States and Safeguards Implementation

LLNL-PRES-559653This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract

DE-AC52-07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC

States and Safeguards ImplementationNGSI Safeguards Courses

Justin Reed

May 2012

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LLNL-PRES-5596532

IAEA safeguards authorities, tools, and technologies

IAEA’s application of safeguards within States Case studies of responses to State

noncompliance Assistance provided to the IAEA

Much of this course is devoted to the IAEA’s implementation of safeguards


This talk focuses on safeguards from the viewpoint of the State*

* Non-nuclear weapon State with CSA or CSA+AP


What are the State’s safeguards obligations and rights?• Comprehensive Safeguards Agrmt• Additional Protocol

State organizations implementing safeguards obligations• State Systems of Accounting for and

Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC)• Safeguards Regulatory Authorities (SRA)• Implementation best practices and

challenges

Outline


What are the State’s safeguards obligations?


What are the State’s safeguards obligations?

“Each non-nuclear weapon State party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement…with the IAEA”• Comprehensive Safeguards

Agreement• Additional Protocol

Top: The cover of the CSA

Left: Malaysia signs its AP (Photo: IAEA)


State CSA obligations: Basic Undertaking

• “…an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards…on all source or special fissional material in all peaceful nuclear activities…” (1)


State CSA obligations: Cooperation

• “…the Agency and the State shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for therein.” (3)

State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC)• “…the State shall establish and maintain a system of

accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards…” (7)— MORE ON THIS LATER IN THE PRESENTATION!


State CSA obligations (continued): Provision of Information to the Agency

• “…the Agency shall be provided…with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material…” (8)



• “…Agency shall be provided…information concerning nuclear material…” (8, as elaborated in paras. 59-69)— With respect to each material balance area:

– Accounting records / Inventory of material

• Including measurement results, adjustments, corrections

– Measurement and accounting procedures

– Material unaccounted for (MUF)

— Transfers within, into, and out of the State

— Material reaching the starting point of safeguards



• “…Agency shall be provided…information concerning…the features of facilities…” (8)— “As early as possible before nuclear material is introduced” (42)

– Description of facility

– Processing equipment for nuclear material

– Location and flow of nuclear material

– Features and procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control

— Operating records

— Modifications to the facility relevant to safeguards


State CSA obligations (continued): Take steps to ensure Agency inspectors can perform

their functions (9) • Locations (76-77):— Strategic points and records

• For independent measurements, other verification rights

— Prior to establishment of strategic points, to– Any location State’s initial report indicates nuclear material is present

– Any location where inspections indicate nuclear material is present

– Points where international transfers are received or dispatched

— To additional locations as part of a special inspection


Select rights of the State under a CSA: Avoid undue interference with peaceful nuclear

activities

Commercial or confidential state information protected

Consultation opportunity if questions arise about interpretation or application of safeguards, prior to IAEA determination that action is “essential and urgent”


State Additional Protocol obligations: Provides the IAEA with enhanced

authorities and information• Information about R&D and more parts of the

nuclear fuel cycle• Complementary access• Ability to use additional tools

Requires State to fulfill additional obligations• Increased information sharing• Facilitate increased IAEA access


Article 2: Provision of Information• 2.a. “[The State] shall provide the Agency with a declaration

containing:”

Information about, but not limited to:

• Nuclear related R&D NOT involving nuclear materials• Expanded locations• Expanded types of safeguards-relevant activities• Expanded types of safeguards-relevant materials and

equipment

(see INFCIRC/540 Article 2.a. for complete list)

State Additional Protocol obligations:


Article 2: Provision of Information (continued)• 2.b. “[The State] shall make every reasonable effort to

provide the agency with the following information:”2.b (i) – Description of R&D related to enrichment, reprocessing, HEU/Pu waste processing not involving nuclear material carried out in the country but not authorized, controlled, or carried out on behalf of the State.

2.b (ii) – Information on entities or persons carrying out such activities upon specific request by the IAEA.

• 2.c. Provide clarifications upon request.



Articles 4 through 10: Complementary Access• Article 5: The State “shall provide the Agency with access to”— Article 2 declared locations in addition to CSA declared locations

— Sites— Decommissioned facilities

— Agency specified locations for environmental sampling

• Article 4(a)(i-iii): For the purpose of— Assuring absence of undeclared nuclear material

— Resolve questions or inconsistencies about declared information

— Confirm decommissioned status



Select rights of the State under an Additional Protocol: In addition to those rights granted by the CSA, an AP

state has the right to• Not have mechanistic or systematic verification by the Agency

of Article 2 declarations• Find alternative means or adjacent locations to satisfy Agency

requirements if the State is “unable” to provide access to locations requested by the Agency. (The Agency decides if it is satisfied)

• “Manage” IAEA access to AP locations, provided the Agency is not precluded from performing its functions


Implementing safeguards obligations:

State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material

&Safeguards Regulatory Authorities


What does the IAEA expect a State to do to fulfill its safeguards obligations?

