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HHiissttoorryy NNootteess IIssssuuee 1177

Slavery in Diplomacy: The Foreign Office and the

Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade

Slavery in Diplomacy Th For ign

fth tr d

p~ ~ For ign &

Comm nw alth Offic

Slavery in Diplomacy Th Foreign Offi and th uppr 10n

of th tran atlantic lav trad

For ign and ommonw alth Offi Hi t nan Hi tory N t N . 1 7

Cover illustration: jmM Bandinel (1 7 3-184 9), enior clerk in th Foreign Office and fir. t h ad of the lav Trade Department. Lithograph 1Yy john Callcott Hor.ley, reproduced cour of th National Portrait allery.

List of Illustrations

Preface

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Documents

Section I

Section II

Section III

Section N

Section V

Section VI

Section VII

Contents

A new and vast branch of international relation

Zealots and Helots. The Slave Trade Department

Judicial Diplomacy. The mixed commission courts

Haranguing Europe

Troubling America

Coercing Africa

Gathering inteUigence

Trading statistics

Disappointing judges

Ending suppression

page

lll

v

1

29

49

83

85

95

10

117

131

145

159

Illustrations

1. Viscount Castlereagh

2. George Canning

3. Viscount Palmerston

4. Lord Aberdeen

5. Lordjohn Russell

6. Slave barracoon

7. Capture of Brazilian slaver, Adila, by boats from HM Britomart, 29 May 1849

8. HMS Black Joke engaging the Spanish slaver El Almirante in th Bight of B nin,

1 February 1829

9. HMS Brisk firing on and closing to board the lav r Sunny outh

10. HMS Antelope of the west Africa squadron capturing a slaver with an American flag

11. Story of the capture of a slaver off Cuba

12. James Bandinel

13. Sir Percy Anderson

14. William Henry Wyld

15. Departm nt photograph 'Dr amers of th Sixti s'

16. Document is ued by Anglo-Portugu s mixed ommission in i rra L on

confirming condemnation of slav hip Josephina, 1 Sept mb r 1 40

17. Certificate Issued to captain f slav ship Josephina by Nicholas Trist, th US Con ul

in Havana, 16 March 1836

18. Regist r of Slaves

19. Certificate of Emancipation and cov ring n t from David urn bull, up rint nd nt

of Liberat d Africans at Havana, to Lord Palm r t n

20. Dr Richard Robert Madd n

21. Dr Madden' deposition at th Ami tad trial inN w York

We would like to thank th fall wing for p rmi si n to r produ illustration : F 0 An 11

Library (No . 13, 14, 15); Illustrat d London N w (N . 6, 9, 10, 11); National P rtrait 11 ry

(Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20); Royal Naval Mus urn, Portsmouth ( . 7 ); Th ati nal Archiv

(Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, 21).

iii

Preface

This year's bicentenary of the act abolishing the slave trade within the British empire has

provided ample opportunity for official and public reflection on the slave trade and the evils

associated with it. For more than a century prior to the passage of the act slave traffick rs from

Britain and its colonies far outstripped their competitors in continental Europe in the

shipment of captive Mricans to the Americas. And it is upon the economic and o ial

consequences of this forced mass migration, the human uffering it engendered, and the aims

motives and politics of its opponents, that attention has tended rightly to focus. Rather les

consideration has been given to the diplomacy of abolition and suppression. ~ t throughout

the nineteenth century the British Foreign Office and the Admiralty were in th forefront of

those seeking to eradicate the trade, not just upon th high eas, but in Mrica and in th Near

and Middle East. Forsaking past sins and wary of for ign charges of hypo risy, British

governments endeavoured to achieve their objectiv through bilateral and multilateral a ord

and the deployment of the Royal Navy in policing op rations in the Atlantic and Indian oc an ,

as well as in the R d sea and the Persian gulf.

One institutional innovation in the ensuing struggl was th stabli hment, on the b i of

international treaties, of mixed commission courts to d cid th fat of v s Is detain d on

suspicion of being slave ships. Another was the creation within th F reign Office of a lav

Trade Department to overs e treaty impl mentation. Ind ed, during th 1 20 and 1830 this

was the Office's largest department, and its first h ad,Jam s Bandin 1, was, aft r his r tir m nt,

to depict the sums devoted to anti- lave trad dipl macy as an act of aton m nt and r paration

for wrongs previously inflicted by the British upon Mrica. Th d partm nt eventually b came

an agent of imperial expansion, as the British sought, through treaties with 1 al rul rs and

territorial acqui ition , to promot legitimat trad whil combating slav ry t ourc .

Nevertheless, it remained wedded to an e ntially moral cau , and its taff had to cop with

issues relating to human rights and humanitarian interv ntion which r main rel vant to this

day. It was with these matter and th Offic ' long tanding ommitm nt to human rights

diplomacy in mind that th Foreign and mmonw alth ffi d id d t organis on -day

seminar on the theme of 'Whitehall and th Slave Trad '. Ho ted by th ffic ' Historian and

its Human Rights, Democracy and Gov rnan Group (HRDGG), th eminar will bring

together on 17 October 2007 distinguish d cholars, diplomats and politi ian .

This History Note on the Foreign Offic and the suppre ion of th transatlantic lav trad

has been prepared for distribution at th eminar. It make n claim to originality. Th re i

already a vast academic literature on th ubj ct, and we have attempted no more than bri f

summary urvey of events and their significance. W hop , howev r, that it will inform tho e

who might oth rwis be unaware of th part played by th Vi torian F reign Offi in th

v

suppression of the slav trade, and that what it has to say about the organisation and

managem nt of th Slav Trade Department and its representatives overseas may be of interest

to specialist research rs. The documents reproduced towards the end of the History Note have

b en selected simply to illustrat various points made in the preceding chapters.

Acknowledgements

We should like to thank for all their help in the preparation of Slavery in Diplomacy, Professor

Patrick Salmon, the FCO's Chief Historian, and our other colleagues in the Historians team,

particularly Mr Grant Hibberd, Mr Giles Rose and Mrs Elaine Alahendra, and two volunteer

members of our staff, Ms Alice Kennedy and Mr Eamonn McCarthy. In addition, we are grateful

to both former and current staff of The National Archives at Kew, especially Mr Hugh

Alexand r and Dr Gemma Romaine, for their advice; the Rare Books, Manuscript, and Special

Collections Library of Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, for permission to cite and

quote extensively from the Backhouse and Bandinel papers in its possession; Ms Carol Ruddock

of Crystal Print Publishing; and Mr Tom Loft of the FCO's Ancell Library Information Services

for his readiness to respond cheerfully and efficiently to our numerous requests.

On behalf of FCO Historians, we should also like to thank for their assistance in facilitating

and organising the seminar, Ms Sarah Clayton, Ms Isabel Olizar and Mr Charles Lonsdale of

HRDGG; Mr Peter Dupont and Mr Peter Vella of FCO Services; Ms Janice Flint and Mr Brian

Jaramillo of the FCO's Conference and Events Group; Mr Matthew Bailey of the National

Portrait Gallery; Dr Colin White and Mr Stephen Courtney of the Royal Naval Museum,

Portsmouth; Dr Diana Paton of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne; and Mr Ian Ward of

Nostalgia Works, Dagenham. We are pleased to acknowledge the generous financial support

provid d by Stakeholder Outreach Team, HRDGG and Information Management Group

(IMG). Special thanks are finally due to Ms Jane Darby, Assistant Director and Head IMG, for

the encouragement and support that she and other members of the Group have given

Historians in undertaking this project.

Keith Hamilton

Farida Shaikh

7 September 2007

vi

Chapter I

A new and vast branch of international relations

Few diplomatic achievements gave Lord Palm r t n more atisfa tion than his rol in

suppressing the Brazilian slave trade. L This may now em surpri ing. Palm r ton was, aft r all ,

foreign secretary and, latterly, prim minister, wh n Britain was at th h ight of its gl bal

power, and when ministers and officials were oth rwise occupied with th r percus ion of

revolutionary change in Europe, the d cline of th Ott man empire in th N ar and Middl

East, and the emergence of the 'Gr at Gam ' in ntral ia. M reov r, throughout th

eighteenth century British slaver had b en in th for fr nt of th transatlanti

and the business thereby generated contributed to th expan ion of that manufacturing

industry upon which Britain 's international strength repos d. By 1807, when parliam nt

outlawed their participation in th trad , they had probably hipp d mor than 2.6 milli n

captive Africans to the Americas; and until 1833 lav ry, th 'a umulat h rrors' of whi h

abolitionists labelled 'crimes against humanity', r main d 1 gal in Britain'

possessions.2 y; t, whil they may not invariably have b n motivat d by high moral prin ipl ,

there can b no doubting the signifi an e that Briti h stat m n and dipl m atta h d t

eradicating th traffic. It was a humanitarian caus whi h L rd astl reagh t k up at th

Congress ofVienna of 1814-15 and to which th Duk ofWellington r turned, s v n y ar lat r,

at the Congr s of Verona; it was th subj ct of num r u bilat ral agr with

other gov rnm nts; and until well into th mid-Victorian p ri d th F r ign Offi

a rel ntless campaign of public diplomacy again t th lave trad . ~ no oth r

were so many diplomatic Blue Books (publi h d v lum of offi ial rr p nd

Already by 1842 slave trad dipl rna y had, in th words of noth r t r ign cr tary, L rd

Aberd en, b com 'a n w and vast bran h of int rnati nal r lation '.3

1 In 1864, a year before his d ath, Palm r ton wr t , ' th hi v m nt whi hI 1 ok ba k on with th gr t st and pur st pl a ure was £ rcing th Brazilians to giv up th ir lav trad '. Cit d in L li B th ll The

Abolition of the Brazilian lave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the lave Trade Qu tion, 1807-1 69 ( ambridg : P, 1979) , p. 360. 2 Letter from Thomas Clarkson et al., The Times, 20 July 1 46, p . , . E.

Cited in Andr w P n r, 'Truste ship, Anti- lav ry and Humanitariani m', The Oxford H . tory of the British Empire, vol. iii , The Nineteenth Century (Ox£ rd: O UP, 1 ), d. Andr w Port r, pp. 1 221.

1

Traders and abolitionists

The British were latecomer to the maritime trade in slaves. Since the fifteenth century the

Portuguese had been transporting slaves from west Africa to southern Europe. There they

were employed largely in domestic service. Fortified trading stations were established on the

coastal littoral between the S negal and Cameroon rivers to facilitate the commerce; Sao

Tome and the Cap Verde islands were acquired as transit points; and the further ext nsion

of trad route into the Indian ocean offered opportunities for the purchase

of slaves in eastern and southern Africa. Other Christian nations, including the Dutch,

the English, th French and the Spaniards, soon became involved in the traffic,

which expanded vastly following th European discovery and colonisation of America,

and the establishment of plantation economies on the mainland and in the islands of

the Caribbean. During the seventeenth century, as they switched from tobacco to sugar

cultivation, the British and French possessions in the Lesser Antilles, Antigua, Barbados,

Guadeloupe, Martinique and St Kitts, emerged as the first important West Indian slave

societies. By then, the British were making up for lost time. The Company of Royal

Adventurers, later to re-emerge as the Royal African Company, was founded in 1660 with

the backing of King Charles II and a group of wealthy London merchants. It was

initially granted a monopoly on the English Africa trade, and within forty years around

three-fifths of the company's income derived from the transport and sale of slaves.

Encouraged by the demand of planters in their North American colonies for African slave

labour, and by the expansion of their dominion there and in the Caribbean, within twenty

years the British surpassed the Dutch and the Portuguese as the leading shippers of slaves

to the Americas. 4 Between 1791 and 1800 British vessels conveyed an annual average of

32,550 Africans into slavery.5

The trade was very often conducted on a triangular basis. Slaves were purchased from African

dealers and merchants, who kept a tight control over their supply, and th~n transported across

the Atlantic for re-sale. Vessel returning from the Americas brought to Britain commodities

such as coffee, cotton, sugar and tobacco, before departing again for Africa carrying

manufactured goods for export. In the long term, this forced mass migration had a debilitating

impact upon the economic development of west and central Africa. It also had a disruptive

effect upon the political and social structures of the region. But such considerations played

little or no part in stimulating public opposition to the trade in Britain. More important was

the sense of moral indignation aroused by the horrors of the traffic itself, particularly the

degradation and sufferings inflicted on its human cargoes and the high mortality rates

4 David Richardson, 'The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1660-1807', The Oxfard History of the

British Empire, vol. ii, The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: OUP, 1998), ed. PJ. Marshall, pp. 441-64. 5

Ronald Hyam, Britain 's Imperial Century: A Study ofEmpire and Expansion (London: B.T. Batsford, 1976), p. 40.

2

associated with the transatlantic passage. Slav ry, widely assumed to have be n rul d illegal in

England by Lord Mansfield's judgement of 1772,6 offended the int llectual susceptibilities of

the Age of Reason.7 It also raised the ire of evangeli al Anglicans and Christian dis enters, and

in 1787 Thomas Clarkson, Granvill Sharp and William Wilberforce, all thr m mbers of th

'Clapham Sect',joined forces with the Quaker movement to form the Society forth Abolition

of the Slave Trade. Wilberforce, who as MP for Hull led th soci ty's campaign in parliam nt,

was able to enli t support from influ n tial politicians, including successive prim ministers,

William Pitt the Young r and Lord Grenvill , and th latter's foreign ecretary, Charl s Jam

Fox.

Parliament first took up the issue in 1788 with a d bate on a bill sponsored by Sir William

Dolbern and aimed at restricting the shipping of lav s, and in 1792 the Hous of Common

passed a resolution calling for the gradual abolition of the trade. That am year, ac ording to

Clarkson, some 300,000 consumers regist red their prot t against the trad by giving up

sugar-perhap one of the first customer boycotts of mod rn tim .9 But abolitioni ts had to

overcome the resistance of a p werful commercial lobby, whi h cont nd d that th. Briti h

economy would suffer if the W st Indian plantations were no long r abl to import lav

labour. Pitt's administration was preoccupied with th war with Fran and, threat ned by

revolution abroad, was disinclined towards embarking on re£ rm at hom . Only in th wak f

Nelson's triumph ov r th French and Spanish fl ets at Trafalgar, was progr r sumed.

temporary glut in th supply of sugar and the relative d din in th conomi importanc of

th We t Indies allowed Wilberforce and his follow rs to combin onomic with humanitarian

arguments for abolition. Within governm nt som still d ubt d th m rits of th ir cas .10 On

16 March 1807, during the third reading of the bill t abolish th trad , William Windham, th

n 'n t to go upon ab tra t principl secretary of state for war and coloni s, urged th

of right, but upon the consideration of the con fth m

of the British empire resulting from it' .11 And, ev n aft r th ucce

ure, and the p ible ruin

ful pas ag of th bill, th

comm rce persisted. The demand for lave r main d high and, in th ca s of Brazil, uba

and the cotton producing south of th Unit d tat s, c ntinu d t ri until well into th

1840 . Slavers flying the flags of nation oth r than Britain readily re p nd d to th

6 Peter Fry r taying Power. The History of Black People in Britain (Lond n: Pluto Pr , 1 7) , pp. 120-26. 7 Hugh Thomas, The lave Trade: The History of the Atlantic lave Trade 1440-1 70 (London: Pap rma , 1 97) , p. 463. Adam Hochschild, Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire ' lav (Lond n: Pan Books, 2006), p. 87.

Thomas, Slave Trade, pp. 507-09. 9 'Sick with the xce of sweetness' , The Economi t, 23 D c 2006 - 5 Jan 2007. 10 Porter, 'Trusteeship', pp. 202-03. 11 W.E.F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the lavers: The uptYres ion of the Atlantic lave Trade (L ndon: & Unwin, 1969) , p. 15. Thomas, p. 554.

3

requirements of the market. British merchants wer meanwhile free to supply them with

manufactured good and to deal in the products of slave economies. Abolitionists, who had yet

to secure the eradication of slavery within Britain's overseas possessions, henceforth looked to

diplomacy and the Royal Navy to stifl the trade upon the high seas. British governments had

in any case an economic interest in ensuring that a lucrative trade should not simply pass into

the hands of rivals.

War, peace and the scourge of Africa

The war with revolutionary France may have impeded progress towards the abolition of the

slave trade. But th war with Napoleon 's Europe facilitated measures aimed at its suppression.

The British were able to reduce the export of slaves from west Africa by exercising the rights

they claimed as belligerents to seize enemy ships and search neutral vessels for contraband. Pre­

eminent at sea, the Royal Navy, with dubious legality, extended these rights to include searching

ships for slaves and arresting and trying slavers. To some extent the British were assisted by the

fact that both Denmark and the United States had also moved to ban their citizens from

engaging in the slave trade, though this did not in itself give Britain the right to enforce such

legislation upon their nationals. And a dispute over belligerent rights was ultimately to lead to

war with the United States in 1812. The Portuguese also presented a problem. Allies in the war

against the French, they stood to benefit from an expanding trade in slaves between their

African territories and Brazil, in whose capital, Rio de Janeiro, the Portuguese royal court was

resident for twelve years following its departure from Lisbon in 1807. An Anglo-Portuguese

alliance treaty of 1810 obliged the prince regent of Portugal to adopt the 'most efficacious

means for bringing about a gradual abolition of the [Slave] Trade, throughout the whole of his

Dominions', and disallowed his subjects from carrying on the trade on any part of the Mrican

coast not belonging to his dominions. 12 It was, however, far from easy to determine what truly

constituted Portuguese territory. With the blessing of local African rulers Portuguese

merchants established trade posts in areas which the British declined to recognise as falling

under Portugal's sovereignty, and in such instances the Royal Navy, much to the obvious

annoyance of the Portuguese who contested the legitimacy of such actions, felt free to stop and

search their ships.

Napoleon 's defeat in continental Europe offered new opportunities for diplomatic initiatives

directed against the slave trade. George Canning, as foreign secretary during 1807-09, had

issued instructions to British envoys to enter into negotiations with their host governments to

secure treaties abolishing the trade.13 As in the case of Portugal, their efforts had met with only

12 James Bandinel, Some Account of the Trade in Slaves from Africa as connected with Europe and America (London:

Longman, Brown & Co., 1842) , pp. 127-28. I ~ Ibid., p. 125.

4

limited success. But during 1813-14 Austria, Denmark, Prussia, Russia and Sweden all signed

treaties with Britain, either promising to prohibit their subjects ' participation in the trade, or

pledging their cooperation in working for its abolition. Meanwhile, a royal decree wa issued

from The Hague forbidding Dutch nationals from slave trading on the coast of Africa and

prohibiting Dutch vessels from leaving Dutch ports with the intention of engaging in th

traffic. The treaty of Paris of May 1814, which brought an end to the war between France and

the sixth coalition, also included an additional article by which the French expressed their

intention to limit their traffic in slaves to their own colonies, and to outlaw it completely within

five years. Spain too agreed in july 1814 to confine the slaving of its nationals to its own colonial

empire. And the treaty of Ghent of December 1814, which formally concluded the war b tw en

Britain and the United States, stated that the two countries would 'use their b st endeavour '

to end the trade. 14 Still more important, however, was the prospect of th British being able to

use the Congress of Vienna to launch a n w diplomatic offensive with a view to making the

trade the subject of a comprehensive int rnational agreem nt.

Lord Castlereagh, Britain's foreign secretary since 1812 and one of the principal architects of

the Vienna settl ment, was a Tory not known to b sympathetic to the abolitionist caus .

Personally of the opinion that morals 'wer never well taught by the sword', h thought it would

be wrong to force abolition upon nations 'at the exp ns of th ir honour and of the tranquility

of the world' .15 He was neverth less awar that h could n t afford to ignor th publi ' strong

desire for Britain to take action again t the int rnational trade. P titions to this f£ ct,

containing nearly a million signatures, had b en r ceived from around th country, 16 and in a

letter to Henry Welles! y, the British ambassador to Spain, he wrote on 1 August 1814

... the nation is bent upon this obj ct. I believe th r i hardly a village that has not

met and petition d upon it; both Hous s of Parliament are pl dg d to pre s it; and

the Ministers must make it the basi of their poli y. 17

Determined to advance the cause of abolition at Vi nna, Castl reagh ought the as i tanc of

Wilberforce and his fellow campaigners. Th y upplied him with information, helped draft

legal documents, and distributed propaganda ov r as.1 His overarching aim was to k to

14 Ibid., pp. 129-42. See also, Lewis Hertslet, A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Convention at present subsi ling

between Great Britain & Foreign Powers; o Jar as they relate to Commerce and Navigation; to the R_epr, ion and Abolition of the Slave Trade· and to the Privileges and Interests of the Subjects of the High Contracting Parties (2 vol ., L nd n: Egenon, 1820), vol. i, pp. 261-63. 15 Cited in Bethell, Brazilian Slave Trade, p. 12. 16 Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade (London: Longman, 1975) , p. 11. 17 Cited inJerome Reich, 'The Slave Trade at th Congre ofVi nna-AStudy in English Public Opinion', The

Journal of Negro History, 53 (1968) , pp. 129-43. 18 Paul Michael Kielstra, The Politics of lave Trade uppression in Britain and France, 1814-4 . Diplomacy, Moralit and Economics (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.34-36, 44, 51.

5

effect 'an immediate and general abolition', and to insert provisions into the general peace

treaty to make this possible.l9 This was in some respects an extraordinary objective.

Philosophers, poets, and even politicians, had debated and sometimes extolled the 'natural

rights of man', but, apart from efforts previously directed towards upholding religious liberties,

there were few if any precedents for submitting an essentially human rights issue to such

high-level international negotiation.

Castlereagh knew his project was an ambitious one. His strategy was first to exert pressure on

the French for immediate and general abolition, on the assumption that if France gave way,

Portugal and Spain, each benefiting respectively from the expansion of the slave-based

economies of Brazil and Cuba, would find it more difficult to resist. Should the French decline,

it still might be possible to persuade them to outlaw the trade in three years, rather than the

five, specified in the Paris treaty. There would, Castlereagh felt, otherwise be 'no hope' of

bringing the other two countries to 'a more favourable determination'. But, he expected, at the

very least, to persuade Spain and Portugal to commit themselves to the immediate abolition of

the traffic north of the equator and to its absolute abolition within eight years. He was less

optimistic about securing an earlier date for abolition, but to that end he contemplated the

threat of an international boycott of their colonial produce. In terms of practical measures, one

ofCastlereagh's most innovative ideas was for the establishment of an international mechanism

for enforcing and monitoring suppression. He envisaged states formulating their own

regulations to outlaw the trade, and a 'sort of permanent European Congress', composed of

committees of representatives of the powers, to oversee their application and 'enquire into the

progress made and the extent of the evil remaining'. He was also eager to discover whether

individual nations would be prepared to agree that each other's navies should have a reciprocal

right of search of suspected slavers. Issues of sovereignty would, he appreciated, make this a

matter of 'great delicacy'. It was, Castlereagh contended, a question of how far states could be

'justified in consideration of those engaged in the Traffick, of whatever nation, as engaged in

an offence proscribed by Civilized Nations, and as such not to be peaceably tolerated'?20

There was some, but only limited, sympathy for such sentiments in Vienna. Little of practical

value came out of a committee set up in January 1815 to consider the question. Spain and

Portugal initially resisted the participation of non-maritime powers in the committee and,

along with the French, objected to the immediate abolition of the trade and rejected the

notion of reciprocal rights of search. French merchants were hoping to profit from the return

of French colonial possessions and their government was reluctant to be seen making further

concessions to a triumphant Britain, and both the Portuguese and the Spaniards viewed the

19 C.K. Web ter (ed.) , British Diplomacy, 1813-15. Select Documents dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe

(London: Bell, 1921), pp. 233-35. 20 Ibid.

6

idea of an international trade boycott a an infringement of th ir sov r ignty. All that th y w r

prepared to accept was a re olution which for aw th in titution of a b ycott against any

country prolonging the trade beyond an agr d, y tun p ified, dat for ab liti n. And v n

the permanent committee, which was set up in L ndon to k p tnea ur against th traffic

under r view, was ultimately to prove an in ffectiv d vi .21 Th ailur and h rt oming

notwithstanding, Castlereagh nevertheless succeed din per uading th pow rs r pr nt d at

Vienna to draft and sign on 8 F bruary 1815 a declarati n, whi h wa v ntually attached t

the Congress treaty as annex xv, and whose wording establish d a m ral f, undati n up n

which future measur s could be constructed. It affirm d that th trad had 'b n n id r d,

by just and enlightened men of all ag s, as r pugnant to th prin ipl of humanity and

universal morality'; and that th 'public voic in all iviliz d c untri ' all d for its 'pr mpt

suppression'. Those gathered in Vienna could not, th d laration continu d ,

... do greater credit to th ir mis ion, b tt r fulfil th ir duty, and mani£ t th

principles which actuat their august Sov r ign than by ... pro laiming, in th nam

of th ir Sov reigns, their wi h of putting an nd to a courg , whi h ha o long

desolat d Africa, d grad d Europe, and afflicted humanity .. . 22

This, howev r, wa qualified by th as rtion that th obj ctiv for n uld not b attain d

by governm nts 'without du r gard to th int r ts, habits, and v n th pr judi f th ir

subjects', and that th pl nipotentiaries c uld n 'pr judg th p riod that a h

particular Pow r [might] consider a most advi abl for th d finitiv b liti n of th Slav

Trad '.23 Th y were agr d that th trad was morally wr ng and that it

but reluctant to say how or wh n. As so oft n in humanitarian dipl rna y, it wa

proclaim prin ipl than t s ttl on m an f, r th ir pra ti al appli ation. That said, a

prec dent had b n set. Th slav trade had b en gni d a a matt r f

international oncern, and th Briti h now had a plat£ rm fr m whi h to m unt furth r

challeng s to thos gov rnments whi h ntinu d to t 1 rat , or w r mpli it in, th trad .

astler agh could at I ast draw som ati facti n fr m thi . As h xplain d t th prim

minist r, Lord Liv rpool, in a 1 tt r from Vi nna f 26 January 1 15, th att nti n of mini t r

had b n awak ned to th ubj ct in a d gr mu h b yond what h had

'consid ringth MultiplicityoftheirAvo ation and th ir£ rm rlgn ran fth Qu ti n '.24

21 .K. W b t r, TheForeign PolicyofCastlereagh, 1815-1822, vol. ii, Britain and the uropeanAllian (Lond n: B 11 , 1958) , p. 458. R i h, p. 142. Mi r, Britain and the Ending of the lave Trade, pp. 1 -13. 22 H rtsl t, Treaties, vol. i, pp. -13.

23 1bid. 24 Th National Archiv (TNA), FO 92/11,

7

I. Viscount Castlereagh - Robert Stewart (1769-1822), Foreign Secretary 1812-1822.As Britain's principal delegate at the Congress of Vienna ( 181-4-15) he worked for 'a permanent European congress' to oversee the suppres­sion of the slave trade. He sought to change the heart of Europe by being at the heart of Europe. (National Portrait Gallery).

The Statesmen

2. G eorge Canning -Tory statesman (I no-1827). Prime Minister ( 1827) and twice Foreign Secretary (1807-1809 and 1822- 1827). In 1822 he denounced the slave trade as 'the scandal of the civilised world'. (National Portrait Gallery).

3. Viscount Palmerston -John Henry Temple ( 178-4-1865). He was twice PM ( 1851-58 and 1859-65) and twice Foreign Secretary ( 1830-34 and 1835-41 ).A gradualist in his approach to the abolition of slavery, he told his constituents: 'the West Indian planters do not always eat the young Negroes or salt the old ones for winter provisions.' But he later recalled that the achievement he looked back on with the 'purest pleasure was forcing the Brazilians to give up their slave trade'. (National Portrait Gallery).

-4. Lord Aberdeen - George Gordon Hamilton ( 178-4-1860), Prime Minister ( 1852-55). Secretary of State at the Colonial and War Dept (1834-35) and twice Foreign Secretary, ( 1828-30 and 1841-46).ln 1842 he declared slave-trade diplomacy 'a new and vast branch of interna­tional relations'. (National Portrait Gallery).

5. Lord john Russell ( 1792-1878), Whig statesman; twice British Prime Minister, (1846-52 and 1865-66) Foreign Secretary (1859-65) and Secretary of State for the Colonial and War Dept. ( 1839-41 ).A high-minded politician, he campaigned on many issues. He exposed the hypocrisy of those who complained about the importation of slave­grown sugar whilst ignoring Britain's reliance on slave-grown cotton. (National Portrait Gallery).

After Vienna

bolitioni w r di appoint d by wha th y r gard d as th ma11 progr mad a Vi nna

t ward a hi ving an int rnational agreem nt on th uppr n of the trad .25 In th umm r

of 1815 it had m d po ibl that the Fren h might b ready to align th m lv mor lo ly

with Britain on the ubj t. t r hi return from Elba, Napol n sought to win Briti h go dwill

y d daring th Fr nch lave trad abolish d nd, foil wing Wat rio , th r tored Bourbon

25 W b ter, Castlereagh, I, pp. 423-24.

8

king, Louis XVIII, felt obliged to reaffirm the decision.26 But there was little public support for

the measure in France, and in subsequent years the French navy proved neither effective nor

enthusiastic about checking a trade from which les Anglais had profited when it suited their

purpose. The Spaniards seemed likewise freer with their pledges than their actions. Admittedly,

they declined a British of£ r of £800,000 in return for their giving up the trade in five year .

Nonetheless, in a treaty with Britain of july 1814 the king of Spain expressed his abhorrence at

the 'injustice and inhumanity' of the traffic in slaves, and promised to prohibit his subj cts from

engaging in the Slave Trade, for the purpose of supplying any islands or possessions excepting

those appertaining to Spain; and to prevent likewise, by effectual measures and regulations, the

protection of the Spanish Flag being given to foreigners who [might] engage in th traffic' .27

In negotiation s parate from the congre s a bilateral d al was also struck with P rtugal in

January 1815 whereby Britain agreed to comp nsat the Portugu e for ship ized since 1810,

and to write off a previous loan, in return for Portugal abandoning the slave trade north of the

equator. Portugal's engagement to 'determine by a subsequent Treaty the period at which

Portuguese Slave Trade should cease univ rsally', and declaration that until then it should not

be lawful for the subjects or flag of Portugal to be used in the slave trade, 'except for the

purpose of supplying the Transatlantic po s ssions belonging to the Crown of Portugal', w re,

however, of marginal value.28 The re-establishment of peace was, in any case, follow d by a new

surge in the commerce as non-British slavers, unhindered by the Royal Navy, sought to meet

the demands of markets in the New World. Moreover, the Portugues and Spanish flag

frequently served as a cover for slave traders from other nations, including Americans and

British, and many of those vessels flying Spanish colour north of the equator were in fact

French and Portuguese. As one naval captain explained in a letter of 7 Novemb r 1816, the

British slave trade might have decreased sine 1807, but the 'cruelty to thos [negroes] ... taken

away by the Portuguese and Spaniards [had] increased quadruple'; and there was ev ry rea on

to suppose it would still further increase 'as the fear of a termination to the trade in a£ w y ars,

[would] induce them to pursue it with much greater activity'. 29

It was by then already apparent that if the British were ever going to enforce r sp ct for

commitments undertaken with regard to the slave trade, the Royal Navy must hav a

legally-defined right of search. Previously, during the war with France, the fat of slavers

detained by British warships had been determined by th British vice-admiralty court in Sierra

Leone. But the court's condemnation in 1816 of a French vessel, Le Louis, had on app alb en

26 Kielstra, Slave Trade Suppression, pp. 56-58. 27

Bandinel, Some Account of the Trade in Slaves, pp. 131-32. 28 Ibid., pp. 151-52. 29

Papers relating to the Slave Trade, 1816-17, pre ented to the House of Commons 7 July 1817, A. No. 1, Copy of Letter from Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, to john Wilson Croker, London, 7 Nov 1816. HP 477, pp. 1-6.

9

overturned by th High ourt of the Admiralty on the grounds that the right of interruption

to th navigation of tates in tim of peace wa only made po sible by states entering into a legal

conventi n t that ef£ t.30 Particularly usceptible to British pressure, Portugal was the

first among t th principal lave-trading nations to sign-up to such a convention. An

Anglo-Portugu nv ntion of 28 July 1817 provided that warships of either power, furnished

with p ial warrants, might visit and earch m rchant vessel of th oth r on the high seas

whi h they uspect d of having on board slaves hipped from prohibited areas. It was also

settl d that a captured ship would b taken for adjudication before one of two mixed

ommis ion ourts, n sitting in Sierra L on and the other in Brazi1.3 1

With th aid of bribery and cajolery, Castlereagh was soon abl to persuade Spain to follow

Portugal' xampl . In r turn for a British promi e to pay Spain £400,000 as compensation,

b th for slav r pr viously eized and for loss s likely to be incurred from subsequent loss of

the trad , it agr d in ptember 1817 to the abolition of the trad north of the equator and

to its compl t abolition within Spanish dominions by 1820. As in th cas of Portugal, British

and Spanish naval ve Is, 'provided with special instructions', were to be grant d reciprocal

rights of vi it nd d tention and mixed commi sion courts, compos d of representatives of the

ignatory pow rs, were to be established for the trial of detained slavers. Then in May 1818 the

Netherland agreed to a imilar treaty, but one whose t rms were imm diately applicable to

traders north and outh of th equator.32 Despite, however, the institution of these new

arrangem nts and the presence of British naval patrols off the west African coast, Portugal and

Spain remain d, a cording to Castlereagh, 'well matched in dishonesty and shabbiness' when

it came to taking action.33 James Bandinel, the superintendent of the Foreign Office's Slave

Trade Department, later remarked on how Spain fail d to take steps to implement treaty

provision so that 'the sea swarmed with slave-ship , carrying on the Slave Trade under the flag

of Spain, and for account of the Spanish colonies'. It would indeed transpire that metropolitan

Spain had ecretly assured its Cuban subjects that it would overlook the continuance of the

ill gal trade.34 And the Portuguese, whom Bandinel castigated for endeavouring, 'with singular

bad faith ... by every means within th ir power, to frustrate the stipulations of the Convention

of 1 17', app ar to have readily permitted slaving north of the equator and, when possible,

ought to influence the mixed commissions in favour of their nationals.

In truth, slaver of all nationalities devised ever more devious means of evasion, including the

us of Am rican and French flags, which offered immunity from search by British warships.

30 Tara Helfman , Th Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone and the Abolition of the West Mrican Slave Trad ' , Yale Law Journa~ 115 (2006) , pp. 1124-55. 31 Bethell, Brazilian lave Trade, pp. 18-19. Bandin 1, Some Account of the Trade in Slaves, pp. 152-56.

S2 Ibid., pp. 159-64. 3 Cited in Th mas, lave Trade, p. 592.

M Ibid., p. 601.

10

Slave traffickers also carried dual sets of papers and flags which could b switched, according

to whatever was currently advantag ous. Castlereagh thought that a multilat ral accord

between all maritime states would serve to overcom these transgre sions. This, he sugg ted,

might be complemented by the 'vigilant superintendence of an armed and international police

on the coast of Africa'35. When, however, the foreign ministers of the gr at powers m t at

ALx-la-Chapelle (Bad Aachen) in the autumn of 181 for the first of th post-Vienna congress ,

Castlereagh' initiative was rejected, with France leading th opposition. 'It cannot be denied ',

the French declared, 'that there exists between th ubj cts of Great Britain and France, and

as it wer bl nd d with the esteem which they mutually inspire, a sentiment of rivalry, whi h

heightened by numerous unfortunat circumstances, has often assum d the character of

animosity. It is unfortunately too probable, that the mutual exercise of the right of visit at sea

would furnish it with new excitements.' 36 Not forth first or last time internationally- pon ored

humanitarian intervention was obstructed by long-standing, if n t irreconcilable, national

rivalries. All that the powers could agr e upon was a draft statement calling on Portugal to et

a date for the complete abolition of the trade. Beyond Europe, th Unit d States was equally

troublesome. The Americans rej cted Castlereagh's efforts to persuade them to sign up to

agreements on the slave trade similar to those concluded with the N therland Portugal and

Spain. They objected to the idea of mutual naval s arches, and refused to countenance

participation in mixed commissions where their citiz ns would be subj ct to a 'court consisting

partly of foreign judges, not liable to impeachment und r the authority of the United States'.37

All they were prepared to condescend to was the despatch of a small naval squadron to patrol

the African coast. Its very limited succes es (between May 1818 and November 1 21 it captured

in all eleven slave ships) did, however, allow th m insight into the scale of the probl m

confronting the British.38

A Royal Naval squadron, comprising six ships under th command of Sir Georg Colli r, was

meanwhile sent to west Africa to patrol the coast between Cape Verde and Benguela.39 But with

so many winding creeks and bays in which slavers could conceal themselve , it was an almo t

impossible task for it to make any lasting impact on the traffic. Slave traders wer in any case

adept at exploiting legal loopholes and, even if they failed to evad apture, they frequently

35 Papers Relating to the Slave Trade, presented to Parliament, Feb 1819: No. ll, Protocol of the conference between the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, 4 Feb 1818, enclosure 1, annex A, memo. submitted to the Conference lly Castlereagh, p. 13. 36 Papers Relating to the Slave Trade, presented to Parliament, Feb 1819: Conference at Aix-la-Chapelle, Nov 1818, No. XI, enclosure 11, memoir of the French Govt. on the Slave Trade, p. 83. 37 Ibid. , No. VI, Castlereagh to Richard Rush, letter, 20 June 1818, p. 45; and No. VIII: Rush to Castlereagh, letter, 21 Dec 1818, p. 50. 38 C. Lane. , "The Mrican Squadron, the US Navy and the Slave Trad , 1820-1 62", at the Mus urn of Am rica and the Sea web- ite: http: //amistad mysti seaport.org/ discovery/them s/ lande.naYY.html 39 Thomas, lave Trade, p. 593.

11

evaded pros cution. Th several treaties relating to the suppression of the trade generally

stipulated that ships could b d tained and tried only if slaves were discovered on board.

This led to many cases in which slave masters, facing imminent capture, either threw their

live cargo overboard or unloaded hapless Mricans in to small boats for transfer to the shore. In

one instance in 1819 a Dutch vessel, the Eliza, was witnessed by Lieutenant Hagan, the captain

of HMS Thistle, unloading slave on the west African coast. When Hagan finally boarded the

ship, there remained only one slave aboard, and the vess I was subsequently released by the

mixed commission at Freetown, Si rra Leone, on the technical grounds that a 'slave' did not

constitute 'slaves' .40 A similar case involving a Portuguese ship occurred the following year.

Castlereagh, who had previously shown impatience with the Admiralty regarding the navy's

over-zealous and legally questionable seizures, was angered by the way in which treaties were

being interpret d in such a way as to flout their original purposes. On 22 September 1820 he

wrote to British ministers at Madrid, Rio de Janeiro and The Hague, instructing them to urg

their host governments,

... on every principle of Justice and Expediency, to concur in a Declaration, and in

corresponding Instructions to the Cruizers and Commissioners under the Treaty, to the Effect, that if there shall be clear and undeniable proof that a Slave or Slaves have been for the purpose of illegal Traffick put on board a Vessel in the immediate Cruize

on which the Vessel shall be captured, then and on that account according to the true

intent and meaning of the Stipulations of the Treaty, she is to be justly detained by

the Cruizers, and finally condemned by the Commissioners. 41

But Castlereagh's tireless endeavour to put an end to the trade added immensely to the

burden of his work and, concluded his biographer, Charles Webster, undoubtedly contributed

to his death.42 Overwrought and possibly suffering from paranoia, Castlereagh committed

suicide on 12 August 1822. He left behind a legacy of international courts and legislation,

.much of it crafted in the language of human rights that would continue to form the basis of

the suppression policies of his successors.

The scandal of the civilised world

George Canning, who replaced Castlereagh as secretary of state, was soon grappling with the

deficiencies in the slave trade treaties. Wellington was en route for Verona where he was to be

Britain's delegat to the congress there, and Canning, fully conscious of the extent to which

the efforts of slavers to conceal their cargoes was resulting in 'the most dreadful sufferings',

emphasised that Wellington should press upon the assembly this 'scandal of the civilised world'.

But foreign, particularly French, suspicion of British motives constrained the Iron Duke's

40 Ward, Royal Navy, p. 82. 41 TNA, FO 315/ 1, Castlereagh to British ministers, Madrid Rio de Janeiro and The Hague, despatch, 22 Sept 1820. 42 Webster, Castlereagh, ii , p. 466.

12

diplomacy.43 Moreov r, anning, lik a tl r agh, had al o tor ckon with British naval offic r

who s emed all too ready to take th law into their own hand . Th aptain of hip u p ct d

of slaving were thu om time ord r d to load their mpty v with Afri an that th y

could be said to have b n captured with lav s aboard and th n d liv r d for ond mnati n

by a mixed commission ourt. Wh n in on u h a a Spani h choon r, th Rosalia, wa

condemn d in Si rra L on , Canning int rv n d p r onally to warn th r sp n ible Briti h

commissioner again t legal rulings supporting u h 'irr gular' condu t.44 In th m antim h

sought to r medy the situation through new bilat ral ngag ments. In this r p t th Dul h

were ready to cooperate. On 31 D c mb r 1822 th y agr d that w r found

upon a detained ves el, it should be cond mn d, if lav had b n put on b ard during th

voyage of which it was captur d; and on 25 January 1823 it was furth r ttl d by th Briti h

and Dut h governments that hips quipp d for th lav trad , though not actually £ und

ngag d in it, should be ondemned wh n d tain d by crui rs f ith r party.45 ' inc that

important stipulation', Bandin 1 noted in 1841, 'th r ha b n n v tig f Slav Trad und r

th Neth rland Flag.' Oth r p w rs w re rath r le a comm dating.46

The Fr nch r main d adamant in th ir oppo ition to a pting any bilateral agr m nt

providing for the stabli hm nt of mixed commi ion . Lik lh Ameri ans, th y obj

placing their national und r foreign jurisdi tion. But, following th fall f th Bourbon in

1830, the newly-install d Orlean monar hy in Fran wa anxi u £ r British upp rt, and

r ady in Novemb r 1831 to sign a conv ntion a epting a v ry r trict d right f arch, t b

x rcis d within ad fin d z n and p ifi d p riod by individual war hip auth ri d

purpose. Ships and cr ws seized w r t b hand d ov r to th urts of th ountri und r

whos flags th y ailed. A suppl m ntary onv ntion of March 1 33 als laid d wn rul f

procedure for search in th form of d tail d in tru ti n for naval ffi r , provid d for th

prompt paym nt of damages and omp nsations for wrongful arr t, and r quir d that hip

quipped for slaving should b cond mn d and br k n up. 47 Th two onv ntions, whi h

served as a model for lat r tr ati with oth r Europ an pow r , n lud d during

Palm r ton's first t rm as for ign hi oppo iti n to th trad , h

cont mplated a coalition of Christian pow rs, in luding th Unit d tat s, to n ur its

eradication. Palm rston was, how v r, ntially a graduali tin his approach to th ab lition

of slavery within Britain' overs a po essi ns, and h ndor d th vi w that wn r d s rv d

financial comp n ation for r suiting lo s s. In D c mb r 1832 h told th tor of hi outh

43 W ndy Hind , George Canning (London: llin , 1973), pp. 341-2. 41 FO 315/1, anning to Briti h ommi sion , d pat h , 25 pt 1 22. 45 Ward, Royal Navy, pp. 119-20. 46 Band in 1, orne Account of the Trade in lave , p. 164. 47 Ibid., pp. 242-45. Ki lstra, lave Trade uptrr< ion, p. 157. Ward, Royal Navy, p. 121.

13

I-Iamp hire con tituency that it wa nee sary to do justi e to the owners, and that 'although

ther mu t be much abu e where arbitrary power is vest yet the planters do not always eat the

young n gro or salt the old ones for winter provision ' . He further recognis d that attacking

th foreign lave trad was both popular with the public in England and with the planter in

theW t Indie who wanted to ee weak ned the lav -bas d conomi of their competitor .48

Palm r ton combin d incerely h ld humanitarian principles with conomic and political

expediency. At th am time, he evidently relished the opportunity to take delinquent states

to ta k when th y fail d to fulfil their int rnational commitments.

Palm r ton' de ir for a comprehen iv multilateral accord on measures to curb the lave trade

ev ntually bore fruit when in December 1841 his ory u c s or, Lord Aberde n, concluded a

treaty with France, Austria, Prussia and Ru ia. This was intended to b a p rmanent agreement

and, ba ed on th pr dent et by the arli r convention with France, it xt nd d the zon in

whi h th right of arch auld be x rei ed and r moved pr vi u limits on th numb r of hips

which any pow r could mploy in anti- lave trade op ration . But the treaty wa widely perceiv d

in France as r inforcing Britain's naval rna tery and dominanc of world markets and, though it

r main din fore for the oth r ignatori , the French parliam nt refus d its ratification. Alr ady

Briti h naval activity of th we t coast of Africa, aim d at curbing a trade which amount d during

30 and 1 40 to the tran port annually to th Ameri as of s me 36-40,000 slaves, was th

ur f in r asing friction with th Fr n h. h Royal Navy' adoption f mor aggre siv

tacti , parti ularly the blockading of riv r and de truction of barracoon wh r slav await d

hipm nt, involv d th d truction of foreign prop rty on for ign oil.49 Mor ov r, Fr nch £ ar

6. Slave barracoon - After capture and before shipment slaves were kept in structures called 'barracoons'. (Illustrated London News. 14 April 1 849).

48E nn thB urn , Palrnerston:the early year., 17 4-1841 ( nd n: 1 nLan , 19 2) , p. 23.

19Mi r , Britain and theEndingofthe lave Trade, pp. 15-17.

14

of British ambitions in Africa were arous d wh n, in line with th vi w of Thomas Fow 11

BtLxton, Wilberfor e's ucces or as 1 ader of th abolitionist cau in parliament, the British

b gan signing treaties with lo al African rulers aimed at suppressing th traffic in slave and

protecting l gitimat trad . Under cover of an anti-slav trade policy, th British s m d

upon securing th ir intere ts again t Fr nch encroa hm nts n th rout to India and

promoting their ommerce with th Afri an interior. And although Palmerston shared th

view of many of his contemporarie that coloni w re more trouble than th y w re worth,

intervention in w st Africa aim d at combating the lave trade led ultimat ly to an expansi n

of th British pr s nee th re. The French responded in kind, and within £ rty y ar Angl -

French rivalry in the region would b a catalyst t Africa' partition.50

For the moment, h w v r, the French w re r ady to pro e d with th neg tiati n of a n w

convention. ign d on 29 May 1845, it abr gated the exi ting agr ments on mutual rights of

search. Instead, it stipulated that ach power would k p at 1 ast tw nty- ix crui r on thew t

African coast with which to counter the lav trad , with th provi o that th y c uld only top

each oth r' m rchant vessel to v rify their right to fly their flag. Any anti- lav tr ati

concluded by either p w r with African potentat s might b adh r d t b th oth r, and if

force were us d in thi context th y wer t cooperate. These provision r · mbl d tho

which, om thre years earli r, the Briti h had agreed with th United Stat . Th latt r, unlik

France, had re isted all Briti h attempts t ecure a c ptanc of mutual rights of either ar h

or visit at a. But in 1840 offi rs of the American and British squadron off th w t Afri an

coast had on th ir wn initiative come to a working arrang ment. Each would d tain v s ls

flying US colours, which were found to be ngag d in, or equipp d for, th slav trad , on th

understanding that if th vess ls prov d to b Am ri an prop rty th y would b r tain d b , r

turn d over to, a US crui r, and if, as wa mor lik ly, th y proved to b Brazilian, Briti h,

Portuguese or Spanish own d, they would b r tain d by, or d liver d t , a British rui r.

a result th British had d tain d v ral Am ri an slav r . Thi had 1 d t prot sts fr m th S

minist r in London, and Palm rston had all t f£ n by asserting that for ign

merchantm n could n t x mpt th ms lv from arch 'm r ly by hoisting a pi c of bunting

with the Unit d State mblem and col ur up n it' .5 1 Oth r in id nts, including that of th

Creole, an American ve s 1 wh se slave carg en mute b tw n N w rl ans and Virginia, had

reb lied, murder d th captain, and then found refug and lib rty in th Bahamas, furth r

inflamed \nglo-Am rican relations. Eventually, h w v r, in Augu t 1 42, the two g v rom nts

were abl t ttl some of th ir differences in a tr aty n gotiat d by Lord hburt n with

Dani 1 Web t r th U cr tary f tate . By it, the W b ter- hburt n tr aty, Britain and th

50 Ibid ., p. 1 51 Muriel E. hamb rlain, Lord Aberdeen: A political biograph (L ndon: Longman , 19 3) , pp. 312-13.

15

Unit d tat agr d to k ep an nti-slav trad fore f 80 guns n th

Afri an coa t, to act tog ther, and to coop rat dipl matically, to uppress th lave markets

in Brazil an Cub .52

Brazil and the Portuguese

By 1 41 Bandin 1 vid ntly £ lt that the For ign Offi could ngratulat its lf n what its slave

trad dipl macy had far achi v d. 'Th only parts of th W tern World wh re th y [ lav s]

till, though ill gally, continu to be import d', h r ord d, 'are th pan ish I land of Cuba

and P rt Rico; and tho Provinces of outh Am rica which form rly belong d to Portugal;

and th I land of ape ¥ rd, t. Thomas, and Princes, belonging to Portugal, n th oast of

Afri a. '53 H might p rhap have add d that for the two previous d cad s Brazil and Cuba had

b n primary d tination of much of th tran atlantic traffic. Ind d, on auth rity on the

Brazilian lav trad has estimated that b tween 1800 and 1830 s m 750,000 African were

import d into Brazil, and that another half-million w r imported aft r 1830.54 British fforts to

counter this trad , which during th fir t quarter of th 19th century was conduct d very larg ly

by th P rtugue in hips op rating legally from th ir Afri an pos essions south of the equator,

w r assi t d by Brazil' d dar d indep nd nee in 1822. Th Anglo-Portugu treaty of 1815

had utlaw d th participati n in th lave trade of P rtugue ve s ls, 'except for th purpos

f upplying th Tran atlanti po s ssion belonging to th Crown of Portugal' .55 And early in

1 24, in c ns quenc of Brazilian independence, the Portuguese prim mini t r con d d in

conv rsation with th Briti h minister in Lisbon that Portugal should now agr to the complet

ab liti n f the trad .56 Two years later, in return for Britain's recognition of th Brazilian

empir , Canning wa abl t extract from the governm nt in Rio d Janeir a treaty by whi h

Brazil ad pt d the pr vision of the Anglo-Portugu se conv ntion of 1817, and agreed to outlaw,

in thr y ar foll wing ratification, th participation of its subj ts in th lave trade. The

carrying on of u h trad was henceforth to 'be d emed and treat d as pira y' .57

h trad , n n th 1 s, continued. It was profitable and con id red by many vital to th

c nomi f Brazil and the Portugu s coloni s in southern Africa. M reov r, despit

Portugal' ngag m nt in its tr aty with Britain of January 1815 t 'determine by sub qu nt

Tr aty th p riod at which Portugu se lave Trad should cease univer ally' and th later

v rb 1 as uran of P rtuguese tatesmen that this r mained th ir int ntion, n ith r the

authoriti in Li b n n r thos in Angola and M zambiqu em d ready t tak any practi al

52 Ibid ., pp. 3~3-21. 53 Ban din 1 Account of the Trade in laves, p. 2 3. 54 B th ll, Brazilian lave Trade, pp. 3 8-95. 55 B ndin 1, Account of th Trade in laves, p. 151. 5 Ibid. , 157. 57 B th 11 Brazilian lave Trade, pp. 27-61.

