affordingher a fair trial and an opportunity to present her defense andimposing upon her the penalty of dismissal, constitutes a graveabuse of his discretion.

WHEREFORE, the Court declares the decision of the respondentin Administrative Case No. R-23917 null and void. The writ o fpreliminary injunction issued in this case is made permanent. Nopronouncement as to costs.

As found by the trial court, the facts of this case which are conclusive upon this Court inthis appeal are as follows:

Petitioner-appellee is a public school teacher of the Vigan Central School, in Vigan, IlocosSur. She holds the degrees of Elementary Teacher's Certificate, Bachelor of Science inElementary Education and Bachelor of Science in Education. She is a civil service eligible,having passed the junior as well as the senior teachers' civil service examinations in 1937and 1956, respectively. As of the year 1963, she had to her credit thirty-eight (38) years ofteaching experience. In the district of Vigan, she was ranked fifth among 138 classroomteachers, with efficiency ratings of mostly 95 %.

On April 1, 1957, petitioner-appellee wrote a letter jointly addressed to Mrs. Esperanza F.Sebastian and Miss Anacleta Faypon, her co-teachers in the same school, containinglibelous remarks against the two. Upon receipt thereof, Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Fayponlost no time in instituting a criminal action against petitioner-appellee in the Court of FirstInstance of Ilocos Sur charging the latter with the crime o f libel. On March 30, 1959,petitioner-appellee was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to pay a fine ofP200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs. This libelconviction was affirmed in totoby the Court of Appeals in a decision which it rendered on

December 21, 1960. Review of the latter decision was denied for lack of merit by this Courtin a resolution dated March 6, 1961.

A few days after the commencement of the criminal action, or on April 11, 1957, Mrs.Sebastian and Miss Faypon lodged before the Division Superintendent of Schools anadministrative charge against petitioner-appellee for (1) gross discourtesy to them as herco-teachers, and for (2) notoriously disgraceful and/or immoral language and/or conduct.They supported their charge with the same libelous letter, basis of the crim

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