Status Competition and Territorial Aggression - Evidence From the...

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Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the

Scramble for Africa

Joslyn Barnhart

Forthcoming in Security Studies

Abstract: When are states willing to engage in behaviors of little material or strategic value in order to assert their status? This article demonstrates that states are more likely to engage in acts of status assertion if their international standing has been called into question. Such status-challenged states seek opportunities to demonstrate their capabilities as well as their intention to maintain their current status. Status assertions often challenge the status and security of other states, leading these states to engage in more frequent acts of aggression. Evidence for these claims comes from detailed analysis of the Scramble for Africa at the end of the 19th century. France and Germany adopted expansionary policies in Africa because their great power status had been called into question. These policy shifts directly led Italy and Britain to adopt expansionary policies, leading to the eventual conquest of 95% of the African continent.

Clear material and strategic rationales sometimes motivate state behavior in the

international system. To a surprising degree, however, states are willing to engage in

actions which require them to pay material costs and which render them strategically more

vulnerable. Scholars have focused on domestic political explanations of behavior that

appears irrational at the systemic level. Yet, domestic political explanations do not account

for many puzzling cases of international behavior. Detailed case analysis demonstrates

that many important, seemingly puzzling instances of international behavior are best

understood largely as assertions of status, often at the cost of immediate strategic or

material interests.

States do not, however, engage in the same degree of status seeking at all times.

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This article demonstrates that states are likely to engage in status competition if their

status has been called into question by an instance of disrespect or by a humiliating

international event. Humiliated and disrespected states, usually great powers or

potential great powers, are likely to engage in competitive practices such as the

development of advanced weaponry, competition over spheres of influence or influence

within international organizations, or, as demonstrated here, the acquisition of vast

amounts of territory.1 Status-challenged states engage in these competitive acts in order

both to signal that they possess characteristics and capabilities which distinguish them

from lesser powers as well as to signal their willingness to vigorously exercise the

prerogatives associated with their desired status. These competitive measures have a

significant impact on international behavior because they often challenge the status,

interests and security of other states in the international system, leading those states to

adopt competitive behaviors they likely would not have otherwise.

Joslyn Barnhart is an Assistant Professor of international relations in the Government Department at Wesleyan University. The author is grateful to Allen Dafoe, Tanisha Fazal, Deborah Larson, Chad Nelson, Barry O’Neill, Elizabeth Saunders, Arthur Stein, Marc Trachtenberg, Robert F. Trager, William Wohlforth, two anonymous reviewers, and participants in seminars and conferences at UCLA and USC for helpful comments.

1 Offensive and defensive realism perceive the value of territory to lie in its tangible benefits. See John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York: James Pott & Co., 1902); Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Resistance Books, 1917); Peter J. Liberman, Does Conquest Pay?: The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); John J . Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, ( N e w Y o r k : WW Norton & Company, 2001). Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 02 (April 2010): 413–425 cites acts of expansion aimed at diverting public attention from economic or civil unrest. Jack L . Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, ( I t h a c a , N Y : Cornell University Press, 1991) cites the ability of domestic interest groups to guide states towards expansionary policies through processes of domestic logrolling. While some scholars have focused on the intangible, psychological value of territory (e.g., see Ron E. Hassner, “To Halve and To Hold: Conflicts Over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility,” Security Studies 12, no. 4 (Summer 2003): 1–33; Paul R. Hensel, “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict,” in What Do We Know About War, ed John Vasquez (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 57–84; Barbara F. Walter, “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” International Studies Review 5, no. 4 (December 2003): 137–153, none have focused primarily on territorial acquisition as a means to status.

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The evidence for this set of claims resides in the detailed analysis of the first

acts of territorial expansion within the Scramble for Africa between 1881 and 1884.

Analysis of the decisions made by France and Germany to adopt expansionary policies

during this period indicates that the Scramble for Africa would not have occurred as it

did if the great power status of these two states had not been previously challenged.2

France, for instance, first adopted its forward policy in Africa as a direct result of

humiliations suffered in the previous decade that had called its great power status into

question. The relatively new German state dramatically altered its colonial policy in

direct response to disrespect it believed it had suffered at the hands of the British.

Leaders within both states adopted expansionary policies in an effort to assert their

state’s great power status and in spite of their expectations of high associated costs

and heightened strategic vulnerability. French and German status-motivated expansion

generated status and security concerns among other states and for Italy and Britain

in particular, leading both states to adopt expansionary policies which they likely would

not have otherwise. Far from isolated instances of territorial expansion, the expansionary

policies adopted by France and Germany during the early 1880s led to the eventual

conquest of roughly 95% of the African continent over the following three decades.3

2 The Scramble for Africa spanned the period from 1881 until 1912. France was the first to adopt a

forward policy in Africa in 1881. Germany’s official policy shift followed in 1884. Though Britain expanded into Egypt in 1882, it did so reluctantly and had no intention until 1885 of expanding elsewhere. Leopold of Belgium did set out to personally claim the Congo in 1876, though his claim was not recognized until 1884. Belgium did not formally annex the land until 1908.

