+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Social engineering - Deutsche Messe...

Social engineering - Deutsche Messe...

Date post: 11-Oct-2020
Category:
Upload: others
View: 0 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
29
© 2017 Avecto Inc. avecto.com Social engineering 2017 Avecto Ltd avecto.com The solution is simple but not sexy! Presented by: Andrew Avanessian VP Technology, Avecto @avecto @andyavanessian
Transcript
Page 1: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Social engineering

2017 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

The solution is simple but not sexy!

Presented by: Andrew Avanessian

VP Technology, Avecto

@avecto

@andyavanessian

Page 2: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Low risk…

High reward

Page 3: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

› Off the shelf malware

› Licenses and support

› Hard to trace

It’s easy to become a criminal

Don’t get ideas!

Page 4: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

80%of workers fail

to spot phishing

emails

Untargeted attacks

have a yield of circa

1% Targeted attacks

have a yield of

75%+

Phishing

Page 5: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.comavecto.com 2017

Companies spend millions on firewalls,

encryption and secure access devices, it’s

money wasted, because none of these

measures address the weakest link in the

security chain

“ “

Kevin Mitnick, former Hacker

250% increase in phishing sites and related

email traffic in Q1 2016 vs 2015

Page 6: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

The Endpoint Security Paradox

Hard

100% FREEDOM100% SECURITY

EASY

LOCK DOWN

EASY

OPEN

Page 7: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com 2016 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 8: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com 2016 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 9: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Page 10: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com 2016 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 11: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Page 12: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com 2016 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 13: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Detection doesn’t work!

2017 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 14: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Why detection is failing?

› Attacks are hard to identify

› 99% of unique MD5 hashes are

being seen for 58 seconds or less*

› Attacks are unique & highly personal

› Only a 3% overlap in threat

intelligences feeds*

› Attackers have a disproportionate

advantage

› Adaptation and change is slow

327 new threats every

minute

=

More than 5 per second

In 60% of cases, attackers

are able to compromise an

organization within minutes

*Verizon DBIR 2016

Page 15: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

› Take a old exploit – 100% AV detection

› Change the code

“execute” > “ex”+ “ecu”+ “te”

› Method m = stat.getClass().getMethod("ex"+"ecu"+"te");

› Now 12% AVs detect

AV test

Page 16: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Page 17: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Good advice is hard to follow

2016 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 18: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

470,880new threats

discovered per day

1 Application whitelisting

2 Application patching

3 OS patching

4 Reducing admin users

1 Australian Government’s Defence Signals Directorate, Strategy paper

Industry advice

Implementing these 4

strategies mitigates

85% of cyber

threats

Page 19: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Ponemon

1 Intrusion prevention (network)

2 Intrusion prevention (host)

3 Web content filtering

4 Email content filtering

5 Multi-factor authentication

6 Operating system patching

7 Application whitelisting

8 Perimeter firewalls

9 Application patching

10 Up-to-date antivirus

11 Data loss prevention

12 Reducing admin users

ASD1

= 1

= 2

= 3

= 4

= 8

= 11

= 12

= 17

= 18

= 26

= 30

= 33

Perception vs. Reality

“It is ironic in the security world that

we keep looking for the ‘bad’—even

though it is infinite—without focusing

on known good, which is finite and

achievable via whitelisting.”

John Stewart

Global Cyber Security Center

1 Australian Signals Directorate – Top 4 Mitigation Strategies To Protect Your ICT System &

Australian Signals Directorate - Strategies To Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions . 2 Verizon DBIR 2016

Page 20: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Foundational security that just works

Start with the basics…

O/S System Configuration & Hardening

O/S System Exploit Mitigation

O/S System Patching

Application Patching

Application Configuration & Hardening

Application Execution Control

Application Privilege Management

Application Isolation

O/S System Security

Patch Management

Application Security

Anti-Malware

Monitoring

D&R

Signature-based

Heuristics or Behavioural

Machine learning

Analysis-based

IOC Signature Based

At least 85% of targeted cyber

attacks used unsophisticated

techniques that can be

mitigated by prevention alone(ASD)

