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Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie,...

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Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud
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Page 1: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Self-deception as self-signaling:a model and experimental evidence

Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud

Page 2: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Self-Deception

Gur & Sackeim’s (1979) definitionAn individual: holds two contradictory beliefs holds them simultaneously is unaware of holding one of the beliefs is motivated to remain unaware of that

belief

Page 3: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Motivational Bias Explanation There is no conscious intention to self-

deceive. Instead, an individual makes judgments based on unconscious motivations.

Examples Self-serving bias

Attributing successes to internal factors, and failures to external factors

Confirmation bias Tendency to interpret events (our own actions) in

ways that confirm our beliefs

Page 4: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Self-Signaling Theory

Our choices affect our beliefs A choice not only causes an action, it

also expresses a belief Levels of Belief

Deep belief State belief Experienced belief

Page 5: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Self-Signaling Theory

Levels of Belief Deep belief Stated belief Experienced belief

If stated belief does not match deep belief, then there is attempted self-deception

If experienced belief is equal to stated belief, it is a successful self-deception.

Page 6: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Self-Signaling vs Motivational Bias Motivational bias does not account for

three characteristics of self-deception Defensiveness associated with challenged

beliefs The special significance of beliefs about the

self You wouldn’t state that someone was guilty of

self-deception if they were convinced the moon landing wasn’t real

Self-deception can fail A bias should necessarily alter belief

Page 7: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

The Self-Signaling Formal Model

Bodner & Prelec (1995) Model of non-causal motivation

Three primary assumptions1. There exists a characteristic that is

personally important2. This is not possible to introspectively

evaluate3. It can be examined through one’s actions

Page 8: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

The Formal Model of Self-Signaling

V(x, θO) = u(x, θO) + λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)

Page 9: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

The Self-Signaling Formal Model

x = the action or outcome θO = the “deep” belief about some characteristic θ = the experienced belief about some characteristic λ = the individual’s level of self-deception

V(x, θO) = u(x, θO) + λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)

The total utility of an action is equal

to

the generated utility of an action, plus

the diagnostic utility of an action

Page 10: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Diagnostic Utility

λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)

This must account for two emerging paradoxes1. The static state paradox

The ability to hold two opposing beliefs Explained by our two separate terms, θO and θ

2. The dynamic paradox The ability to remain unaware of a held belief To explain this, there must be two variants of self-

signaling Face-value Rational

Page 11: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Diagnostic Utility

λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)

Face-value Our knowledge of θO is a probability distribution, p(θ) p(θ|x) = our inferred value of θO given the action x

This is derived with the assumption that our action is to solely provide maximum outcome utility

“By choosing x I demonstrate deep beliefs such that x maximizes standard expected utility given these deep beliefs”

Page 12: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Diagnostic Utility

λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)

Rational Inferences about motivation are exactly the same as

in an interpersonal scenario Only paradoxical if action and belief are inconsistent

As such, belief θ influences the action x, and action x derives belief θ

Not ignorant of diagnostic utility and so can be mitigated rationally. This variation is through λ

Page 13: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

The Formal Model Revisited

x = the action or outcome θO = the “deep” belief about some characteristic

V(x, θO) = u(x, θO) + λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)

The total utility of an action given the deep belief of a characteristic is equal to

the outcome utility of an action given a deep belief, plus

The diagnostic utility of an action, as determined by susceptibility of self-deception, the utility of an action given an experienced belief, and the change in our experienced belief given that action

Page 14: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

The Experiment

Page 15: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Purpose

Designed to induce self deception in individuals, where self deception has a cost.

Designed to examine failed self deception, where the subject is aware of their own attempted self deception.

Author
Page 16: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Design

Female rated symbols Male rated symbols

Page 17: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Phase one

85 subjects view 100 Korean symbols.

The subject classifies the symbol as male or female and then rates their confidence on a 5 point scale.

Subjects are awarded $0.02 for every correct classification.

Page 18: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Phase Two

The subjects are asked to predict the gender of a symbol, then they are shown the symbol and asked to confirm or reject their prediction.

Again subjects rate their confidence. $0.02 are awarded for every correct

prediction and correct guess.

Page 19: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

$40.00 bonus

In Phase two a $40.00 bonus is awarded to 3 individuals in two different groups.

In the first test group it is awarded to the subjects with the highest number of correct post – prediction classifications.

In the second group it was awarded to the subjects with the highest rates of correct predictions.

Page 20: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

“In the absence of self-signaling the subject will categorize the sign as male if, and only if the probability

of male is greater than .5. With

self - signaling, one has to factor in the diagnostic utility of selecting male.”

The subjects desire for their prediction to be accurate prompts them to self deceive.

This deception makes the subject less likely to correctly confirm or reject their prediction.

Page 21: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Application of the Formal Model

Stated simply: A subject will choose a confirmatory response if

there is more total utility in a confirmatory response We know there is no optimal outcome utility, so we

must examine the individual components of the equation

V(x=m, θO) - V(x=f, θO) > 0

The total utility of a confirmatory

response minus

The total utility of a disconfirming

response

Is great than zero

Page 22: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Application of the Formal Model

c(θOm - θO

f) +

λa(E(θm|x=m) - E(θm|x=f))

The reward for choosing correctly * (the deep belief that the character is male - the deep belief that the character is female)

The degree of self-deception * the reward for correct anticipation * ((The experienced belief that the character is male given that you choose male) – (The experienced belief that the character is male given that you choose female))

Outcome Utility Diagnostic Utility

Page 23: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

What does this mean?

λa(E(θm|x=m) - E(θm|x=f)) Face-value

As mentioned earlier, in this system x implies θm, therefore, self-deception occurs

Rational Given rational discounting of (E(θm|x=m), the

effect may be diminished, but will always be positive. There will always be confirmatory self-deception to some arbitrary degree.

Page 24: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Results The inconsistent responses give a baseline for

subject error.

There are proportionately more self deceptive classifications than the error baseline.

The effect is greater in the anticipation group.

Page 25: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Results

Red: Anticipation bonus

Green: Classification bonus

At p=.001 27% of the subjects in classification group, and 45% of people in the anticipation group are self deceptive.

Page 26: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Results

Looking at individual changes in confidence between phase one and two: Moderately self deceptive individuals show an

increase in confidence following confirmation. +2.11

High self deceptive individuals show a decrease in confidence following disconfirmation. -1.76

It is expected that a confirming response will decrease confidence.

Page 27: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Results

Figure 3 shows that confirmation gives a confidence boost at moderate rates.

Page 28: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Results

High self deception correlates with fast response time, implying a suppression of evidence.

Page 29: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Discussion

Page 30: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Discussion

Self-deception can be induced when a large, financial award is offered

People who have statistical bias achieve higher confidence by self-deception – to a point Moderate self-deception possibly related to

increased self-esteem and mental health Many participants exhibited a statistical bias This model can be applied to intrapersonal

self-deception as well as interpersonal deception

Page 31: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Two Agents

An actor An observer Evolutionary explanation

It is easier to deceive others in a mental state that is ignorant of the individual’s true beliefs

Goal-setting argument Two mental structures are required for successful

goal setting: one to choose which actions to take, one to evaluate and reward the self for performance.

Page 32: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Alternative explanations

Perceptual bias Motivationally biased perception of characters

Does not explain faster response time and is confounded by randomized presentation of stimuli

Priming Exposure to one’s prediction makes that gender

more salient during the selection phaseDoes not explain effects seen in scaling of incentive

Page 33: Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud.

Applications

How far does the model extend? Confirmation bias Denial Cognitive dissonance More?


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