16

steps towards halting the traffic. During th 1830 th British maintain d st ady pre ur

on Portugal to fulfil its int rnational obligation . Lord Melbourn 's c nd admini trati n

(1835-41) ould not afford to ignor the abolitioni ts amongst its radi al and non- onformi t

supporters, and Palm rston, a for ign s cr tary, wa t on uring Portu al' c mplian

Wh n, in D c mb r 1836, foll wing th ollaps f protra t d n g tiation with Britain , a n w

gov rnm nt in Li bon is u d a deer d daring th entir abolition f th Portugu

trade and authorising courts to confi at hip equipp d £ r laving, Palm r ton pr d

Portugal to accept a n w treaty allowing th Royal Navy to enfor the law. But th Portugu e

prevaricated, and meanwhil th ir nationals and tho of oth r nati n wh ho to op rat

under Portuguese olours p rsist d in th trad . Finally, in Augu t 1 39, Palm r t n, ba ing

himself on previous Portuguese promis to co p rate with Britain in th trade' suppr n,

had parliam nt pass an act authorising British cruis rs to d tain all Portugu

suspected of being slav rs, and providing for th ir cond mnation by vi -admiralty urts.

Much r nt din Lisbon, wher it wa p rceived as Briti hint r£ r n in P rtugal' d m ti

affairs, the measur attain -d its immediat bj ctive . Th R yal Navy was abl to a t

str nuously against slavers flying the Portugu flag, and thr y ar lat r, in 1 42, th

Portugu s w re persuad d to conclud an w tr aty with Britain, xt nding th mutual right

of earch to south of th equator and stabli hing mix d commi ion in Luanda (An la), B a

Vista (Cap ~ rde i lands), Spanish Town (Jamai a) and th Cap of G d Hop .5

During the three year betw en th summer f 1839 and that f 1 42th Royal Navy nj y d

a p riod of unpre d nted u ss in its efforts to mbat th tran atlanti lav trad . M re

than 150 ships engaged in the Brazilian slav trad , in addition to oth r trading with uba,

wer captur d and h avy los s w re infli t d on slav traders on land as w l1 a at a. Th

sue esse were paralleled by a r due d d mand for slave in Brazil. But th y w r in larg part

due to the mor aggressive tactics adopt d by th Briti h quadron op rating ff th Afri an

coast, and to th readiness of Palm rston and Ab rd n to a t unilat rally again t th trad .

Th British had, in addition, r cently cur d new pow r t act again t ve claiming

panish nationality. Th restoration of constitutional gov rnm nt in Madrid had af£ rd d

Palmer ton the opportunity, inJun 1835, to wring fr m pain a tr aty on ding mutual

rights of s arch and det ntion, th establi hm nt of mix d urts, and p w r t ond mn

v ssels quipped for slaving. And with a vi w to making th ir r - n lavern nt 1 s lik ly, n gr

liberat d by the mix d courts wer to b deliv r d ov r to th g v rnm nt wh rui r mad

the capture. Palm r ton ought to hav imilar provisions add d to th Anglo-Brazilian tr aty

of 1826. Wh n, howev r, the Brazilian d din d t ratify su ham ndm nts, th British simply

resorted to re-int rpreting th tr aty. From 1839 Briti h ommi ary judg in Fr town and

Rio d Janeiro began to argue, with th upport of th gov rnm nt in L ndon, that th Royal

5 Ibid., pp. 154-86.

17

avy already had th right to ear h and captur Brazilian ve sel uspected of intending to

trad in slave . British cruis r were thus free to detain those hips leaving Brazilian ports

which, often on the ba i of intelligence reports, they a sumed to be en gag d in th trade. In

th ir turn, Brazilian judg re i ted the claims of their British colleagues. Disputes within the

mix d commi ion multiplied, and naval ffi er delivering captive hip could never rely with

confid nee on th ir cond mnation. For all the u ce

ituation was far from ati factory.59

achieved in countering the trade, the

7. Capture of Bruilian slaver, Adila. by boats from HMS Brito mart. 29 M ay 1849 - The Royal Naval ships of the West African squadron used their boats to patrol inshore waters and rivers. and often to capture much larger slave vessels. This is a watercolour painted at the time by E J Bennet. a member of the Britomart's crew. (Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth).

he Brazilian , lik th P rtugu , w r or at the ta ti adopt d by th Bri Li h.

v rnments in Ri d Jan unt f th int r ts and pr judi f th va t

majority of influ ntial Brazilian who quat d th ir pro perity with th maint nan of a

r gular upply f negro lav , and who w re opp d to allowing th Briti h navy furth r

p w r . Brit.i h rui r w r in any c alr ady in pr Lie op rating within Br zili n

t rrit ri 1 water ; Brazili n hip w r b ing tak n b for tribunal with n r zilian pr n t;

and b th oa tal and l gitimat high a tr d w b ing int rrupt d. But r m th Briti h

p int of vi w, th dang r w that, unl th R yal d with its r pr tv m ur ,

lav would imply r v rt t Brazil' r than th f Portugal. hat aid, th

59 Ibid., pp. 1 4-220.

18

Brazilian s em d d t rmin d not t yi ld, and in March 1 44 gav noti t Britain f th

xpirati n of th Anglo-P rtugu e tr aty of 1817, which had b n ndor d by th Brazilian

after ind p nd n e, and which pr vid d t r mutual rights of ar hand the tabli hm nt f th

mix d ommi i ns. It was in r sp ns to this that Ab rde n , £ r ign s r tary in Rob rt Pe l'

administration, re olved that Brazilian lav rs should, as th 1826 tr aty had tipulat d, b treat d

as pirate , and in August 1 45 parliam nt pass dan act pr viding £ r th ir trial by vi -admir l ty

courts. Th a twas oppo d in Britain by fre trad r and manufa turing int r ts, anxi u t

safeguard British comm rc with Brazil. Many que tion d its l gality. Nev rth le , it pr vid d

the Royal Navy with th powers it r quir d, p rmitting th aptur f Brazilian and ' tatel s '

hips on th high seas at any stag in their v yage, and in a littl ov r five y r hip f th w st

African and Cape station captur d alm t 400 vess ls ngag d in the 1 v trad with Brazil. 5°

Unfortunately, from the p int of view of abolitioni ts, th Ab rd n act was not uffi i nt t

put an end to the trad . Indeed, in th lat 1840 it continu d to fl uri h. D mand £ r Brazilian

produce, particularly of£ and ugar incr a d, and too did i lav -ba d plantati n .

The traffic in slaves was m r highly rgani d and th Briti h mpl y d in i

suppr s ion w re oft n old and 1 w compared with th modern Am rican ailing hip

employ d by th slaver . In additi n, th latter om tim vaded aptur by flying Am .ri an

ol urs. Public and parliam ntary opinion in Britain wa also in r a ingly c pti al ab ut th

sums being p nt on naval a tion whi h med nly apab l of d nting th trad . William

Ewart Gladston , th future Liberal prim mini t r d lar d in th n 1 Mar h

1850 that it was not 'an ordnanc of pr vid nc that th gov rnm nt of on nati n h uld

correct the morals of anoth r' and that it was impra ticabl t try to put d wn a ' r at br n h

of comm rce' .61 For th rs, lik an ld rly Thoma lark nly way of n urin i

radi ati n wa by the total abolition of lav ry in th Am ri .62 y; t, Palm r ton, wh

return d to th Foreign Offi e in 1 46, wa n t pr p r d to compr mi . By 1 50 it wa

be oming apparent that, aft r y ar imp rts , th Br zilian mark t w t d, and

th re w re indicati ns to that th auth riti in ming disturb d by th

d mographi f£ ts on th ir c untry f rna iv £ r ed migration fr m n a. gain t thi

backgr und, th Briti h g v rnm nt d id d t tr tch furth r th m aning f th 1 26 tr aty

so as to permit the R yal Navy t r s rt t n 1 Jun 1 50 J m Hud n, th Briti h

charge d'affair s in Rio, and R ar Admiral Barrington R yn ld · m t and d vi d a plan of

naval a tion. F ur day lat r, British war hips nt r d Brazilian p r 1 b ing

fitted for th lav trad . h ub qu nt burning and uttlin f

x hang s with astal batt ri s, r ult d in a pr di tabl ut ry in Br zil, in luding

60 Ibid., pp. 21 -5 . hamb rlain , Aberdeen, pp. 3 -61 it d in B th 11 , Brazilian Slav Trade, p. 323. 62Ibid., p. 2 7.

19

th v rnm nt to n id r war with Britain . Wi r un Is pr vail d, and in th umm r of

mpr h n iv ban on th imp rtation f lav sand m a ures f r

1 fitt d forth trad . U nlik pr vi u acts, the provisi n w r rigorou ly

n£ r d and within tw lv m nth th Brazilian slav trad wa ffectiv ly extinct.63

Cuba, Spain and the Americans

Th am uld n t b aid f that with uba and Pu rto Ri . During the 1850s th Cuban

la n my ontinu d t prosp r, producing by th end of th d cade over a quarte r of th

w rld' · u ar, and its d mand for aptiv labour, m t ve ry larg ly by v s ls flying Am ri an colours,

r main d r b t It was timat d that during 1 58-59 betwe n tw lve and fifte n thousand slav

w r imp rt d into th i land and, according to th Briti h on ul-general in Havana, in Augu t

1 5 v n cargo s of about 4,500 w re land d at various plac s on the coast.

rrupti n parti ularly th bribing of officials t overl ok th landing of lave cargo , was rife, and

th r stri tiv m asur in force w r utt rly inad quate. 'The Spani h Govt.', not d a Foreign

m m randum f 23 Jun 1 59, continu t et at naught all our reman trances on the

subj ct fth uban lav Trad .'64 Nin te n m nth lat r, Palm r ton, by th n prim minister, told

th omm n , that pain ~ c ndu t 'might hav giv nus just aus for war if we had thought prop r

t avail urs lv fit' .65 Fa d also with a r vival of larg - al slav trading in the bights of Benin

and Biafra, th Briti h g v rnment cont mplated further co rciv a tion again t local potentat s

with a vi w t halting th upply of lav to th Caribb an.66 Captain Eardley Wilm t, an old hand

f th w t Mri an quadran, call d £ r a do naval blockade of the west African coast and a

mt 1 n t G 1 1 , th n wly-installed king of Dahom y, to p rsuade him to giv up th traffic.

Palm r t n urg d an atta k n th king' principal port at Whydah. 'I b li ve ', he declar d in the

umm r f 1 61, that with th pr nt King instead of a Word and a Blow, w ought to admini ter

Bl w and Word ... It i only th trong arm that can prevail with Barbari m.' But whil the

F r ign ffi favour d u h acti n, the Admiralty opp d it. The gov rnment finally settled for a

naval bl kad and Wilm t was nt to Dahomey t try hi hand, none too ucc fully, at

dipl macy. 7 M anwhil , aft r a d ad of British comm rcial and politi al involv ment th re, th

n ighb urin prin ip li ty fLag was£ rrnally ann x d by Britain to a£ guard its p pulation from

th slav trad r and kidnapp r who£ rm rly oppre ed th m' and to fost r 'legitimate ' trade.68

63Ibid ., pp. 27- 3. &I F 4/ 1 2 m m by W.H. Wylde n th tat of affair in the Slav Trad D partm nt, 23 June 1859. F 4/ 10 O,J. raw£ rd ( ting nsul n. , Havana) to L rdj hn Ru 11, d pat h No. 21 , 5 S pt 1 59. 65 Th rna lave Trade p. 77

f HM \te uvius, 20-25,000 1 v

4/ 110 , Wi t

67 David Murr , Odi omrnerce: Britain, pain and the abolition of the Cuban lave Trade ( ambridge: P, 1 ) ' pp. 302-04. 6 Mi r Britain and the Ending of the lave Trade, pp. 4 -5 .

20

1\J .....J.

8. HM

S B

lack Jo

ke eng

agin

g th

e S

pan

ish slav

er El A

lmira

nte in th

e B

igh

t of B

enin, I F

ebru

ary 1829, which, according to

the inscription, she captured after a chase of thirty-on

e hours. (R

oyal Naval M

useum, P

ortsmouth).

9. HMS Brisk firing on and closing to board the slaver Sunny South. (Illustrated London News, 8 December 1860).

in m ting th tran atl ntic lav rad m d, h w v r, ul tim at ly t d p nd l

d nt ,.

m nyy

h d th

kn wl

rr n

m tu

ilin th

rn

1tili thi i t llig n

69

th m lv

22

nit d

in rm nt f u n

ffi amply an

n n ri fitt d for 1 vin .

n

rv

9 t th B ri ti h mi

xt n iv ly and vi

'I find that th

P rt Ri

t and fr b tw

nit

bl m [! r th Briti h v rnm nt w

r u ly'. h

d

tion nd th

m n d and

, prin ip lly

n

diz,

ing h w b t

hibal wa r in hi wn mind th it w uld w r th n

u eles £ r h himself to interced with the US local authorities with a view to p r uading th m

to halt the d parture of slavers. Apart from the fact that h suspected that ' trong t mptation

[ wer ] thrown in their way to let offenders cape', h was also convinced that it 'would, by n

m an , advanc the caus of ju tice, were it known that a foreign functionary, e p cially a

Briti h on ul, busied himself in denouncing [to them] ves 1 and individuals ... or otherwi

inter£ red in such matters'. No p ople, he observed, were' o sen itiv as the American 'on th

subj t of foreign interpo ition with their 'peculiar institution '.70

I 0. HMS Antelope of the west Africa squadron capturing a slaver with an Am eric n flag (Illustrated London News. 17 January 1857).

It al r main d th that Briti h n val offi r had no tr aty ri ht to vi it nd ar h hip

flying th Am rican en ign. Th d pl ym nt in v mb r 1857 f £ ur Briti h gunb ats in

ub n wat r , with auth ity to r p f nati h d

lr dy 1 d t n r tati b arclin f n

tr ngly w rd d dipl m ti pr

hy t ria in th , r ulting in th with rawal of th

Briti h w t ri an qu dron uld, if th y had p itiv i £ r ti n r tr n r und £ r

70 Ibid. 71 Murray, Odiou omrnerc , pp. 263- 4.

23

u p ting that Am rican ol urs had b n fraudul ntly a urn d, pas this on to th ir

Am ri an ount rpart:s. In addition, th y might vi it a v ss 1 to h kits documentation, but

its rna ter r own r w uld th n be ntitled to mp nsation for delay if th y could

demon trat their bona fide entitl m nt to th protection of th flag. 72 And, a the Admiralty

wa w 11 awar , th Am rican hip old to uban lav trad r w r fr qu ntly furni hed with

Am rican pap r .73 Briti h offi in tructed to pro e d with gr at caution.

Ev n , th ir a ti n till 1 d to pr t sts from Wa hington. In on instanc , in April 1 859,

Li ut mmand r of HM Triton, wa a cu ed of u ing thr at ning and

intimidating languag wh n h board d and d tain din the Congo river an Ameri an barque,

th Orion, a v s el whi h was fully quipp d for laving and which th British gov rnment

und r to d to hav b en pur has d by parti in Havana. The Unit d States minister in

London om plain d of Burton's 'mi condu t', and Rear-Admiral Sir Fr derick Grey, Burton's

commanding offic r, admitted that h would hav brought him b for a court martial if h had

b n abl t onven a suffici nt numb r of offi rs to form a ourt. 74 There wa , how ver,

littl doubt in Briti h minds that such incid nts could be avoid d if th US gov rnm nt were

to liv up to its pr viou commitm nts.

De pit th obligation of th Americans to maintain a naval quadran of 80 guns off the coast

of we t Afri a, th quadran's disposition meant that in pra tic thi was reduc d to the

pr n e th re t r n1n m nths of the y ar of on sailing ship, th USS Marion, a c rvette of

20 guns.75 Ther w r al o instanc s when the U squadron simply seemed to hav no

enthu ia m ~ r coop rating with the Royal Navy. In th autumn of 1859 Commodor Charles

Wi of HM 1k uvius thu felt comp 11 d to rei a from det ntion a notorious slav r, th Isla

de uba, when th ommand r of th USS Vincennes imply fail d t me t with him in order to

verify th v l's claim to Am rican nationality.76 And, mu h to th d pair of the British, ev n

wh n US rui r w r in a position to d tain an Am ri an v ss 1, their offic rs did not have

in tru tion d fining what onstitut d th quipment and fitting of a slave hip.77 'The natural

u eptibility of th United tate in r gard to th ir Flag, and th trict rul of Int rnational

Law', not d Lord john Russell, the foreign cr tary in Palm rston' s ond abinet, 'pr v nt

72 In fa t, pri r to March 1863, in only two ca did it prove pos ibl forth Royal Navy to u e th int llig n e r lay d by Ar hibald t halt the a tiviti s of lav r flying American colours. Two usp ct d lav ship wer r p rt d to th U W t Afri an quad ron and, following th ir capture, th y w r ent th m toN w York for adjudi ation. N ith r, h w v r, w cond mn d, and th nly ati fa tion d riv d by th Foreign Offic from th ir apture r suited fr m th know} dge that b th voyag had b n brok n up. FO 84/1202, minute by Wyld on Ar hibald to Ru ell, Sl v Trad 1 tter No. 2, 18 March 1863. 73 F 4/10 3, Maim bury to Lyons, lav Trade d pat h No. 4, 6 May 1 59. 74 FO 4/1085, Ru 11 to Dall ( mini ter, London), 1 tt r, 31 Aug 1 59. FO 84/1099, Gr y to Admiralty, lett r N . 114, 20Jun 1 59. 75 0 84/10 3, Malme bury t Lyon , lav Trad d spat h No.4, 6 May 1 5 7 FO 4/10 3, Ru 11 to Lyon , Slav rad d spat h No. 3 , 19 Nov 1 59. 77 Ibid ., Ru 11 to Lyon , Slav Trade d pat h No. 11, 29 July 1859.

24

II . Story of the capture of a laver off Cuba - This article appeared in the Illustrated London News on 20 June 1857, describing the capture by HMS Arab of a Cuba-bound slave vessel with 370 slaves on board. Before preparing to escape with his crew on a boat. the captain of the slaver had 'lashed the helm of the vessel, while all the sails were set. so as to run her full on the reefs clos by' in order to destroy the evidence (including the slave cargo) against him.

25

any ef£ ctual interference with the Slave Trade by Briti h Cruisers in the case of American

ventures. But so much it behov s the American Gov rnment to take effectual measures to save

the honour of their Flag from this abuse of its immunity. '78 To that end he urged the US

government to strengthen its squadron, possibly by fulfilling an earlier proposal for the

employm nt of mor teamships with fewer guns.79 Pre ident Jam s Buchanan responded

r adily, and in the autumn of 1859 four private steamships were added to the United States

African squadron, and a further four steamers were stationed for the first time off Cuba. In

consequence, the US squadron captured eight slavers during the course of 1860, four times as

many as it had detained in the previous nineteen years.80

The election that year of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency of the United States made further

action against the slave trade all the more likely. The arrest of Captain Nathaniel Gordon of the

slave ship Eric, his conviction in New York for piracy, and his execution by hanging on 21 February

1862, demonstrated the Union's determination to stamp out the trade. Gordon was the only

American ever tried, convicted and executed on charges arising from slave trading. His fate was

also, according to Archibald, 'attributable to the disturbed condition of public sentiment growing

out of th extraordinary state of public affairs in this country' .81 Indeed, although the outbreak

of the American Civil War was followed by the immediate withdrawal of the US squadron from

the coast of Mrica, the federal government was, in an endeavour to win British sympathy for its

cause, equally quick to express its readiness to set aside long-standing American objections to the

Royal Navy s arching suspected American slavers. Negotiations began and on 2 April1862 Britain

and th United States agreed a treaty conceding a mutual right of search for ten years and

establishing an Anglo-American court of mixed commission at New York. Archibald exchanged

his role of spy-master for that of judge, and within twelve months the city had ceased to be a major

centre for organising the slave trade. Deprived of American capital and the protection of the

American flag, and with the Royal Navy adopting ever more aggressive tactics off Mrica and in

the Caribbean, the Cuban slave trade went into rapid decline. There were also indications of a

growing reformist mood in Spain and in Cuba, doubtless encouraged by the Foreign Office's

publication in 1865 of correspondence reporting the revelations of Jose Agustin Argiielles, a

former lieut nant-governor of Colon, with regard to official corruption and the trade. Under

British diplomatic, and domestic abolitionist, pressure, in 1866 the government of General

Leopolda O'Donnell in Madrid introduced to the Cortes legislation outlawing the trade in terms

which left far less scope for evasion than anything previously attempted.82

7 Ibid. 79 Ibid., Russell to Lyons, Slave Trade despatch No. 4, 8 July 1859. 80 Thoma , pp. 772-73. 81 FO 84/1172, Archibald to Russell, Slave Trade despt No. 6, 24 Feb 1862. 82 Murray, Odious Commerce, pp. 298-326.

26

Th n w bill was, as David l\l[urray ha r mark d , larg ly symboli in its importan . 3

William

Henry Wylde, th th n head of th Foreign Offi 's Slav Trad D p rtm nt, thought that if

its proVISions wer carried out in good faith the Cuban trade would 'h nceforward be kn wn

only as a matter of history'. 4 But by th tim of its passag through th Cortes th trade wa

air ady cl arly untenable. That was ensured by th Anglo-American treaty of April 1 2, th

Royal Navy' more vigorous pur uit f slavers which it permitt d, and th nergetic re olv

displayed by recent captain -general of th island. Moreov r, th ivil war and th Uni n '

blockade of C nfed rate ports further restrict d th comm rc , and th la t lav imp rtation

into Cuba report d by British officials to k place in 1 67. The government £ rm d b

Glads ton in the following y ar was in any case convinced that th tim had orne to wind down

the co tly m chani ms stablished by Britain for the trad 's uppr si n.85

Tr ati w r

subsequently concluded with P rtugal and the United State di olving the mix d commi ion

courts, that at Freetown was clos d in 1871, and in 1 92 th Briti h onsul-g neral at Havan

finally relinquish d th office and titl of commi ary judg . In the m antim , whil th we t

African squadron r mained in being to prot ct British po s ttl ments, it wa

reduced in size and m rg d with th Cape squadr n in 1 70. H w v r, f m r ignificanc .6 r

the futur of British diplomacy was th urvival, alb it within a r £ rmed admini trati

structur , of the Slave Trade D partment of the For ign Offi e. A key el m nt in th yst m

devised to fight th slave trade, it was t ntinu to pl an in trum ntal role in th

elaboration of Britain's policy t ward ub- aha ran Africa.

3 Ibid., pp. 323-24. 4 FO 4/ 1270, m m . by Wyld , 10 July 18 6 .

85 B th 11, Brazilian Slave Trade, p. 386.

27

28

Chapter 2

Zealots and Helots The Slave Trade Department

One measure of the British government's ommitm nt to th

human mis ry was the emerg nee within th For ign Offi

radication of th traffi king in

o a parate lav Trad

Department. Jame Bandin 1, its fir t sup rintendent, becam an acknowl dg d xp r on

matters r lating to the commerc and for more than tw nty-fiv y ar work d with ru ading z al

for its suppression. His strong moral conviction w r probably r infor d by hi Anglican

conn xions. Born in 1783, the son ofth R v r nd Dr james Bandin 1, th r ctor ofNeth rbury,

h was younger brother to th Rever nd Bulk 1 y Bandin 1, th Librarian of th Bodl ian in

Oxford, and son-in-law to th Rev rend Rob rt Hunt r, th r ctor of Burton Brad to kin Dorset

His son, anoth r James, also ent r d the hurch becoming ev ntually r ctor of ml y in

Yorkshir and a minor, though noted, theologian. Ban din 1' own care r was, howev r, with th

exception of a brief mi sion to Sweden, almo t ntir ly confin d to th For ign ffi wher h

was first engaged as a clerk in April 1799.1 And it was in that capacity that in 1819 h took on

'extra-employment' in superintending the detail of th x ution of the various lav trad

treati sand the management of the commissions established by them.2 In 1822 h was promot d

to become one of the Office's two senior cl rks, and thr y ar lat r Chari s P ttingal, a 1 rk

from outside the regular Office tablishment, was appoint d to assist him in hi lav trad work.

Pettingal was joined in 1826 by G org Fr r , and in 1827 by Bandinel's neph w,Johnjam L

Mesurier. But this nascent departm nt was from th tart stamp d with what H nry Unwin

Addington, a later permanent under- cr tary, would d crib as 'th mark ... of helotry' .3

Salaries, structures and stratagems

The Foreign Office was itself only forty year old wh n Bandin 1 cur d hi s nior cl rkship

and its departmental structure remained rudimentary. Inde d, th Slave Trad D partm nt

was in t rms of numbers employ d th larg t d fin d bran h of th Offic dire t d by a nior

clerk. But at its inception it was in Addington' word a 'm re nullity ... aD pt. of econdary

consideration and welded on, as it w re, to the Offic a an xcresc n aggr gat d to a body

1 OxfMd Dictionary of National Biography, vol. iii, pp. 664-65. harl R. Middl ton , The Administration of British FMeign Policy, 1782-1846 (Durham, NC: Duk UP, 1977) , p. 264. 2 TNA, FO 83/40, Planta to Bandinel, lett r, 4 D 1824. 3 TNA, FO 366/313, Addington to Aberd en, draft 1 tt r, autumn 1843, atta h d to minut by Addington , 16 March 1847.

29

12. james Band inel - He oversaw slave trade correspondence from 1819 until 1845; Bandinel was one of two senior clerks in the Foreign Office from 1824 and was first head of the Slave Trade Department. He was responsi­ble for overseeing the diplomatic effort to suppress the trade. (National Portrait Gallery).

The Officials

13. Sir Percy Anderson - Slave Trade Clerk in the FO, 1854-55, and head of the Consular and African Department, 1883-96. He oversaw the transition of the Slave Trade Department from an organisation devoted to suppression of the trade into a new African Department devoted to the partition of Africa. (FCO,Ancell Library).

14. W illiam H enry W ylde - Senior clerk in the Foreign Office, and head of the Slave Trade Department, 1859-61, and of the Consular and Slave Trade Department, 1872-80. For someone of his rank, he had a more prominent advisory role to Government on matters pertaining to the slave trade than was usual at that time. (FCO,Ancell Library).

15. De partm ent phot ograph 'Dream ers of t he Sixties' - Foreign Office staff (c. 1861-66). This photograph was taken in Whitehall Gardens during the period when the present Main Building was under construction. William Henry Wylde, head of the Slave Trade Department 1859-61, is seated third from left; John Wodehouse, Parliamentary under-secretary of State at the FO 1859 -61, is standing, second from right, front row. (FCO, Ancell library).

of high r quality and n ture' .4 hi wa

departm n t wa fund d. In 1 19 Bandinel

in larg part due to the mann r in whi h th

m simply to hav a d d th admini trati n f

th lav Lrad rr pond n to hi xi tin dutie , but in D c mb r 1 24 org anning,

th for ign retary, de id d to r ward him for hi xtra s rvi with a paym t of £1,000,

and an annual allowance of £200. h £1,000 wa to be paid from 'the moni ari in from th

al f cond mn d lav 1 ', but, on the re omm ndation of the annual

4 Ibid.

30

allowance was to be included in the expenses yearly voted by parliament to cov r th costs of

the several slave commissions.5 Likewise, when clerks were first appointed to assist Bandinel their

salaries were borne, not on the establishment of the Foreign Office, but defrayed out of the

parliamentary vote for the expenses connected with the suppression of the slave trade.6

Their

employment was seen as a temporary measure, and their work essentially that of copyists rather

than that of 'persons requiring education and capacity'. Bandinel continued to execute most of

the important tasks himself, and, in consequence, the salaries of his assistants were inferior to

those of other clerks in the Office, as also were their prospects for career advancement.7

Pay and other conditions of service were in time to become a serious grievance of the slave

trade clerks. As Addington was to point out in a letter drafted in the autumn of 1843 cl rks on

the regular establishment of the Foreign Office received on their first appointment £100 per

annum, and by annual increments, ranging from £10 to £50, they could eventually hope to

attain the office of chief clerk with a maximum salary of £1,250 per annum. By contrast, clerks

in the Slave Trade Department entered the Office on £80 per annum, and could nev r attain

a higher salary than £300, or a higher position than that of first clerk within the department.8

Some were tempted to enhance their income through appointment to one of the mixed

commissions overseas. But in doing so they risked falling victim to disease and sometimes

violence in the tropics. Sir George Jackson, whose health was 'much impaired by a long

succession of Tropical Residences', was informed by two insurance offices in 1842 that policies

on his life would be forfeited if he took up the post of commissary judge in Surinam;9

and

George Canning Backhouse, the son of john Backhouse, the first permanent under-secretary

in the Foreign Office, was murdered following his appointment as commissary judge in

Havana. 10 The British government was also too optimistic in its estimate of the impact of

diplomacy and naval action upon the slave trade. Treaties relating to its suppression multipli d

as also did the paper-work associated with their execution. In consequence, the business of

Bandinel's department, which included the direction of all the relevant correspondence with

foreign powers and the mixed commissions overseas and, in response to public demand, the

preparation of a large body of parliamentary papers, seemed relentlessly to expand.

Despatches and letters received and sent by the departtnent rose from 844 in 1830 to 2,205 in

1840, and to 4,198 in 1845, and between 1830 and 1845 the printed slave trade papers laid

5 FO 83/40, Planta to Bandinel, minute, 4 Dec 1824. 6 FO 366/386, Palmerston to Treasury, draft letter, 9 Aug 1841. 7 See note 3 above. 8 1bid. 9 FO 84/447,Jackson to Aberdeen, letter, 2 March 1842.Jackson, who was commissary judge at Sierra Leone (1828-32) and Rio de Janeiro (1832-41), was nonetheless appointed to Surinam. In 1845 he was appointed commissary judge in Luanda. 10 Middleton, Administration of British Foreign Policy, p. 263.

31

before parliament ro e from 338 to 1,335 printed pages. 11 Bandinel was, in addition,

responsible for the distribution of parliamentary grants averaging £20-30,000 a year in the form

of contingency expenses, salaries and pensions, to commission personnel. In effect, he himself

acted as paymaster to the commissioners, collecting a 1 per cent fee on their salaries, an

arrangement of which the Treasury was unaware until in 1843 it assumed direct responsibility

for such payrnents.12

Bandinel's grasp of the slave trade and the economic and political issues associated with it

made him something of an authority on African matters in general. He was the only person in

the Foreign Office with any specialised knowledge of Mrica and he was frequently consulted by

both the Treasury and the Colonial Office. Lord Palmerston, who was foreign secretary for all

but nine months of the period between November 1830 and August 1841, sought his advice on

British policy towards French expansion in west Africa and, more particularly, with regard to

French incursions into the area bordering the River Gambia. On another occasion, Bandinel

was charged with the preparation of a memorandum on the political and legal status of

Fernando Po and Annabon, islands which the British government considered purchasing with

a view to relocating there the mixed commissions of Sierra Leone and easing the sufferings of

Africans liberated on captured slave ships. Although the islands had been ceded by Portugal to

Spain in 1778, they had not been under continuous European occupation and, in Palmerston's

opinion, Spain appeared to have 'the same kind of claim' to them as Britain then had to the

Falkland islands. 13 British explorers also met with Bandinel and, at the invitation of Fowell

Buxton, in 1839 he attended the first meeting of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society,

the body established to campaign for world-wide emancipation.

Buxton was personally of the opinion that the suppression of the African slave trade might be

better facilitated by attacking it at its source, and by persuading local Mrican rulers to turn

their attention to agriculture and other forms of commerce. The idea appealed to Lord

Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, and early in 1839 he proposed the despatch of an expedition

to west Africa to further these ends. Bandinel was drawn into discussions with Glenelg, and at

the latter's behest began work on drafting comprehensive instructions for the negotiation of

treaties with Mrican chiefs and kings within the bights of Benin and Biafra.14 The papers with

which Bandinel supplied the Colonial Office included, in addition to a model treaty (based on

one concluded in 1840 with the sultan of Muscat) prohibiting the slave trade and providing for

11 FO 366/313, Charles Parnther and Henry C. Scott to Palmerston, minute, 17 March 1847. 12 Middleton, Administration ofBritishFareignPolicy, pp. 198-99. FO 84/489, Trevelyan to Canning, letter, 23 Nov 1843. 1 ~ FO 84/299, FO to Colonial Office, 30 Jan 1839, enclosing memo by Bandinel, 24 Jan 1839. 1" Duke University (Durham, NC) , Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Bandinel MSS. , minute by Glenelg, 18 Feb 1839, enclosed in Bandinel to Aberdeen, letter, 28 Nov 1843.

32

the 'opening of friendly communications for innocent and useful Commerce ', proposals for

Britain's acquisition of Fernando Po and for the erection of a small fort above the delta of the

River Niger (or Quorra as it was then known).15 These reflected Cabinet thinking on the

matter. Nevertheless, Bandinel evidently perceived his work on the Niger expedition as

extending somewhat beyond his customary administrative duties. 16 He was left free to draft on

his own initiative and, in his dealings with Glenelg and his successors, Lord Normanby and

Lord John Russell, he assumed more of an advisory role than might at that time have been

expected of a senior clerk in the Foreign Office. Thus, as he explained in a letter to the

Colonial Office of 10 April 1840, covering the latest version of a draft agreement, he had

introduced into the text only such conditions as appeared likely to be needed in such a

document, and he had made the construction of the sentences as 'natural' as he could and

used 'as simple Words as [he] could find to express the Meaning'. He also made a number of

suggestions as to what might be offered to local rulers with a view to securing their adhesion.

Native tribes could, he thought, be offered protection against their neighbours if this would

induce them to give up the slave trade, but only when Britain could conveniently fulfil such a

condition 'on account of immediate contiguity' or 'other special circumstances'. Likewise, he

counselled against more than 'anxious and affectionate advice' when pressing for the abolition

of 'human Sacrifices' where such practices existed. The 'prejudices of the Natives' might, he

speculated, 'be so strong in favour of the Custom that the Abolition of it may in some cases

create a Risking of breaking off the negotiation' .17

Conscious, however, that he might be close to overstepping the boundary which separated

clerical from ministerial responsibilities, Bandinel concluded his covering note with a sentence

which bordered on the obsequious. 'I do not know', he wrote, 'whether I ought to beg pardon

for these Observations, but I must add that I shall readily obey any Directions which Lord john

Russell may give me for altering the draft of the Agreement in the way that he shall desire.' 18

In truth Buxton and his fellow anti-slave trade campaigner, Stephen Lushington, considered

Bandinel's draft instructions too modest. They believed that any settlements intended to

demonstrate the benefits of agriculture and commerce 'must be kept apart from the

contamination of prevailing native practices'; and, to that end, they urged that ' the

15 TNA, FO 881/521, memo., 'Mrica. Expedition and Mission Proposed: Some Points for Consideration' , 1 Feb 1839, and Annexes A and B, Draft Instructions for Negotiators and Draft Treaty. FO 84/ 336, Bandinel to James Stephen (CO), letter, 10 Aprill840. Palmerston was subsequently to request that the term 'agreement' be substituted for 'treaty' since the latter implied a negotiation under the Foreign Office. FO 84/ 337, Russell to Bandinel, extract from minute, 13 Dec 1840. 16 Bandinel MSS, Bandinel to Aberdeen, draft letter, 23 Nov 1843. The full history of the ill-fated Niger expedition of 1841 is covered in detail in Howard Temperley, White Dreams, Black Africa: The Antislavery Expedition to the Niger (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1991). 17 FO 84/336, Bandinel to Stephen, letter, 10 April 1840. 18 Ibid.

33

Commis ioners be instructed to purchase, on the part of the Government, the sovereignty of a

territory not exceeding one hundred miles square'. Even this represented a retreat from their

belief that the establishment of British sovereignty over whole kingdoms was the 'greatest boon'

which could be conferred on Africa and 'the surest as well as the speediest mode of effecting

the eradication of the Slave Trade'. The alternative might in any case mean leaving Africa to

the French, the Portuguese and, in the case of Liberia, the Americans. There were, in addition,

the newly independent 'Texians', who might 'ere long covet portions of the African soil, for the

very purpose of giving facility to the Slave Trade'. Already the intellectual, if not yet the

political, seeds, were being sown which would one day help transform the Slave Trade

Department from a repository of information into an agent of empire in Africa. 19

Two years later, in 1842, Bandinel published his own history of the slave trade, a work he

hoped would give 'the publick, here and abroad, an account of the state of things as relate[d]

particularly' to what the British government had done;20 and that same year Lord Aberdeen,

Palmers ton's successor as foreign secretary, appointed him to the commission, which was to

meet in 10 Downing Street, to revise the instructions of the British fleets engaged in suppression

of the trade. 'We must', Aberdeen observed, 'by the perfect justice and openness of our

proceedings induce foreign powers to join Great Britain in the Christian and humane tasks

which, at immense cost and labour, she has imposed upon herself. '21 There was never any doubt

in Bandinel's mind about the righteousness of his endeavour. The suppression of the slave trade

was for him an act of reparation for sins previously committed in Africa. When, in retirement,

he testified before the House of Commons Select Committee on the Slave Trade, a body which

was highly critical of the costs and efficacy of the naval squadrons maintained off the coasts of

west Africa and South America, he was adamant in opposing any relaxation of British efforts to

extinguish the commerce. On 13 April1848 he responded to questioning on the subject:

I think that we are bound to exert these efforts by every principle; by the principle of the retribution which we owe to those people from having been the foremost at one time in creating the cruelties which they suffered, and that from a very base and narrow motive, not even the larger motive, that the slave holders had of benefiting by the labour of the slaves. We bought them in Africa, and we took them and threw them

out to be treated as any person might like. I think that there is a retribution which we

owe to them; and I think also that we owe it to every principle of humanity; we owe it to what we have done and have been able to do; we owe it also to the general feeling

19 FO 84/337, Lushington and Buxton to Russell, letter, 7 Aug 1840, enclosed in Russell to Commissioners of the Niger Expedition, letter, n/ d Dec 1840. 20 Bandinel MSS, Bandinel to Aberdeen, draft letter, 23 Nov 1843. 21

Ibid., Aberdeen to Bandinel, minute, 6 Dec 1842. FO 84/446, Aberdeen to Stephen Lushington, minute, 14 Dec 1842; Canning to the Commissioners, letter, 29 Dec 1842.

34

of this country; we owe it to the character which we hold among the nations of the

world, to be still foremost in endeavouring to extinguish the trade, and we should do

what is practicable.22

Bandinel was equally anxious to ensure respect for treaties already concluded. In the case of

Brazil, whose governments had done little to fulfil their international obligations with regard

to halting the traffic, he thought that Britain would be justified 'in making redress by force of

arms' .23 Unlike Quaker abolitionists, Bandinel had no qualms about resorting to naval action

in defence of what would now be defined as human rights. In other respects he was, however,

far from being a paragon of bureaucratic virtue. Despite his literary venture, Bandinel's

drafting skills were evidently not always up to the standards expected of a senior clerk.

Palmerston could be quite tyrannical in such matters, and in a minute in which he complained

of having to correct the English of his staff, one parliamentary under-secretary, Granville

Leveson-Gower, noted:

]. Bandinell [sic] for instance, who I believe knows as much about his department, the Slave Trade, as anyone can know on such a subject, expresses hlmselfvery awkwardly. It

is disagreeable for me to correct, as if he was a schoolboy, all his sentences ... and yet, if I do not do this, Palmerston sends it back, slashed about with very cutting observations.24

So upset was Bandinel by one of Palmerston's comments on his draft that he ordered it 'to

be kept for the hereafter' .25

Clerical errors

It may be that the moralising, and in later years abstemious, Bandinel was peculiarly sensitive

to criticism. His relations with his estranged wife hardly suggest that he was the most

accommodating of individuals. Jealousy on his part reputedly led to their separation, and both

were subsequently to engage in the bitterest of recriminations. According to his niece and

future daughter-in-law, Julia Le Mesurier, James Bandinel's affairs with Lady Arabella Harvey

and Lady Mary Shephard also ended in squabbles and tears. 'just like all women', he

complained of a Lady Mary, distraught at his refusal to run off with her, 'so unreasonable! If a

man will not give up every thing, character & station, & all his hopes of succeeding in life, they

are infuriated and will hate you more bitterly than they loved you warmly!' 26 Bandinel's

personal ambitions, particularly where money was concerned, do indeed appear to have

overshadowed his relations with colleagues, family, friends and lovers. As a young man he had

been deeply troubled by his failure to gain early advancement in the Office and he had been

22 Parliamentary Papers, 1847-48, xxii (272) House ofCnmmuns Select Cnmmitteeon the Slave Trade, 1st Report, para. 3281. 2

!1 Ibid., para. 3387. 24 Bourne, Palmerston, p. 425. 25 Ibid. 26 Bandinel MSS, Julia Le Mesurier to Mrs J Bandinel, letter, 30 Dec 1839.

35

desperate to enlarge his income.27 In middle age he was determined that nothing should be

allowed to threaten either his position or perquisites. This, in part, explains his resistance to

the efforts of Backhouse, the permanent under-secretary, to achieve a 'proper system and

Establishment for the Office'. Following the retirement in 1841 of the chief clerk, the Foreign

Office's principal administrative officer, Backhouse sought to ensure that whoever succeeded

to the post should have no extra financial allowances additional to the stipulated salary. It was

a condition that clearly did not suit either Bandinel or the then first senior clerk, john Bidwell.

But nor did they want to see the third senior clerk, the one-legged and ill-tempered Ulsterman,

George Lenox-Conyngham, appointed above their heads, and together they hatched a plan to

abolish the chief clerkship. Their dog-in-the-manger tactic had little chance of success.

Backhouse, who characterised the conduct of Bandinel and Bidwell as 'mean and tricky' and

their scheme as 'vile', had Palmerston's backing, and from an interview with the foreign

secretary the two emerged, in Backhouse's words, 'totally defeated, but affecting to look like

Innocents without guile' .28

Backhouse, who retired in Aprill842, had hoped that his projected reforms would result in a

general improvement in working conditions throughout the Office. Palmerston wanted to place

his staff on salaries commensurate with those of the Colonial Office, and to that end looked

towards the abolition of special allowances and the ending of the anomalous status of the Slave

Trade Department.29 For the moment, however, Bandinel's department was a less than happy

fiefdom. Pettingal, the son of a Peninsular war veteran,30 survived the longest in post. Subject to

attacks of 'Rheumatic Inflammation attended with great Debility', he remained in the

department until October 1843 when he left, possibly with a view to escaping to a better climate

and securing a higher salary, to become arbitrator of the recently-established mixed Anglo­

Portuguese commission at Boa Vista in the Cape Verde islands.31 Frere, whose career in the

department was interrupted by a brief spell as secretary to the British legation in Berne ( 1835-

36) and who suffered 'disappointment and discouragement' at being shut out from the

prospect of advancement in the Office/~2 also left in 1842 to become slave trade commissioner

27 Ibid., Bandinel to Marian Hunter (later Mrs Bandinel), letters, 2June 1812 and n.d. 1812. 28 Duke, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Backhouse MSS, Box 12,]. Backhouse to George C. Backhouse, letter, 27 July 1841. 29 1bid. FO 366/386, Palmerston to the Treasury, draft letter, 9 Aug 1841.

~FO 84/46, Thomas Pettingal to Bandinel, letter, 15 Nov 1825. 31 Middleton, Administration of BritishFareign Policy, p. 301; FO 84/389, Pettingal to Bandinel, letter, 7 Feb 1841; Pettingal to Palmers ton, letter, 5 May 1841. As early as 1826 Petrin gal had been offered the job of clerk with the mixed commission in Havana, but he declined the appoinnnent because of worries relating to the climate, expenses, and the well-being of his family and other dependants. He was also 'engaged in a Chancery Suit, respecting some property' which he assumed would eventually be his. FO 84/61, Pettingal to Planta, minute, 14 June 1826. 32 FO 366/674, Frere to Palmerston, letter, 28 Aug 1841.

36

at the Cape of Good Hope. Twenty years later he was appointed judge with the newly-established

Anglo-American mixed commission court there. Dogged by ill-health and hopeful that this

could be improved by residence in a warmer climate, in 1833 Le Mesurier gained appointment

as attache at Buenos Aires, but died a year later aboard a ship bound for Madeira. Two

subsequent appointees to the department, John Browne (1834) and Daniel Dowling (1841),

both had serious financial troubles. The former, a negligent and dilatory character who was the

subject of several reprimands, was a chronic debtor, and in june 1835, at the beginning of a two

and a half year absence from the Office, found himself in such distress in France that

Palmerston was moved to seek him a position in a merchant's house in Dunkirk.33 By November

1839, ten months before he finally left the Office, he was having £20 annually deducted from

his salary for payment to the commissioners of the insolvency court.34 Hardly less embarrassing

was Dowling's situation. On 20 May 1845 he had to send Bandinel a note explaining that his

creditors had made it impossible for him to come into the Office. They, he wrote, 'have been

watching in the Street for me and all my hopes of settling everything satisfactorily depend in

great measure in my not being in actual restraint from them' .35 Five months later, still unable

to resolve his 'pecuniary difficulties' in a manner that would allow him to fulfil his Office

duties, he resigned. 36

These, however, were relatively minor domestic problems of little or no significance when set

aside those resulting from the actions of two other Slave Trade clerks, Charles Henry Parnther

and Henry Charles Scott. A barrister's son, Parnther was educated at Eton and Trinity College,

Cambridge, and, a keen cricketer, he played for his university and the MCC. He first gained

employment in Bandinel's department in April 1835, but was dismissed in 1836 after having

been accused of mishandling agency fees. His father, an old friend of Palmerston, intervened,

and in 1837 he was reinstated on appeal. 37 Within six years, following the departure in quick

succession of Pettingal, Frere and Browne, he found himself first clerk in the department,

managing an impecunious Dowling and, from November 1842, an inexperienced Scott. He

also, in effect, acted as assistant to Bandinel, substituting for him as superintendent whenever

he was absent. Intent on making the most of his new position, he soon began lobbying for a

salary increase or, at any rate, an additional allowance, to compensate for his new

responsibilities.38His senior colleagues were not unsympathetic to his plea. Charles Canning,

the son of the former foreign secretary and the then parliamentary under-secretary,

33 TNA, FO 27/510, Bidwell to V.-Consul Pettingal (Dunkirk), letter, 4June 1835. 34

FO 84/305, Palmerston to the commissioners of the Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, draft letter, 16 Nov 1839. 35 Middleton, Administration of British Foreign Policy, p. 275. 36 FO 366/674, Canning to Dowling, letter, 1 Nov 1845. 37 Middleton, Administration of British Foreign Policy, p. 301, and Bourne, Palmerston, p. 447. 38 FO 366/313, Canning to Parnther, letter, 8 Nov 1843.