3 Other states participated, but were far less active. Belgium engaged in one act of expansion, though a relatively large one of 2,344,858 km2. Portugal during this time added 909,000 km2 to the few holdings it had maintained for over a century. These figures are taken from data on all instances of territorial change between 1816 and 2008. See Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, “Territorial changes, 1816–1996: Procedures and data,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 16, no.

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Historians have presented numerous accounts of the Scramble for Africa, focusing

on broad explanations rooted in the material, strategic, or social contexts of the time.4

These explanations have often been based on imperial rhetoric employed after the act of

conquest as leaders attempted to sell skeptical publics with rational myths of colonial

expansion even when the act of conquest originally lacked a material or strategic

rationale.5 This article, alternatively, roots its novel explanation of the Scramble for

1 (Spring 1998): 89.

4 For material arguments citing the need for new markets for excess goods and capital, see Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Empire 1875-1914 ( U K : Hachette, 2010); Hobson, Imperialism: A Study ; Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Howard Robinson, The Development of the British Empire (L ondon : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922) presents a convincing counterargument. G.N. Sanderson, “The European Partition of Africa: Coincidence or Conjuncture?,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 3, no. 1 (1974): 10 cites the demise of the ‘mythological beast of economic imperialism.’ See also M. E. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa ( U K : Longman, 1974), 40 – 44; D. K. Fieldhouse, “Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision,” The Economic History Review 14, no. 2 (December 1961): 187–209; Richard J. Hammond, “Economic Imperialism: Sidelights on a S tereotype,” The Journal of Economic History 21, no. 4 (December 1961): 582–598; Ronald Hyam, “The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy, 1763–1963,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27, no. 2 (1999): 27–52; William L. Langer, “A Critique of Imperialism,” Foreign Affairs 14, no. 1 (October 1935); 102-119; D.C.M. Platt, “Economic Factors in British Policy during the “New Imperialism”,” Past & Present 39 (April 1968): 120–138; A.J.P. Taylor and A.J. Percivale, Germany’s First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A Move in Bismarck’s European Policy (Macmillan, 1938) for arguments against material rationales. R.E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (Macmillan, 1966), ch. 4 presents the most prominent strategic rationale. A great deal of evidence has also been offered in refute of their argument. See A l e x a n d e r Schölch, “The “Men on the Spot” and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882,” Historical Journal 19, no. 3 (September 1976): 773; Sanderson, “ The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture?;” John S Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al Sayyid-Marsot, “The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 4 (November 1978): 471–488; P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914, ( L o n d o n : Longman, 1993), 366-367; and A.G. Hopkins, “The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882,” Journal of African History 27, no. 2 (July 1986): 376. For arguments rooted in social context and the notion that emigration would serve as a ‘safety valve’ to stave off domestic unrest, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an Authoritarian State, ( L o n d o n : Arnold, 1995). Each of these arguments has confronted serious and convincing challenges with time. For an exception and a well-regarded review of these perspectives, see Sanderson, “ The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture?.” Arguments based in the material, social or strategic context of the time do not provide adequate explanations of the timing of state actions or why the pace of expansion accelerated so rapidly once it began. See Ibid. on this point.

5 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism ( University of Chicago Press, 1982), argues that economic arguments were usually “adduced as afterthoughts to justify territorial gains that had already taken place,” (p. 102). See also D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914 ( I t haca , N Y : Cornell University Press, 1973); and Henri Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and

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Africa in the detailed analysis of the key factors leading up to the initial adoption

by France and Germany of expansionary policies in Africa in the early 1880s, prior to

the point at which they perceived they were participating in a race of any sort. These

expansionary policies precipitated a competitive race for territory that eventually

penetrated every corner of the continent. To say that status concerns shaped these early

decisions is not to say that such concerns guided every instance of conquest throughout

the Scramble for Africa or that leaders during this time were never guided by

domestic, material or strategic motivations. Rather, the analysis demonstrates that

without the impetus provided by status challenges, the conquest of Africa, if it occurred

at all, would likely have assumed a very different form.

This article proceeds in three sections. It begins by laying out the theoretical

argument and placing it within the context of existing literatures. It then presents the

detailed analysis of why France and Germany decided to adopt forward policies in

Africa when they did, starting with the French decision to acquire Tunisia and territory

in the Congo in 1881 and 1882 and then addressing Bismarck’s surprise decision to join

the colonial fray in April of 1884, a decision which involved the annexation of 83% of

Germany’s eventual colonial holdings in Africa.6 Within each case, I address alternative

arguments based on political, economic, strategic and social factors and then Realities (FA Prager, 1966), 182 - 190 on this point. Snyder in Myths of Empire argues that over expansion is driven by parochial rather than national interests in cartelized political systems. Snyder himself notes however that Germany in the early 1880s was not governed by cartels but was strongly unified under Bismarck, who repeatedly ignored special interests unless they corresponded with his own (pp. 67, 78 - 79, 99). Snyder asserts that Bismarck’s acts of expansion were intended to assertively defend German prestige.

