“Maimonides and Soloveitchik on the Knowledge and Imitation of God,’’ Moses Maimonides (1138-1204): His Religious, Scientific, and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different Cultural Contexts, eds. Gorg Hasselhoff and Otfried Fraise (Ergon Verlag, 2004), pp. 491-523.

Lawrence Kaplan McGill University

In Memory of Walter Wurzburger: A brilliant and devoted student of the works of the Rambam and the Rav, he both elucidated and exemplified their teachings

In discussing the influence of Maimonides on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik and the relationship of the latter to the former one must distinguish, as several scholars have already observed, between Soloveitchik the halakhist and Soloveitchik the philosopher.1

Soloveitchik, qua halakhist, consistently refers in the course of his analysis of any Talmudic text or halakhic issue to Maimonides' relevant halakhic rulings as presented in the Mishneh Torah. In this regard he sees and presents himself as an interpreter of Maimonides, whose task it is to make sense of the internal logic of the rulings as well as to show that they constitute convincing or at the very least plausible interpretations of the Talmudic texts upon which they are purportedly based. And, indeed, such has been Soloveitchik’s success in brilliantly carrying out this task that he has been rightfully lauded as our generation's interpreter, par excellence, of Maimonides' halakhic writings.2

By contrast, Soloveitchik, qua philosopher, is a modern philosopher in the post-Kantian tradition. As such, he rejects much of the medieval rationalist tradition — one of whoseoutstanding representatives was, of course, Maimonides — with its Aristotelian picture of the cosmos, its proofs of the existence of God, its realistic epistemology, its teleological and qualitative view of nature, and much else. It would appear, then, that qua philosopher, Soloveitchik would be able to make only limited use of Maimonides' philosophy. And, indeed, Soloveitchik resorts to the philosophic writings of Maimonides very selectively and even, at times, quite critically.3

1 See Zev Harvey, “Some Observations on Rabbi Soloveitchik and Maimonidean Philosophy” [in Hebrew], Emunah bi-Zemanim Mishtanim, edited by Avi Sagi (Jerusalem, 1996), p. 95; and David Shatz, “Science and Religious Consciousness in the Thought of Rabbi Soloveitchik” [in Hebrew], Sagi, op. cit., p. 340, n. 29. 2 There has been a lively debate recently as to whether Soloveitchik saw his main task to be that of making sense of the internal logic of Maimonides’ rulings or rather that of reconciling those rulings with the Talmudic texts upon which they were purportedly based. See Yitzhak Twersky, “The Rov,” Tradition 30:4 (1996): 23-24; Moshe Lichtenstein, “`What’ Hath Brisk Wrought: The Brisker Derekh,” The Torah U-Madda Journal 9 (2000): 14, n. 3; and Elyakim Krumbein, “From Rav Hayyim of Brisk and Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik to `The Halakhic Discourses of Rav Aharon Lichtenstein’ — On the Transformations of a Tradition of Study ” [in Hebrew], Netu`im 9 (2002), notes 27 (pp. 65-66) and 82 (pp. 89-90). 3 Thus, for example, Soloveitchik in Halakhic Mind (New York, 1986), pp. 91-99, sharply criticizes Maimonides’ theory of ta`amei ha-mitzvot as set forth in Guide 3:26-49, contrasting it unfavorably with his theory of ta`amei ha-mitzvot as found in the Mishneh Torah. For a defense of Maimonides, see Harvey, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

And yet Maimonides serves as a central, almost talismanic, figure in Soloveitchik's philosophical essays. Perhaps George Santayana's description (in a letter he wrote to Harry Wolfson) of the use he made of Spinoza might serve to characterize the use Soloveitchik the philosopher made of Maimonides the philosopher:

You know, perhaps that Spinoza is a great force in my private economy, and, Idaresay, I sin in adapting and transforming him to my own uses — [but] it is alegitimate absorption of what one finds nutritive.4

What exactly, then, was the nature of this adaptive and transforming process in the case of Soloveitchik's philosophical use of Maimonides? How did Soloveitchik absorb what he found nutritive in the philosophy of the great eagle?5

Soloveitchik's doctoral thesis, Das reine Denken und Seinskonstituierung bei HermannCohen is an analysis of the epistemology and ontology of Hermann Cohen as set out in his first great work of systematic philosophy, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis,6 and, as is well known, Soloveitchik's reading and interpretation of Maimonides' philosophy bears many signs of Cohen's ethical and critical idealism. At the same time, as perhaps the foremost traditionalist Talmudic scholar in the second half of the twentieth century, Soloveitchik was an outstanding spokesman for and an exponent of traditional rabbinic Judaism. This present essay, the first part of a larger study, examines Soloveitchik's discussion of Maimonides' views regarding the central issue of the knowledge and imitation of God. I will seek to determine to what extent Soloveitchik was faithful to Maimonides' own positions on this major issue and to what extent he "sinned" in pushing Maimonides' philosophical views in either a more neo-Kantian or a more traditionalist rabbinic direction or both. In a future essay, I will examine Soloveitchik's discussion of Maimonides' views regarding the issue of naturalism and human perfection, with particular emphasis on the themes of repentance and immortality.

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The Knowledge of God, the Attributes of Action, and Negative Theology

Towards the beginning of his first great essay, Halakhic Man,7 Soloveitchik attempts to resolve what appears to be a fundamental contradiction in Maimonides' thought concerning the knowledge of God. First, the apparent contradiction:4 Cited in Leo Schwarz, Wolfson of Harvard (Philadelphia, 1978), p. 87. 5 For studies dealing with Soloveitchik and Maimonides’ philosophy, in addition to the essays of Harvey and Shatz cited in note 1, see Walter Wurzburger, “The Maimonidean Matrix of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s Two-Tiered Ethics,” Through the Sound of Many Voices, edited by Jonathan Plaut (Toronto, 1982), pp.172-183; Aviezer Ravitzky, “Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge: Between Maimonideanism and Neo-Kantian Philosophy,” Modern Judaism 6:2 (1986): 157-188; Reinier Munk, The Rationale of Halakhic Man: Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Conception of Jewish Thought (Amsterdam, 1996), pp. 91-96; 108-113, 117- 120, 123, 128-129; and Dov Schwartz, “Concrete Models of Homo Religiosus in the Early Thought of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik” [in Hebrew], Tarbut Yehudit be-`Ayn Ha-Se`arah, edited by Avi Sagi and Nahem Ilan (Eyn Zurim, 2002), pp. 484-507. 6 For analyses of Soloveitchik’s doctorate, see Munk, op. cit., pp. 14-51; and Avinoam Rosenak, “Philosophy and Halakhic Thought,” Emunah bi-Zemanim Mishtanim, pp. 281-284. 7Halakhic Man, translated by Lawrence Kaplan (Philadelphia, 1983). All page references are to be found in the body of the article.

On the one hand, Maimonides ruled that the knowledge of God is the first among the 613 commandments. ‘‘The foundation of foundations and the pillar of all the sciences is that there is a First Being.... And this knowledge is a positive commandment” (Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1, 6). On the other hand, he maintained the doctrine of negative attributes, which denied all possibility of knowing God. On the one hand, Maimonides designated the knowledge of the Creator as man['s] ... ultimate end. On the other hand, Maimonides held that the knowledge of God is not in the realm of human cognition. Are there two greater opposites than these? (p. 11)

Soloveitchik offers the following solution:

The substance of [Maimonides'] answer is that negative cognition does not forfeit its status as cognition. However we know that the entire phenomenon of negative cognition is possible only against the backdrop of affirmative cognition. For we negate with respect to the Creator all of the attributes that we have affirmed with respect to created beings.... The act of negation is reconstructed out of the very substance of affirmation. And what constitutes affirmative cognition if not cognition of the cosmos—the attributes of action. Moses prayed that these attributes of action be communicated to him and his petition was granted. Indeed, we are all commanded to occupy ourselves with the understanding in depth of these attributes for they bring us to the love and fear of God as Maimonides explains in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah (2:2). First we cognize positive terms categories God's great and exalted world, and afterwards we negate the attributes of created being from the Creator. (pp. 11-12)

This answer of Soloveitchik may be broken down into three separate claims. First, thatthe positive commandment to know God requires that we occupy ourselves with theunderstanding in depth of the attributes of divine action. Second, that by knowledge ofthe attributes of action Maimonides means cognition of the cosmos, of God's great andexalted world, of created being. Indeed, in a footnote Soloveitchik again identifies thecognition of the attributes of action with the cognition of "this vast and great cosmos" (p. 146, n.14). Third, that "the act of negation is reconstructed out of the very substance of affirmation." Or, as Soloveitchik states in a footnote, that "as a result of th[e] cognition [of the attributes of action] we arrive at the negation of the essential attributes" (p. 146, n. 14).8

8 Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 486-490, argues that we may correlate these three claims with the three stages in the process of reconstruction as developed by Soloveitchik in Halakhic Mind, an essay written shortly after Halakhic Man. (Halakhic Man was originally published in 1944. In the “Author’s Note” preceding Halakhic Mind, Soloveitchik writes, “This essay was written in 1944.” However, Soloveitchik told me that he still remembers how while working on the essay one morning, the news broke of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. This would mean that the essay was not completed until 1945.) Schwartz’s argument is suggestive, though certain details may be open to question. But to discuss this matter with the fullness it deserves would lead us too far afield.

How well do these claims stand up to critical scrutiny? With reference to the first claim, while Soloveitchik is correct in claiming that in Maimonides' view it is the cognition of the attributes of action that bring one to the love and fear of God, it is difficult to identify the positive commandment to know God with an obligation to know the attributes of action. Rather an examination of Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1: 1-6 indicates that the positive commandment referred to in 1:6 is the obligation to know that the First Being (Matzui Rishon), i.e., the Necessary Existent, who is the Source and Sustainer of all contingent existents is to be identified with the God of the cosmos (E-loha ha 'olam), i.e., the Mover of the first sphere, the Source of all motion.

