Standards - NERC highlights and Mintues 2013/Board_Presentations_November...•Initial scoping with...

Standards

Howard Gugel, Senior Director of Standards and EducationBoard of Trustees MeetingNovember 9, 2017

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY2

2018-2020 Reliability Standards Development Plan

• Status Posted for industry comment June 26 – July 25, 2017 NERC Standards Committee endorsed on October 18, 2017 Presented to Standards Oversight and Technology Committee

• Action Approve 2018-2020 Reliability Standards Development Plan


• Reliability Benefit Perform GMD vulnerability assessments using an enhanced GMD event Require collection of GMD-related data Require deadlines for Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) and mitigation Improved transformer thermal assessment criteria

• Action Adopt TPL-007-2

Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation


Special Assessment: Potential Bulk Power System Impacts Due to Severe Disruptions on the Natural Gas SystemPreliminary Findings

Thomas Coleman, Director, Reliability Assessment Board of Trustees MeetingNovember 9, 2017


• Aliso Canyon storage facility outage underscored risks to electric generation and potential reliability issues

• Evaluate impacts to bulk power system (BPS) reliability as a result of potential disruptions and the loss of major natural gas infrastructure facilities: Key pipeline segment outages Disruption of LNG transport operations Natural gas storage disruptions

• Collaborative effort with Argonne National Laboratory analysis on critical facilities

• Advisory group established with electric and gas research organizations

Special Assessment Scope and Drivers


Analysis Approach and Assessment Structure

• Gain better understanding of existing planning approaches

• Highlight and promote best practices

Step I: Review of Existing Studies

• Evaluate large storage facilities that are tightly coupled to electric generation (>2GW)

• Measure BPS reliability implications when storage facilities are not available

Step II: Evaluation of Gas Storage

Facilities

•Identify areas with a high density of natural gas generation

•Determine vulnerabilities and risk factors to consider in resiliency planning

Step III: Identification of

Generation Clusters


Step 1: Review of Studies


Step 1: Review of Studies – Key Findings

• Variety of concerns and region-specific challenges• Wide-area transmission impacts (voltage and thermal

constraints) due to loss of natural gas infrastructure are typically not studied; focus is generally on resource adequacy and resource availability

• Many respondents indicated that there were no natural gas storage facilities within their systems to evaluate

• Opportunity to learn from those with comprehensive resilience plans


Step II: Storage Facilities

12 storage facilities have

been identified that can impact

> 2GW of generation


Step III: Identifying Generation Risk Clusters

South CA-AZ:60 GW – 201617 GW -- Planned

East TX-OK-LA85 GW – 201628 GW – Planned

Northwest:25 GW – 20164 GW – Planned

Florida38 GW – 20165 GW – Planned

Mid-Atlantic95 GW – 201650 GW – Planned

New England11 GW – 20165 GW – Planned

Southeast55 GW – 20167 GW – Planned

* All values are approximates, various sources: EIPC, EIA-860, NERC LTRA


• Aliso Canyon and has unique characteristics than most natural gas storage facilities

• Natural gas facility disruptions have varying impacts dependent on location and infrastructure density

• NERC’s transmission simulations demonstrates operational challenges in the event of natural gas disruptions

• Demand for natural gas has altered storage dynamics• Mitigation strategies (e.g., dual fuel) can reduce potential impacts• Natural gas supply sources have become more diversified• Recent FERC Orders continue to promote coordination• Comprehensive planning by Planning Coordinators can

significantly increase resilience

Key Findings


• Regulators should consider fuel assurance mechanisms as they establish energy policy objectives

• In the event of an emergency, planning processes should include provisions for, and be prepared to, secure necessary air permit waivers

• Cyber and physical security needs should be diligently considered by regulators

• DOE should consider collecting data that quantifies dual fuel storage and seasonal on-site inventory

RecommendationsRegulators and Policy Makers


• NERC registered entities should consider the loss of key natural gas infrastructure in their planning studies

• Owners and operators of dual fuel generators must ensure operability

• Wholesale electric markets should continue to incentivize performance of natural gas fired generation

• Natural gas and electric industries should continue to advance operational coordination

