SGS Final Report Feb 2014

8/13/2019 SGS Final Report Feb 2014

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/sgs-final-report-feb-2014 1/91

20130511 Final Report Feb 2014 (2)

Review of Auckland urban

planning and infrastructure

Final report NZCID

February 2014



20130511 Final Report Feb 2014 (2)

This report has been prepared for the New Zealand Council for

Infrastructure Development. SGS Economics and Planning has taken all

due care in the preparation of this report. However, SGS and its

associated consultants are not liable to any person or entity for anydamage or loss that has occurred, or may occur, in relation to that

person or entity taking or not taking action in respect of any

representation, statement, opinion or advice referred to herein.

SGS Economics and Planning Pty Ltd

ACN 007 437 729

www.sgsep.com.au

Offices in Canberra, Hobart, Melbourne and Sydney

http://www.sgsep.com.au/





Review of Auckland urban planning and infrastructure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY 1

1 INTRODUCTION 5

1.1 Background 6

1.2 SGS’s brief 6

1.3 Method 7

Approach 7

Limitations 7

1.4 Report structure 7

2 INTEGRATING SPATIAL PLANS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 9

2.1 Overview 10

2.2 Principle 1 - the metropolitan planning ‘trilogy’ 10

The spatial vision 11

Implementation mechanisms 12

Governance 14

2.3 Principle 2 – distinguishing ‘strategic’, ‘structural’ and ‘follower’ infrastructure 15

City shaping power of major infrastructure projects 16

Investment appraisal tools – the limits of traditional cost benefit analysis 17

Investment decision making processes 18

Managing structural and follower infrastructure 18

2.4 Principle 3 - densification in the suburban city 20

Orthodox planning approaches to infill housing 20

Infill housing and the suburban context 20

2.5 Tests of efficacy in Auckland’s planning 21

3 URBAN GOVERNANCE IN AUCKLAND 23

3.1 Overview of existing governance arrangements 24

Governance structure 24

Central government 24

Auckland Council 25

Council-controlled organisations 26

The governing body and local boards 27

Independent Māori Statutory Board 30

Other key agencies 31

3.2 Overview of regulatory tools and plans 31

The Auckland Plan, Unitary Plan and Long-Term Plan 32

Place-based plans and strategies 36

3.3 Critique of existing governance arrangements 38

Alignment of institutions and communities 39

Accountability 39 Integration in decision-making 39




Conclusion 41

4 APPRAISAL OF PLANS AND STRATEGIES 43

4.1 The Auckland Plan 44

Scope and purpose 44 Key policy moves 45

Critique 46

4.2 The City Centre Masterplan 55

Scope and purpose 55

Key policy moves 56

Critique 56

4.3 The Waterfront Development Plan 57


Key policy moves 57

Critique 57

4.4 The Integrated Transport Program 2012-2041 58 Scope and purpose 58

Critique 59

4.5 The National Land Transport Program for Auckland 61


4.6 The Southern Initiative 62


Key policy moves 62

Critique 63

4.7 The Tamaki Strategic Framework (formerly the Tamaki Transformation) 63


Key policy moves 64

Critique 64

4.8 Auckland Housing Accord and Housing Action Plan 65

Auckland Housing Accord 65

Housing Action Plan (Stage 1) 65

4.9 Strategic investment plans of major util ities and public service assets 69

5 SYNTHESIS 72

5.1 Overview 73

5.2 Strengths 73

5.3 Weaknesses 76

6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 78

6.1 Questions set by NZCID 79

To what extent do the plans work as cohesive suite of plans? 79

Does investment and sequencing of major infrastructure projects support planned urban

development? 79

Does urban development support planned investment in major infrastructure projects? 80

On current plans, will the objectives of the Auckland Plan be achieved? 80

6.2 Recommendations 80

REFERENCES 82




LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1 REVIEW PROCESS 8

FIGURE 2 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN SUCCESSFUL METROPOLITAN PLANNING 11

FIGURE 3 INFRASTRUCTURE TYPOLOGY 16

FIGURE 4 CO-ORDINATING ‘STRATEGIC’ AND ‘STRUCTURAL/FOLLOWER’

INFRASTRUCTURE 19

FIGURE 5 DENSIFICATION AROUND SUBURBAN NODES 20

FIGURE 6 OVERVIEW OF AUCKLAND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 24

FIGURE 7. AUCKLAND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 26 FIGURE 8. LOCAL BOARDS AND WARDS IN AUCKLAND 29

FIGURE 9. KEY AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DELIVERY INFRASTRUCTURE TO AUCKLAND

31

FIGURE 10. REGULATORY AND STRATEGIC PLAN STRUCTURE I N AUCKLAND 32

FIGURE 11. IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS – FUNDING TOOLS 34

FIGURE 12. IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS – DELIVE RY MECHANISMS 35

FIGURE 13. IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS – INSTI TUTIONAL TOOLS 36

FIGURE 14. IMPLEMENTATION THRO UGH PARTNERSHIPS 38

FIGURE 15 AUCKLAND PLAN AND RE LATED PLANS 44

FIGURE 16 VISION OUTCOMES AND TRANSFORMATIONAL SHIFTS 45

FIGURE 17 NOTIFIED UNITARY PLAN ZONING ISTHMUS AND WEST 47

FIGURE 18 ACTIVITIES TO BE FUNDED BY DEVELOPMENT CONTRIBUTIONS 48 FIGURE 19. EDS COORDINATION STRUCTURE 51

FIGURE 20 RURAL URBAN BOUNDARY 52

FIGURE 21 AUCKLAND PLAN LAND RELEASE PROCESS 52

FIGURE 22 THE SHAPING INFLUENCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE 54

FIGURE 23 UNITARY PLAN ZONING FOR VARIETY OF DWELLINGS FORMS 55

FIGURE 24 INTEGRATED TRANSPORT PROGRAM RELATIONSHIP TO AUCKLAND PLAN

58

FIGURE 25 ITP INVESTMENT SCENARIOS 59

FIGURE 26 FULLY FUNDED AND COMMITTED FUNDING PREDICTIONS FOR AUCKLAND

PLAN TARGETS 61 FIGURE 27 THE SOUTHERN INITIATIVE 62

FIGURE 28 FUTURE PORT EXPANSION 70

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. SCOPE OF BENEFITS IN (TRANSPORT) INFRASTRUCTURE COST BENEFIT

ANALYSES (CBAS ) 17

TABLE 2 SGS’S CRITERIA FOR APPRAISING AUCKLAND SPATIAL PLANS AND

INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGIES 22 TABLE 3 OVERVIEW OF COUNCIL CONTROLLED ORGANISATIONS 27




TABLE 4 ALLOCATION OF DECISION MAKING POWER 40

TABLE 5. AUCKLAND HOUSING ACTION PLAN PRIORITY AREAS AND ACTIONS 67

TABLE 6 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES – ALIGNING INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN

PLANNING IN AUCKLAND 75



Review of Auckland urban planning and infrastructure 1

SUMMARY




SUMMARY

SGS Economics & Planning Pty Ltd (SGS) has audited the Auckland Plan (AP), the accompanying suite of

place and sectoral strategies and the infrastructure investment plans for the Region against 20 markers

of good practice. These variously relate to the efficacy of governance arrangements in integrating spatial

and infrastructure plans, the deployment of limited capital into ‘city shaping’ infrastructure and

management of suburban densification in line with market realities (see table overleaf).

Arguably, Auckland is equipped with the most evolved metropolitan governance structure of any city in

Australasia. Unlike its counterparts in Australia, where the metropolises are continuously contested

territory between local and State Governments, Auckland has a united voice on regional issues and the

critical mass to make trajectory shifting decisions in its own right. This advantage shows in the way the

Auckland community and the nation have gone about the AP. Overall, the documents we reviewedfunction as a comprehensive and cohesive suite of plans that provide a clear and worthwhile vision for

the city. We would judge that Auckland is in much better shape in terms of its strategic spatial planning

compared to most cities in our Region.

Having said this, there are a number of areas where the current situation appears to fall short of our

nominated best practice criteria – at least as far as an analyst can assess on the basis of resolved policy

and documents in the public domain.

The principal weaknesses we see relate to investment in city shaping infrastructure. A significant shift in

urban structure is envisaged in Auckland over the next three decades, but, as far as can be gleaned from

published plans, the only truly ‘strategic’ project to drive this is the City Rail Link, and this does not

appear to be part of a committed funding program for the first 10 years. In the interim, Auckland’s carbased, low density structure is likely to become even more entrenched.

On the face of things, the aspirations for urban transformation in Auckland do not seem to be aligned

with the capacity to fund the required infrastructure. But this does not imply that planning ambitions

for the metropolis should be ‘scaled back’ to fit the Auckland and NZ communities’ funding capabilities.

Rather it points to the fact that community and its leaders need a better understanding of how a

restructured Auckland might boost national productivity, GDP and aggregate tax revenues. In this

context, the question is not ‘can we afford the AP vision’ but rather ‘will the tax dividend from

implementing the Plan, including timely delivery of the requisite city shaping infrastructure, pay for the

additional investment involved? ’

SGS’s recommendation is that the AP needs to be interrogated from a productivity perspective with viewto establishing (or not) the case for expanded co-investment by Central Government in city shaping

infrastructure. Such co-investment may facilitate a more aggressive intra Auckland program of reform in

difficult matters like road pricing and value capture, which are also important to achieving the AP vision.




STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES – ALIGNING INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN PLANNING

IN AUCKLAND

Markers of leading practice Comment

1 A compelling and demonstrably achievable vision for Auckland's

spatial development 2 A comprehensive schedule of implementation actions with clear

assignment of action responsibility

3 A clear set of measurable outcome indicators benchmarked

against a base case or leading comparator cities

4 Unambiguous translation of the vision into a statutory plan with

attendant policies and decision rules for development assessment

5 Fair, transparent and pre-notified user pays contributions for the

extension and augmentation of urban infrastructure

Confirmation of the ‘locational

signalling’ role of development

contributions is required

6 Separation of policies and rules for various forms of development

contributions - user pays, impact mitigation and value capture

Various forms of development

contribution are discussed in

different documents. It is not clear

that there is an integrated approach

to harmonising these

7 Clear policy direction for road pricing Alluded to as an important optionand intergovernmental discussion is

in train, but no commitment as yet

8 Ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring

and review

No specific programs beyond

standing local government and RMA

processes

9 Ongoing community education programs regarding the merits of

the compact city



processes

10 Analysis showing how the spatial vision will underpin Auckland's

competitive advantages and ongoing economic development

Productivity gains from the AP are

not demonstrated

11 Mechanisms to deal with land fragmentation, contamination,

infrastructure deficits and other market failures deterring

brownfield and infill development

The potential for government

auspiced development authorities is

flagged but not yet resolved

12 Clear policy direction for value capture as part of an infrastructure

funding strategy

Broad based value capture options

(land tax reform) is not canvassed inany detail

13 Demonstrated adequacy of affordable and market accessible land

supply for greenfield development


supply for infill and brownfield development

It is unclear how a ‘pipeline’ of infill

housing opportunities will be

maintained in line with AP

aspirations

15 Clear policy direction for inclusionary affordable housing

provisions in statutory planning rules

Flagged in an Addendum to the

Unitary Plan but not yet resolved

16 Publicly accessible charter assigning planning and infrastructure

responsibilities to Central Government, ACC and Local Boards in

line with subsidiarity principles

Legislation and accords are in place,

but a genuine partnership of peers is

still a work in progress

17 Documented criteria and systems for distinguishing 'strategic'

from structural and follower infrastructure, and for optimal

investment in line with the spatial vision

There appears to be little or no city

shaping investment in the first

decade of the ITP 18 Separate and broader evaluation and implementation processes

for candidate strategic projects geared to leveraging city shaping

effects in line with the spatial vision

CRL appears to have been part of a

separate evaluation process, but this

is not formalised for wider

application.

19 Adoption of development sequencing policies or similar to

support efficient roll out of structural and follower infrastructure

20 Wide palette of non-detached dwelling forms around suburban

nodes, recognising market demand realities and creating

opportunities for a variety of developer types

strength uncertain potential weakness Source: SGS Economics & Planning Pty Ltd







INTRODUCTION




1 INTRODUCTION

This section describes the scope of this independent review of planning and infrastructure in Auckland.

1.1 Background

Auckland Council recently released an overarching spatial plan for the metropolitan region. This

envisages a more consolidated, poly nucleated urban structure than what would occur on an unchanged

trend scenario.

A plan is only as good as the capacity to implement it. In turn, implementation depends on effective

institutional structures and the ability to make the required infrastructure investments. There is, of

course, a nexus between these elements. It usually makes sense to devise land use strategies that

acknowledge limitations in the amount of capital available for infrastructure investment and renewal,

after taking into account reasonable reforms in funding arrangements.

Against this background, the NZCID was concerned to test, via independent audit, whether Auckland has

the ‘right’ land use vision and the capacity to provide the infrastructure to support such a vision. SGS

was commissioned to undertake this review.

1.2 SGS’s brief

The NZCID brief identified the extensive suite of plans and policies that have been developed for

Auckland in recent years. This includes the following documents:

Auckland Plan

Unitary Plan

Economic Development Strategy

City Centre Master Plan

Waterfront Development Plan

Integrated Transport Program

National Land Transport Program for Auckland

Auckland Housing Accord

Southern Initiative

Tamaki Transformation

In addition there are the strategic investment plans of major utilities and public service assets, some of

which are in the public domain.

The brief called for the following questions to be addressed in respect of these policy documents and

strategies:

To what extent do the plans work as cohesive suite of plans?

Does investment and sequencing of major infrastructure projects (exceeding $100m) support

planned urban development?

Does urban development support planned investment in major infrastructure projects?




On current plans, will the objectives of the Auckland Plan be achieved?

What actions are recommended?

Amongst other motivations, the NZCID sought this independent review of urban planning and

infrastructure as a key input to its submissions on the draft Auckland Unitary Plan.

1.3 Method

Approach

SGS’s method in undertaking this review is summarised in Figure 1 below. Our appraisal of the

robustness of urban planning and infrastructure provision in Auckland flowed from a set of policy and

practice principles derived from the recent literature and SGS’s body of work in this area.

This paper is the ‘Final report’ indicated below. It takes into account extensive commentary received in

respect of an earlier draft (the ‘Discussion paper’ shown Figure 1) which was circulated by NZCID to a

broad group of stakeholders, including all relevant divisions and Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs)of Auckland Council.

Limitations

The time and resources available for this study permitted only a desktop analysis of planning and

infrastructure arrangements in Auckland. Feedback received in respect of the Discussion paper

highlighted the ongoing ‘behind the scenes’ work being done by the Auckland Council and other

stakeholders in refining the Auckland Plan and its attendant strategies and implementation mechanisms.

