Specifying autobiographical information alters emotion activation, but not the way you think it does…

Pierre PhilippotUniversité de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique

www.ecsa.ucl.ac.be/personnel/philippot/

Theoretical background - I

Personal memories comprise differents types of information that are stored separatly– Emotional information (non declarative)– Contextual and factual information

(declarative)

(Brewin, 2001; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Leventhal, 1984; Philippot et al., 2003; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993)

Theoretical background - II

Personal memories can be reactivated through – Direct retrieval– Generative retrieval

(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000)

Theoretical background - III

Activation of emotional information arouses the corresponding emotional state.

Emotional arousal might disrupt high level cognitive processes such as those required for AM generative retrieval:– Yerkes-Dodson law– Automatic attentional biases– Automatic conceptual priming

Hypothesis : high level cognitive processes inhibit emotional arousal.

Theoretical background – IV

It follows from the above rationale that volontarily specifying AM should inhibit emotional arousal.

However, there is a commonly shared belief that the opposite is true.

Study 1Philippot, Douilliez & Ramon, 2003

Naive theories regarding how specifying of AM might alter emotion

Hypothesis

Do people hold the naive theory that: « specifying AM leads to an increase in emotional arousal »?

Study 1:Method

Participants– 94 students (57 women and 37 men), aged between 18 and 32.

Procedure– Participants were asked :

1. to imagine that they were thinking either in a specific or in a general way for 10 minutes about a positive and a negative AM.

2. to report how the intensity of their emotional feeling would evolve, minute after minute on a ten point scale.

3. to qualify the emotional profile of the event on the Differential Emotion Scale (DES).

Figure 1.Evolution of Emotional Intensity as a Function of Mode of Thinking about Worries

Time (minutes)

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Study 2Philippot & Verhasselt, 2002

Naive theories regarding

how specifying of AM might alter emotion:

Comparison of normal versus clinical samples

Hypothesis

Do people suffering from anxiety disorders hold a different naïve theory than people exempt from any emotional disorder, especially for negative emotion?

Study 2:Method

Participants– 18 out-patients (10 women and 8 men) diagnosed with an anxiety

disorder according to the DSM IV criteria (APA, 1994) aged between 20 and 56 (Mean: 42.94, S.D.: 10.02).

– A control sample of 26 individuals (14 women and 12 men), aged between 22 and 55 (Mean: 39.08, S.D.: 11.29).

Procedure– Participants were asked :

1. to imagine that they were thinking for 10 minutes about a positive and a negative personal event.

2. to report how the intensity of their emotional feeling would evolve, minute after minute on a ten point scale.

3. to qualify the emotional profile of the event on the Differential Emotion Scale (DES).

Study 2:Results

Manipulation check :– Anxious patients and controls did not differ regarding

the emotional profile and intensity of the events considered.

Figure 1.Evolution of Emotional Intensity as a Function of Diagnostic Status and Event Valence

Positive Event

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Study 3Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, In press, Emotion

General versus Specific AM priming during emotion induction

Method

Participants : 45 students

Diary for 12 consecutive days– the strongest negative event and an average

intensity negative event– description of the event, emotional labelling,

and intensity rating

Method II

Procedure:– Imagery training

– AM recollection

– Distraction task

– Relaxation (60”)

– Priming (60”)

– Re-experience in imagery (20”)

• S-ABM Condition : priming of S-AM

• G-ABM Condition : priming of G-AM

• Control Condition : semantic task

– Intensity rating of emotion felt during imagery

Study 3: Results

3 (Condition) x 2 (Time) Anova– Main effect of Time,

F(1,44)=10.70, p <.005

– Main effect of Condition, F(2,88)=3.57, p <.05

– Interaction,F(2,88)=5.12, p <.01

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ControlS-AMG-AM

Study 4Schaefer, Collette, Philippot, et al, (2003). NeuroImage, 18, 938-949.

Schematic vs. propositional processing of emotional information during induction.

Method- IDesign

– Schematic vs. propositional processing• Schematic: mentally repeating metaphoric sentences• Propositional: mentally repeating specific appraisals

– Emotion (Anger, Sadness, Happiness, Affection, Neutral)

Measures– Feeling state quality (DES) & intensity– Heart Rate & Skin Conductance– H2

150-PET camera

Method- IISubjects

– 21 right-handed male volunteers

Procedure– Prior training session– Experimental session

• 10 standardized scripts, in a random order

Method- III

Trial

Time (s.)

Event

Measures Subj.Int. Physio. PET

Relaxation Imagery

0” 60” 0” 70”

Results: Subjective Feeling Intensity

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Anger Sadness Joy Tender. Neutral

Schematic

PropositionalCondition:F(1, 20)=161.73, p<.0001

Emotion:F(4, 80)=80.97, p<.0001

Condition X Emotion:F(4, 80)=45.08, p<.0001

Results: Heart Rate Changes

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Schematic

Propositional

Condition:F(1, 18)=4.63, p<.05

Emotion:F(4, 72)=5.28, p<.001

Condition X Emotion:F(4, 72)=4.21, p<.004

Schematic versus Propositional mode of processing

Ventromedial prefontal cortex

Propositional versus Schematic mode of processing

Anterolateral prefontal cortex

Etude 5Philippot, Baeyens & Burgos, 2002

Specific versus General Processing of Anxious Predictions

Method

Sixty students were placed in a state of anxious apprehension.

They were randomly distributed in three conditions– specific processing of anxious information– general processing of anxious information– no processing.

Participants filled in the DES and the STAI before and after the manipulation

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ControlGeneralSpecific

AnxietyIntensity

Interaction: F(2,57)=28.68, p<.000, 2= .45

Anxiety Evolution as a Function of Experimental Condition

Study6Philippot, Douilliez & Ramon, 2003

Reappraisal versus Specific versus General Processing of Anxious Predictions

Method

Sixty-nine students were placed in a state of anxious apprehension.

They were randomly distributed in three conditions– Specification of the worst fears in the situation– Positive reappraisal of the situation. – General processing of anxious information

Participants filled in the STAI before and after the manipulation

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Anxiety Pre-test Anxiety Post-test

ReappraisalGeneralSpecific

STAI

Interaction: F(2,66)=3.78, p<.03, 2= .10

Anxiety Evolution as a Function of Experimental Condition

Conclusions

People share a naive theory stating that specifying personal information increases emotional arousal

However, manipulating the processing of personal information shows that the opposite is true– For present as well as for past (AM) information– With many different operationalizations of this manipulation

This gap between naive theory and empirical evidence might constitute a maintenance factor for emotional disorders.

Subjective Feeling Intensity as a Function of Emotion and Cognitive Processing condition

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