Soloveitchik's second claim that by knowledge of the attributes of action Maimonidesmeans cognition of the cosmos is, by contrast, right on the mark. It is supported by thefollowing equation that Maimonides draws in Guide 1:54: Moses' apprehension of theattributes of action = his apprehension of God's goodness = his apprehension "of allexisting things" = his apprehension of "their nature [the nature of all existing things] andthe way they are mutually connected." Moreover, as examples of such divine actionsMaimonides offers, on the one hand, "the production of the embryos of living beings"and, on the other hand, "submergence of land, earthquakes, [and] destructive storms." Toclinch the matter, we may finally note that in Guide 3:32 Maimonides explicitly identifies the divine actions with the natural actions.9

In this respect Soloveitchik's understanding of the attributes of action is truer to Maimonides than is Hermann Cohen's understanding of these attributes as presented in his classic work, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism.10 There Cohen sharply distinguishes between theoretical and practical reason, natural science and ethics, "is" and "ought." For Cohen the attributes of action, which may be summed up under the concepts of love and justice, belong not to the realm of causality but to that of purpose (pp. 94-95; cf., p. 98). They are not "determinations of being" but rather "conceptually determined models for the actions of man" (p. 95). As Avi Ravitzky has already noted, Cohen could link his understanding of the attributes of action to that of Maimonides only by ignoring the identification that Maimonides makes in Guide 1:54 between the attributes of action, God's goodness, and "all existing things."11

Soloveitchik's third claim that "the act of negation is reconstructed out of the very substance of affirmation," that "as a result of th [e] cognition [of the attributes of action] we arrive at the negation of the essential attributes," is suggestive but problematic. Certainly it is true, as Maimonides indicates in Guide 1:58, that—to use Soloveitchik’s terminology — "we negate the attributes of created being from the Creator." However, Maimonides in Guide 1:58 clearly differentiates between an attribute of action and an "attribute intended for the apprehension of His essence," and it is only with regard to the

9 Cf. Halakhic Mind, pp. 45-46: “The actional attributes, accessible to man’s mind, do not lead him directly to a cognition of God, but to a cognition of His world. `The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork’ (Ps. 19:2).” In his note on this passage, Soloveitchik quotes, as one would expect, the relevant text from Guide1: 54. 10 Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, second edition, translated by Simon Kaplan (Atlanta, Georgia, 1995). All page references are to be found in the body of the article.

11 Ravitzky, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

latter that he states that "it signifies the negation of the privation of the attribute in question."12 Moreover, as David Shatz has already observed, the thirteen attributes of action made known to Moses are not in any way negated with respect to God.13 Rather, as Maimonides states in Guide 1:54 and 3:54, the purpose of our knowing such divine actions is to assimilate our actions to them, i.e., they serve as the basis for Imitatio Dei. Still, Soloveitchik is certainly correct in identifying God's great and wondrous acts and creatures to which Maimonides refers in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 2:2 with the attributes of action, and the purpose of our knowing these great and wondrous acts and creatures and "discerning from them His wisdom" is to bring us to not the imitation of God but to the love and fear of God. Indeed, a possible reading of Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 2:2 is that man's love of God results from his affirmative cognition of the attributes of action, while his fear of God results from his confrontation with the sublime and unknowable God concerning whom all our "apprehension turns into incapacity" (Guide 1:58).

This passage towards the beginning of Halakhic Man is, to my knowledge, the only place in Soloveitchik's writings where he suggests that our affirmative cognition of the attributes of action serves as the backdrop for the entire phenomenon of negative cognition, where he maintains that we utilize the very substance of affirmation to reconstruct the act of negation. As we shall see, generally in the passages in his writing where he speaks about our knowledge of the attributes of action he follows Maimonides’ lead in Guide 1:54 in maintaining that the purpose of our knowing such divine actions is to assimilate our actions to them, that they serve as the basis for Imitatio Dei.14

This results in a suggestive paradox. As we saw Soloveitchik's claim in the passage towards the beginning of Halakhic Man that our affirmative cognition of the attributes of action serves to "negate the attributes of created being from the Creator" is somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, precisely because we can only "negate the attributes of created being from the Creator" if we achieve an objective, scientific understanding of the cosmos, this problematic claim leads Soloveitchik to the correct conclusion that by knowledge of the attributes of action Maimonides means cognition of the cosmos. By contrast, his claim in the other passages in his writings where he speaks about our knowledge of the attributes of action that the purpose of our knowing such divine actions is to assimilate our actions to them is more firmly grounded in Maimonides' texts. Nevertheless, as I shall attempt to show, his interpretation of the significance and meaning of the attributes of action in those passages deviates from the correct understanding presented in the passage towards the beginning of Halakhic Man and assumes an at times more neo-Kantian, at times more traditionalist coloration. Let us now proceed to examine those passages. The Attributes of Action: Ontological and/or Ethical

12 This is in opposition to Munk’s understanding of Maimonides’ view concerning the divine attributes. See Munk, op. cit., pp. 69-75. 13 Shatz, op. cit., p. 309. Note that in the passage from Halakhic Mind, cited in note 9, where Soloveitchik speaks about the knowledge of the “actional attributes,” he does not link that knowledge with “the negation of the essential attributes."14 I say “generally,” for in the in the passage from Halakhic Mind, cited in note 9, where Soloveitchik speaks about the knowledge of the “actional attributes,” he does not refer to Imitatio Dei.

In an important but somewhat enigmatic passage later on in Halakhic Man, Soloveitchik cites the verse, “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament reciteth His handiwork” (Ps. 19:2), and comments as follows:

But what is the tale of the heavens if not the proclamation of the norm? What is the recitation of the firmament if not the declaration of the commandment? …The principle of “And thou shalt walk in His ways” (Deut. 28:9) (Imitatio Dei) flows from halakhic man’s normative relationship to the world. We can know God’s ways only through studying the cosmos, for it is in the cosmos that there stand revealed before us the glorious and resplendent attributes of action. And, as Maimonides already taught in the Guide (1:54), the cognition of the attributes of action is the source of ethical life. In order to implement the ethical ideal we must fix upon the whole of being and cognize it. This cognition is teleological in essence — it aims to reveal the traces of the norm hidden in reality. (p. 64)

To what extent does this passage accord with Maimonidean teaching and to what extent does it deviate from it? On the one hand, practically all contemporary Maimonidean scholars would certainly agree that Soloveitchik’s claim that “We can know God’s ways only through studying the cosmos, for it is in the cosmos that there stand revealed before us the … attributes of action” is sound Maimonidean doctrine. On the other hand, many, perhaps most, of these same scholars would maintain that Soloveitchik’s further claim that, according to Maimonides, “the cognition of the attributes of action is the source of ethical life” should be corrected to read “the cognition of the attributes of action is the source of political life.” Perhaps we can finesse this difference by stating that all would agree that, for Maimonides, the cognition of the attributes of action is the source of the ethical-political life or, more generally speaking, the source of practical action. But—and this is the key question—in what sense? Does Maimonides believe, as does Soloveitchik, that the heavens proclaim the norm and the firmament declares the commandment? To state the question non-metaphorically, does Maimonides believe that there are “traces of the norm hidden in reality”? And if he does not believe that, then could he accept Soloveitchik’s claim that “the cognition of the attributes of action … is teleological in essence”?15

In order to clarify the differences between Maimonides and Soloveitchik on these critical issues we must first clarify what Soloveitchik means when he states that “the cognition of the attributes of action … aims to reveal the traces of the norm hidden in reality.” In Halakhic Man, Soloveitchik does not elaborate upon this important claim. But his meaning becomes clearer when we turn to his discussion of the attributes of action and Imitatio Dei in his other major Hebrew essay, “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham.”16 There he states:

15 Once again, note that in the passage from Halakhic Mind, cited in note 9, where Soloveitchik speaks about the knowledge of the “actional attributes,” he cites the verse “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork” (Ps. 19:2), but, contrary to the view expressed in Halakhic Man, he does not maintain that the heavens proclaim the norm and the firmament declares the commandment. There is no indication in his, admittedly brief, discussion there that “the cognition [of the attributes of action] is teleological in essence — it aims to reveal the traces of the norm hidden in reality.”

The idea that the creation of the world is a moral act and that man is obligated to imitate God by devoting himself to acts of creation is the basis of Maimonides’ doctrine of the attributes of action. It is permitted for man to refer to these attributes of divine action whereby God created and governs the world for they are all ethical actions — characteristics that obligate man to assimilate his acts to them. (p 185, n. 16)

And again:

The source of ethics is God and its revelation is creation. The fact of being is an embodiment of the ethical will…. The highest ethical good is perfected being…. Imitation of God, the foundation of Israelite morality expresses itself in imitation of His creative acts. The entire cosmic process is the revelation of divine ethics. (p. 223)

As Ravitzky has noted, we have here the “far- reaching [assertion that] creation is a combination of fact and value: the norm is rooted in being itself, the `ought’ in the ‘is.’… Not only are the Creator and the Commander one, but also creation and commandment are unified.”17 As Ravitzky further elaborates, “It is Soloveitchik’s interpretation of the attributes of action within an ethical context, similar to Cohen, on the one hand, and his faithfulness to Maimonides’ teaching concerning creation as God’s attributes of action, on the other hand, which guided his unique approach: divine creation God’s attributes of action is good; human good mans’ imitation of God’s action is creative.”18

But these “far-reaching” assertions rest, in turn, on an even more fundamental base. As Shatz correctly argues,19 if, for Soloveitchik, from the divine perspective, “the creation of the world is a moral act” and “the fact of being is an embodiment of the ethical will,” it is because with respect to God there is a perfect identity of intellect—will—action as a reality (p. 195). And if, from the human perspective, “the highest ethical good is perfected being… [and] the imitation of God … expresses itself in imitation of His creative acts,” it is because with respect to man this identity of intellect—will—action, in imitation of the divine identity, serves a regulative ideal. As Soloveitchik argues, “Man must imitate His Creator not only with regard to the identity of intellect and intelligible, but also with regard to the identity of intellect—will—action” (p. 202; cf. p.195). That the combination of fact and value, of “is” and “ought” derives from the identity of intellect—will—action, whether as reality with respect to God or as ideal with respect to man, is set forth almost explicitly by Soloveitchik in the following assertion:

16 “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” [= “But From Thence You Will Seek;” based on Deut. 4:29: “But from thence you will seek the Lord your God and you will find Him; if you will search Him out with all your heart and with all your soul”] Ish ha-Halakhah—Galui ve-Nistar (Jerusalem, 1979). All page references are to be found in the body of the article.17 Ravitzky, op. cit., p.177.18 Ibid., p. 178.19 Shatz, op. cit., p. 322.