Some of this background work is acknowledged in this Final report . Nevertheless, after corrections for

factual errors, the findings of the desktop audit stand as critique that an independent observer might

make based on confirmed plans and the information that is available in the public domain.

1.4 Report structure

The structure of the report generally follows the study process shown in Figure 1. The next Chapter (2)

explains the overarching principles and criteria we have adopted for the audit of the metropolitan

management in Auckland. Following this, Chapter 3 surveys the architecture of governance

arrangements in Auckland in respect of integrating and delivering spatial and infrastructure while

Chapter 4 reviews each of the plans cited in the NZCID brief against the adopted criteria. Chapter 5

provides our summary of the strengths and weaknesses in Auckland’s planning and infrastructure

arrangements. Finally Chapter 6 crystallises our responses to the questions posed by NZCID in its brief,

and sets out our recommendations.




FIGURE 1 REVIEW PROCESS

Source: SGS Economics & Planning Pty Ltd




INTEGRATED SPATIALPLANS AND

INFRASTRUCTURE




2 INTEGRATING SPATIAL

PLANS ANDINFRASTRUCTURE

This chapter sets out the principles for effective urban planning and infrastructure co-ordination, which in turn

inform a series of tests or criteria of efficacy. We rely on these criteria in our independent review of Auckland’s suite

of plans and urban management arrangements, which we discuss in the remainder of this report.

2.1 Overview

In undertaking a review of the potential economic efficiency, and efficacy, of spatial and infrastructure

planning in Auckland, a number of touchstone principles need to be borne in mind. These include that:

a broad suite of implementation and governance arrangements needs to be put in place, in

addition to well considered land use regulations, if metropolitan spatial planning is to be

effective – we refer to this principle as ‘the metropolitan planning trilogy’

it is important to distinguish between those infrastructure decisions that shape the pattern of

settlement and those that serve this urban structure densification in the suburban city requires a staged and patient approach.

In this Chapter we elaborate on each of these principles in turn, with a view to extracting tests of efficacy

to be applied in the review of Auckland’s plans, strategies and urban management arrangements as

listed above.

2.2 Principle 1 - the metropolitan planning ‘trilogy’

There is a continuing tendency to see metropolitan planning as primarily an exercise in spatial visioning

and the formulation of land use regulations governing the location, type and density of development in

line with this vision. These elements are necessary for successful urban management, but they are not

sufficient. A number of policy levers outside the domain of traditional ‘town planning’ need to be

deployed in pursuit of the spatial vision, and governance arrangements, including inter-jurisdictional

relations, need to be similarly aligned.

A more useful conceptualisation is of a ‘trilogy’ of plan making and implementation elements, as

summarised in Figure 2 and elaborated below. This conceptual model is drawn from the perspective of

those institutions, like Auckland Council, which set out to frame effective plans for a better Auckland.

Implicit in the model is the ‘buy in’ of the private sector and the general community, without which

there is little hope of planning visions being realised.




FIGURE 2 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN SUCCESSFUL METROPOLITAN PLANNING


The spatial vision

A clear, readily recognised and compelling vision for the future structure of the metropolis is required to

guide land-use planning decision making, galvanise private investment activity and provide the wider

community with a degree of certainty and purpose in the evolution of the city.

The vision itself should reflect up to date planning principles, focussed on sustainable development in all

its dimensions – economic, social, environmental and cultural.

The vision should also be practical, reflecting ‘stretch’ but demonstrably achievable shifts from the trend

based development scenario for Auckland in terms of housing location and mix, employment

distribution and travel efficiency amongst other parameters of urban performance.

The scope of metropolitan plans varies but is likely to cover:

Where and how housing and employment requirements will be accommodated

‘No-go’ areas for urban development

The hierarchy and distribution of activity centres

Areas targeted for accelerated regeneration and intensification

Regional open space corridors and facilities

Major infrastructure corridors

The clustering within, and connections between, particular business areas

Inter-regional connectivity

The staging or sequencing of development.

Importantly, the vision needs to be expressed in a form that enables monitoring and evaluation. That is,

it should be possible for a third party to assess whether the plans in place to deliver the vision are

actually being implemented and whether the anticipated community benefits, in terms of, say, job

numbers and access, housing choice and affordability, congestion mitigation and so on are being

achieved.

Thus, an effective monitoring and evaluation framework for the vision will generally have two

dimensions:

PREFERRED

ECONOMIC & SOCIAL

GEOGRAPHY

THE ‘VISION’

TRANSPORT

INVESTMENTLAND USE

REGULATION

PRICING

LAND MARKET

PROGRAMS

AFFORDABLE

HOUSING

EDUCATION &

MARKETING

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

IMPLEMENTATION

MECHANISMS

CENTRAL

GOVERNMENT

GOVERNANCEAUCKLAND

COUNCIL

LOCAL BOARDS

DELIVERED THROUGH DELIVERED THROUGH




A time bounded schedule of ‘inputs’ or ‘implementation actions’ with clear assignment of

responsibility for delivery. Examples include, build road ‘X’ by date ‘Y’, rezone land at site ‘X’ by

date ‘Y’ etc.

Time bounded outcome measures, formulated with reference to a base case or benchmark

cities. Examples include, ‘all Aucklanders reside within 100 metres of a principal public

transport route offering a level of service ‘X’, ‘peak hour average travel speeds for private

vehicles moving through the central city region are 10% higher than those experienced in

Sydney’, ‘median house price expressed as a multiple of median household earnings are at least

10% lower than those in Sydney’ etc.

Implementation mechanisms

Land use regulation

To be realised, the vision needs to be translated into a land use regulation (‘statutory planning’) regime.

Mandatory public exhibition and review will generally apply to this element of metropolitan planning.

One key issue here will be striking the right balance between prescriptive and performance based

controls in the development assessment or resource management process.

The effectiveness of arrangements under this heading will also depend on how decision making power

over development approvals is shared between independent certifiers, local expert panels, elected

Council members, review bodies and ministerial call-ins.

Pricing

Efficient infrastructure pricing, including recovery of a reasonable share of the cost of infrastructure

extension or augmentation to support development through up front contributions, plays an important

role in the timing, sequencing and density of development. Indeed such pricing signals can have a more

powerful influence on these incremental investment decisions than ‘lines on a map’.

Congestion pricing in transport can similarly play a key role in allocating road space to the highest

welfare generating uses whilst dampening the need for expensive ‘predict and provide’ infrastructure

strategies. There are ample precedents for this in water and electricity pricing.

It must be acknowledged that deployment of pricing strategies to manage the pattern of development in

line with the spatial vision is fraught, given the inertia in existing settlement patterns and concerns over

both inter-generational and horizontal inequities. Those least able to pay may be called upon to bear

the brunt of urban adjustment. While these issues require careful and sensitive management, they can

be viewed as transitional challenges. The sustainable metropolis of the future will have to price its

resources efficiently, taking into account all externalities as well as financial costs of infrastructure

delivery.

Education and marketing

Community engagement, education and marketing usually have a high profile in the spatial visioning

process, but tend to fall away once plan implementation gets underway. Experience in other

Australasian cities is that it is important to bring the community along over the long haul of metropolitan

planning and to build a sophisticated constituency for sustainable development. This requires an on-

going ‘big picture’ dialogue with citizens, as distinct from local debates over neighbourhood plans and

resource consents.

Transport investment

More than any other infrastructure portfolio, investments in transport infrastructure can set the

metropolis in the direction of the adopted vision, or steer it, inadvertently, elsewhere. As discussed

below, the metropolitan planning process needs to feature a reliable and consistent mechanism for

identifying and appraising transport projects with ‘city shaping power’.




Economic development

Until relatively recently, metropolitan plans in our region have been formulated independently from

economic development strategies for these cities and their hinterlands. In part this is an outworking of

the statutory mandate for urban planning (land use licensing). But it also reflects an aspatiality in the

formulation of economic policy which has tended to focus on sectoral determinants of competitiveness

(skills, industry specialisations, input costs and so on) rather than the geography of value creation.

Regional, spatial and economic development planning are gradually converging. It is noteworthy that

two recently released draft metropolitan strategies in Australia (Plan Melbourne and the Integrated

Transport and Land Use Plan for Adelaide) plus one proposed for radical revision (the South East

Queensland Regional Strategy ) define sustainable economic competitiveness as the pre-eminent

challenge to be addressed in spatial planning.

The establishment of a unitary Council for the greater metropolitan region should provide Auckland with

a major advantage on this front.

Land market programs Efficient land use regulation, careful infrastructure pricing and harmonised economic development

policies will go a long way to realising the spatial vision for Auckland, but they cannot be relied upon to

do the whole job. Evolution in metropolitan development patterns will be hampered by various forms of

market failure including land fragmentation, contamination and infrastructure deficits on brownfield

sites and lack of innovation and capability on the part of the private development sector.

Overcoming these barriers to efficient urban adjustment may require special land market programs and

agencies to assemble and clean-up sites, and undertake demonstration projects.

Also relevant under this element of metropolitan planning is the formulation of appropriate value

capture arrangements. These are not to be confused with infrastructure pricing strategies. Rather they

relate to public capture of a reasonable share of the uplift in land values occasioned by communityinvestment in infrastructure and/or the granting of development licenses which are rationed to produce

net welfare gains. Value capture can significantly expand the region’s capacity to invest in strategic

infrastructure.

Typically, value capture is thought of in site or corridor specific terms, for example land prices before and

after rezoning, or in the immediate locale of a major infrastructure project. These are valid approaches

but are beset by measurement, market speculation and enforcement issues. Consideration should also

be given to broader based taxes that acknowledge the pervasive land value impacts of major transport

investments in particular.

By way of illustration, economists Grimes and Young (2010) examined the effects of urban passenger rail

upgrades to Auckland’s Western Line. The upgrades, and associated urban renewal projects, wereannounced in mid-2005. Using unit record house sale price data, the researchers tested the hypothesis

that price appreciation was affected by proximity to Western Line stations following the upgrade

announcements. They found positive impacts on prices up to 8 kilometres away from the subject

stations. In applying their estimates of land price rises to all parts of Waitakere City that are within eight

kilometres of a rail station, Grimes and Young found …

“a rise in values of $605 million to $667 million upon announcement in 2005 (using 2004

values). These benefits are broadly comparable to the costs ascribed to the Western line

upgrades pertaining to Waitakere City (including the New Lynn projects costs).” (p 23)

Affordable housing

Affordable housing deserves a special mention within the metropolitan planning ‘trilogy’ because of itscritical role in influencing community perceptions of whether the city ‘works for them’, its hypothesised

role in social sustainability and its impact on labour markets and human capital development. Also




relevant is the observed tendency for central governments to roll back their commitments to base line

social housing programs, implying a greater task in this area for regional and local governments.

Creating efficient land markets to ensure adequate pipelines of development opportunities for both infill

and greenfield housing must be a priority if metropolitan plans are to advance affordable housing

objectives.

Beyond this, there may be a role for pro-active planning instruments which mandate the inclusion of

affordable housing in certain types of development in certain areas.

Governance

Governance arrangements must support the plan implementation process, mediating the inevitable

political tensions between local community interests and regional community interests.

We make the following observations regarding the effective metropolitan governance, based on our

experience in an Australian context:

1. There needs to be reasonable alignment between governance institutions and clear

spatial communities of interest or communities of co-dependence

2. There should be clear democratic accountability in each of these spheres – institutions

should not rely on implied mandates

3. There should be subsidiarity in the allocation of decision making power across these

institutions and spheres of community. A possible allocation of responsibilities for

urban planning matters and infrastructure is shown below:

>Improving national consistency of planning and building

regulation

>Resolving cross-border issues such as water supply, ports andtransport connections

>Environment, heritage issues of national significance

>Maintaining nation-wide land use and development regulation

system

>Maintaining administrative and judicial review processes

>Overseeing planning institutions

>Development planning and development determinations for

sites or projects of nation-wide significance

>Investing in strategic infrastructure of metropolitan

significance

>Designating major activity centres and facilitating

development in these centres

>Designating and managing major transportation corridors>Identifying and developing key employment nodes

>Formulating land release schedules in growth areas

>Protecting environmental assets of regional significance

>Maintaining efficient land supply for housing

>Neighbourhood structure planning

>Regulating housing development redevelopment within

applicable national and regional guidelines

>Regulating development in all lower order activity centres

NATIONAL

METROPOLITAN

LOCAL




4. There should be subsidiarity in the allocation of revenue raising powers across these

institutions, to avoid the accountability problems associated with vertical fiscal

imbalance.

2.3 Principle 2 – distinguishing ‘strategic’, ‘structural’ and

‘follower’ infrastructure

In considering the adequacy of infrastructure programs in Auckland, it is important to note that not all

infrastructure is ‘equal’ in terms of impact on settlement patterns.

SGS has devised a typology of infrastructure projects or assets comprising the following categories:

Strategic or city shaping infrastructure

Structural infrastructure

Follower infrastructure.

Strategic infrastructure comprises a relatively limited number of projects, almost exclusively in the

transport domain, which have the power to shift relative accessibility across the metropolis. These

projects drive the location decisions of households and firms and can create new agglomeration

economies thereby boosting productivity.

Structural infrastructure represents the higher order or ‘trunk’ facilities and networks that provide the

skeletal framework for the urban region in question. These include arterial roads, sub-regional sewers

and water mains, major water storages, full service and research hospitals, principal university campuses

and the like. These items are distinguished by their sub regional service catchments and their cost.

Sufficiency in the provision of structural infrastructure is what underpins the economic adaptability of a

Region.

The third category of infrastructure – ‘follower’ services and facilities – comprise assets whose service

catchments tend to be more localised. These items are vital to community wellbeing and business

efficiency, but they neither shape the pattern of development nor provide an overarching structure for

settlement and industry development. Rather they provide services into a suburb or neighbourhood

once the development of these areas has been enabled by investment in higher order infrastructure

projects – see Figure 3.




FIGURE 3 INFRASTRUCTURE TYPOLOGY


City shaping power of major infrastructure projects

A significant body of research literature shows that major infrastructure projects can, quite literally, re-

sculpt the pattern of metropolitan development. Substantial shifts in the accessibility contours applying

over urban space will change the location choices of firms and households alike, setting in place a new

geography of land values. This, in turn, will signal where new and/or intensified urban development is

warranted under commercial market rules. The outcome is a shift in urban form and, sometimes,

structure.

These processes have been intuitively understood in policy circles and within the wider community for

many years – people see, for example, the nexus between highway development and increasing land

values and housing development in peri-urban regions.

There is a growing awareness that major transport investments are a powerful and, perhaps, the pre-

eminent policy lever for determining metropolitan structure. Land use regulation via planning schemesand the like is more likely to play a supplementary role in managing urban development. This means

that major transport projects need to be conceptualised within the context of a preferred urban

structure that is, ‘creating the sort of city we want’ as opposed to following the once conventional

‘predict and provide’ philosophy where transport investment simply responds to demonstrated demand.

