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Second Kharkov, May 1942:A Case Study in Failed PlanningBy Paul Youde

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Karelian and Crimea regions. Hisfinal directive on the matter read:

Simultaneously with the shift toa[n overall] static defense, I foreseethe conduct of local offensiveoperations along a number ofaxes to fortify the success of thewinter campaign, to improve theoperational situation, to seize

the strategic initiative and todisrupt German preparationsfor their summer offensive.That decision reflected Stalins

general strategic and operationalphilosophy during that period of thewar. That is, he felt certain it would bethe application of offensive force inmany sectors at once, or perhaps in

rapid succession, which would prove tobe the quickest and most certain wayto defeat the Germans. He believedthat German forces, after their retreatduring the previous winter, were stillexhausted and logistically overextended.That, in his mind, justified the decisionfor further attacks. Gen. AleksandrM. Vasilevsky, at that time in 1942the head of Soviet armored forces,later remarked that Stalins decision

to defend and attack simultaneouslyturned out to be the most vulnerableaspect of the [1942 Soviet] plan.

At about that same time the Germanhigh command, after considerabledebate, decided their forces in theeastno longer strong enough to attackall along the front as they had the yearbeforewould resume the offensive inearly summer with their primary axisof advance in the south. In general, inFuehrer Directive 41,Hitler establishedthe two objectives for the upcomingsummer campaign as being to conclu-sively destroy the Soviet armed forcesand to deprive the Soviets of the resourc-es necessary to continue the war.

He chose the codename OperationBlue for the new offensive, therebyreverting to the color-title systemunder which the stunning 1940 victoryover France had been won (OperationYellow). More particularly, he alsodirected thatArmy Group Southwouldadvance through the Donets Riverbasin (thereby immediately denying theSoviets an area rich in natural resources

and industry) to Stalingrad and thenturn south to the vital (for both sides)oilfields of the Caucasus. He believedthe open terrain of the southern steppeswould allow the German Armys tacti-cally superior panzer and motorisedinfantry formations to destroy theSoviets opposing them in large encircle-ment battles even more decisively thanhad been done the previous year.

The consequence of Stalins defend-and-attack strategy therefore meant anypre-emptive or local offensive actionsin the south would be opposed by the

Germans most combat-effective forma-tions, which were preparing for theirown much more massive operation.In early March, then, even as the lastembers of the Soviet winter offensivewere extinguishing themselves in themud, Stalin went ahead and orderedhis front commanders to preparean appreciation of the operationalsituation in their respective sectorsand to propose local offensive actionsfor the spring and early summer.

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Southwestern Direction

In the Kharkov region that taskfell to the Southwestern Direction(theater of operations) Military Council,consisting of Direction CommanderMarshal Semyon K. Timoshenko; Chiefof the Directions Operational Group,Lt. Gen. Hovhannes K. Bagramian; andDirection Military Commissar NikitaS. Krushchev. On the 22ndthey sent

their appreciation (Report No. 00137/op) to Moscow. The report stated:

As a result of a series ofoperations involving attacks onimportant and vital enemy axes,Southwestern Direction Frontshave seized the initiative, inflictedsevere losses on the enemy, andliberated significant territory fromthe German-Fascist occupiers...At the same time our forcesoccupied a rather favourableposition for developing an attackon Kharkov. Only insufficientnumbers and means preventedus from fully exploiting ourachieved success to finally defeatthe main enemy group in thesouth and secure Kharkov.

The optimism and confidence inher-ent in the tone of that report reflectedthe Southwestern Directionsrecentrun of success. In November 1941 itsforces defeated the Germans at Rostovand, in January 1942, they established

the Barvenkovo bridgehead across theDonets River to the south of Kharkov.Their most recent success, albeit morelimited in nature than the earlier one,came at the beginning of March when38thArmyestablished another bridge-head across the Donets, this time to theeast of Kharkov. (Even so, a subsequentattack by Southwest Fronts6thArmyinthe Balakleya area failed to eliminatethe German bridgehead on the easternside of that same river, and that failurewas to prove costly once the new SovietKharkov offensive was underway.) In the

reports evaluation of the enemy and hisprobable intentions, its principal author(Bagramian) expressed the view that:

As a consequence of completedand ongoing offensive operations,we have succeeded in disruptingenemy forces normal operations,forcing him to expend not onlyall his operational reserves, butalso to fragment his divisionsin the first line of defense, rightdown to separate battalions inorder to localize our success.