37

complimented Parnth ron the 'zealous and most efficient manner' in which he had invariably

discharged his dutie and, after discus ing the matter with Aberdeen, wrote in November 1844

to inform Parnther that he was confident that before the end of the year the matter would 'be

determined and acted upon in a manner which will make your position in the Office more

satisfactory to you' .39 And in December Parnther was awarded an additional allowance of £100

per annum, backdated to 5 January 1844 and to be drawn on the Office's contingent fund. 40

In his letter to Parnther advising him that he was soon likely to receive an additional

allowance, Canning added that Ab rdeen 's decision would be 'quite independent of any

general change in the Slave Trade Department', the difficulty attending which he feared would

'be very great' .41 Administrative change regarding the department had for some time been

under consideration. Already, just before parting office in August 1841, Palmerston had begun

pressing the Treasury to end the anomaly of a separately-funded Slave Trade Department. He

thought it 'more in conformity with the general principle upon which Estimates to Parliament

[were] framed' that its clerks 'should be borne on the Establishment of the Office'.42 And from

30 March 1842 the expenses of the department were, with Treasury approval, transferred from

the mixed commissions' grant to the Foreign Office. The following year the Treasury decided

that since costs of the mixed commission courts, then amounting to £23,000 per annum, had

become a 'Branch of the fixed expenditure of the Country', it would also assume direct

re ponsibility for their payment. 43 The clerks of the Slave Trade Department nonetheless

remained inferior in status and income to those in other divisions of the Office, and in the

autumn of 1843 Addington, in consultation with Bandinel, took up this matter with Canning.

In a draft letter to Aberdeen Addington emphasised that the difference between the slave trade

clerks and others in the Office was 'both unjust and impolitic'. 'The weight of business being

equal and equal educational qualifications being required, the pay and prospects of the

labourers ought' , he opined, 'surely, in fairness, to be equal. '44

To remedy this situation Addington proposed that the Slave Trade Department should be

organised on the same footing as the Office's Consular Department 'as an integral part of the

general establishment in which every Clerk of the lower classes should be liable to take his

turn ' . Parnther, he suggested, should then be recognised and rewarded as Bandinel's principal

assistant. And while, because of his years of service in the Slave Trade Department, Parnther

could not simply be transferred to the establishment without injury to the careers of other

Ibid., Canning to Pamther, letter, 13 Nov 1843. 40 Ibid., minute by Addington, 19 Dec 1844. 41 Ib"d Can . 1 ., mng to Pamther, letter, 17 Nov 1843. 42 FO 366/ 674, Palmerston to Treasury, letter, 9 Aug 1841.

·~ FO 84/ 489, Trevelyan to Addington, letter, 2 Aug 1843; Trevelyan to Canning, letter, 23 Nov 1843. 44 FO 366/ 313, Addington to Aberdeen, draft letter, autumn 1843.

38

clerks, Addington recommended that he should be placed on the same footing as an extra

clerk on the same pay scale as that clerk on the establishment nearest to him in standing.

Dowling and Scott might then be appointed to the establishment without any inconvenience.45

Addington's draft was not, however, submitted to Aberdeen.46 Canning for one had serious

doubts about whether Henry Goulburn, the chancellor of the exchequer, would be ready to

sanction such a scheme. He readily accepted that, as regards salary, Parnther should be placed

on the same footing as the clerk of the regular establishment, and that Dowling, as second slave

trade clerk, might be placed on the establishment But the duties of the other clerks in the

department he thought 'in truth, scarcely more than those of Copyists'. The department's

business may have been 'exceedingly heavy and laborious' and very much on the increase, but

much the greater part of its correspondence was made up of 'simple covering letters, or letters

of mere routine by form than in the case of any other Dept. of the Office'. 'I am', Canning noted,

'confident that all the head work of the Dept. can be efficiently done by the Superintendent, one

Assistant & the 2nd Clerk, if this last is a Person of intelligence and industry. '47

Parnther would doubtless have been well-satisfied if Canning's proposal had been put into

practice. Canning and, to a lesser extent, Addington were, however, of the opinion that the

Treasury was unlikely to entertain any changes involving additional expense, and the project

was eventually allowed to drop.48 Almost another three years were to elapse before the matter

was taken up again at an official level. Meanwhile, Dowling left the Office to be replaced by

Scott as second clerk in the department, and in December 1845 Bandinel, possibly perturbed

by the prospect of Palmerston's impending return as foreign secretary, retired on grounds of

ill-health. It is, nevertheless, apparent that Scott, like Parnther before him, was already

becoming agitated about his poor career prospects.49 In March 1847 he and Parnther

addressed a minute to Palmerston, who had returned to the Foreign Office in the previous

summer, drawing his attention to the 'great and discouraging difference' between their terms

of employment and those of other clerks in the Office. Parnther, so the minute asserted, was

still only on the salary scale of a 3rd class clerk on the regular establishment, while his

contemporaries in the Office were already 2nd class clerks, and Scott was in receipt of £140 per

annum, £20 less than a clerk appointed to the Office nine months after him. 5° Addington was

sympathetic to their plight, as was Thomas Staveley, Bandinel's successor as senior clerk and

superintendent of the Slave Trade Department. Both favoured the two clerks being placed as

supernumeraries on a level, or at least nearly so, with their coevals in the Office until they

451bid. 46 FO 366/313, minute by Addington, 16 March 1847. 47 Ibid., memo. by Canning, April 1844. 48 Ibid., memo. by Addington, 18 March 1847. 49 Ibid., Bandinel to Scott, 9 Jan 1846. 50 Ibid., Parnther and Scott to Palmerston, minute, 17 March 1847.

39

reached th top of th cale of 2"d clas clerks. 51 So also did Palrnerston. 'I am in Principle', he

ob erved, 'for unity of e tablishment in an Office; I think that an Office ought to be like a

Regiment, one Body, th memb rs of which should in their respective Grades be liable to

perform any of the Duties for which the Body is constituted, and to be shifted from one Duty

th . . 152 to ano r as occasion may reqwre.

For the moment, however, Palmerston favoured putting practicality before principle. He

thought that it was perhaps not worthwhil 'to alter the Con titution of the Office in order to

make it entirely conformable with Theory', and considered it bett r simply to proceed with

Staveley's recommendations.53 Unfortunately for Parnther and Scott, Addington delayed

approaching the Treasury until other contemplated administrative changes in the Office were

ready for ubmi sion.54 As a result no formal application was made to the Treasury until

0 tober 1 48.55 Discussions regarding the e tablishment and reporting of a Treasury

commission of enquiry into the working of the Foreign Office made for further delay, and the

Treasury did not formally signal its approval of Staveley's contemplated changes until

D cemb r 1851.56 Even then, everything was far from settled. The Foreign Office wanted the

pay rises for Parnther and Scott to be backdated to April 1848; the Treasury insisted that they

hould only b paid from October 1851; and in March 1853 it was finally settled that that the

two slav trad clerks should be assimilated to the scales of 2nd and 3rd class clerks of the

establishment and benefit from their re-grading from January 1850.57 But Parnther remained

disgruntled. He was particularly disappointed to learn that as part of the exercise he was to be

deprived of the £100 per annum allowance he had been awarded eight years earlier, leaving

him, he wrongly reckoned, £5 a year worse off. H was qually put out by the news that his

colleague Scott was, after only eleven years in the d partment, to be retrospectively promoted

to the grade of 2nc1 class clerk. 58

Mter an interview with the chief clerk, Parnther was reassured that his prospects were in fact

improved.59 Nonetheless, his ten-y ar truggle for a pay rise may have affected his attitude

51 Ibid. , memos. by Addington, 18 March 1847, and Staveley, 3 May 1847. 52 Ibid., memo. by Palmerston, 6 May 1847. 55 Ibid. 54 FO 366/313, Addington to Staveley, minute, 12 Feb 1848. 55 Ibid. , Palm rston to Treasury, draft 1 tter, 22 March 1851 . 56 Ibid. , Addington to Palrnerston, minute, 8 Nov 1851; G. Corn wall Lewis to Palmerston, letter, 17 Dec 1851. 57 Ibid. , Stanl y of Aid sley to Tr asury, letter, 24 Dec 1851; memo by C. Trevelyan, 7 Feb 1852; memo by G. Lenox-Conyngham, 23 F b 1852; minute by Clarendon, 15 March 1853. 58 It was agreed in March 1853 that Scott should receive the pay of a 3ro clas establishment clerk from jan 1850, but that like his coeval on the establishment, GreviJle Morier, h should be considered promoted to a 2nc1 class clerkship from December 1852, ibid. FO 366/313, Parnther to Addington, minute, 15 April 1853. 59 FO 366/313, Parnth r to Addington , draft letter, 21 April 1853.

40

towards his work. It may also have contributed to a d cline in hi physical, and po sibly hi

mental, well-being. In july 1 52 he took sick leave, but this was followed by his absence from

the Office without satisfactory explanation for a full 151 days. Reprimanded by Addington, in

February 1853 he was threatened with dismissal if the offence w re repeated.60 But whether

Parnther's ab nee from, or his g n ral dissatisfacti n with, his position had any bearing on

subsequent revelations that he and Scott were involved in emb zzling lav trade funds remains

open to speculation. The fraud first came to light when in August 1853 Lord Clar ndon,

secretary of state since February 1853, received a letter from the R v rend Charles Jackson of

Bentley near Farnham in Hampshire . This reveal d that his uncle, Sir Georg Jackson, sine

1845 the British commissary judge at Luanda, had b en alarmed to find that £450 was mi sing

from the account which Parnther and Scott managed for him in London.61 As was customary

at this time, the two clerks had acted as agents for Jackson and his colleagu s, nsuring

payment of salaries and settl ment of outstanding bills. Howev r, on investigation by Lenox­

Conyngham of the agency a counts of Parnther and Scott, it was discovered that th y were in

debt to Jackson for the sum of £498.10s.ld, and that in addition they owed Edmund Gabri I,

the British arbitrator at Luanda, and William Smith, the regi trar there, £622.18 .lld and

£414.19s.1d respectively. All the available evidence suggested that the moni s had been

misappropriated by Parnther and Scott for their own uses over a period of eighteen to twenty

months. 'The lamentable extent of the irregularity' , noted th chi f clerk, '... is quite

inexplicable'.62 Parnther and Scott were in no position to make good the missing funds and on

16 September 1853 both received notice of their dismissal on the grounds that they were 'guilty

of fraudulent and disgraceful behaviour'. 63 Needless to say, neither was in th Offi e to receive

the news. Parnther was again absent without leave, and Scott simply absconded.

There was some irony in the fact that George Jackson should have b n a casualty of the fraud

perpetrated by Parnther and Scott since, in the previous decade, Ja kson had him elf b n

suspected of corruption. Originally a career diplomat, Jackson had s rv d in Berlin, Madrid

and Washington, before, possibly with a view to enhancing his pension, taking up appointm nt

in 1828 as British commissary judg in Sierra Leone. Although the po t carried with it a alary

of £3,000 per annum and an outfit allowance of £500, Jackson r main d in Freetown for little

more than nine months before returning on half-pay to England on grounds of ill-health. His

60 F0366/449, Addington to Parnther, minute, 9 Aug 1852; Addington to Parnther, letter, 21 F b 1853. 61 Ibid., Charles Jackson to Clarendon, letter, 10 Aug 1853. 62 Ibid., memo. by Lenox-Conyngham, 31 Aug 1853. 63 Ibid., minute by Clarendon, 16 Sept 1853; Addington to Parnther and Scott, 1 tt r, 16 S pt 1853; Addington to G. Jackson, letter, 27 S pt 1853. Following the dismissal ofParnther and S ott a stop was put on the payment of the salaries due to them for the quarter ending 30 September 1853. But in the autumn of 1 61, by whi h time both Parnther and Scott were dead, elicitors acting on behalf of Edmund Gabriel, on of the victims of their fraud, took out letters of administration to their effects and had this top page lifted. FO 366/ 675, Lenox­Conyngham to Paymaster G neral's Office, 30 Nov 1861.

41

subsequent posting to Rio de janeiro in 1832lasted nine years.64 There, however, as the British

judge on the Anglo-Brazilian mixed commission, his dilatory conduct and the inconsistency of

his decisions drew considerable criticism from naval commanders, consuls and diplomats.

William Ouseley, the British charge d'affaires in Rio, thought him 'more than a little cracked',

and claimed, with reference to Brazil's slavers, that the British should 'have crushed the rascals

completely with almost any sane commission'. 65 Allegations that jackson accepted bribes from

Brazilian slave ship owners were never substantiated, but there was evidence that his cohabiting

lady friend was in their pay. Indeed, in July 1841 Ouseley was advised by Brazil's foreign

minister ' that no doubt existed that the Female who live[d] with him Uackson] had received

considerable sums from Slave Traders' .66 Palmers ton was sufficiently alarmed to have Jackson

removed to Surinam where he could do no harm. Four years later he was sent to Luanda where

he did some good. An underpaid and overworked Parnther may meanwhile have concluded

that an overpaid and under-performing Jackson was fair game for peculation

Post-mortem permutations

Parnther was just a fortnight short of his fortieth birthday when he learned of his dismissal.

Within fourteen months he was dead. He suffered a ruptured aorta, and his body was found on

10 November 1854 in the Red Lion at Walham Green, not far from where he had once resided

in Brompton.67 The public house has since been appropriately renamed the Havana Tavern

and, situated in the Fulham Road, it now offers its clientele Cuban cocktails and salsa dancing.

It seems unlikely that Bandinel would have approved of the establishment. However, by 1854

he was long since deceased. He died on 29 July 1849 after having had the misfortune to

contract Asian cholera at Salisbury while attending a meeting of the Archaeological Institute.68

And in April 1851 Bandinel's immediate successor as superintendent of the Slave Trade

Department, Staveley, had been replaced by Thomas Ward, the third son ofViscount Bangor,

and a veteran of several diplomatic missions. 69 These changes, and particularly those associated

with the agency fund scandal, offered Clarendon both an opportunity and a pretext for seeking

once and for all to end the anomalous status of the department. He began by appointing in

Parnther's stead Francis Alston, a very able second class clerk of the regular establishment, who

would eventually succeed Lenox-Conyngham as chief clerk. This Clarendon did on the clear

~FO 84/445, memo. on Sir GeorgeJackson's Services and Pension, 13 March 1842.Jackson, who while in Berlin had attested the marriage of Ernest, Duke of Cumberland, was made a Knight Commander of the Hanoverian Guelphic Order (KCH) in 1832. 65 Bethell, Brazilian Slave Trade, pp. 201-02. 66 FO 84/445, memo. on the Causes which led to Sir George jackson's removal from Rio de janeiro, 13 March

1842. 67 General Register Office, Death Certificate for Pamther, 11 Nov 1854. 68 Middleton, Administration of British Foreign Policy, p. 264. Gentleman's Magazine, 1849, part 2, p. 327. 69 Ibid., p. 316.

42

understanding, henceforth to be 'taken as a fixed rule', that ' any Clerk who may be selected to

serve as First Assistant to the Superintendent of the Slave Trade Department, is to have the

option of being transferred, upon a vacancy, to one of the Diplomatic Departments' .70 Then,

in a letter to the Treasury of 9 March 1854, in which he outlined further proposals for the

reform and expansion of the Foreign Office, he expressed his intention to constitute the

department 'as in every respect a regular Department of the Office, to be worked in exactly the

same manner, and placed, as to pay and position exactly on the same footing with every other

Department in the Office'. The effect of this reorganisation, in which the Treasury concurred,

was the suppression of three slave trade clerkships and their corresponding addition of three

clerkships to the establishment. 71

Only one slave trade clerk, George Skelton, who had been appointed to the department in

1845 and who, as longest-serving clerk, now succeeded to Scott's position, seemed unlikely to

benefit from the change. He was not offered the opportunity to join the establishment, but it

was agreed in June 1854 that he should receive the salary of a second class clerk.72 Two years

later he left the Office to follow the same path as many of his under-appreciated predecessors,

becoming arbitrator to the mixed courts of justice in Sierra Leone, where he died of fever in

1865.73 A more fortunate slave trade clerk was Percy Anderson. Like Bandinel, a clergyman's

son, he had joined the department in October 1852 and in April 1854 was, as a result of

Clarendon's reform, appointed to the regular establishment as a 4th class clerk. Within thirty

years he was to rise to become head of the Office's Consular and African Department, into

which the Slave Trade Department had by then been transformed, and, as such, he was a key

figure in the European partition of Africa.74 Parnther's disgrace proved to be Anderson's

salvation. Yet, even in a reformed Slave Trade Department, grievances over pay and grading

persisted. William Henry Wylde, who in 1855 was appointed assistant senior clerk in the

department, nourished what became a long-standing grudge against the Office for, while in

1854 he had been raised to senior clerk, after a year's probation his promotion had not been

confirmed. Instead, he found himself acting and paid as second in command, first to Ward, and

then to Ward's far from healthy successor, Adolphus 'Dolphie' Oom. During the latter's

prolonged absence on sick leave, Wylde had effectively to take over the direction of the

department, and although, following Oom's retirement in April 1859, he replaced him as

senior clerk, he had by then been passed over for promotion by at least three junior colleagues.

7° FO 366/449, Addington to Lenox-Conyngham, minute, 31 Oct 1853. 71 1bid., Clarendon to Treasury, letter, 9 March 1854; W.E. Gladstone to Clarendon, minute, 5 April 1854. 72 1bid., Skelton to Clarendon, minute, 28 June 1854; note by E. Hammond, 30 June 1854. 73 Ibid., Earl of Shelburne to Skelton, minute, 1 Dec 1856; Middleton, Administration ofBritishFareignPolicy, p. 308. 74 Wm. R Louis, 'Sir Percy Anderson's Grand Africa Strategy, 1883-1896', English Historical &view 81 (1966) , pp. 292-314.

43

After nine years in the position, both Clarendon and Edmund Hammond, the permanent

under-secretary, felt Wylde deserved to be recompensed, not only to mark his merits as a public

officer, but to 'show to others that industry and perseverance under circumstances of some

discouragement must finally meet with their reward'. However, the Treasury would have none

of this. It feared that a precedent might thereby be created, and a disgruntled Wylde had, like

earlier Slave Trade clerks, to content himself with a salary inferior to his peers.75

Wylde had been introduced early to clerical work. Born in April 1819, the son of Colonel

(later Major-General) William Wylde of the Royal Artillery, he had, aged sixteen, accompanied

his father to northern Spain when in 1835 Colonel Wylde was despatched there as part of the

British Auxiliary Legion serving under Queen Isabella during her struggle with the Carlists.

The young Wylde was present at many military operations.76 He also acted as his father's private

secretary before returning to England in 1838 to take up appointment in the Foreign Office,

first as a supernumerary clerk in the Slave Trade Department, and then, from April 1839, as a

junior clerk of the establishment. Nine years later he returned to the Iberian peninsula, again

in the company of his father, who from October 1846 to August 1847 reported on military

developments in Portugal. Such experience might seem particularly pertinent to one who

would spend a good part of his subsequent career collating information on the slave trade with

Spain's remaining imperial possessions. Certainly, at the time of his promotion to senior clerk

the trade with Cuba was his department's main concern. In the two previous years it had in

Wylde's estimate 'increased considerably', and he was vigorous in pressing for arrangements

which would ensure a regular supply of intelligence from Havana and New York.77 Indeed, his

minutes and memoranda suggest that he was far less circumspect than Bandinel had been in

counselling ministers and senior colleagues on the subject. Palmerston, who was prime

minister during 1859-65, continued to busy himself with the slave trade and its suppression. But

Wylde and his departmental associates acquired a detailed understanding of the traffic which

four successive and relatively inexperienced secretaries of state, Malmesbury, Russell, Lord

Edward Stanley and Clarendon, could ill-afford to ignore.

The Slave Trade Department's geographical focus of attention also shifted eastwards during

the following decade. As the transatlantic traffic in slaves declined, so did official interest in

curbing that of the Muslim world increase. Palmerston had long since launched an attack on

the Arab trade, and to that end agreements had been concluded with the Ottoman and Persian

empires and their neighbours and feudatories in Arabia. But it was the revelations of David

75 FO 366/ 675, Hammond to Lord Malmesbury, minute, 26 July 1858. FO 366/676, memo by Wylde, 8 Dec 1868, enclosed in Hammond to Clarendon, minute, 22 Dec 1868; Hammond to Treasury, letter, 28 Dec 1868; Geo. A Hamilton (Treasury) to Hammond, letter, 20 Jan 1869. 76 The TifTW, 4 March 1909, p. 13, col. e. 77 FO 84/1082, memos. by Wylde, 26 May, 23 June, 2 and 29 Aug 1859.

44

Livingstone and the grim tales he had to tell about the east Mrican slave trade which in the

mid-1860s re-ignited public concern for the sufferings of the native peoples of the region.

Zanzibar, whose sultan was a quasi-independent tributary of the ruler of Muscat, was at the hub of

the trade and, when the results of naval patrolling off the east Mrican coast proved disappointing,

Wylde was drawn into the Whitehall-wide debate on how best to deal with the sultan and the Arab

slavers. His advice was blunt and forthright. In a memorandum of 6 April 1869 he argued that

Britain must behave liberally towards the sultan in order to win his assistance in taking further

measures against the trade, and at the same time deliver warnings to the chiefs of the Arabian

coast and Persian Gulf that the Royal Navy intended to enforce existing treaties. He was convinced

that such measures, along with a well-organised distribution of a small squadron, would suffice to

suppress the east Mrican trade. 'There were', he declared, 'never wanting Prophets who

prophesised that it would be impossible to put an end to the Slave Trade on the West Coast, but

the result has proved the contrary, and I have no doubt the same success will attend our efforts

on the East Coast should it be decided by H.M.'s Govt. to make the attempt.'78

Wylde's memorandum was far more robust in style and content than anything drafted by

Bandinel during his stewardship of the Slave Trade Department. It was a policy document

whose emphasis was as much on strategy as tactics. Yet Wylde's department remained

peripheral to the main political work of the Office. Indeed, with the elimination of the

transatlantic trade it, like the navy's west African squadron, had lost its original raison d'etre.

Wylde's staff consisted of no more than an assistant, and two junior, clerks, and after he left the

department in July 1869 to take over the superintendence of the Commercial and Consular

Department, his replacement, Hussey Crespigny Vivian, stayed no more than three years in

post before moving to the more prestigious German Department.79 A single Consular and Slave

Trade Department was subsequently established under Wylde, and in 1876 its work was divided

between a Slave Trade Department, under Wylde's personal supervision, and a Consular

Subdivision. Within this combined super-department other permutations were to follow,

including the creation in 1879 of a Slave Trade and Sanitary Department.80 It, in addition to

dealing with the slave trade, had responsibility for handling correspondence relating to cattle

plague, quarantine and pilgrims, thus bringing under common management a bizarre

amalgam of agricultural, humanitarian, religious and social issues.81 When, however, Wylde

finally retired in March 1880 a further reorganisation was effected, and by 1882 two quite

separate departments, a Commercial and Sanitary Department and a Consular and Slave Trade

78 FO 84/1310, memo. by Wylde, 31 March 1869. 79 FO 366/676, minute by Clarendon, 27 July 1869. FO 366/ 677, minute by Lord Granville (secretary of state) , 9 Feb 1872. 80 FO 366/677, minute by Lord Derby (secretary of state), 15 Dec 1876. 81 FO 366/678, minute by Lord Tenterden (PUS, FO), 13 Dec 1879.

45

Department, had come into existence.82 This reflected the growing importance of commercial

and consular work, and the assumption, confidently expressed by Lord Granville, the foreign

secretary in Gladstone's second administration, that the management of a diminishing slave

trade correspondence would soon be distributed elsewhere within the Office.83 Granville had

evidently neither foreseen the extent to which developments in tropical Mrica would

impinge upon British diplomacy during the 1880s, nor reckoned with the ambitions and

calibre of Percy Anderson, who though nominated in 1882 senior clerk in charge of the

Consular and Slave Trade Department, was in fact appointed in 1883 first head of a renamed

Consular and Mrican Department.84

The change in departmental nomenclature was a matter of some significance. Henceforth, the

slave trade and its suppression would increasingly be treated in the Foreign Office as but one,

albeit important, element of a broadening Mrican agenda. Ever since the 1840s the promotion

of other forms of trade and the establishment of British settlements had been seen as means of

combating the traffic in Africa. Palmerston and Russell had encouraged with subsidies and, on

occasions, warships, the penetration of the Niger basin by British explorers, merchants and

missionaries. And when in June 1854 Livingstone arrived at Luanda, after having traversed the

African interior, he was quick to impress on Edmund Gabriel, the principal victim of the agency

fee fraud, that 'if Legitimate Commerce were once established in the Congo, there [was] a high

degree of probability that the Slave Trade would be effectually checked throughout the whole

extent of that Country.'85 It was likewise characteristic of Wylde that, soon after parting the Slave

Trade Department in 1869, he argued strongly in favour of maintaining the Royal Navy's annual

expedition up the Niger to its confluence with the Benue at Lokoja. 'I think', he wrote, 'it would

be very bad policy to withdraw from the Niger now when trade is being developed satisfactorily

and only wants a little more energy on the part of our traders to render it in the course of a few

years a most valuable mart for British manufacturers. '86 Commerce, Christianity and empire

were the handmaidens of humanitarian intervention. Barely, however, had Anderson settled

into his new department before he was confronted by what looked like a French bid for

hegemony over the mouth of the Congo, and in the ensuing scramble for land and influence he

gave priority to safeguarding Britain's power and prestige. He may only have had a third class

degree in classics, but in the words of Roger Louis, he had a 'first class chess-board mentality'

when it came to dealing with imperial rivals.87

821bid., R W. Lingen (Treasury) to Lord Tenterden (PUS, Foreign Office) , letter, 20 April 1880.

3 FO 366/ 678, Granville to John Bergne, letter, 10 March 1881.

a.. Ibid., minutes by Francis Alston (Chief Clerk), 30 Nov 1882, and Granville, 20 & 21 Dec 1882. 85 FO 84/ 931 , Gabriel to Clarendon, despt, 22June 1854. 86

FO 84/ 1311, memo. by Wylde, 2 Oct 1869. See also on the Foreign Office and the Niger, John D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London: Macmillan, 1966) , pp. 34-38. 87 Lo . 'P ms, ercy Anderson' , pp. 292-94.

46

Anderson gained much credit for his part in the Berlin west Africa conference of 1884-85.

Sometimes perceived as a watershed in the European partition of Mrica, the conference

followed on from the objections of other great powers to Britain's efforts to block the territorial

aspirations of France by advancing the historic claims of Portugal. Agreement was eventually

reached on a mix of measures, including internationalisation and neutralisation, which were

intended to ensure free trade in the Congo and Niger basins. In practice they may well have

hastened the transition from informal to formal empire across the continent.88 The British,

nevertheless, still managed to introduce humanitarian content into the conference

proceedings, and the Berlin Act pronounced that the maritime slave trade was forbidden by

international law, and that operations which furnished slaves for it on land and water 'ought

likewise to be regarded as forbidden' .89 After over half-a-century of fighting the slave trade, the

Foreign Office still clung to the moral high ground whilst defending tenaciously Britain's

interests in the market place of empire. In these respects the British derived considerable

advantage from having had in the Slave Trade Department a knowledge-based department with

unrivalled experience in marshalling public opinion behind the causes it pursued. No other

European foreign ministry had the equivalent resident expertise for engaging in the complex

diplomatic wrangles which arose over Africa, east and west, during the next two decades.

Bandinel's department, associated with patronage and prone to financial malpractice, may

sometimes have seemed to belong more to the eighteenth than to the nineteenth century. But

the department, recast in the 1850s and renamed in the 1880s, emerged as the very model of

a modern Foreign Office department, in which its senior staff, individuals such as Anderson

and Clement Hil1,90 would have the opportunity to influence policy in a manner virtually

unknown elsewhere in the Office. In the long process of reform and transition, humanitarian

intervention became an instrument as well as an object of British foreign policy.

88 Wm. Roger Louis, 'The Berlin Congo Conference', Britain and France in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven: Yale UP, 1971), eds. Prosser Gifford & Wm. Roger Louis, pp. 167-220. 89 Miers, pp. 172-73. 90 See, for example, M.E. Chamberlain, 'Clement Hill's memoranda and the British interest in East Mrica' , English Historical Review 87 (1972), pp. 533-47.

47

48

Chapter 3

Judicial diplomacy The mixed commission courts

Until 1854 the clerks of the Slave Trade Department were in, but not truly of, the Foreign

Office. Their administrative remit was narrower, and their career prospects correspondingly

more limited, than those of the clerks of the regular Office establishment. Overseas, there w re

parallels in the staffing of the mixed commission courts. The names of the commissary judges,

arbitrators and registrars, who made up the mixed commissions, appeared in the Foreign Office

List alongside ambassadors, ministers and consuls, but, save in those instances when consuls

doubled as commissary judges, they were not considered members of either the diplomatic or

consular services. Nor were they usually men with any legal training. They adjudicat d,

arbitrated and assessed; they gathered intelligence on the slave trade; and they reported to the

Foreign Office. Far better remunerated than the Slave Trade clerks in Whitehall, and with

fewer opportunities for long-term career advancement than their colleagues in legations, they

were part of a unique experiment in judicial diplomacy. Their positions they owed to the

bilateral anti-slave trade treaties Britain had concluded successively with Portugal (1817 and

1842), Spain (1817), the Netherlands (1818), Brazil (1826) and the United States (1862). In

each instance these had provided for the establishment of at least two courts, one within the

territory of each of the contracting parties, with responsibility for deciding the fate of vessels

seized by their respective navies on suspicion of trading illegally in slaves. British court officials

were in consequence very often well placed to acquire an intimate understanding of how the

traffic was conducted in places proximate to the main points of slave export and importation.

Functions and functionaries

Anglo-Portuguese, Anglo-Spanish, Anglo-Dutch, Anglo-Brazilian and, from 1862, Anglo­

American, mixed commissions were set up in Freetown, the capital of the British crown colony

of Sierra Leone. The port was selected for a number of reasons. First, Sierra Leone had been

established in 1772 by the philanthropic Sierra Leone Company as a settlement for liberated

slaves, and as a crown colony it had acquired a relatively developed administrative

infrastructure which made it an ideal reception centre for both naval crews and the freed

captives of slave ships. Secondly, there was already a precedent since a vice-admiralty court had

been established there after the 1807 abolition act in order to adjudicate cases of British, and

sometimes foreign, slavers. Finally, most captures of slave vessels took place along a vast 2,000

mile stretch of west Mrican coast, so a 'local' depot where warships could bring in slavers and

their cargoes was necessary. An Anglo-Dutch commission also sat in Surinam, an Anglo-Spanish

49

commission in Havana, an Anglo-Portuguese (later Anglo-Brazilian) commission in Rio de

Janeiro, and, from 1842, Anglo-Portuguese commissions sat in Boa Vista, the Cape of Good

Hope, Luanda and Spanish Town Qamaica). Later, there were Anglo-American commissions at

the Cape of Good Hope and in New York. Each court comprised a commissary judge and a

commissioner of arbitration from each signatory country, and a registrar, responsible for

recording court decisions, was appointed by the sovereign government of the territory in which

the commission resided. The contingent expenses of the courts were shared equally between

the two countries concerned, except in Freetown where Britain paid one third, and Portugal,

Spain, Brazil and the Netherlands one sixth each. Responsibility for the payment of the salaries

of British commissioners, borne initially by the funds voted by parliament for the suppression

of the slave trade, rested with the Foreign Office.

The early years of operation saw a number of teething problems. Whilst Castlereagh keenly

pursued implementation of the new treaties, including the prompt appointment of court

officials, other countries parties to the treaties were less conscientious. In February 1819

Thomas Gregory was appointed first British commissary judge in Freetown, along with Edward

Fitzgerald, the commissioner of arbitration, and Daniel Molloy Hamilton, the registrar. 1 But

when, by November that same year, Portugal had still not appointed its court personnel, British

officials at post were left confused about how best to proceed. Castlereagh, after consulting the

Portuguese minister in London, the Marquis de Palmella, instructed commissioners to hear

cases involving Portuguese ships even in the absence of Portuguese officials, and until they

arrived to fill their positions.2 This proved to be a lasting arrangement that would apply at

various times to all of the mixed commissions in Sierra Leone.3 For although Dutch and

Spanish commissioners were appointed in 1819, and the Portuguese commissioners the

following year, frequent absences through illness, and a failure by governments to replace

deceased staff meant that British commissioners often sat alone.4 The Brazilians, who failed to

appoint a judge until September 1828,5 attempted to use this deficiency to favour condemned

slave-traders. On arrival at post, the Brazilian judge challenged the legality of all previous

adjudications concerning Brazilian slavers, arguing that they could not have received a

satisfactory hearing in his absence. This claim the king's advocate rejected. He placed

responsibility firmly on the shoulders of the Brazilian government, declaring

1 FO 315/1. Prusim. 2FO 315/1, Castlereagh to Commissioners Gregory and Fitzgerald, despatch 18 Nov 1819.

3 FO 315/1, Foreign Office to Commissioners at Sierra Leone, despatch 26 Nov 1822 confirms this

arrangement. 4

Bethell, 'The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century', in The journal of African History 7 (1966) , pp. 79-93. 5FO 315/2, Aberdeen to Commissioners, despatch, 25 Sept 1828.

50

... if the Brazilian Owners conceive, that they have sustained any injury by the absence

of a Commissioner on the part of Brazil, the cause of it is attributable solely to the

delay of their own Government in appointing a proper person to fill the office.6

In fact, foreign governments had difficulty finding people who w re pr pared to brav far

from attractive postings to a disease-ridden Sierra Leone. But the British, by contrast, w r

able to recruit personnel, sometimes from the pool of officials already in situ in th colonial

administration/ by offering relatively attractive salaries. In 1819 the commis ary judg at

Freetown received a salary of £3,000 per annum, plus £500 outfit allowance, that compared well

with the colonial governor's salary of £2,000. Meanwhile, the annual salaries of the

commissioner of arbitration and the registrar were respectively £1,000 and £500, and, lik

the judge, they could draw pensions after six years' service at post.8 British commissioners

in Rio de Janeiro and Havana, whilst spared, at least to some extent, a severe and d bilitating

climate, were often more at risk of personal violence than their counterparts in Freetown.

During the 1830s, for example, George Jackson, the commissary judge, and Frederick Grigg,

the court arbitrator, in Rio de Janeiro, frequently called on the national guard to escort them

through angry crowds which were apt to hurl stones at the courthouse when the mixed

commission was in session.9 Around this time the commissary judge's salary in Rio de Janeiro

was £1,200, and that of the commissioner of arbitration £800. In Havana the equivalent salaries

were £1,600 and £1,200. 10

Despite these relatively high salaries, personnel were not shy of asking for more. William

Smith, who had worked his way up from registrar in Freetown in 1825 to commissary judge in

November 1830, could not claim a full judge's pension because illness had forced him to return

to England in April 1834, preventing him from serving the qualifying six years. He

subsequently wrote to Wellington, then briefly foreign secretary, requesting that, in view of all

his years of hard work (he had overseen the adjudication of 145 slave ships and th

emancipation of 26,000 slaves), and taking into account the fact that since the establishment

of the court in 1819, of the six judges appointed he alone had survived, he might be granted

6 FO 315/2, Aberdeen to Commissioners, despatch, 2 Dec 1829. 7 C.W. Newbury, British Policy Tawards WestA.frica:SelectDocuments 1786-1874, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p 494. See for example, Edward Fitzgerald, appointed first Commissioner of Arbitration in 1819, was also named as Chief justice in the "Constitution of the Colony and Sierra Leone and its Dependencies, 17 October 1821 ",and Daniel Molloy Hamilton, the first Registrar at the Mixed Coun in 1819 was also the advocate of the colony. 8 Slave Trade Papers presented to the House of Commons, 10 June 1842: Return on the Amount paid for Salaries and Incidental Expenses for the Commissions established on the part of Her Majesty under the Treaties with Foreign Pawers for

suppressing the Traffic in Slaves .... up to january 1842, HP 426, p. 2. See also Bethell, Mixed Commissions, p. 81, footnote 5, although these figures are at odds with the above. 9 Bethell, Mixed Commissions, p. 84, citing FO 84/275; Jackson and Grigg to Palmerston, letter, No. 21 , 24 Apr 1839. 10 See footnote 8.

51

the full pension. 11 Smith 's request does not appear to have been granted.12 In another typical

case, George Randall, who in 1825 temporarily covered a period of absence for the registrar in

Freetown, repeatedly tried to claim in excess of the salary due to him. Canning would have

none of it and Joseph Planta, his under-secretary, wrote to inform Randall:

Mr Canning desires me further to observe, that his surprize at this application is increased when he recollects, that Mr Randall was absent on lea:ve from August 19th to December 20th, part of the very period for which he asks the entire Salary of acting Registrar . .. Mr Canning desires that no such application may be renewed.13

As the needs of the courts became clearer over time, additional staff were recruited,

including clerks, a court marshal, messengers, translators, and mixed commission surgeon to

take care of slaves during the period of arbitration.14

The functions of the courts, and matters concerning procedure, were outlined in the several

bilateral treaties, and further clarified by guidelines which issued from the law officers of the

crown.15 On arrival in port, the captured slave ship, together with any slaves it carried, became

the responsibility of the marshal of the court. The officer in command of the prize crew had to

make an affidavit before the registrar, and hand over any papers found on board the captured

vessel together with a certificate, drawn up at the time of capture, stating where and when the

ship was searched, its condition, and the number of slaves found on board. Ships' papers were

crucial pieces of evidence: dual sets would imply attempts to switch nationality and evade search,

valid passports might sanction the legal trade in slaves: for example, prior to 1822 Portugal was

permitted to trade south of the equator, and log books might provide evidence of a ship's

deviation from the permitted route and into illicit slave-trading territory. The captain and two

or three individuals from the captured vessel also had to make depositions on oath. A standard

set of 'Interrogatories for the Use of the British Commissioners, to be administered to the

Witnesses belonging to the Vessel taken' was drawn up in order to help ascertain the facts in

court. All items of evidence were presented to the court which had to decide, without appeal,

and within twenty days of the ship being brought into port, on the legality of capture, and

whether the vessel in question was guilty of illegal slave-trading. Except in special circumstances,

a final sentence had to be delivered within two months. If judges found themselves unable to

agree on the sentence, or on any matter relating to the enforcement of the treaties, they had to

draw by lot the name of one of the two commissioners of arbitration to settle the matter.

12 Slave Trade Papers presented to the House of Com11UJ'11S, 10 June 1842: &turn on the Number of Persons naw receiving

Pensions f(JT Service in the said Commissions ... , HP 426, p. 7. Smith 's pension from 1835 is stated to have been £850. 1s FO 315/ 13, Planta to Commissioners, note, 27 Sept 1825. 14

Senior clerks received their salaries from the Foreign Office, but less senior staff were paid from the contingent expenses of the court. In 1824 the salary of a senior clerk in Sierra Leone was £400 pa, that of a junior clerk £150 pa, and that of a surgeon £100 pa. Information about salaries inFO 315/1. 15 Bethell, Mixed Commissions, p. 84.

52

,

~. I.

' Y'~ ...

..

16. Document issued by Anglo-Portuguese mixed commission in Sierra Leone confirming condemnation of slave ship Josephina, I September 1840 - Certification that a Portuguese slave vessel, Josephina, was captured by HM sloop Columbine north of the line. condemned before the mixed commission in Freetown, and the surviving 346 slaves liberated. (TNA. FO 84/311 ).

J

53

54

) .

17. Certificate Issued to captain of slave ship Josephina by Nicholas Trist. the US Consul in Havana, 16 March 1836 - It certifies, by word of a 'respectable merchant' of Havana, 'a faithful list of the men and arms' on board the Portuguese vessel Josephina. Far from being respectable, the vessel was found to be a slaver and condemned before the mixed commission court in Freetown in 1840 (see illustration 16). (TNA. FO 84/31 I).

18. Register of Slaves - Shows details of the Spanish slave ship Emilia which was condemned before the mixed commission court in Sierra Leone on 16 March 1827.The first column is a record of the running total of slaves brought before the court up to this date (starting at 9,852). Other columns record the names, sex, age, and height of each slave. The last column records details of bodily marks on the slaves, some of which may have been inflicted by the slave-traders (e.g. perhaps branding and other cuts} as well as those that were tribal in origin (e.g. cuts and tattoos on various parts of the face and body). {TN A, FO 3 15/31}

Ve ls found guilty of ill gal trading, and which had b n lawfully iz d, w re ond mn d

a 1 gal priz , their arg ( x ept lav ) old by publi au ti n, and th profi divid d qually

b tw en th two g v m i ty w paid t th r ward for

th ir work, whil t th £ di p d f th ir bar

s par t funds fr m th pr vid d a b unty or h ad-m

n b ard and, ft r th intr du ti n f into tr

b rd), a m

nd mn

lib rat d, i u d wi h

wh t rri ry th

rdin to th

r li t d, al ng with their d tail in a

rtifi at f mai d hand d ov r t

m n t, t b mpl y d a rv nt

n

th n

g v rntn nt in

r fr lab ur r .

16 lav Trade pap~ pre ·ented to the !lou e of ornmon, 24 August 1 46: A Return of all ums ofmone:y paid in ach year in 1 07 to aptor. of ve el condemned for Violation of the Law and Treatie prohibiting the lave Trade., HP 653, p. 4. A t 1 t 2d f o. 4, . 1, and th 5th . 4, . 11 f 1 24 ntitl d th apt r t th Briti h m i ty f th pr fr m a nd mn d v 1. 1~ nnag · b unty b cam p abl t r th p ing fA t f th lst & 2nd Vi t. . 7, n 27 July 1 3 .

55

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L.i.' t: , <' I . • \ -< ntz

• · Til. IlOMHHE DE f '.\:\L\Jt \ ) • l: J£fi . ._, . D L .r:nr OG . ~· P .\ 1 L\Z\ ; • J • \ "'l' l\4.) 11:. "l:D ·, "n~ 11 ~o. · lH:L 'J'HID . \ J \l l. TO D:~

T .\H • c ~:LE H \H, nc l. · u c c Tn.\n

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19. Certificate of Emancipation and covering note from David Turnbull, Superintendent of Liberated Africans at Havana, to Lord P lmerston - This certificate was issued following the condemnation of the Spanish slave ship, Segunda Rosario, by the mixed commission court in Havana ln I 8<41. The n me of th liberated Afr1can is stated to be M1guel. His nationality, age, height, and other distinguishing marks are also recorded. The certificate 1s signed by El Conde de Fernandina, the Sp nish judge, and Santiago Oames) Kennedy, the British judge, on the mixed commission. (TNA CO 267/174).

56

57

in 1 6. M

r

1 u r tiv pr fi t

than 1 0 and

Mix

nd mn

th

p

pil t f th

w r

ill

pr pri r

Briti h nd ibiliti f appr nti hip in th

f bl k r a plot f land £ r ultivation in

thin m r th n by a diH r nt nam , a

n, n ard nt ab liti ni t a parliam ntary t

wh h t tay in i rra L t parti lllarly

av ur , nd th y al ran th ri k f b ing r aptur d and

b fth

tal, n lib rat d in Fr t wn, and m r

lib rat din Havana nd lli d Jan tiv ly. 1

did n t hav juri di t.i n v r th wn r , rna t r , r r w f

r t1 nat.i nal urts t try and puni h u h individual . But

ir bu in to £ r of th ir wn

xampl , wh n in 1 34 tw P rtugu £ und

m ' and Prin ip , Briti h rra L on wrot

f th i land r minding him t th n ity f au in th

1 w t b arri dint f£ t', nam ly th banishm nt f th m t rand

imp it.i n up n th m fa h fty fin .19 hip that

l trad , r whi h w r judg d t h v b n

with th (in ludin lav ) .

n ti n £ r 1 al in urr d,

iz d

u h

ari in r m th in t rim d ath f nd th daily ts th lav and r w durin

th trial. And th mmi i n urts w r t r d t rminin

n warran d. h ' aptain f th n val hip whi h mad th

u h in pra ti th Briti h v rnm nt

n pp ar d t t t th bill, r t 1 n. Thu, b tw n mb r 1 3

and r 1 44, l tal f 12 ut f 274 hip br u ht ur w r r st r d, and

th mp n ti n in thr f th wa paid in full by th British v rnm nt .21

17 h m , Lav Trade, p. 1 B th II , Mi d ommi ions, p.

315/ 12, i rra fP rtu fPrin and t Th m ',1 tt r, July 1 4.

20 H r 1 t, Treati , v l . i nd ii ~ r pr vi i n n Mix d m n .

21 ' Lav Tradt Paper pr mted to th Hous if ommon, 13 Mar h 1 45: A Return of the Number of~ els aptur din

a h of the aid Y4 ar., tating whether they wer ultirnatel &leas d or ndemn d, and with an A ount of th Net

Pri ds ... , HP 4 71, p ; nd A R£turn of th A moun , nearl as th can b given, paid for fllegal aptur, · d · tingui hing the omp ations paid by the aptar. from tho paid by th Brit . h ov rnrnent, p 12. Th m u n t f

mp ti n p id b th Briti h rnm nt in th thr r ~ rr d t t ll d 1, 43, . 42, d. 6. in~ rm ti n i ith r by th apt r r th v rnm nt £ r th r aini

58

Because the Briti h Navy's fforts were concentrated on the west coast of Mrica, it followed

that most adjudications took place at the court in Freetown. During the period 1 19-45 the

distribution of cases between the mix d commission courts was as follow :22

Sierra Leone Anglo-Spanish Commi sion 241 Anglo-Portuguese Commission 155 Anglo-Brazilian Commission 111 Anglo-Dutch Commission 21

Total 528

llavana 50 Rio de Janeiro 44 Surinam 1

In many of the instance th effective running of th mixed commi ions involv d do

collaboration betwe n British court officials, colonial admini trat r , and memb rs of th

consular and diplomatic services. Con uls were an e p cially valuabl our e of information on

local slave trafficking, and consular clerical staff om times mad up £ r t.affing d fi i n i in

the mix d commission . But the conditions and t rm of th ir empl yrnent were very dif£ rent

from those of commissary judg s and arbitrators. 23 On occasi n , th dif£ r n w r a

sourc of friction. During his travels through Cuba in th lat 1830 , th pr min nt a litionist,

David Turnbull, prais d Chari s David Tolme, th th n Briti h con ul at Havana 'mo t

efficient, intellig nt, and courteous', yet d spair d that 'his alary [was] limit d , b ing n t

more than 300L a year, that he ha[d] been comp 11 d to ngag in bu in as am r hant and

a planter, in ord r to enabl him to ccupy that tati n in ociety whi h th natur of hi ffi

imp ratively r quire[d]'. Like all planters and m rch nts in ub T lm .. , and

h import d g ods that would m t lik ly b d in th pur h

compl t contradi tion of Britain ' ab liti n p licy.

'impossibl that there [could] b mu h c n him and th

b rv d

th r Briti h

functionari , wh duty, of ou , it [was] t gain t lav ry in all its u

c '24 B . F th ' 1.0rm . y contrast, 1n r t wn it was 1 nial admini tration r p nsibility t

cloth and pay x- lav t t nd pl of land until m r p rm n nt ppr nti hip uld b

s ured. And th Anglo-Spanish tr aty f 1 35, whi h m d pr vi i n £ r fr d lav t b

22 Taken fr m Bethell Mixed Commis ions p. 4 al lat d fr m fi in annu 1 r p rts Briti h C mmi i n rs t th F r ign Offi . 2~ R. Fynn, British ConsuLs Abroad: Their Origin, Ro.nk and Privileg , Duti Jurisdiction and Emoluments ( J W rth im r & , 1 4 ). n uls nerally r iv d fairly g d alari in luding Vi on ul , w r ith r n t paid tall, r paid v ry littl . In th £100 pa, in M drid £350, in p 'VI rd 40 , in Ri d Jan ir 0 ; th £1,200. v rnors w r v ry w ll paid.

~" David Turnbull, uba: With Noti of Parto Rico and the lave Trade (L nd n: L ngman 1 4 , r pr in Elibron l i ri by d m nt M di rp rati n, 2 05), pp. 43-44.

59

delivered to the government whose navy had made the seizure, led to appointment in Havana

of a superintendent of liberated Mricans. Richard Madden was the first person to take up this

position in the employ of the Colonial Office, and with Foreign Office approval, though his zeal

proved controversial not only with the Cubans, but with some of his colleagues on the island.