In some instances, it may make more economic sense to prioritise transport infrastructure that will

reshape the city in permanently advantageous ways, over those projects that are solving evident

congestion problems.

Strategic infrastructureThis shifts relative accessibility across the

metropolis and therefore influences the location

decisions of households and businesses,

effectively shaping the pattern of settlement.

Structural infrastructureThese are the high level network elements and

nodes which form the skeletal structure of the

Region

Follower infrastructureThese are the local and district services that flesh

out the skeletal structure of the Region




Investment appraisal tools – the limits of traditional cost benefit analysis

A deeper understanding of the city shaping effects of strategic transport projects has significant

implications for the tools used within planning and infrastructure agencies to assess the merits of

competing investment opportunities.

The key investment appraisal tool applied within government is cost benefit analysis. This seeks to

determine whether the stream of traded and external benefits generated by a project justify the capital,

maintenance, operating and external costs involved, taking into account that the same resources could

be deployed to other socially productive uses.

Cost benefit analysis, as applied to major transport investments, is evolving rapidly. The range of

impacts taken into account in investment appraisal can now extend well beyond direct user benefits and

a limited range of environmental externalities (emissions, safety, neighbourhood disruption and amenity,

etc.).

In particular, “agglomeration economies” are increasingly taken into account in project appraisals, albeit

in supplementary documentation to ensure full transparency of the impact of these factors on overallinvestment performance. Some appraisals are extending the scope of benefits further to take into

account human capital enrichment (achieved by allowing households better connections to formal and

informal learning opportunities) and the improvement to equity and social harmony which follows from

allowing a greater palette of housing, employment, learning, health and recreational choices to

households which currently have limited choices (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 . SCOPE OF BENEFITS IN (TRANSPORT) INFRASTRUCTURE COST BENEFIT

ANALYSES (CBAS)

Potential benefits generated by a new transport link Traditional

CBA

Traditional CBA +

(wider economicbenefits) WEBs

Traditional CBA +

WEBs + Equity &Human Capital Effects

Business transport costs are reduced, enabling expanded

production

Household travel costs are reduced

Business to business synergies are improved (e.g.

economies of scale and scope)

Removal or mitigation of transport constraints on the

expansion of high value added industries in propitious

locations

Labour participation and productivity are improved as a

result of reduced travel costs for workers and better labour

matching

Human capital is enriched (expanded formal and tacitlearning opportunities)

Households choice (consumption, learning, employment) is

expanded

Source: SGS Economics & Planning

Ideally, the appraisal tools applied in Auckland would cover this broad spectrum of benefits. But even if

a wide net is cast in terms of identified impacts, cost benefit analysis faces some structural weaknesses

which limit its efficacy in the context of ‘city shaping projects’. It is conventional in cost benefit analysis

to restrict measured impacts to the ‘first round effects’ of projects. These may be subject to lags, but

have a direct ‘cause and effect’ link with the infrastructure item in question. Indirect and feedback

effects are excluded, mainly for practical reasons; if second and subsequent round benefits are to be

taken into account, so must costs, making the data gathering and analysis process very complex and

open to challenge (because multiple judgements are required in identifying the effects).




The issue here is that the profound city shaping power of major projects is effected through a multitude

of linked decisions where feedback loops are crucial. For these type of projects cost benefit analysis

needs to evolve further, perhaps taking on more of the character of dynamic general equilibrium

modelling, in terms of tracking feedback effects, and linking this to land use outcomes. If modelling

along these lines cannot be applied in Auckland, the logic, at least, should obtain in more qualitative

assessments of bona fide city shaping projects.

Investment decision making processes

A relatively small number of investment decisions on city shaping projects can set the scene for a large

number of subsidiary investments in lower order roads, schools, hospitals and the like. This dichotomy

should be reflected in the business case evaluation processes applied to strategic versus structural and

follower infrastructure projects. The first category deserves a different evaluation track with, as noted, a

more expansive evaluation discipline applied.

This is not necessarily an issue of project size in dollar terms. Decisions to build a billion dollar hospital

or invest a billion dollars in a portfolio of suburban road projects are substantively different - with

respect to city shaping effects – from commissioning a billion dollar road which significantly affectsaccessibility across the metropolitan area.

In principle, city shaping projects demand a more concerted ‘whole of government’ approach to

planning and evaluation because they will have cross-portfolio implications for asset management and

service delivery costs. This does not mean that expensive and cumbersome bureaucratic structures have

to be set up to pursue co-ordination. The projects in question are few and far between and can be dealt

with via time limited enquiry and co-ordination structures, rather than permanent institutions.

Generally speaking governments in advanced western countries are not particularly adept at making

investments in strategic infrastructure projects. In part, this is because it is difficult to discern and

evaluate the systemic impacts of these projects. Also relevant is the contemporary received wisdom

that separation of policy making and service delivery leads to better community outcomes becauseservice providers are more focussed, comply with commercial disciplines and are not (unduly) distracted

by political agendas. The downside is a diminished appetite to take cross-portfolio impacts into account

in business case development. For example, why should a CCO look at the ‘bigger picture’ if it threatens

to compromise performance versus their contracted performance indicators?

Managing structural and follower infrastructure

The co-ordination of ‘follower’ infrastructure will require some form of market-informed development

sequencing in which a preferred pathway for development in a planning district is identified, based on

minimisation of the total cost of social and economic infrastructure. Although most obviously applicable

in greenfield growth areas, the concept of a preferred pathway for development is equally relevant in

areas undergoing progressive redevelopment or wholesale regeneration as is envisaged, for example, in

the Metropolitan Centres and their immediate neighbourhoods in the Auckland Plan. The idea is tomake a reasonable forecast of the pattern and timing of development (and, implicitly, the pattern and

timing of demand for infrastructure services) and then adopt this as the notional benchmark for services

planning by all infrastructure agencies. Agencies would not necessarily be required to endorse this

assumed sequence or pattern of development, rather it could be offered to them as a plausible scenario

for asset management and services planning purposes. The incentive for these agencies to adopt the

preferred sequence of development would, in part, stem from a common sense of regional purpose. But

more importantly, adoption of the preferred sequence of development would provide them with a vital

tool to manage financial risks in the roll out of infrastructure investments.

For their part, developers would not be obliged to remain within the staging set down in this least cost

pathway. They would be free to pursue out of sequence projects provided they are prepared to meet the

additional costs of supplying economic infrastructure, and provided they are prepared to bring forwardthe provision of social infrastructure in their preferred location.




The benchmark sequence of development would be reviewed regularly (say, every year) and as required,

as new information comes to hand on land demand and as out of sequence development approvals alter

the geography of infrastructure capacity in a district.

As well as paying for the acceleration costs (effectively the bridging finance costs) for water supply,

sewerage, drainage, education, health, transport and other infrastructure, developers would be required

to contribute to local infrastructure costs on a share of usage basis as set out in a development

contributions plan.

The notion of requiring out of sequence developers to accelerate infrastructure provision at their cost is

certainly not new. There are several examples across Australasia where an out of sequence developer is

required to fully fund accelerated infrastructure, with the Council or government agency in question

either buying back the facility at the time when its creation in the subject location was scheduled, or

collecting contributions from intervening developments and passing these back to the original out of

sequence developer, without interest. In the context of an effective cross-portfolio co-ordination

system, these practices would be codified and operated on a consistent basis across the metropolitan

geography and across all infrastructure providers.

The relationship between the phasing of strategic infrastructure versus follower and structural

infrastructure in a sound co-ordination system is illustrated schematically in Figure 4. The city shaping

power of strategic infrastructure is leveraged to help bring about a metropolitan settlement pattern that

is preferred on economic, social and environmental grounds – in this case the spatial vision for Auckland.

Structural and follower infrastructure is then managed via a spatial sequencing process, which ensures

that providers can externalise the risks associated with fragmented or leap-frog development.

FIGURE 4 CO-ORDINATING ‘STRATEGIC’ AND ‘STRUCTURAL/FOLLOWER’

INFRASTRUCTURE


2010 - 2015

2015 - 2020

2020 - 2025

2025 - 2030

Sequence ofdevelopment to aidplanning of ' fo l lower '

infrastructure

Preferred regionalstructure, shaped by' st rategic' transportinfrastructure




2.4 Principle 3 - densification in the suburban city

Orthodox planning approaches to infill housing

Over the past decade, planning for new housing in established urban areas has been strongly concerned

with issues of accessibility, density and sustainability. The resulting ‘orthodoxy’ in planning is to focus

new residential development in ‘activity centres’ or ‘transit corridors’ - locations that offer the best

access to services, facilities and public transport. Conceptually, such locations correspond to area 1 in

Figure 5 below.

Although potentially satisfying sustainability and amenity objectives, the provision of housing in these

‘area 1’ locations is subject to a number of challenges. Land close to the core of existing centres or

corridors typically accommodates existing retail or commercial activities. If these uses are viable and

provide profits to the landowner and/or tenants, they can act as a disincentive to undertake

redevelopment. In addition, these locations commonly feature a pattern of subdivision that is

characterised by small and narrow allotments that are in multiple ownerships. Under these

circumstances the acquisition of a sufficiently large land parcel to make new housing development

technically or financially feasible can also be a significant challenge. Limited demand for apartment style

living in suburban locations can also be an issue that undermines the viability of apartment and mixed

use development.

In summary, issues of financial feasibility, fragmented land ownership, and limited demand for

apartment type dwellings can conspire to limit the extent to which orthodox planning approaches have

been successful in facilitating housing supply.

FIGURE 5 DENSIFICATION AROUND SUBURBAN NODES


Infill housing and the suburban context

Referring again to Figure 5, Areas 2 and 3 both represent alternative locations for infill housing

developments.

Area 2 locations are those that are near to the centre and are better suited to intermediate or medium

density housing forms (for example, townhouses, terrace, small-scale apartments) because of attributes

such as the street and block layout and/or the presence of larger allotments (minimising the need for

site amalgamation) and/or favourable topography, orientation, and so on. These precincts could host a

range of intermediate or medium density housing forms – for example, townhouses, terrace, small-scale

apartments – providing both housing choice and a transitional urban character between areas 1 and 3.

1

2

2

3

3




Area 3 locations are those that are around the centre, still within a walkable catchment, that could

provide opportunities for small-scale infill housing projects such as ancillary dwellings, duplexes, or, in

some cases triplex housing forms. Development in area 3 might be more dispersed in nature – ‘salt and

peppered’ – rather than the comprehensive redevelopment that is implied in areas 1 and 2.

This represents a more sophisticated approach to planning for infill housing which acknowledges the

importance of orthodox planning approach for centres (mixed use and apartment development in

centres) but recognises that existing residential areas near and around centres can play a more

significant role in supporting infill housing provision. This is not to say that redevelopment of the core

areas of activity centres should not be pursued. However, this is more likely to be a longer term

proposition. In the short to medium term alternative strategies might be undertaken to facilitate housing

supply that are better aligned with existing demand and financial viability.

Applying a variety of approaches also has the advantage of providing a range of infill housing

opportunities that might support a greater diversity of housing products, as well as a pipeline of projects

for the full spectrum of developer types that contribute to the infill housing markets. This includes ‘mum

and dad’ investors and small builders who are typically less reliant on external financing than developers

that are involved in larger scale apartment developments.

2.5 Tests of efficacy in Auckland’s planning

The foregoing discussion of principles for effective urban planning and infrastructure co-ordination gives

rise to a series of tests or criteria of efficacy (Table 2). We rely on these criteria in our independent

review of Auckland’s suite of plans and urban management arrangements, which we discuss in the

remainder of this report.




TABLE 2 SGS’S CRITERIA FOR APPRAISING AUCKLAND SPATIAL PLANS AND

INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGIES

Element of successful metro planning Markers of leading practice

The metropolitan planning ‘trilogy’ 1 A compelling and demonstrably achievable vision for Auckland's spatial

development 2 A comprehensive schedule of implementation actions with clear


3 A clear set of measurable outcome indicators benchmarked against a base

case or leading comparator cities

4 Unambiguous translation of the vision into a statutory plan with attendant

policies and decision rules for development assessment

5 Fair, transparent and pre-notified user pays contributions for the extension

and augmentation of urban infrastructure



7 Clear policy direction for road pricing

8 Ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring and review

9 Ongoing community education programs regarding the merits of the

compact city



11 Practical arrangements for overcoming land fragmentation, contamination,

infrastructure deficits and other market failures deterring brownfield and

infill development in targeted areas

12 Clear policy direction for value capture as part of an infrastructure funding

strategy

13 Demonstrated adequacy of affordable and market accessible land supply for

greenfield development

14 Demonstrated adequacy of affordable and market accessible land supply for

infill and brownfield development

15 Clear policy direction for inclusionary affordable housing provisions in

statutory planning rules

16 A transparent and publicly accessible charter assigning various planning and

infrastructure responsibilities to Central Government, ACC and Local Boards

in line with subsidiarity principles

‘Strategic’, ‘structural’ and ‘follower’

infrastructure

17 Documented criteria and systems for distinguishing 'strategic' from

structural and follower infrastructure, and for optimal investment in line

with the spatial vision

18 Separate and broader evaluation and implementation processes for

candidate strategic projects geared to leveraging city shaping effects in line

with the spatial vision

19 Adoption of development sequencing policies or similar to support efficient

roll out of structural and follower infrastructure

Densification in the suburban city 20 Provision for a wider palette of non-detached dwelling forms around

suburban nodes targeted for densification, recognising market demand

realities and creating opportunities for a variety of developer types





URBAN GOVERNANCE

IN AUCKLAND




3 URBAN GOVERNANCE IN

AUCKLAND

This chapter contains overview and critique of governance arrangements for planning and infrastructure provision in

Auckland. This draws down on the relevant principles and criteria in Section 2 noting the importance of sound

intergovernmental forums for decision making, particularly in respect of city shaping infrastructure.

3.1 Overview of existing governance arrangements

Governance structure

Auckland has a three tier governance structure (Figure 6). The priorities and responsibilities of these

three tiers vary and the effectiveness of this structure is explored in more detail below.

FIGURE 6 OVERVIEW OF AUCKLAND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Central government

Act in the interests of New Zealand as a

whole (particularly the economy)

Metropolitan/regional government

Act in the interests of the Auckland

metropolitan region

Focus on the broad region-wide strategic

decisions for the Auckland metropolitan area

Local level

Make decisions on local matters

Focus on providing local leadership and

building strong local communities

Source: SGS Economics and Planning, 2013

Central government

Central government in New Zealand is focused on the interests of the country as a whole, compared to

local government (Auckland Council) which is focused on acting in the interest of the local community.

Tensions can often arise between these parties when these two interests conflict.

Central Government

Auckland Council

Local Boards & Wards




As identified in the Auckland Plan, Central government is ideally focused on working with Auckland

Council and ‘sharing as much of the information and lessons learned as possible, to promote and foster

ongoing collaboration in the pursuit of mutually agreed outcomes’ (Auckland Council 2012a).