RecommendationsIndustry


• NERC should consider enhancing its Reliability Guidelines and/or Reliability Standards related to transmission planning and extreme event assessments

• NERC should enhance its Generator Availability Data System (GADS) database for better granularity in generator outage causes

RecommendationsNERC


• Seeking Board of Trustees acceptance of the report, endorsement of the recommendations, and approval to publish

Next Steps


Geomagnetic Disturbance Research – Phase IIIUpdate

John Moura, Director, Reliability Assessment and System AnalysisBoard of Trustees Meeting November 9, 2017


• Initial scoping with the Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force (GMDTF) in February

• NERC’s Preliminary GMD Research Work Plan filed with FERC in May 2017 Developed by NERC, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and the

GMDTF to meet Order No. 830 objectives Reviewed by NERC Planning Committee (PC)

• On October 19, 2017, FERC issued an order accepting NERC’s preliminary plan and directing NERC to file a final plan within six months

• EPRI project management of the research work plan capitalizes on EPRI’s EMP research

Research Plan Development


• Held face-to-face meeting in September to seek partnership with industry/researchers and provide plan update

• Developed Section 1600 draft data request with NERC• Task Force is a collaboration of researchers, agencies, and

utilities North American Transmission Forum NASA, Canadian Space Agency U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada U.S. Space Weather Prediction Center U.S. National Labs Utilities from all regions in North America EPRI

GMD Task Force Update


• NERC and EPRI partnership successful in obtaining technical support from researchers

• Research project begins in November 2017 and project runs through early 2020

• Research has begun on the following two tasks: Development of a Transformer Thermal Assessment Tool (Dec 2017)o Develop an open-source tool for modeling transformer heatingo Develop tool to conduct thermal analysis for transformers

Improve Harmonics Analysis Capability (Dec 2019)o Develop guidelines and tools for use in performing system-wide assessment of

GMD-related harmonics

Research Update


• Order No. 830 includes directives for collecting data to “improve our collective understanding” of GMD risk Includes GIC and magnetometer data NERC is to make data available to the public

• Developed draft data request with input from GMDTF and NERC• PC will be asked to approve data request for 45-day industry

comment at December 2017 PC meeting• The final data request will be submitted to the PC and NERC

Board of Trustees for approval in 2018

Section 1600 Data Request


Inverter Resource Performance Task Force and Level 2 Industry Recommendation UpdateJames MerloVice President, Reliability Risk ManagementNovember 9, 2017


NERC Level 2 Alert issued 6/20/2017

• Focused on inverter-based photovoltaic resources

• Frequency and voltage performance during recent system events

• Requested information on status of controls for these resources


• Responses account for 99% of BES registered utility grade solar

Alert Responses

Manufacturers MW Responses Inverter units1 6,232 29 3,817 2 5,124 56 5,303 3 1,323 13 761 4 854 8 786 5 684 5 461 6 634 10 837 7 537 8 968 8 403 5 247 9 361 6 576

10 360 4 284 11 207 1 272 12 30 1 30 13 20 2 32 14 2 2 4

Total 16,771 150 14,378

-

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

MW

Manufacturer


• 37% or 6,244 MW were calculating frequency incorrectly• Positive response to remediation recommendations

Erroneous Frequency Calculation

Implemented Manufacturer Recommendations?MW Responses Inverter units

Yes 4,258 47 4,591 No 1,986 27 2,557 Total 6,244 74 7,148

4,258 , 68%

1,986 , 32% Yes

No


• 84% or 14,113 MW cease output during abnormal voltage• Positive response to remediation recommendations • More work needed in this area

Momentary Cessation during Abnormal Voltage

Inverter cease output during abnormal voltages?MW Responses Inverter units

Yes 14,113 119 11,821 No 2,657 31 2,557 Total 16,771 150 14,378

14,113 , 84%

2,657 , 16%

Yes

No


• Inverter Based Resource Performance Task Force (IRPTF)• Reliability Guideline: Inverter-Based Resource Performance• http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Inverter-Based-

Resource-Performance-Task-Force.aspx• http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Pages/1200-MW-Fault-