6 Germany acquired over 1.2 million km2 in 1884 and early 1885. It acquired an additional 182,000

km2 over the rest of the Scramble.

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demonstrate that instances of humiliation and disrespect prompted the countries’

actions. The article concludes by briefly addressing the significant impact that these acts

of status assertion had on the international system more broadly as well as the

implications of the analysis for status seeking in contemporary international politics.

The Nature of Status and Status Seeking

Humans are hard-wired to care about their status as individuals and about the status

of groups with which they identify.7 Numerous scholars have demonstrated the significant

degree to which status concerns drive international behavior.8 International status is

7 See Jonathan Dvash, Gadi Gilam, Aharon Ben-Ze’ev, Talma Hendler and Simone G Shamay-

Tsoory, “The Envious Brain: The Neural Basis of Social Comparison,” Human Brain Mapping 31, no. 11 (November 2010): 1741–1750; Donald H. Edwards and Edward A. Kravitz, “Serotonin, Social Status and Aggression,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 7, no. 6 (December1997): 812–819; Klaus Fliessbach, Bernd Weber, Peter Trautner, Thomas Dohmen, Uwe Sunde, Christian E Elger and Armin Falk, “Social Comparison Affects Reward-Related Brain Activity in the Human Ventral Striatum,” Science 318, no. 5854 (November 2007): 1305–1308. Bernardo A. Huberman, Christoph H. Loch and Ayse Onculer, “Status As a Valued Resource,” Social Psychology Quarterly 67, no. 1 (March 2004): 103 demonstrates experimentally that actors are willing to pay costs in pursuit of status even without the promise of long-term tangible rewards. See also Robert H. Frank, “The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods,” The American Economic Review 75, no. 1 (March 1985): 101–116; Ori Heffetz and Robert H. Frank, “Preferences for Status: Evidence and Economic Implications,” in Handbook of social economics Vol. 1A , ed. Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, Matthew Jackson (July 2008), 69–91; Christoph Loch, Michael Yaziji and Christian Langen, “The Fight for the Alpha Position: Channeling Status Competition in Organizations,” European Management Journal 19, no. 1 (February 2001): 16–25. On group-level concerns about status, see Henri Tajfel and John C Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations editors, pp. 33 – 47. Brooks Cole, 1979; Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 8 Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Deborah W. Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 63–95; Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Daniel Markey, “Prestige and The Origins of War: Returning to Realism’s Roots,” Security Studies 8, no. 4 (Summer 1999): 126–172; Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” International Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 229–252; T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth, Status in World Politics ( N e w Y o r k : Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jonathan Renshon, “Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders”, International Organization, Forthcoming 2015; Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 01 (January 2009): 28–57; Ayse Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). See Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for

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based on the collective beliefs of others about a state’s rank on admirable characteristics

such as military capability, wealth, demographic position, or diplomatic influence.9

Because objective rankings of status dimensions are often impossible, a state’s rank is

rooted in social perception.10 International status seeking is therefore the process of

attempting to shape other states’ perceptions about one’s rightful position in the

international hierarchy.11

Status seeking may be an innate human trait, but actors do not seek status at

all times. States are particularly inclined to engage in status competition under the

following conditions – when their status has been called into question by an instance of

disrespect or by a humiliating international event. To show ‘respect’ is to behave in a

manner consistent with another state’s status; to show disrespect is to deny another

state the degree of esteem or consideration it feels entitled to, thereby implicitly refusing

to recognize the state’s desired status.12 Disrespect therefore depends upon a state’s

War,” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 371 – 393 for a discussion of the emotional and instrumental components of status seeking. Also Tuomas Forsberg, Regina Heller and Reinhard Wolf, “Status and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 3 (2014): 261–268.

9 Deborah W. Larson, T. V. Paul and William C. Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” in Status in World Politics, ed . Paul , e t a l . , 7 - 17 presents a detailed conceptualization of status. Influence is not merely an indirect measure of capability. It depends upon one’s willingness and intention to assert their interests.

10 Objective rankings of army size or GDP may be possible. Measures of resolve or influence rely upon social perceptions. Perceptions even play a role even in the relative assessment of tangible characteristics like one’s strategic arsenals, where subjective estimations must be made of how the sheer number of weapons interacts with capacity or reliability in determining superiority.