Collaboration between central government and Auckland Council is particularly important in relation to

infrastructure including the implementation of the National Infrastructure Plan. The effectiveness of

collaboration and cooperation between these two government tiers is further analysed in Section 3.3.

Auckland Council

The Royal Commission on Auckland Governance was established by the Government in October 2007 to

respond to growing concerns about the workability of local government arrangements in the metropolis.

In 2009 the Royal Commission recommended that a single council for Auckland be established to

address its fragmented governance and poor community engagement, which the Commission

considered had contributed to the city’s apparent underperformance. Since its inception on 1 November

2010, the Auckland Council has provided a new model of local government in New Zealand.

The role of Auckland Council is to focus on the broad region-wide strategic decisions and is responsible

for:

preparing and adopting the Long Term Council Community Plan (LTCCP), annual plan and annual

report

making rates and bylaws

decision making on regulatory matters and on region-wide non-regulatory matters

setting regional strategies, policies and plans, including the spatial plan and the district plan

the governance of CCOs

consulting with and considering the views of local boards before making a decision which affects

the communities in the local board area, or the responsibilities or operations of the local board

negotiating a local board agreement with each local board

monitoring and reviewing the performance of the organisation. (Auckland Council 2013a)

THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE IN AUCKLAND IS ILLUSTRATED IN

Figure 7. The structure aims to separate electoral and bureaucratic branches (McKinlay 2011) with CCOs

responsible for service delivery and Auckland Council (the organisation, non-political) responsible for

policy and planning.




FIGURE 7. AUCKLAND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Source: Auckland Council, 2013

Council-controlled organisations

A CCO is a corporate entity in which the council controls 50 per cent or more of the votes or has the right

to appoint 50 per cent (or more) of directors or trustees.

A ‘substantive CCO’ is one that is either responsible for the delivery of a significant service or activity on

behalf of Auckland Council, or owns or manages assets with a value of more than $10 million.

Auckland has seven major CCOs:

Auckland Council Investments Limited Auckland Council Property Limited

Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development Limited

Auckland Transport

Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Limited

Regional Facilities Auckland

Watercare Services Limited.

Detail on the role and funding arrangements for these CCOs is contained in Table 3. The majority of CCOs

are tax paying entities except for Auckland Transport and Regional Facilities Auckland.




TABLE 3 OVERVIEW OF COUNCIL CONTROLLED ORGANISATIONS

Agency Role Funding mechanisms Spatial plans and

strategies

Auckland Council

InvestmentsLimited

Manage Auckland Council’s

major equity investments.

Return on these investments

(dividends)are invested by the

council into public projects

Tax paying entity

Expected to generate surpluses and does not

receive funding from Auckland Council for its

operations

Dividends to be returned to Council

leads the co-

development of

the Auckland Plan.

Auckland Council

Property Limited

Manages assets and ensures

that there is an appropriate

return on Auckland Council-

owned commercial or 'non-

service' property.

Tax paying entity

Charge a management fee to Council for

undertaking management of properties

Does not own properties so not expected to

have any funding requirements

Auckland Tourism,

Events and

Economic

Development

Limited

Aims to help lift the Auckland

region's economic wellbeing,

and support and enhance the

ability of the region to compete

internationally.

Tax paying entity

charge a service fee to Council to cover the cost

of its day to day operations

generates some revenue from grants and

sponsorship which is used to reduce the fundingrequirements from Council

Auckland Visitor

Strategy

Auckland Transport Responsible for:

The planning and funding of

public transport

Promoting alternative ways to

get around the city

Operating the local road

network.

Funded by New Zealand Transport Agency

(Central Gov’t) and Auckland Council through

operating revenues

Tax exempt entity

Capital funding raised through development

contributions

Operating expenses funded by Auckland Council

Capital expenditure funded by NZTA grants,

revenue from operations and Auckland Council

Integrated

Transport Program

Auckland

WaterfrontDevelopment

Agency Limited

Lead the delivery of the

revitalisation of the waterfront,

and deliver developments

which are in line with policy and

funding set out by Council

Tax paying entity.

Operating funding for public space activities

comes from Council

Operations funded by internal cashflows

Capital works funded by revenues and lease

sales or equity investment for Auckland Council

Other funding mechanisms include user charges

Waterfront

development plan

Regional Facilities

Auckland

Provides a regional approach to

running and developing

Auckland’s arts, culture and

heritage, leisure, sport and

entertainment venues.

Charitable Trust and is tax exempt

Operational funding provided by Council

generates revenue from its operations (e.g. user

charges, events income), which is used to

reduce the operational funding requirement

capital works funded by surpluses and

borrowings from Council

Watercare ServicesLimited

Provides reliable water andwastewater services to the

people and businesses of

Auckland.

Tax paying entity Operations funded by revenue

Capital expenditure funded by borrowing

Prohibited from paying dividends, surplus funds

must be used to reduce borrowing

All water and wastewater activities are funded

directly through Watercare revenues

Source: SGS Economics and Planning 2013, information sourced from Auckland Council, 2013

The governing body and local boards

The Council consists of the governing body (Mayor and 20 Councillors) and 21 local boards, which

represent the interests of local communities. This governance structure strengthens Auckland-wide

leadership and provides effective local democracy.




The governing body and local boards have local input into the decisions implemented by Auckland

Council which provide support and advice in return.

The 21 local boards are illustrated in Figure 8. Local boards ‘make decisions on local matters, provide

local leadership and build strong local communities’. Local boards are responsible for:

preparing a triennial local board plan and negotiating an annual local board agreement with the

governing body

non-regulatory decision-making on local matters, including negotiating the standards of services

delivered locally

representing their communities and building strong local communities

providing local leadership and developing relationships with the governing body, the community,

community organisations and special interest groups in the local area

identifying and communicating the views of local people on regional strategies, policies, plans

and bylaws to the governing body

providing input to CCO plans and initiatives

identifying and developing bylaws for the local board area and proposing them to the governing

body

monitoring and reporting on the implementation of local board agreements

any additional responsibilities delegated by the governing body, such as decisions within regional

bylaws. (Auckland Council 2013a)

While local boards will negotiate service standards and delivery budgets with the governing body, only

the latter has the power of setting and collecting local taxes (rates). This, potentially, sets up a

disconnect between accountability and responsibility for delivery of services, known in Australia as

‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ . The Australian Commonwealth Government collects the lion’s share of taxes

across the nation, handing back a proportion of these to the States and Territories on a tied or untied

basis for the delivery of various services like health and education. A perennial and damaging problem

in the Australian body politic is one of blame shifting. Where service standards or performance fall

short, the States blame the Commonwealth for inadequate funding transfers, while the Commonwealthblames poor management by the States. The ordinary citizen is, in effect, denied the opportunity to

hold governments to account.




FIGURE 8. LOCAL BOARDS AND WARDS IN AUCKLAND







Other key agencies

A number of key agencies are involved in delivering infrastructure for Auckland (refer to Figure 9). These

include local government agencies and CCOs, as well as central government agencies such as NewZealand Transport Agency (NZTA).

FIGURE 9. KEY AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DELIVERY INFRASTRUCTURE TO AUCKLAND

Source: Auckland Council, 2012a

3.2 Overview of regulatory tools and plans

The regulatory and strategic plan structure for Auckland is illustrated in Figure 10. Auckland Council is

responsible for leading the preparation and development of the Auckland Plan which involves working

with central and local government agencies, the private sector, institutions and non-government

organisations as well as the community.




FIGURE 10. REGULATORY AND STRATEGIC PLAN STRUCTURE IN AUCK LAND


The Auckland Plan, Unitary Plan and Long-Term Plan

The Auckland Plan is a spatial plan which provides the 30 year vision for the city and is supported and

implemented by two key regulatory tools; the Long Term Plan and the Unitary Plan.

The Long Term Plan ‘combines all Council and CCO funding across Auckland and must, by law, provide for

a balanced budget over the 10-year plan period. It will provide the basis for staging and phasing

Council/CCO projects’ (Auckland Council 2012a). The Long Term Plan covers the use of developmentcontributions, rating policies, Public Private Partnerships, user charges, central government subsidies

and potential central government partnerships.

Alongside the Long Term Plan, Auckland Council is responsible for preparing a Financial Strategy which

supports the priorities, locations, sequencing and directions for infrastructure. A number of approaches

to funding and financing infrastructure are being investigated by Council including the use of market and

incentive based tools, efficient and flexible pricing and infrastructure and service delivery, demand

management and private sector participation.

The Unitary Plan is the statutory ‘town plan’ for the metropolitan area. It combines regional and district

planning functions to facilitate the Auckland Plan through rules and incentives to manage land use

change and development in an integrated manner. As described in the Council’s website (referenced Feb2, 2014), “the Unitary Plan will determine:




what can be built and where

how to create a higher quality and more compact Auckland

how to provide for rural activities

how to maintain the marine environment.”

To ensure the priorities and functions of the CCOs are aligned with the Auckland Plan and the priorities

of Council, CCOs are required to prepare an annual Statement of Intent (SOI). The SOI is a key

accountability mechanism which sets out:

How the CCO’s activities will contribute to desired outcomes (which contribute, in turn, to the

Auckland Plan)

How the CCO’s performance will be measured in relation to these outcomes

The specific performance targets that each CCO expects to meet.

The SOI provide major input into the Long Term Plan process including the budget.

The Auckland Plan highlights that implementation is to be achieved by ensuring that partner

organisations work closely together. This includes:

Central Government agencies and departments to develop a shared decision-making framework

for capital project investment e.g. the National Infrastructure Plan states that Central

Government agencies are expected to consider the strategies within the Auckland Plan when

making investment decisions.

private sector to understand the imperatives, constraints and hurdles to be overcome in meeting

Auckland’s growth challenge.

providing certainty for private sector investment.

voluntary and community sector to be actively engaged through local boards to access non-

traditional funding and shape integrated implementation.

neighbouring regions through the Upper North Island Strategic Alliance to align planning

objectives and highlight opportunities for cost efficiencies in infrastructure and service delivery

ownership and involvement by Māori stakeholders and investors.

The implementation tools outlined within the Auckland Plan include funding mechanisms (Figure 11),

delivery mechanisms (Figure 12) and institutional tools (Figure 13). These have been identified as

potential options by Auckland Council which highlights that more work is required to fully resolve an

implementation strategy.

Implementation is also expected to be facilitated through the alignment of objectives and mechanisms

within the National Infrastructure Plan and the Auckland Plan. Ten-year capital intention plans as part of

the National Infrastructure Plan will provide more detailed information about future infrastructure

investment and assist in the delivery of the Auckland Plan by providing more certainty for investors and

decision-makers (Auckland Council 2012a).




FIGURE 11. IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS – FUNDING TOOLS





FIGURE 12. IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS – DELIVER Y MECHANISMS





FIGURE 13. IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS – INSTI TUTIONAL TOOLS


Auckland Council is also preparing a Forward Land and Infrastructure Programme which will ‘facilitatethe staged and orderly delivery of serviced land across Auckland to meet Auckland Plan (long-term 30

year targets) and Auckland Housing Accord targets (short-term 3 year targets)’ (Auckland Council

2013b).. The land release strategy and this Programme will provide ‘the critical links between the

Auckland Plan, the Unitary Plan and long-term plan to ensure a quality compact form can be

successfully achieved’ (Auckland Council 2013b).

Place-based plans and strategies

There are a number of place-based plans and strategies which have been developed by Auckland Council

and the CCOs in conjunction with national agencies and local partnerships. These include:

City Centre Masterplan

Waterfront Development Plan

Integrated Transport Program

National Land Transport Program for Auckland




Auckland Housing Accord

Southern Initiative

Tamaki Transformation

The City Centre Masterplan is intended to be integrated with the Auckland Plan and Unitary Plan to

assist with implementation. The Masterplan also supports a number of Council strategies including the

Auckland Economic Development Strategy and the Auckland Visitor Strategy. Transport elements of the

Masterplan are expressed within the Auckland Transport and NZTA’s Auckland Integrated Transport Plan.

Key implementation mechanisms for the Masterplan are detailed in Figure 14.

A major partnership which is identified in a number of these place-based plans and strategies involves

Auckland Transport, Auckland Council and the New Zealand Transport Agency. This partnership is

developing and delivering the Integrated Transport Plan. Transport infrastructure has been identified as a

key challenge for Auckland and Auckland Transport has been mandated to explore alternative funding

mechanisms, as discussed above.




FIGURE 14. IMPLEMENTATION THRO UGH PARTNERSHIPS

Source: Auckland Council, 2012b

3.3 Critique of existing governance arrangements

Section 2 identified that governance arrangements must support the plan implementation process,

mediating the inevitable political tensions between local community interests and regional community

interests.

The recent restructure in Auckland provided the opportunity for the governance arrangements to be

clarified and simplified. The separation of local and regional community interests has been clearly

identified, with local boards responsible for communicating local interests to the governing body,

Auckland Council and CCOs. The governing body is responsible for making decisions on broader region-

wide (Auckland-wide) issues.

The separation between electoral, bureaucratic and service delivery branches is a sound structure for

managing political tensions and the plan implementation process. However, this will only be successful

with effective communication between these various groups based on an in-depth understanding and

sharing of desired outcomes. One issue with separating ‘providers’ from ‘purchasers and policy makers’

is that the imperative of operational efficiency can see a CCO lose sight of its underlying public purpose

for lack of involvement in (and therefore ownership of) the policy formulation process.






TABLE 4 ALLOCATION OF DECISION MAKING POWER

Level Examples or decisions for this level Auckland model

National Improving national consistency of planning and

building regulation

Resolving cross-border issues such as water supply,

ports and transport connections

Environment, heritage issues of national

significance

Maintaining state-wide land use and development

regulation system

Maintaining administrative and judicial review

processes

Overseeing planning institutions

Central Government is responsible for major

infrastructure projects such as hospitals and

transport, particularly those which extend beyond

Auckland

Often works in conjunction with Auckland Council

Regional/

Metropolitan

Development planning and development

determinations for sites or projects of metro-wide

significance

Investing in strategic infrastructure of metropolitan

significance

Designating major activity centres and facilitatingdevelopment in these centres

Designating and managing major transportation

corridors

Identifying and developing key employment nodes

Formulating land release schedules in growth

areas

Protecting environmental assets of regional

significance

Maintaining efficient land supply for housing

Auckland Council (including the governing body)

and CCOs are responsible for majority of the

examples provided and are often supported by the

Central Government where a project is considered

of national significance

Local Neighbourhood structure planning

Regulating housing development redevelopment

within applicable metropolitan guidelines

Regulating development in all lower order activity

centres

Local Boards are responsible for their local

communities and make decisions on local issues,

activities and facilities.