Britain's overseas representatives were also not invariably at one on the handling of cases

brought before the mixed commission courts. The case of the Activo is one such example, but

it is also an illustration of how the courts, through trial and error, contributed to the

development of international treaty law. The treatment of slave-trading as an international

crime was novel, so the courts had to interpret and codify the new laws without the benefit of

drawing on established norms or legal precedent. Although no appeals could be made against

the courts ' decisions, the advocate general or doctors commons25 would often provide advice

on procedural matters and/ or the legal aspects of cases already heard, and this would be taken

into account when deciding on future cases of a similar nature. James Arthur Murray, the

commander of HMS Athol~ had been responsible in 1826 for seizing the Brazilian brig, Activo,

more than four degrees south of the equator, with slaving equipment and slaves on board.26

The capture came before the Anglo-Portuguese commission at Freetown,27 but before a verdict

could be reached, the slaves on board staged a rebellion and all 163 of them escaped to shore

where the customs officer within the colonial administration took custody of them. The

governor and his staff clearly had their own opinions and methods regarding suppression of

the illicit traffic, and had done some legal homework: a request to the administration by

Murray's agent for the slaves to be returned was refused with the argument that once landed

on British soil, slaves automatically became free. 28 The British law officers disagreed, and in

their opinion attempts to apply such a principle

would involve the contradiction on the part of this Country, and in the Law itself, of

establishing a regular tribunal at Sierra Leone, bound by the faith of a Treaty, and by the positive directions of an Act of Parliament, to decree the restitution of them to the Claimant as Slaves, or as having been illegally captured or detained by a British Vessel.29

25 Doctors Commons was a society of lawyers practising civil law in London. While English Common Law developed mostly independently from Roman Law, some specialised English courts, including admiralty courts, applied Roman law-based civil law. So doctors commons were suitably qualified to advise government about cases before both admiralty and mixed commission courts. 26 FO 315/ 2, Record of Anglo-Portuguese Commission at Sierra Leone, 7 July 1826; Ward, pp. 122-123

<n But, as was often the case, only the British Commissioners were present. 28 FO 315/ 2, Planta to R. W. Hay (Colonial Office) , 26 Feb 1827, reporting inter alia the opinion of His Majesty's Law Officers with regard to the case of the Activo. According to the Law Officers, the colonial administration had 'mistakenly borrowed from the Court of Kings Bench in the well known case of Somerset the Negro, namely, that a Slave acquired his freedom from the mere circumstance of his landing upon the soil of Great Britain' to argue their case. 29 FO 315/ 2, Doctors Commons to Canning, 20 Jan 1827.

60

It would not, however, have been either politically, or practically, expedient to round up the

escapees in order to hand them back into slavery, and they were therefore allowed to go free.

The colonial administration's interference had created difficulties not only for the mixed

commission but for Captain Murray. The court ruled that although the Activo had been guilty

of trading illegally in slaves, its capture had likewise been illegal because it had taken place south

of the equator. It ordered the restitution of the vessel to its master, Jose Pinto de Araujo, and that

Murray should pay unconditionally a sum of £256. 2s. 8d to cover de Araujo's legal expenses. But

further compensation for the 163 escaped slaves, demurrage of the brig, and interest 'on the

estimated Capital employed in the purchase and maintenance of the Cargo', amounted to

£10,787. 15s.30 This sum, the court ruled, should be paid by Murray, provided the governments

of Britain and the newly- independent Brazil agreed and declared that ' the said sums ought to

be so paid according to the intent and meaning of the said convention, but not otherwise '. The

mixed commission was in effect seeking legal advice from the governments concerned as to

whether, though wrongfully seized, illicit slave-traders were to be compensated for financial

losses thereby incurred. Attempts by the British minister at Rio de Janeiro to discuss the matter

with the Brazilian authorities were spurned, and in consequence Aberdeen dismis ed as

'perfectly unwarrantable' Brazil's persistent demands for the total indemnity to be paid.31

The same issue had, in fact, arisen with the Portuguese in 1823, when Britain had refused to

pay compensation, and Aberdeen, who was appointed foreign secretary for the first time in

June 1828, had no intention of making concessions for Brazil.32 British mixed court

commissioners, not always mindful of previous precedents, had to be advis d accordingly to

ensure their correct interpretation of convention in future case . In th ev nt, the master of

Activo was not compensated for the loss of his slaves, but the British gov rnment (not Captain

Murray) did pay him an indemnity of £413 11s. (£157 8s. 4d. mor than th court had ordered

be paid unconditionally for legal expenses) .33

British commissioners tended to be more ho tile towards the slav trade than th ir for ign

counterparts, and in disputed cas s the nationality of th commissioner of arbitration (literally

3°FO 315/2, Record of Anglo-Portuguese Commission at Si rra Leone, 7 July 1826. Of this total , £9,983.15 was

cited as the comp nsation for the 163 slaves, putting th price of a ingl lav at thi tim at more than £61. 31 FO 315/2, Aberdeen to Vicomte d'Itabayana, letter, 1 Dec 182 . 32 F0315/2,Aberde ntoLordPonsonby(Briti hminit ratRiodejaneiro) , despat h ,6 D c1 2 .Ab rd n tated: 'His Maj sty's government are determin d to adh r to the principle contained in the d claration

which was made to the Portugue e government. ... as far ba k as Octob r 1823 that, "no comp n tion whatever can be due to Traders, in cases of Traffick carried on under ircumstan e which con titute illicit Trade, whilst on the other hand, no condemnation of a Vess I ought to tak place, when th captur is mad at a spot, not absolutely within the Bounds prescrib d for capture by the Treaty"' . 33 Slave T-r:ade Papers presented to the Hause of Commons, 24 Aug 1846: A Return of aU Sums of Money paid by the Crown to or on behalf of Captors, in Satisfaction or Indemnification of Expenses or Damages arising from the Pro ecution or Seiz.ure of Vessels alleged to be engaged in the Slave Trade, HP 653, pp. 5-7.

61

decided by the drawing of lots) could be the most decisive factor in determining the fate of a

ship. As David Turnbull noted during his travels through Cuba in 1840, 'it may be fairly said

that the condemnation of a slaver depends not nearly so much on fact, or law, or the merits of

the case, as on the less fallible doctrine of chances' .34 A ship was far less likely to be restored to

its master in Sierra Leone where British commissioners often sat alone, than in Havana or Rio

de Janeiro (see the table 1 below). Moreover, while it was common knowledge that Spanish,

Portuguese and Brazilian vessels were adept at evading the law, information gathered by

Britain 's commissioners and its representatives overseas suggested that foreign governments

were very often complicit in such illegalities. The treaty with Spain of 1817 permitted those

Table 1: Ships Adjudicated, Condemned, and Restored at Various Mixed Courts 1831-184135

Mixed Court Ships Adjudicated Ships Condemned Ships Restored %Ships

Restored

Sierra Leone 272 267 5 1.8

Havana 30 27 3 10

R. dejaneiro 25 17 8 32

holding royal licences to continue slave trading south of the equator until 1820. But it was

discovered that the Spanish authorities continued to issue them well after this date. In 1822

Canning protested against this 'very considerable Abuse practised by the colonial Authorities

of Spain ' .36 Subsequent Spanish assurances that such abuses would not be tolerated were

nonetheless repeatedly dishonoured, with the result that this became a persistent cause of

Anglo-Spanish disagreement.

Similar problems persisted elsewhere. In 1826 Henry Chamberlain, the British consul­

general in Rio de Janeiro, alerted the Foreign Office to a highly irregular passport service

being offered by the president of the Brazilian province of Bahia. According to Chamberlain,

on the advice of local merchants likely to be 'most interested in the continuance of the very

abuse we are endeavouring to put down' ,37 he had been issuing passports permitting slave­

traders, in direct contravention of the treaty, to trade at ports north of the line. British

commissioners were informed, and instructions issued to naval officers 'so that upon the

meeting with any vessels irregularly licensed, such vessels may be dealt with according to Treaty

34 Turnbull, Cuba, pp. 40-41. 35 Figures calculated from Slave Trade Papers presented to the House of Commons on 3 May and 6 August 1842: A Return of the Number of Slave VtsSe~ Captured by Her Majesty's Cruisers since the Year 1831 inclusive . .. , HP 561, pp. 6-11 . 36 FO 315/1, Canning to Commissioners, despatch with enclosures, 25 Sept 1822; and Francisco Martinez de la Ro a to L. Hervey, letter, 3 June 1822. 37

FO 315/2, Canning to Sierra Leone Commissioners, despatch 12 Jan 1826, and subsequent correspondence from H Chamberlain (HM consul general at Rio) to Canning.

62

upon that parti ular point' .3 Brazil's r fu al to nd thi a tivity r ulted in som h at d

diplomatic exchanges, with Ab rd n ventually pr mi ing tr ng n£ r m nt m ur t

counter th Brazilian governm nt's blatant brea h f its tr aty obligation .39 P rtugue

officials w re equally compli it in u h irr gulariti . h ap Verd i land had £ r many

years been a major transit d p t for th slav trad , and the Portugu authoriti had long

been, oft n op nly, ab tting the lav rs. 40 In n in tan in 183 oop rati n b tw n

Britain's commis ioner in Si rra L on and its con ul at ap ¥ rd 1 d to th di ov ry that

the Portugu s governor of the i lands had b vi iting lav r .

Confronted with th videnc (passports with hi signatur t und on b ard ond mn d

vessels), the gov rnor denied all involv m nt, blaming in t. ad th hi f magi trat f th

island who had, h claimed, p rform d th 'work of an arti t ' in forging hi ignatur 41 h

following year th Briti h con ul rep rt d that n t only w r fraudul nt pa ports till b ing

issued, but hip b longing t th P rtugu gov rnm nt w r b ing u d t traffi lav 42

Giv n th se circum tance it is hardly urpri ing that wh n th Briti h finally lo t pati n

first with the Portugue in 1839, and th n with th Brazilian in 1 45, th y d id d n

unilateral action. In b th in tan th y mix d mmi i n urts and r rt d

to the simple exp dient of r £ rring u p

courts in Briti h oloni s. Int rnati nal law wa

iz d by th Royal Navy to vic -admiralty

. But £ w d ubt d th

morality of th poli y pursu d, and Britain' n ur d that th

obj tiv ould b a hi v d. Th Anglo-Brazilian mix d mmi whatm t

Brazilian r gard d as Britain' hi h-hand d a ti n . Th r wa h w v r an xpan i ninth

numb r f Anglo-Portugu mmi i n urts aft r 1 42, and th An 1 pani h

courts continu d to play a r I in th suppr si n f th uban lav tr d . Ind d, th

xp rienc ofBriti h offi ials inv lved in mbating th trad in th aribb an m rit furth r

attenti n. Ri hard Robert Madd n and David 1urnbul1 w r k y fi 1r in th un£ ldin

drama, and th ir liv illu trat m of th pr bl m f d by individual in impl m nting

poli i d vis d in a v ry di tant Whit h 11.

38 FO 315/2,] ph Planta t r tary to th Admir lty, 12Jan 1 2 . 39 F 315/2, Re rd of Angl Brazilian mmi i n at i rra L n , 24 J n 1 27: inv lvin Br zili n ri Heroina. 40 xampl lave Trade Paper. laid b ifm th Hou of ornnwn , Nov. 1 2 - Jul 1 27: (A) ommunication received lYy the Admiralty from Naval Officer., ince November 1 2 . n . No 29 - opy of a L tter from J.P Larke, E qui~ ; dated at Briti h on ulate, t ]ago, Cape de Verd , 13 Ma 1 27, addre d to ommodm Bullen, .B. HP , p. 17. 4 1

' 315/1 , Ma ulay & D h rty ( n ) t R nd 11 (HM rd ) , 1 tt r, 31 0 1 3 . 42 F 4/310, Doh rty t 1 4/ 40, 22Jun 1 40.

63

Our men in Havana

Richard Robert Madden

20. Dr Richard Robert Madden -Author and colonial administrator. From 1836 he was Superintendent of Liberated Africans and judge Arbitrator in the mixed commission in Havana. (National Portrait Gallery).

Richard Madden, a Catholic Irishman,

became committed to the abolitioni t

cau e whilst practising medicine in

England. Eager to join the fight against

oppr sion, he readily accepted

appointment, facilitated by hi radical

reformi t friend, Sir Francis Burdett, as a

p cial magi trate in Jamaica.43 In that

capacity he was expected to oversee the

implem ntation of the abolition of slavery

act of 1833. But the open hostility of local

planter , in part g nerat d by his

egalitarian principl and his critici m of

the working of the apprentic hip yst m

tabli bed by th act, soon led to hi

resignation. 'I found', he ub equ ntly

con£ d, 'the prot ction of the negro

in ompatibl with my own.' 44 He wa, nonethele , afford d another opportunity to rv th

abolitionist cau wh n in May 1836 h was mad first uperint nd nt of lib rated Mrican in

uba. Th po t r ulted from th tr aty with pain f June 1835, which had provided that

Briti h loni might r iv lav s lib rat d from hip ond mn d by th Anglo- pani h

mi d ommi n . hi w int nd d t prot ct emancipado from furth r maltr atm nt on

th i land. It al of£ r dar m dy t th urr nt labour h rtag in th Briti h W t Indi .45

h appointm nt au d a p litical torm in uba v n ah ad f Madd n' arrival. ' r

Madd n', n t d n ral Migu 1 a on, th island's aptain-gen ral, 'i ad ng rou man fr m

what v r point of vi w h i on id r d, and living in thi I land h will h v far to many

pp rtuniti to i minate diti u id a dir ctly or indir tly, whi h not v n my on tant

vigilan can pr v n . '46 F r warn d f a 6n' pr judi again him, M dd n wa , how v r,

in n m od to£ How th advi of dward henl y, th Briti h urt arbitrator at avana, th t

h h uld on arrival h w 'th gr at t ircumsp ti n and m d ration £ r th purp f

43 R.R. M dden, The lave Trade Aided and Abetted, and Slavery Upheld Under the Name of Pawning, on the Gold oast, (Lond n, 1 43), p. 2. 11 D.R. Murray, 'Ri hard Rob rt Madd n: Hi areer as a lav ry Ab litionist', in tudie, 61 (1972), pp. 41-53. 45 F 4/195, Strangway to Havana ommi sioner , 5 May 1836. 46 Murray, 'Madden', p. 4 .

64

allaying them' .47 And, almost immediately, there developed a remarkably acrid relationship

between the fiery Irishman and Schenley. The latter had been severely wounded at Waterloo

and knew the value of cautious diplomacy. Like Madden, he was also ready to engage in mutual

recrimination in personal correspondence with Palmerston. When, shortly after his arrival in

Cuba, Madden turned to his colleagues in the commission for support in a quarrel with Tac6n

over his refusal to grant a plot of land for the temporary accommodation of emancipados

awaiting transfer to British colonies, Schenley declined to forward an official letter of protest

to the captain-general. Madden's protest had, according to Schenley, been 'couched in

language so likely to exasperate the local authorities' that it would have been 'highly

injudicious' to do so.48 Undeterred, Madden finally succeeded in persuading the British

government to send a warship, HMS Romney to Havana. There, manned (controversially) by

black soldiers, it served as a floating transit centre for the emancipados. Further conflicts ensued

when Tac6n refused the black soldiers shore-leave, and the governm nt in Madrid sought

Madden's replacement by someone 'whose opinions and conduct [would] not prove

dangerous to the safety of the Island of Cuba. '49 But Palmers ton was not to be moved and let

the Spaniards know that he fully supported Madden's appoinunent, blaming the Cubans for

failing to share Madden's philanthropic principles.

Meanwhile, relations between Madden and Schenley took another plunge when in July 1836

the commissary judge went on sick leave, leaving Schenley in charge, with Madden temporarily

appointed as arbitrator. Schenley appears, possibly deliberately, to have concealed from

Madden the terms of his employment, resulting in the latter's uncertainty about his working

relationship with the British consul and other aspects of his job.50 Perhaps there was a whiff of

jealousy when very early on Madden started to make headway at work. For example, it had long

been standard practice for commissioners to send monthly returns to London detailing arrivals

and departures of suspected slavers from Cuban ports. But the data was patchy owing to the

refusal of the captain-general to cooperate directly with the commission rs who, instead, had

to seek his help via Tolm .. , the British consul. Madden, an innovator, had soon by-pass d

Tolme, recruited contacts from amongst the mercantile houses, and was sending back his own

separate despatches containing more detailed returns than the commissioners had previously

managed. Schenley was put out and demanded to know whence Madden had obtained his

information, and why he had not pooled it for use in a joint despatch. He was, h said, quite

prepared to acknowledge within the despatches Madden' 'superior vigilance' by highlighting

47 FO 84/195, Schenley to Palmerston, letter, 8 Oct 1836. 48 FO 84/195, Schenley to Strangways, letter, 31 Oct 1836. 49 Murray, 'Madden', p. 50. 5° FO 84/195, Madden to Palmerston, letter, 5 Nov 1836.

65

that information obtained by Madden alone. Angry at what he perceived as Schenley's

deliberate attempts to misconstrue his motives, Madden complained directly to Palmerston.

Schenley decried as 'so mean a trick' Madden's habit of sending 'vindictive' letters to

Palmerston in the diplomatic bag at the last minute, so that Schenley would 'remain a month

undefended or explained' .51 In the end, after months of bitter exchanges, Palmerston had to

intervene, with the reprimand that '[s]uch Disputes ... waste in unprofitable discussion and

Correspondence that Time which ought to be employed in forwarding the Public Service; and

if these Differences come to the knowledge of the local government they cannot fail to impair

the authority of the Commission' .52

In fact, the commission faced many obstacles to its effective operation without this in-fighting

adding to its burden. The Anglo-Spanish treaties had not been promulgated in Cuba and, in

spite of receiving evidence from Madrid to the contrary, the captain general repeatedly insisted

that he had not yet received instructions from the Spanish government on this matter.53 Slave

dealers were attempting to conceal their illicit trade by claiming that the Africans found on

seized slave ships or sold at market were 'ladinos' (i.e. long-settled in Cuba and legally

enslaved), who were merely being transported within the island, not 'bozals' (newly-imported

Africans) . Fraudulent papers found on board slave ships would often testify to this falsehood

by allocating Spanish names to their slave cargo. And Spanish slave ships were increasingly

using the US and, prior to the passing ofPalrnerston's act in 1839, Portuguese flags in order to

avoid being searched. The result was that few cases were being brought before the mixed

commission, and few liberated Mricans were being taken into custody by Madden. It was this

issue that compelled Madden and Schenley finally to take united action in the form of a letter

to Nicholas Trist, the Virginia-born US consul in Havana, asking him to investigate the abuses

involving the US flag. Trist, however, returned their correspondence and refused to discuss the

matter given 'the very limited official character' invested in him. 54

By 1837 James Kennedy, a former MP from Palmerston's own Tiverton constituency, had

been appointed the new commissary judge, followed, in 1839, by Campbell J. Dalrymple, the

new arbitrator. Their period of tenure (Kennedy's until 1851, Dalrymple's until his death in

1847), would not pass without criticism: Kennedy was said to devote 'his whole time' to the

study of ornithology, and Dalrymple described as a 'poor man ... too simple to do good, and

51 FO 84/195, Schenley to Macleay, private note.

52fO 84/195, Palmerston to Schenley & Madden, letter, 15 Dec 1836.

51\CO 318/ 146, Madden (as Superintendent for Liberated Africans) to Foreign Office, despatch, 27 Feb 1839;

and FO 84/ 195, from Foreign Office to Havana Commissioners, 9 May 1836. 54

FO 84/ 195, Schenley & Madden to Palmerston, 30 Nov 1836; and Trist to Schenley & Madden, letter, 29 Nov 1836.

66

too innocent to do harm' .55 And Madden, previously frustrated by what he saw as Schenley's

feeble protests at treaty violations, was no more impressed with the new commissioners in these

respects.56 Nonetheless, in the course of their duty, and at a time when the Cuban slave trade

was experiencing an upsurge fuelled by the sugar industry, Kennedy and Dalrymple reported:

... an astonishing number of new sugar estates have been opened throughout the

island within the last two years .... We regret to think that of these estates many have

been commenced by American, and some even British subjects, who will thus give considerable impetus to the slave trade by means of their capital, industry and skill ...

it is with great regret, that on account of the new plantations the demand for negroes in the market is as high as ever, and the price therefore remains proportionally high

also, consequently the inducement to prosecute the trade will continue the same, so

long as those inclined to engage in it may find protection from the governments which refuse the only cooperation that would be effective to control them.57

The available statistics on the traffic to and from Cuba in 1838, and the national flags

employed by the vessels concerned, are shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Ships sailing between Havana and the coast of Africa in 1838, and the national

flags employed by them58.

Ships sailing from Ships arriving in Havana Havana to Coast of Africa from Coast of Africa

Portuguese 42 44 American 19 -Spanish 8 4 French 1 -Brazilian 1 1 Russian - 1 TOTAL 71 50

Madden estimated that the number of Africans being imported to Cuba had risen from

under 20,000 in 1836, to 25,000 in 1837 and 27,000 in 1839.59 Yet th use of foreign flags

meant that in 1837 only two cases were brought before th Anglo-Spanish court.60

55 Luis Martinez-Fernandez, Fighting Slavery in the Caribbean: the Life and Times of a British Family in Nineteenth­Century Havana, (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 47. 56 RL. Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood: the Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict between Empires over Slavery in Cuba, (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), p. 144. Madden warn d his uccessor, David Turnbull, not to depend on either commissioner. 57 FO 84/274, Kennedy and Dalrymple to Palmerston, despatch No. 3, 1 Jan 1839. 58 Ibid

59 FO 84/299, Madden to H. Laboucher (Secretary of State for Coloni and War), 1 tter, 30 May 1839. 60 Bethell, Mixed Commissions, p. 84.

67

Some months before Palmerston's act was passed, the ship Venus, registered in Baltimore

under the US flag with several American citizens on board, departed Havana for Africa. It

returned with a new name, the Duquesa de Braganza, and under the Portuguese flag, to deposit

a staggering 860 slaves in Havana. Those on board had boasted how, when questioned about

their activities, they had told visiting British cruisers off the coast of Africa, that 'it was no

business of theirs, and that they were Americans' -evidence, thought james Kennedy, 'of the

feelings held by certain classes of the American community with regard to the slave trade, and

the part taken by the British government to suppress it' .61 Indeed, when presented by Kennedy

with details of the circumstances surrounding the Venus case, Trist, the US consul, responded

with great hostility, professing

a mixture of sorrow and indignation, at the spectacle of such prostitution of the energies of the British people, in theatrical playings off, to their delusion and to the benefit of whomever it might concern, in a cause which ... is sanctified by a sincerity

and self-forgetfulness, in proportion to the intensity of which every empty show, got up by self-seekers, turning to profit, becomes intensely disgusting and hateful.

Trist objected to British officials interfering in matters relating to the conduct of American

citizens. He also pointed to Britain's hypocrisy with regard to her continued, if less obvious,

role in the perpetuation of the slave trade, asserting that

... no Consul or other functionary of the US at this place or elsewhere ... however

sincere his zeal against the slave trade, would ever dream of volunteering an official

communication to a functionary of Great Britain, in regard to the amount of British

fabrics made-expressly for the coast of Mrica, nor of the number of casks of shackles, (the distinctive instrument for carrying on the slave trade) of British manufacture, annually exported to this island; some of which I have seen passing through the custom house here, without attracting any more notice from either officers or

bystanders than so many boxes of Dutch cheeses ... He [the Consul] might have discovered that they could not have got here without the gross violation of British law.62

This was not the first time that the British had been accused of double standards. And whilst

Britain continued to enforce zealously international agreements to suppress the slave trade,

domestic legislation outlawing the supply of equipment or capital for the trade was left

untested. What is more, whilst crusading against African enslavement, Britain was

simultaneously supplying its colonies with indentured 'coolies' from the Indian sub-continent.

How, asked Trist, could British commissioners press him to act over the Venus,

at the very period when, ... Lord Glenelg ... was engaged in drawing nice distinctions

as a basis for instructions to the Governors of British Guiana, charging them, that care

must be taken to prevent Africans being imported, (say from the Coast of Guinea,

61 FO 84/ 274, Kennedy to Palmerston, despatch, 19 Jan 1839. 62 FO 84/274, Trist to HM Commissioners, letter, 8 Jan 1839.

68

distant 50 or 60 days sail from Demerara) under the order in Council permitting the

importation from India at more than double the distance, and in any quantity in

which they could be stowed on board of any craft, the industrious, the frugal , the

delicately-shaped, the gentle, the graceful, the refined, the engaging natives of

Hindostan! Of these rice-eaters-( eaters when philanthropy leaves them any of their rice to eat)-... any quantity that can be kidnapped into an agreement, under which they fancy themselves about to be taken to 'one of the Company's villages ' . Hindoos?

Yes! In any quantity. But beware of touching an Ajrican!63

But Trist's angry outpourings were also a reflection of his favourable attitude towards slavery,

and it was increasingly clear that he had become personally involved in facilitating the trade in

Cuba, a point Madden and the British commissioners wished to demonstrate.

Cuban sugar production had meanwhile reached a record high, and by 1840 Cuba's overall

level of commerce surpassed that of metropolitan Spain. Opportunities were ripe for personal

wealth generation. Tac6n was reported to receive ten dollars for every African illegally

imported into the island amounting, over the four years of his tenure as captain-general, to an

estimated total of 500,000 dollars.64 The salary of the American consul, aid to have been paid

by fees collected for services on trade matters, was described as 'one of the most lucrative

offices in the gift of government' .65 But Trist supplemented his considerable earnings by also

taking the job of Portuguese consul in Havana, a post which had hitherto long remained

vacant, and which now put him in charge of issuing papers to ships whose flags were most

involved in slave-trading. Outraged by this development, Kennedy fulminated to Palmerston:

... when no such person was found ready to undertake the disgrace of sharing its associations with the slave trade-when· the only occupation and advantage it could give proceeded from the slave dealers, proportioned, too as the office holder screened and aided them in their iniquities, the one person above all others they could find ready to become their instrument and assistant was the Am rican consul! And as if the office of itself, on account of its only existing duties, had not been sufficiently disgraceful, he thus added the indecency of associating with it the compromising the flag and national character of his republic, the laws of which declared the severest penalties against the slave trade, while its citizens were openly,

and with impunity, furnishing it vessels and giving it every assistance their ingenuity could devise. 66

British naval officers had for some time been aware of masters of slave ships carrying papers

signed by Trist, evidence, it seemed, of his alleged profiteering from the illicit trade. In one

notable case which came before the mixed commission in Sierra Leone, a pile of blank forms

63 FO 84/274, Trist to Kennedy & Dalrymple, letter, 2July 1839. 64 RR. Madden, TM Island of Cuba: its Resources, Progress, and Prospects (London: Chari s Gilpin, 1849) , p. 32. 65 Turnbull, Cuba, p. 44. 66 FO 84/274, Kennedy to Palmerston, despatch, 27 Oct 1839.

69

bearing Trist's signature were found in the desk of a Spanish passenger on board the captured

slaver Constitucao.67 Trist was apparently endorsing Spanish slavers as American vessels, or

testifying to the legitimacy of what were really illicit slave voyages undertaken by Portuguese

ships. Moreover, British commissioners had long-since suspected Trist of facilitating, by issuing

false documents of emancipation, a slave-smuggling operation between Cuba, Texas and

America's slave-holding states.68 The use of false documents, including those proclaiming bozals

to be either ladinos or emancipated slaves, was commonplace, but there was little point in

attempting to disprove the authenticity of such documents in Cuban courts. Then in 1839, in

what would prove to be one of the most notorious cases of Cuba's violation of Spain's anti-slave­

trade agreements, the opportunity to expose the fraud in a US court presented itself. Fifty three

bowls, recently imported into Cuba from Africa and bound for Puerto Principe on the

Baltimore-made schooner Amistad, rebelled. They killed the captain and cook, and held the

two Cuban slave-owners, Jose Ruiz and Pedro Montes, captive to navigate the ship back to

Africa. But whilst steering an Africa-bound course by day, the Cubans turned the ship around

at night in the hope of attracting the attention of other ships and themselves being rescued.

Currents eventually carried the Amistad into US waters off the coast of Long Island, where the

USS Washington intercepted her, and the Africans on board were jailed pending a resolution of

the case. The Spanish government wanted the ship restored and the mutineers, whom they

claimed to be ladinos (as passports issued by the Cuban captain-general falsely testified), to be

returned to Cuba to face trial for murder. But a legal team put together by American

abolitionists, and which included former US President, John Quincy Adams, argued that the

Africans were really bozals, illegally enslaved, and their 'mutiny' had merely been an attempt to

regain their liberty.

When news of this case reached Madden, he determined to help the Africans by offering

himself as an expert witness to expose the fraudulent and ubiquitous use of the term ladino.

Ahead of the case reaching court Madden wrote to the American abolitionists, detailing Trist's

misuse of power as an example of this widespread fraud. The subsequent publication by the

Americans of Madden's letter resulted in much public interest and debate. In the meantime,

in a separate letter to Kennedy, Madden expressed fears that Trist might seek to influence the

trial, and that their status and therefore their lives would ultimately depend upon his report. 69

Yet, as Madden was also aware, however vital his own evidence might be, his involvement in the

case might irritate the authorities in London. He therefore sought Kennedy's approval for his

proposed deposition as an expert witness. Convinced that a great body of opinion in Britain

67FO 315/13, Walter Lewis (commissary judge at Sierra Leone) to Rear-Admiral G Elliot, 26 May 1840.

68 FO 84/196, Macleay & Schenley to Palmerston, despatch 1 Jan 1836.

69 CO 318/146, Madden to Kennedy, minute, 25 Sept 1839.

70

would regard the execution of the negroes as 'judicial murder', he hoped that 'where the vii

[was] so great, and in a case so irremediable by any ordinary means', the government would

not think that he had over tepped his duty or interfered with that of the commis ary judge.70

70 Ibid.

21 . Dr Madden's d position at the Amist d t rial in N w Yo rk - Madden took leave from his official duties in Havana to make a deposition before the court in the United States. His evidence helped secure freedom for the Amistad's African captives. (TNA. CO 318/1 46).

71

Madd n ' d p iti n had to tak th form fa w rn affidavit b for a 1 gaily r c gni d

auth rity, and in it w uld b ' ntirely ut f th qu ti n ' t a k a uban t act in thi

apa ity, Madd n a k d K nn dy in t ad. But K nn dy di appr d f M dd n' pr po d

our f a tion and r fu t hi affidavit. 71 Madden, who had

n rant d 1 a u nally and w ar hi affidavit

ph tr ng in w York. n decid d t xt nd his tay in rd r t

app ar in urt a an xp rt witn , and h duly rep rt d ba k to Lond n details of th court

pr ding .72 IfMadd

to wh mh r p rt d w r al rath r n rvou . An un ign d hand-writt n uote p nn d

fits ffi iaJ ad vi d that ' thi very ingular tory h uld not b pia d nth r ord

Offi by r gist ring thi lett r h r ... It i a trang and awkward story with whi h it i

quit as w 11 that ur hould n tint r~ r , unl nab lut n s ity.' 73

In th v nt, Madd n' vid n at th trial prov d ru ial. tting th I gal cont xt, h

xplain d that imp rting Afri an into uba as Jav after 1820 was prohibit d by a tr aty to

whi h pain wa party, and that btaining fal sh w that th Afri an had been slav s

before 1 20, £ r a fe paid to th uban authoriti s, wa a mmonpla and imple bu in

mark om being lo at d v ry lose to th aptain

g , and vid n had gath r d prior to d parting£ rAm rica p int d

t having pur has d th Amistad lav at n of th markets. Furth rm r ,

havin vi it d th a us din jail, Madden uld a ert, nth ba i of th ir lingui ti kills and

th r b havioural £ atur , that th y w r in fa t bozals ill gaily import d into Cuba. h

n w pap w r fill d with d tail f thi n ati nal t ry. 74 Aft r a I ng and omplex trial th

fr d and v ntually nt t Si rra L one. Lord J hn Ru 11, th n Ionial

r tary, duly a knowledg d th 'z al and ability' with whi h Madd n had a t din th ca e. 75

Hi all g ti n again t ri t al o r ult d in th latt r ' r m val from uba and a

nal nquiry int hi ondu t76 Tri twas not, h w v r, indi t d, but 1at r mad f

1 rk f th D partm nt, and th th p ac ttl m nt with th

M xi an whi h r u1ted, in 1 48, in th ir 1 to th Unit d tat s f a1ifornia and N w

M xi o. Thi wily g ntl man', Madd n sub qu ntly ob rv d, 'i th Am rican c mmi ion r

71

7'J.

73

72

1 / 14 , M dd n t Bla kw d ( nior J rk in lonial Offi ), I tt r, 3 t 1 39.

31 / 146, M dd n t L rdjohn Ru II, I tl r, 20 D 1 39.

f th Amistad cas , nd full t xt of m f th n w pap r arti I , p rt. rg/

I nial Offi t Madd n , I tt r, 2Jan 1 4 .

ugar t Made with Blood, pp. 1 1 .

L rd ub equ nt

in M xi o ... The r ad r will notice the Cuban apprenticeship of this Ameri an diplomatist­

the preparatory cour e of intrigue, to fit him for the tate-swindling diplomacy in Mexico.'77

Trist was not the only consul in Havana to fall foul of Dr Madden. Charles Tolme, the Briti h

consul there had for some tim been regarded with u picion by his colleagues in the mix d

commission.78 In 1836, for example, it was reported that he had 'incautiously certified the

clearance of three Spanish vessels, which he had reason to£ ar were notorious Slavers' .79

Then,

early in 1839, Kennedy wrote to Palm rston bemoaning Tolm ''s frequ nt socialising with lav -

traders, and the fact that he had entered into busines with Franci cod Goyri, who had mad

his fortune by previously working for 'the most notorious Slav dealer of hi day' .80

All the

warning igns had long been manifest both Tolme and ch nl y po s ss d lav s th m elv and

had tried to persuade Kennedy to purchas lave on his first arrival at post ch nl y had al o

made gifts of slaves to Tolme's step-daught r and to Trist' brother-in-law at th end of hi

posting.81 But in spite of all the evidence against Tolme, Palm rston did not pre s for his r moval ;

instead, the Foreign Offic agreed that any futur con ul in Havana 'should b int rdict d from

having anything to do with Commerce' .82 How v r, Madden was not content to 1 t thing re t,

and in March 1840 h launched a new offen ive, detailing to hi uperiors at the Colonial Offic

instances ofTolme's blatant misconduct, and accusing him of having worked with Trist to d feat

British government measures. Tolme, he denounced as 'a lave buyer inter sted in th lav

mark t ... a bad promoter of th obj cts of the Commi ion and a zealous friend of the int r ts

of slavery', and, in K nnedy's words, his gen ral condu t had be n nothing hort of 'an act of

treason' .83 Yet, exclaimed Madd n, Palmerston continu d to 1 t Tolme hold thi office. Ind d,

under these conditions, Madden hims lf £ lt that he would be b tt r employ d l wh r .

Vernon Smyth, under-secretary of state forth coloni , was uf:fi i ntly p rturb d by Madden'

denunciation of the errant Tolme 'and though le dir tly y t not very ambiguously the condu t

of the For ign Office itself for maintaining Mr Tolm in that po ition', to r quest Ru 11 to

speak privat ly with Palmerston about having~ lm ... r mov d. 4

77 Madden, Island of Cuba, p. 87. 78 Tolme had, in 1836, made it clear that he want d no lo o-op ration b tw n hi offi e and that of th Commission rs, .g. FO 4/ 197, Tolme to ommi ion rs, 1 tt r, 2 ov. 1 36, in whi h h tat : .. ur two branches of s rvi - they are you know of v ry different clas , th obj t of yours, i th furth ran of a particular int re t, 11 important, I admit but not p pular her , whilst to min bel ngs th maint nan and promotion f general int rests , for which a rtain d gre of popularity i requi it -and th t popularity I ould not hope to njoy in thi place, if the on ulat w r look d n ted with th mmi i n." 79 FO 84/ 197, Sch nley & Madden to Palm rston, d spatch 4 t. 1

FO 84/274, K nn dy to Palm r ton , de patch 16 Mar. 1 3 . 81 FO 4/274, Kenn dy to Palmerston , despatch 2 May 1 39. 82 FO 84/274, FO to Kenn dy, not , 29 July 1839. 83 CO 318/149, Madden to Vernon Smyth, n t , 2 Mar 1 40.

N t writt n by Vernon Smyth in th margin f Madd n ' not to him f 20 Mar h 1 40.

73

Madden achieved what he wanted: Russell appointed him to the commission of inquiry into

the administration of British coastal settlements on the west coast of Africa; and in August 1840

Palmerston relieved Tolme of his position in Havana.85 Although this was to be Madden's last

official involvement in the cause of abolition, he went on to fight for the rights of others,

including Jews in Damascus, and Aborigines in Western Australia, before returning to Ireland

where he worked until 1880 and died in 1886.86

David Turnbull

The two vacancies in Havana created by the departure in 1840 of Madden and Tolme were

quickly filled by the same man, David Turnbull. He was well known in England and in Cuba for

his recently-published book, Travels in the West, in which he exposed the iniquities of the Cuban

slave trade. The Anglo-Spanish mixed commission courts had, he claimed, become mere

sinecures,87 and he urged that instead of simply adjudicating the few ships brought before

them, their powers should be extended, enabling them 'to consider the civil right, under the

existing laws of Spain, of an imported Mrican to his freedom, after the fact of his being landed

in the island' .88 This would, in effect, allow any boz.al brought to Cuba and enslaved after 1820

to bring his case to the mixed commission in Havana and thereby assert his right to freedom.

If a slave-owner's legal right to his slaves could be successfully challenged in court, in all

likelihood he would be discouraged from investing in further slave imports. Further publicity

was given to this proposal when Turnbull addressed the World Anti-Slavery Convention, but his

repetitive letters to both the Foreign Office and Colonial Office on this subject suggest what he

most desired was a high-level official response to his ideas. Strong opposition was expected

from Spain, which Turnbull proposed be countered by a British commitment to recognise and

guarantee Cuban independence. But if Spain would agree to these measures, Britain could

guarantee Spain's possession of Cuba as long as the island remained free of the slave trade.89

Palmerston expressed doubts, but saw some merit in this proposal and eventually asked his

officials to draw up a draft convention for presentation to the Spanish government.90

Buoyed up by this knowledge, and with his eye already on the vacancies created in Havana by

the departure of Madden and Tolme, Turnbull proposed that these positions be combined and

upgraded, and that he be the first appointee to this new position. His apparent sense of

85 FO 72/559, Palmerston to Tolme, despatch 22 Aug 1840. 86 J. M. Rigg, 'Madden, Richard Robert (1798-1886) ', rev. Lynn Milne, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) [http:/ /www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17753]. 7 For example, in 1840 only one slave vessel, the Merudita, and in 1841 two vessels, the Jesus Maria and Segunda

Rosario, were condemned at the Havana. 88 Turnbull, Cuba, p. 342. 89 Murray, Odious Commerce, p. 137. 90 Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood, pp. 136-37.

74

self-importance did not go unnoticed. Lord Edward H ward, Russell's private secretary, not d:

'Mr Turnbull is very magnificent in his ideas-h wishes to be Consul-General-First

Commissioner of the Mixed Commission Court and Superintendent of Lib rated Africans and

to have under him 3 or 4 Vice Consuls and a Man of War Steamer at his di posal. '91 Neverthel s ,

Russell approved the combined position of Consul and Superintendent (i.e. with no upgrading

of status), and Turnbull's appointment to it. And since the consular half of the job was the

Foreign Office's responsibility, Palmerston had, with the assistance of the British and Foreign

Anti-Slavery Society, to be persuaded to approve the plan.92 It, nevertheless, became clear v ry

early on that what one author describes as Turnbull's brash sal smanship'93 was an irritant to

Palmerston. He privately warned Turnbull 'against the Danger of giving way to an excessive

Desire for personal Distinction not the Result of personal Labour', and confided in official his

fear that Turn bull would 'get himself in to Difficulties by an overweening fondness for Display'. 94

By the time Turnbull arrived at post, unrest was brewing amongst the island's inhabitants.

The Creole community were fed up with oppre sive taxes being levied on their wealth by the

Spanish government, as well as the repressive measures, such as the d nial of higher education

and press censorship, designed to stymie political expression. Provi ion in Spain's 1833

constitution depriving Cubans of any representation in the Spanish Corte had 'produced a

feeling of hatred against the mother country that never before existed in Cuba' .95 A strong

desire amongst Creoles for independence was, how ver, tempered by an insecurity fann d by

Spain. Turnbull in his Travels in the West wrote:

... it is the policy of the court of Madrid to k ep th island of Cuba in h r dep nd nee;

and this, it is supposed, can only be done ef£ ctually by the salutary terror inspired by the presence of a numerous, half-savage n gro population. Th exi tenc of uch a population seems at once to justify and require the pre ence of a peninsular army,

which ... produces such a pre sure on Creole interests, as to have hith rto deterred

the native inhabitants from any open attempt to assert their ind p nd nc .96

Turnbull's arrival also coincided with a slave revolt in Cienfuegos province, and th re w re

rumours that Britain had negotiated emancipation for all the island' laves. Many Cuban

believed that the British ship HMS Romney, still tationed at Havana, was a centr of subver ive

activity, and that its black soldiers were inspiring r b Ilion. And Madd n's w 11 publici d rol

91 CO 318/149, Lord Edward Howard, minute, 4 Au 1 40. 92 CO 318/149, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 July 1840. Murray, Odious Commerce, p. 139. 93 Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood, p. 133. 94 FO 72/559, Palmerston to official , minute, 19 Aug. 1 40. This was aft r Turnbull had ask d wh th r h might be allowed to accept Spanish or French d coration , in light of hi panish 'lit rary accompli hments' . Palmerston had repli d that he could not. 95 Madd n, Island of Cuba pp. 55-56. 96 Turnbull, Cuba, p. 171.

75

in the Ami tad case had contributed to a general anglophobia. The last thing the Cubans

wanted during these unstable times was another avowed abolitionist stoking unrest. The new

captain-general, Pedro Tellez de Giron, refused to grant Turnbull his exequatur, a written

recognition of his posting, and warned the metropolitan government to have him removed or

risk a colonial rebellion.97 The metropolitan government, financially and politically indebted

to Britain, had to grant Turnbull his exequatur, but continued to try and persuade Palmerston

to have him replaced. Palmerston would not hear of Turnbull's removal. As things stood it

appeared that his only crime had been to hold views on slavery which 'instead of being

considered in this country as blameable, are in fact thought to be highly praiseworthy', and

'pointed him out to Her Majesty's Government as a fit person to hold those appointments' .98

As it happened, Turnbull did come close to being dismissed, not for his opinions, but for

impropriety in his personal finances. His former landlady, Margaret Stephen, had written to

Russell accusing Turnbull of repeatedly refusing to repay a debt he had owed her for more than

sixteen years. When threatened with the sack, Turnbull blamed his wife for the debt which he

said he had not, until that moment, been aware of, and which he asserted he was now willing to

repay. All the evidence suggested Turnbull had fabricated his wife's culpability, but in the

absence of definitive proof, Russell felt he had no option but to accept Turnbull's word on the

matter.99 If Turnbull was relieved at not having been put on the next boat to England, he must

have been equally worried at the prospect of staying in Cuba where hostility towards him was

growing. In December 1840 Arthur Aston, the British minister in Madrid, had asked the Spanish

government to consider adopting a draft convention giving the mixed courts investigative

powers to determine whether enslaved negroes in Cuba 'have or have not been imported into

that island since the 30 October, 1820, and whether therefore they ought or ought not to be

restored to freedom' .100 The matter was referred by Madrid to the Cuban authorities, asking that

they canvass opinions of leading corporations and individuals. The captain-general made sure

that those consulted were planters and merchants or others most likely to have benefited from

the slave trade, and their rejection of the proposed new treaty was unanimous. Responses ranged

from outrage at the imminent assault on Spanish sovereignty, to fears of insubordination of slave

to master, and the threat to property (slaves) that such a convention would create.

97 Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood, p. 139. 98

Slave Trade Papers, Carrespondence with Fareign Powers- Spain - Class B, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1841, presented to both Hou.ses of Parliament, 1842. No. 15., Palmerston to Mr Aston (HM Minister at Madrid), 6 Mar 1841, pp. 17-19. 99

CO 318/149, Russell to Turnbull, 27 Oct 1840, and minutes by officials, 10 Oct 1840; and FO 72/584, Turnbull to Russell, 22Jan 1841; and CO 318/153, minutes by officials 31 Mar 1841 concluding that Turnbull had to be taken at his word. 100

Slave Trade Papers, Carrespondence with F areign Powers - Spain - Class B, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1841, presented to both Hou.ses of Parliament, 1842. No. 1., Aston to Palmerston, 30 Dec 1840, first enclosure in No. 1: Aston toM de Ferrer, 17 Dec 1840, p. 1.

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U nsurprisingly, Spain cited this public reaction as grounds for rejecting the treaty. Most Cubans

recognised Turnbull's book as being the source of Britain 's proposal, the consequence of which,

according to Turnbull, already the recipient of a great many abusive letters, was ' to make my

. . th H f ·1' 101 position at e avana one o extreme pen .

Unperturbed, Turnbull decided to challenge the Cuban administration head-on. He had

inherited from Madden an extensive intelligence network of restive slaves and free coloureds,

liberal Creoles, and paid informants, and through them learned of illicit slave landings and

infringements on the rights of emancipados.102 Of particular interest to him were cases of

negroes emancipated in British colonies who had been kidnapped or duped by their former

owners into travelling to Cuba where they were immediately re-enslaved. Turnbull decided to

take it upon himself to investigate individual cases of this sort in an attempt to secur the

victims' freedom. One of his first test cases involved an emancipado called Gabino who had been

released from a slave ship sixteen years earlier, but who was re-sold into bondage four times, a

fee being payable to a Cuban official with each change of ownership. Turnbull gave details of

the case to the captain general and applied for Gabino's release and back-payment of his

wages.103 The very next day the captain-general issued a firm response:

I do not recognise in you the power to listen to complaints of this nature; and stilll ss that of taking the name of the negro in question, and of making representations in consequence, whether as British Consul or as Superintendent of Liberated Africans ...

By this act you have interfered in a matter very foreign to your official character.

Turnbull had only been in Cuba a few weeks, and already de Giron considered hi 'pr ence

in the Island incompatible with its tranquillity and preservation', such that he felt a duty to

hand him his passport.l04 An angry Turnbull replied in suitably emotive terms:

But Your Excellency will permit me to suggest that if I am vi ited with deportation, th

voice of the exile will be heard in every corner of Europe; that if I b come th victim of assassination, while residing under the immediate protection of Your Excellency, the blood of the first Martyr which this fair Island shall have given to the Cause of Freedom will cry aloud for vengeance, and will serve to nourish and invigorate that glorious Tree of Liberty which first planted under the British Banner .. .is destined to

spread like the Blessed Banyan until its shadow encircles the Earth throughout the whole extent of the broad Girdle of the Tropics. 105

101 Slave trade Papers, Correspondence with Foreign Powers - Spain (consular) - Class B, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1841, pre ented

to both Houses of Parliament, 1842, No. 182., Turnbull to Aberdeen, 25 Nov 1841 , pp. 387-88. 102 Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood, p. 141. 103 CO 318/149, Turnbull to Captain General de Giron, letter, 21 D c 1840. 104 CO 318/149, de Giron to Turnbull, letter, 22 Dec 1840. 105 FO 84/319, Turnbull to de Giron, letter, 28 D c 1840, cited in Paquette, p. 142 .