Establish national laws and regulations requiring safeguards obligations to be fully met

— National laws binds relevant entities to the treaty requirements of the State

Provide timely, correct, complete information to IAEA

Provide the IAEA support and timely access to necessary locations and information


State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC)

Safeguards Regulatory Authority



“Organizational arrangements at the national level which may have both • A national objective to account for and control nuclear

material in the State, and • An international objective to provide the basis for

application of IAEA safeguards”

Definition from: IAEA Safeguards Glossary



Involves government, governmental entities, regulators, operators

A system for nuclear material accounting:— Facility operators keep track of nuclear materials and report to

government regulators— Regulator assembles reports, conducts audits of its facilities— Government transmits reports to IAEA

IAEA reviews reports, conducts independent verification




Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA)







Refers to the specific State authority/authorities responsible for all international safeguards implementation, including provision of design information and AP information

NEW TERM!! (But not new concept)— Introduced in IAEA Guidance for States Implementing

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (March 2012)



A few Safeguards Regulatory Authorities:


What is an SRA supposed to do? Develop and enforce regulations

Collect, compile, maintain, and manage information

Conduct audits or inspections to ensure regulatory compliance and correctness of information

Transmit correct information in a timely manner

Support/facilitate IAEA activities in country


What are some SRA best practices for meeting IAEA safeguards obligations? Independence

• from facility operators• from State policy makers

Empowerment• Laws giving SRA legitimate authority

Procedure-driven• Clear role and responsibilities• Timely and correct meeting of responsibilities

Self-improving• Continuous reviews of and updates to procedures• Training for staff


What is the relationship between the SRA/SSAC and the IAEA? “The Agency…shall make full use of the [SSAC]

…and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of the State’s accounting and control activities”

“The Agency’s verification shall include…independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency”

- INFCIRC/153 (31)


What challenges might a SRA have in meeting its safeguards obligations? Resistance from other national agencies/entities

• Lack of authority or high-level support

Scale of nuclear fuel cycle / related industry• Small – limited pool of experts, less familiarity• Large – complex activities, greater scope of activity

Experience / Human resources• Need experts in nuclear engineering, materials, physics, chemistry, law,

political science, management, accounting, statistics, IT…

Funding

*In some states, SRA nonexistent because of challenge


Why develop a strong SRA/SSAC? Improve efficiency of IAEA safeguards

Other benefits of nuclear material accounting• Domestic safeguards benefits• Economic operation of nuclear facilities

Secure international investment

Demonstrate nonproliferation commitment


Assistance provided by the international community to SRAs: IAEA SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS)

• Provides assistance on regulatory, technical, and administrative measures— For States without SSACs or rudimentary SSACs, assistance

focuses on establishing measures— For States with more advanced SSACs, ISSAS evaluates

performance on these measures and recommends improvements

NNSA NGSI and other advanced states• Technology and methodology development• Regulation development• Other infrastructure development


Concluding thoughts: “Safeguards” isn’t only something that the IAEA

does to a State

States accept obligations when they sign the NPT and their safeguards agreements

Fulfillment of obligations can be challenging, regardless of intentions

A strong SRA is NOT a guarantee of compliance

A weak SRA is NOT a guarantee of noncompliance

Thank You

Questions?



Other than safeguards, what else might the Authority serving as SRA be responsible for?

Other nuclear regulation and enforcement• Safety at nuclear facilities• Security at nuclear facilities

Regulation of other peaceful uses of nuclear technology• Nuclear medicine• Industrial use of radioactive sources

Auxiliary activities• Radiation protection and health physics• Quality assurance / quality control of its own activities• Radioactive waste management• Nuclear/radioactive emergency preparedness


State system of accounting forand control of nuclear material

(SSAC) in Japan

Seiji Uchikoshi

Nuclear Material Control Center

　 JAPAN

SEMINAR 20 YEARS OF ABACCRio de Janeiro, Brazil,

Palácio Itamaraty, 10 - 11 November 2011

An example SSAC

Slides taken from presentation available at:http://www.abacc.org.br/?page_id=2405&lang=en


State system of accounting forand control of nuclear material

(SSAC) in Japan

Seiji Uchikoshi

Nuclear Material Control Center

　 JAPAN

SEMINAR 20 YEARS OF ABACCRio de Janeiro, Brazil,

Palácio Itamaraty, 10 - 11 November 2011


　 SSAC Structure in JapanBILATERAL AGREEMENT

COUNTRIES

Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) - Nuclear fuel-related R&D activities without NM - Buildings in sites - Activities specified in Annex I - Uranium mines, etc.

NUCLEAR FACILITIES

- Report on Inventory & Material Transfer- Notification/Confirmation of Transfer etc.

International Inspection

Inspection

Data Processing

GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (Japan Safeguards Office, MEXT)

National Inspection

Comple-mentary Access

NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONROL CENTER

AccountancyReport

- Inspection Result- Conclusion

Report on buildings,activities, etc. under AP

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153)

International Atomic Energy Agency

- Accountancy Report- Inspection Report

Annual Declaration

Taken from Uchikoshi, Seiji, “State sytem of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in Japan”, Nuclear Material Control Center Japan

MEXT(JSGO)

NMCC

Nuclear Facilities

Routine Inspection Assignment-Access -Item count -Book Audit -NDA -DA sampling -C/S

InspectionReports

(inspection results & analysis results)

Inspection

-Scheduling-Inspection-DIV -CA

NMCC is only the organization which has been approved on the national law to carry out the national SG inspection

State Inspection SchemeTaken from Uchikoshi, Seiji, “State sytem of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in Japan”, Nuclear Material Control Center Japan

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States and Safeguards Implementation

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