Governing body (Council) can delegate decision-

making powers to local boards

Source: SGS Economics and Planning, 2013

This three tiered approach offers the potential for better vertical integration of decision making

compared to, say, Australian States and Territories. For example, with respect to the Auckland Integrated

Transport Program, the NZTA and Auckland Transport are working together with Auckland Council to

develop a genuinely multi-sectoral strategy in this sector – though it is not yet clear that this integration

has been achieved (see discussion in Section 4).

Vertical integration The Royal Commission on Auckland Governance recommended a co-decision-making structure with

Auckland Council and Central Government responsible for decision-making in relation to government

spending on social services within Auckland. McKinlay (2011) highlights that the success of this structure

will be dependent on how the relationship evolves and tensions surrounding power sharing. Central

Government is the principal funder of major transport infrastructure and it remains unclear to us just

how these investment decisions will be made across these jurisdictions, beyond the convening of

discussion forums. That is, what the mechanisms and protocols for genuine power sharing over these

decisions. In broad terms, Central Government may be reluctant to cede too much power to Auckland

Council because of the size and importance of Auckland within the New Zealand economy.

Without a formal structure or agreement to frame the desired cooperation between Central

Government and Auckland Council, it is unlikely that the co-decision making aspired to in the

establishment of the unitary Council will be fully realised. In this regard, recent experience in the UK

regarding Central and Local Government agreements is instructive.




In 2011, Greater Manchester (UK) established the Greater Manchester Combined Authority which

‘provides a compelling platform for radical devolution of powers from central government’ (Greater

Manchester Combined Authority 2012). The Authority has powers in its own right and is not dependent

on delegations from central government and this provides greater certainty for the Authority around

decision-making. Alongside the establishment of the Authority, a ‘City Deal’ has been development

which sets out a number of agreements between central government and the Authority based on

priorities for the Greater Manchester economy.

A key benefit of this model is the establishment of joint governance arrangements for transport,

economic development and regeneration. This allows for strategic prioritisation of projects across the

area. Greater Manchester Combined Authority (2012) emphasises that this model has facilitated greater

integration with central government and local authorities:

‘Not only does the Greater Manchester Combined Authority provide a stable and strong

governance structure enabling it to take on new powers and functions, it also has the gravitas

to engage with central government and national agencies successfully. This will enable Greater

Manchester to secure future devolution and resource prioritisation’.

Significantly, the abovementioned ‘City Deal’ allows for a sharing of the productivity (tax) dividend from

a more efficient Manchester between local authorities and the Central Government. This is particularly

important with respect to investment in productivity enhancing, ‘city shaping’ infrastructure.

Horizontal integration There is some evidence of horizontal integration between CCOs and Auckland Council but this is not

clear.

The role and powers of local boards remain vague. Under the Local Government (Auckland Council) Act

2009, local boards have decision-making power over non-regulatory matters but only on delegation from

the Auckland Council. This is not fully aligned with the Royal Commission’s advice which proposed

setting out the powers of local boards within legislation.

As noted, local boards have no independent revenue raising powers. All funding is sourced from, and

approved by, Auckland Council as per its Long Term Plan and the applicable Local Board Plan and Local

Board Agreement.

For reasons of the vertical fiscal imbalance described earlier, there is potential for the role of local

boards to diverge from building strong communities and providing input into strategic planning at the

regional level. They may develop into strident 'NIMBY' forums which may hinder strategic planning and

thus the implementation of the Auckland Plan. It is important that the role and powers of local boards

are clearly identified within the Auckland Plan.

Conclusion The existing governance structure in Auckland is beneficial with clear leadership dedicated to the

metropolitan community of interest. This will assist with implementation of the Auckland Plan. More

refinement is required, however, in relation to the clarity of the roles of various agencies, particularly

local boards and the relationship between central government and Auckland Council.

Introducing formal structures to encourage greater commitment from Central Government in relation to

co-operation with Auckland Council will facilitate the implementation of the Auckland Plan. Likewise, a

better understanding of the role of local boards and their powers will also assist with this, particularly

when the ‘rubber hits the road’ on issues like local urban intensification.







APPRAISAL OF PLANS

AND STRATEGIES




4 APPRAISAL OF PLANS

AND STRATEGIES

This section sets out an appraisal of the major plans and policies shaping urban development and infrastructure in

Auckland. The audit is again structured around the principles and criteria outlined in Section 2.

4.1 The Auckland Plan

Scope and purpose

As previously noted, the Auckland Plan (the Plan) is an overarching spatial strategy which provides the

30 year vision for the metropolitan region. It identifies the location and timing for future urban

development and infrastructure provision. It also aims to guide the services, projects and programs of

the Auckland Council, its CCOs, Central Government and the private sector. It is supported and

implemented (in part) by two key regulatory tools – the Long Term Plan and the Unitary Plan, as well as

area specific plans such as the Waterfront Development Plan and the City Centre Masterplan (Figure 15).

FIGURE 15 AUCKLAND PLAN AND RELATED PLANS

Source: Auckland Council, 2012a.




Key policy moves

The policy moves in the Auckland Plan are aimed at contributing to the social, economic, environmental,

and cultural well-being of the city. According to the Plan, its two important focuses are the city centre

and the Southern initiative (see below). The central theme for the Plan is the agenda for a more compact

city, involving greater infill and higher density built to superior design standards. The rationale is toutilise existing infrastructure, increase viability of public transport and reduce environmental effects of

low density ‘sprawl’.

Following a clear articulation of the internal and external challenges facing Auckland, both now and over

the next three decades, the Plan highlights the vision for Auckland with seven aspirational ‘outcomes’

describing what the city will be like in 2040. Six ‘transformational shifts’ indicate the changes required to

achieve the vision (Figure 16).

FIGURE 16 VISION OUTCOMES AND TRANSFORMATIONAL SHIFTS


In turn, the six ‘transformational shifts’ will be driven by 13 specific ‘strategic directions’ and two

‘delivery directions’:

1. Create a strong, inclusive and equitable society that ensures opportunity for all Aucklanders

2. Enable Māori aspirations through recognition of the Te Tiriti o Waitangi / The Treaty of Waitangi

and Customary Rights

3. Integrate arts and culture into our everyday lives

4. Protect and conserve Auckland’s historic heritage for the benefit and enjoyment of present and

future generations

5. Promote individual and community wellbeing through participation and excellence in recreationand sport

6. Develop an economy that delivers opportunity and prosperity for all Aucklanders and New

Zealand

7. Acknowledge that nature and people are inseparable

8. Contribute to tackling climate change and increasing energy resilience

9. Keep Auckland productive, protected and environmentally sound

10. Create a stunning city centre with well-connected quality towns, villages and neighbourhoods

11. House all Aucklanders in secure, healthy homes they can afford

12. Plan, deliver and maintain quality infrastructure to make Auckland liveable and resilient

13. Create better connections and accessibility within Auckland, across new Zealand and to the

world

14. Auckland stakeholders work together to deliver the plan 15. Regularly review progress against targets and adapt actions to deliver the plan.




The importance of integrating land use and transport is discussed with recognition that the transport

system is a key shaper and enabler of all development within and beyond Auckland. The Plan is based on

analysis of existing infrastructure capacity, and the need for future investments to be timed to fit with

significant changes in land use and community needs.

The City Rail Link (CRL) is indicated as the most important new transport investment that will drive, via

step change, greater use of public transport and intensification of residential and commercial

development in the CBD and along the western and southern rail lines.

The downtown Port of Auckland and Auckland International Airport are shown to contribute significantly

to economic growth and opportunities in Auckland and New Zealand. The Plan supports the role of

these key economic infrastructure items with directives to protect the airport’s operations and review

the long-term nature and function of the seaport.

As noted, the Auckland Plan has two big initiatives to support the economy and improve Auckland’s well-

being – dramatically improving the city centre and the Southern Initiative. The City Centre Masterplan

guides the development for this precinct over the next 20 years, while the Southern Initiative focuses ontransforming the economic fortunes and quality of life for an area of Auckland with high social need.

The Auckland Plan was prepared collaboratively and includes a comprehensive chapter on

implementation. The focus of this review is on Chapters 12, 13 and 14, which cover physical and social

infrastructure, transport and implementation, respectively.

Critique

Relevant evaluation criteria derived from our earlier discussion of the metropolitan planning ‘trilogy’, the

city shaping power of certain infrastructure investments and the need for a nuanced approach to

suburban residential intensification (Section 2) are reproduced below, followed by our assessment of the

AP in respect of each of these the criteria in turn.

A compelling and demonstrably achievable vision for Auckland's spatial development The vision of the Auckland Plan adequately reflects up to date planning principles, with a focus on triple-

bottom line sustainability. From a social perspective, the Plan’s vision is for a fairer, safer and healthier

Auckland that is culturally rich and emphasises Maori identity. Economically, the Plan aims to achieve a

prosperous city with expanded business and trade opportunities and greater transport connections to

boost productivity. And, from an ecological perspective, the Plan aims to create a green Auckland,

improve public transport utilisation and create a more compact city. Importantly, the Plan acknowledges

that trend based development is not acceptable and that strong interventions to change course are

warranted.

A comprehensive schedule of implementation actions with clear assignment of action responsibility,

and a clear set of measurable outcome indicators benchmarked against a base case or leading

comparator cities

As noted, the core policy thrust of the Auckland Plan rests in 13 ‘Strategic Directions’. Each of these is

associated with a set of targets which, on the whole, relate to improved social, economic, environmental

and cultural outcomes for the metropolis.

The discussion of each Strategic Direction encompasses a set of actions or initiatives. These are not

always explicitly or implicitly assigned to particular agencies for implementation.

In its “Measuring Progress” Chapter (#15), the Auckland Plan commits Council to the preparation of

regular audit reports to track the extent to which actions are being delivered and targets achieved.






Fair, transparent and pre-notified user pays contributions for the extension and augmentation of

urban infrastructure Contributions for the extension and augmentation of urban infrastructure are not articulated in the

Auckland Plan itself. The Long Term Plan (LTP), which aims to achieve the vision outlined in the Auckland

Plan, details the contributions that will be collected from new development (as well as setting out an

infrastructure and land release program).

The Long Term Plan, along with the Unitary Plan, emerges as a critical tool for delivering the outcomes in

the Auckland Plan. It targets a balanced budget over a 10-year period to ensure all Programs and actions

can be implemented. The LTP reflects staging and phasing of intentions for Council/CCO projects,

including policies on development contributions, rating policies, public-private partnerships, user

charges and potential Central Government partnerships.

The LTP indicates that contributions funding will generally be set at a regional or sub-regional level for

most activities. The contributions system is fair in a number of ways. Firstly, the level of contributions

depends on the type of development being carried out, with compact development paying less. Tomitigate the impact that contributions can have on the feasibility of development, contributions are

payable later in the development cycle to take account of the holding costs of developers. The user pays

contributions are transparent, with the contribution amounts clearly outlined in the policy. The types of

activities to be funded by development contributions are set out in the LTP and indicated in Figure 18.

Somewhat less clear is whether user pays development contributions reflect differences in costs across

growth and intensification areas, thereby signalling the most efficient growth path.

FIGURE 18 ACTIVITIES TO BE FUNDED BY DEVELOPMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

Source: Auckland Council, 2013.

Separation of policies and rules for various forms of development contributions - user pays, impact

mitigation and value capture The Plan indicates that the Council is investigating new approaches to funding and financing

infrastructure and services, including market and incentive based tools. Value capture (tax increment

financing) and user pays (congestion, network and car parking charging) and impact mitigation

(development contributions) mechanisms are all discussed as ‘options for consideration’.




There is no commitment in the Plan on how these mechanisms will be used; only an indication that the

Council will develop a Financial Strategy to determine which mechanisms should apply. There is no clear

timeline for when the Financial Strategy will be delivered except that it ‘will take a period of time to

develop’.

Clear policy direction for road pricing As alluded to directly above, there is no clear policy for road pricing in the Auckland Plan. It is only

considered as one potential mechanism among many to manage demand and help fund future

infrastructure development.

At the same time, the report ‘Funding Auckland’s Transport Future: Alternative Funding for Transport’, is

more practical about the potential of road pricing. The report indicates that at the latest, a decision on

how to fill the funding gap (between what the Auckland Plan needs by way of transport infrastructure,

and what is committed under currently available funding streams) would need to be made by 2015. Two

alternative pathways are considered in this report: one where annually increasing rates, public transport

fares and fuel taxes would be the main funding mechanism and another which would see the

introduction of road pricing by 2021. Public feedback indicated a strong aversion to continual increasesin rates, public transport fares or fuel taxes so road pricing is suggested as a ‘worthy consideration’.

Ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring and review Community engagement provided input into the development of the Auckland Plan, the Unitary Plan

and the Southern Initiative. Maori were also engaged on initiatives in the Auckland Plan. However, there

does not appear to be a clear structure for ongoing community engagement beyond the established

institutions of Council and the consultation processes prescribed or necessitated under the RMA. While

the Implementation Framework (Chapter 14) does indicate that there will be community engagement,

there is a lack of detail regarding the level, frequency and structure of this process.

Under the heading of ‘building enduring implementation partnerships’, the Implementation Frameworksuggests that local boards will provide opportunities for active engagement with communities and that

there will be ‘numerous instances where partnerships and collaboration will be critical to Plan delivery’

and that a process of engagement and planning with stakeholders will clearly define roles and

expectations. However, the emphasis here is on partnership, rather than community engagement.

Ongoing community education programs regarding the merits of the compact city The Plan indicates that one of the implementation tools to achieve the strategy is ‘advocacy’. It suggests

that advocacy would be used to ‘educate the community about the importance of a high-quality built

environment. This includes - providing public education regarding housing choices’. This is a promising

sign that community education programs will be used. The Plan stresses that that more work is required

to identify the suitability of advocacy as an implementation option.

Analysis showing how the spatial vision will underpin Auckland's competitive advantages and ongoing

economic development There is no clear analysis of how the spatial vision will underpin Auckland's competitive advantages and

ongoing economic development. Indeed, there is a little discussion about the competitive advantages of

Auckland.

The Auckland Economic Development Strategy (EDS) is informed by the economic chapter in the

Auckland Plan. The five priorities that guide the EDS are the same as those that underpin Strategic

Direction 6 of the AP - ‘develop an economy that delivers opportunity and prosperity for all Aucklanders

and New Zealand’ . They are:

1. Grow a Business-Friendly and Well-Functioning City




2. Develop an Innovation Hub of the Asia-Pacific Rim

3. Become Internationally Connected and Export Driven

4. Enhance Investment in People to Grow Skills and a Local Workforce

5. Develop a Vibrant, Creative International City

Under the first priority, the well-functioning city includes delivering an integrated transport system, with

emphasis on facilitating 4 key projects: City Rail Link, AMETI, East-West link and an additional Waitematā

Harbour Crossing.

The EDS, as a standalone strategy, has three overarching goals:

grow exports by 6 per cent or more per annum.

grow GDP by 5 per cent or more per annum.

grow productivity by 2 per cent or more per annum.