77

When, however, Turnbull requested the British commissioners to convene the mixed court

to determine whether Gabino could be said to be in '"a state of perfect freedom', they refused

on the grounds that the court's functions were limited, and any expansion of its remit would

have to be sanctioned by the British and Spanish governrnents.l06

Another case that consumed Turnbull was that of Henry Shirley, a British subject, kidnapped

from Jamaica in 1830 by a Cuban smuggler named LeDesma, and enslaved in Santa Cruz. Shirley

had managed, ten years later, to communicate his circumstances to his aunt in Jamaica, and she

had in turn appealed to Jamaica's governor for assistance. Turnbull's predecessor, Tolme, had

said he believed Shirley to be dead, and correspondence from Cuban officials claiming to have

carried out investigations, also proffered the same conclusion.107 But Turnbull believed none of

this, and went to great lengths, illustrative of his dogged character, to gather evidence and settle

the case by some other means. He found a witness in Jamaica who could identify LeDesma as the

man guilty of kidnapping Shirley, and suggested that he be sent to Havana to testify. If de Giron

would agree, Le Desma could then be sent to Jamaica for trial. De Giron dismissed the proposal

as contrary to the laws of Spain.108 Turnbull's exertions led Palmerston to order the British

minister in Madrid to 'demand liberation of this man',109 and to persuade the Spaniards that

mixed courts should be able to offer emancipados the choice of remaining in Cuba or moving to

a British colony.110 Before de Giron had time to formulate a response to these renewed demands,

a change of government in Spain led to his replacement by the more anglophile Geronimo

Valdes. Valdes gave renewed hope to Turnbull and his allies in the British and Foreign

Anti-slavery Society: he arrived in Cuba with instructions to enforce the Treaty of 1835, and one

of his first actions was to close Havana's public barracoons.111 Turnbull introduced himself to the

new captain-general by sending him a long despatch outlining all the issues currently troubling

him, including the taking of bribes by Cuban officials under de Giron, the fate of emancipados,

and shore-leave for the black soldiers of the Romney. It took a number of weeks for Valdes to

respond, and when he did it was to say that he could not possibly grapple with the numerous

issues raised by Turnbull after so short a time in office. Palmerston, who had on many previous

occasions expressed irritation with Turnbull's verbose correspondence,112 could not resist

commenting that this despatch, 'from its length and Prolixity I daresay was never read'. n3

106 FO 84/356, Turnbull to Commissioners, note, 4Jan 1841, and Commissioners to Turnbull, note, 9 Jan 1841. 107 FO 84/356, Gabriel Grenada to Turnbull, letter, 2 Jan 1841. 108 FO 84/356, Turnbull to Palmerston, despatch 24Jan 1841. 109 FO 84/356, Turnbull to Palmerston, despatch 2 Jan 1841; and Palmerston to Aston, note, 21 Feb 1841. 110 Murray, Odious Commerce, p. 286. 111 Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood, p . 145. 112 See, for example: FO 72/584, in which Palmerston minuted, 28 Apr 1841: 'I wonder Mr Turnbull does not send me Copies of every private note he writes or receives in the Course of each day ... He uses Three Times as many words as are needful for his meaning'. 113 FO 72/584, Palmerston, minute, Mar 1841.

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Turnbull's relations with the British commissioners also became very fraught In February

1841, Schenley had informed Turnbull that Kennedy, was using an emancipado call d Pancho as

a slave. Whilst Schenley was probably motivated by a desire for revenge (Kennedy had previously

exposed him to Palmers ton for purchasing slaves), his accusations were largely substantiated by

Turnbull's characteristically robust investigations. 114 Revealingly, during his investigation of

Schenley for a similar offence in 1839, Kennedy had expressed the view that 'undoubtedly there

is a great temptation [to purchase slaves] considering that in wages we must pay as much in a

year and a half or two years as would amount to the price of the negro ' .115 Whilst conceding that

Kennedy had behaved improperly, Palmerston rebuked Turnbull for his abrasive attitude, and

instructed him to show more respect for his colleagues. Yet more woes afflicted Turnbull who,

having never relinquished his desire for higher status and pay, wrote to Palmerston to complain

about his situation. He was, he said, the only foreign consul on the island who did not enjoy a

carriage for transport, and it was impossible for him to live in such an expensive place on his

current salary. Furthermore, his life had been reduced to 'drudgery' by all the document

copying he was forced to do, and for which he hoped the Foreign Office would provide him with

two clerks.116 The request only provoked further admonition from Palmers ton who instructed

his officials to 'State that the next Time he applies for higher Pay and allowances I shall recall

him; and that as to Clerks if he would send me less Trash he would need less copying' .11 7

Given his failure to establish a close working relationship with either the Spanish authorities

or his British colleagues, it must have been welcome relief to Turnbull when, during th course

of his consular duties, he encountered a man who would prove to be his ally in the fight against

slavery. Francis Ross Cocking had recently come to Cuba and taken employment a a

bookkeeper with a Cuban businessman who had sub equently swindled him out of his wages.

Cocking, a British national, sought his consul's help. But all Turnbull's conscientious

representations to Valdes on Cocking's behalf, achieved nothing, since, as Valdes reminded him

it was for the courts to provide redress. Sympathetic to his financial plight, and impressed by his

professed antipathy towards the slave trade, Turnbull employed Cocking to assist with cl ri al

tasks.118 Cocking spoke Spanish like a native, having lived more than ten years in Venezuela, and

had very good contacts in Cuba's mercantile community, so he also made for Turnbull a good

spy. Very soon Cocking also started to receive a fee from the British and Foreign Anti- lavery

Society in return for information on the Cuban slave-trade. He became a corr spondent writing

114 FO 83/356, Turnbull to Palmerston, despatch 12 Mar 1841. 115 FO 84/274, Kennedy to Palmerston, despatch 29 May 1839. 116 FO 72/584, Turnbull to Palmerston, despatch 7 March 1841. 117 FO 72/584, Palmerston, minute, 28 April 1841. 118 FO 72/584, Turnbull to Palmerston, despatch 18 March 1841 ; and Cocking to Turnbull, 1 tter, 26 Jan 1841.

79

anonymously f, r The Anti-Slavery Reporter, the Society's newspaper, and in its July 1841 edition he

claimed that abolitionist principles were now beginning to take root in Havana and Matanzas:

an assertion Spanish officials erroneously attributed to Turnbull and cited as proof of his

seditious activities. 119

Turnbull's prospects seemed anyway to dim when in August 1841 abolitionists broke with

Palmerston over his support for free trade in sugar. The Tories took power, and Aberdeen

replaced Palmerston as foreign secretary. The Spanish envoy in London saw this as a chance to

renew his urgent requests for Turnbull's removal, but Aberdeen was at this stage no more

prepared than his predecessor to oblige. Turnbull meanwhile continued to initiate new

investigations, travelling to suspect sugar estates to interview coloured employees and potential

witnesses. His persistent probing excited local antipathy and drew renewed criticism from the

Spanish authorities. By January 1842 the former British consul, Tolme, had, along with his

British merchant friends, joined forces with ship-owners and merchants in London to petition

Aberdeen. They claimed that the trouble stirred up by Turnbull in Cuba had adversely affected

their businesses, and therefore proved his superintendency was incompatible with the

promotion of British commerce.12° Concerned by all these developments, in February 1842

Aberdeen notifi d the Spanish government that Britain did not intend to pursue the convention

envisaged by Turnbull and previously proposed by Palmerston 'for the purpose of examining

generally into the condition of the negroes in Cuba'. At the same time, he informed Turnbull

of the decision to separate again the superintendent's duties from those of consul, and whilst

Turnbull was to continue in the former capacity, Aberdeen had to find someone else to fill the

consular post. The colonial authorities in Havana were, however, far from satisfied. They had

been troubled by sporadic slave rebellions around the island, and they were worried lest

Turnbull's continued presence spark further trouble.

Turnbull was no less disturbed by recent developments. The death threats he had been

receiving seemed more menacing once he had been stripped of the protection afforded by his

consular status, and he took refuge aboard HMS Romney. He kept abreast of affairs on shore by

consulting his old black servant, Bemis, and his assistant, Cocking, and had every intention of

returning to shore in due course to continue with his investigations. But Joseph Crawford, who

arrived in April 1842 with the title of consul-general, was in no mood to assist him. Although an

abolitionist himself, Crawford did not share Turnbull's zeal, nor did he approve his methods.

When Turnbull ought his help in retrieving his passport from Valdes so that he might travel the

island to complete his investigations, Crawford reluctantly complied. The application was,

however, r fused, and Turnbull was finally persuaded by his distraught wife to give up his

119 Paquette , Sugar is Made with Blood, p. 151 , and Murray, Odious Commerce, p. 152.

120 Murray, Odious Commerce, pp. 154-55.

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superintendency and leave Cuba altogether. Wh n in October he r turn d, this tim aboard a

chartered sloop, he was arrested, tried and p rmanently expell d. The Cuban authorities

nonetheless blamed Turnbull when in 1843 they were threatened by a succession of slave

uprisings.121 Fearful of both a British-backed rebellion and the annexationist inclinations of th

United States, the Spanish authorities resorted to ruthless repression. During 1844, the 'y ar of

the lash' or 'la Escalara' (because rebels were often strapped to a ladd r and lashed to death),

thousands of slaves, free coloureds, and some whites were tortured, impri oned, or murdered,

after 'confessing' to being involved in the alleged conspiracy.122 Suspicion were fuell d by

Cocking, who, in the hope of securing influence with the British government, wrot to a

disapproving Palmers ton, confessing his part in a plot, anctioned by Turnbull, to ov rthrow th

Spanish colonial government and free the slaves.123

Turnbull left behind an ugly legacy for, despite his denials when chall nged by Aberdeen, it

seems likely that he had acted independently to foment rebellion in Cuba. 124 The ext nt to

which it could be described as a well-organised conspiracy remains, however, open to d bate. In

any case, Turnbull's conduct did not prevent Aberdeen from ub equently appointing him

judge in the Anglo-Portuguese mixed commi sion in Jamaica, wh re he continued to court

controversy during his seven years of service ther . Like Madden, an id alist, Turnbull had don

much to expose the shortcomings of others and the corruption inherent in Spain' col nial

administration. But he had in the end to leave the uppression of th lav trad to coll ague

who recognised the importance of maintaining local goodwill whilst eeking to tak what

practical advantage they could of the bilateral agreements negotiated betwe n London and

Madrid. British officials resident in lands with slav -based economies had som tim s to

compromise their principles in ord r to maintain th ir po itions, and ther by their influ n ,

in society. The information suppli d by consuls d p nded on th ir b ing in regular conta t with

business communities tainted by their involvem nt in slavery. Judi ial diplomacy, wh ther

practised by the mixed commissions or by tho charged with superintending court d ci ion ,

had likewis to operate on the basis of unc rtain precedents and within th fr qu n tly too

narrow confines of established international law.

121 Murray, Odious Commerce, p. 160. 122 Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood, pp. 209-32. 123 1bid., pp. 159-167. 121 Ibid., p. 174.

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82

Documents

Page

Section I Haranguing Europe 85

Section II Troubling America 95

Section Ill Coercing Africa 109

Section IV Gathering intelligence 117

SectionV Trading statistics 131

Section VI Disappointing judges 145

Section VII Ending suppression 157

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84

Section I Haranguing Europe

British diplomatic efforts to suppress the transatlantic slave trade were in the main focused

upon achieving bilateral agreements with foreign governments and local rulers aimed at

outlawing the traffic and providing mechanisms for naval action. But in the aftermath of the

Napoleonic wars, at the Congress of Vienna of 1814-15 and sub equent gathering of the

representatives of the great powers, British diplomats and statesmen sought to establi h a

framework of international law with which to facilitate naval action. This very often involved

them in haranguing their continental neighbours on the immorality of the trade. In addition,

it meant constructing diplomatic coalitions in order to overcome the obduracy of France,

Portugal and Spain.

The first of the following documents, a memorandum sent under cover of a lett r from

Castlereagh to the prime minister, Lord Liverpool, outlines the foreign secretary's negotiating

strategy at Vienna with regard to the slave trade. It also contains his remarkably farsighted

proposal for what amounted to the creation of diplomatic commissions for monitoring the

efficacy of measures adopted by the congress.

The second document, instructions sent by Canning to the Duke of Wellington, Britain's

delegate to the Congress of Verona of 1822, emphasises the difficulties which were lik ly to

arise with France. Joseph de Villele, the president of the French coun il of ministers, had, in

conversation with Wellington, already indicated that France would not yield to British pressur

to concede a mutual right of search of seaborne traffic, leaving Canning under the impre sion

that 'every fresh representation does but irritate and confirm the spirit of resistance, and tend

to convert more and more of a question of moral duty and political obligation into on of

national pride'.

No less problematic was the issue, already raised by Castlereagh, of whether non-participating

countries could be expected to abide by decisions taken by the great powers in concert. Was

the unanimity of all powers essential, or could humanitarian principles override th do trin

of state sovereignty? Canning was firm on this point. He would have liked to achieve agreement

amongst the great powers declaring that the slave trade should be treated as piracy. But h

recognised that Brazil, whose independence from Portugal had y t to be recognis d, might

hold out against such a ruling. That, he thought, might lead to 'justifiable' coercion. 'If it be

true', he reasoned, 'that no combination of great Powers can justify an infliction of injury upon

a smaller Power: it may be affirmed on the other hand that no Power has the right (nor has it

at all the more for being insignificant in strength) to interrupt by its ingle act, th cons nting

policy of all the civilized world on a matter on which the dictat s of hristianity and morality

85

are clear; and to perpetuate to a large portion of their fellow creatures misery and sufferings

which all other Powers are conspiring to heal.' Where the slave trade was concerned, Canning

was an unashamed interventionist.

No. I Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool

[Webster, British Diplomacy, pp. 233-35]

Vienna, 21 November 1814 That I may be the better enabled to profit by your suggestion on the best mode of bringing the question of abolition before the Congress, I enclose a Memorandum of what has occurred to me on this subject. I particularly recommend to your consideration the advantage of having a sort of permanent European Congress in existence, as therein proposed upon this particular subject. I am of opinion that this may be made in itself a most powerful instrument to enforce with good faith the engagements of the several Powers, and as I foresee, that from defect of powers or other causes, we may be disappointed in obtaining such an arrangement during the Congress as Parliament would deem satisfactory as a final measure, it may satisfy feelings much as well as contribute to the success of our views, if our exertions are only adjourned over, to be followed up in London and at Paris by the united exertions of the Ministers of the respective Powers.

Enclosure

Memorandum as to the mode of conducting the negotiations in Congress for the final abolition of the Slave Trade

The first effort should be directed to effect an immediate and general abolition of the traffick; with this view a joint representation should be made by the Powers (vizt. Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark) already declared in favour of this measure to France, to induce her to concur in giving at once effect to the system which she is pledged to carry into execution at the end of five years.

Should France decline acceding to this representation an attempt to be then made by the same Powers to induce the French Government to reduce the period from five to three years and to give effect without delay to the abolition north of the line as promised to Great Britain.

In the event of France refusing to depart from the decision she has hitherto pronounced, there being in that case no hope of bringing Spain and Portugal to a more favourable determination, the seven Powers above named may unite their efforts with those of France to induce the Governments of Spain and Portugal to conform themselves to the engagements taken by France.

Should Spain and Portugal refuse to adopt the limitation of five years, but propose to render the abolition absolute at the end of eight years, with an immediate cessation of the traffick north of the line, the question then will be, should the eight Powers acquiesce and consider the whole of the Powers as then embarked in one common interest, vizt. to carry into full effect this regulated measure of abolition, according to the stipulation of the respective Powers or ought the Powers who have engaged to abolish immediately, or at the end of five years, to separate their councils in the Congress from those of Spain and Portugal, and employ all justifiable means still to enforce upon those Powers the necessity of a more early abolition.

86

The measure of immediate abolition in States growing more colonial produce than th y can themselves consume, may be effected in two ways, either by the law of the State itself prohibiting the import of slaves, or by a law on the part of all other States, excluding the colonial produce of such State as shall refuse to comply with the system of abolition.

With respect to the efficacy of this remedy, if adopted sincerely by the eight Powers, th re can be no question. There might be evasion of such a law to a certain extent, but a prohibition enforced with ordinary attention in all the principal markets against the produc of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies would at once deter their planters from the further purchase of slaves.

The justice of the remedy if otherwise prudent cannot be question d, as a mean of giving effect to a system to which so many Powers have made a sacrifice of colonial in tere ts, and which are all morally bound with their utmost means to carry into full execution. It may however deserve consideration whether this extreme measure should not be waived in favour of some reasonable compromise with those Powers, or if that cannot be effected during the sitting of the present Congress from their plenipotentiaries being restricted by their instructions, whether the application of the principle of exclusion should be not su pended till further discussion shall have taken place with their respective Courts.

As it is clear, that the final and effectual ext nsion of the traffick in slaves must be a work of some time, and the success of the effort mu t dep nd upon the ffectual execution of the regulations adopted by the respective States, it is proposed that the ministers of the veral Powers engaged in the cause of abolition resident in London and Paris, should b their respective Courts be ordered to act together in concert for watching over the ef£ tual execution of these regulations, that for this purpose, they should assemble together from time to time in each capital to enquire into the progress made and the extent of the evil remaining. That they should consult upon the most effectual means of countera ting evasion, and of promoting the common object, and that they should require on the [ ] of [ ] in each year to draw out a joint report for the information of their respective Courts, stating the re ult of the former years' exertions, as far as the same can be ascertained. Th mission in London and Paris to correspond and act in concert.

There are two further questions of great d licacy and importance connected with the suppression of this unnatural and criminal traffick, which deserves to b examined. Th 1 st is to what extent and under what regulations the nations of Europ , who desire to ffe t the abolition, can actually trust each others hips of war with the d tention of v s els acting on the coast of Mrica in violation of the regulations of th ir particular state ? For the elucidation of this subject a Projet of treaty is annexed.

The 2nd question is, how far, after the trade in laves shall have be n aboli hed by all or nearly all Christian States, the Governments of the aid States may be ju tified in con id ration of those engaged in the traffick of whatever nation, as ngag d in an offence proscrib d by civilized nations, and as such not to be peaceably tolerated? These questions are sugg t d for consideration without any judgement being pronounced thereon.

87

No.2 George Canning to the Duke of Wellington

[Wellington Despatches, vol. i, pp. 322-29] Letter Foreign Office, 30 September 1822

My Lord Duke, However sincere the anxiety of his Majesty and his government to devise all means which may tend in any way to the extirpation of that scandal of the civilized world, the slave trade, and however confident I am that your Grace will exert yourself with the utmost alacrity and zeal to impress upon the minds of the Allied sovereigns and their ministers the duty of perfecting the work of the abolition, I confess that your Grace 's conversation with M. de Villele, as represented in your despatch, has greatly damped my hopes of any favourable result from the approaching conferences.

The positive refusal of France not only to enter into any new engagements or to pass any new laws for the suppression of the slave trade, but her neglect and repugnance even to execute those by which she has already bound herself; and the notorious continuance of that traffic by her subjects in spite of law and of treaty, and with the knowledge at least, if not with the connivance, of her government, leave little doubt but that all the authority of the French plenipotentiaries will be employed at Vienna to prevent the adoption of any effectual resolution by the Allies, or if adopted, to frustrate its operation.

Every effort must nevertheless be made to bring at least the moral influence of the congress to bear upon this most momentous subject: and as the other three members of the Alliance are disinterested in the consideration of it, we may hope at least that such a manifestation of opinion may b obtained from them as may show that their sentiments, as declared in 1815, have undergone no change, even if they are not prepared with any additional means of

nforcing them.

The difficulty under which this country now labours in pressing the subject of the abolition, b yond what it experienced in 1815, arises partly from the lowered tone of sentiment throughout Europe upon subjects appealing to the feelings of mankind, compared with that which prevailed at a moment of general excitement and enthusiasm, and partly from the notion sedulously inculcated by other Powers having colonies, that self-interest now mingles with our humanity, and that by our persevering to inflict upon the colonial possessions of our rivals a portion of the evils which the partial abolition is alleged to have brought upon our own.

Your Grace may confidently affirm, in reply to such insinuations, that among the causes which have contributed to the depression of colonial produce in this country, so far is the abolition of the British slave trade from being one, that its continuance would unquestionably have aggravated that depression; and its revival would be deprecated by no class of men more than by the colonists of Great Britain.

But in proportion as the interests of that class of his Majesty's subjects have been exposed to hazard by the legislature of this country in setting the example of the unqualified renunciation of a practice originally incorporated with the system of all colonies, and long supposed, however falsely, to be necessary to their existence - a renunciation dictated by considerations of a high r order than have usually guided the conduct of States - in the same proportion is the British government called upon to leave no effort untried to give effect to that example, and to take care that it shall not have been set in vain.

88

At present, whatever may have been the advantage or disadvantage to the British Coloni s, it is much to be feared that to Africa the abolition by Great Britain has be n injury rather than gain. The Slave Trade, so far from being diminished in extent by the exact amount of what was in former times the British demand, is upon the whole perhaps greater than it was at the period when that demand was the highest: and the aggregate of human suffering and th waste of human life, in the transport of slaves from the coast of Africa to the Colonies, is increased in a ratio enormously greater than the increase of positive numbers. It s ems as if those who continue this abominable traffic had a malicious pleasure in defeating the calculations of benevolence, and in visiting upon the innocent victims of their avarice the fruitles endeavours to rescue those victims from their power.

Unhappily it cannot be denied that our very attempts at prevention, imperfect as they yet are under the treaties which now authorize our interference, tend to the augmentation of this vii. The dread of detection suggests expedients of concealment productive of the m t dreadful sufferings to a cargo with respect to which it hardly ever seems to occur to its remorse! ss owners that it consists of sentient beings. The numb rs put on board in each venture are so far from being proportioned to the proper capacity of the vessel, that the probable profits of each voya&e are notoriously calculated only on the survivors; and the mortality is accordingly frightful- to a degree unknown since the attention of mankind was first called to the horror of this traffic.

To these enormous and, I am afraid, even growing evils, we have nothing to oppo but the declaration, now obsolete and powerless, of the Congress of Vienna, and our treaties with Spain and the Netherlands, abolishing the trade definitively and totally; and that with Portugal restricting the Portuguese slave trade to the south of the line.

The provisions of those treaties are about to receive a beneficial extension, by an article which those governments respectively have agreed to add to them, inflicting the am penalti of capture and confiscation on ve sels on board of which slaves may have been, as on those on board of which slaves are actually found at the time of visiting them.

I enclose a copy of this article, and of the instruction with which it is conveyed to hi Majesty' missions at the courts of the Hague, Madrid, and Lisbon.

I enclose also a copy of a despatch which I address to the arne Minister , the obj ct of which is to procure a further extension of the same principle by admitting the peculiar fitting of a slave ship as evidence of the purpose and proof of the criminality of its voyage.

The former extension being already (as I have said) agreed to, and wanting only the form of signature to make it binding and operative, I have not thought it prudent to hazard th reopening of a discussion upon it by bringing forward a proposition for carrying that articl to a further extent. But, having gained the object of that article, th con equence which I propose to treat as naturally following upon it, may, I hop be admitted without mu h difficulty: for it is in truth absurd to talk of prevention, if the ves el must a tually have compl t d the purpose of its voyage, before that purpose, however evident, can be uspected; and if, whil the having on board a single negro is to be conclu ive proof of guilt, th manifest pr parati n for the reception of hundreds are not to be considered as leading to a presumption of it.

But, even when all this is done, little, very little way, i mad towards th accompli hm nt of our great work, so long as Portugal continues the trade with half th contin nt of Afri , long as France is determinately hostile, and, I fear I must add, the Unit d tat luk warm, if not indifferent, to our purpo .

The government of the Unit d States has, as your Grace is awar , p itiv ly r fus d to dir t its minist r at Paris to join with his Majesty' ambassador in any repr s ntation to the Fr n h

89

government upon the manifest infractions of the laws of France abolishing the slave trade, by French subjects. And as to France herself, there can be no doubt, after M. de Villele's open declaration to your Grace, but that, so far from any advantage being likely to be obtained by the separate urgency of the British government with that of his Most Christian Majesty, every fresh representation does but irritate and confirm the spirit of resistance, and tend to convert more and more of a question of moral duty and political obligation into one of national pride.

It is important to take this plain, though discouraging view of the situation of this great question; because, neither the past efforts of his Majesty's government, nor those which your Grace is directed to make at the present congress, can be viewed in their just light, if it is supposed that they have been, or are to be, employed upon willing or even unprejudiced minds; or that the failure to produce the desired effect is to be attributed to want of zeal or of importunity on the part of those who argue and remonstrate, and not to indifference, obduracy, self-interest (however mistaken), vanity, and (in proportion as the pressure of the pleading becomes more strong) resentment, on the part of those who listen, or refuse to listen, to such arguments and remonstrances.

It is important that, all compliment and courtesy laid aside, it should be known as the truth (however lamentable or incredible) that, by the testimony of the French government itself, there is no public feeling, none, on this subject, in France, which responds in the smallest degree to the sentiment prevalent in England; that no credit is given to the people or to the legislature of this country for sincerity in these sentiments; that our anxiety upon the matter is attributed to a sense of national interest; that a ministry in France, which should agree to a mutual right of visit, would infallibly seal its own immediate downfall by such an agreement; that a new law founded on a proposition from England for new restrictions on the illicit slave trade, would be thrown out on the first reading in whichever chamber of the legislature it was

introduced, and that the rejection of it would be justified, if any justification was thought necessary, or any discussion vouchsafed to it at all, not on the merits of its provisions, but on its prima facie inadmissibility as the suggestion of a foreign power; as the sequel and sanction of a concession forced upon France in the hour of her humiliation; and finally, that, if such a law were passed, the tribunals and the juries would not force it.

That this is the state of public opinion and public feeling in France, your Grace knows from unquestionable authority, and it is fit that it should be here recorded, because as France is no inconsiderable member of the confederacy to which your Grace is to appeal for giving efficiency to the measures taken and to be devised for completing the abolition, it is but just that it should be remembered what difficulties on the part of that Power your Grace may have to encounter.

There are obviously but three modes by which nations or individuals can be brought to accept an unpalatable proposition; the first is persuasion, the second coercion, the third interest under all its different modifications.

As to the efficacy of persuasion on this subject, as applied to France, it is unnecessary to say more than has been said already.

The government of France cannot grant the right of mutual visit, if they would: the attempt to persuade them into it is therefore so much exertion thrown away.

Of modes of coercion, the most direct that has been recommended by persons laudably anxious for the attainment of the great object in view; is that the congress should declare the carrying on of the slave trade to be piracy. But does there appear the slightest probability that the French plenipotentiaries would concur in a proposition qualifying as acts of piracy, acts which, as the French government are perfectly aware, their own subjects are committing every day? and thus laying open the ships and properties of those subjects, not to a right of visit to be

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mutually exercised, but to sweeping uncompen ated capture by the cruiz rs of Great Britain? Would such a declaration by the three other members of the Alliance, the three great continental Powers who have no colonies of their own, carry great weight in Europe?

Possibly it may be worth the trial; but, coming from them, the utmost extent (as it appears) to which such a declaration could safely go, would be the manifestation of an opinion and desire that the maritime Powers should enter into negotiations among thems lves to bring about an understanding on this point. So far the moral authority of the three Powers might perhaps avail; but any assumption on their part of a right to legislate in matter of public law, and to establish a new principle of maritime police, could hardly fail to excite in Europe and in America, a disposition to demur to their jurisdiction. There is a minor degree of coercion which is undoubtedly within their right, as well as their power, and which has be n mor than once pressed upon their attention, though I am afraid without effect. It i , that th y should each in their dominions, whether severally or by joint compact, prohibit the introduction of colonial produce from the colonies of States which have not legally and ef£ ctually abolished the slave trade.

This is easy, this is practical, this would be attended with some immediate and p rhap with greater ultimate good effect; and this would be done in the exercise of an undoubt d and legitimate authority, which even those who might suffer by it could not call in question.

But I confess if this simple mode of at once manifesting their sentiments and giving effect to them shall be overlooked, in favour of some more o tentatious but more qu stionabl exhibition of virtuous indignation, I shall cease to augur very confidently of the good to be done by the intervention of the three great continental Powers on this subject.

The species of coercion last mentioned partakes of the nature of the third class f motiv s by which any nation is to be lured to sacrifice or cone ssion: I mean that of interest.

But there is more direct operation of interest which has b n allud d to in the propo al opened to your Grace by M. de Villele. He propos s to exclude French ship from all preten for frequenting the coast of Mrica, by exchanging the French settlements on that oast again t the Isle of France.

Upon this proposal we have reflected and enquired, as much as the int rval sine your Grace's despatches were received, would allow. And I will state to your Grac the con iderations which appear to stand in the way of the acceptance of it.

In the first place the comparative value of the things to be exchanged is prepo terously unequal. But I do not state that obj ction as conclusive. If we cannot a hiev our obje t by persuasion or by force, we must be contented to do it by purchase. We have done so, in fact, in other cases. We paid largely to Spain for her total abolition (such as it is); and largely to Portugal for her partial (which is in fact none at all). If we could buy from France a real abolition with the difference between the value of her ettlements on th coast of Mrica, and that of the Mauritius, we should make a better bargain than heretofore; not because we should pay less, but because we should get what we paid for.

But should we get what we paid for?

In the first place, would our possession of the French settlements on the coast of Africa enable us to exclude them altogether from that coast? There is an innocent trade to th co t of Africa in which our merchants are pretty largely cone rned. Th French perhaps ar not o; but would they stipulate never to embark in it? How would such a stipulation accord with tho feelings of th French legislature, and the Fren h people, which M. d Vill ' le has told your Grace (and I fear too truly) would d feat any attempt of th gov rnm nt to legislat £ r the effectual repression of illicit slave trad ? And if the Fr nch flag w r at lib rty till t app ar in

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those seas, would they then agree to the right of visit any more than now? And if all these que tions must be answered in the negative, might we not find that here again we should have paid the consideration without obtaining the object? But there is a still more serious difficulty in respect to the achievement of that object by these means. There is a slave trade carried on also on the eastern coast of Africa. The French import slaves into the Island of Bourbon, even while we are in possession of the neighbouring island. But once masters of both, there would be no limit to their importations into both; and from those settlements they might feed their West India Islands with cargoes of slaves not only without impediment but without question, since we ourselves allow the transport of negroes from one slave colony to another.

To speak of guarding against the extension of the evil by stipulations in the treaty would be idle; considering that evasion, or rather open violation of public engagements, is the very mischief to which we are endeavouring to find a cure.

Another project there is which has been suggested to your Grace, not coming exactly under either of the foregoing heads; but being rather a matter of regulation than a step towards the abolition of illicit slave trade: of which suggestion, after turning it fully in my mind, I confess I do not see the advantage.

It is, that agents or consuls should be appointed reciprocally by the British and French governments (I suppose by the British and Spanish governments too) to reside in the colonies of each other, for the purpose of inspecting the registration of slaves in each respective colony, and reporting every instance of violation of the abolition law, by the importation of new negroes.

Now to what end? If there were any doubt whether the law was violated by the French, this might be a mode of detection: but is not the fact already perfectly notorious? Are not slave ships publicly fitted up at Havre and at Bordeaux? Are not shares in the venture of those ships openly saleable in all the seaports? Are not the cases of Le Rodeur, L'Africain, Le Dauphin, and many other French vessels captured with cargoes of slaves on board, known to all the world - and known through the proceedings of French courts or the publication of French pamphlets or sp eches? What necessity is there for further evidence? Or would the fact, so well ascertained, that French vessels filled with negroes, sail from the coast of Africa, be at all strengthened by the evidence that their cargoes were landed at Martinique in the face of an English supervisor?

On the other hand, would there not be something peculiarly harsh and unjust towards our own colonists, who are unsuspected of any violation of the slave trade laws, and are sufferers by the non-execution of the laws of other States, to place them by public compact with a foreign State on an equal footing of jealously with persons, whom we not only suspect but know to be guilty of constant systematic violation, either of existing treaties, or of the laws of their own country?

I say nothing of the improbability of the French government admitting this right of reciprocal residence ashore, any more than that of reciprocal visit afloat. But I cannot help adding that I hope this suggestion to your Grace has not risen from a desire to stigmatize and to punish our own West India colonies for the reluctance which some of them have idly and perversely shown to consent to an efficient system of registration. No effort of the government will be left untried to carry that system into complete operation. But I should doubt the policy of employing the agency of a French resident for that purpose: which on the contrary must, as I conceive, according to every principle of human nature, excite in all the colonies a feeling of discontent and of resistance to so novel an authority.

The advantages to be derived then from the union of sovereigns to the cause of the abolition, appear to resolve themselves into these two:-

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1st. An engagement on the part of the continental sovereigns to mark their abhorrence of this accursed traffic by refusing admission into their dominions of the produce of colonies belonging to Powers who have not abolished, or who notoriously continue the slave trade.

2ndly. A declaration in the names, if possible, of all the five Powers; but if France shall decline being a party to it, then in the names of the three great Powers of the continent, renewing the denunciation of the Congress of Vienna, and exhorting the maritime Powers who have abolished the slave trade to concert measures among themselves for proclaiming it and treating it as piracy; with a view to founding upon the aggregate of such separate engagements between State and State, a general law to be incorporated into the public law of the civilized world.

Such a declaration, as it assumed no binding force, would not be obnoxious to the charges which would attach to a declaration of new public law by an incompetent authority: while at the same time its moral influence might materially aid us in our negotiations with oth r maritime States; and would at least enable us to bring to a test the sincerity of their acts and professions.

We could have no difficulty in consenting that subjects of the United Kingdom found trading in slaves should be treated as pirates: upon reciprocal admission of the same principle by other States.

The only State upon which both these two measures would operate by force, is Portugal- or to speak more properly, Brazil.

As to the first- the exclusion of her produce from Russia, Prussia and Austria- he has no right to complain. It is a regulation wholly within the power of every ind pendent government.

As to the second it cannot be denied that supposing all other powers to agree in considering the traffic in slaves as piracy, the imposition of the result of such general concurrence upon Brazil without her consent, would be a measure of some, though justifiable viol nee:­justifiable, because to hold out, as that country or colony would then do, against proclaimed and recorded sense and example of every State in that quarter of the world in which the mother country is situated, and of every State in that quarter of the world in which it is situated itself, in the prosecution of a criminal and proscribed traffic, would be to put itself in orne measure out of the pale of social connection with other nations, and to call down upon itself the resentment of them all. If it be true that no combination of great Powers can justify an infliction of injury upon a smaller Power: it may be affirmed on the other hand that no Power has the right (nor has it at all the more for being insignificant in strength) to interrupt by its single act, the consenting policy of all the civilized world on a matter on which the dictates of Christianity and morality are clear; and to perpetuate to a large portion of their fi How creatures misery and sufferings which all oth r Powers are conspiring to heal.

It is a consolation also that there is in the present circumstances of Brazil a peculiar facility for obtaining her concurrence in a general measure for the abolition. S parated from the mother country by a dissent which is already almost qualified as rebellion, Brazil must sp edily be looking to other Powers for recognition, if not for support. It is needless to ob erve that such recognition can only be purchased by a frank surrender of the slave trade.

I have only to add that should your Grace' endeavour to obtain the prohibition of the importation of the produce of the slave-trading colonies into the dominions of the con tin ntal Powers, be met by an enquiry, whether this country would be prepared to exclude from its ports the like produce, which comes here in transit but not for consumption? your Grace will xpress your readiness to refer that proposition for imm diate consideration to your government.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant, George Canning

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Section II Troubling America

Where the slave trade was concerned, the United States was a special problem for the British.

American and British laws with regard to trafficking in slaves were not dissimilar. On 2 March

1807 the US Congress had prohibited the import of slaves into any place within the jurisdiction

of the Union; and thirteen years later, in May 1820, a further law was enacted by which any

American citizen, or person on board an American vessel, attempting to en lave any coloured

person not yet a slave, was to be adjudged a pirate and, on conviction, uffer the death penalty.

Yet, as Canning observed in his instructions to Wellington of 30 S ptember 1822, the Unit d

States appeared 'lukewarm, if not indifferent, to [Britain's] purpose' when it came to

international action on the eradication of the trade. In 1824 Anglo-American negotiations for a

convention which would have provided for a mutual right of search of each other' vessels were

terminated when it became apparent that Congress was unlikely to ratify such an agr ement; and

in 1831 and 1833 Washington again rejected United States participation in similar arran gem n ts.

Documents in this section illustrate the extent to which the absence of an agreed mutual right

of search gave rise to mutual recrimination, particularly when British naval officers decid d to

challenge and detain suspected slave ships whose masters had, in Palmerston's words, chosen to

protect themselves by hoisting 'a piece of Bunting with the United States Emblem and Colors upon

it'. They also concern the differences which arose when British judges in the Bahamas and

Bermuda freed the slave cargoes of American ships engaged in th Am rican dom stic slave trade.

The last three documents relate to 'Lucky Nat' Gordon, the first Am rican laver to b

executed for piracy, and the opening of the Anglo-Am rican n gotiations which result din th

1862 treaty with its provision for a mutual right of search.

No.3 Sir Charles Vaughan to the Duke of Wellington

[FO 84/306]

Letter British Legation, Washington, 28 March 1835

My Lord Duke,

The American Brig 'Enterprize' sailed from Alexandria in this di trict, on the 27th January, for Charleston in South Carolina, with a cargo of v nty eight Slave , and it was comp lied, by stress of weather, to put into the B rmudas, wher , upon the repre ntation, mad by a o i ty of people of colour, a writ of Habeas Corpus was issu d, and the lave were taken b for th Chief justice, who ordered them to be set at lib rty. The Brig has r turned to Charle ton, and according to the Extracts from a Chari ston New pap r, the e proceeding at th B rmudas, are considered as 'piracy under the cover of law', and 'as mor 1 gitimate ground of war than the indemnity refused by France'.

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The Secretary of State has mentioned the circum tances to me, but I have not yet received any official communication from him, and I presume that the American Charge d'Affaires at London will be instructed to make a representation to His Majesty's Government. I could only observe to Mr. Forsyth, that since Slavery had been abolished throughout the British Colonies, I presumed that the Magistrates in the Colonial Ports, did not think themselves authorized to abstain from extending the protection of the law to the victims of Slavery, when brought within their jurisdiction by Foreigners.

In my Dispatch No: 6, I had the Honour to state the anxiety of the Government of the United tates, to receive the expected decision of the Law Officers of the Crown, respecting the legality

of seizure and liberation of Slaves, at Nassau in New Providence, driven there by stress of weather, and which were owned by Planters in North Carolina. The late occurrence at the Bermudas makes it more necessary than ever, that it should be clearly understood, whether the accidental entrance of a Foreign Ship, with Slaves on board, into any Port of a British Colony, constitutes as effectual an abrogation of Slavery, as the casual contact with British Territory in Europe has always done.

In the United States a most disgraceful domestic Slave trade has been long carried on, between the most Northern, and the most Southern Slave-holding States. The principal places, where the Slaves are collected for exportation, are, Washington, the seat of the General Government, and Alexandria in the District of Columbia. During the last Session of Congress many memorials were presented to both Houses, praying for the gradual abolition of Slavery in this District, but they were laid upon the table, and any discussion about them studiously avoided, in consideration of the feelings of the members from the Southern States, which are highly excited, whenever the question is touched upon, in any shape.

I have the Honour to enclose a copy of the Memorial presented to Congress, by the inhabitants ofWashington, and the neighbourhood, as it contains some authentic information of the injustice and cruelty, with which the domestic Slave Trade is carried on in the District of Columbia.

When the Americans complain of their loss of property by the liberation of their Slaves in the British Colonial Ports, it should not be forgotten, that all persons of colour, acting as Mariners or Stewards on board British Vessels, are treated with the greatest severity, in all the Ports of the Southern United States. A British Ship arrived at Savannah in Georgia very lately, having on board a Coloured man in the capacity of Cook. He was immediately seized & imprisoned, and the same thing has repeatedly occurred at Charleston in South Carolina. No engagement proffered by the Master of the Vessel, that the coloured person shall not have any intercourse with the Shore, prevents his being arrested, and carried to prison, until the Vessel is ready to 1 ave the Port.

At Appalachicola in Florida a British Schooner from Nassau in New Providence, was seized, on the 7th November last, by the Collector of Customs, the laws of the United States having been violated, as a passenger on board, had with him a Slave, whom he meant to keep in his service, during his residence in the United States. The master has pleaded in his defence, that, by the late Act of Parliament, the Slave had changed his condition, and was an apprentice. It remains to be seen, whether the laws of Florida will be strictly enforced by the tribunals of the Territory, in which case, the only redress will be, by petition to the President of the United States.

I have the Honour to be with the Highest Respect, My Lord Duke, Your Grace's most obedient Humble ervant, Chas. R Vaughan

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No.4 Lord Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury

[FO 84/306]

Draft letter Foreign Office, 31 July 1835

My Lords,

I beg to refer Your Lordships to my Letter of the lOth May, 1834, and to Your Lordships' Answer of the 28th of the same month, on the subject of the claim advanced by the Government of the United States for compensation for the value of Slaves, who being the property of American citizens, were wrecked in the United States Vessel 'Comet', off the Bahamas, carried into New Providence, and there liberated by order of the British Authorities; and I have to acquaint Your Lordships, that claims for compensation have also been put forward by the Government of the United States, in two other cases in which Slaves, belonging to American Citizens, have been liberated by British Authorities under similar circumstances.

These cases are that of the 'Encomium' wrecked, like the 'Comet' , off the Bahamas and that of the 'Enterprize', driven by stress of weather into the Bermudas.

The papers relating to the case of the Slaves on board the 'Encomium', were referred, by my directions, to the Colonial Department together with the papers relating to the case of the 'Comet'; and an Answer on the subject of both these Cases having been received from the Colonial Department, I now transmit to Your Lordships, a Copy of that Answer, as well as Copies of the papers relating to the 'Encomium', which have not yet been laid befor Your Lordships.

The papers relating to the case of the 'Enterprize', which were received subsequendy to those relating to the 'Comet' and the 'Encomium' , were r ferred, by my directions, to the Law Officers of the Crown; and I now send a Copy of the Report which I have received from the King's Advocate and the Attorney and Solicitor General, expressing the unanimous opinion of those Officers, that the Claim of the American Government for compensation for the value of the Slaves liberated, and lost to their American Owners, through the operation of the Municipal Laws of Great Britain; (with Slaves having been forced within British Jurisdiction, by the force of events, and not having been brought there wilfully) is well founded, and cannot be resisted.

I enclose also copies of the Papers upon which the above mentioned Report was founded.

The Charge d'Affaires of the United States of America in this Country has ren wed, in the most urgent manner, his application for Answers upon these several Claims, and it must be confessed that a due regard for the honour of the British Government required that some Answer should be speedily given him upon this matter.

A long delay in answering a Claim of this kind, exposes a Government to the imputation of wishing to evade making reparation, and of shrinking from the responsibility of openly refusing to make it.

I have therefore to request that Your Lordships will take these Paper into Your immediate consideration in order that I may be able to make known to Mr. Vail, th final decision of the British Government.

I have &c' Palmers ton

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No.5 Lord Palmerston to Andrew Stevenson

[FO 84/306]

Draft letter Foreign Office, 7 January 1837

The undersigned &c has had the honor to receive the Notes which have been addressed to him by Mr. Stevenson, Envoy Extra: and Minister Plen: from the United States, respecting the claims preferred by the Government of the United States of America, for Compensation to the Owners of certain Slaves who were on board the 'Comet' and 'Encomium' wrecked on the Bahama Islands, and on board the 'Enterprize' driven by Stress of Weather into the Port of Hamilton in the Island of Bermuda.

The great importance of the questions which are involved in these claims has rendered it necessary to give them the fullest and most deliberated Consideration.

His Majesty's Government has no means of satisfying Claims of this Nature, if found to be just, but by applying to Parliament for a Vote of Money for such Purpose; and it is therefore the Duty of His Majesty's Government fully to investigate the Justice of a Claim to the Consideration of Parliament.

Moreover the Claims now in Question bring into Discussion Matters of peculiar Delicacy and Importance: the Authority of the Laws which have been passed in this Country for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, and for the Abolition of Slavery. The Applicability of those Laws to natives of Foreign States, who may come within the Dominions of the Crown. The unrestricted Right of every Individual who finds himself within British Jurisdiction to claim the full Protection of the Laws of the Land; all these Questions are necessarily raised by the Claims now under Discussion; and Mr. Stevenson will at once understand the Gravity of a Decision, which has not merely to determine the Existence or Extent of a pecuniary Liability, but which was incidentally to carry with it important Interpretations of the Law.

Mr. Stevenson, therefore, and the Government of the United States will not be surprized that the British Govt. should have been unable to give an Answer to the Applications which have been made to It on this Subject.

The U.S. [Under-Signed] has now to inform Mr. Stevenson that H.M.'s Govt. having considered these Cases with an Anxiety and Care proportioned to their Difficulty and Importance, has come to the Conclusion that the Claim preferred with respect to the Enterprize is not well founded; but that the Claims preferred on Account of the Comet and Encomium are well founded.

His Majesty' Government is of opinion, that the Rule by which these Claims should be decided is, that those Claimants must be considered entided to compensation who were lawfully in possession of their Slaves within the British Territory; and who were disturbed in their legal possession of those Slaves by Functionaries of the British Government.

Now the Owners of the Slaves on board the 'Enterprize' never were lawfully in possession of those Slaves within the British Territory.

Before the Time when the Enterprize arrived at Bermuda, Slavery had been abolished throughout the British Empire, and consequently the Negroes on board the Enterprize had, by entering within British Jurisdiction, acquired rights which the local Courts were bound to recognize and obliged to protect; and the Undersigned must beg to point out a distinction between Laws bearing upon the Personal Liberty of Man, and laws bearing upon the Property which Man may claim in irrational Animals, or in inanimate Things.

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If a Ship containing such animals or Things were driven by Stress of Weather in to a Foreign Port, the Owner of the Cargo could not be justly deprived of his Property by th operation of any particular Law which might be in existence in that Port; because, in such a case, there would be but Two Parties interested in the transaction; the Foreign Owner and the Local Authority; and it would be highly unjust that the former should be tripped of what belongs to him through the forcible application of the Municipal Law of a State to which he had not voluntarily submitted himself.

But in a Case in which a Ship so driven into a Foreign Port by Stress of Weather contains M n over whose personal liberty another Man claims to have an acquired right, there are Three Parties to the Transaction; the Owner of the Cargo, the Local Authority and the alleged Slave; and the Third Party is no less entitled than the First to appeal to the Local Authority for such Protection as the Law of the Land may afford him. But if Men who have been held in Slavery are brought into a Country where the condition of Slavery is unknown and forbidden, They are necessarily, and by the very nature of Things, placed at once in the Situation of Alien who have at all times from their birth been free.

Such Persons can in no Shape be restrained of their Liberty by their former Master, any more than by any other Person.

If they were given up to such former Master, they would be aggrieved, and would be entitl d to sue for damages. But it would be absurd to say that when a State had prohibited Slavery within its Territory, this Condition of Things must arise, namely that as often as a Slave Ship shall take refuge in one of the Ports of that State, liability must necessarily be incurred either to the former Owner of the Slaves, if the Slaves be liberated; to the Slaves th mselves if they are delivered up to the former Owner.

If indeed a Municipal Law be made, which violates the Law of Nations, a Question of another kind may arise. But the Municipal Law which forbids Slavery is no violation of the Law of Nations. It is, on the contrary, in strict Harmony with the Law of Nature; and therefore when slaves are liberated according to such Municipal Law, there is no wrong done; and there can b no Compensation granted.

H.M.'s Govt. therefore consider the claim respecting the Slaves of the Enterprize to be finally disposed of by the Principles thus laid down, and it follows likewise from thence that no claim of that kind can ever be entertained.

But applying the foregoing Rule to the case of the Comet, compensation seems to be demandable.

In January 1831 the State of Slavery was permitted in the Bahamas, and as the Law acknowledged Rights of Property which British Subjects there residing might acquire in Slaves, a Foreigner might also lawfully have been in possession of Slav s in thes Islands, if he did not infringe any of the Laws by which Slavery was there regulated.

Therefore the relation of Owner and Slave was not necessarily dissolved by the arrival of Slaves at that Time in that Colony. The Slaves in question app ar moreover to have b n actually in the possession of their owner within the British territory, at the mom nt when th y were illegally seized by a Functionary of the British Government.

Had it not been for this interference there can be little doubt that the Slaves would hav b en reshipped in the Vessel prepared to receive them, and would have reached th Port to which they were destined. The Undersigned has furth r to tate that the Case of the Encomium does not appear to His Majesty's Government to differ ubstantially from that of the Comet When the shipwreck of the Encomium happened, Slavery was till allowed in th Bahamas; the Slaves on board the 'Encomium' had never b en fr d from the control of th Own r, and

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being virtually in his Possession, they also were set at large by a Functionary of the English Government.

It is undoubtedly true that even if there had been no interference on the part of the British authorities, it might still have been possible that the Owners might not in the case of either of these Vessels, have been able to reship the Slaves; yet as the seizure was wrongful and prejudicial some Compensation is equitably due.

His Majesty's Govt., therefore on being furnished with specific Information as to the Value of such of the Slaves on Board the Comet and Encomium as remained at the Bahamas, and were not removed from thence by their former Owners, will be prepared to take into Consideration the Amount of Compensation which it may be reasonable to allow for any Injury the Owners may be presumed to have sustained from the Interference of British Functionaries in landing the Slaves at the Bahamas.

The U.S. has accordingly to request that Mr. Stevenson will have the Goodness to furnish him with such Information respecting the pecuniary Value of the Slaves as will enable H.M. 's Govt. to form an Opinion as to the Amount of Compensation which the Owners may be entitled to receive in Consideration of the Circumstances under which the Services of their Slaves have been lost to them.

The U.S. in conclusion has to repeat, that Slavery being now abolished throughout the British Empire there can be no well-founded Claim for Compensation in Respect of Slaves who, under any Circumstances, may come into the British Colonies any more than there would be with Respect to Slaves who might be brought into the United Kingdom.

P.

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No.6 Lieutenant Edward Latham to Rear-Admiral George Elliot

[FO 84/340]

Letter Simons Bay, 22 April 1840

Sir,

In obedience to your Orders and in reply to the documents forwarded by their Lordships of the Admiralty in reference to the circumstances under which the American Brig Edwin was boarded by HM Sloop Columbine, I have the honour to state the following facts.