The report also noted the build up ofenemy reserves, including a significantnumber of tanks, in the areas oppositeSouth Front. In line with the alreadyofficially accepted (and therefore doctri-nal) truth the Germans were certain toattack Moscow that summer, Bagramianspeculated about those panzers:

It is probable that, together withfrontal attacks against the WesternFront, the enemy will attemptto envelope Moscow from thesouth and southeast with largemoto-mechanized formationsattacking from the Bryansk andGomel regions to reach the VolgaRiver in the Gorki region and

isolate Moscow from the most vitalindustrial and economic centersin the Volga and Ural regions.

The report also outlined the probablegoals of the expected enemy secondaryoffensive in the south as being:

an offensive by large enemy forcesbetween the Northern Donets Riverand the Taganrog Gulf to securethe lower Don and subsequentlythe Caucasus oil fields. This attackwill probably be accompanied byan offensive against Stalingrad

by a secondary force groupingand by amphibious operationsfrom the Crimea against theCaucasian coast of the Black Sea.

Bagramians assumptions concerningthe direction of the German offensivein the south were startlingly close to thepath the German high command wasintending to take in Operation Blue.Though he guessed correctly aboutthe direction, he was wrong aboutthe relative strength of the blow theGermans were planning to land onthe Soviets in the south. In the part ofthe report dealing with the immediatestrategic aims of Southwestern Directionoperations, Bagramian boldly declared:

According to all indicators,spring should be characterizedby a renewal of extensive enemyoffensive actions. Irrespectiveof this, during the period ofthe spring-summer campaign,Southwestern Directionforces must strive to achieve the

principle strategic aim to defeatthe opposing enemy forces andreach the middle Dnepr River(Gomel, Kiev and Cherkassy) and

Semyon Timoshenko,Southwest Direction Commander

Destroyed german tanks after second battle in Kharkov, May 1942.

continued on page 12

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A captured and repaired Pz.38(t) tank on its way to a Soviet line unit.

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Armor Organization

By the start of the Second Battle

of Kharkov the organization of the tank

(panzer) formations used by both sides had

changed markedly since the outbreak of

the German-Soviet War the year prior.

The SovietsThe Soviets at the beginning of the war

formed their tanks into divisions; however,

those units proved vastly inferior to their

German counterparts and were destroyed in

the frontier battles of June and July 1941.

For the remainder of that year the largest

tank formations the Soviets employed were

brigades. In March 1942, in recognition of the

need to return to fielding larger mechanized

units, they experimented with mechanized

corps each containing three brigades. In

mid-April Stavkaordered the creation of tank

corps consisting of three tank brigades and a

motorised rifle brigade along with supporting

mortar and reconnaissance battalions.

A spring 1942 tank corps tank brigade

consisted of 46 tanks formed into two

battalions with 5xKV heavy tanks, 8xT-34

medium tanks and 10xT-60 light tanks in each,

along 8x82mm mortars, 6x14.7cm anti-tank

rifles and 4x37mm anti-aircraft guns, all

with an established strength of 1,471 men.

A tank corps motorised rifle brigade had

an established strength of 3,152 men with

12x76mm guns, 4x120mm mortars, 30x82mm

mortars, 12x37mm anti-aircraft guns, 12x45mm

anti-tank guns and 54x12.7cm anti-tanks rifles.

The motorised riflemen were supposed to

be transported in trucks, but due to the ongoing

shortage of those vehiclesAnglo-American

Lend Lease hadnt yet kicked inmany of

them rode on the tops of the tanks to get to

the battlefield and then dismounted. That

lack of independent mobility for the riflemen

meant the tanks were more easily separated

from their support in combat, leaving them

vulnerable to enemy attack and counterattack.

farther to a front from Cherkassythrough Pervomaisk to Nikolaev.That report to Stavkais important

because it reveals not only the inten-tions of the Southwestern DirectionMilitary Council, but also theiroptimism and confidence, whichwas built on their recent success.The reports assertion SouthwesternDirectioncould not only halt the

upcoming German offensive in thesouth, but at the same time throwback those German forces beyond theDnepr, demonstrates that thinking.

Recently, post-Soviet Russianhistorians have emphasized the politi-cal aspect of the councils decision topropose such an ambitious offensive:pleasing Stalin. He wanted to attack theGermans as soon as possible, and themembers of the council were therefore

going to give him such an attack. AsCommissar Khrushchev remarked:The Supreme High Commander,Stalin himself, had assigned the frontthat mission and [hed declared] that itwas already a guaranteed success.