In addition, in line with the AP, the EDS has a target to ensure there is an ongoing provision of planned

and serviced capacity for ‘Group 1’ business land, to meet five-yearly demand. The EDS identifies

Auckland’s existing business land, key employment areas and Business Improvement Districts and future

urban business areas.

The five priorities mentioned above are broken down into a total of 66 key actions within the EDS. Detail

in terms of the status, target timeframe and agency accountable is set out for each action.

There are a number of key organisations involved in the coordination and implementation of the EDS

(refer to Figure 19), including; Auckland Council; Auckland Tourism; Events and Economic Development

(ATEED); and Central Government.




FIGURE 19. EDS COORDINATION STRUCTURE


The overarching goals of the EDS and the actions in pursuit of them are considered by Council as‘ambitious and in most cases long-term’ (Tuatagaloa and Hitchins 2013).

A monitoring report, which was released after the EDS, identifies all data sources used to create baseline

indicators and methods for measuring progress against the objectives over time. This provides a

transparent tool for evaluating the effectiveness of the EDS. As part of the implementation process, key

performance indicators (KPIs) are to be developed for each of the 66 actions in the Strategy. Progress on

actions and these KPIs are to be reported annually through an EDS Annual Implementation Update.

The Auckland EDS is a comprehensive example of an economic development strategy with a strong

strategic direction and specific targets.

Practical arrangements for overcoming land fragmentation, contamination, infrastructure deficits andother market failures deterring brownfield and infill development in targeted areas The Housing Chapter recognises complexities in overcoming fragmented land and acknowledges that a

significant institutional response will be provided. However, there are no practical arrangements

outlined in the Plan for dealing with these market failures.

Clear policy direction for value capture as part of an infrastructure funding strategy There is no clear policy direction for value capture as part of an infrastructure funding strategy. It has

been identified in the Plan and allied documents as an ‘option for consideration’.

Apart from recurrent rates, development contributions represent the only discrete strategy forinfrastructure funding referenced in the Plan. The LTP indicates that the Council will have to fund some

projects from sources not yet available or currently used. It suggests that alternative funding options




could include some form of road pricing and a betterment tax or targeted rates on properties that will

benefit from infrastructure upgrades (value capture). But there is no resolved response to this key policy

issue.

Demonstrated adequacy of affordable and market accessible land supply for greenfield development. The treatment of affordable and market accessible land supply for greenfield development is a strength

of the Plan. Priority 1 in the Housing Chapter of the Plan is to ‘increase housing supply to meet demand’.

To achieve this priority, the Auckland Plan outlines a benchmark range for housing capacity, with a

staged release of unconstrained and developable land that is ‘ready to go’. This is spelt out in the Urban

Auckland chapter, Directive 10.2, which indicates that there is a ‘plan for a seven-year average of

unconstrained development capacity (zoned and serviced with bulk infrastructure) at any point in time

with a minimum of five years’ and a maximum of 10 years’ capacity’. The Plan also identifies future

residential development fronts in Auckland and there is a directive to implement a Rural Urban

Boundary (RUB) in the Unitary Plan, providing for land capacity over the next 30 years (Figure 20).

FIGURE 20 RURAL URBAN BOUNDARY


The Plan indicates that there is capacity for around 60,000 dwellings in the development pipeline

(greenfields land), two thirds of which are within the baseline 2010 Metropolitan Urban Limit (MUL).

There are no progressive targets attached to this housing production aspiration. Instead, the Plan

indicates that a planned Housing Strategic Action Plan will include actions to ensure that there is

adequate housing supply.

Figure 21 displays the process for ensuring adequate supply of greenfield housing and how land will bereleased inside the RUB over the term of the Plan.

FIGURE 21 AUCKLAND PLAN LAND RELEASE PROCESS





Demonstrated adequacy of affordable and market accessible land supply for infill and brownfield

development While a compact Auckland is the key spatial vision emanating from the Auckland Plan, the Plan does not

clearly indicate that there is sufficient supply of land for infill development. The Plan suggests that

intensification should be focussed in areas that have infrastructure in place and that are in close

proximity to centres and public transport.

The ‘Urban Auckland’ chapter identifies areas for different densities of development. For example, the

city centre is expected to accommodate a gross average density between 50-200 dwellings per hectare,

the city fringe between 40 to 60, metropolitan centres between 40 to 100 and local centres between 20

to 40+ dwellings per hectare.

Reduced development contributions and density bonuses are discussed as incentives for development.

There is also passing reference to a development agency, such as Vic Urban (now called Places Victoria),

as a potential institutional tool for implementing the development strategy. However, it is unclear how

such a vital tool will be applied.

The focus in the Plan is on incremental infill in existing centres and neighbourhoods. Demonstration of

an adequate supply for infil l development could have been more clearly identified. For example,

strategically located, large brownfield sites could have been identified or particular centres could have

been earmarked for greater development (similar to the Urban Activation Precincts identified in the

draft Metropolitan Strategy for Sydney). We recognise, however, that major brownfield sites are less

common in Auckland given its different industrial history versus those of Sydney and Melbourne.

Clear policy direction for inclusionary affordable housing provisions in statutory planning rules The AP acknowledges that more than market efficiency is required to address the systemic problem of

affordable housing, but does not clearly indicate how a more expansive affordable housing system will

be funded. Nevertheless, an Addendum to Unitary Plan canvasses options for securing a contribution to‘affordable housing’ (defined as being accessible to owners or renters with incomes up to around

$120,000/year) in greenfield and redevelopment areas, including site specific value capture

arrangements or various forms of ‘inclusionary zoning’. The former option (value capture) would require

a change in the Local Government Act, while inclusionary zoning is permissible under the RMA if it can

be shown to be required for the sustainable management of Auckland’s resources.

A transparent and publicly accessible charter assigning various planning and infrastructure

responsibilities to Central Government, ACC and Local Boards in line with subsidiarity principles The Plan includes some details on the key agencies that are responsible for delivering infrastructure in

Auckland.

The Long Term Plan covers the activities and services provided by the Auckland Council, being the parent

entity, and where appropriate, the activities and services provided by those entities that comprise the

Auckland Council group entity (including all subsidiaries, associates and joint venture arrangements).

The LTP outlines the source of decision-making responsibilities

1. Statutory decision-making responsibilities

2. Delegation of decision-making responsibilities

3. Allocation of decision-making for non-regulatory activities

As discussed in Section 3, the governing body has decision-making responsibilities for the regulatory

activities of Auckland Council, while local boards have decision making responsibility for local boardplans and community engagement, consultation and advocacy. Furthermore, the LTP outlines that




decision-making responsibility for a non-regulatory activity of the Auckland Council should be exercised

by its local boards unless the nature of the activity has implications on an Auckland-wide basis.

The Plan and related documents implicitly acknowledge the subsidiarity principle, discussing the need

for co-ordinated decision making on infrastructure investments on the part of the Central Government.

But, as we have noted, how this co-ordination is to be delivered is largely unresolved.

Documented criteria and systems for distinguishing 'strategic' from structural and follower

infrastructure The Auckland Plan does recognise the difference between infrastructure that shapes the growth of

urban structure and infrastructure which simply responds to demand (Figure 22). However, the Plan only

briefly mentions this distinction and does not use this framework to articulate the key strategic city

shaping infrastructure projects, beyond the CRL.

FIGURE 22 THE SHAPING INFLUENCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE


Separate and broader evaluation processes for candidate strategic projects geared to leveraging city

shaping effects in line with the spatial vision The City Rail Link appears to have a separate and broader evaluation process. Although the Plan is not

explicit about a clear process for this infrastructure, the direct acknowledgement of the project as a

critical infrastructure item implies that there would be a different evaluation process.

Adoption of development sequencing policies or similar to support efficient roll out of structural and

follower infrastructure The Plan has a broad development sequencing policy for greenfield development as outlined in the

Urban Auckland chapter. Directive 10.2 outlines ‘Plan for a seven-year average of unconstrained




development capacity (zoned and serviced with bulk infrastructure) at any point in time with a minimum

of five years’ and a maximum of 10 years’ capacity.’

Provision for a wider palette of non-detached dwelling forms around suburban nodes targeted for

densification, recognising market demand realities and creating opportunities for a variety of

developer types The Plan suggests that intensification should be focussed in areas that have infrastructure in place and

that are in close proximity to centres and public transport. The focus appears to be on incremental infill

in existing centres and neighbourhoods.

Figure 23 demonstrates that the zoning in the Unitary plan allows for a greater variety of non-detached

infill around suburban nodes. This broadly in line with the model we illustrate in Figure 5 on page 20.

The Plan also acknowledges that small-scale developers and builders find it difficult to access finance. It

suggests that partnerships between a private developer and either the Auckland Council, central

government or a development agency could encourage innovation in the market, by providing examples

of smaller, cheaper, well-designed, energy‑

efficient homes.

FIGURE 23 UNITARY PLAN ZONING FOR VARIETY OF DWELLINGS FORMS


4.2 The City Centre Masterplan

Scope and purpose

The CCMP is a 20 year vision for Auckland’s city centre. The aim of the Masterplan is to ‘unlock

Auckland’s potential as an economic hub’, to increase tourism visitation and to create a colourful,

pedestrian-friendly and lively city centre that is accessible and legible.

The key changes required to address some of the city centre’s greatest deficits, challenges and needs

were identified as:

Changes to make it easier for people to get from the city centre to the waterfront (reconnecting thecity centre with its harbour) and from the urban villages of Ponsonby, Freemans Bay and Parnell.




Changes to ‘green’ the city centre; including better links between our existing open spaces through

pedestrian routes that are pleasant and green.

Consideration of where future growth will be and what it will be like. For example, the City Rail Link

stations will naturally be places where residential and commercial growth will concentrate.

Key policy moves

The CCMP identifies a number of challenges that are to be addressed in the plan:

The lack of affordable, high density housing and general amenity in the city centre

Poor connections to surrounding areas, such as Ponsonby, Freemans Bay, Devonport and Parnell

Barriers between the harbour and city centre – the two need to be better integrated

Area is dominated by cars, with public transport congestion and poor pedestrian amenity

Incomplete pedestrian and open space network

Lack of a critical mass of visitor destinations, linked by poor quality streets

Neglect of heritage

Need for greater social infrastructure, especially improved minimum standard of accommodation and

amenity for the disadvantaged.

Need for a ‘liveable city’ form based on a compact city form, eco-economy, sustainable resource use

and efficient transport and energy systems

Need for greater recognition of Auckland’s relevance as a regional centre for economic, cultural and

entertainment activity

The key policy moves are formulated in response to the challenges outlined above, rather than offering a

radical new vision for the city centre.

Critique

Unambiguous translation of the vision into a statutory plan with attendant policies and decision rules

for development assessment. The CCMP is a non-statutory supporting document to the Auckland Plan, and provides input to the

Unitary Plan, which in turn, provides the rules guiding development assessment in the precinct.

There is an identification of broad ‘good design principles’ within the CCMP that will guide development

in the city centre, but they are fleshed out in detail elsewhere, in the Unitary Plan.

The CCMP is in line with the vision of the Auckland Plan.

Ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring and review. An ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring and review is not identified in detail,and it is not clear how the outcomes of the community engagement for the draft CCMP have affected

the final product. However, the CCMP is subject to formal reviews every six years, which will include

engagement with the community and stakeholders.


economic development. The CCMP will support the high level actions outlined in the Auckland Plan and Auckland EDS which

envision Auckland as an innovation hub in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, the CCMP aims to

strengthen the links between Auckland’s research institutions and businesses and organisations through

the Learning Quarter Plan and establishment of commercialisation centres and business incubators

within universities.




There is an emphasis on making Auckland’s city centre ‘business friendly’ and removing barriers to

business expansion and economic growth. The CCMP seems to envision the role of the Council as a

facilitator for private industry to deliver economic outcomes, without providing in-depth employment

strategies or strongly guiding investment in the area.

Mechanisms to deal with land fragmentation, contamination, infrastructure deficits and other market

failures deterring brownfield and infill development

While the CCMP is a response to existing market failures, and an attempt to find a solution to these

existing challenges, there is no mention of mechanisms to deal with market failures confronting

brownfield and infill development in Auckland.

The implementation aspect of the CCMP identifies current economic factors and challenges, but not in

detail, and there is also recognition that there are interdependencies between projects that will have

impacts on the timing and sequencing of projects, e.g. the City Rail Link will have long term impacts on

the transport network.

However, the main implementation mechanism of the CCMP seems to be creating a business-friendlyenvironment and upgrading the public domain.

4.3 The Waterfront Development Plan

Scope and purpose

The overall purpose of the Waterfront Development Plan is to propose initiatives for the future

development of the central city waterfront, linking the Wynyard Quarter to the waterfront and

eventually connecting to St Heliers.

The Waterfront Plan is a non-statutory spatial plan under the Auckland Plan, and is very well integrated

with this overarching plan for Auckland. The objectives of the waterfront plan are directly linked to

broader goals of the Auckland Plan.

Key policy moves

Waterfront Auckland, the development agency responsible for the area, is focused on:

Optimising the development and management of the waterfront assets to generate, long-term,

sustainable returns

Delivering public realm projects and non-commercial projects to achieve the agreed vision for the city

waterfront, city centre and broader Auckland

The approach is to leverage public sector investment to attract private sector participation andinvestment to drive growth and establish key building blocks.

Critique

A compelling and demonstrably achievable vision for Auckland's spatial development The Waterfront Plan outlines a number of detailed projects for revitalizing the waterfront, building on

the success of the Wynyard Crossing and Karanga Plaza project in 2011. There is a clear timeframe for

each project that also identifies funding sources between 2013 and 2022. Planned public investment (for

commercial seed funding and infrastructure projects) is also broadly discussed for the same time period.

Arguably, there should also be a supporting economic development and employment generation

strategy integrated with the existing Waterfront Plan. As it stands, the Waterfront Plan offers limited

evidence on the demand side for proposed urban design projects.




Ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring and review. Public consultation on the draft Waterfront Plan was held in late 2011, and community and stakeholder

feedback on the plan was generally positive and supportive. This has been incorporated into the Plan.

Clear links have been drawn between the outcomes of community engagement and the Waterfront Plan.

For example, the waterfront-wide walkway and cycleway has been confirmed for early investment, based

on community feedback to the draft Plan.

Ongoing community engagement in the delivery of the Waterfront Plan is described as comprising

consultation on development proposals, regular forums with key stakeholders, post-occupancy research,

communicating progress and change through the website, newsletters and the media. This engagement

Program will be reviewed as the number of businesses in the area increase.


economic development. Under the broader goal of a ‘Smart Working Waterfront’, consideration is given to how a redevelopedwaterfront could underpin Auckland’s competitive advantages and ongoing economic development. This

includes recognition of the strategic role of the port in supporting international freight and trading

competitiveness, tourism and cruise lining and the benefits of agglomeration.