Prophecy, which revealed the divine actions to man, views the world as the embodiment of the concealed intellect within the supernal will, as the unfolding of divine cognition—will, entirely ethical, entirely teleological. From it there flows the ethical lawfulness to be found in the world.” (p. 185, n.16) (emphasis added)

But how does all this —to return to the query we raised earlier—relate to Maimonides’ view of the subject?20 Though Shatz does not address this question directly, he gives the impression that Soloveitchik here is being faithful to Maimonidean teaching.21 Ravitzky, to the contrary, seems to suggest that in some undefined way Soloveitchik is deviating here from Maimonidean teaching, but he does not spell out exactly how.22

A rather revealing ambiguity in Ravitzky’s presentation may serve to point us in the direction of an answer. On the one hand, Ravitzky maintains, correctly in our view, that Soloveitchik unifies creation, the ontological law, and commandment, the revealed law. And, in this connection, Ravitzky cites a passage from Soloveitchik that makes this point explicitly. “Judaism declares that there is no difference between the revealed law and the ontological law but by [human] perception. The ontological law, demonstrated in the existence of creation, makes itself known to man as a revealed commandment” (p. 225)23

On the other hand, Ravitzky maintains, incorrectly in our view, that Soloveitchik establishes a bridge between the ontological law and the revealed law.24 The image of a bridge suggests, however, that the ontological law and the revealed law are not unified, that while linked to one another they are separate. Precisely this latter position, I will now argue, is the view of Maimonides. As we have seen, Maimonides in Guide 1:54, equates Moses' apprehension of the attributes of action with the cognition of the cosmos. More specifically, Moses apprehended “the nature [of all existing things] and the way they are mutually connected so that He [Moses] [knew] how he [God] governs them in general and detail.” This apprehension on the part of Moses was a purely intellectual grasp of God’s governance as manifested in the scientific order of the cosmos, that is to say, to use Soloveitchik’s terminology, of the ontological law.

The revealed law for Maimonides, I would suggest, emerged out of Moses’ purely intellectual grasp of the ontological law. How so? To answer this let us look at the continuation of Maimonides’ discussion.

Maimonides goes on to say “Scripture has restricted itself to mentioning only the thirteen characteristics although Moses apprehended … all His actions because these [thirteen

20 I leave the side the question as to how Soloveitchik can espouse his teleological view of the divine attributes, given that he accepts the modern scientific view of the cosmos that denies the existence of final causes. This issue has been dealt with very well both by Ravitzky, pp.178-180; and Shatz, pp.317-319.21 Ibid., p. 318.22 Ravitzky, p.178.23 Ibid., p. 177. (“In Soloveitchik’s writings … creation and commandment are unified.”)24 Ibid., p.177. (“[A] bridge between the moral law and the ontological law is asserted in writings of Rabbi Soloveitchik.”)

characteristics] are the actions proceeding from Him …in respect to giving existence to the Adamites and governing them. This was Moses’ ultimate object in his demand [“Show me Thy ways”], the conclusion of what he says being `that I may know Thee … and consider that this nation is Thy people’ (Exod.33: 13) -– that is, a people for the government of which I need to perform actions that I must seek to make similar to Thy actions in governing them.” Thus though Moses attained intellectual knowledge of the totality of the cosmic order (“all His actions,” “Everything that [God] made”) he was particularly concerned with the actions of the cosmic order as they impinged upon man. For Moses’ goal was to imitate the actions whereby God governed man, i.e., the thirteen characteristics, by performing actions similar to God’s and thereby governing the people. In a word, Moses’ political governance of Israel was an imitation of the divine cosmic governance of mankind.

But what were the actions that Moses performed, actions that were similar to, that imitated the divine actions? Maimonides does not tell us. I would maintain, as I have argued elsewhere,25 that, for Maimonides, the actions that Moses had to perform in governing the people similar to God’s actions in governing mankind, or to put the matter another way, Moses’ act of Imitatio Dei, par excellence, was the formulation, the legislation, of the revealed Law. That is, Moses, through an act of pure intellectual cognition, grasped the scientific functioning of the cosmos, the ontological law; he apprehended God‘s governance of all things and man in particular. Then, in a second act, Moses translated that intellectual apprehension of the ideal divine pattern of governance, of the perfect ontological law of the cosmos, into ethico-political categories and produced the revealed Law. The revealed Law is thus distinct from though intimately related to the ontological law, for the revealed law is a perfect imitation in ethico-political terms of the ideal ontological law.26

To return to our earlier questions: We had asked, does Maimonides believe, as does Soloveitchik, that the heavens proclaim the norm and the firmament declares the commandment? To state the question non-metaphorically, does Maimonides believe that there are “traces of the norm hidden in reality”? The answer is no. For, as we have seen, the norm emerged, for Maimonides, only when Moses translated his intellectual apprehension of reality into ethico-political categories. As for the question, if Maimonides does not believe that there are “traces of the norm hidden in reality,” then would he be able to accept Soloveitchik’s claim that “the cognition of the attributes of action … is teleological in essence”? The answer again is no. The cognition of the attributes of action, in Maimonides’ view, is not teleological in essence.27 And yet, while cognition of the attributes of action is not teleological in essence, Moses certainly had a 25 Lawrence Kaplan, “`I Sleep, but My Heart Waketh: Maimonides’ Conception of Human Perfection,” The Thought of Moses Maimonides, edited by I. Robinson, L. Kaplan and J. Bauer (Lewiston, Maine, 1991), pp. 137-145. I develop my argument much more fully there, with appropriate documentation and detail, which is why I have allowed myself here to present just the bare bones necessary in this present context. 26 Cf. Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought (Albany, New York, 1999), p. 15, where, referring to Guide 1:54, Kreisel states: “In this passage too Maimonides alludes the view that the legislation of the law is the product of Moses’ `translation’ of the theoretical knowledge of all existence into a system of ideal rule in the human context.” I am pleased that the suggestion put forward in my article that the revealed Law should be seen as a product of Moses’ “translation” of the perfect ontological law has been adopted by this distinguished Maimonidean scholar.

practical goal in view in his apprehension of the thirteen characteristics. “This was Moses’ ultimate object in his demand [“Show me Thy ways”], the conclusion of what he says being `that I may know Thee … and consider that this nation is Thy people’ (Exod.33: 13) -– that is, a people for the government of which I need to perform actions that I must seek to make similar to Thy actions in governing them.”

As we saw earlier, Ravitzky correctly argues that “It is Soloveitchik’s interpretation of the attributes of action within an ethical context, similar to Cohen, on the one hand, and his faithfulness to Maimonides’ teaching concerning creation as God’s attributes of action, on the other hand, which guided his unique approach.” Thus Ravitzky portrays Soloveitchik as being between Maimonideanism and neo-Kantianism. But, in another sense, we can say that Maimonides is between Soloveitchik and Cohen. For if, in Cohen’s view, the attributes of action, as we have seen, belong not to the realm of causality, but to that of purpose, are not "determinations of being" but rather "conceptually determined models for the actions of man," it is because, as we have also seen, Cohen sharply distinguishes between theoretical and practical reason, natural science and ethics, "is" and "ought," the ontological law and the revealed law; that is, he argues that there is an unbridgeable gap between these categories. Soloveitchik, as we have seen, unifies the ontological law and the revealed law; that is, he collapses the distinction between the two. Maimonides, to use his own terminology, would then be a mean between the two extremes, for he maintains that the ontological law and the revealed law, while not unified, while separate, are linked to one another, inasmuch as the revealed law is a perfect imitation in ethico-political terms of the ideal ontological law.

The Attributes of Action as “Conceptually Determined Models for the Actions of Man": Soloveitchik’s Neo-Kantian Turn

To return to Soloveitchik: We have argued that in both Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” Soloveitchik sets forth the same view regarding the relationship between the knowledge of the attributes of action and the imitation of God. In both essays he unifies the ontological law and the revealed law. Thus, Soloveitchik’s statement in Halakhic Man that “This cognition of the attributes of action aims to reveal the traces of the norm hidden in reality” corresponds to his statement in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” that “The fact of being is an embodiment of the ethical will…. The entire cosmic process is the revelation of divine ethics.” And yet, in one place in the latter essay Soloveitchik appears to lean slightly away from Maimonideanism and to tilt in a slightly more neo-Kantian direction. We had cited earlier the following passage from “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham”:

27 Of course, Maimonides believed that the divine actions, that is, the natural actions, are purposive, that there is an internal teleological order in nature. But these purposes, this teleology are perceived by man’s intellect, by his theoretical reason. When I say that the cognition of the attributes of action is not teleological for Maimonides, I mean that inasmuch as he did not believe that there are “traces of the [ethico-moral] norm hidden in reality” he also did not believe that the cognition of the attributes of action is the cognition of those norms.

The idea that the creation of the world is a moral act and that man is obligated to imitate God by devoting himself to acts of creation is the basis of Maimonides’ doctrine of the attributes of action. It is permitted for man to refer to these attributes of divine action whereby God created and governs the world for they are all ethical actions — characteristics that obligate man to assimilate his acts to them. (p. 185, n. 16)

Soloveitchik here once again unifies the ontological law and the revealed law. “The attributes of divine action whereby God created and governs the world … are all ethical actions.” And yet — and here is where the neo-Kantian tilt appears — “it is permitted to man to refer to these attributes of divine action” not because they are actions “whereby God created and governs the world,” but only because “they are all ethical actions — characteristics that obligate man to assimilate his acts to them.” To use Cohen’s terminology, while Soloveitchik maintains that the attributes of action are both "determinations of being" and "conceptually determined models for the actions of man," he also appears to maintain, in this passage at least, that we are only allowed to refer to them qua "conceptually determined models for the actions of man" and not qua "determinations of being."

What we have here in this passage is only an inchoate tendency. However, in his halakhic discourse, “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem,”28 Soloveitchik presents an analysis of the attributes of action that at one as the same time, assumes both a more strictly neo-Kantian and a more traditionalist coloration. In this essay the cosmic, ontological aspect of the attributes of action almost entirely disappears from the picture.