Plan Approved

The Southwestern DirectionMilitary Council met with Stalin

The GermansThe Germans changed the composition

of their panzer formations a number of

times throughout the war, with the overall

trend being to reduce the number of panzers

in each, while increasing the quality of

those machines as well as the amount

of infantry and other support units.

By April 1942 German panzer divisions

consisted of a panzer regiment of three panzer

battalions, with an established total strength

of 190 medium and light panzers; and two

panzer grenadier regiments, each of three

infantry battalions and one engineer battalion.

Those battalions were partly equipped with

halftrack vehicles, while the rest of the divi-

sions infantry moved in trucks. Each panzer

division also had a reconnaissance battalion

equipped with armored cars and halftracks, a

motorcycle battalion and an artillery regiment

with two battalions of 105mm howitzers

and one battalion of 150mm howitzers.

The cross-country mobility provided by

their halftracks gave the German panzer

grenadiers an advantage over Soviet truck

or tank-riding riflemen. The Germans could

therefore more easily perform combined-armstactics. They also often employed custom-

mixed ad hoccombat groups (kampfgruppen)

of panzers, reconnaissance and grenadiers

that proved to have as much combat power

as full strength Soviet rifle divisions.

That combat power enhancement was

also multiplied by the presence of a radio in

almost every vehicle in a panzer division, as

compared to their only being carried in com-

mand vehicles in their Red Army counterpart

organizations. Even though the information

age wouldnt be viewed to have begun until

after World War II ended, that greater speed

in information handling facilitated Germancombat efficiency over their opponents in the

east right up to the end of the war. The panzer

divisions greater flexibility in force composi-

tion, their superior tactical mobility, their

speed in communication, their manpowers

higher level of combined-arms training, and

their longer combat experience, all combined

to give them great advantages over Soviet

tank corps in the spring of 1942.

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and Shaposhnikov on 27 March inMoscow to present their offensiveplan. In the discussions that followed,Shaposhnikov again argued attackingin the spring would dissipate Sovietstrength and undermine the defenseof Moscow. Bagramian disagreed,stating it was better to strike before theGermans had completed reorganiz-ing for their summer offensive.

Stalin, while still wanting an

offensive in the Kharkov region,recognized he couldnt agree to transferthe number of additional formationsrequired for the Southwestern Directionsproposal. It would cancel out hisproposed offensives elsewhere alongthe front, while also possibly cruciallyweakening the defense of Moscow itself.He therefore ordered them to preparea more limited offensive proposal.

The question as to the numberof additional formations required bySouthwestern Directionin order forit to achieve success in the proposedoffensive was crucial to the outcomeof the battle as it actually came to befought. Bagramian had initially pro-posed it would require an additional 34rifle divisions, 28 tank brigades and 24artillery regiments, which Stalin rejectedin the meeting of 27 March. When theymet with Stalin again two days later,their revised additional force require-ment totalled 27 rifle divisions, ninecavalry divisions, 26 tank brigades, threemotorised rifle brigades and 25 artilleryregiments, which was again rejected.

Before the Southwestern DirectionMilitary Council left Moscow, theypresented yet another revised requestfor additional formations that amountedto 10 rifle divisions, 26 tank brigadesand 10 artillery regiments. Stalinapproved that proposal and directedthem to undertake final planning foran offensive in the Kharkov regionon that much-reduced basis.

Even if we assume Bagramiansinitial estimate of the number ofadditional formations required forthe operation was exaggerated; the

fact his second estimate was alsorejected, and only a third and muchlower estimate was accepted, leavesa question mark over the rationalefor the whole operation. The patterndemonstrated was one that degradedSoviet planning throughout this phaseof the war: once Stalin had declaredsome overarching consideration to bein place, his subordinates then wentthrough whatever machinations ofpseudo-logic were necessary in order tohew to that line. To do otherwise was to

risk their careers and possibly their lives.

Red Army Quality

Another factor to consider was thequality of the Red Army in the springof 1942. At the time the average Sovietsoldier was green, especially in compari-son to his German counterpart. Mostof the 1941 manpower of the Red Armyhad been killed, wounded or capturedby the Germans. In simple fact, thetypical soldier in the Red Army at thattime was only recently conscripted andhad little or no combat experience. Theinexperience of the average junior andnon-commissioned officers was also acause for concern. As Marshal AlexanderM. Vasilevsky would later put it:

The Soviet Army of [early] 1942was not prepared to conduct majoroffensive operations against thewell-trained German Army, simplybecause it did not have the neces-sary quantitative and qualitativeadvantage over the Wehrmacht,and because its leadership bothat command and junior officerlevel was still being rebuilt afterthe stinging defeats in 1941.