Although the plan contains a vision to establish part of the waterfront as an innovation precinct, it does

not outline an employment strategy or list of potential tenants for this precinct.

4.4 The Integrated Transport Program 2012-2041

Scope and purpose

The Auckland Integrated Transport Program (ITP) was developed by Auckland Transport and the New

Zealand Transport Agency in collaboration with the Auckland Council. It discusses the 30 year investment

Program required to meet the transport priorities revealed in the Auckland Plan. The role of the ITP and

its relationship with the Auckland Plan is shown in Figure 24.

FIGURE 24 INTEGRATED TRANSPORT PROGRAM RELATIONSHIP TO AUCKLAND PLAN

Source: Auckland Transport, 2013.

The ITP tests different investment scenarios using a range of assumptions about funding and growthlevels, as well as development patterns. The Auckland Plan is based on Scenario 1 – a high growth,






In this context, it is worth restating that the land use (and economic and population) feedback effects of

strategic transport investments can be quite profound, as exemplified in a post hoc review of the

impacts of Melbourne’s CityLink, Western Ring Road and Underground Rail Loop, all strategic

investments variously commissioned between the early 70s and the late 90s – see text box.

Impact of strategic projects in Melbourne

The improved accessibility offered by CityLink has facilitated a further 70,300 jobs to locate in Melbourne along with an extra

58,200 households compared to a base case without this infrastructure. The project added $8.94 billion to the Melbourne

economy during 2010-11 (3.8 per cent of Melbourne’s GDP) via employment growth and labour productivity improvements. In

addition, the reduced freight costs due to the project resulted in GDP increasing by $81 million (0.03% of GDP) versus the base

case. The increase in human capital allowed a further increase in GDP of $14 million (0.01 per cent of GDP).

The City Loop’s impacts in 2011, versus the base case, were of a similar order to CityLink’s.

The Western Ring Road also had a substantial impact generating a gross value added (GVA) uplift of more than $2.5 billion and

creating 24,900 net new jobs.

The City Loop has transformed the northern section of the CBD, while the north west of Melbourne has been opened up for both

industrial and residential development by the Western Ring Road. CityLink has provided heightened connectivity between the CBD

and north and south eastern parts of Melbourne, stimulating residential and business development in the inner west.

Source SGS Economics & Planning Pty Ltd

Stakeholder commentary on our earlier Discussion Paper suggested that there are projects of a ‘city

shaping’ nature referenced in the AP and included in the ITP. Aside from the CRL, which, from previous

SGS work, we judge to have strong claims on the title ‘city shaping’, the additional claimed ‘strategic’

projects include the AMETI and East West Link, the Waterview Connection and the rail

electrification/EMU program. These projects certainly come with big price tags, but as discussed, this

does not, by itself, validate recognition as a city shaping investment. Some of these projects may simply

be addressing sub-regional circulation or capacity issues, rather than altering accessibility contours

across an expansive metropolitan geography. We could find no evidence in the public domain that the

dynamic land use and transport modelling demonstrated that these projects would have the effect

ascribed to them. Moreover, it is difficult to discern from available information just when a number of

these projects will be delivered so as to commence their shaping effect.

Thus, the ITP begs some questions. The performance of the ‘Committed Funding’ scenario versus the

Auckland Plan land use scenario is tested and is shown to miss some key targets in the Plan, particularly

those concerning traffic congestion. But, on the face of things, there is little chance of the Auckland Plan

‘quality compact city’ scenario being achieved at all unless the (apparently) unfunded strategic transport

investments like the CRL are made.

The ITP leaves some doubt as to whether even the ‘Fully Funded’ transport program will achieve the

Auckland Plan urban structure and liveability outcomes. As shown in Figure 26, reproduced from the ITP,

the fully funded program also falls short of adopted targets in respect of transport delays and abatement

of greenhouse gas emissions. The ITP states that ....“the Fully Funded programme is necessary but still

not sufficient to fully deliver the vision, transport outcomes and targets over the second and thirddecades of the AP” (p 100) noting that other measures relating to ‘demand management’ will be

necessary to resolve these gaps. However, there is no accountable plan for this vital demand

management element either in the Auckland Plan or the ITP (see below).

We are left to conclude that the Auckland Plan vision is not, at this point at least, supported by:

an appropriate program of investment in ‘city shaping’ infrastructure, including but not limited

to the CRL

a complementary program of travel demand management.

This puts the deliverability of the Auckland Plan fundamentally at risk.




FIGURE 26 FULLY FUNDED AND COMMITTED FUNDING PREDICTIONS FOR

AUCKLAND PLAN TARGETS

Source ITP

Clear policy direction for road pricing The ITP indicates that greater interventions to manage the network will be required to achieve an

efficient transport network. It suggests that stronger transport demand management will be needed to

reduce road congestion. It discusses the imperative of encouraging more use of the improved public

transport system and walking and cycling facilities. However, whilst it acknowledges the role of pricing

strategies in the broader context of demand management, it makes no commitments as to when and

how a road pricing strategy might be rolled out for the metropolis. At the same time, the ITP makes

clear that road pricing (or something like it) is necessary for achievement of Auckland Plan outcomes.

4.5 The National Land Transport Program for Auckland

Scope and purpose

The National Land Transport Program (NLTP) is a planning and investment partnership between local

authorities and the NZ Transport Agency (NZTA). Between 2012 and 2015 the program will deliver

transport solutions to cities across New Zealand. It comprises a $12.3 billion investment in New

Zealand’s land transport system, with priority given to activities that promote economic growth and

productivity, value for money, road safety and travel choice.

The NLTP 2012–15 investment in the Auckland region in collaboration with transport partners is

intended to make it easier for commuters to move around Auckland, and facilitate freight movements.

The NLTP will contribute $240 million into the $1.5 billion Auckland Manukau Eastern Transport Initiative(AMETI), $1.15 billion to the construction of the Western Ring Route and around $890 million is




dedicated to investment in public transport. The public transport contributions will go to loan

repayments for new trains, rail improvements and integrated ticketing across all public transport modes.

4.6 The Southern Initiative

Scope and purpose

The Southern Initiative is a customised program of action in an area of high social need and economic

opportunity (Figure 27). The area extends across four local board areas: Mangere-Otahuhu, Otara-

Papatoetoe, Manurewa and Papakura. The Southern Initiative is a multi-faceted, multi-agency initiative

to realise the area’s potential. Its prime focus is to strengthen children and families, and support stable

homes. It will encompass supporting and upskilling parents and guardians, raising educational

achievement and upgraded and new housing.

FIGURE 27 THE SOUTHERN INITIATIVE


Key policy moves

The Southern Initiative is one of two big place-based initiatives of the Auckland Plan (the other being the

City Centre Masterplan), and will affect an area of nearly 300,000 residents, including 80,000 under 15

years old. Policies for the first five years of the 30 year plan are outlined in the Auckland Plan. Theseinclude:




Ensuring strong family attachment and early intervention for children before school

Providing clear pathways and support for young people to achieve in education and employment

Creating an outstanding international gateway and destination area

Promoting economic development and jobs for local people

Increasing public transport services and encouraging increased use of public transport

Housing development in Mangere and Manurewa.

The Southern Initiative is seen as an opportunity to improve the quality of life and wellbeing of local

residents, reduce disparities and increase business investment and employment opportunities in the

area, and is well integrated into the aims of the Auckland Plan for economic development and social

improvement.

Critique

A compelling and demonstrably achievable vision for Auckland's spatial development The Initiative outlines opportunities to leverage existing infrastructure and economic opportunities, such

as the Auckland Airport, major business investment in the area and the opportunities in the growinghealth sector to improve the social wellbeing of the population of the Southern Initiative area.

The Initiative also realistically identifies the challenges associated with the area, such as low education

attainment and high youth unemployment.

Unambiguous translation of the vision into a statutory plan with attendant policies and decision rules

for development assessment The Southern Initiative is part of the Auckland Plan, and the decision rules for development assessment

are included in the Unitary Plan.

Ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring and review This is not clearly outlined, partly because the details of the Southern Initiative have not yet been

fleshed out. Clearly, community engagement should be a key element of improving the welfare of the

Southern Initiative area.

4.7 The Tamaki Strategic Framework (formerly the Tamaki

Transformation)

Scope and purpose

The Tamaki Transformation Program is a 15 to 20 year regeneration initiative aimed at transforming theTamaki area of Auckland (broadly comprising the suburbs of Glen Innes, Point England and Panmure).

Since being mentioned in the Auckland Plan (2012), it has been rebadged as the Tamaki Strategic

Framework, run by the recently established Tamaki Redevelopment Company, Auckland’s first urban

redevelopment agency.

The draft Strategic Framework has been developed through community engagement, and the Tamaki

Redevelopment Company (jointly owned by New Zealand’s Central Government and Auckland Council)

has been established to facilitate the regeneration process.

The regeneration program aims to increase the dwelling stock in the area, reduce high unemployment

and raise educational levels, skills and income.










TABLE 5. AUCKLAND HOUSING ACTION PLAN PRIORITY AREAS AND ACTIONS






24 Council facilitate a trial landlord WOF scheme through a combined Auckland Council,

Beacon Pathway and CMDHB partnership. (R)

25 Undertake a Social Return on Investment evaluation of council’s current Retrofit Your Home

Programme (RYH) to analyse how well the programme is delivering to the Auckland Plan

targets for improving housing quality and environmental performance particularly in order

to achieve increased take up in rental accommodation. (SP)

26 Continue to investigate the use of a minimum Homestar rating for all new housing at an

affordable cost and include a whole of life cost benefit analysis. (P, R)

9 Papakainga and housing for

Maori

27 Continue to support the development of the Maori Land Programme which identifies

papakainga as a priority. (P)

28 Support enhancing the capacity of Maori housing providers through opportunities for

development partnerships on Maori-owned and other land. (P)

10 Housing for Pacific Peoples 29 Pursue partnerships to deliver provide culturally appropriate, quality, affordable and secure

housing for Pacific peoples. (P)

30 Continue to work with COMET and community-based education providers to deliver

programmes to prepare Pacific peoples for homeownership and affordable housing

provision generally. (F, SP)

11 More secure rental tenure 31 Explore the necessary changes required to current legislation and policy structure that

balances tenants‟ and landlords‟ rights and obligations that will enable long term secure

rental sector to develop. (P, A)

12 Removing legislative barriers 32 Explore improvements to legislation that covers common property. (A)

Source: Auckland Housing Action Plan 2012

4.9 Strategic investment plans of major utilities and public service

assets

The strategic investment plans of major utilities and public service assets were reviewed to assess how

well these lined up with the spatial vision outlined in the Auckland Plan. The utilities and assets included:

Watercare

Vector

Transpower

Ports of Auckland

Auckland Airport

Various Auckland universities.

Watercare Services Limited is the water and wastewater service provider for Auckland. It is a CCO, wholly

owned by Auckland Council. Two of its documents were assessed against the Auckland Plan including the

2013 Demand Management Plan (DMP) and the Asset Management Plan. The DMP has a target of 15%

reduction in gross per capita consumption by 2025, compared with 2004 usage levels. The DMP

acknowledges the intensification of development in existing urban areas associated with the compact

city agenda of the Auckland Plan and recognises that this could result in reduced water demand per

capita. Nevertheless, the DMP does not demonstrate how it would achieve and promote the Auckland

Plan vision.

The Watercare Asset Management Plan relies on the same underlying growth assumptions stated in the

Auckland Plan. While the document states that it contributes to realising the relevant 30-year outcomes

set out in the Auckland Plan, there is no articulation throughout the document of how this actually

occurs.

Vector is a multi-network infrastructure company which owns and operates a range of energy and

technology businesses and assets. Its 2013 review reveals that it was an active partner in shaping the

Unitary Plan, but it is unclear how.

The 2013 Annual Planning Report from Transpower, which is the state-owned enterprise responsible for

power transmission in New Zealand, considers the Auckland region’s needs over the next 15 years but




does not reference the AP. It may be that changes to the urban structure of Auckland do not affect

regional supply of electricity.

A review of the Ports of Auckland Development Proposals May 2013 document revealed planned

upgrades and extension to the port (Figure 28). The Auckland Plan surprisingly had little to say about the

expansion of the port, except that it would take account of the Port of Auckland study.

Implicitly, the AP sees the port as a permanent feature of the metropolitan economy. There is no

discussion of the long term viability of the port and its opportunity costs, in terms of occupying land that

might otherwise accommodate higher value adding business activity.

FIGURE 28 FUTURE PORT EXPANSION




Source: Auckland Council, 2012b.

A review of the Auckland Airport Future Economic Impact Assessment highlighted that it is important to

ensure that there is enough capacity for airport associated business activity to grow. This is in line with

the Auckland Plan, which signals expansion of employment land at the airport.

The strategic and investment plans of the Auckland universities were examined. The University of

Auckland acquired the former Lion Breweries site in Newmarket and is creating an inner city campus.

The development of this site is consistent with the compact city agenda of the AP. It will be redeveloped

and adapted for high density uses to cater for 30-50 years growth of the university.

The Manukau Institute of Technology Tertiary Centre was opened in the Manukau CBD and is a part of an

integrated transport hub (AMETI) outlined in the Auckland Plan.

The Auckland University of Technology and Massey University have no immediate intention to expand

and no other spatial plans outlined in their two year investment plan.




SYNTHESIS




5 SYNTHESIS

This section synthesises our assessment of urban planning and infrastructure arrangements in Auckland, providing

our conclusions as to current strengths and opportunities for improvement.

5.1 Overview

An overview of our assessment of urban planning and infrastructure arrangements in Auckland is

provided in Table 6 below.

Arguably, Auckland is equipped with the most evolved metropolitan governance structure of any city in

Australasia. Unlike its counterparts in Australia, where the metropolises are continuously contested

territory between local and State Governments, Auckland as a city has a united voice on regional issues

and the critical mass to make trajectory shifting decisions in its own right. This advantage shows in the

way the Auckland community and the nation have gone about the Auckland Plan. Overall, the AP and

the supporting implementation plans, place-based plans and other related studies function as a

comprehensive and cohesive set of policies that provide a clear and worthwhile vision for the city. We

would judge that Auckland is in much better shape in terms of its strategic spatial planning compared to

most cities in the Region. Having said this, there are a number of areas where the current situation falls

short of our nominated best practice criteria – at least as far as an analyst can assess on the basis of

resolved policy and documents in the public domain.

The strengths and weaknesses of the Auckland Plan are summarised below.

5.2 Strengths

The spatial vision for Auckland is well articulated. It is ambitious and practical at the same time and, with

a strong focus on triple-bottom line sustainability. It reflects up to date planning principles. The Unitary

Plan is a strength in the suite of plans. While it could be better signposted, it provides a clear and

accessible translation of the Auckland Plan into land use and development regulations. The links

between the specific rules and the Auckland Plan vision is made clear throughout the document.