In this discourse Soloveitchik sets forth with even greater emphasis the point he had made in the passage we just cited. “The entire basis of our being permitted to praise God [by attributing to Him the attributes of action] derives from the commandment of ‘And thou shalt walk in His ways’ (Deut. 28:9)” (p. 173). The attributes of action in this essay are described time and again as "conceptually determined models for the actions of man." To cite just a few statements: “Every one [of the attributes of action] is a fundamental halakhic principle in the realm of man’s ethical behavior and moral dispositions. Each one… serves as a source of man’s [ethical] obligations” (p. 171). And again: “The whole halakhic character of our use of the attributes of action exhausts itself in the command that man should crown himself with them through his good and right deeds and fine and proper thoughts” (p. 172). And one final example: “In each and every praise of God [through ascribing to Him the attributes of action] there is to be found a firm foundation for ethics and morals” (p. 173). There is no reference here to “the attributes of divine action whereby God created and governs the world,” no hint here that “The entire cosmic process is the revelation of divine ethics” or that “It is in the cosmos that there stand revealed before us the glorious and resplendent attributes of action.”

28 “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem,” Shi`urim le-Zekher Abba Mari, Z”L, Vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1985), pp. 164-181, especially, pp. 170-173. All page references are to be found in the body of the article.

Soloveitchik’s citations from Maimonides in this discourse are revealing. While he does refer to Guide 1:54, he only cites the passage “This was Moses’ ultimate object in his demand [“Show me Thy ways”], the conclusion of what he says being `that I may know Thee … and consider that this nation is Thy people’ (Exod.33: 13) -– that is, a people for the government of which I need to perform actions that I must seek to make similar to Thy actions in governing them.” He refers to the verse “I will make all My goodness pass before thee” (Exod.33: 19), but omits the key passage in 1:54 where Maimonides draws the equation: Moses' apprehension of the attributes of action = his apprehension of God's goodness = his apprehension "of all existing things" = his apprehension of "their nature [the nature of all existing things] and the way they are mutually connected." I had cited earlier Ravitzky’s observation that Cohen could link his understanding of the attributes of action to that of Maimonides only by ignoring the identification that Maimonides makes in Guide 1:54 between the attributes of action, God's goodness, and "all existing things." But this exactly what Soloveitchik does in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem”!

The main text that Soloveitchik relies on in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem” is Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5-6.

We are commanded to walk in these middle ways, which are the good and right ways. As it is said: “And thou shalt walk in His ways” (Deut. 28:9). Thus they taught in explaining this commandment: Just as He is called gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is called merciful, you too be merciful; just as He is called holy, you too be holy.

In like manner, the prophets applied all these epithets (kinuyyin) to God: slow to anger, and abundant in loving-kindness, just and righteous, perfect, powerful, strong, and the like. They did so to proclaim that these ways are good and right, and a man is obliged to train himself to follow them and imitate according o his strength.

Scholars have noted that while in this passage Maimonides refers to imitating God’s moral dispositions, in Guide 1:54 he refers to imitating His actions.29 Another

29 See Wurzburger, “Imitatio Dei in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitzvot and the Mishneh Torah,” Tradition and Transition, edited by Jonathan Saks (London, 1986), pp.321-324; idem, “Law, Philosophy, and Imitatio Dei in Maimonides,” Aquinas 30 (1987): 27-34; and Kreisel, op. cit., pp. 128-132. On the other hand, Soloveitchik in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem,” p.171, argues that in Laws of Moral Dispositions Maimonides views both the performance of deeds of loving kindness and the acquisition of moral virtues as constituting Imitatio. In support of this contention he cites Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:7, where Maimonides states that one must perform repeated deeds of mercy and grace in order to acquire those moral virtues. This position cannot be maintained, First, Maimonides in 1:7 does not cite the verse, “After the Lord, your God, you shall walk” (Deut.13: 5), the verse cited in B.T, Sotah 14a as the basis for seeing the performance of deeds of loving kindness as a form of Imitatio. Second, Maimonides in this passage gives no indication that the performance of those deeds is a form of Imitatio. Indeed, Maimonides attributes there precisely the same psychological function to the performance of those deeds as he does in Eight Chapters 4, and in that latter context he does not even mention Imitatio at all, not even in connection with the moral virtues! Finally, note that in Sefer ha-Mitzvot the commandment to cleave to God precedes the

difference, not previously noted, is that in Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5-6 Maimonides cites the Sifre to Deut.10: 12: “Just as He is called gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is called merciful, you too be merciful;” while in Guide 1:54 he cites Abba Saul’s statement: “Just as He is gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is merciful, you too be merciful.” (B.T. Sabbath 133b).30

These are important differences whose significance we cannot explore here. But for our present purpose it is critical to note that Maimonides’ presentations of the meaning of the “ways of God”—to use the term common to Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5-6 and Guide 1:54— in these two passages differ fundamentally one from another. The entire ontological, cosmic aspect of the attributes of action so central to the discussion in Guide 1:54 is completely missing from Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5-6. In its stead the view is expressed that “the prophets applied all these epithets to God … to proclaim that these ways are good and right, and a man is obliged to train himself to follow them and imitate according to his strength.’’ Shades of Hermann Cohen! Indeed, we might go so far as to say that Cohen gravely erred in seeking support for his view that the attributes of action are "conceptually determined models for the actions of man" and not "determinations of

commandment to walk in His ways, while in the Mishneh Torah the order is reversed. Very briefly, the reason for this is the following. The order in which Maimonides presents the commandments, in Sefer ha-Mitzvot, the Mishneh Torah, and the Guide, is: beliefs, moral dispositions, actions. In Sefer ha-Mitzvot the commandment to cleave to God involves both beliefs and actions, while the commandment to walk in His ways involves both moral virtues and actions. The actions, as it were, cancel each other out, and therefore the commandment to cleave to God precedes the commandment to walk in His ways. In the Mishneh Torah Maimonides simplifies matters. The commandment to walk in God’s ways now involves only moral virtues, while the commandment to cleave to Him involves only actions. Therefore the commandment to walk in God’s ways precedes the commandment to cleave to Him. The bottom line is that in the Laws of Moral Dispositions the commandment to walk in God’s ways involves only the acquisition of moral virtues.30 The very last rabbinic statement quoted by Maimonides in Guide 1:54 is “Just as He is gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is merciful, you too be merciful.” Kafih, Schwarz, and Pines in their translations all offer as a reference the Sifre to Deut.10: 12. But this is clearly wrong. For the text of the Sifre, as we have seen, is “Just as He is called gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is called merciful, you too be merciful.” Maimonides does cite the Sifre in the Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Positive commandment 8, and Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5. But in Guide 1:54 he is citing Abba Saul’s statement in B.T. Sabbath 133b. In general, Maimonides’ conclusion to Guide 1:54 has been misunderstood. Maimonides concludes the chapter thus: “For the utmost virtue of man is to become like unto Him… as far as he is able; which means that we should make our actions like unto His, as the Sages made clear when interpreting the verse `You shall be holy’ (Lev.19: 2). They said: “Just as He is gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is merciful, you too be merciful.” Scholars have assumed that Maimonides means to say here that the Sages in commenting on Lev.19: 2 (“You shall be holy”) stated, “Just as He is gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is merciful, you too be merciful.” The problem is that nowhere in rabbinic literature do we find this comment appended to this verse. I would suggest that this passage should be understood as follows. “For the utmost virtue of man is to become like unto Him… as far as he is able; which means that we should make our actions like unto His, as the Sages made clear when interpreting the verse `You shall be holy’ (Lev.19:2).” Full stop! That is, Maimonides is saying here that the Sages in commenting on Lev.19: 2 asserted that the verse “means that we should make our actions like unto His.” Maimonides is referring here to the comment of Abba Saul (!) in the Sifra on Lev.19: 2: “`You shall be holy’ — Imitate the King.” Then Maimonides continues: Do you want to know what Abba Saul meant by “Imitate the King”? Look at Abba Saul’s statement in B.T. Sabbath 133b: “Just as He is gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is merciful, you too be merciful.”

being" in Guide 1:54. He should have sought support, and, indeed, would have found support in Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5-6.

Not that I for a moment believe that Maimonides was a neo-Kantian. Maimonides’ true view concerning the attributes of action is, I am convinced, to be found in Guide 1:54. The view he presents regarding the attributes of action Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5-6 is, I would suggest, an accommodation to a more traditionalist view. But it is of exceptional interest that this more traditionalist view turns out be the Neo-Kantian view. And, to return to the protagonist of our essay, we can now understand why Soloveitchik in developing his neo-Kantian view of the attributes of action in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem” relies so heavily on Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:5-6 and pushes Guide 1:54 into the shadows.31

Revelation as the Basis for the Knowledge of the Attributes of Action: Soloveitchik’s Traditionalist Turn

We saw that in Halakhic Man, Soloveitchik, following Maimonides’ lead in Guide 1:54, maintains that “We can know God’s ways only through studying the cosmos, for it is in the cosmos that there stand revealed before us the glorious and resplendent attributes of action…. In order to implement the ethical ideal we must fix upon the whole of being and cognize it”. But if, for Soloveitchik, in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem” the cosmic, ontological aspect of the attributes of action disappears from the picture, then how does one attain knowledge of the attributes of action or of God’s ways?

Soloveitchik, not surprisingly, picks up on Maimonides’ phrase in Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:6, “the prophets applied all these epithets to God,” and throughout “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem” he suggests that “the praises of God [“slow to anger, and abundant in loving-kindness, just and righteous, perfect, powerful, strong, and the like”] were revealed to the prophets in order to teach the ways of God” (p. 173). Indeed Soloveitchik goes so far as to say that Maimonides placed the chapter on the effacing of the divine names, which discusses, among other things, the epithets applied to God (Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 6), before the chapter dealing with prophecy (Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 7) because “in the teaching concerning the names of God is to be found the entire foundation and goal of prophecy” (p. 173).31 In truth, I believe that even in Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:6 Maimonides views the attributes of action as "determinations of being” and not "conceptually determined models for the actions of man." The difference between Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:6 and Guide1: 54, in my view, is that in the former passage Maimonides is describing an Imitatio of the mean, while in the latter he is describing an Imitatio of overflow. This difference, in turn, is related to the first difference we noted between the texts, namely, that in Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:6 Maimonides is referring to imitating God’s moral dispositions, while in Guide 1:54 he is referring to imitating His actions. I intend to expand upon these necessarily brief and cryptic remarks elsewhere. But since my goal in this essay not to elucidate Maimonides’ philosophy, per se, but rather Soloveitchik’s use of that philosophy, the major point to keep in mind is that while it is easy to understand Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:6 as maintaining, in good neo-Kantian fashion, that the attributes of action should be viewed as "conceptually determined models for the actions of man," it is not easy —indeed, not possible! — to understand Guide 1:54 thus, unless, as Ravitzky notes, we ignore the identification that Maimonides makes there between the attributes of action, God's goodness, and "all existing things."