Thus the relatively inexperienced

Southwestern Directionforces weretasked to undertake an offensiveagainst a combat hardened opponentwithout the necessary overwhelmingquantity in terms of the numbersof formations needed to redressthat qualitative imbalance.

Further Debate

On 10 April the SouthwesternDirectionMilitary Council submittedits final operational plan to Stavkafor

the offensive in the Kharkov region.The plans principle aim was: tosecure the Kharkov region, [then] toconduct a force regrouping and bya subsequent attack in the directionof Dnepropetrovsk and SinelnikovoStation, deprive the enemy of importantcrossing sites over the Dnepr.

Again, just as in its earlier versions,the final plan for the Kharkov regionoffensive still ambitiously called forSouthwestern Directionforces pushingthe Germans across the Dnepr. The plandetailed the following assignments:

To achieve the establishedobjectives the basic concept ofSouthwest Front operations is asfollows: encircle and destroy the

enemy Kharkov grouping by envel-oping attacks by 6thArmy fromthe south and 28thArmy from thenorth; reach the designated posi-tions and create favorable jump-off positions for regrouping for thenext attack on Dnepropetrovskand Sinelnikovo Station. The

Soviet riflemen advancing past a wrecked Panzer soon after the start of the offensive.

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basic concept of South Frontoperations consists of creatinga deep echelon defense alongthe most important axes andconducting an active defense totie down opposing enemy forces.

The final plan met with opposi-tion from several Stavkamembers;in particular, Shaposhnikov voicedconcern about the vulnerability of the

forces attacking out of the Barvenkovobridgehead, which he described asan operational sack. He warnedthe bridgehead was vulnerable tobeing severed at its base along theDonets River via converging attacksmade by the German forces in theBalakleya bridgehead to the north andfrom the Slavyansk area in the south.Timoshenko lobbied hard for the plan,however, and personally guaranteed toStalin it would have full success. Stalinsupported his old friend against hisother advisors, and gave his permis-sion for the offensive to go ahead.

The plan also met with criticismfrom the commanders of SouthwestFrontwho were tasked with implement-ing it. Gen. Moskalenko, commander of38thArmy, objected to the fact it called

for the northern pincer to be conductedby28thArmyrather than his own force.He noted the28thhad only recently beenactivated, and as such its staffs com-mand and control ability was unknownand its logistical organization untried;whereas 38thArmywas an experiencedformation and had an establishedlogistical network. The staff of Soviet 6thArmywere also concerned about theprotection of the outer flank of their

southern pincer, which would becomelonger and more vulnerable to counter-attack the farther their forces advanced.

The Southwestern DirectionMilitaryCouncil therefore issued yet anotherrevised plan on 28 April (OperationalDirective No. 00275) incorporating anumber of alterations based on recom-mendations received from the frontcommanders. That directive still calledfor the primary attack from the south-ern bridgehead and a secondary attackfrom the northern bridgehead; however,in the south a separate flank forcefrom Soviet 6thArmywas created calledGroup Bobkin, consisting of a cavalrycorps with added tank support and tworifle divisions, to protect the southernflank of those forces advancing out ofthe southern bridgehead. At the same

time, 38thArmywas given a greaterrole in the attack out of the northernbridgehead along with28thArmy.

Bagramian later claimed theSouthwestern DirectionMilitary Councilwas particularly concerned about thepossibility of a German thrust fromSlavyansk. Even so, that concern didntstop them from weakening South Frontby transferring seven artillery regiments,three tank brigades and two rifle bri-

gades to Southwest Front. Bagramiansfinal solution to the problem of theBarvenkovo bridgeheads southernflank was, then, simply to throw it backon the South Frontcommanders. Heproposed that, as the Germans wouldhave to shift formations from othersectors opposing South Frontin orderto be able to attack the southern flankof the Barvenkovo bridgehead, thatwould free Soviet formations in thosesame sectors to move to reinforce thedefenders of the attacked southernflank. Bagramian was clearly trying topre-emptively shift the blame for anyfailure onto his South Frontcolleagues,as he was certainly aware the timeinvolved in such a redeploymentwould make his solution impractical.

A German Machinegun position near Kharkov.

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The Course of the Fighting

Eds Note: the following sidebar is

excerpted and adapted from a piece

that originally ran in issue 68.

Early Going

Initially the Soviets poured through the

German lines on 12 May. The Germans were

able to avoid a route in front of Kharkov

only by forming the same type of all-aroundstrongpoints (hedgehogs) that had broken

the back of the Soviet winter offensive.