There are built in safeguards in terms of a ‘floating’ target for the balance between infill and greenfielddevelopment, recognising uncertainties regarding the pace at which Auckland’s economy will move

further into knowledge based service industries, with consequential shifts in job locations and housing

preferences. At the same time, the Unitary Plan could probably have been stronger in translating the

compact city imperative into higher density zones.

Significant work appears to have gone into calibrating and securing an adequate supply of land for

greenfield housing development. This provides for certainty and stability on the supply side, thereby

mitigating at least one factor that might otherwise adversely impact housing affordability.

The development contribution system in Auckland appears to make the required distinctions between

value capture, impact mitigation and user pays cost recovery. However, it seems only the latter two

categories that are resolved at this stage, and, in respect of the user pays grouping, we could not finddefinitive evidence that development contributions will be fully reflective of cost variations in different




growth and intensification areas, thereby playing a locational signalling role. This is a matter for further

investigation.

A sophisticated approach has been taken to the identification of infill potential around key nodes and

corridors in the metropolitan region. Scope has been provided for the flexible ‘outside in’ approach to

densification in these nodes and corridors as discussed with reference to Figure 5 on page 20.

Notwithstanding this, there are question marks regarding the pace of apartment building that can be

expected in locations outside the central city, given the modest investment in transport improvement in

these areas.

The Auckland Plan acknowledges that more than market efficiency is required to address the systemic

problem of affordable housing. The Unitary Plan canvasses the option of Inclusionary Zoning, with a

requirement that all developments with more than 15 houses / lots must provide at least 10% for

affordable housing. But this is not yet a resolved policy position.




TABLE 6 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES – ALIGNING INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN

PLANNING IN AUCKLAND

Markers of leading practice Comment

1 A compelling and demonstrably achievable vision for Auckland's

spatial development 2 A comprehensive schedule of implementation actions with clear


3 A clear set of measurable outcome indicators benchmarked

against a base case or leading comparator cities

4 Unambiguous translation of the vision into a statutory plan with

attendant policies and decision rules for development assessment

5 Fair, transparent and pre-notified user pays contributions for the

extension and augmentation of urban infrastructure

Confirmation of the ‘locational

signalling’ role of development

contributions is required



Various forms of development

contribution are discussed in

different documents. It is not clear

that there is an integrated approach

to harmonising these

7 Clear policy direction for road pricing Alluded to as an important optionand intergovernmental discussion is

in train, but no commitment as yet

8 Ongoing system for community engagement in plan monitoring

and review



processes

9 Ongoing community education programs regarding the merits of

the compact city



processes



Productivity gains from the AP are

not demonstrated

11 Mechanisms to deal with land fragmentation, contamination,

infrastructure deficits and other market failures deterring

brownfield and infill development

The potential for government

auspiced development authorities is

flagged but not yet resolved

12 Clear policy direction for value capture as part of an infrastructure

funding strategy

Broad based value capture options

(land tax reform) is not canvassed inany detail


supply for greenfield development


supply for infill and brownfield development

It is unclear how a ‘pipeline’ of infill

housing opportunities will be

maintained in line with AP

aspirations

15 Clear policy direction for inclusionary affordable housing

provisions in statutory planning rules

Flagged in an Addendum to the

Unitary Plan but not yet resolved

16 Publicly accessible charter assigning planning and infrastructure

responsibilities to Central Government, ACC and Local Boards in

line with subsidiarity principles

Legislation and accords are in place,

but a genuine partnership of peers is

still a work in progress

17 Documented criteria and systems for distinguishing 'strategic'

from structural and follower infrastructure, and for optimal

investment in line with the spatial vision

There appears to be little or no city

shaping investment in the first

decade of the ITP 18 Separate and broader evaluation and implementation processes

for candidate strategic projects geared to leveraging city shaping

effects in line with the spatial vision

CRL appears to have been part of a

separate evaluation process, but this

is not formalised for wider

application.

19 Adoption of development sequencing policies or similar to

support efficient roll out of structural and follower infrastructure

20 Wide palette of non-detached dwelling forms around suburban

nodes, recognising market demand realities and creating

opportunities for a variety of developer types

strength uncertain potential weakness Source: SGS Economics & Planning Pty Ltd




5.3 Weaknesses

The principal weaknesses we see in the current suite of plans and governance arrangements relate tocriteria 17 and 18. A significant shift in urban structure is envisaged in Auckland over the next three

decades, but, as far as we can see, the only truly ‘strategic’ project to drive this is the CRL, and this does

not appear to be part of a committed funding program, at least not in the first 10 years. In the interim,

Auckland’s car based, low density structure is likely to become even more entrenched. There is a real

concern that land use aspirations in the Plan are not matched by sufficient planned investment in road

and rail infrastructure.

To some extent, this critical weakness stems from poor articulation of roles and responsibilities between

Central and metropolitan governments with respect to genuinely strategic projects. Central Government

is inclined to take a house keeping approach to investment (fix problems as they arise on a just in time

basis as this is the financially prudent way to proceed). Meanwhile, metropolitan government has a

more visionary, ‘create the future’ approach.

We understand that there has been much discussion and study in the past (and continuing today)

regarding such matters, as exemplified in the efforts of the ‘Consensus Building Group’ regarding

mechanisms for funding infrastructure. We have also been made aware of the Central Government –

Auckland Council Forum, which is expected to meet annually to review progress in the implementation

of the AP. But there seems to be no definitive power sharing forum or intergovernmental agreement

through which funding priorities for city shaping projects may be resolved. In this context, the

Manchester Model for infrastructure partnerships between central and regional governments may be

useful for Auckland. The ‘productivity dividend’ aspects of the Manchester Model could be the focus for

the next phase of evolution in the NLTP.

Crucial questions around funding appear to be deferred in the documents. As noted, value capture –particularly in its broad based form – is flagged but unresolved.

Likewise, there is no clear policy direction for road pricing, notwithstanding that the discussion set out in

Funding Auckland’s Transport Future sees it as a worthy consideration and the ITP implies that it is

necessary to achieve reasonable outcomes in terms of traffic congestion and greenhouse gas emissions

outcomes in line with the Auckland Plan vision.

The apparent lack of strategic infrastructure investment to support the quality compact city is, in part,

attributable to the weakly developed policy around infrastructure funding, congestion pricing and broad

based land value capture. We acknowledge that there is a political hypersensitivity to such issues. But as

a well-resourced metropolitan government with a broad mandate, one might expect that an institution

like the AC would be in a position to push the envelope on such issues, especially by the standards of

Australian cities which are hamstrung by the conservatism of their host State Governments.

There are also concerns around governance and community engagement. The documents in the public

domain imply that local boards and the Council itself will provide the ongoing forums for community

involvement in the AP and education in pursuit of the quality compact city. But how this is to occur is

unclear. Moreover, looking down the track, when change begins to ‘bite’ in some of the neighbourhoods

designated for intensification in the Unitary Plan, there is the potential for the local boards to become a

locus of organised opposition to the overall compact city strategy.







CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS




6 CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

This section provides specific responses to the questions set out in NZCID’s brief to SGS and proposes ways to better

align planning and infrastructure governance in Auckland.

6.1 Questions set by NZCID

As noted in Section 1.2, the NZCID sought SGS’s independent response to 4 specific questions relating to

the efficacy of current infrastructure and land use planning initiatives in Auckland. These questions are

reproduced below, together with our findings.

To what extent do the plans work as cohesive suite of plans?

The level of integration / harmonisation that has been achieved across a broad spectrum of thematic

and sectoral plans, as well as spheres of government, in Auckland is impressive. In our experience, the

Auckland Plan and the attendant strategies and policies (Unitary Plan, City Centre Master Plan, Economic

Development Strategy, Waterfront Development Plan, Integrated Transport Program, National Land

Transport Program for Auckland, Auckland Housing Accord, Southern Initiative, Tamaki Transformation)set a new standard for integrated metropolitan planning, at least in an Australasian context. To some

extent this is a vindication of the initiative to establish the Auckland Council. The metropolis has long

been hampered by fragmented planning and conflicting visions. In large part this issue has been

resolved.

Moreover, the documents SGS reviewed give the sense that significant progress has been made in

breaking down policy silos, especially those relating to transport and land use planning.

Does investment and sequencing of major infrastructure projects support planned

urban development?

Notwithstanding the level of collaboration and integration that has been achieved at the paper plan

level, we are not convinced that the proposed investment in major infrastructure is adequate to achieve

the structural transformation envisaged for the metropolis in the Auckland Plan. There is an effective

admission in both the ITP and the Auckland Plan that the currently committed 30 year funding program

for transport in Auckland will fall short of what the ambitious metropolitan restructuring process

requires. From the documentation, the Committed Funding program includes no first decade

investment in genuine city shaping infrastructure; at least, no evidence from land use modelling is

offered to this effect.

This is concerning enough, but to compound the issue, the ITP itself states that even a Fully Funded

program of transport investment as per Auckland Plan priorities would not be sufficient to meet adopted

objectives. Outcomes in terms of transport delays and greenhouse gas emissions, in particular, would

not meet targets by orders of magnitude. The documents point out that serious travel demand

management would need to be employed in conjunction with the Fully Funded program, including, most

likely, road pricing. However, we could find no program of accountable action to progress the travel




demand management challenge. Nor could we find a program of accountable action for the

development of alternative funding streams to deliver the required program of investment in

infrastructure.

Achievement of planned urban development – the ‘quality compact city’ is therefore dependent on

three major unknowns:

1. What are the projects other than the CRL that will shift housing and business locational

behaviour to the extent necessary to achieve the transformation sought by the Auckland Plan?

2. Given that the outlays for such investments are likely to be significantly above what will come

through conventional Council and Central Government funding streams, how will the funding

gap be bridged?

3. If some form of congestion pricing or equivalent travel demand management strategy will be

essential even with full funding of transport infrastructure priorities, how will such a strategy be

rolled out?

Does urban development support planned investment in major infrastructure

projects?

None of the documents we reviewed discussed or illustrated the feedback effects between transport

investment and land use change, even though we are advised that dynamic transport modelling was

applied in the creation of the AP.

It is therefore difficult to comment definitively on whether, for example, the CRL is ‘justified’ by planned

intensification in the central city and linked activity nodes.

We will note, however, that genuinely strategic projects, as defined in this paper, have dynamic and long

term effects which are typically beyond the reach of conventional cost benefit analysis. As discussed in

Section 2.3 (page 15) and illustrated in the text box on page 62, strategic transport investments can

significantly boost employment and population growth in their own right. In a sense they help growtheir own demand. Melbourne’s Underground Rail Loop indicated a benefit cost ratio of less than one

when first proposed but has since proven essential to the growth of the central city economy which is

now the acknowledged premier wealth driver for the State of Victoria.

On current plans, will the objectives of the Auckland Plan be achieved?

We find in the negative on this question. This is because of the unresolved questions surrounding how

required city shaping infrastructure projects will be funded and therefore delivered, and how travel

demand is to be managed to avoid serious worsening in road congestion.

This is not to say that the Auckland Plan cannot be delivered. It is a question of securing plausible

funding streams for the infrastructure investment program and addressing a number of difficult public

policy challenges around road pricing, property taxation and value capture.

In our view, the key to advancing this agenda is to provide Central Government with a compelling

business case for additional co-investment in Auckland. We take this up in our recommendations below.

6.2 Recommendations

As we have discussed, the aspirations for urban transformation in Auckland do not seem to be in line

with the capacity to fund the required infrastructure. This appears to create an intractable dilemma,

potentially leading to a conclusion that land use planning ambitions should somehow be ‘scaled back’ to

fit the Auckland and NZ communities’ funding capabilities.




However, this line of thinking ignores the crucial fact that a restructured Auckland is likely to boost

national productivity, GDP and aggregate tax revenues. In this context, the question becomes ‘will the

tax dividend from implementing the Auckland Plan, including timely delivery of the requisite city shaping

infrastructure, pay for the additional investment involved?’

Our recommendation is that the Auckland Plan needs to be interrogated from a productivity perspective

with view to establishing (or not) the case for expanded co-investment by Central Government. Such co-

investment may facilitate a more aggressive intra Auckland program of reform in matters like road

pricing and value capture.

Additional analysis along the following lines is required:

Model medium to long term national productivity and GVA outcomes, assuming a (current)

trend based pattern of development in metropolitan Auckland

Model medium to long term national productivity and GVA outcomes assuming timely

investment in city shaping infrastructure and delivery of the Auckland Plan

Estimate the tax revenue uplift from any productivity gain offered by a restructured Auckland,

and the incidence of these tax receipts

If warranted by the foregoing analysis, make a case to Central Government to share some of its

prospective tax revenue uplift from a restructured Auckland in the form of accelerated co-

investment in required city shaping infrastructure.




REFERENCES




REFERENCES

Arthur Grimes & Chris Young (2010) Anticipatory Effects of Rail Upgrades: Auckland’s Western Line,

Motu Working Paper 10-11, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research

Auckland Council 2012a, The Auckland Plan.

Auckland Council 2012b, The City Centre Masterplan.

Auckland Council 2013a, Auckland Council Annual Report 2012/13.

Auckland Council 2013b, Section 32 Report for proposed Unitary Plan.

Auckland Council 2014, Independent Māori Statutory Board,

<http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/AboutCouncil/representativesbodies/Maori_relations/Pages/i

ndependentmaoristatutoryboard.aspx>.

Austin, Patricia 2013, ‘Housing Affordability in Auckland: looking behind the rhetoric’, SOAC Conference

Paper.

Greater Manchester Combined Authority 2012, Greater Manchester City Deal .

Independent Māori Statutory Board 2014, Independent Māori Statutory Board

<http://www.imsb.maori.nz/>.

McKinlay, P. 2011, ‘‘Integration of Urban Services and Good Governance: The Auckland Supercity

Project’’, Paper presented at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) Seminar on Environmental

Sustainability in Urban Centres, Perth, Western Australia, April 13.

Mouat, C., & Dodson, J. (2013). Reviewing the Auckland ‘super city’: towards an ongoing agenda for

evaluating super city governance, Australian Planner , 50(2), 138-147.

Tuatagaloa, P and Hitchins, H (2013). Auckland Economic Development Strategy Targets and

intermediate outcomes: a baseline report 2012. Auckland Council technical report, Auckland Council

TR2013/036






Contact us

CANBERRA

Level 1, 55 Woolley Street

Dickson ACT 2602

+61 2 6262 7603

[email protected]

HOBART

Unit 2, 5 King Street

Bellerive TAS 7018

+61 (0)439 941 934

[email protected]

MELBOURNE

Level 5, 171 La Trobe Street

Melbourne VIC 3000

+61 3 8616 0331

[email protected]

SYDNEY

Suite 12, 50 Reservoir StreetSurry Hills NSW 2010

Date post:	03-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ben-ross
View:	217 times
Download:	0 times

SGS Final Report Feb 2014

Documents