Note the difference here between Maimonides and Soloveitchik. True, Maimonides in Laws of Moral Dispositions 1:6 states that “the prophets applied all these epithets to God.” But he does not take the extra step, taken by Soloveitchik, of stating that “the praises of God were revealed to the prophets.” This brings us face to face with the question of the relationship between reason and revelation with respect to the attributes of action. And since, for Maimonides, Cohen, and Soloveitchik, “the cognition of the attributes of action is the source of ethical life” or, as we have argued in the case of Maimonides, of ethical-political life, we are brought face to face with the question of the relationship between reason and revelation with respect to ethical life or ethical-political life.

As we saw, the revealed Law, for Maimonides, is a perfect imitation in ethico-political terms of the ideal ontological law. Similarly we saw that, in Maimonides’ view, Moses, grasped this ontological law through an act of pure intellectual cognition. The clear implication is that reason, i.e., the intellectual cognition of the attributes of action, of the scientific functioning of the cosmos, of God‘s governance of all things and man in particular, serves as the source of the revealed ethico-political law.

Hermann Cohen could certainly subscribe to Soloveitchik’s claim that “the praises of God were revealed to the prophets,” and that “in the teaching concerning the names of God is to be found the entire foundation and goal of prophecy.” The question, though, is: How does he understand this prophetic revelation of the attributes of action and its relationship to reason?

For Cohen, as indicated by the title of his classic work, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, religion is the religion of reason and this religion of reason derives from the sources of Judaism. Moreover, there exists a particularly tight link between the religion of reason and morality. As Cohen declares, “Religion itself is moral teaching or is not religion” (p. 33). Indeed, as he goes on to exclaim, “How could religion be the religion of reason, if at the same time it were not moral teaching?” (p. 33)

What, then, is revelation? Cohen answers: “Revelation is the creation of reason…. Reason is … the root of the content of revelation” (pp. 72, 82). Indeed, Cohen avers, we should not even speak about revelation. Rather, let us use the traditional term “the giving of the Torah.”

God is called “the Giver of the Torah.” There is nothing said here about a mystery, nothing about unveiling (revelatio). God gives the Torah as he gives everything…. Revelation is the sign of reason, which… comes from God and connects with God. (pp. 83-84).

How though does God give the Torah? Here we return to the attributes of action. God gives the Torah insofar as the attributes of action are moral characteristics that serve as "conceptually determined models for the actions of man." Or, to put it another way: Given that, for Cohen, God’s primary moral characteristic is holiness, God gives the

Torah insofar as His holiness serves as “the archetype for the action of man” (p.110). As Cohen explains:

“Ye shall be holy; for I the Eternal your God am holy” (Lev.19: 2)…. Holiness thus means for man a task, whereas for God it designates being. [But] this designation of being with regard to God is not concerned with His metaphysical causality, but with His purposive acting. In holiness God becomes for man the lawgiver who sets tasks for him…. Holiness is [man’s] purpose, which sets for him his task, God’s task. (emphasis added) (pp. 96-97)

And, of course, this task that God’s holiness sets for man is moral striving and action.

The holiness of man consists of self-sanctification, which however can have no termination, … but only infinite striving and becoming…. Only in the correlation to God, and only in the infinity of its fulfillment, and only in the confinement of holiness to moral action, therefore only in the abstraction of eternal moral becoming, does the holiness of man consist. (emphasis added) (pp. 111-112)

For Cohen, then, the revelation of the attributes of action to be found in the teaching of the prophets refers precisely to their knowledge of the Holy God as the “the archetype for the action of man” (p.110). Indeed, as Cohen declares, “God’s holiness also becomes the embodiment of the thirteen characteristics of God; it comprises justice and love; it makes love akin to justice” (p. 98). This prophetic knowledge of God’s holiness, of the thirteen characteristics of God, of justice and love, does not, in Cohen’s view, involve the knowledge of nature -- on this point, as we have seen, he differs from Maimonides --but only the knowledge of morality. This prophetic knowledge derives from man’s spirit, a spirit, which precisely because it is a spirit of knowledge of God’s holiness, of morality, does not simply remain a spirit of knowledge but “develop[s] … into the spirit of the will and action” (p.100).

Thus, the views of Maimonides and Cohen concerning the relationship between reason and revelation with respect to the ethical life or ethical-political life are relatively straightforward. Maimonides maintains that the ontological law and the revealed law are distinct but linked to one another, that the revealed law is a perfect imitation in ethico-political terms of the ideal ontological law. It follows that the ethico-political law is known through revelation, but that reason, i.e., the intellectual cognition of the ontological law, serves as the source of that revelation. Cohen sharply distinguishes between the ontological law and the revealed law, indeed argues that they are separated by an unbridgeable gap; but this distinction is not a distinction between reason and revelation, but a distinction between theoretical reason and practical, ethical reason (p. 86).

Soloveitchik’s view on the matter, at least in Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” is more difficult to determine. In these essays, as we have seen, Soloveitchik unifies the ontological law and the revealed law. What are we to infer from this? We previously cited Soloveitchik’s statement in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” that “Judaism

declares that there is no difference between the revealed law and the ontological law but by [human] perception. The ontological law, demonstrated in the existence of creation, makes itself known to man as a revealed commandment.” But if the ontological law is known through reason and the commandment is known through revelation, are we to infer that reason and revelation are two sides of the same coin, that they differ only “by human perception”? We similarly cited Soloveitchik’s statement in Halakhic Man that

We can know God’s ways only through studying the cosmos, for it is in the cosmos that there stand revealed before us the glorious and resplendent attributes of action, … the source of ethical life. In order to implement the ethical ideal we must fix upon the whole of being and cognize it. This cognition is teleological in essence — it aims to reveal the traces of the norm hidden in reality.

Should we to infer from this statement that not only are reason and revelation two sides of the same coin, differing only by “human perception,” but that the same holds true for the distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason? Does Soloveitchik collapse that distinction as well, or at least reduce it to one of “human perception”?

So it would seem. But such inferences fly in the face of the tenor and the overall argumentation of both essays. The fundamental premise of both essays is that the halakhah derives from divine revelation and not from human reason—not exactly a particularly surprising position for the outstanding exponent of traditional rabbinic Judaism in our generation to espouse. To be sure, in both essays Soloveitchik argues very forcefully that the halakhah, while revealed, is given over to human understanding and interpretation. As he states in Halakhic Man:

Halakhic Man received the Torah from Sinai not as a simple recipient, but as a creator of worlds, as a partner of the Almighty in the act of creation. The power of creative interpretation (hiddush) is the very foundation of the received tradition. (p. 81)

And as he elaborates in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham:”

The unique significance that the halakhah bestows upon the intellect is so striking that it pervades, informs, and colors the entire character of the halakhic outlook. The intellect is the final decisor in all matters of law and judgement. The content of the Torah, which in its essence is revelational, is subjected to the rule of intellectual cognition…. The backdrop is revelational-visionary — the written Torah and the oral Torah revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai—but the whirl of colors painted on that background is cognitive-“natural.” …The study of the Torah is an act of independent intellectual construction, possessed of epistemological and noetic values that derive their life and vitality from the creative spirit and mastery of man the knower who has penetrated into the revelational realm and seized hold of it. The revelational consciousness is incorporated into the developing creative cognitive consciousness. God gave the

Torah to Israel and has commanded us to engage in creative interpretation. (pp. 204-206)

But while these passages give exceptionally eloquent expression to the role of man’s intellect and his creative cognitive consciousness in the study, interpretation, and determination of halakhah, they still affirm in no uncertain terms that “the content of the Torah … in its essence is revelational,” that “the backdrop is revelational-visionary — the written Torah and the oral Torah revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai.” As we have seen, however, Soloveitchik’s analysis of the attributes of action in Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” would appear to break down— or, at the very least, to blur — the distinctions between reason and revelation and between theoretical reason and practical reason precisely with respect to the very essence and contents of revelation!

I confess to being unable to resolve this difficulty in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, as I intend to show just below when discussing Soloveitchik’ great essay, “The Lonely Man of Faith,” it would seem that Soloveitchik himself was at least obliquely aware of this difficulty, and it was precisely this difficulty that was at least partially responsible for his suppression of the cosmic, ontological aspect of the attributes of action. For it is only through this act of suppression that he was able to pry reason and revelation apart after having brought them into such uncomfortable proximity with one another. Be this as it may, the turn in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem” to revelation as the way to attain knowledge of the attributes of action or of God’s ways is clear. “The praises of God were revealed to the prophets in order to teach the ways of God.”

But more. The way for us to come to know these praises of God, these divine ways, these attributes of action is not “through studying the cosmos,” not through fix[ing] upon the whole of being and cogniz[ing] it,” not through “aim[ing] to reveal the traces of the norm hidden in reality,” but through studying the teachings of the prophets. Do you desire to learn about God’s acts of mercy and graciousness? Turn not to the cosmos, but to Isaiah, Hosea, and Jeremiah. For it is in their writings — Soloveitchik declares in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem” — that you will find “the authoritative teaching regarding the ways of God, the authoritative teaching regarding the [divine] epithets [the attributes of action] that obligate a person to imitate his Creator” (p. 173).