470,880new threats

discovered per day

Skills

Demand

Never 100% protection

Fail frequently

Diminishing effectiveness

Threat Information Overload

Post Compromise

Page 21: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Prevention is possible

2017 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 22: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

PROACTIVE ENDPOINT SECURITY

Only vendor to combine three proactive capabilities:

PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT

APPLICATION CONTROL

CONTENT ISOLATION

Page 23: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Prevent escalation

Reduce known threats

Block payloads

Contain threats

Creating solid foundations

Multi-layered security to stop cyber

attacks at the endpoint

DATA

Page 24: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Conte

nt

isola

tion

99.9% of vulnerabilities were

compromised a year after

CVE published

~90%of malware unique to

an organization

85%+ Windows exploits

mitigated by removing

admin rights

55%of insider threats

is privilege abuse

97%+ of threat intel is unique

Attack vector mitigationKnown malware

Known exploits

Replace OS files (start/stop services)

Exposure networks to malware (DDOS)

System wide config changes

Install unauthorized / licensed software

Manipulate user accounts & Pwd (PtH) attacks

Disable/uninstall security software/policies

Data leakage

Install malware (i.e. root kits)

Social engineering email/installs

Infected content on external media

APT’s/exploit kits drop files to disk (payloads)

Unknown user installed apps (portable)

Document based attacks (macros, active script)

Theft of corporate data (IPR)

Prevents “fileless malware” (in memory)

Zero day browser/Apps exploits

Applic

ation w

hitelis

ting

Least

privile

ge

Patc

hin

g

Anti-m

alw

are

Page 25: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Malicious attacks attempt to:

Handling the unknown

Drop executable

payloads

Access admin

rights

Steal user

data

Exploit built in or

whitelisted tools

1 2 3 4

“The foundation of any information security

protection architecture should start by reducing the

surface area of attack by using a

combination of techniques”

Page 26: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Implementing success

2017 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Page 27: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Security scale

All users are LARs

Unknown apps allowed

Unknown content allowed

Ransomware and malicious allowed

Security polices & software easily bypassed

No control of software installs

Defendpoint increases security from day 1

0 Min security 10Max security

7

Standard User Privileges

Privilege Apps have custom tokens

Trusted apps individually identified

Untrusted apps blocked

Untrusted content isolated

Workstyles applied based on role

Only apps requiring admin right are elevated

Trusted applications seamless identified

Untrusted applications are blocked

Untrusted content is isolated

Customisable & secure justification messaging

Accurate user behaviour data captured

Defendpoint

baseline policy

Page 28: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com*Circle size: equates to effort required to complete stage

Implementation methodology

: denotes stage may involve multiple iterations

Baseline policy deployed

Security significantly improved

Clie

nt Wintel /

Security / Helpdesk

Implementation workshop

PHASE 1

PROJECT DESIGN

1 52

PHASE 2

TECH DEPLOY

Wintelengineering

Agent & infrastructure deployment

3Wintel /Security

Baseline workstyle

customisation

Baselinedeployment

4

Internal comms

PHASE 3

BASELINE DEPLOYMENT

Comms team

Wintel engineering

Wave 1

PHASE 5

WORKSTYLE DEPLOY

Wintel

Deployment of layered

workstyles

PHASE 6

PROJECT HANDOVER

BAU support

Helpdesk / Wintel

9

PHASE 4

LAYERED WORKSTYLES DESIGN

Wintel / Security

Review user behavioural

data

Wintel /

Security

67

Design layered

workstyles

8

Wave 2

Page 29: Social engineering - Deutsche Messe AGfiles.messe.de/abstracts/74870_HODI14_00_AvectoAvanessian.pdf · avecto.com © 2017 Avecto Inc. › Off the shelf malware › Licenses and support

© 2017 Avecto Inc.avecto.com

Protect the future, don’t detect the past!

2017 Avecto Ltdavecto.com

Prevention is possible

@avecto

@andyavanessian


Recommended