Induced-Solar-Photovoltaic-Resource-Interruption-Disturbance-Report.aspx

• http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Pages/Alerts.aspx

Way Ahead

http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Pages/1200-MW-Fault-Induced-Solar-Photovoltaic-Resource-Interruption-Disturbance-Report.aspx

http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Pages/1200-MW-Fault-Induced-Solar-Photovoltaic-Resource-Interruption-Disturbance-Report.aspx

http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Pages/Alerts.aspx


Supply Chain Activity UpdateKen McIntyre, Vice President and Director of Standards and ComplianceBoard of Trustees MeetingNovember 9, 2017


• Board approved Supply Chain Standard in August• Board issued supply chain resolution to support implementation

and further analysis of supply chain risk • Petition for approval filed with FERC, September 26

Background


• Support effective and efficient standard implementation (e.g., CIP V5 transition)

• Study supply chain risks and provide recommendations• Communicate supply chain risks to industry • Forum and Association white papers• Plan to evaluate effectiveness of supply chain standards

Board Supply Chain Resolution


• Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC) will establish standard implementation advisory group in December 2017

• NERC created a supply chain standard webpage for standard implementation information and references

• NERC to provide initial workshop on supply chain standard in 2018 Q1, with workshops to follow on key topic areas

• NERC and Regions to provide readiness evaluations in 2018 Q3-Q4

• NERC and Regions to conduct small entity advisory sessions in 2018 Q1-Q3

Effective and Efficient StandardImplementation


• Engage CIPC in study design during Q4 2017 Finalize design and approach for supply chain risk study (Q1 2018) Recruit industry experts and vendors to participate in supply chain risk

study (Q1 2018) First interim deliverable due August 2018 Final report due February 2019

• Supply chain risk identification and actions CIPC to develop security guidelines to address known risks Partner with National Laboratory to identify vulnerabilities in legacy

equipment and recommend mitigation practices NERC’s E-ISAC to engage Departments of Energy and Homeland Security to

explore information sharing and supply chain risk assessments

Supply Chain Risk Study and Actions


• NERC Alerts to communicate supply chain risks Recently issued a level 2 NERC Alert in September 2017 Utilize E-ISAC communication systems and protocols to disseminate

information

• E-ISAC including supply chain risk topic in GridEx IV

Communicate supply chain risks


• Forums and Associations developing white papers First drafts completed Q1 2018 Final review and publish Q2 2018

• NERC to post white papers on supply chain standard webpage• NERC, Forums, and Associations to present papers to industry CIPC open meetings NERC and Regional workshops

Forums and Associations


• ERO Enterprise will: Develop standard effectiveness evaluation plan in Q4 2018 o Consider standard effective date and implementation timeline

Continue small group advisory sessions throughout implementation Assemble auditor observations and feedback to support effectiveness

determination

• CIPC advisory group to gather and provide feedback to ERO Enterprise on standard effectiveness

Plan to Evaluate Standard Effectiveness


• Incorporate supply chain activities in CIPC’s work plan Executive Committee discussed at August meeting Finalize work plan at December meeting Stand-up supply chain advisory group in December Present work plan to NERC Board Of Trustees in February 2018

• Finalize supply chain risk study design and resource requirements in 2018 Q1

• Update webpage• Provide quarterly updates to Board of Trustees

Immediate Next Steps


1

E-ISAC Update

Marcus Sachs, Senior VP & Chief Security Officer, NERCBill Lawrence, Senior Director, E-ISACBoard of Trustees MeetingNovember 9, 2017TLP:WHITE

2

Summary of Q3 2017

TLP: White

• Sharing and reporting 221 E-ISAC staff posts to the portal (+3% above the quarterly average over

the past year) 60 member posts to the portal (+9%)o 36 unique organizations shared (+21%)o 10 of those 36 organizations had never shared before

421 new portal accounts (+10%)

• Engagement (monthly average during the quarter) 186 webinar attendees (-20%) 562 downloads of the daily report (+35%)

• CAISS Pilot 19 companies participating (+1 participant)

3

CRISP Statistics

2015 Total

2016 Total

2017 Q1

Total

2017 Q2

Total

2017 Q3

Total

Cases Opened 788 1,553 532 421 425

Reports Generated 138 194 60 62 60

Site Annexes 259 442 200 319 384

CASA Automated Reports

71,000 165,852 46,293 42,689 37,769

TLP:WHITE

4

• NERC and the Regional Entities are joining CRISP in 2018 Will use same type of Information Sharing Device as currently used by

existing CRISP members Sensors will be distributed across several locations, feeding Pacific