We can see the fallout of the disappearance of the ontological, cosmic aspect of the attributes of action and the return to revelation alone as the basis of ethical action in “The Lonely Man of Faith.”32 With reference to the first point: If the ethical attributes of action, in good neo-Kantian fashion, no longer possess a cosmic, ontological aspect, then conversely, also in good neo-Kantian fashion, the cosmos no longer possesses any ethical significance. No longer do the heavens proclaim the norm; no longer does the firmament declare the commandment. And with reference to the second point: If the heavens no longer proclaim the norm and the firmament no longer declares the commandment, it is precisely because the proclamation of the norm and the declaration of the commandment

32 “The Lonely Man of Faith,” Tradition 7:2 (1965), pp. 5-67. All page references are to be found in the body of the article.

derive from an act of divine revelation separate and distinct from any cosmic, rational religious experience. It is only against this background that we can understand Soloveitchik’s interpretation of the verse, “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork” (Ps. 19:2) in “The Lonely Man of Faith.” Soloveitchik first cites the verse and then comments as follows:

Yet, let me ask, what kind of tale do the heavens tell? Is it a personal tale addressed to someone, or is it a tale which is not intended for any audience? Do the heavens sing the glory of the Creator without troubling themselves to find out whether or not someone is listening to this great song or are they really interested in man, the listener? I believe that the answer to this question is obvious. If the tale of the heavens were a personal one, addressed to man, then there would be no need for another encounter with God. Since God in His infinite wisdom arranged for the apocalyptic-covenantal meeting with man, we may conclude that the message of the heavens is at best an equivocal one. (pp. 30-31)

How strikingly different is the explanation of the verse offered here from that offered in Halakhic Man! Indeed, as Ravitzky, who briefly discusses this passage, correctly notes, “It would seem that a change took place in Soloveitchik’s conception concerning the nature of cosmic experience and cosmic knowledge.”33 But what he does not note is that Soloveitchik in this passage almost explicitly offers a reason for his change of mind. To return to the difficulty we had raised earlier: If the heavens proclaim the norm, if the firmament declares the commandment, if there are “traces of the norm hidden in reality,” if we can know God’s ways, i.e., the attributes of action, through studying the cosmos, and finally, if, indeed, it is the cognition of the attributes of action as they stand revealed before us in the cosmos that serves as the source of ethical life — if, as is the case both in Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” all this is true, then why, indeed, do we need “another encounter with God”? Why, indeed, should “God in His infinite wisdom [have] arranged for the apocalyptic-covenantal meeting with man”? It would appear, then, that it is precisely this difficulty posed by his earlier position that pushes Soloveitchik to conclude here that “the message of the heavens is at best an equivocal one.” And if “the message of the heavens is at best an equivocal one,” then, as Soloveitchik suggests in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem,” the ethical attributes of action can not have any cosmic ontological ground, but must be grounded solely in divine revelation.

The Dog that didn’t Bark: The Attributes of Action and “The Lonely Man of Faith”

But this change of mind on Soloveitchik’s part would appear to have given rise to, at least in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” a more far-reaching conclusion than that drawn in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem.” For one may ask: If, as Soloveitchik states, “God in His infinite wisdom arranged for the apocalyptic-covenantal meeting with man,” and if, as he further states, this encounter was “crystallized and objectified in a normative ethico-moral message” (p. 38), then why bother with making “the cognition of the attributes of action … the source of ethical life,” even if, as in “Be-`Inyan Mehikat Ha-Shem,” that

33 Ravitzky, op. cit., p. 187, note 109.

cognition is grounded in revelation and not reason? Why not “pass go,” as it were, that is, why not bypass the attributes of action completely, and, rather, ground the ethical life directly in the revealed command, in “the apocalyptic-covenantal meeting”? And, indeed — whether motivated by considerations like these or not — this is precisely what takes place in “The Lonely Man of Faith.” There is no mention in this essay of the ethical attributes of action, but rather the ethical norm emerges directly from “the prophetic God-man encounter” (p. 40).

To be sure, we do find a reference in “The Lonely Man of Faith” to Imitatio Dei. But this has nothing to do with “the cognition of the attributes of action [as] the source of ethical life.” It is “aggressive, bold, victory-minded” Adam the first who in this essay by “engag[ing] in creative work tr[ies] to imitate his maker (Imitatio Dei)” (p. 15). But creativity in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” whether divine creativity or human creativity, does not possess the ethical significance accorded to it in Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham.” The fact, then, that Adam the first is driven to create in order to thereby “imitate his Maker,” cannot serve to motivate him to lead an ethical life. And, indeed, as Soloveitchik states, “Adam the first’s … conscience is energized not by the idea of the good, but by that of the beautiful. His mind is questing not for the true, but for the pleasant and functional, which are rooted in the esthetical, not the noetic-ethical sphere” (p. 15). True, Adam the first as a creator, in addition to his intellectual and esthetic creations “also displays creativity in the world of the norm.” But, as Soloveitchik immediately emphasizes, “he legislates for himself norms and laws because a dignified existence is an orderly one” (p. 15; cf. p. 58). The bottom line is that “Adam the first is always an esthete, whether engaged in an intellectual or ethical performance” (p. 15). The genuinely ethical norm does not originate in the dignified, majestic community of Adam the first, but “in the covenantal faith community” of Adam the second (p. 52). And in the emergence of this ethical norm the attributes of action play no role.34

34 Shatz, op. cit., p.330, argues, however, that “Adam the first engages in his creative activities for ethical purposes. For through these creative activities he fulfils the command of `And thou shalt walk in His ways’ (Deut. 28:9).” Shatz’s position cannot be maintained. First, though Soloveitchik, as we have seen, refers to Imitatio Dei in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” p. 15, he does not cite the verse “And thou shalt walk in His ways.” The Imitatio to which he is refers is “just as God is a Creator, so you too should be a creator.” But, as we have seen, creativity does not possess any particular ethical significance in “The Lonely Man of Faith.” He does not cite the verse “And thou shalt walk in His ways” precisely because that verse does possess great ethical significance. For it is this verse that the Sifre and, following the Sifre, Maimonides interpret to mean “Just as He is called gracious, you too be gracious; just as He is called merciful, you too be merciful.” Shatz refers to “The Lonely Man of Faith,” p. 14, where Soloveitchik asserts that Adam the first “fight[s] diseases … builds hospitals, discovers therapeutic techniques and saves lives.” But, as Soloveitchik immediately goes on to say, Adam the first does all these things in order to attain dignity, not out of some profound ethical concern for the other. Shatz ignores the Soloveitchik’s explicit claims that “Adam the first’s … conscience is energized not by the idea of the good, but by that of the beautiful. His mind is questing not for the true, but for the pleasant and functional, which are rooted in the esthetical, not the noetic-ethical sphere;” that he “is always an esthete, whether engaged in an intellectual or ethical performance;” and that the genuinely ethical norm “originates in the covenantal [faith] community [of Adam the second].” On the other hand Soloveitchik there immediately goes on to say that the realization of that norm takes place almost exclusively in the majestic community of Adam the first (p.52). Moreover, the concrete man of faith, in Soloveitchik’s view is both Adam the first and Adam the second. What we may say then

Soloveitchik’s view concerning the emergence of the ethical norm in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” then, most certainly has nothing to do with “Maimonides’ teaching concerning creation as God’s attributes of action.” It even has nothing to do with seeing “the attributes of action within an ethical context, similar to Cohen.” We have moved here far away from any Maimonideanism, or from any neo-Kantianism, or, indeed, from any combination of the two. The emphasis is on revelation, pure and simple: not a revelation grounded in theoretical scientific reason, as is the case with Maimonides; nor a revelation identical with practical, ethical reason, as is the case with Cohen; nor even a revelation unified with reason— reason’s other side of the coin, as it were— as is the case with the Soloveitchik of Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham.”

Reason and Revelation in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” and “The Lonely Man of Faith”

And yet, if in one sense Soloveitchik pries reason and revelation apart in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” in another sense he brings them together. And here we return to the point of our departure, Soloveitchik’s interpretation of the commandment to know God as set forth by Maimonides at the very beginning of the Mishneh Torah. As we saw, Soloveitchik in Halakhic Man identifies the knowledge of God with the knowledge of the attributes of action. However, both in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” and “The Lonely Man of Faith” he argues that the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4 refers to an “aboriginal experience of God.” (“The Lonely Man of Faith,” pp. 32 –33, n.*)

This aboriginal experience is characterized in both essays in very similar ways. In both essays Soloveitchik’s starting point for describing this experience is Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1.

The foundation of foundations and the pillar of all the sciences is to know (leyda`) that there is a First Existent and He brought all other existents into existence. And all the existents from heaven to earth and what is between them derive their existence only from the truth of His existence.

In “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” Soloveitchik describes the “aboriginal experience” thus:

is the following. Consider a doctor who is a man of faith, both Adam the first and Adam the second. This doctor “fight[s] diseases … builds hospitals, discovers therapeutic techniques and saves lives.” What motivates him to act thus? And what gives him the ability to act thus? Qua Adam the second, he is motivated to act thus because of his deep his ethical concern for the other, a concern deriving from the ethical norm which originates in the covenantal faith community to which he, qua Adam the second, belongs. Qua Adam the first, he is motivated to do so in order to attain a dignified existence for himself and for all who, like him, belong to the majestic community of Adam the first. But what gives him the ability and the know-how to act thus, whether his motivation is ethical concern for the other or the attaining of dignity or both, are the creative talents with which God endowed him qua Adam the first. In any event, the ethical attributes of action play no role in any of this.

It is a transcendental experience — the experience of the absolutely infinite in the midst of the temporal and bounded, the perception of the Creator in the midst of the cosmos as its source and end. (p. 133)

This knowledge [of God] is not based on logic and syllogism but is immediate in nature: the knowledge of existence as rooted in the divine, the apprehension of the cosmos as emerging out of the bosom of the infinite. … This knowledge is based upon the immediate ontological apprehension that there can be no existence without God. (p. 129, n. 4)

In a similar vein, in “The Lonely Man of Faith” Soloveitchik describes the “aboriginal experience” as consisting in “the cosmic confrontation of man and God as an experiential reality.” It is an experience whereby “God is apprehended in reality” [emphasis in original], whereby man arrives in an immediate fashion at the realization that “the most elementary existential awareness as a subjective `I exist’ and an objective `The world around me exists’ awareness is unattainable as long as the ultimate reality of God is not part of that awareness.” Here too Soloveitchik maintains that this knowledge of God “transcends the bounds of the abstract logos and passes over into the realm of the boundless intimate and impassioned experience where postulate and deduction, discursive knowledge and intuitive thinking, conception and perception, subject and object, are one” (pp.32 –33, n. *)

Moreover, in both essays Soloveitchik further maintains that this knowledge of God is based not on the formal-mathematical scientific world of quantity, but upon the immediately apprehended qualitative, sense world. As he declares in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” precisely as a result of the halakhah’s unequivocal approval of this cosmic confrontation between man and God, it required that we recite a blessing on every cosmic phenomenon, “on the fiery rays of the setting sun and the brilliant orange and purple of the rising sun emblazoning the mountain tops, on the moon casting a pale white light, on the stars in their courses and comets sweeping in from unimaginable distances, on the rainbow in the cloud and the thunder and lightning in the gloom, on budding trees and sweet smelling flowers, on the turbulent rushing ocean, on water and bread, on the fruit of the earth and the bounty of the fields, on a healthy body created in wisdom, its muscles and sinews, on the ability to sit, stand, and rise” (p. 135). Similarly, in “The Lonely Man of Faith” he insists that the image of God is to be found in “every beam of light, in every bud and blossom, in the morning breeze and the stillness of a starlit evening” (p. 17). In a word, in both essays it is the “the irresistibly fascinating qualitative world” (“The Lonely Man of Faith,” p. 17) that provides the stage for the cosmic confrontation between God and man.