On July 22, 1839 HM Sloop was starting in for the slaving Port of Ambriz when a sail was seen on the lee bow, and the weather being hazy all sail was made to close.

On nearing her we perceived she was a brig standing in a wind & when close to her, as she hoisted no Colors, a gun was fired.

Mter a time the Brig hoisted the American Flag but continued on her course cruising all Sail. This disinclination to show Colors or heave to excited strong suspicions that the Vessel was engaged in the Slave Trade and not entitled to the protection of the Flag she hoisted.

Sufficient sail was kept on HM Sloop to close her & on getting alongside Captain Elliot hailed and desired the Master to heave to. Heave to? was the reply of the Master 'I'll see you damned first' pointing to his flag. Capt Elliot again urged the necessity of his doing so. 'I'll see you damned first, you no nation bugger' was the second reply: the language of the American which followed was of the lowest & grossest description, much of which I do not now retain in memory. I remember however his hailing and saying 'my flag is as good as your bloody piratical one' and some reference to a lesson he stated we had already received on the rights of search and which we should have again.

The language & conduct of the Master giving additional suspicion of his Vessel not being American, Capt Elliot continued running abreast of her & urging by every argument the necessity of his ascertaining that he had a right to the Flag he hoisted & that he had no Slaves on board, adding 'you are aware I can compel you by firing, but while you hoist that Flag I shall abstain if possible, but board your Vessel I am determined to do'. This was replied to by the most violent and abusive language.

Captain Elliot now said 'Corne on board then yourself & bring your papers' which the Mast r of the Brig replied to with these words 'I'll see you buggered first'.

Soon after which the Crew of the Brig hove her to apparently without any orders from the Master.

Captain Elliot now ordered me to bring the Master on board with his papers to ascertain if he was American leaving Mr Wells (Master of HMS 'Columbine') on board the Edwin.

On boarding the brig I told the Master the orders I had received: he however was most violent and abusive, declaring no one should see his papers and no one should force him from his Vessel.

I told him I had no wish to use any force but that his conduct had excited suspicions and which he as an American Citizen should be anxious to disprove.

With the assistance of the Master he was at last persuaded and got into the boat with his papers.

On our way to HM Sloop I recognized the Master as a person I had seen at the factorie of Ambriz & on this recognition he gave me his papers and appeared more tranquil.

101

I now told him that I was sure Capt Elliot would allow him to return immediately he ascertained he was American.

On gaining the Columbine Quarter Deck I delivered the papers to Capt Elliot immediately, followed by the Master of the Edwin who advanced shaking his fist and grasping at the papers in Capt Elliot's hands, making use of the most abusive language. Mr Carpenter (1st Lieut) as also myself stepped in between him and Capt Elliot to prevent the personal violence & indignities threatened by the Master of the Edwin to the Commander of HM Sloop on HM's Quarter Deck.

So violent however was his conduct that Capt Elliot ordered two Marines to stand between him and the Master of the Edwin who even then pushed forward in the most outrageous manner to grasp his papers or to strike Capt Elliot but was prevented by the Marines.

Captain Elliot having satisfied himself that he was entitled to the protection of the flag he hoisted, explained that he regretted the steps forced on him to disprove suspicions principally founded on the conduct he (the Master of Edwin) had pursued & giving him his Papers he returned to his Brig soon after which HM Sloop made sail and anchored at Ambriz.

Capt Elliot and myself immediately landed and repaired to the American Factory where we were received by a Mr Cox who stated he was in the same employ with Mr Daley the Master of the Edwin & expressed much concern at what had happened remarking that he must have been drunk or mad.

Mr Cox suffering under a bad case of Mrican fever attended with most serious symptoms, our Surgeon attended him by order of Capt Elliot, who in his anxiety to show by every possible means the feeling which he held towards American Citizens sat by his bedside several hours and paid him every possible attention during our stay.

Under the advice of our Surgeon Mr Cox recovered and nothing could suppress the anxiety shown by him to evince his gratitude.

I further beg to state that during the passed year it has been my duty as Boarding Officer to visit several American Vessels and on no occasion have they shown the least objection to produce their Papers: on the contrary the very best feeling possible has existed & the case now referred to was alike deplored by ourselves as by the American Citizens trading at Ambriz.

It is further my duty in explanation to state that additional reason of suspicion in this case was excited from the ascertained fact that many of the Slavers sailing from Ambriz and the Coast near have American papers & are under the American Flag.

In the Month ofjune last, I boarded the 'George Crooks' of Baltimore, a Schooner anchored at Kabinda & in every way prepared to receive a Cargo of Slaves. This Vessel produced papers signed by the American Consul at Havannah from which place she last sailed: on mustering her Crew they were found all Spaniards but the Master.

On the 6 July, only a fortnight previous to meeting the 'Edwin', I again boarded the 'George Crooks' which I found still in the same state of preparation, but the papers produced as an American prevented further steps being taken.

On our return to Kabinda, we were informed that the Schooner 'George Crooks' had sailed with a Cargo of Slaves.

I have .. Chief Lt. Edward Latham, 2 Lieut of HM Sloop Columbine

102

No.7 Lord Palmerston to Andrew Stevenson

[FO 84/376]

Draft letter Foreign Office, 27 January 1841

The Undersd. has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Note from Mr. Stevenson dated the 14th Augt. 1840, in reply to the Note of the Undersigned dated the 23rd of April 1840, on the subject of a complaint made by the American Govt. against the Officer in command of Her Majesty's Brig 'Grecian', for having boarded the American merchant Ship 'Susan' when off the Light of Cape Frio in the month of April 1839.

The Undersd begs leave to state to Mr Stevenson, in reply to the remarks contained in his last Note, that H.M. Govt. do not pretend that H.M. Naval Officers have any right to search American Merchantmen met with, in time of Peace, at Sea; and if in some few cases such Merchantmen have been searched when suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, this has been done solely because the British Officer who made the search imagined that he was acting in conformity with the wishes of the United States Govt. in endeavouring to hand over to the United States Tribunals Ships and citizens of the Union found engaged in a flagrant violation of the Law of the Union. Such things, however, will not happen again, because orders have been given which will prevent their Recurrence. But there is an essential & fundamental difference between searching a Vessel, and examining her papers to see whether she is legally provided with Documents entitling her to the protection of any Country, and especially of the Country who e Flag she may have hoisted at the Time. For though by common parlance the word 'Flag' is us d to express the Test of Nationality; and though according to that acceptation of the word H.M. Govt. admit that British Cruizers are not intitled in time of Peace to search Merchant Ves ls sailing under the American Flag, yet H.M. Govt. do not mean thereby to say that aM rchantman can exempt herself from search by merely hoisting a piece of Bunting with the United States Emblems and Colors upon it. That which H.M. Govt. mean is, that the Rights of the United States Flag exempt a vessel from Search when that vessel is provided with Papers in titling her to wear that Flag, and proving her to be United States Property & navigated according to Law.1 But this fact cannot be ascertained unless an officer of the Cruizer whose Duty it is to ascertain this Fact shall board the Vessel or unless the Master of the Merchantman shall bring his pap rs on board the Cruizer; and this examination of the Papers of Merchantmen suspected of being engaged in Slave Trade even though they may hoist an United States Flag is a Proceeding which it is absolutely necessary that British Cruizers employed in the suppression of the Slave Trade should continue to practise, and to which H.M. Govt are fully persuaded that the United States Govt. cannot, upon consideration, object. Because what would be the consequence of a contrary practice? What would be the consequence if a Vessel engaged in the Slave Trade could prot t herself from search by merely hoisting an United States Flag? Why it is plain that in such case every slave trading Pirate, whether Spanish, Portuguese, or Brazilian or English or French, or of whatever Nation he might be would immediately sail under colors of the United States: very Criminal could do that, though he could not procure genuine American Papers; and thus all the Treaties concluded among the Christian Powers for the suppression of Slave Trad would b rendered a dead letter, even the Laws of England might be set at Defiance by her own Subj ts,

and the Slave Traders would be invested with complete impunity.

1 Palmerston noted in the margin: 'Query this last Condition?'

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H.M. Govt are persuaded that the United States Govt. cannot maintain a doctrine which would necessarily lead to such monstrous consequences, but the Undersd. is bound in duty frankly to declare to Mr. Stevenson that to such a docuine the British Govt. never could or would subscribe. The Cruizers employed by H.M. Govt. for the suppression of Slave Trade must ascertain by inspection of papers the nationality of Vessels met with by them under circumstances which justify a suspicion that such Vessels are engaged in Slave Trade, in order that if such Ves el are found to belong to a Country which has conceded to Great Britain the mutual right of search, they may be searched accordingly and that if they be found to belong to a Country which like the United States has not conceded that mutual right, they may be allowed to pass on free, and unexamined to consummate their intended Iniquity. H.M. Govt. feel convinced that the United States Government will see the necessity of this course of proceeding.

But H.M. Govt. would fain hope that the Day is not far distant when the Govt. of the United States will cease to confound Two Things which are in their Nature intirely Different; will look to Things & not to Words, and perceiving the wide & intire Distinction between that Right of Search which has heretofore been a subject of Discussion between the Two Countries, and that Right of Search which almost all other Christian Nations have mutually given each other for the Suppression of the Slave Trade will join the Christian League, and will no longer permit the Ships & Subjects of the Union to be engaged in Undertakings which the Law of the Union punishes as Piracy.

P.

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[FO 84/1 172]

No.8 E.M.Archibald to Russell

Slave Trade No. 6 British Consulate, New York, 24 February 1 62

My Lord,

Referring to my despatch, Slave Trade, No. 43 of the 11th of Novemb r last, I have the honor to report to Your Lordship that the execution of the sentence of death on Captn. Nathaniel Gordon of the Slaver 'Eric' took place on Friday last the 21st inst. The most stre nuous efforts on the part of his friends, aided doubtless by the pecuniary influence of the Slave Trading interest in this City, were made with a view to set aside the conviction; and, failing succe by resort to every available legal proceeding, to obtain a commutation of the sentence of death. A Petition, said to have been signed by 25,000 inhabitants of New York, was for this purpose presented to the President who, however, remained inflexible. A general impression prevailed to the last moment that the sentence would not be carried into effect,- so little was the public sentiment in harmony with this exceptional enforcement of a Law which, not very long since, was regarded to be so sanguinary as to induce a former prosecuting officer to ab tain from pressing prosecutions for its violation.

The execution of this unhappy man at last took place und r the most sho king circumstances, the prisoner having attempted to commit suicid by the taking of poison; and, from the effects of stimulants, to prevent the action of the poison, being all but unconscious of what was taking place. Revolting, however, as are all these sickening incidents of the death scene, for which the miserable victim was himself responsible, there is no qu stion that whatever good effect the conviction may have, would have been very greatly le sen d, had the Prisoner been allowed to die by his own act.

It is nevertheless but too apparent that the conviction and execution of this offender, gro and notorious as were his crimes, is attributable to the disturbed condition of publics ntim nt growing out of the extraordinary state of public affairs in this country. I think it highly improbable that, under any circumstances, a similar vindication of the Law will ever occur.

I beg leave to enclose some extracts of the public newspapers containing r ports and comments on the execution of Gordon.

I have the honor to be My Lord Your Lordship's most Obedient Humble Servant E.M. Archibald

105

[FO 84/1170] Draft Slave Trade No. 4

My Lord,

No.9 Lord Russell to Lord Lyons

Foreign Office, 28 February 1862

Mr. Adams spoke to me a few days ago on the subject of the African Slave Trade. He deplored the vigour and success with which the traffic is carried on at Cuba, and placed in my hand a Despatch from the United States Consul at Havana, of which I enclose a Copy.2

This information had previously reached Her Majesty's Government from Her Majesty's Consul at Havana.

Mr. Adams went on to say, that the Government of the United States would be glad to see our Cruizers sent to the Coast of Cuba.

I did not give any formal answer, but said, that the difficulty lay in the question of the Right of Search, upon which so much correspondence has taken place.

The United States are bound by Treaty to have a Squadron with 80 Guns on the Coast of Africa to intercept and prevent the Slave Trade. They now have only one Vessel of 22 Guns.

I know the United States Minister excused this nonfulfilment of Treaty, on the ground of the necessity of blockading the coast of the Southern States, and thus the Blockade of the Southern Ports, which inflicts gross and serious injury on British Commerce and manufactures, is made a Reason by the United States Government for not fulfilling their engagements towards Great Britain in a matter, in regard to which the British nation have long taken the most lively interest.

The result is that American Cruizers are taken away from the African Coast on the ground of the Civil war, while British Cruizers are kept away from the Cuban Coast in deference to American jealousy with respect to the United States Flag.

I am well aware that Mr. Seward has told you, as Mr. Adams has told me, that the American Government have no objection to the overhauling of American Ships by British Cruizers, provided there exist good grounds of suspicion.

But a verbal agreement of this kind might be of little avail against a popular cry, founded on the indisputable doctrine of International Law, that the Right of Search cannot be lawfully exercised in time of Peace.

The only alternative, I can perceive, is, that the United States Government should either keep up their Squadron of eighty Guns on the Coast of Africa, with a sufficient number of Cruizers on the Coast of Cuba, or that the United States should give their consent to an efficient Slave Trade Treaty.

I send you a Draft of a Treaty for that purpose.3 It is true that the United States by agreeing to this Treaty would not be relieved from the formal obligations of the Treaty of 1842, by which she is bound to keep a squadron with a fixed number of Guns on the Coast of Africa.

But the proposed Treaty would enable British Men of War to supply, to a certain degree the want of American Cruizers.

In any event it would befit the United States to join in the most vigorous measures for the suppre ion of the traffic in Slaves.

2 Not printed . 3 Ibid

106

No. 10 W.H. Seward to Lord Lyons

[FO 84/ I 171]

Copy Department of State, Washington, 22 March 1862

My Lord,

I think it is already well known to the Government of Great Britain that the President of the United States is animated by a sincere desire for the complete suppression of the African Slave Trade. On reviewing the history of that trade during the period which has elapsed since the convention which was entered into between that Government and our own on the gth day of August, 1842, it has been found that, during that time, no slaves have been carried into any of the territories of Great Britain, and with the exception of the case of the bark Wanderer, none have been brought into the United States. But it is equally certain that large numbers of African slaves have been carried into the Colonies of Spain, and that this infamous traffic has been mainly carried on by persons resident in other countries, including the United States, and under the fraudulent cover of their flag. The operations of the naval forces of the two countries on the coast of Africa, when prosecuted under the most favourable circumstances, proved very ineffectual. This inefficiency has been recently aggravated by the necessary withdrawal of a considerable part of our own naval force from that coast to suppress a domestic insurrection. The President does not doubt that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty is fully impressed with the importance of this grave subject, and is animated by a desire not less strong than his own, for the suppression of a surreptitious trade which has been justly condemned by all enlightened nations.

Having received instructions to negotiate with you, if possible, some arrangements with a view to that object, I have the honor to inquire ofYour Lordship, for greater certainty, what is the actual disposition of the British Government upon the question, and whether Your Lordship has authority to treat with me upon it in the spirit I have indicated? If your answer should be favourable, I will have the honor to submit for your consideration the form of a convention upon which, if acceptable to your Government, the President would ask the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States.

I have the honor

William H. Seward

107

108

Section Ill Coercing Africa One problem which the British had repeatedly to confront in their efforts to suppress the

transatlantic slave trade was that of how most effectively to deal with those African rulers who

persisted in supplying captive Africans to local dealers on the coast. Abolitionists had hoped

that the trade might be discouraged through measures aimed at promoting alternative

legitimate forms of commerce, and to this end treaties were concluded and, in some instances,

protected settlements and colonies established.

Lagos, which commanded the entrance to a long coastal lagoon, was during the 1840s a

centre for clandestine slave trading. But it was also regarded as a possible entrepot for

potentially lucrative commerce with the Yoruba hinterland. In 1851, under pressure from

merchants and missionaries, Palrnerston sanctioned consular intervention in a royal succession

dispute, secured promises from the port's new ruler that the slave trade would be suppressed

and, with the backing of the Royal Navy, established British predominance there. British traders

nonetheless continued to complain about the insecurity of their position, and there were

rumours of slaving in the neighbourhood. As the following documents indicate, by the summer

of 1860, further intervention was under consideration in Whitehall.

Some believed that slaving would never be eradicated from the bight of Benin without prior

action against Dahomey. The kings of Dahomey had long been active in the west Mrican trade,

engaging in wars with neighbouring, sometimes christianised, peoples, to ensure they had

slaves for export. In the early 1860s abolitionist opinion in Britain was appalled at the

reluctance of Gelele, who had succeeded his father, Ghezo, as king in 1858, to forego the

profits of the trade. Even the electors of Dorset were outraged by events in Dahomey, and in

November 1861 the good citizens of Lyme Regis were moved to petition Lord john Russell, the

foreign secretary, to take steps to teach Gelele that he was 'not to outrage humanity with

impunity'.

One proposal for dealing with the errant monarch and others engaged in the trade was that

put forward by Captain Eardley Wilmot, a veteran of the West African Squadron. He argued, in

a letter to Russell of 30 July 1861, in favour of a close naval blockade of the west African coast

and the despatch of a mission to Gelele to persuade him to give up the trade. There was

considerable support for the plan in the Foreign Office, and, as subsequent documents reveal,

William Henry Wylde, the head of the Slave Trade Department, readily endorsed a 'certain

amount of coercion'. Lord Palmerston, by then prime minister, believed that force must b

used to seize the king's main port at Whydah. In the event, however, Russell doubted th valu

of naval pressure without further military action, the Admiralty resisted propo als for taking

109

Whydah, and Wilmot was sent by Russell on an ultimately fruitless mission to Gelele.

Meanwhile, in August 1861, Palmerston sought both to check Dahomey's influence and to

satisfy British merchants by compelling Dosurnu (Docemo), the king of Lagos, to cede his small

but strategically-important realm to Britain.

No. II Edward Lugard to Edmund Hammond

[FO 84/1 130] Letter War Office, 20 Aprill860

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 20th October and my reply of the 15th November last, respecting the steps proposed to be taken for the protection of the Trade of Lagos; I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Lord John Russell, the enclosed copy of a despatch from the acting Governor of the Gold Coast containing the report he had been called upon to give on this subject.

I have th honor to be Sir Your obedient Servant Edward Lugard

Enclosure

Acting Governor A. Bird to the Duke of Newcastle Cape Coast Castle, Gold Coast, 13 February 1860

My Lord Duke,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's Dispatch No 31, dated the 22nd Nov' 59, relative to the proposed withdrawal of H.M. 'Brune' from Lagos and substituting a stationary force of troops, and erecting fortifications there, and calling upon me to report fully thereon.

I beg, in reply, to state for Your Grace's information that Lagos is far out of the reach of this Govr being distant from Head Quarters 310 miles- that I have never been there- consequently am quite unacquainted with its locality, and that there is no communication between Lagos and this, other than by the English monthly Mails.

I trust therefore, under these circumstances, Your Grace will see this liability on my part to form any first opinion on the subject, though, from what I have heard, I would incline to the opinion that a permanent force with the suggested fortifications would be a more certain protection to the trade of Lagos than the occasional visit of a Man of War: but, I have also been informed that the climate of Lagos is unsuitable to the European constitution.

I have ( igned) A. Bird Acting Governor

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[FO 84/1 I 30]

No. 12 Memorandum by VV.H. Wylde

Foreign Office, 20 April 1860 In the summer of last year when Koroko threatened an attack upon Lagos, and the Admiralty expressed their intention to withdraw the Gun Boat 'Brune' from the Lagos Lagoon, Commodore Wise and Govr Hill suggested that with the view to the permanent protection of Lagos and to avoid the periodical panics occasioned by Koroko's threatened attacks, that a small mud fort should be erected and armed, to be manned either by the Residents at Lagos, or by a small Company of Black Soldiers from Sierra Leone.

Lord J. Russell directed that the suggestions of the above mentioned Officers should be referred to the War Dept for the opinion of Mr Secty Herbert. The Papers were accordingly sent to the War Depart and from thence by Mr Sidney Herbert's direction to the Colonial Office to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle by whom they were forwarded to the Govr of the Gold Coast for his opinion as to the measures which should be adopted for the protection of Lagos.

The accompanying dispatch from the Govr of the Gold Coast contains all he has to say upon the matter.

Lord Palmerston has recently suggested that we should take possession of Lagos, and there can be no doubt that such a proceeding would afford great protection and encouragement to legitim ate trade in the neighbouring Rivers, and would be a considerable check upon the Slave Trade. Lagos would also unquestionably become the resort of large numbers of refugee Slaves from the neighbouring Country.

But the permanent occupation of Lagos would on the other hand be the source of considerable jealousy on the part of the native Chiefs who would be annoyed at losing their Slaves, and it would afford a pretext also for the Reports now industriously spread by the Slave Traders to the effect that the object we have in view in the suppression of the Slave Trade and the encouragement of legitimate trade if that we may increase our influence and eventually take possession of their Country.

The French and I believe other European Powers have Factories established at Lagos and questions might possibly arise with them if the place is permanently occupied by us.

It would be necessary moreover I presume to mention Docemo the present Chief of Lagos.

W.H.W.

Note by Lord Wodehouse (under-secretary of state) No doubt the Slave Traders would raise a tremendous outcry, but as the measure will be

directed against them, this would be no more than natural. Before any serious step is taken, we ought, I presume, to consult the Colonial Office.

The mode of proceeding would be to conclude a Treaty with Docemo (King ofLagos) for the cession of his town, and it would be a matter for consideration, whether he should be continued in any shape as a chief acting under our authority or whether we should assume the direct Sovereignty. I should think the latter would be the safest course.

The French & other foreigners would no doubt raise objections to our assumption of Sovereignty, tho' I don't think they can have any rights which would be inconsistent with a cession of the territorial rights of the native Chief to us.

W. April 27/60

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No. 13 Note by Lord John Russell

[FO 84/1 130] Foreign Office, 30 April 1860

I observe that the Governor of the Gold Coast says he believes Lagos to be unsuitable to a European constitution.

I think we must hold our hands till we know more about Lagos - new colonies in unhealthy stations are not desirable.

Russell

[FO 84/1130]

No. 14 Memorandum by W.H. Wylde

Foreign Office, 2 May 1860 As far as regards the Climate of Lagos it [is] not more unhealthy or unsuitable to Europeans, or indeed hardly so much so, as some of our other possessions on the African Coast. I think therefore that if it should be considered advisable to take possession of the place, no consideration founded on the insalubrity of the Climate should be allowed to have any weight.

Would Lord john Russell wish the Papers sent to Lord Palmerston before any communication on the subject i mad to the Colonial Office[?]

WHW

[FO 84/1160]

No. I 5 Memorandum by W.H. Wylde

Foreign Office, 7 August 1861 In ubmitting for Lord Russell's consideration the following observations, I trust it will not be considered presumptuous of me, if I premise what I have to say, by observing that I believe there is not in Her M's Navy a more active, intelligent and zealous Officer or one who bears a higher character in his profession than Captn Wilmot, and that if he were placed in a responsible po ition on the Coast there is no Officer who would work with greater good will, or who is better fitted than he is to carry out the views of Her M' s Govt for th up pres ion of the Mrican Slave Trade.

Captn Wilmot' ob ervations are in the main excellent and well worthy of every consideration; it is however orne Years since he was on the Coast, and things have considerably alt red since he was there. In the first place he is mistaken in consid ring that the Slave Trad is on the decline on the East Coast.

112

On the contrary more vessels, if Native Craft are included, have b en tak n within the last twelve months on that Coast, than have been captur d in the previous twelve Years.

This is to be accounted for by the fact that, in consequence of the cooperation of the American Squadron, Slavers find it considerably more difficult than they used to ship their Cargoes. As an instance I may quote the case of the 'Ardennes' an American Barque that has been on the Coast disguised as a Whaler for upwards of a year and a half without being able to ship. By the last Mail however we received intelligence that sh had shipped her Cargo and that she was a few hours afterwards caught by H. M. 's S. 'Wrangler' with 500 Slaves. She had of course made away with her Papers and was in other respects disguised as much as pos ible.

On the East Coast however there are no American Cruisers, add to this that we have v ry few British Cruisers there, and that the Portse. Authorities are notoriously venal, and the reason for the increased Slave Traffic on the East Coast will be accounted for.

But the Traffic on this Coast has also its drawbacks, among them as pointed out by Captn Wilmot the much longer duration of th voyage to Cuba, and th cons quently greater liability to losses among the Slaves.

It requires also a much longer time to collect a Cargo on the East Coast, and the risk of capture is proportionately increased.

In dealing, however, with the Question of the Slave Trade, it will be as well on th present occasion to confine our observations to the West Coast, as if th Traffic is once suppressed on that Coast, the days of the Slave Trade on the East Coast will be numbered, as far as the exportation of Slaves from thence to Cuba is concerned.

In the palmy days of the Brazilian Slave Trade, the export of Slaves from th West Coast amounted to between 70 and 100,000 annually, and it extend d over a line of Coast upwards of 2000 miles in length.

It is now reduced to about 300 miles, and a few Years since the numbers exported had fall n to between 6000 and 8000; latterly however, say last Year, the numb r of Slaves shipped may b calculated at between 20,000 and 25,000 at the very outside.

The places notorious as points from whence nearly all the slaves are shipped, are the Congo River and its immediate neighbourhood which may b consid red as the Head Quarters of th Slave Dealers, Cabenda, Melemba, Kilongo, Loango, Mayumba & Mangua Grand , and Ambuzette to the Southward. The Congo River, Cabenda, Melemba and Kilongo are all included within a space of 100 miles; and further north. Whydah and its n ighbourhood may be considered as the most notorious for Slave Traffic.

A Cargo may occasionally be shipped in th Line of Coast watched by the Northern Division of the Squadron, but thes shipments are rare compar d with what takes place on th outh Coast not averaging I should think more than one in a Year.

The Questions to be decided are, can this Traffic be put a top to, and if o how? I beli v with Captn Wilmot that it is possible by our own unaided exertion to put a stop to the Slav Trade despite the protection afforded to Slav Vessels by the American and French Flag .

But we must have more energy and a better system on the part of the Admiralty than has of late Years characterized their policy on th African Coast. Th Slave D al rs have mat rially altered their plans of late Years, but we have not altered ours, with th exc ption of furnishing the Commanders of Crui rs with list of known and susp ct d Slav rs.

I hardly think that Captn Wilmot's plan of Blockade by the Boats of Cruisers would in itself be sufficient or effective though it would go a long way toward it.

W must take active measures on shore. Our object is correctly tat d by aptn Wilm t to b to prevent the shipment of Slaves at all, not to apture th m. Every argo hipp d, v n if

113

captured subsequently, is so much gain to the Native Chiefs and to the Portse., Brazn., and Spanish Slave dealers settled on the shore.

The Masters of American Vessels do not hesitate now in some cases to avow that they have come for Slaves, or if they do not avow it, their errand is nevertheless notorious, but the Commander of British Cruisers cannot touch them, even if they have, as in one instance was notoriously the case Slaves on board, and the boldness of the American Shippers will ·be considerably increased when as will shortly be the case, the U.S. Cruisers will have left the Coast. Nine out of ten of the Slavers that go to the Coast are met by British Cruisers, and could be captured if we had an equipment Treaty with the U.S. Govt.

We cannot however expect to obtain this, and we must therefore devise some other mode of proceeding for what use will it be to have Boats blockading, or watching the Coast, if the Officer in command are to become Witnesses of Vessels daily cruizing within sight, waiting only for opportunities to ship Slaves or openly doing so in defiance of them.

What I would v nture to suggest would be that sat some of the most notorious shipping points for Slave , say th Congo & Loan go, and one or two others if possible Depot Vessels should be stationed with Coals, Provisions &c for the Steamers and strong Black Crews in addition to a Crew of White Men say 15 or 20, sufficient to man a boat or two if necessary. Some of the captured Slav Ves els would make very good Depot Ships, and the White Crews could be attached to the Cruiser in the neighbourhood whose duty it should be to communicate with the Depot ay once in 24 or 48 hours according to the direction of her Commander.

The Cruiser with her Depot and Boats could in this manner easily guard 40 or 50 miles of Coast by changing the White Crew of the Depot Ship every ten days or a fortnight the health of the men would be preserved.

Having establish d my Depot or Guard Ship I would warn the Chief in the neighbourhood that the first embarkation of Slaves from their Territory would bring down upon them certain punishment, and I would give orders to the Commodore to carry out this threat, and to demand the xpulsion of the Slave Dealers. By the judicious expenditure of small sums of Money we could al o procure from the shore all the required information respecting the movements of the Slave Dealers.

Thi plan might b carried out at one or two points as an experiment, and if found to answer, xtended to other points. Experience has I think proved that the only effective means of

putting a top to the Slave Trade is by using a certain amount of coercion, more or less as the cas may be, in th first instance. As soon as the native Chiefs are convinced that by shipping Slaves they will bring down upon themselves punishment, they will cease the traffic, but as long as we threaten only, o long will they continue to supply the Slave Dealers as they have hitherto done and put us off with fair words.

The foregoing suggestions are intended to apply more particularly to the Southern Coast.

At Whydah and against the King of Dahomey, I would suggest that stronger measures should be adopted.

I cannot conceive that Cptn Wilmot's idea of proceeding to Abomey to negotiate with the King of Dahom y would be attended with any practical result, even if it were safe for him to there which I very much doubt, if we may judge from the nature of the last me sage we receiv d from that Chief. I think it by no means impossible to bring such an amount of coercion to b ar upon him as would effectually cripple him and his resources. The Trib s in the neighbourhood fear and d t st him and the Chief at Whydah, his principal port, would be only too glad of an opportunity of throwing off his Yoke.

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If this is the case, as it is stated to be, by making proper arrangements b forehand with the discontented Tribes and the Chief at Whydah, it might not be difficult to make Whydah independent of the King of Dahomey and a large and friendly population could doubtless b got together if it were given out that fugitive Slaves would be protected there.

On the other hand if we were to subsidize the King of Dahomey and his Chiefs in order to induce them to forego the profits they make by selling Slaves to the Cuban Slave Dealers, we should in the first place have to pay highly for their acquiescence in our vi ws in this respect, without gaining our ends, which I take it are not only to prevent the export of Slaves but to develop the resources of the Country & to put a stop to the desolating Wars which are carried on for the purpose of supplying victims for the annual 'Grand Cu tom'. And ofwhat use would it be to put a stop to the export of Slaves, if the Wars are still to be carried and the Prisoner taken are to be sacrificed instead of being sold as Slaves. Other native Chi fs in th neighbourhood would also feel that they had a right to be subsidized for giving up the lave Trade, and might feel aggrieved if they were not.

Now that the King of Porto Novo had been compelled to give up the Slave Trade, and w are about to have an efficient Gun Boat in the Lagos Lagoon we shall have done more to cripple the King of Dahomey and to prevent the export of Slaves from his Dominions than has be n effected for the last ten Years in that neighbourhood, and if an attack wer made on Whydah, and an old fort there reoccupied we should place the finishing troke to th Slave Trade from the Dahomian Chiefs Territories.

If it is really intended to take more efficient steps on the West Coast of Africa for the suppression of the Slave Trade, I would venture to suggest whether it might not b advisable to bring together some of the Officers who have recently returned from Africa, and who from the position they have held would be enabled to give practical opinions upon the mean b st adapted for putting a stop to the Slave Trade.

Rr Adml Sir Fredk Grey, the present first sea Lord of the Admity has only lately return d from the command of the Squadron on the Coast, Commodore Wise who is also in England was second in command under Sir Fr Grey. Rr Adml Keppel has returned within the last few days. Captn Wilmot is also a good authority and thoroughly understands the ubj ct, and Lieut Glover could also give valuable information as to the practicability of operating in the Lag s Lagoon where there is believed to be access by Water to within a few miles of th Capital of Dahomey.

I think if a Conference of some of the above nam d and probably other Officers were assembled, some practical measures might be suggested for rendering our efforts for th suppression of the Slave Trade considerably more effective than th y now are. It could do no harm and might possibly do much good.

I will only add that if the system of D pot Ships should be establi hed, which was a plan that I know Commodore Wise was in favour of, ther are now 8 or 10 Vessels admirably adapt d for this service that the Papers have recently announced as being about to be sold out of th Navy.

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[FO 84/ I I 60]

No. 16 Memorandum by Lord Palmerston

Foreign Office, 9 August 1861 I quite concur in the opinion that a Blow judiciously struck at Slave Trade on land would be more effectual than our efforts by sea, because it would go to the Source of the Evil. The present is a good Time for Exertion, because it is likely that the civil war in America will divert from Slave Trade Capital and Ships which would otherwise be employed in it, and that fewer ships will sail from New York or Boston for the Coast of Africa, while none will go thither from the Confederate States. The King of Dahomey & the other Chiefs will therefore have fewer Customers, and will be more likely to listen to Reason. Our first object ought I think to be to stop lave Trad from Whydah, we have stopped it, at least I hope so, from Lagos and Porto Novo, and I believe from Badagny. If we could seal up Whydah against Slave Trade, we should have shut it out from quarters formerly swarming with Slade Traders. I doubt it being advisable to enter into any previous communication with the new King of Dahomey. He seems to be a brutal savage. The Statement in these Papers of the Disposition of his Father to come to Terms with us, do not apply to the present man, though one should like to know why the late King's overtures were not acted upon. I believe that with the present King instead of a Word and a Blow, we ought to administer a Blow and a Word-we should begin by taking possession of Whydah, and either tell him why, or wait till he asks us why, and then tell him it is to prevent the exporting of Slave . I believe that Whydah would be found to be reachable by the Lagoon that extends along the inside of the Coast from Lagos; our improved Gun Boat with a Squadron of native cano and orne black troops would easily settle the Matter and occupy the Place. The March from Abom y would be difficult for the Dahomey King as well as for us if we wanted to attack Abomey. W hould tell the Europeans at Whydah that if they want to deal in Slaves they must go els wh re; if they are content with Palm Oil & such things they would be welcome to stay. We hould have no difficulty in maintaining Whydah as we have kept Lagos, and we should oon have a larg legitimate Trade there. If the Lagoon scheme would not do, we would effect

a Landing through the Surf in Canoes, and with the support of Fire from the ships easily occupy Whydah.

The fir t tep would b to increase our Black Regiments, and send a Detachment from the W st Indie to We t rn Mrican and to send some light Draft Gun Boats to Lagos. When we had got th King of Dahomey to parley we should in Time bring him to Terms, and without paying him. It i only th trong arm that can prevail with these Barbarians.

As to the b st m d of acting in th Congo Station the opinion of naval officers might be tak n.

P. 9/8-61.

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Section IV Gathering intelligence

Effective naval action against the slave trade required reliable intelligence on those engag d in

the traffic. This was particularly the case when it came to intercepting vessels equipp d for

slaving, but without live cargoes. It was also important when detaining ships trading under false

colours. The correspondence here reproduced relates to the employment of informers in Rio

de Janeiro, where Charles James Hamilton Hamilton was British minister, and in New York,

where Edwin Archibald, the British consul, established close relations with a Cuban informant.

Remuneration was always an important issue in such relationships. But as Joaquim Guedes

Alcoforado pointed out (No. 22), espionage was a risky business and the rewards available did

not always compensate for loss of status and position in society.

No. 17

C.J. Hamilton Hamilton to Lord Aberdeen

[FO 83/367]

Confidential and Secret Slave Trade No. 17 My Lord,

British Legation, Rio de Janeiro, 29 November 1841

Frequent Reference has been made during the past year in the, Slave Trade Dispatches of this Mission, to the important Service of an Individual whose Cooperation has b en condu ive to the Capture or Destruction of no inconsiderable number of Slavers by H .M. Ship of war on this station. His Remuneration for these, Services is, in part, by a Percentage, to b , paid on the value of the Captures made through his Instrum ntality; and partly, by o casional Advanc s made by Her Majesty's legation, on account of SecretS rvice Mon y: but the form r mode is tedious and uncertain, and, in truth, little advantageous to him; whil , th , oth r entail a considerable deal of troubles, which it were b tt r to avoid, on H.M. Legation, accompanied also by no small share of p ril to the Individual himself, by putting him too frequently in communication with the former.

Under these circumstances it has app ared to m very d sirabl that som more pecific and more regular mode of Remuneration should be adopted, wh rein the e, and, oth r Inconveniences might be got rid of. And I th refor instructed Mr. Gordon, paid Atta he of the Mission, who is very intimately acquainted with all th Events attending th Employrn nt f this Individual, and comprehends perfectly all the bearings of the question, t pr pare, a memorandum on the subject, in order to be ubmitted to Her Maje ty' Gov rnm nt.

That Document I have the honour to indo h r with. I hope it will it will be found to m rit your Lordship's Attention, and that it may induce you to ignify your pl asur t th adoption of the plan proposed, with as little d lay as po sibl .

Some such arrangement I consider indisp n able, in ord r to ecure to H.M. hip in th s as th continuanc of his valuable assistanc

I hav th honor to be,

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with the highest respect. My Lord, Your Lordship's Most Obedient Humble Servan~ Hamilton Hamilton

Enclosure

Memorandum by C.J.R. Gordon

Rio de Janeiro, 29 November 1841

In the month of December of last year, Mr Ouseley, H.M. Charge d'Affaires, entered into relations with an individual who was strongly recommended to him by a Personage high in the Imperial Administration, as capable of furnishing constant, correct and valuable information on all matters connected with the parties engaged in the Slave Trade of Brazil, and respecting the various plans and contrivances resorted to by them from time to time in the prosecution of their terrible Traffic. The individual thus recommended is a young man whose occupation hitherto had been that of Shipmaster or First Mate, in the Brazilian Mercantile Marine, and, in these capaciti s, he has made more than one voyage to the Coast of Africa in Slave Vessels. His motives for renouncing an occupation of so lucrative a nature were various: hope, however, of greater and more certain gains than even his previous but precarious mode of life afforded, was probably that which had the greatest weight with him; though a disgust, apparently sincere, with his former criminal and inhuman practices, as also sympathy with the political sentiments of the Per onag before mentioned, have doubtless exercised considerable influence in inducing him to afford his aid, towards assisting H.M. Servants in the execution of the orders of their Government suppressive of the Slave Trade.

Relying on th recommendations in favour of this person and on the experience he himself oon attain d of the value of the information given by him, Mr Ouseley did not hesitate to place

him in communication with Rear Admiral Sir Edward King, then recently arrived at Rio de Janeiro as Commander in Chief of H.M. Naval Forces on this Station. The Admiral at once p rceiv d the ervice hi intimate acquaintance with the Proceedings of the Slave Traders might b of to th exertions of the Squadron under his command, and, by means of Mr Ous 1 y' intervention private contracts were conclud d between the informer and several of the Commanders of H.M. Cruisers, by which, in return for the information afforded by him, he b cam entitl d to a certain percentage on the prize money paid to them by H.M. Gov rnment for ev ry Slave Vessel they might capture in consequence of following the dire tion and availing themselves of the indications furnished by that Individual.

In c n qu nc of the exertions of the informer directed and applied by H.M. Naval Squadron; Fiv lavers,- as nam din the margin*,- have, since the commencement of the present year, been captur d by H.M. Ships 'Fawn', 'Clio' and 'Grecian' in addition to those fallen in with -a dd ntally by th se vessels and others. Two of these Slavers had Africans on board to the number of712; and, besides these two Slavers, as per margin,** having on board upwards of700 African , have, in cons quence of similar indications been driven on shore and the vess Is destroy d; while on outward bound Slaver,- the 'Africano',- denounced by the informer as fitted for the Slave Trad and visit d accordingly by Captain Jones of H.M.S. 'Curacoa', but allowed to pro eed on h r voyage as not having on board proof to justify her d tention, has since, it is

report d, been taken with a cargo of Africans on board by one of H.M. Cruisers on the Coast of Afri a. Furth r anoth r laver with Mrican on board (the 'F liz Navegant ') was fall n in with

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by H.M. Brigantine 'Fawn', in consequence of indications given by the inform r, but, unfortunately, escaped from that cruiser by superiority of sailing and th intervention of night

In order to ensure the due success of his indications the informer has generally accompanied one or other of H.M. Cruisers to sea, acting frequently as their Pilot, - a measure ab olutely necessary in the service on the Coast of Brazil - it being oft n requisite - in order to come up with and seize Slave vessels- to enter creeks and Bays not laid down on the Charts, and with all of which the informer, from his previous mode of life is most intimately acquainted. The Commanders of H.M. Cruisers fully admit the benefit of this person's services, and Captain Fremantle, late ofH.M.S. 'Clio', has declared that, inasmuch as, during a cruise of four months, without the advantage of that person's information, he did not make one prize,- he (Captain Fremantle) feels assured that, had he been with him, he should, on the contrary, have taken at least four Slavers - that number having landed their Cargoes of Africans to the knowledge of the informer without interruption from H.M. Cruisers, during the above period:- and that a British vessel might cruise still longer and meet with no Slave vessels if unaided by accurate information on this extensive Coast; while, with such information as that individual can afford, success must generally without fail attend their endeavours.

The informer, it must be remarked, has, of course, necessarily given up all his former means of gaining a livelihood and, moreover, in the service in which he is now engaged, he constantly exposes his life to the vindictiveness of his former associat : it i evid nt also that he must maintain his previous style and manner of living in order to d ceive the e person and to induce their belief of the feigned account he gives them of his pre ent mode of life. F r thi reason, also, when in want of money, he cannot, as before r quest as istance from them- and, in time, it will readily be perceived that, having ent red upon this S rvice, it is to H .M L gation and Cruisers and to them alone that the informer, not having any private m ans, can, as long as he devotes himself to it, turn for assistance and support.

Now, were it in the power of Commanders of H.M. Cruisers, on the capture of a slaver through his means to advance at once to the informer the share of Priz money that they may have agreed to give him, and were the numb r of Cruisers on this Station such that his indications could always and immediately be acted on by th Commanding Offi r of H.M. Vessels in Port, - he would never - such is the ext nt to which the Slave Trade is carri d on -be in want of means of support. As it is, however, the case is dif£ rent: for, not only i it in mo t instances impossible for the Command rs of H.M. Ships, from their limited circum tance , t advance sums of money to this person on account of the percentage of th ir Priz money, which they may have consented to give him, b fore that money be actually paid th m by H.M. Government, - which is never less than a year after the date of each capture, - but H.M. Squadron on this Station has, for some years past b en so r duced that th Commanding Officer in Port is frequently unable*** from want of cruisers, to avail himself of the indication offered by the individual in question; while, in addition to this, Admiral King app ar latt rly to have conceived an unaccountable suspicion and dislik of this p rson, and, by cone aling from H.M. Legation and the Commanders of H.M. Ship their destinations and p riod of sailing, by dispatching them to other points of his command than th Coast of Brazil, m to which to throw obstacles in the way of cruisers availing th ms lves of his information. It thu occurs that this individual has, at the present moment, by a mod rat calculation about £500 due to him on account of th several Slavers who e capture h has caused, but h i unabl t touch a farthing of it till the Prize Money for them b paid to th Captors.

The con equence of this state of things is that the inform r is constantly comin to H.M. Legation to petition for mon y to enable him and his family to xi t and, by thi m an , h very justly observes, the sums he has worked and xposed his li£ for, b come fritt r d away in

119

small advances for present unavoidable expenses, instead of being paid at one and of thus being made applicable towards creating a small capital and surplus fund for any emergency that might occur. In this manner Mr Ouseley advanced to him 2324 000 Rs., being the amount he was to receive for the 'Asseiceira' whose capture he caused and since Mr Ouseley's departure, Mr Hamilton has thought it expedient so far to continue the encouragement hitherto afforded to this person by H.M. Legation as, every now and then, to advance to him small sums for present necessities. But the having constantly to communicate on such subjects with an individual of this stamp is both unpleasant and perhaps derogatory to H.M. Legation besides being, to a certain extent perilous from the continual chance of discovery to the individual him elf; and, assuredly it is also hard upon him to be under the necessity of thus constantly begging for means of subsistence when he has fairly due to him a considerable sum, the just remuneration for his active and valuable Services. And, indeed, so impossible does he find it to continue to expose himself as he does, without gaining by his exertions, unless with difficulty- and by repeated applications for what, in fact, is no more than his due,- even the means of upplying himself and family with the mere necessaries of life, that he now declares it to be his intention - should no means be adopted for his receiving regularly and without delay the sums due to him, - to break off his relations with H.M. Legation and to resort to some other method of gaining his livelihood. The integrity with which he has hitherto acted towards H.M. Legation has been abundantly manifest and has latterly induced him, though, at the time, ab olutely in want of means to provide himself with necessaries and to meet expences incurred by a continuance of serious sickness in his family - to refuse to take the command of a Slave vessel for a voyage to the Coast of Africa and back, which would have occupied about 60 days and for which he was offered four Contos of Reis (about £500) -one Con to being promised in advance to fit himself out and provide for his family during his absence.

The obj ct, therefore proposed in making the above detailed statement is, - in the first place - to enable H.M. Government to judge in some measure of the advantage that the assistance of this person has been of to H.M. Legation and Ships in their efforts to carry into effect their Instructions; and, secondly, in the event of the views held by H.M. Legation, relative to the expediency of ecuring a continuation of his services, being approved and shared by H.M. Government, to suggest th propriety of H.M. Legation being authorized to pay to this informer a small fixed monthly Salary (say 100,000 Rs. Per month equal to about £150 a year) as retaining Fee- so as to obviate the necessity of H.M. Legation having constantly to listen to hi application for pecuniary assistance and to afford that individual means of support during u h p riod as th percentage due to him on account of hi information cannot be paid him

by th Captor of Slave vessels, or when the small number of Cruisers on the Station shall render that information unavailable.

It will be understood further that the information given by this individual is not only useful in th mann r above indicated to H.M. Cruisers, but is frequently very serviceable to H.M. Legation in furni hing notice of the proceedings and ubterfuges of Slave Traders- procuring evidence for the condemnation of Slavers by the Mixed Commission Court. On the receipt of the above alary being assured to him, he expresses himself ready to devote himself still more entirely to th ervic of H.M. Legation, to go to sea in cruisers at th shortest notice wh n pro eeding to a t on th indication furnished by himself, or to act as Pilot on board them, when ver o required, - in the numerous and intricat inlets and archipelagos of this Coast, hould they b nt to intercept Slavers expected to arrive or sail, even from information not

coming fr m him lf - and, in tim , to 1 nd himself in every pos ible manner, under the direction of H.M. L gation, to discover and foil the contrivances of Slav Traders.

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It may further be remarked, in favour of this propo ed outlay by H.M. Government, that preventive measures against Slave Trade appear perhaps to be more advantageous and to entail less expence of money, waste of human life and liability to disease amongst H.M. Servants on this Coast than on that of the Continent of Africa. The climate here is good- there are several Harbours and Ports where H.M. Cruisers can be supplied with neces aries, - and Headquarters are established in the centre of the operations of the Slave Traders; so that there is scarcely any sickness as on the Coast of Africa among the Officers and men of H.M. Cruisers, and it is not necessary for the latter to be removed far from their cruising ground and their services thus be lost for any considerable time, in order to procure supplies and repairs when they may stand in need of them. Then too, with regard to the interception of Slavers- this Coast appears to be the more advantageous as respects vessels with Africans on board, for they all come to a £ w known points which, with a sufficiency of cruisers might easily be watched. Be ides this, the constant prevalence of winds in one fixed and favourable direction, which, on the Coast of Africa so materially assists the speculations of Slave Traders by enabling their vessels to stand out to sea immediately that the speedy operation of embarking their Negroes is completed, does not obtain on this Coast which it is, at times, a comparatively difficult object to make thus affording increased facilities and chances of capture of Slavers with Negroes on board than those presented on the Coast of Africa:- while, for similar reasons, the latter is the b st cruising ground for the interception of vessels only prepared for the Slave Trade, and on their way to embark their wretched Cargoes.

In conclusion, should H.M. Government so far concur in the conclusions drawn from the facts stated above, as to authorize the payment of a monthly fixed Salary to the Informer, so long as his Services may be found useful, it may perhaps likewise be considered expedient by the Board of Admiralty that the Commander in Chief of HM. Squadron on this Station be confidentially instructed to facilitate, as far as may be consistent with other calls upon the services of the Ships under his command, the employment of a large proportion of them in conformity with the indications of that person as communicated through H.M. Legation.

GJ.R.G.

* Asseiceira - 332 Negroes

Do us de F evereiro - 380 Do --

F elii Vencedor

Venus

Constante

- Cargo for Coast

-Do- Do

- found abandoned

**'Estrella do Cabo' driven on shore at the Prima Isles with 380 Africans on board by th Boats of H.M.S. 'Clio'. 'Eliza', driven on shore by H.M. Brigantine 'Fawn' with 350 Negroes on board.