Soviet 6thArmytore open the German

front in its sector. The Germans soon had

gaps in their line where there were simply no

units. By 15 May, Krasnograd and Taranovka

had fallen. The next day a Soviet reconnais-

sance element temporarily got within 25

miles of Army Group South headquarters

in Poltava, the scene of the historic defeat

of an earlier would-be conqueror or Russia,

Charles XII of Sweden, in the 17thcentury.

By rapidly moving 3rdand 23rdPanzer

Divisions into the breach, Gen. Paulus,

commander of German 6thArmy, was able

to halt the drive of 28thArmy some 12 miles

from Kharkov. Army Group South commander

Marshal Fedor von Bock was in a quandary

as to what to do: Paulus could barely keep his

army afloat, much less launch an immediate

counterattack. The only rescue force available

was 17thArmy, the command element that was

to constitute the southern wing of Operation

Fredericus II, the Germans own planned and

upcoming attack into the Soviet salient. Even

so, it was apparent that army would have to

be quickly reinforced. Field Marshal Ewald vonKleist was therefore hurriedly moved forward,

along with elements of his 1stPanzer Army, to

command the southern counterattack force.

The Soviets were playing into the

Germans hands in that regard, in that they

were being slow to commit their reserves.

Instead of pushing out those units far and

fast as they opened gaps in the German line,

as the Germans surely wouldve done had

the situation been reversed, they sent them

in piecemeal. One of the axioms for using

a reserve is it must not be committed too

soon or too late; the decisive moment occurs

when the weight of the reserve can alter (orculminate) the course of a battle. Sent forward

in driblets, the Soviet reserve had little impact.

At the same time, by only probing to the

south, the Soviets failed to disrupt the hurried

German preparations for a counteroffensive.

As it was, by 16 May the Soviet command

was receiving reports of the growing strength

of the enemy force assembling to the south.

They realized too late they were advancing

into what amounted to a trap about to

be sprung. The Germans launched their

counteroffensive from the south on 17 May.

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Counterattack

By the 21stthe Germans had reached the

Donets. They also sent 16thPanzer Division

toward Izyum, the main communication center

for the whole Soviet bulge. That division crossed

the river and got inside the suburbs of that town.

The larger German attack was carried out

by 3rdPanzer Corps. That force continued to

drive north, and on 22 May it linked up with 44 th

Infantry Division coming down from the north:

all the Soviets to the west were pocketed.Meanwhile, the leadership of Southwestern

Directionwere urging Stalin to call back the

whole attack, reporting to him about the German

force that was cutting into their operations

southern flank. Stalin refused to consider any

change in plan and, as a result, the Soviets

were unable to prevent the Germans from

firmly sealing off their rear. Once the cut off was

completed, however, the Southwestern Direction

command, on its own initiative, began to divert

forces to try to reopen a path into the newly

formed pocket. They deployed units from 37th

and 38thArmiesin a line to keep the Germans

from expanding their ring wall to the east,

and their plan was to have those units attack

inward as those in the pocket attacked out.

The situation was fluid, as the Germans had

little time to prepare strong positions within

the lines of their encirclement. The Soviets then

threw everything they had into the rescue and

breakout effort. The mutilation of the German

dead discovered after the battle attested to the

ruthlessness of that attack. The focal point of

the Soviet effort fell on the 101stJaeger (light

infantry) Division, which was then the only

formation standing between the Reds and a

clean getaway. At that crucial moment, however,the Soviets had no final reserve left to commit

in order to secure a breakthrough. Everything

was already committed, and none of the units

nearby proved able to disengage and move

rapidly enough to get where they were needed.

The result was a bloodbath, but by the third

day of the Soviet effort the 101ststill held, and

the Reds attack ran out of steam. The pressure

on German 6thArmy was by then also falling

off, and that force was able to add its weight

to the counterattack, which was enough to

keep the remainder of the Soviet forces away

from the breakout attempt. The rest of the

battle was little more than a German mop upoperation as the Soviet pocket was destroyed.

When the fighting was over the Germans

had bagged 22 rifle and seven cavalry divisions.

The Soviets had lost 239,000 men, 1,250 tanks

and 2,026 artillery pieces. Soviet 6th, 9thand 57th

Armieswere destroyed, and the commanders

of the first two were killed. As it turned out, it

was the last strategically significant pocket the

Germans would create during the war, though no

one wouldve predicted that at the time.

Stephen B. Patrick

A captured Soviet T-34 tank put to use by the Germans.