In both essays Abraham, in good Maimonidean fashion, serves as the paradigm of the individual who has a cosmic encounter with God. He was the first “who pursued the image of the Creator in the lanes of the cosmos” (“U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” p. 136),

“who sought out and discovered God in the star-lit heavens of Mesopotamia” (“The Lonely Man of Faith,” p. 32).35

Finally, in both essays Soloveitchik insists that this natural, cosmic religious experience, despite its “aboriginal” quality, despite “its importance, greatness and power is insufficient” (“U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” p. 137). Ultimately, the deepest and most pressing longings and needs of the man of faith can be provided for only by a revelational religious experience, that is, can be satisfied only if “God in His infinite wisdom arrange[s] for [an] apocalyptic-covenantal meeting with man.”

Yet, the relationship between the rational, cosmic religious experience and the revelational, covenantal religious experience is constructed very differently in the two essays. In “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” though Soloveitchik does contrast the “relative, bounded, limited scientific experience” and the transcendental, unbounded, rational religious experience (p. 133) the fundamental contrast he draws in the essay is between the rational religious experience itself and the revelational, covenantal religious experience. These two experiences are fundamentally opposed to one another, though the whole point of the essay is to argue that in the final stage of a person’s religious development the opposition can be overcome. This is not the place for a full analysis, but let us briefly list some of the contrasts that Soloveitchik draws between the two experiences in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham.”

1. In the rational religious experience man seeks God in the ordered, structured, lawful cosmos. In the revelational religious experience man is sought out by God from out of the midst of a torn crisis-laden existence. (pp.141-144) 36

2. The God of the cosmic experience, the God of creation, is the sekhel ha-ne`elam, the concealed intellect, the object of man’s cognitive desire. The God of the revelational religious experience, the God of Sinai, is the rezon ha-ne`elam, the concealed will, who imposes upon man a specific mode of life, who demands of him unlimited obedience and absolute submission. Revelation is primarily revelation of the Law. (p. 146)

3. The cosmic religious experience is consequently an experience of freedom, of expansion, testifying to the greatness and reach of man’s spirit. The revelational religious experience is an experience of necessity, of compulsion, of being imposed upon by God. (pp. 150-154)

4. Finally: Flowing from the above, the rational religious experience affirms man’s identity as a cultural being; indeed, it may be seen as an expression — as the highest expression — of man’s cultural creativity. The revelational religious experience, by contrast, is “unrelated to the free creative spirit of man, and is unconcerned with cultural creativity in all its unfolding.” (pp. 151-154)

35 For the most recent study of Maimonides’ conception(s) of Abraham, see Masha Turner, “The Patriarch Abraham in Maimonides’ Thought” [in Hebrew], The Faith of Abraham in the Light of Interpretations throughout the Ages, edited by M. Hallamish, H. Kasher, and Y. Silman (Ramat Gan, 2002), pp. 143-154.36 Cf. “Majesty and Humility,” Tradition 17:2 (1978): 32-33.

In “The Lonely Man of Faith,” however, both the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience and the revelational, covenantal religious experience characterize Adam the second, not Adam the first. To be sure, Adam the second finds this “aboriginal,” cosmic religion inadequate, and he, therefore, turns to meet God “at a personal covenantal level” (p. 32). But this is not the fundamental contrast Soloveitchik draws in this essay. The fundamental contrast he draws is between the revelational, covenantal religious experience of Adam the second and the cultural, philosophical, “pure rational religious awareness” of Adam the first (p. 59).

This “purely rational religious awareness” is a “translated “cultural religious experience (p. 59). What appears to happen is this. The cosmic religious experience proper, an aboriginal, passionate, in-depth experience, belongs, as I just said, only to Adam the second. Adam the first borrows “some component parts” from this transcendental, aboriginal experience, and he “translates” them into cultural religious categories (p. 59). He does this “in order to endow the whole cultural gesture with intrinsic worth and ultimate and unconditioned validity” (p. 59). But, as Soloveitchik emphasizes, the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience of Adam the second — much less his covenantal, revelational religious experience — can never be wholly translated into cultural categories (pp. 60-61).

In sum, in “The Lonely Man of Faith” the “aboriginal” cosmic religious experience is much more tightly linked to the revelational religious experience than is the case in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” where Soloveitchik sharply distinguishes between the two. Conversely, the “aboriginal” cosmic religious experience in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” is much more tightly linked to man’s cultural world than is the case in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” where it is only the “translated” cosmic religious awareness that belongs to that world.

Why is this so? Let me tentatively suggest the following.

In “The Lonely Man of Faith” the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience of Adam the second is a receptive experience. In this respect this “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience differs sharply from the scientific experience of Adam the first, which is creative in nature. As Soloveitchik states:

Adam the second does not apply the functional method invented by Adam the first. He does not create a world of his own. Instead he wants to understand the living “given” world into which has been cast. …While Adam the first is dynamic and creative, transforming sense data into thought constructs, Adam the second is receptive [emphasis added] and beholds the world in its original dimensions. (p. 17)

However, though Soloveitchik does not make the contrast explicit, this “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience of Adam the second differs precisely in the same way from the “translated” cosmic religious awareness of Adam the first. For Adam the first’s

“translated” cosmic religious awareness, like his functional scientific approach, is also a creative process.

The creative cultural consciousness pick[s] out from the flow of transient impressions, abstract constructs and ideas, those bits that point toward the infinite and the eternal. From these elements it construct[s] a pure rational religious awareness in order to endow the whole creative cultural gesture with intrinsic worth and with ultimate and unconditional validity. (emphasis added) (p. 59)

But if the receptive “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience of Adam the second differs from both Adam the first’s creative, “translated” cosmic religious awareness and his creative functional scientific approach to reality because it is receptive and they are creative, it resembles, in its receptive quality, the covenantal revelational religious experience of Adam the second, which is also an experience of receptivity. This covenantal revelational religious experience is an experience of receptivity in two senses. First, it is God who takes the initiative here, who divests Himself of His cosmic transcendental inaccessibility and establishes a personal relationship with Adam the second. And second, Adam the second acknowledges that a self-legislated norm cannot be redemptive and consequently accepts the divine norm that comes from the outside. In this latter sense the covenantal revelational religious experience is an experience of submission, of being commanded and subjected to an imposed discipline (pp. 24-26, 54).37 In sum, the line dividing Adam the first from Adam the second is precisely the line dividing creativity from receptivity.38

However, in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience, though it discovers God’s traces in the qualitative sense world, is primarily a dynamic active experience that derives from man’s free, creative spirit. It therefore can be seen as an integral, nay the most exalted, component of man’s cultural gesture, as the most sublime of his aesthetic, ethical, and cognitive achievements, for do not they as well derive from that same free, creative spirit. Indeed, though the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience as described in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” cannot be reduced to a pure rational religious awareness, it, nevertheless, possesses a noetic quality lacking in the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience as described in “The Lonely Man of Faith.” For in the latter essay Adam the second seeks to establish, through the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience, an intimate relationship with a personal God who trails him

37 And yet, as Soloveitchik insists, this moment of submission in Adam the second’s covenantal revelational religious experience gives rise, in dialectical fashion, to a moment of self-assertion. For, so Soloveitchik contends, though the ethico-moral law must come from outside man if it is to be redemptive, it must also be freely and fully accepted by him if it is to be valid; and this acceptance makes man God’s partner in the covenant, indeed almost His equal. (“The Lonely Man of Faith,” pp.29-30, especially, p.29, note**) This contention, which Soloveitchik presents with great eloquence, could have easily led into a discussion of halakhic creativity, similar to those found in Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham.” . But, for reasons that I cannot enter into in the present context, Soloveitchik did not avail himself of this possibility.38 I have presented the different types of experiences Soloveitchik sets forth in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” and “The Lonely Man of Faith” — scientific, philosophical, and religious— in the form of a chart that should enable the reader to take in both the similarities and the differences between the two essays at a glance. See the Endnote.

“like an everlasting shadow” (p. 17). However, in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” as we saw, man in the cosmic religious experience searches for the hidden intellect whose presence he discerns hidden within every aspect of the cosmic order. For all these reasons the cosmic religious experience in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” though it is an “aboriginal” and not a “translated” experience, is nevertheless fundamentally different from the covenantal, revelational religious experience which, to begin with, is an experience not of freedom but of necessity, not of creativity but of receptivity, not of dynamic expansion but of compulsion and contraction. In a word, the “aboriginal” cosmic religious experience in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” belongs to the varied and dazzling cultural edifice constructed by man’s free creative spirit, and it thereby fundamentally differs from and is opposed to the revelational religious experience.

Having ascertained the similarities and differences between the “aboriginal” cosmic religious experience as described in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” and as described in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” I must now seek to determine the validity of the Maimonidean pedigree claimed for it in both essays.

Of course, Soloveitchik is well aware of the fact that the modern, post-Kantian approach to the question of the knowledge of God differs from the medieval approach espoused by Maimonides among others. As he states, “Both the medieval and early modern philosophers expressed the search for infinity and eternity in an objective form, through demonstrative proofs, which, in their view, possessed logical validity. The new [post -Kantian] approach denies the logical-objective value of these proofs…. It declares that we cannot use categories that have emerged out of contingent, finite, and temporal being to demonstrate the truth of infinite, absolute, eternal being” (“U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” p. 127). However, as he goes on to say, the modern approach “rather than simply dismissing entirely the proofs [for the existence of infinite, absolute, eternal being], affirmed them as giving expression to immediate experiences not based on logical inference” (p. 128). And this last point provides Soloveitchik the wherewithal to characterize the transcendental, cosmic approach to God he describes in both essays as being genuinely Maimonidean. For, as he argues in both essays, the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4, unlike the medieval approach, is not based on any proofs, on any form of indirect knowledge, but, in good modern fashion, expresses an immediate, “aboriginal” awareness of God. (“U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” p. 129, n. 4; “The Lonely Man of Faith,” p. 32, n*)

This claim, while suggestive and not without merit, cannot, in my view, ultimately be sustained. True, Soloveitchik is correct in noting that Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4, does not advance any proof for God’s existence; and only in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:5 “does he introduce the Aristotelian cosmological proof of the unmoved mover” (“The Lonely Man of Faith,” pp. 32-33, n*). However, as Zev Harvey has noted,39 Maimonides’ assertion in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4 that

39 Harvey, “The Mishneh Torah as a Key to the Secrets of the Guide,” Me’ah She`arim: Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky, edited by E. Fleischer, G. Blidstein, C. Horowitz, and B. Septimus (Jerusalem, 2001), pp. 19-22.