*** Note: Mr Hamilton applied on Sept. 27 to Admiral King for a crui er, to b nt to intercept a slaver about to sail from Campos and was informed that he had none at hi dispo al for that Service. The informer, for two months previously urg d the nece ity of hi going to sea in a cruiser on the 1st of November for 3 or 4 weeks in order to detain 5 lav rs on their return from Africa, of which he had certain knowledge. It has b n impo sibl to pla a v 1 at his disposal and 3 out of the 5 Slavers announced by him as xp cted hav land d th ir cargoes without interruption in the neighbourhood of Rio d Jan iro. S veral simil r as have occurred.

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No. IS Lord Aberdeen to C.J. Hamilton Hamilton

[F084/410] Draft Slave Trade o.3 Foreign Office, 2 March 1842 Sir, I have received your despatch marked 'Slave Trade No.17 Confidential' of the 29th November 1841, enclosing a Memorandum drawn up by Mr Gordon containing suggestions as to the mode of remunerating an individual who is employed in obtaining information for Her Majesty's citizens with respect to the movements of Slave vessels on the coast of Brazil; and I have to state to you in reply that Her Majesty's Government approve of the payment of a monthly salary to the person in question at the rate suggested by Mr Gordon; namely 100,000 Reis p r month. Such salary to continue as long as, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Envoy at Rio de Janeiro, the services of the individual in question shall appear to merit that reward.

You are accordingly authorised to make the payment. You will place it to the account of sums reserved for Her Maje ty's Foreign Secret Service, and draw for it accordingly.

I am &c. (signed) Ab rdeen

No. 19 C.J. Hamilton Hamilton to the Earl of Aberdeen

[FO 84/408] ret and Confid ntial

lav Trade No. 42 British Legation, Rio de Janeiro, 20 September 1842 My Lord, The e ret ource wh nee is d rived the Information to be found in Indo ure No.3 of my Slave Trad ries No. [ ... ] of this Date, i the Individual already known to Your Lordship for the utility of hi ommunication to Her Maj sty' Legation on matters relating to the Suppres ion of lav Trad . In this rvice h continues to be as zealous as ever, although at the greatest p rsonal risk; and if of lat better ucces has not follow d on his Reports, th Circurnstanc is mainly attributabl to th Insuffici ncy of the Force in these Waters. The Arrival on the Coast, h w v r, f th only two '/4 sels recently captured- thos by H.M. Ships 'Ros ' and 'Fan tome', adv rted t in my Dispatch No. [ ... ] Slave Trad Serle of this dat , was in both instances ann unc d pr viously by him.

In a form r ornmunication of mine, r sp cting this P rson No. 17 S.T.S. of last y ar, marked r t and onfid ntial, and to which, tog ther with th Memorandum indo d in it, I b g to

r £ r Your Lordship, it was uggest d by me, and you were pleased to act on th Sugg stion, that in plac f urn i u d o asionally on account of cret Servic , a monthly stip nd of 100,000 Rs., qual to about £150 P r Annum should b allowed to him, in part paym nt of his

rvi ; a furth r R muneration being a certain Per C ntage on th valu of the Prize mad thr ugh his In trum ntality, in Virtu of a Contra t entered into with th Commanding Offi r , & co f H.M hip making th capture. But a difficulty att nds o casionally this last m nti ned Mod of R mun rati n which it app ars d sirable to r mov . Commanding

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Officers of H.M. Ships have sometimes declared themselves averse from any such Deduction to be made from the Proceeds of th Prizes, however much their Capture may have been the Result of the previous Information afforded by the Individual in question; and even if approving of the Measure themselves, there may by Difficulties in obtaining the Con nt of

their Officers and Crews.

I would therefore, venture to submit to Your Lordship's better Judgement, whether the Payment of the Percentage, due as it certainly must be considered, and purchased by uch an enormous personal hazard, might not be made imperative by a Government Instruction, rath r than be left optional with the said Officers, and to be effected in such mann r, and at such rate, as may appear to Your Lordship just and advisable.

Remuneration for this Man's Services, and the Perils h encounters daily and hourly in performing them, cannot I think be guaranteed to him in too clear and positiv a manner.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect; My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant: Hamilton Hamilton

No. 20 E.M. Archibald to Lord Lyons

[FO 84/1086]

British Consulate, New York, 4 Octob r 1859 My Lord, I have already acquainted Your Lordship, unofficially, of the corre pondenc which, inc th commencement of March last, I have conducted not only with the Foreign Offi e, but with our Consuls and other British Functionari s elsewhere, on the subject of th African lave Trad . This correspondence has resulted from information, which has b en uppli d to me by the person referred to in my despatch to Lord Napier of the 26th February last, und r an arrangement, and upon terms approv d of by the Secretary of Stat for For ign Affairs.

With reference to the nature of this information, I may observe that I hav , since Mar h last, been in almost daily communication with my special informant here, who, b ing hims lf a native of Cuba, and having friends and correspondents in that Island, and being mor ov r a Shipbrok r and acquainted with or having the means of knowing the movements of partie in N w York engaged in the Slave Trade, possesses extensive and authentic sources of intelligence with respect to the outfitting and sailing of Slave Trading Vessels, as well from this as from oth r Ports.

Owing to the hazards peculiar to his position and services, his correspondence with me is conducted anonymously, frequently through a mutual friend, and much of it in Cyph r. Founded upon his communications and, in some instances, on oth r corroborativ circumstances, I have addressed to the Secretary of State, in all, thirty lave Trade D pat h , containing, with few exceptions, enclosures, many of them voluminous, and hav found it necessary likewise to correspond incid ntally with our Consuls and oth r at differ nt P rts of the Union, as well as at Havana and elsewh re. The result has b en that, to th pr nt tim , I have reported to Her Majesty's Government the name and de cription with, in m t as , detail d information of the movements of no fewer that fifty Ve sels, all f whi h n

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exceeding perhaps half a dozen doubtful ones, are beyond question engaged in the African Slave Trade. Be ides these there is a list of suspicious vessels whose movements it is advisable

should be watched.

no question has hitherto arisen, nor have any circumstances occurred, requiring Your Lordship ' intervention, I have not thought it necessary to trouble Your Lordship with copies of or extracts from my correspondence; but I beg leave now to transmit to Your Lordship a tabular statement of the names, tonnage, ports of clearance etc. of the vessels above mentioned, in numerical order for greater convenience of reference, in the event circumstance rendering necessary any further communication to Your Lordship on this subject.1 I have transmitted to the Secretary of State from the information supplied to me here, corre t descriptions of nearly all of these vessels, taken from the American Lloyds Register and oth r Auth otic sources, with such particulars as to their purchase, outfit, movements, and the partie interested in most of them, as will enable the Commanders of Her Majesty's Cruizers, as well as those al o of the United States Squadron on the African Coast, to act with certainty and deci ion in case of falling in with any of the vessels in question.

For many years past the African Slave Trade has not been so extensively and vigorously carried on as during the present year. The removal, last year, of our Squadron from the Cuba Coast, and the weakness of the United Stat s Squadron on the Coast of Africa have both tended gr atly to encourage the traffic.

From the knowledge which I have obtained I find that the negociations and arrangements for carrying on the Slave Trade to Cuba and Porto Rico, are commenced and matured, almost en tir ly, in the Ports of New York and Havana, by certain parties, principally Spaniards and Portugues , who move to and fro between these Ports, they or their Agents visiting, occasionally, ther Ports of the United States as well as Ports of Cuba, Cadiz, Gibraltar and Fayal. Th y hav also local trading agents or correspondents at suitable points on the Coast of Afri a wh r laves are congregated for hipment. Excepting as shipmasters to navigate ships from h nee to the Coast of Africa, and as a Brokers and Agents in facilitating the operations of prin ipals, v ry few if any nativ American Citizens in the Northern States are engaged in this traffic. I know the names of some ten or twelve of the principal trad rs residing here. All are Spaniards, Cubans or Portuguese by birth; and everal have accumulated great wealth from this n farious traffi . In the S uth there are, doubtle s, some Native Americans interested; but I qu tion if, b id th Wand rers Cargo, more than one, or at most two other cargo s have b n land d in Florida.

Th n w pap r accounts of arrivals of uch Cargoes are due to political motives, and a design to mak capital of th se rumors at the approaching presidential election. Ther are, n v rth 1 , two cargoes of Slave shortly expected to be land d in Texas, and parties int r t d have not long ince gone Southward from this City with a large sum of money to mak arrang m nts £ r the landing of th laves. I have not yet ascertained at what points they ar expected to arriv . Your Lordship will naturally suppose that there must have b en occasion wh n intelligenc po essed by me could have been mad us ful if communicated to th lo al auth ririe , in ord r to prevent the departure of v ssel fitted out or known to be int nd d £ r the lave Traffic. I regret t say that my experience has confined me in th opini n of the wor than us I re ult of uch a proceeding on my part. I n ed not now nt r into any dis ion as to the truthfulne or th r vers of th assertion so fr qu ntly mad , of th d £ ctiv int grity of th local functionaries.

t print d .

124

I can only say that I have no doubt that strong temptations are thrown in their way to let offenders escape. But I have entirely satisfied myself that it would, by no means, advance the cause of justice, were it known that a foreign functionary, and especially a British Consul, busied himself in denouncing vessels and individuals to the local authorities or otherwise

interfered in such matters. In all that relates to their own peculiar Institutions, and in particular to their shipping interests, no people are so sensitive as Americans on the subject of such foreign interposition, as the history of this Consulate, and the termination of my predecessors career, testify. I have, indeed, in one or two cases indirectly caused such information to be given as led to the detention and examination of vessels which I knew to be fitted out for the trade, but to no purpose; they were allowed to proceed on their way. I may further observe that a large proportion of the articles of merchandise shipped on board vessels carrying on a legitimate trade with the Coast of Africa, being identical with those required for Slave traders, nothing is easier (even excluding the influence of any improper Agency) than to elude the vigilance, or, if detained, to remove the doubts of the authorities as to the honesty of the intended voyage. On the other hand my seeming indifference has the effect of throwing parties off their guard, and thus, probably, enables me to obtain fuller and more authentic information than I could otherwise procure for transmission to I-Ier Majesty's Government.

Of the vessels in the accompanying list three only have as yet returned from the Coast of Africa to this Port, namely, 'Orion' 'Ardennes' and 'Emma Lincoln', 4,11 & 5, the two former seized through information from any informant here communicated through our commanders in the Coast, to the Commander of the United States Sloop 'Marion', and sent here for condemnation. The 'Emma Lincoln' after being detained on the African Coast, was unfortunately released. Her voyage, however, was broken up and she returned her in ballast; but she will shortly return again to the Coast to effect, if possible, the object of her former voyage. I regret to say that the 'Orion' has been permitted to be cleared by the Master, and sailed again from this Port for Porto de Lumba on the West Coast of Africa on the lOth of August. This is owing to the highly objectionable practice of allowing parties intere t d in vessels and Cargoes, seized for violation of the laws relating to the Slave Trade, to tend r their appraised value and thus obtain re-possession of them, before condemnation. AB the speedy return of this vessel to the Coast might by misconstrued into a proof of the honesty of her former voyage, and be used as a means of deception in reference to the obj ct of her present trip, I have given timely notice of her departure.

It is probable, from late accounts, that before this time several of the vessels denounced and mentioned in the accompanying list have been captured on the Coat of Africa. The lat increase of the United States Squadron on the Coast of Africa, as well as in the Cuba waters will , I am sure, be productive of most useful results; especially with the means I am now enabl d to command of reporting, beforehand, the movements of vessels fitted out and proce ding from this side of the Atlantic.

I beg leave also to transmit to Your Lordship a copy of a publication in the N w York H rald of the lOth August (of which I transmitted, at the time, duplicated copies to the Foreign Office),

2 containing a good deal of useful and interesting information in reference to the

African Slave Trade. I would especially call your Lordships' attention to that part of it whi h describes, and with general accuracy, the mod of fitting out Slavers from New York and other parts, and the manner in which the voyage is performed confirming my own exp ri n and representations on this subject in former despatches to the Foreign Offic .

2 Ibid

125

In conclusion, I trust it may not be out of place to observe that this is a practically new Branch of duty in the Consulate of New York, and has imposed upon me a great additional amount of anxiety and labor.

I have the honour to be My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant. E.M. Archibald

No. 21 E. M.Archibald to Lord John Russell

[F084/ II II]

Slave Trade despatch No. 5 My Lord

British Consulate, New York, 29 February 1860

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship, herewith enclosed, an extract from a letter which I have received from my Informant, referring to the arrangement entered into with him on the terms and conditions specified in Your Lordship's despatches Nos.[ ... ] and[ ... ] of the 5 August last, and to the payment made to him of the sum of One Hundred and fifty pounds, and complaining of the absence of any information as to the captures and detentions in respect of which h considers himself entitled to the remuneration, - as well as of delay in the residue of the payments stipulated to be made to him. He requests also to be informed at what date the existing arrangement with him is considered to be terminated.

I have the honour to be My Lord, Your Lordships mo t ob client humble Servant, E.M. Archibald

Enclosure Extract from letter to Archibald from his informant

New York, 28 February 1860 Dear Sir,

On th 6th January last in a communication addressed to you (in duplicate) by the writer, he communicat d from the tabular statement furnished the names of the slavers captured and cond mned and of the one detained and sent to this port. This information was derived from th English pap rs and from the corre pendent at St Helena of the New York 'journal of Commerce' and although some of the captures were made as far back as July 59, the writer has rec ived no communication from the Foreign Office through you except the demand for more information concerning the Slave Bark- 'Isla de Cuba' which was captured and releas d by on ofH.B.M. Crui ers. The writer is under the impre sion and firm belief that other slavers, d crib d in th tabular tatement furnished, have also been captured by H.B.M. Cruisers, -recogni ed und r no flag or nam or under an as umed name, as these vessels have not been

126

heard from since they sailed, and the FO appears to be well informed as to what ve sels hav escaped from the Mrican coast with slaves.

When the writer accepted the terms offered by the FO, he was under the impression that he would be paid according to the contract, and to which he refers, soliciting their statem n t of the date when that contract terminates, and regretting exceedingly that he should have to call the attention of the FO to what he conceives to b the nonfulfillment of their part of the Contract, thereby discouraging him and keeping him in a false position.

The prompt manner in which you were requested by the FO to pay the writer the One Hundred & Fifty Pounds Sterling led him to believe that the same course would be pur u d as to future payments and he therefore requests that he may be informed when the oth r payments due him are to be made.

No. 22 Note by W.H. Wylde

[FO 84/1 I I I]

Foreign Office, 21 March 1860 The Informer at New York is not borne out in making it a cause of grievance that he has not been informed of the captures made by British Cruisers on the African Coast, or that h has not yet been paid the sum stipulated for his information.

By the terms of his Agreement he was to receive a retaining£ e of £100 a year, 10 pr Ct. of the proceeds of all Vessels captured by British Cruisers in consequence of his information, and £50 for every Slave Voyage that might be brok n up by reason of information furnished by him, and it was further agreed that under any circumstances the amount of remuneration to be paid to him for his Services for one~ ar should not be le s than £400. He has air ady received £150, viz £50 as the Moiety of his retaining [! e of £100 a Year, and £50 a piece for the two Ves 1 "Orion" and "Ardennes" which were both detained by Brit. Officers and hand d ov r to th Commanders of U.S. Cruisers by whom they were sent to America for adjudication on a charg of being equipped for the Slave Trade.

It would have been no use to have told our Informer that a Ves el d nounced by him had been captured by a Brit. Cruiser, unless we could at the same time have informed him that such Vessel had or had not been captured on the information furnished by him. The greater part of the Prizes made by Brit. Cruisers, have be n captured without Colours or Paper to den te their Nationality, and they would, when met with under such circumstances, hav fallen a Pr y to the first Brit. Cruiser that fell in with them, whether they had been d nounc d by our Informer or not. The knowledge on the part of th Command rs of some of the Brit. Crui rs that certain Vessels were denounced as being intended for employment in the Slave Trad , has no doubt, in some instances, induced the Commanders of our Cruisers to pay such Ves ls more marked attention than they otherwise would, but in no one instance yet, has a Brit. Commander, when reporting th Captur of a Prize, stated that such Priz was mad in consequence of information furnished by this Office.

I am inclin d to think that one if not more Vessels have b en captur d that would oth rwi e have escaped if had not been for the information emanating from our Inform r furni h d by the Foreign Offic , but the Commanders of several of our Cruisers who have mad aptur have either neglected to state on what information th y made such captur , or th y may not have received the Instruction from th Admiralty directing them to furnish thi informati n.

127

I would venture to suggest in ord r that we may be enabled definitively to settle what amount of remuneration our informer is entitled to receive, that the Admiralty should be requested to call upon the Commanders of all our Cruisers who have made captures for a Confiden rial Report as to whether the information furnished to them from this Department was in any way instrumental to the capture of the Prizes taken by them, and they might also be asked whether they consider the information usually furnished as of sufficient importance to render it

advisable that it should be continued.

As there was no record in the Department of the exact date on which our Informer at New York commenced to supply his information, I wrote to the Consul on the subject, and it will be seen from hi letter, which is annexed, that the Year for which the Engagement was to last expired on the 1st instant It will be necessary therefore that Mr Archibald should be authorized to pay his Informant the Balance due to him under his Contract, viz £250, and it would be right perhaps that the necessary authority to make this payment should go out by the next Mail.

Some Deci ion hould also be come to as to whether the Services of the Informer should be continued. He is continuing for the present to supply information as usual, and I think it would be expedient that he should go on doing so, at any rate until we can get the opinion of the Naval Officers on the Coast as to the value they put upon the information supplied to them.

Although an American Vessel whenever met with on the Mrican Coast would be an object of suspicion, till as the Commanders of our Cruisers are not authorized to make any search on board American Ve els whereby they could ascertain whether she is an honest trader or not, it cannot but b of ervice to them to know on good authority whether the Vessels they meet under American Colours are engaged on a Slave Voyage or not.

WHW

Note by Lord Wodehouse I think the Admiralty hould b asked as Mr Wylde suggests, and the services of the informer continued for the pres nt.

W March 21/60

Note by Lord John Russell I think £250 hould b paid, and th Inform r's engagement continued, or renewed.

JR

128

No. 23 Joaquim Guedes Alcoforado to Lord Palmerston

[FO 84/ I 130] Rio de Janeiro, 9 March 1860

My Lord, I beg to be allowed again to explain to Your Lordship the critical circumstances and position wherein I now find myself after having for the long space of 20 y ars rendered loyal an faithful Services to mankind and Her Britannic Majesty's Government, as Your Lordship are doubtless aware not only from what appears in the Archives of the Foreign Office, but also from th personal knowledge which Your Lordship already po sesses of such services.

The persecution which I but lately experienced at the hands of my own Governm nt gave occasion of the Earl of Clarendon, duly appreciating my Servic s, to assume upon hims If th responsibility of the Process instituted against me 'ex officio' upon the false pretence of my having chosen false witnesses to be sent to England to depo e against the Brazilian Government, and of my being here 'the pronounced Agent of Lord Palmerston '; a Preten e which the Brazilian Government did not fail to avail of as a sufficient ground to dispense with those Services which I then rendered in common to it, and the British Government.

All this may be ascertained from the Copy of the said Process, which was duly forwarded by the respective Legation at this Court, to Her Britannic Majesty's Government for its information and in order to make apparent the real position wherein I was thereby thrown.

Notwithstanding, however, this proceeding of the Earl of Clarendon my Governm nt both dismissed me from its Service, and has hitherto positively refus d me the recomp nse I was

promised by it- as Mr Scarlett will no doubt have made known to the Foreign Office. But not yet satisfied with all this, my Government in spite of the Note which was addressed to it by ord r of the Earl of Clarendon wherein he reputed my dismissal an encourag ment to the Traffic, has waged that persecution so unremittingly as to prevent me, by means of its influen , to obtain any other means of sub istence besides that afford d me by the British Government.

It is true, Her Britannic Majesty's Government has ever given m proofs of gratitude, through its several Ministers at this Court, as well as th assurance that my ervices will at all p riod b acknowledged by it- as the Earl of Clarendon was pleas d to d clare in a Note I received from him in answer to a Despatch which I had the honour to addr ss to Your Lordship some time ago-; but although this is no doubt, highly grateful and honourable to m , still I r gret mu h that I am forced to inform Your Lordship that the p nsion which I receive, affords now a v ry insufficient means of subsistence to me and my family, with orne decency and the n c ary independence in Rio de Janeiro; and that in Consequence, I hall perhaps eventually find myself bound to remove any residence from this plac to orne other part of this country or out of it, wherein obscurely to maintain my family and myself out of the reach of the p rsecution whereof I am now victim in Rio de Janeiro: and therefore I beg resp ctfully to requ t of~ ur Lordship that in this event you will be pleased to exert your highly valuable influ nc , in ord r that that pension and protection hitherto afforded me by H r Britannic Maj sty's Gov rnm nt, upon which alone I can now rely, may not be withdrawn, for th just reasons d tail d abov .

The cessation of the Traffic, which mankind acknowledges due to th fforts of th Briti h

129

Government alone, is now on the footing described in the information lately given by me to Her Majesty's Minister here, in answer to certain queries which he propounded to me.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect My Lord Your Lordship's Most Obedient Humble Servant J oaquim Paula Guedes Alcoforado

130

SectionV Trading statistics

The Slave Trade Department of the Foreign Office was kept regularly appraised of figures

relating to the state of the trade in west Mrica and the Americas. British con ular officials and

commissary judges supplied statistics on commerce as also did naval officers, reporting through

the Admiralty. The following documents, including two annual reports from Briti h mixed

commission officials, all relate to the Cuban trade. They reflect the exasperation felt by British

officials and naval officers over the reluctance of the Spanish colonial authorities to cooperate

with them in the suppression of the trade. That at No. 26, in which the British consul-general

in Havana fulminates against the corruption of the local administration, is typical of such

correspondence.

No. 24 Commander Tucker to More O'Ferrall

[Slave Trade Papers, HP 1842, Class B]

HMS Wolverine, at sea, lat. 6° 21' N., Long. 3° 10' E., 29 S ptemb r 1840 Sir, Considering it an important part of my duty, as senior officer in command, to give to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty all the information I can give relating to the service I am employed upon, I have the honour to report that, should Her Maj sty's Gov rnm nt not hav been previously informed of it, steps may be taken to ascertain its correctness, to serve as a guide in any further measures it may be deemed neces ary to take for the t tal suppression of the Slave Trade.

At St. Jago de Cuba and the Havannah it is the general opinion that England will never b able to stop the Slave Trade, so long as the Spanish Government does not prevent slave-v ss Is fitting and clearing out in the Spanish ports and harbours for th coast of Africa, and o long as it is encouraged, and the slave merchants and carriers are assisted by the officers of th Spanish Government, in command or in offic at those places, who, though th y publicly d ny it, receive privately from the slave-merchants the following sums for the slaves land d within their command or jurisdiction:-

Dollars The Governor receives for each slave landed. . .. . . . .... . ........... .. ... ..... 16 The Commodore or Senior Officer in command of the naval force of the whole station ........................................ . . . .. .. . . . . . .. .... 4

The Intendente or Collector of Cu toms . ...... . ... ... . .... ........ ... . . . . .. 7 The gendarmes, who take charge of the slaves and conduct them from th place at which they are landed to the merchants' houses, (one g ndarme being allowed for that service, and to ascertain the number,) lav not being now permitted to be landed at th eat of Gov rnment . ...... .. . ... . . . . .. 1/ 2

131

And so long as the owners or slave-merchants are induced to continue it by the enormous net profits arising from paying only 16 dollars, or trade goods which cost at St. Jago de Cuba and the Havannah that urn, and selling each slave landed, on the average, for the enormous sum of 300 dollars; and o long as the captains, officers, and crews of slave-vessels are induced to continue to carry them by the great emoluments arising to them from it, receiving as follows, VlZ.-

Dollars The Captain- wages per mensem, and 10 per cent. Upon the slaves landed ...... 100

The 1'' Pilot- wages per mensem, and 3 1/ 2 per cent. Upon the slaveslanded ... . 70

The 2od Pilot- wages per mensem, and 1 per cent. Upon the slaveslanded ........ 60

The Contra Maestre, or Boatswain- wages per mensem, and 1 per cent. upon the slaves landed ... .. .......... ... ....... ......... .... .. .. . .. ...... . . 60

The Carpenter- wages per mensem ...... .. ..... . ........................ 50

The Cooper . . .. .. . ..... . .. ... .... ..... ... . . ..... . .... . ... . . .. .... .. . 50 The Cook . .. ...... . . .......... . ........... ....... ........ . ...... ... . 40

The Steward of Provisions, and to serve slaves .................... . . .. .. .. ... 40

Seamen each .... . .. ... ... .... . .... ................ ... .. .. ..... .. ... . 30

Ave sellately detained by me, which was 105 Spanish tons, and had cleared her purchase and expense by former successful voyages, was calculated would have realized, on the completion of the voyage she was detained, for which six months were allowed, the enormous net profit of 75,000 dollars, or 16,2501. sterling, which was calculated as follows, on the supposition of all the slave being land d, to the amount of 400, the number he was to have taken from the River Nun, viz.-

132

Slaves landed, 400, at 300 dollars each Deduct the following:-

First co t, of 400 laves, at 16 dollars each Fee to Gov rnor, at 16 dollars for each slave Commodore or nior Officer, at 4 dollars Intend nt , at 7 dollars G ndarrn at 1/2 dollar

To Captain, 100 dollars p r month, for six months Ten p r c nt. upon 400 lav

Dollars

6,400

1,600

2,800

200

600

12,000

To 1st Pilot, 70 dollars per month, for six months 420

3 1/ 2 per cent upon 400 slaves 4,200

To 2nd Pilot, 60 dollars per month, for ix months 360

On p r cent. upon 400 laves 1,200

To Contra Ma tr , or Boatswain, 60 dollars a month for ix month

On per c nt upon 400 lav s

1,560

360

1,200

Dollars

6,400

11,000

12,600

4,620

1,560

Dollars 120,000

Brought forward

Carpenter, 50 dollars per month, for six months

Cooper, do do

Dollars

300

300

Cook, 40 dollars per month, for six months 240

Steward for provisions do do 240

Seamen, 15, at 30 dollars each per month, for six months Provisions, Harbour-dues, Pilotage-loss

Total net profits of the voyage to merchants

which, at 4s. 4d. the dollar, is sterling

I have, & c. (Signed) William Tucker Commander and Senior Officer

No. 25

Dollars 37,740

600

480

2,700

3,380

Dollars

120,000

44,900

75,100

£16,250

J. Kennedy and C.J. Dalrymple to Lord Palmerston [CO 318/153]

No.4 Mixed Commission, Havana, !January 1841 My Lord, We have the honour to submit our annual Report of the state of the Slave Trade at this place, and also as usual to enclose with it Lists of Vessels despatched hence in the last two years, suspected of being intended for that Traffic, together with one off Vessels that have arrived here during the last year from the Coast of Mrica. 3

Of these Vessels, tho' the particulars we have been able to obtain may not in some respects be so full as might be desired, yet we believe that, in the essential point of numbers the lists approach, as nearly as can be hoped for, to correctness. We feel warranted, therefore on account of the conclusions to be drawn from them, and other considerations to express our humble congratulations on the very marked success they present, attending your Lordship's policy and endeavours to put down the Slave Trade.

Previous to the year 1838 it was well understood that there were about 80 Vessels from this Port engaged in that Traffic. The List for 1837, which is the first we have to be relied on from the better mode of Information then obtained, enumerates as having sailed in that year for Mrica 71 Vessels

The List for 1838 enumerates also 71 Do. 1839 decreased to 59 Do. 1840 shows further decrease 54

3 Not printed

133

Making an apparent decrease of one fourth in the number of Vessels despatched, but in

reali ty more, if we consider that five at least of the American Vessels were sent merely with

Stores and equipments or as tenders to the Slave Vessels.

Nor is the falling off less satisfactorily exhibited in the number of Vessels arriving from the

Coast of Africa.

In 1837 the number returned was ... 57

" 1838 . . . . .................... 50

" 1839 .... ... . . .. . . ...... . .... 47

" 1840 the enclosed list shows it .. . . 41

At first sight this may appear a decrease of only about one fifth; but an examination of the List will show that of those 41 Vessels there were

1 t Americans that returned in ballast. Viz. Nos 19. 20. 22. 24 and 28

2"d Spanish that arrived only with Passengers, the Crews of Ve els condemned at Sierra Leone viz Nos 1 and 4

3rd Spanish Brig Aguila, No 35, that came back empty finding her Port of destination too strictly watched to b able to enter

-----5

-----2

-----1

Consequently th r al decrease in the arrivals may be estimated at one third also.

With regard to the number of Slaves actually introduced during the year, we are further fortunate enough to have obtained a return that may be relied on as made up from the Reports received at the particular place of meeting or Exchange for persons engaged in Slave Trade. This is a Store in the Government Plaza or Square of the City belonging to a person named Abreu, whose name is often to be met with in the Papers relating to Slave Trade laid before Parliament. From this Return which agrees sub tantially with our own ascertained Lists, we believe we can confidently state that in 1840 there were but 28 Vessels arrived in this Port and neighbourhood with negroes, the others having landed their Slaves at other places, and that th e 28 Ve sels brought no more than the given number 10,104 negroes.

From the same Authority we learn that in 1840 there were but six Vessels arrived at Matanzas, which brought 1652 negroe . To Santiago de Cuba it states there were only two Cargoes of Slaves brought in 1840, but does not give their number nor any particulars from the other Ports of th Island. But uppo ing the two Vessels to Santiago brought 550, according to the averag of those to Matanzas, making them together 2200, and giving an equal number for Trinidad and the smaller Ports, which is certainly a full allowance. Still the whole number brought to the I land in 1840 would be less than 15,000 or under three fifths of the supposed average of form r years.

Nor is this decreas in the upply to be explained away by any upposition of a decrease in th d mand. The price of Slaves in this market continues the same, and one of the late cargo s has be n old we are credibly informed, though the negroes were very young at the price p r head of 425 Dollar , cash payment.

M anwhil th Planters are continuing th ir increased exertions for th greater productionof ugar. In our form r R ports we have called your Lordships attention to thi view of the question

as on of th b st crit rions by which we could judge of the future tate of the Slave Trade.

134

In our last yearly report, dated the 1st January 1840, we stated that notwithstanding the extraordinary increase of late years in the exportation of sugar 'in the present season it is well ascertained the exports will reach 700 000 boxes, or 140.000 Tons' .

Our information proved correct, inasmuch as the exports from Havana and Matanzas were returned as 711.000 boxes, and we refer to it as a guarantee for the accuracy of the assertion we now make on the same Authority that the exports of the present season from these two Ports will approach to even BOO.OOOboxes or 160.000Tons, which is alone equal to the consumption of the British Islands. Supposing the exports of the other places in Cuba to amount to 300.000 boxes, and the consumption in the Island at another 100.000 boxes, we consider we cannot giv a better criterion of the impetus given to Sugar cultivation, or of the demand for labour.

Such extraordinary increase, double within five years, may no doubt partly be accounted for by the formation of railroads and the adoption of Steam Engines, and oth r improved Machinery. But still it must be seen that it could not be obtained without a greater demand increasing with it for Labourers, and that these labourers in the present state of the Country must be expected to be obtained only from Mrica. Such might be the expectations at fir t entertained on this view of the question. But we feel your Lordship will be much gratifi d to learn that a Spirit hostile to the Slave Trade has risen up, so practical in its character, as to induce many Planters to seek free Labourers for their Estates in the Place of Slaves. On this Subject several disquisitions have recently appeared in the different periodicals of the City, including the Monthly publication of the Sociedad Patriotica. Of one of these from the Diario, a Government Paper which is also remarkable for holding a tone in favour of Creole intere ts, as distinguishable from those of the Mother Country, enclose a Translation, interesting from its novelty, as well as its importance. From this your Lordship will perceive that a numb r of Catalonian Colonists, about 60, have been actually brought into this Island under a strict agreement for 6 years to labor in the field; and if the speculation should prosp r, as we trust it may there can be no doubt that a very severe blow will have been struck at the continuance of Slavery itself, as well as of the Slave Trade.

For White labourers Spain possesses an immense advantage in the teeming population of the Canary Islands, containing a hardy race well prepared for this Climate, tho their habits of Industry are not so well direct d, it is said, as are those of the Catalans. From those Islands it is estimated that more than 15,000 persons migrate every year to Cuba and South America, of whom not more than one third come to this Island. Under judicious application of h r advantages Cuba might probably secure a larger proportion of those emigrants, and so supply her agricultural wants by Labourers who, if they would require more wages and bett r food and treatment than the enslaved natives of Mrica receiv , would unquestionably comp nsate for the outlay by their superior intelligence and better applied indu try.

We sincerely trust that this praiseworthy experiment may have a fair trial and prosp r; for without some such substitute as Slave labour we fear that the Slave Trade will continu unabated under the extraordinary increasing development of the resources of the Island. On every side we find proofs of astonishing prosperity, founded on bases too sound to admit a doubt of their continuance. The Population of this City, in less than 12 year has increased from 94.000 to upwards of 130.000 and that of the other Chief Cities it is aid in proportion.

Large Towns have sprung up with extraordinary rapidity; Cardenas, about 15 leagu s from Matanzas within the last 5 years; Cienfugos near Trinidad, within the last 10, and a mall village Nuevitas within the last year has assumed the character of a flourishing S a port. To this place a railroad is now making from the City of Principe in the interior, containing 55.000 oul , and another is projected thither from Villa Clara a Town of 10.000 Inhabitants, in the interior, though it is a question whether it be taken to Nuevitas or Ci nfugos.

135

Meanwhile other improvements are going on in silent, but in an astonishingly rapid progress. The communications with the interior are extended by railroads, of which one to the South is already opened to Guines, a distance of 15 Leagues, and two others are nearly completed. A fourth as has been mentioned, is projected from Villa Clara to the Sea, and Steamboats are in active employment along the Coast, with others advertised soon to be started. The Streets and Roads about the Havana also are in course of wonderful improvement, the public Walks are extended and well kept, and no fewer than 8 new fountains within 3 years have been erected with more or less taste in the City and Suburbs, for the accommodation and health of the Inhabitants. New Houses are being erected but not sufficiently so to meet the demands for them, while rents have arisen 50 pr. Cent within a few years. In the last year it is stated that there have arrived in this City, as passengers/according to the Government Paper

Nacionales 2919

Strangers .2..811 5766

of whom probably two thirds may be considered permanent additions to the population.

One circumstance we consider worthy of remark, with regard to this Population, that there are few traces observable of a Mixed race, and consequently that one source of danger supposed to exist among such Classes of inhabitants is not here to be apprehended. This may no doubt be ascribed to the great number of Whites, of whom it is said there are in the Island 440.000 to 660.000 people of Color of whom 498.000 are Slaves. This would make a proportion of two Whites to 3 Colored Persons, whereas in Jamaica, according to Mr McQueens Estimate in 1831 there were in round numbers 30.000Whites to a Colored Population of 356.000, or as 1 to 10, and since then we understand the white population has considerably fallen off.

Under these circumstances, could the Slave Trade be effectually put down, this fortunate Island seems to po sess every means of maintaining in sound prosperity a numerous white race interposed between the Black population of the West India Islands and the alarmingly increasing colored population of the Southern States of the North American Union. That White race in this Island we think sound Policy would require every attention to maintain, and one means in the power of the Spanish Government has been pointed out in the Diario p culiarly advisable. Every year by the Policy of the Government there are 400 Soldiers ordered to Spain, on the expiration of their Service, and their places and other vacancies are all upplied by recruits from Europe. Many of these 400 retired Soldiers, would, no doubt, if they

had th option, prefer remaining here, and thus form an important addition to the white Inhabitants, while the expense of transporting them home might be avoided. But the prospect of increasing the White population in Cuba is by many persons here, looked on with apprehension and General Tacon made no scruple of openly expressing his opinion that it was

sound policy to admit Slaves to be brought from Africa, who would in effect be a check upon the Whites. Whatever may be the operating causes, it is a melancholy truth that negroes are introduced so openly and notoriously as to afford no doubt of its being done with the correct connivance of the Government. That the Creole Inhabitants have no particular favor for the Trade, we have every day more reason to believe. In fact they know full well that it tends not so much for their benefit, or the upply of their Estates, which are already sufficiently stocked, as for th benefit of n w S ttlers, opening new Estates. These new Settlers who are gen rally Foreigners, and in a large proportion from the United States, are justly regarded as rivals, and therefor are xceedingly distasteful to the Natives. As soon as a Planter has his Estate suffici ntly upplied he has, in fact, a direct interest in suppressing the Slave Trade, because if it were uppressed hi property would at once double in value, and the great effect upon the

136

Country would be the preventing of the opening of new Estates. The Owners of Slaves would also be under the necessity of paying more attention to their health and reasonable labour, and thus their situation would at once be considerably improved. With such attention there is no doubt that the agricultural wants of labor in the Island might be sufficiently supplied from th natural increase, as in the Slave holding States of the North American Union where it is w 11 known the colored Population increase at the rate of 60.000 per Annum.

Our conclusion is as we stated in our last years report, that the Planters would without a murmur see an end put to the Slave Trade which has in fact, no other supporters than tho who are interested in it. These are 1st the Slave dealers, 2"d Merchants, who we regret to say, ar all more or less involved with the Slave dealers, and 3rd those Members of the Governm nt who share in the fees paid per head on the introduction of the negroes.

To these Fees we adverted in our last years Report also, and refer to them again, principally because we consider them the one great obstacle to the suppression, but partly because, by the Parliamentary Papers we find them brought forward by evidence satisfactory and tangible enough to be treated of beyond our Report (see Papers for 1840, Class A, in two different Cases, pp. 39 and 59). We trust therefore that your Lordship will not allow of any evasion on the Subject, in answer to the Representations made to the Spani h Government respecting them (Papers Class B. p.l6).

When the local Government has so direct an interest in the Trade, there can be no wonder at its continuance, nor at another remarkable circumstance in the history of the Treaty, that during the 20 years in which the Commission has be n in existence th re has not been on cas of a Slaver d tained by a Spanish Vessel of War xcept the one can be so considered of th 'Maria da Gloria' under Portugues Colors in 1824, which was tak n from a privateer by th Spanish Brig of War 'Marte'. Yet during these 20 years there have probably sailed from the different ports of the Island some hundreds of Vessels engaged in that traffic, in open violation of the Law and the Treaty. Nor should it be supposed that this has been owing to any want of means on the part of the Spanish Government, for the Naval Force on this Station is quite sufficient to meet any such call for its services, and is fully equal to what the British Governm nt has ordinarily on these Coasts. Of this Naval Force we enclose an account, from which your Lordship will see that it consists of one Frigate of 44 Guns five Corvettes or Brigs of from 14 to 22 Guns, and nine small Schooners or Cutters of sufficient Strength to cruize again t Slavers. Thes.e Vessels are well offered and well paid and provided in every respect, and from th ir inactivity therefore we can draw no other conclusion than that the Officers well know they ar abstaining agreeably to the wishes of their Superiors, even if not according to positive Instructions. These observations we are induced to make the rather because we do find occasional instances of Slave Vessels being taken by Brazilian and even by Portugues Cruizers and authorities, and their conduct supported by the Brazilian and Portuguese Governments, while here every instance we have of the interference of Spanish Vessels of War, or of the lo al Authorities has been in conniving at the escape of Slave Vessels, even if not in giving th m direct assistance and protection. We need refer only to the gross cases of the 'Magico' in 1824 and the 'Matilde' in 1837, in corroboration of our remarks.

We cannot therefore too strongly express our Conviction that from the Officers of th Spanish Government we can hope for no assistanc whatever in suppressing th Slav Trade and that England must determine on taking it into her own hands, unless she b content to have made a useless sacrifice in all her past exertions, and r tire baffled from uch an inglorious contest. This we cannot believe, now that the efforts of th Slave deal rs have b n so signally paralyzed. On the contrary we trust that even this partial ucce may 1 ad to th r still greater, and that more rigorou measures b r sorted to with regard to th p rson tak n

137

in pursuit of Slave dealings. We would therefore humbly recommend 1st That strict orders be given that no persons found on board Slave Vessels be allowed to be put on shore, as at present, at the first convenient spot, but that they be detained in custody and sent to their respective Governments for punishment. 2ndly that the haunts of the Slave dealers on the Coast of Mrica be subjected to visitation and the persons found there engaged in Slave Trade may be also taken and handed over to their respective Governts, as having been found guilty of an infraction of their Laws. 3rdly that in case the local Government of this Island still persevere in its present course of assisting the dealers by direct connivance, or palpably false pretences of enquiry when cases of Slave Trading are brought before their notice, then that your Lordship repeat and enforce the proposition contained in your Lordship's Despatch of the 26th October 1838, in these terms; ''You will communicate these Papers to the Spanish Government, you will point out to them that there can be no hope that the importation of Slaves into Cuba will be suppres ed until an entire change is effected in the course at present taken for the examination of Slave Trade Transactions; and you will propose that as experience has proved that no Spanish uthorities will conduct investigations of this nature faithfully and truly power shall be given to the Mixed Court of Commission established at the Havana to call before it parties suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, and to subject them to the same course of examination which ought to be carried on by the Administrative Officer of the Colonial Government but which is wholly evaded and omitted by those Officers (Parliamentary Papers 1839 Clas B 1840).

We have & I signed/ J . Kennedy Campbell J. Dalrymple

No. 26 J.J. Crawford to Lord Malmesbury

[FO 84/ 1 073]

No. 3 My Lord,

British Consulate-G neral, Havana, 25 January 1859

Th r has b n m d lay in transmitting the annual Report upon Slave Trade during the past year, occasion d by my earnest desire to make it as correct and as full as possible.

I hav now th hon ur of laying before Your Lordship a Statement of the number of Slaves known to have b n landed in Cuba during 1858 and the proportion which hav been aptur d by the Spanish Authoritie , shewing:

That, 12, 744 hav been sa£ ly introduced, in defiance of th Law and in violation of th existing Treaty, whilst 639 only, have been captured, and if to the above numbers landed, w add th usual allowanc of a third, as the approximate numb r of tho e of which we have had no information, w arrive at the enormous total of 16,992 Slaves land d during the past year!

But, I am by n m an atisfied that the number ofBozals introduc d as Slaves h rein 1858, has b n limited to tho numb r . I b li ve that many Cargoes have b en run, with regard t

whi h, n ith r th overnment of th Island, nor this C mmission has had any intellig nc , and that of th m the numb r far xc ed the proporti n of one third which I have expr s d. It would als b but fair to add a lik proportion to th number of th captured, making it up to 852 which I think I can ventur to assure Your Lordship it does not exc ed.

138

I am well aware that this Statement will, as has been usual, be denied by the Spanish Government, and that I shall be charged with credulity as has been the case on other occasions to suit The purposes of the Govt of Madrid, but I can indeed assure Your Lordship that I have fully investigated the information I have received and have been satisfied of its validity before I have acted in any instance, besides the having thrown aside much that was doubtful, or unsupported.

There has been the most glaring corruption of the local authorities and a connivance at these violations of the Law, and of the Treaty for suppression of the Slave Trade, which is in the highest degree criminal and degrading to the characters of the Spanish officers.

The District of Cardenas is most conspicuous, and the Lieut Governor notwithstanding retains his post! It is true that General Concha sent an oidor from the Royal Audiencia to investigate matters at that place, and that the result, as I have been informed, was to show, that there had been nothing wrong, but His Excellency knows well the reason why no proofs could be obtained as to the Slave Trading which has been carried on almost publicly at Cardenas and elsewhere in that district to the Scandal of the Inhabitants who were witnesses, but durst not, or would not declare what they had seen, so that all the abettors were enriched by the investigation, and it is said, the oidor Returned perfectly satisfied with his success, although his Judicial functions had only served to cover the delinquencies he was sent to detect and punish.

That, however, is only another to be added to the List of the fruitless results of such commissions, in so far as the administration of Justice, they are wholly unproductive, and consequently only are resorted to when the Acts of the Slavers and their accomplices in office have been so manifestly glaring as to need the shield of such Judicial Mockery- which it is well known can be obtained by the usual Agency of Gold, and that is generally pretty liberally applied in such cases. The Hush money and the safe conduct of one of the Cargoes of Slaves (980 in number) from the landing place to the Estate, their Certificates of Baptism, Cedulas which is said to have cost the Slave Traders about $200,000, but it produced the desired effect, and could well be afforded out of the enormous profits of the expedition.

Under such circumstances, My Lord, it is not surprizing to find th Slave Trade most flourishing. There is nothing to check it but our Cruizers on the Coast of Mrica. We have none now in these waters. The Americans have retired theirs. The Spaniards do not cruize to put an end to the Traffic, and they capture, only in cases where they are specially sent on that Service, or they take the empty Vessels, after their Cargoes have been safely landed.

I am of opinion, that every Spaniard connected with Cuba, whether an officer of the Crown or a Civilian, views the Treaty with Great Britain for Suppression of the Slave Trade, as tending to the abolition of Slavery, and consequently, as detrimental to their Interest in th s Colonies. I do not believe it possible for us to obtain the co-operation of the Spanish authoriti s in carrying out the provisions of that Treaty, but on the Contrary, that whatever Laws may be enacted, or whatever instructions may be issued by Spain to enforce the observan e of the Treaty they will be so administered as to be of no use whatever for that purpose. In hort, that there is not, nor ever has been on the part of Spain any loyal Co-operation, or desire to put an end to the detestable Traffic.

Every Cargo that has appeared off the Coast of this Island, (having escaped th Captur of Her Majesty's Cruizers) has been landed, and the unhappy Victims continue in Slavery, the number of such illegally introduced Africans that have been seized by the Spanish authoriti being quite insignificant, and some estimate of the extent to which the disrespect by pain of her obligations under the Treaty of 1835 may be arrived at, if we advert to the enormous slave population, which produced 1,800,000 Boxes, or nearly 450,000 Tons of Sugar, all the Tobac o

139

and other Exports of this Island and reflect, that nearly 24 Years have elapsed since the date of the ratification of that Treaty, that the ordinary mortality would have carried off all the Slaves of that period by this time, and, that notwithstanding such Calculation, there are many more Africans now in Cuba than there were in '35' certainly not arising from the fecundity of the Negroes, which here is exceedingly limited, but, owing to the constant Stream of Bozals which continues, and in tead of diminishing, is, this last year considerably increased, with a prospect of being kept up, if not augmented in future, by the facilities afforded to the Slave Traders in their abuse of the Flag of the United States, under which the Traffic is now, and for some time past has been carried on to a great extent. The Slavers also reckoning upon that perfect impunity here which they have always enjoyed, as there is not one instance of conviction under the penal Law, indeed not one of the Slave Traders, most of whom are well known, has ever been subjected to its operation such is the feeling here in favour of the Traffic that, I conceive, it would be impos ible to obtain legal proofs against them.

With the greatest respect. I have the honour to be My Lord, Your Lord hip ' Mo t obedient HumbleS rvant Jos. J. Crawford Commi sary Judge

140

~

.:..

Statem

ent o

f the

Nu

mb

er o

f Slaves Kn

ow

n to

have been

landed in the Island o

f Cu

ba d

urin

g th

e Year

1858,

and pro

po

rtion

captu

red by th

e Au

tho

rities

Date

Where lan

ded

N

um

ber

Captured

Nam

e of V

essel R

emarks

land

ed

Jan

ua

ry 2 S

ag

ua

5

00

6

3

Barque, nam

e un

kno

wn

T

he vessel w

as captured empty by the S

pa

nish

steamer 'Isabel F

rancisca: the crew being

allowed to escape in

the boats. T

he 63

slaves captured were landed by

the coasting

Schooner 'Esperanza' n

ear M

ata

nza

s.

February 7

Sig

ua

4

00

-

Barque 'R

osario'

February 7

Gu

an

ima

r 5

14

-

Am

: brigate 'Crim

ea' T

he Negroes w

ere taken to the estate 'Santa Teresa' n

ear the E

nsen

ad

a M

aja

na

, an

d the

vessel was fo

un

d w

ith her masts cut aw

ay.

February 2

8

Mariel

40

0

-A

m: brigantine 'C.

Th

is cargo belonged to D

ura

iion

a H

e. a

nd

was landed by

coasting schooners. T

he

Perkins I 1

7 6 tons

'Perkins I then w

ent to Yucatan, returned here on the 3

0th

Ma

y last, an

d b

eing

seized on

suspicion of fittin

g o

ut fo

r another Slave voyage, w

as scuttled an

d su

nk in

Ha

van

a

harbor du

ring

the nig

ht o

f 6th July by the m

aster an

d crew

Carry over

18

14

6

3

March 2

Sierra Morena

56

0

-A

m: barque V

enu

s' T

his vessel took on board 8

00

Slaves at L

amoo

Ap

ril12

B

ah

ia H

on

da

3

20

-

Schooner na

me u

nkn

ow

n

Th

e Negroes w

ere taken to an

estate called Bu

ena

Vista

Jan

ua

ry 5

20

A

m: brig 'N

ancy' T

his vessel w

ent to Cam

peche or La

gu

na

, returned here on

the 14

th o

f Ap

ril an

d w

as

21

9 tons

fitting

ou

t again when she w

as seized (July 17th) by the US C

onsul, but ha

s since been

released.