Northwest National Laboratories as a single CRISP member

• Provides additional protection for sensitive data held and managed by the ERO

• No CRISP information will be shared with NERC and Regional Entity CMEP functional staffs As with other CRISP members, site annexes and CASA automated reporting

will go to the information technology teams for action E-ISAC analysts will assist with interpreting and developing response plans

CRISP for NERC and Regions

TLP:WHITE

5

• Modular Malware (Defense Use Case #6) – August 2, 2017• Dragonfly 2.0 – September 6, 2017• Kaspersky security software (Government report and a NERC

Alert) – September 13, 2017

Cyber Incidents and Reports

TLP:WHITE

6

• E-ISAC tracked the Kaspersky issue for several years Most information was classified, limiting what could be released DHS Binding Operational Directive 17-01, September 13, 2017 declassified

the most significant facts and directed all US federal agencies to:o Identify any use or presence of Kaspersky products on their information systems

within 30 dayso Develop detailed plans to remove and discontinue present and future use of the

products within 60 dayso Begin to implement the agency plans to discontinue use and remove the

products from information systems 90 days from the date of the directive

• E-ISAC alerted members immediately after the BOD release Published a TLP GREEN bulletin with guidance on September 15, 2017 Published a non-public Level 2 NERC Alert on October 5, 2017

Kaspersky Issue

TLP:WHITE

7

• Kaspersky anti-virus products and solutions provide broad access to files and elevated privileges on systems using their products Can be exploited by malicious cyber actors to compromise those systems

• Russian law allows Russian intelligence agencies to request or compel assistance from Kaspersky and to intercept communications transiting Russian networks

• Russian government could use access provided by Kaspersky products to compromise foreign information systems Directly implicates national security Kaspersky confirmed that classified NSA information was sent to Russia

Kaspersky Threat

Sources: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/13/dhs-statement-issuance-binding-operational-directive-17-01https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/internal-investigation-preliminary-results/19894/

TLP:WHITE

8

• Kaspersky-branded products that are a potential threat: Kaspersky AntiVirus Kaspersky Internet Security Kaspersky Total Security Kaspersky Small Office Security Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack Kaspersky Endpoint Security Kaspersky Cloud Security (Enterprise) Kaspersky Cybersecurity Services Kaspersky Private Security Network Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security

• Several private sector businesses are offering “free” removal and replacement of Kaspersky software

Kaspersky Products

9

• Initiative to overhaul existing website started in 2015• New “look and feel” launched in October 2016 Significant improvements to old portal Fixed numerous bugs and technical issues Set up conditions for successful transition to a new platform

• New contractor hired in early 2017 Developed new layout and functionality with input from MEC and other

stakeholders New site “go live” date set for November 30, 2017 Updates and additional new features will begin in January 2018

New Portal Platform

TLP:WHITE

10

• The E-ISAC’s Cyber Hygiene and Internet Risk Program leverages two initiatives at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber Hygiene program (CyHy) Risk and Vulnerability Assessment program (RVA)

• These initiatives are federally funded and are available AT NO COST to private sector entities in the US

• Reduces industry risk by identifying cyber vulnerabilities Provides E-ISAC with meaningful security metrics Identifies areas that need improvement

• NERC and E-ISAC enrolled in CyHy in June, 2017• All Regional Entities enrolled in CyHy in July/August, 2017

CHIRP Initiative

TLP:WHITE

11

• Grid Security Conference (GridSecCon) 2017• October 17-20, 2017 in Saint Paul, Minnesota Technical training Speakers, panels, and threat briefings Security vendors Over 500 attendees

• GridSecCon 2018 will be in the WECC Region

Grid Security Conference

TLP:WHITE

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GridEx IV is:An unclassified industry/government exercise

designed to simulate a coordinated cyber/physical attack with operational impacts

on electric and other critical infrastructuresacross North America

to improve security, resiliency, and reliability

Grid Security Exercise

November 15-16, 2017

TLP:WHITE

13 TLP:WHITE

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