All the existents from heaven to earth and what is between them derive their existence only from the truth of [God’s] existence; [and] if one were to suppose that He does not exist then nothing else could exist

corresponds to his claim in Guide 1:69 that God is the formal cause of the world. As Maimonides explains there:

One should …consider that just as every existent thing endowed with a form is what it is in virtue of its form, there subsists the same relation between the deity and the totality of the remote principles of existence. For the universe exists in virtue of the existence of the Creator, and the latter continually endows it with permanence in virtue of the thing that is spoken of as overflow…. Accordingly if the non-existence of the Creator were supposed, all that exists would likewise be non-existent; and the essence of its remote causes, of its ultimate effects, and of that which is between these, would be abolished.

The similarity between the two passages cannot be denied. But one also cannot deny that this conception of God and his relationship with the world, as described in Guide 1:69, is a strictly philosophical and scientific conception, involving such categories as form, overflow, remote principles of existence —all of which are every far from being known in immediate or “aboriginal” fashion.

But perhaps Soloveitchik has a fallback position. Granted that the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4 does not express an immediate, “aboriginal” awareness of God. But, as we saw, Soloveitchik maintains that the modern approach though “it denies the logical-objective value of the proofs” for the existence of God, “affirms them as giving expression to immediate experiences not based on logical inference.” Could he not say, then, that though the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by him in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” and “The Lonely Man of Faith” is not identical with the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4, the former is a legitimate modern translation and updating of the latter?

Of course, there can be no clear-cut answer to such a question. I think it is fair to say, though, that the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by Soloveitchik in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” has a better claim to be a legitimate modern translation and updating of the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4 than does the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by Soloveitchik in “The Lonely Man of Faith.” As we saw, man, in the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by Soloveitchik in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” searches for the hidden intellect whose presence he discerns hidden within every aspect of the cosmic order. In this respect, then, this experience possesses a noetic quality similar to the noetic quality possessed by the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4. On the other hand, as we saw, the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience as described in “The Lonely Man of Faith” lacks this noetic quality.

For Adam the second in his “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience is not searching for the hidden intellect, but rather attempting to establish an intimate relationship with a personal God (pp.17, 30-31). And while the hidden intellect of “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” bears more than a passing resemblance to Maimonides’ God as the formal cause of the world, the same cannot be said for the personal God of “The Lonely Man of Faith.”

Moreover, the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by Soloveitchik in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” possesses, as we saw, an active, dynamic quality. In this respect as well it resembles Maimonides’ conception of the knowledge of God, since, in Maimonides’ view, all knowledge consists of a movement from potentiality to actuality.By contrast, the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience as described in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” is, as we saw, purely receptive in nature and lacks that quality of activity characterizing knowledge in the Maimonidean sense.

Finally, even though Soloveitchik in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” contrasts the “relative, bounded, limited scientific experience” and the transcendental, unbounded, rational religious experience, he does argue there, as we saw, that this rational religious experience can be seen as an integral, nay the most exalted, component of man’s cultural gesture, as the most sublime of his aesthetic, ethical, and cognitive achievements. In this latter respect, at least, this transcendental, unbounded, rational religious experience does resemble the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4, inasmuch as that knowledge, for Maimonides, is integrally related to all the sciences, indeed is “the pillar of all the sciences.” Again, by contrast, in “The Lonely Man of Faith” a very sharp dividing line separates—in strikingly un-Maimonidean fashion—the “aboriginal,” cosmic religious experience from all of man’s cultural and scientific activities.

I do not wish to push the resemblance between “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by Soloveitchik in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” and the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4 too far. As Soloveitchik emphasizes time and again, the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God is a product of man’s free, creative, personal spirit. But, as a number of scholars have emphasized correctly, for Maimonides knowledge in general and certainly knowledge of God, is characterized by impersonality, necessity, and objectivity.40 This striking contrast notwithstanding, I think it is fair to conclude that the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by Soloveitchik in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” unlike the “aboriginal,” cosmic experience of God described by him in “The Lonely Man of Faith,” may with some justice be viewed as a legitimate modern translation and updating of the knowledge of God described by Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:1-4.

What, then, to sum up, can we say about the relationship between reason and revelation in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” and “The Lonely Man of Faith” and the role that Maimonidean concepts play in them?40 See Harvey, “Some Observations on Rabbi Soloveitchik and Maimonidean Philosophy,” p.99; Shatz, op. cit., pp. 317, and, especially, 339, note 28; and Eliezer Goldman’s review of David Hartman’s Torah and Philosophic Quest, Daat 1(1977): 143-144. Of course, the influence of Cohen on Soloveitchik regarding this matter is evident.

With reference to the first question, my analysis appears to have given rise to a perhaps paradoxical conclusion. Regarding the relationship between the “aboriginal” cosmic religious experience and the covenantal revelational religious experience: In “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” Soloveitchik sharply contrasts these two experiences, thereby appearing to pry reason and revelation apart, while in “The Lonely Man of Faith” he links these two experiences—describing them both as receptive and ascribing them both to Adam the second— thereby appearing to blur or, at least, soften the distinction between reason and revelation. Regarding the authority of the ethical moral norm, however, the reverse holds true. Soloveitchik in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” argues that the attributes of action serve as the ground of the ethical life and, in that connection, he further argues that “there is no difference between the revealed law and the ontological law but by [human] perception. The ontological law, demonstrated in the existence of creation, makes itself known to man as a revealed commandment.” Such a position, as we have seen, would appear, if anything to collapse the distinction between reason and revelation. In “The Lonely Man of Faith,” however, the attributes of action play no role, and Soloveitchik grounds the authority of the ethical-moral norm solely in revelation. This position would appear to heighten the distinction between reason and revelation.

With reference to the second question, my conclusion is more straightforward. In Soloveitchik’s analyses in “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham” of the rational religious experience and the attributes of action Maimonidean concepts, to be sure in a modified and transformed fashion, have an important role to play. On the other hand, despite its extensive citations from Maimonides’ writings, “The Lonely Man of Faith,” with its sharp separation of the world of faith from that of science and culture and its elimination of the attributes of action as the source of the ethical life, leaves Maimonidean concepts— not to mention neo-Kantian ones—far behind. What we have in the latter essay, then, is a move in the direction of a revelation based religious existentialism characteristic of Kierkegaard and Barth,41 though Soloveitchik, unlike them, does acknowledge that the two genuine faith experiences, the “aboriginal” cosmic religious experience and the covenantal revelational religious experience, can be partially translated into cultural categories (pp. 60-62). I wonder how those ardent anti-rationalists, Kierkegaard and Barth, would feel to find themselves in the company of Maimonides, that equally ardent rationalist. And how would Maimonides feel to find himself in their company? Certainly they would all be surprised. Would they be dismayed as well?

41 Shatz, op. cit., p. 307, draws a similar comparison, but has Leibowitz in the place of Barth. Revelation, however, doesn’t play nearly as important a role in Leibowitz’s thought as it as it does in that of Soloveitchik—if, indeed, it plays any role in his thought at all! The key categories of Leibowitz’s thought are (“bad”) anthropocentric religion and (“good”) theocentric religion. On the other hand, certainly the cultural, philosophical, “pure rational religious awareness” of Adam the first is a particularly striking form of an anthropocentric religion, while the revelational, covenantal religious experience of Adam the second is an equally striking form of a theocentric religion. An even more significant dividing line, then, between Soloveitchik and Leibowitz may be the difference between Soloveitchik’s personal God, the God whom Adam the second encounters in the course of his revelational, covenantal religious experience, and the remote, transcendent, impersonal God of Leibowitz, the God whom one worships solely on account of His sublimity, without any hope of a reward. It goes without saying, that Leibowitz’s God and the God of Maimonides’ Guide bear a close family resemblance, while the personal God of “The Lonely Man of Faith” is —at best! —just a distant cousin.

*****

To circle back to our point of departure: Certainly Soloveitchik, in a Santayana like fashion, “sins” in adopting and transforming the thought of Maimonides to his own uses. But — regarding the issues discussed in this paper— I believe that in the case of Halakhic Man and “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham,” this adaptive and transforming process constitutes a “legitimate absorption” on Soloveitchik’s part of what he finds “nutritive” in Maimonides’ philosophy. I am not so sure the same holds true for his use of Maimonides in “The Lonely Man of Faith.”

What lesson, if any, may we draw from all this? I suppose the old lesson that in judging the influence of philosopher a on philosopher b, we — that is, we scholars— should not be mislead by how often b cites, invokes, or appeals to texts, terms, and concepts from the writings of a. What always remains to be determined and must be determined is to what extent do these texts, terms, and concepts preserve at least some measure of their original meaning and force? To what extent do they play a significant explanatory role in the thought of the philosopher citing, invoking, or appealing to them? As I say, it’s an old lesson, one we all know. But—alas! — we do not always keep it in mind.42

Endnote “The Lonely Man of Faith” “U-Viqqashtem mi-Sham

Scientific Abstract world of Same as “The Lonely Man of Faith”

42 See my essay, “Kabbalistic Motifs in the Thought of Rabbi Soloveitchik: Substantial or Ornamental?” [in Hebrew], Emunah bi-Zemanim Mishtanim, pp.75-94.

experience quantity; product of man’s creative cultural consciousness; Adam the first

“Translated,” pure rational religious awareness

Creative cultural consciousness; picks out elements that point to the infinite; Adam the first

Not discussed

Aboriginal,”Cosmic religiousExperience

Genuine living experience; God found in the qualitative sense world; receptive in nature; search for the mysterious fascinating personal God; distinct from creative cultural gesture; Adam the second

Genuine living experience; God found in the qualitative sense world; dynamic, active, creative yearning; noetic quality deriving from search for God as hidden Intellect; part of the creative cultural gesture

Revelational, covenantal experience

Receptive in nature; revelation of the Law; distinct from creative cultural gesture; Adam the second

Same as “The Lonely Man of Faith”

Double dividing lines indicate demarcation between creative and receptive experiences