Ap

ril16

O

rtigosa 4

00

-

Barque 'P

eruana 1 O

wn

ed by D

. jose P

la an

d D

. jose F

resneda.

Ma

y 21 B

aracoa 8

00

-

Barque n

am

e un

kno

wn

T

he agent fo

r this adventure was a certain M

r Mones. O

ne of the ship's boats w

as seized

at B

aracoa, but the lan

din

g is denied by the C

aptain General

Jun

e 14

C

ardenas 9

35

-

Spanish ship 'Iberia' E

ugenio Vinas m

aster, D. ju

lian

Lu

lueta

an

d other

owners. T

he vessel after la

nd

ing

her cargo was hidden in

a creek, an

d w

as pu

t ashore on

the Colorados, w

here she was

fou

nd

an

d tow

ed here on the 9th Sept. by the Span. Steamer B

lasco de Garay, a

nd

has

been made a G

overnment T

'ransport.

AU

!fUSl 2

1

of!S

ag

ua

-

-A

m. B

rig 'Pu

tna

m'

Captured w

ith 32

8 negroes by U

.S. Brig

'Dolphin'

----

--l..

~

1\.)

Date

Sept 8

Sept-

Oct-

Oct-

Oct 1

5

Oct3

0

Nov 15

Dec-

Dec-

Dec-

Where lan

ded

N

um

ber

land

ed

Cardenas

90

3

Pu

nta

de Feja

65

0

Sierra Morena

41

5

Do.

58

0

North Side

16

07

]aru

ko

51

5

Bienfuegos (R

iver 3

25

A

rimao)

Rem

edios 1

10

0

Cat-dim

as 4

00

Cardenas

90

0

--

Captured

Nam

e of V

essel R

emarks

-A

m. ship 'H

aidee' Left N

ilongo with 1145 Slaves. O

wners D

. Julian Zulueta a

nd

others who conveyed

the Negroes to the 'A lava' estate w

ith an esco-rt of about 2

00

armed m

en. The B

ribes on this scandalous occasion are said to have am

ounted to about $200, 000.

-A

m. bk.

ti'.A. R

awlins'

The vessel w

ent afterwards to Savannah a

nd

was fined for irregularity o

f paptffs.

Am

. llrig 'Charlotte'

Left the Congo w

ith 600 slaves

Am

. brig ti'.A. C

hase'

Screw steam

er D

enied lly the Captain G

eneral

Am

. bk. 'Venus'

Captured by Span. Steam

er 'Venadito'

Schooner -nam

e P

robably the Portuguese schooner 'U

niao'

unknown

Vessel name u

nkn

ow

n

Probably the A

m. Ship T

rovatore '. This cargo w

as landed on the E

state Jucaro'

belonging to D. M

anuel Abreu in

Yaguajay.

Vessel name u

nkn

ow

n

Am

. brig ~lien' F

ound aground in the C

anal de los Barcos

12744 6

39

4248 -

16992 6

39

No. 27 J.J. Crawford to Lord John Russell

[FO 84/1218] No.1 British Consulate-General, Havana, 27 February 1864

My Lord,

I would most respectfully beg leave to refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 23 dated the 15th December last, in which I laid before your Lordship copy of a correspondence which I had had with the Captain-General respecting a large number of negroes who were captured at Las Posas in june 1860, and who were declared to be emancipados by the then Captain-General Serrano, but who were ordered to be returned by those to whom they had been, at that time, consigned as such, the Royal Audiencia having decreed that they were slaves, and General Dulce having, in compliance with that decree, ordered the unfortunate creatures to be reduced to slavery, after the lapse of upwards of three years from the period of their capture.

Of so extraordinary and I may say unheard-of proceeding, I deemed it my duty to apply for explanation and a copy of the sentence, which was refused me, and the matter was reported to his Government by the Captain-General, all of which I did myself the honour of reporting to your Lordship.

Since that time I have been constantly hearing of the manner in which the sentence of the Royal Audiencia was obtained, and lately I discovered that it might be possible to obtain the particulars from an authentic source. This I have, I am happy to say, accomplished, and I herewith have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship the history of the whole affair, developing a series of acts of demoralization and corruption of these authorities unh ard of, all the result of villainous bribery, by which means it was made to appear that 521 negroes, captured on board the lighters which brought them from the steamer in which they had been conveyed from the coast of Mrica, and who had never set foot on the Island of Cuba, were part of a dotation that were being taken from one estate to work at another belonging to the arne owners, which, by means of false testimony, obtained by money and the connivanc of the justices and other Spanish officials, to bring the case within the gth Article of the Penal Law, operated the iniquitous sentence that is a disgrace even to the corrupt source from which it emanated.

The succinct nature of the information which I am thus enabled to lay before your Lord hip would make it easy to investigate the whole of this complicated affair by trustworthy offic rs, but I need hardly state your Lordship are of the greatest importance, because they prove beyond the possibility of doubt, that all our efforts, honestly and pati ntly performed, at an immense cost of life and the treasure of the country, are frustrated by the horde of lav -traders, and the corruption produced by their unsparing bribery of almost every officer und r the Spanish Government, whose duty it is (if they could be made to do it) to put an end to the Slave Trade, but who are in the pay of the slave-traders, and lend thems lves to every fraud which they invent to contravene the provisions of the existing Treaty.

Such men as the slave-traders and all tho e who are in their pay ar desperate charact rs . Their name here is legion; and although they themselves, none of them, would b known or be ever discovered, they would not hesitate one moment to gratify th ir revenge, and to this w are exposed; much care and circumspection is therefore nece sary to be observed, in th us that your Lordship may deem it advisable to make of this information.

But still there is the sad consideration that some 500 of our fellow-creature of the Las Posas

143

expedition are groaning in slavery, to which they have been consigned in the villainous manner we now know of; and surely the most energetic efforts should be made to rescue them from that condition, and obtain the punishment and degradation of those who have plotted and connived to place these unfortunate negroes in their miserable condition.

I have, &c. Jos. T. Crawford

144

Section VI Disappointing judges

Commissary judges were assumed to be men of high moral integrity. Yet those seeking

appointment to the mixed commission courts were probably motivated as much by the relatively

high salaries on offer, and the prospect of early retirement on a comfortable pension, as by any

personal commitment to eradicating the evils of the slave trade. Their conduct was sometimes

disappointing to the Foreign Office. In other instances they themselves were disappointed by

conditions prevailing at posts. The documents included in this section shed light on the careers

of two such judges, Sir George Jackson and George Canning Backhouse. The former, who

served in both Africa and South America, was a far from satisfactory appointee and gave th

Office no end of trouble over his claims for enhanced remuneration. The latter found Havana

more expensive than he had expected and did not live to draw his pension.

The following three memoranda, relating to Jackson and his affairs in Brazil and Sierra

Leone, are self-explanatory. They concern his claim for additional pension payments and

financial compensation following his removal by Palmers ton from the post of commissary

judge at Rio de Janeiro. They reveal what one of his colleagues was to describe as his 'peculiar

and morbid sense of official or personal dignity and [his] excessively captious and querulous

irritability of temperament'. They also suggest that his desire for personal gain may have

influenced some of his more questionable judgements. But, however unsatisfactory his conduct

at Freetown and in Rio de Janeiro, he survived to be appointed commissary judge in Luanda

in December 1845, at which post he remained until his retirement in March 1859.

George Canning Backhouse had no such luck. The son of John Backhouse, George

Canning's private secretary and first permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office, in 1838

he had been persuaded by his father to abandon his studies at Oxford in order to accept

Palmerston's offer of a junior clerkship in the Office. But evidently soon bored by his clerical

duties, he had sought a posting abroad. A brief spell as attache in the British legation in

Frankfurt did not satisfy his quest for foreign adventure and, after having been refused

consular appointments in Lima and Elsinore, he was overjoyed when, despite his lack of

experience in slave trade work, on 17 December 1852 Malmesbury invited him to take up th

post of commissary judge with the Anglo-Spanish court at Havana. The post carri d with it a

salary of £1,600 per annum, and in twelve years he would be free to retire on an annual pen ion

1 Backhouse MSS Box 17, G.C. Backhouse to Mrs]. Backhouse, letter, 21 Dec 1852. 2 Ibid., G.C. Backhouse to Miss Backhouse, letter, 1 May 1853. Marnnez-F rnand z, Fighting laver in th Caribbean, pp. 132-52.

145

of £600. Moreover, Backhouse understood Cuba to be 'wonderfully beautiful' with a climate

'very good for the West Indies' .1 Everyone he met agreed that he had been very fortunate to

get the job.

Unfortunately, as was probably the case with other appointees to mixed commission courts,

Backhouse was disappointed by what he found. Neither he, nor his wife, Grace, had bargained

for the 'beastly hole' in which they were first lodged in Havana. Nor had they reckoned with

the cost of setting up home in Cuba. And the house which they eventually rented, along with

its garden, abounded in 'varieties of lizards', and the 'flies, mosquitoes, glow worms & frogs

were numerous ' .2 Grace was in any event less than enthusiastic about the charms of life in the

Caribbean, and in April 1855 she, then pregnant, left with their two children for England,

intending to return in November. Backhouse, perhaps with a view to avoiding any reduction in

his salary, resolved to remain in post-a fatal decision, since on 31 August 1855, whilst dining

alone with his acting secretary, Thomas Callaghan, intruders broke into his house and in the

en uing affray he uffered a knife wound from which he subsequently died. Grace and others

usp cted that George had been the victim of a 'slave dealing conspiracy', but his assailant was

never caught and the motive £ r the crime remains a mystery.3

Documents N . 30-32 includ a poem drafted by Backhouse on 31 December 1852, which

refl cts his elation n 1 arning of his appointment and imminent departure from the Foreign

Office, other xtra ts from his diary registering his first impressions of Havana, and two

accounts of hi murd r in the summer of 1855. It is interesting to note that on Sunday 2

January 1 53 Back.house was to join relatives in a walk which would have taken th m past the

Red Lion (n w th Havana Tavern) at Walham Green, wh re almost two year later the d ad

body of org Ja ks n's London agent, Charles Parnth r, was discover d.

~ B kh M , B x 1 , ra B kho to Clar nd n, 1 tt r, n.d. Jan 1 5 .

146

No. 28 Memorandum on Sir George Jackson

[FO 84/445] Foreign Office, 13 March 1842

The Services of Sir George Jackson have been partly in the Diploma tick Line, and partly under the Slave Trade Department. His diplomatick services, up to the latest Period at which he was employed in the Diplomatick Line have been considered; and a Pension assigned to him for those Services. That Pension was £700 a year, netting something above £600 a year.

His Services in the Slave Trade Deparunent have been 1st at Sierra Leone, and 2ndty at Rio de Janeiro. At Sierra Leone he remained nine months and a half, and for that period he received the full outfit of the appointment £500

By special indulgence three months' Salary previous to embarkation 750

H1s full Salary while he was at his Post, and during his Passage to it,

and half Salary on passage horne

One year's half Salary after his Return

3,302

1,500

£6,052

His Services for the Period, nine months and a half, during which he acted as Judge in the Slave Trade Department at Sierra Leone may therefore be consid red as fully requited.

His Services at Rio de Janeiro have been of eight years' duration.

But he was told on his appointment to that Station that he would not acquire any claim to increased Pension on account of his services in it: and he* expressly signified his acquie cence in that arrangement.

Nevertheless, if he had served the full Period with the approbation of his Superiors, the arrangement might have deserved reconsideration. But Sir G orge Jackson did not erv the minimum term upon which a Pension could be granted to any Judge for the services in the appointment, and his conduct was marked repeat dly with the xpressed disapproval of the Secretary of State, insomuch that on one occasion he was told that if he 'should again concur in a Sentence so much at variance with the purposes for which the Mixed Commission was established, Lord Palmerston will consider it his duty to recommend to Her Majesty that h b recalled from his Situation'.

But complaints continued to reach Her Majesty's Govt. on Sir George Jackson' conduct, that he interposed unnecessary delays in adjudication, that he obstructed Justice, that he quarrelled with the other British Functionaries, and that he even received Bribes for perverting Justi e: and finally from her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Rio, that if we are 'to get rid of Slave Trad , it would be impossible to make a more unfortunate choice than of Sir G. Jackson as Judg '.

Lord Palmerston therefore determined to remove him: but wishing him out of the S rvi , transferred him to Surinam, and transferred the Judge at Surinam to Rio.

Sir George Jackson now declines the appointment to Surinam, solicits som other Employm nt, and asks that till he shall again be called into activity, uch temporary Provision may b giv n him as the length of his Services, and the Posts he hash ld may entitl him to. H tates that h p nt £400 last year on his House, and nearly £70 in purchasing the fre dom of a Slav , and that h had made a considerable acrifice of his dif£ rent effects: and that he has not been paid for his Pas ag home, which cost him upwards of £200: and that he has received no Salary in S ptemb r last;

147

and he solicits the consideration of Lord Aberdeen to all these Points.

On these claims it is to be observed, 1st as to his temporary Provision, that on his relinquishing his Po t as Slave Trade Commissioner, he resumes his diplomatick Pension.

2ndly As to his losses on removal, that he has already received £300 on this account But in kindness something more perhaps should be allowed, say £200.

3rdly As to his Passage horne, it is but right that he should be allowed a reasonable sum for it. The sum he received on going to Rio was £200, and he says his Passage home cost more: perhaps therefore a larger sum should be allowed, say £250.

4thly As to Salary since he left Rio de Janeiro in September last; he has a fair ground for claiming it up to the period of his Resignation. But it will remain also for Lord Aberdeen to decide whether for this period he should be paid at the rate of half Salary, as on leave or ab ence, or whole Salary, as on Service: but it is submitted that, under the circumstances, his Return may be con idered as under orders on Service.

Extra compensation for losses Pas age home Full Salary for half a year to the 31 5

t March

£200 250 600

£1,050

If Lord Aberdeen should be pleased to allow Sir Ceo: Jackson this Sum it is submitted that all his claims will have been fully and liberally compensated.

A Draft to Sir G. Jackson i submitted, for Lord Aberdeen's approval, in case His Lordship shall think proper to sanction this view of his case.

Th particulars of Sir G. Jackson's services are more fully stated in two long memoranda accompanying this Paper.

*[Marginal annotation] 'Looking as I have always don to promotion and active employment, rather than to mol urn nt, as the best acknowledgem nt of my claims I hesitate not to accept thi appointment upon th understanding with regard to Pension expressed in your Letter.' Sir G. Ja kson, 5th July 1 32.

No. 29 Memorandum on Sir George Jackson's Services and Pension

(FO 84/445]

Foreign Office, 13 March 1842 Sir G org Ja ks n was mploy d in various Diplomatic Services from 1802 to 181 [?], and having d dined th Appointment of Secretary of Embas y at St. Petersberg [ ic], was unemploy d from ... to ... ; enjoying in the mean tim a Pen ion of £500 a year granted to him for hi dipl m ti rvi e .

In 1823 h was again call d into Employment. He was appoint d one of His Maj sty' Commi ion r £ r arrying into ffect th Conv ntion of t. Petersb rg [sic xplanatory of th 1 t Arti l of th Treaty of Gh nt; which Employm nt ased in 1827: wh n h again ent r d int th R ipt of his Pension of £500 a y ar.

He then ask d £ r th Appointm nt of ommi ary Judge at . L one: and on th 5th f January l 2 h was told that his nam would b ubmitt d to Hi Majesty forth Appointm nt. H was told t th arne tim that it would b n ary £ r him to go as soon as p ibl .

148

He acknowledged that letter on the gth January 1828; stating that doubts had been suggested to him whether by accepting the Appointment he would not subject himself to be consid red as removed out of the Diplomatic line, and thus forfeit the advantages which accrued to him from his previous Services; he stated that he had no idea of accepting the Appointment on such terms, and at the same time asked for an increase of Pension, (mentioning incidentally that he considered himself entitled to a Pension of £1000 a year), with the View of reverting to it, in the event of his being compelled to give up his Situation of Commissary Judge at S. Leone before he had served the Period fixed as giving claim to his Pension.

He was answered on the 16th January, that Lord Dudley did not think it necessary to make any arrangement at the present moment with regard to the Contingency contemplated; and he was told that if it should occur it will be the province of the Secretary of State for the time being to decide his application. And it was added that although the appointment at Sierra Leone was conferred upon him principally as a consideration for past Services, Lord Dudley did not consider it as necessarily cancelling, in the Contingency to which he referred, his Pretensions to a Pension for previous Diplomatic Service.

Sir George Jackson acknowledged this letter of the 17th and requested Payment for the Period which intervened between the cessation of his Salary as Commr. in America, and the commencement of his Salary as Commy. Judge at S. Leone.

He was desired on the 22"d of January to take a Passage on a Merchant Vessel within a month.

On the 29th his letter of the 17m was answered: he was told that Lord Dudley would recommend the revival of his Pension for the period he mentioned; But his Lord hip de med it inexpedient to recommend a rate of Pension for that interval beyond that which he enjoyed previously to his Employment in America: yet that his Lordship does not intend thereby to prejudice his pretensions to an advanced rate of Pension consequent upon that Employm nt should the event arise which is contemplated in his letter to Lord Dudley of the 9th: nam ly, that of being compelled by ill health to abandon his appointment at Sierra Leone before he had completed the term requisite to entitle him to a Pension for that Service.

On the 4m of March Sir G. Jackson was told that H.M.S. 'Rose', would sail for S. Leone in about a month and he was directed to be ready to go by her.

On the 5th Sir George asked that his appointment might be consider d so far Diplomatic as that he might be allowed 1/ 2 a year's Salary as outfit. This was refused on the 8th and he was told 'with a View to obviating all misunderstanding on the subject hereafter that the Situation of Commissary Judge was not diplomatic, and that Services performed in that Situation can in no case be reckoned as Diplomatic Services'. He was told in the same letter that in consideration of domestic circumstances which he had represented and in continuation of the indulg nee which Lord Dudley had already shown to him and to set at rest for ever all discussion on th subject, Lord Dudley would extend to him the favour of allowing his Salary as Commissary Judge to commence three months previous to his embarcation. But he was told that this indulgence was altogether contingent on his departure by H.M.S. 'Rose': and if he hould hesitate about proceeding to his Post by that Vessel, his appointment would be consid r d cancell d: and an immediate and definitive answer was required from him.

On the 17th March he answered declining the appointment and he then refunded £500whi h had been paid to him as outfit.

Sir George being now unemployed; it was thought right that the matter of his P nsion should be settled. Accordingly on the 28th April he was recommended to the Treasury for a P n ion of £700 a year: which was an increase of £200 a year on his previous Pension; and which Pension of £700 per annum was considered as the full amount of Pension to which he was entitl d for Services up to that time.

149

On the same day, the 28th of April, a letter was about to be forwarded to Sir George announcing that he had been recommended for an increased Pension.

A letter, however, bearing date also on the 28th April having been received from Sir George; the letter to him of the 28th was detained, till an answer was sent to Sir George's letter of the 28th. That answer was ent on the 3rd May; and the letter to him of the 28th of April accompanied it.

Sir G orge in the letter of the 28th April stated, that if it was not too late, he was willing to go to . Leone if his alary was allowed to begin from the January quarter, and if his Pension was placed on a somewhat more beneficial Scale than it would be fixed at without reference to the contingency of Ill Heath forcing him to abandon his Post.

This letter was answered on the 3rd May. He was told that Ld. Dudley saw nothing in it to alter the decision already come to as to his Pension. He was told that Lord Dudley, yielding to con iderations submitted to him in a private letter by Sir George, was willing to consider the door as not finally do ed again t his going to Sierra Leone as Commissary Judge. But no alt ration could be made in the terms previously offered to him.

Sir G orge accepted the appointment on the 7th May and in another letter of the same date complained of the mallness of the Pension granted to him.

Th two 1 tters were acknowledg d on the sam day, the 7th, and he was directed to be at Plymouth on th 30th to go by H.M.S. 'Nledina' , and he in fact went by that Ship on 5th June.

He was allowed an Outfit of £500: a Salary of £3000 per annum, which was to be reduced on half during p riod of ab enc from hi Po t; and after 6 years actual Service at hi Po t, a Pen ion of £1000 p r annum.

Lr org arriv d at Sierra Leone on the 26th ugust 1828.

On 31st January 1 29 he asked leav of ab nee to r turn to England, for hi private affair . H was an w r d on th 15th May that Ld. Ab rd n could not comply with that r qu t

ir org l ft i rra L on on gth June 1 29 in con quence of Ill Health: and on the 24th ugu t h an noun d his arrival in England: and nt in am dical C rtificate which tat d that

hi not calculat d ever again to encounter with a£ ty th Climat of rica.

rg h ving remained in England till July 1830 was th n asked wh th r he would b r ady to r turn to hi Po tat th nd of two months: and he was at th am tim told that no porti n f his alary could b continu d to him during his resid nee in England for any p riod

ding a y ar fr m th date of hi arrival.

ir rg , h w v r, took no noti of thi 1 tt rand on th 11th Octob r again dr w for hi half alary: and h was told in r ply on th 23rd of Octob r that thr month h ving lap d with ut hi having an noun ed hi int ntion tor turn to his Post, Lord b rd n would ubmit th n m of m oth r ntl man £ r th ituation, unl s ir C rg a tually mbark d £ r his P t within a m nth.

n th 1 t ov mb r ir C org Ja k.son announ d hi int nti n of n t r turning t L n , and r ign d his ppointm nt.

H th n nt r into r ceipt of hi P n ion of £700 a y ar.

H r main dun mploy d tilljun 1 32 when h was appoint d mmi ary Judge at Ri d J n ir . And h w t ld that h would not quir any claim to in r as d P n i n

f hi rvi mmis ary Judg tRio: and h ignifi d his a q n in that

From 11 th' it pp ar that £700 y ar was th full am unt f P n ion t whi h ir Ja ks n was c n i r d t b ntitl d for his rvi pr vi u t ing to i rra L r m in th r for t b en wh t claim ir rg h t any furth r all wan in that tim .

150

Sir George served at Sierra Leone 9 months and a half. At that time 6 years actual S rvice at this Post was the minimum of Service flxed upon as giving to Per on holding situations in the Mixed Court at S. Leone a claim to a Pension (that term of Service has since b en increased to

8 years).

It is submitted that a Service of nine months and a half is too short, on which to recommend to the Treasury the grant of any extra allowance.

But there are other circumstances to be taken into consideration.

Sir George had the full advantage of the £500 outfit, though he stayed o short a time at his Post.

His Salary commenced 3 months before his Embarcation. His Salary for thes 3 months was £750

His pension for that period would have been £175

Difference £575

Moreover he received for a whole year after he left his Post the half Salary of the appointment: viz. £1500

His Pension for that Period would have been

Difference

£700

£800

It is submitted that under these circumstances Sir G. Jackson has no well £ unded claim for any further allowance on account of his Services at Sierra Leone.

With regard to his Services at Rio, he has acquired no claim for con iderati n: for he accepted the appointment on that express condition.

This he admits: but he states that he looked to and confidently expected Promotion for his Recompense long before the Expiration of the Twelve Years, during which time, however, he no less clearly understood that he might, if he pleased, retain the Situation.

To the first of these propositions it may be stated, that no Prospect of Promotion was held out to him on accepting the Situation; on the contrary he was considered as having retired from the line of Diplomatic Service. On the Second that although Sir George Jackson doubtl s understood that he might remain Commissary Judge at Rio for 12 year; yet he must at the same time have understood that if the due fulfilment of the duties of the ituation he h ld required his Removal before that time Her Majesty's Government were at liberty to recall him. Lord Aberdeen's attention is requested to the annexed memorandum on th circumstan e which led to Sir George Jackson's removal from Rio to Surinam.

No. 30 Memorandum on the circumstances which led to Sir George

Jackson's remqval from Rio de Janeiro

[FO 84/445]

F reign Offi , 13 Mar h 1 42 In the case of the 'Flor de Loanda' rei as don the ground that h was Portuguez , ir Jackson acquiescing, the Commrs. w re instructed on th 5th De emb r 1 3 that 'th y w uld have be n justified in attributing a Brazilian chara ter to th 'Flor d L and ', and in d alin with the Vessel and the Slav s on board accordingly'.

151

In the case of the 'Recuperador' released, Sir George Jackson acquiescing, the Commissioner were told on the 23rd November 1839 that 'Her Majesty's Government disapprove of the entence of the Court decreeing the Restitution of the 'Recuperador'.

On the 3rt December 1839 the Commissioners were told that 'Her Majesty's Government highly di approve the conduct of Sir George Jackson in this case'; and 'if Sir George Jackson should again concur in a sentence so much at variance with the purposes for which the Mixed Commission was e tablished Lord Palmerston will consider it his Duty to recommend to Her Majesty that he be recalled from his Situation as Commissary Judge.'

In the case of the 'Dom Joao de Castro' the Commissioners were told on the 2"d June 1840, that 'if such Delays shall take place in other cases and if their Proceedings should be equally open to animadversion and complaint they will be removed and other Commrs. will be appointed'.

The e are the leading cases in which the direct displeasure of Her Majesty's Government was

signified at the conduct of Sir George Jackson.

R peated complaints were made against him by almost every naval officer on the Station.

Her Majesty's Treasury on various occasions disapproved his proceedings.

Complaints again t him were frequently made by Her Majesty's Legation. The Following extracts from de patches from Mr. Ouseley will throw some light on the matter.

In a Despatch to Lord Palmerston dated April17, 1841,

'I thought it my duty to report to Your Lordship on the asserted bad conduct of Sir George Jackson [accusation of having received bribes] however painful the task, and it is proportionally grateful to me to be enabled now to assure Your Lordship that the accusations are false.'

'I am informed, however, that Bernadino de Sa [an owner of Slave Vessels] did give the Sum air ady m ntioned to the English Woman who lives with Sir George Jackson, and possibly th

lave Trader may imagine that it reaches Sir George through her hands. But I am inclin d to think that the British Commissioner is not aware of the transaction.'

'While I make the above Statements injustice to Sir George Jackson it is at th arne time my duty to dedar that upon the most mature consideration of all th circumstance that nece arily have com to my knowl dge in the course of the years that I have b en officially in contact with Sir George Jackson, my opinion is that hi conduct has b en and continues to be such as to do great mi chief to the cause of th Suppr ssion of Slave Trade in thi ountry, and that it would b difficult to find a Commi ioner so totally unfitted, wh ther influenced by his own p uliar id as or tho e of others as the present Commissary Judge.'

Again in a De patch to Lord Palmerston dated the 6th of May 1841 Mr. Ouseley stat s: 'The Brazilian Commi ary Judge has obtained and exercise over Sir George Jackson a compl t and pow rful influ nee. I will not at this time enter into any of the xplanation giv n by dif£ rent p rson as to how this influence has been acquired. At pr sent it is sufficient to tat that it is po itiv ly exercised.'

'Th conduct of ir George Jackson in the case of the "R cuperador" and on tho veral th r lave '/4 1 , th vexatious delay and end avours to thwart th pro eding and fforts

of Mr. Hesketh and to injure th cause of the Captor; in short, almo t all th ourc of th num rous com plaints of Her Maj sty' Con ul and Naval Offi r , nd th oc asi nal difficulti s that hav oc urred between this legation and th Mix d Commi sion are t b tra d ntir ly to this ource. The p culiar and morbid n of official or p r onal dignity nd th xce iv ly captious and qu rulous irritability of temp ram nt of ir org Jackson and h · con qu n t unfortunate p rsonal difference with almo t ver Engli h ffi r r ubj t

152

with whom he comes in contact of course add to the dissatisfaction universally expres ed h re respecting H r Majesty's Commissioner both in public and private character.'

'I have cautiously endeavoured for a long time to avoid giving occasion for asking any Explanation of his conduct, and only when absolutely necessary for the good of the Service have any communication with him.'

'Finally, many of the Statements made by Sir George Jackson can only b met by decidedly counter Statements, and thus it must depend on Your Lordship and others to decide as to whose opinion is entitled to greater weight on the complaints made against Her Majesty's Commissioner. For instance, when Sir George Jackson says that no avoidabl delays occur on his part, that every assistance he can afford to Her Majesty's Officers is given, that his good offices are ever at their disposal, it is difficult for me to say more than that in every one of these points, as far as my observation goes, I differ toto caelo with Sir Georg as to the fact.'

It was on the receipt of the Despatch from which these late Extracts are made that Lord Palmers ton decided to remove Sir George Jackson. Again in a letter to Mr Bandinel dated the 16th June 1841, Mr. Ouseley states 'At the same time any person would think that the conduct of Sir George Jackson was clear enough. All I can say and I shall be obliged to say it officially I suppose, is that none of the obstacles and opposition I have met with here have bothered me so much as those of Her Majesty's Commissary Judge.'

'But it would be impossible I think to make a more unfortunate choice if we are to get rid of Slave Trade than of Sir G. Jackson as Commissary Judg .'

Lastly, in a Despatch to Viscount Palmerston dated the 17th July 1841, Mr. Ouseley in r lating the substance of a conversation with the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affair state

'I gathered from some hasty replies of Snr. Aureliano that His Excellency consid red the Accusations against Her Majesty's Commission r as unfounded; but that no doubt exi ted that the Female who lives with him had received con iderable Sums from Slave Traders.'

'In fact the reports on this subject that it has been already my unpleasant duty to lay befor Your Lordship were completely corroborated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.'

I find that the Sum received by this woman from B rnardino de Sa Six Contos of Reis.'

153

No. 31

Entries in G.C. Backhouse's Diary

[Backhouse MSS, Box 27]

Farewell departed fifty-two! Last year of Wellington adieu 4

Farewell to late alarming floods Farewell to coming vernal buds Farewell F.O. -farewell Protection And fifty objects of affection Farewell to F.O. dreary drudgery

London, 31 December 1852

Farewell to pipes smoked in the Nudgery Farewell to every London manner Farewell

London, 2 January 1853 Gra e w nt to 9 o'clock Service in the morning. I went with the others at 11, & fell in with

th two young Sandhams (of Cadogan Place) on coming out They lunched here, & I went out with th m aft rwards walking on the Fulham Road a good way beyond Walham Green ...

London, 7 January 1853 ... Obtain d & paid into Drummonds my outfit money for Havana £400 ...

Lond n, 22 January 1853 ... I w nt to F.O. Read Havana confl pap r , & wrote to Lord Wodehouse (new Undr S cy)

about day of my departure for Havana & who I hd tak with me ...

Havana, 21 March 1853 [Dis mbark d HM Medea] ... We got lodged in what turned out to b a b astly hole a low Am ri an B arding House kept by Mi Gilbert ...

Havana, 2 April 1 53 ... Mad arrang m nts, verbal to b follow d by writing, about our n w hous tak n for two y ars fr m on Izaguird a cigar Manufacturer. An old nigg r his prop rty to b allowed t oc upy a mall room n ar the stable & poultry yard. Rent 7 ounce a month. onsult d

raw£ rd, with r £ r nc to an old FO Instruction as to propriety of my having th lav of my Landlord living at my hous & working in my garden without wag . H did n t ny ob tad ; aid th r was n t a wash rwoman in thi plac who was n t a lav ...

4Th Duk ofW llingt n , th victor ofWat rloo, died on 14 pt mber 1 52.

5 Evid ntly r £ r nc to th 'Nurs ry', a playroom in th attic of th ld For ign Offi wh r th juni r

cl r w re all w d to whil away par mom nts. Th y might al o hav n bl t ap th r Palm r ton' pr hibiti n n making in the Offi .

154

No. 32 J.J. Crawford to Lord Clarendon

[Backhouse MSS, Box 17] No. 62 Consulate-General, Havana, 1 September 1855

My Lord, It is with the deepest regret that I have to report to your Lordship the death of Mr Backhouse, H.M.'s Commissary Judge which took place last night at 11 o'clock.

Mr Backhouse resided about a mile out of Town, in the direction of the Cerro (his hous was No. 1 Calle Real de Buenos Ayres), he had Mr Thomas Callaghan, hi acting ecretary with him, they had dined and were sitting at table at their wine when, about 7.45 there suddenly app ar d before Mr Callaghan a black man who laid hold of him and who succeeded in overpowering him, so that he was thrown down and bound hands and feet, the negro stealing his watch. Almost simultaneously Mr Backhouse was assaulted by a mulatto man with whom it appears he struggled hard for some time, but the fellow was too strong, and, at length, poor Mr Backhouse was thrown down and stabbed in the left side, a deep and mortal wound!

Mr Callaghan could render no assistance to Mr Backhouse having b en myself overpow r d and tied. The servant, hearing the struggle, ran to the dining room, and, in a stat of the greatest terror, after seeing his master and Mr Callaghan attacked as th y were, leap d th garden fence and made for the police station no far distant where having obtained imm diate aid, he returned with the officer but in the meantim the deed has b en done, and th assassins, as it is supposed, having been alarmed, had escaped. The servant, howev r, had observed (at least) three more coloured men in the garden from whom he was abl toes ap when he ran for the police, and one negro man, an exceedingly powerful fellow, was captured in the garden by the Officers who accompanied 'Manuel' the servant upon his return.

The surgeon of the district 'Dr Valdes', was in attendance very soon, and the m eng r on way for Dr Be lot, who attended Mr Backhouse 's family, having informed m of th ad occurrence, I lost not a moment in proceeding to th scene of so horrible a trag dy wh re I arrived about 1/2 past 8 o'clock.

I found Mr Backhouse suffering from a wound in th left side inflicted s mingly by a kni£ , & Dr Valdes, who had already examined th injury, informed me that it was deep and had penetrated into the cavity, but whether it had wound d th vital parts h was unabl to ay.

Soon afterwards, Dr Belot came and everything was done that could b done, but an extr me difficulty of breathing which from the first Mr Backhouse had complain d of be am very distressing and it increased until death put an end to his sufferings.

During all the time which elapsed, from the infliction of the injury, till within£ w moments of his death, Mr Backhouse was quite collected, he declared that he was wounded by a mulatto man with whom he had struggled long and hard, that he tried to throw him and to tak th knife from him but that he had been unabl to do either, at last, h said, the fellow got him down then stabbed. Mr Backhouse was asked by th magi trat in attendance wh th r h w uld know the assassin if he saw him, but he said that he would not, he was asked if he had n th man who assaulted Mr Callaghan, and he said that he had, that it was a negro, but that h should not be able to identify him if he saw him.

Shortly before his death at the instigation of the Magistrate, Mr Backhou , having b n previously made aware of his dangerous state by Dr Be lot, I asked him if h wish d t rnak any disposition of his affairs, when he said that he wi h d me to tak ar f v rything of hi h r

155

and to realise and send the proceeds to his wife and family, which (his last expressed desire) was duly noted upon the proceedings.

Mr Callaghan says that he cannot say what sort of a man it was that assaulted Mr Backhouse, he himself being so engaged with the Black who attacked him, but the deceased repeatedly said that the assassin who gave him the wound was a Mulatto or Chino, as the coloured persons not entirely blacks are here called.

The negro captured, although no doubt connected with the most atrocious murder and outrage, had not been identified by Mr Callaghan as the man by whom he was assaulted and overpowered-indeed he says that he should not be able to identify the ruffian if brought before him, which is to be regretted, and can only be accounted for by the sudden nature of the attack and the terror to a certain extent, which must have been created thereby.

The police is engaged in every direction to capture and bring to justice the perpetrators of this most dreadful crime and the Magistrate is still continuing the investigation at Mr Backhouse's residence.

At the po t mortem examination which took place this morning, it was ascertained that the wound inflicted on Mr Backhouse by a mulatto or chino unknown last evening, was the cause of his death, which is all that is in my power to state to your Lordship at this time.

I shall leave no means untried which may all in my power to stimulate the authorities in their endeavours to discover the authors of this atrocious murder. I have taken charge of Mr Backhaus 's affairs and hall do everything in my power to act up to his last expressed disposition.

No.33 Thomas Callaghan to Thomas Staveley

[Backhouse MSS, Box 17] Copy Mixed Commission, Havana, 8 September 1855 Dear ir, B ing aware of your onfidential intimacy with Mr Backhouse, I feel it my duty to communicate to you th circumstanc s under which he was murdered here on the evening of the 31st Ulto.

Mr Backhouse and I were eated alone at his house (about a mil from this city) on th 31st Ult about 1

/ 4 o ' do k PM, shortly aft r dinn r, when we were surprised by two men who enter d ingly, as th door was only half open; the first, a Negro, seized on me, and pres ntly I found

my elf in th adj ining room on the floor, being tied and forcibly held down. I next saw a dagg r at my throat and £ lt my watch being jerked out of my po ket. What was passing in the m n tim with Mr Backhous I had no opportunity of knowing. However b fore I was cur ly ti d I was udd nly r li v d from th pressure on my body and throat and saw on of the ervants ent r, with who assistance I was again standing are v ry much disengag d. On

looking round I p rc iv d that Mr Backhouse was lying about where my feet had b en, amid bl ding profus ly from a dagger wound in his left side. M dical assistance was very soon afford d him. It was found that one of his rib had been broken and that it was imp sible to ay h w far th in trum nt was pen trated. His own phy ician (Dr. Belot) oon arriv d and rd r d bl ding and 1 chlng, but all to no purpo -he xpir d within thr hour from th

tim h r v r d th wound. H was urged by Dr Belot to sp ak to Mr Cranford, wh was

pres nt, with r gard to his affairs, but he aid he had nothing to ay. How ver, a short tim b for h di d, in answer to a qu tion from Mr Crawford, h definit ly cons nt d with 'y s'

156

that Mr C should look to his affairs for his wife and family, and at the same tim said that I had his keys. His remains were deposited the following day in a vault from which his remain can be removed at the will of his family. Mr Crawford at once assisted in making arrangements for an immediate sale of his effects which (with the excepting of plate, clothes, books and some comparatively trifling articles of which Mr Crawford took charge and which are to be sent to England by the packet from this on the gth or lOth Inst) was concluded on the 6th Inst, when for the first time since the occurrence, I left the house. It is right for me here to say that since Mrs Backhouse's leaving this I had been his constant guest, and I have reason for knowing that no­one here enjoyed his friendship so unreservedly as I did. Mr Backhouse's attention and kindness to my family and self will induce her and his friends to require from me a circumstantial account of every thing relating to the sad event and likewise with regard to hi affairs which have been to nearly wound up by Mr Crawford in my presence.

I feel that though a perfect stranger to you I need no apology for thus intruding on your attention, and am confident that no time will be lost by you in taking such teps on may appear most wise with regard to breaking the awful intelligence to the bereaved widow of your deceased friend. I am not aware whether Mr Crawford writes by this mail (American via New York) but of course there will be a more circumstantial, and, as to his affairs, a more satisfactory communication from Mr Crawford by the English Packet which should leave this on th gth or lOth Inst. I have in my possession belonging to Mr Backhouse, a small gold seal with his coat of arms, which was attached to his keys, a small silver pencil case, and his pocket knife. Th last two articles I found in his pocket, together with one ounce and three quarters, which I of course hand to Mr Crawford.

The attempts of the villains were arrested by the arrival of th Police, who arriv d in consequence of being advised by Manuel (one of the servants) who made his escap at the commencement of the outrage. The Police succeeded in arresting one on the premis s; the remainder of the number of seven having made their escape. Five have ince been tak n and confident hope is entertained of the Assassins being brought to justice.

I am, Dear Sir, very truly etc. Thomas Callaghan

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Section VII Ending suppression

By the mid-1860s the transatlantic slave trade between Africa and the Americas was virtually at

an end, and in this last document William Henry Wylde offers his analysis of the reasons for its

decline. But this is anything but a self-congratulatory essay by the head of the Slave Trade

Department. Wylde was well aware that neither British diplomacy nor the Royal Navy could

have achieved their objective without the civil war in North America and the readiness of

Washington to agree to a treaty conceding a mutual right of search. Moreover, as Wylde

pointed out, it was only in recent years that the Foreign Office had become fully conscious of

the size of the slave trade between east Africa, the Persian gulf and the Ottoman Red sea ports.

There were no short-term solutions to the problem Castlereagh had identified more than half

a century earlier at the Congress of Vienna.

[FO 84/ 1270]

No. 34 Memorandum by W.H. Wylde

Foreign Office, I 0 July 1866 The State of Affairs in the Slave Trade Department

Africa: West Coast

The exportation of Slaves from the West Coast of Africa has been almost entirely suppressed, only four Cargoes having, as far as we are aware, been shipped from this Coast within the last two Years, three ofwhich were from the Portse. Possessions to the Southward ofLoanda, in the Autumn of last Year.

Of these four Cargoes three were captured by the Spanish Authorities either off the Cuban Coast or immediately on their landing. The Spanish Authorities deny the existence of the 4th

Expedition, but the Captn. Genl. of Cuba admitted privately that the Slaves were succ fully landed and distributed among the Planters.

Whilst there can be but little doubt that the result of the late struggle in America must have operated to prevent the Slave Dealers from engaging in the Traffic to the same extent as heretofore, still the great diminution in the export of Slaves from the West Coast must not be attributed entirely to the abolition of Slavery in the United States. The price of Slaves in Cuba and the demand for Slave labour is as great now as it ever has been, and strenuous efforts have been made to introduce Slaves into Cuba, fast steamers as well as sailing Vessels having been employed within the last three Years for this purpose, but the Vessels have either been captured, or driven off the Coast by the vigilance of the British Cruisers.

The causes which have led to the present state of things may I think be attributed

rt To the conclusion of this Country of a Treaty with the United States giving us th right of

search;

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2ndly To the strict Blockade established by the Officer lately in command of Her M's Naval Forces on the African Coast, and the vigilance of the Officers engaged in carrying it out; and

3rdly To the good faith with which the late Captn. General of Cuba (General Dulce) acted in fulfilment of the engagements of the Spanish Crown for the suppression of the Slave Trade.

Formerly nearly the whole of the Cuban Slave Trade was carried on under the American Flag, and as we had the right to interfere with American Vessels even if they had Slaves on board, and the U.S. Govt. had seldom more than two or three Cruisers on the Coast at the same time, to prevent their Vessels engaging in the traffic, our efforts for the suppression of the slave Trade were almost completely paralyzed, but with the conclusion of the Treaty with the United States Slavers under the American Flag entirely disappeared.

This simplified matters very much as far as British Cruisers were concerned for these was no longer any Flag with the exception of the French, that could afford efficient protection to the Slave Dealers and it has always been dangerous to use this Flag, the Crews of one or two Vessels that had succeeded in shipping Slaves under French Colours having subsequently been caught and punished by the French Authorities.

In proof of the vigilance of the British Cruisers it may be mentioned that a notoriously fast Spanish Steamer was driven off the Coast three times without being able to ship a Cargo, and on the last attempt her Mates and a Boat's Crew were captured whilst on their way to the shore to make arrangements for shipping a Cargo that was in readiness for her.

The result of the diminution of the export of slaves from the West Coast has been that the Slave Dealers have been completely ruined.

In many instances they have left the Coast entirely, and in others they have taken to legal pursuits.

In the Congo River alone where a few years since there existed eight Firms almost entirely engaged in the slave Trade, six are reported to have left, and the other two are now engaged in legitim ate Trade. The occupation of Lagos was also a great blow to the Slave Dealers and has put a stop to the export of Slaves from a part of the Coast where a few Years since some thousands were exported annually.

In proportion as the Slave Trade increases, lawful Commerce increases, and where legal Trade is once established it is difficult to revive Slave Traffic.

The line of Coast that now requires watching is very much reduced, and this enables our Cruisers to establish a more effective Blockade where it is still possible for the Slave Dealers to carry on their operations.

Africa: East Coast

There is a very considerable traffic in Slaves carried on from the East Coast of Mrica, probably from 25,000 to 30,000 are exported annually, by far the greater portion of whom are taken to the Persian Gulf and the Turkish Ports in the Red Sea. The Island of Zanzibar imports from 6,000 to 8,000 annually and probably another thousand find their way to Madagascar, the Comoro Islands and und r the name of free labourers to the French Possessions of Mayolle and Nossi Be.

It is only within the last few Years that we have been aware of the extent to which the traffic in slaves from the East Coast has been carried on, and since our attention has been turned to that part of the African Coast the traffic has been considerably diminished, but our Squadron is too small to act efficiently against the Slave Dealers on this Coast, not more than three or four Vessels being available for the purpose.

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We have lately called the attention of the Admty. To the fact that the traffic on the East Coast might be almost entirely suppressed by stationing two or three small Steam Vessels in the Straits of Socotra during the months of March, April and May, and again in September, October and November, these being the months that the Monsoons suit for the Native Vessels to make th ir Slave Trading Voyages.

All these Vessels are compelled to pass the Straits, and an efficient watch kept there would make it next to impossible for the Native Vessels to continue the traffic.

Brazil

No Slaves have been imported into this Country since 1855.

Previous to the rupture of Diplomatic Relations between this Country and Brazil a Correspondence had been carried on between the two Govts. in regard to the bad faith of the Brazilian Govt. towards the Negroes who had been emancipated under the auspices of the Mixed Commission Courts in Brazil and in whose welfare the British Govt. are therefore bound to take an interest.

In 1845 when the British & Brazilian Mixed Commn. Courts were dissolved, there wer upwards of 3,600 Emancipados who had been handed over the Brazilian Authorities.

These Negroes by the Brazilian Laws were bound to serve an Apprenticeship of 14 Years before they were entitled to their freedom, but at the expiration of the Year 1859 they ought all to have been free.

It was ascertained however that as late as 1863 a very considerable number were still detained in forced servitude by the Brazilian Authorities, but all attempts to obtain from the Brazilian Govt correct Returns as to how many Emancipados were in existence, or as to how the 3600 had been disposed of, were fruitless.

Subsequently to the rupture of our Diplomatic Relations with Brazil a Decree was promulgated by the Brazilian Govt ordering all the Emancipados in the employ of the Govt to be furnished with free Papers.

We have not heard how many Emancipados have received free Papers in compliance with th provisions of this Decree, but in January last the Brazilian Minr. for Foreign Affairs informed Her M's Minr. at Rio that a list was being prepared and that the greatest exertions were being made to discover all those who were entitled to their complete freedom, so that their Pap rs might be delivered to them.

The Question of the Emancipados was the only one actually under discussion between the two Govts. As far as this Depart. Is concerned, at the time of the rupture of Diplomatic Relations between the two Countries and on Diplomatic Relations being r sumed, Mr. Thornton was informed that it was not the wish of H r M's Govt. that he should enter upon former matters of controversy connected with this question.

France

There have been some Negotiations going on lately with th French Govt when the question of the Right of Visit, which have resulted in the Amendment of certain Instructions that were drawn up in 1859 for the guidance of the Commanders of British & French Cruisers ngag d

in the suppression of the Slave Trad on the African Coast.

The only point that remains to be settled related to the Paper to be produced by the Masters of British Merchant Vessels to prove their Nationality. We have sugge ted that the 'R gi ter' &

'Ship Articl s' should be the proper Papers, and we are waiting forth decision of the French Govt on the subject which we shall probably receive shortly.

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Portugal

It is to be regretted that the only slaves shipped within the last two Years from the West Coast of Africa should have been exported from the Portse. Possessions.

There can be no question however that this is the case.

The Portse. Govt. are there is little doubt earnest in their endeavours to put a stop to the export of Slaves from their Possessions in Africa, but their endeavours are thwarted by the venality of the subordinate Authorities who are not proof against the large Bribes paid by the Slave Dealers for permission to carry on their operations.

We have also been obliged to make a strong remonstrance to the Portse. Govt. for allowing slaves to be exported from their Possessions on the Mainland of Africa to the adjacent Islands of Principle and San Thome. By Treaty the Portse. are bound not to allow any other than Household Slaves, and these only in very limited numbers and accompanying their Masters, to be. exported from their Possessions in Angola to the adjacent Islands, but as there has been a great demand for labour in those Islands Portse. Subjects have been in the habit of purchasing Slaves on the mainland giving them Tickets as 'Emancipados', and their sending them without in any way consulting their wishes, to Principe and San Thome, where they are reduced again to Slavery.

spain

Spain within the last 18 months has apparently been acting in perfect good faith, in the fulfilment of her Treaty Engagements for the suppression of the Slave Trade.

The Spanish Govt. has lately introduced into the Cortes the Project of a stringent Law for the suppression of the Slave Trade, and I have no hesitation in saying that if its Provisions are carried out in good faith it will be effectual in putting a stop to the Cuban Slave Traffic.

General Dulce the late Captn. Genl. of Cuba acted most energetically against the Slave Dealers. His time of service having expired, he has lately been succeeded by General Sersundi, who promises to follow in his Predecessor's steps by using his utmost endeavours to put a stop to the Slave Trade.

Nearly everything will depend on this Officer's honesty and energy. If he acts in good faith, the new Spanish Law will when it comes into operation enable him to proceed against the Slave Dealers in a far more summary manner than his Predecessor could, and we may expect that the Cuban slave Traffic which has now been reduced to very narrow limits will henceforward be known only by name.

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