11 The degree to which a state’s domestic elite attempts to signal its expectation that the state will hold higher status depends significantly on the status they themselves ascribe to their state. In that way, status depends both on the perceptions of others as well as on one’s perception of self. 12 This definition is taken from Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (February 2011): 105–142. Wolf presents a detailed theory of the role of disrespect in international relations and calls for plausibility probes to assess the degree to which disrespect may impact state behavior. See pp. 106 - 107, 112. As Wolf notes, disrespect is particularly relevant in international relations exactly because of its relationship with status. As Wohlforth notes, one’s position within the status hierarchy is hard to measure without feedback from others. See William C . Wohlforth, “ Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict,” in Status in

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expectation of how much consideration and deference it believes others should show it, an

expectation that is derived from the state’s identity.13 Disrespect may assume an

evaluative form in which others clearly acknowledge but disregard a state’s interests or

a non-evaluative form in which others ignore the state’s interests, rights and concerns

altogether.14 An act of disrespect may occur within the public sphere for all to see or

may occur privately between two states.

A state is humiliated when it believes that its position has been lowered in the

eyes of others and that this lowered estimation will result in a future decline in respect and

deference.15 Humiliation may be an intended act.16 It may also, however, be self-inflicted

when a state fails to live up to the expectations of the international community. Defeat in

World Politics, ed. Paul, et al., 121. An act of disrespect serves as direct feedback on where one stands in the international system. Others have noted the importance of recognition of status and identity. See Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar, The International Politics of Recognition (Paradigm Publishers, 2012); Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power P olitics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies 19, no. 4 (November 2010): 656–688; Erik Ringmar, “On the Ontological Status of the State,” European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 4 (December 1996): 439–466; Erik Ringmar, “The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West,” Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 2 (June 2002): 115–136.

13 There is a large literature on the sources of national identity. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence argues that state leaders compete to define the national image. Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics,” Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 491–542 and others argue that national identity formation depends upon interactions with other states rather than on leaders’ agency. See also Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

14 As Wolf notes, a state may also be disrespected if its physical integrity, social importance, ideas and values, achievements, efforts or rights are ignored or disregarded by others.

15 The definition of humiliation is in keeping with the definition often used within philosophy and psychology. See, for example, Maury Silver, Rosaria Conte, Maria Miceli and Isabella Poggi, “Humiliation: Feeling, Social Control and The Construction of Identity,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16, no. 3 (1986): 269–283 and Daniel Statman, “Humiliation, Dignity and Self-respect,” Philosophical Psychology 13, no. 4 (2000): 523–540.

16 This was the case with the crowning of the new German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles at the end of the Franco-Prussian war. Scholars of the role of humiliation in international relations have focused primarily on effects of intended acts of humiliation on subjugated peoples. See Evelyin Lindner, Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict (Praeger Security International, 2006), xiv; Paul Saurette, “Are You Dissin’ Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics,” Review of International Studies 32, no. 3 (2006): 495; Deepak Tripathi, Imperial Designs: War, Humiliation & the Making of History (Potomac Books, Inc., 2013).

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conflict to a ‘weaker’ state, for instance, or the involuntary loss of territory to a lower

status state will likely cause the international community to question the state’s

position within the international status hierarchy. Humiliating events occur on the

world stage and thereby threaten to generate common knowledge within the

international community of the state’s decline.17

Humiliated or disrespected states which have the capabilities to do so will likely

engage in competitive acts with the intention of signaling the status they expect to

hold in the international system.18 Such competitive acts may occur within a bilateral

environment as a disrespected state attempts to signal to a particular rival that it

expects to be treated with a greater degree of deference. They may also occur within

more multilateral environments as states that have been humiliated or disrespected on

the world stage attempt to shape the perceptions of the international community of

their right to heightened status.19 Competitive status-seeking acts may include efforts to

gain membership into elite clubs through the acquisition of symbols of great power or

17 Status is rooted in second-order beliefs, or beliefs about others’ beliefs. See Paul et al., Status in

World Politics. p. 8 – 9; Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Barry O’Neill, “Nuclear weapons and National Prestige,” (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1560, 2006); Dafoe et al., “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” pp. 374-5.

18 Humiliated and disrespected states commonly possess relatively high status. They are those states which expect a certain degree of success and deference within the system. See Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations. This is supported by research in psychology that shows that those with high self regard are more likely than those with low self esteem to act aggressively towards those attempting to challenge their self-image. See Roy F. Baumeister, Brad J. Bushman and W. Keith Campbell, “Self-esteem, Narcissism, and Aggression: Does Violence Result from Low Self-esteem or From Threatened Egotism?,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 9, no. 1 (2000): 26–29; Brad J. Bushman and Roy F. Baumeister, “Threatened Egotism, Narcissism, Self-esteem, and Direct and Displaced Aggression: Does Self-love or Self-hate Lead to Violence?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75, no. 1 (1998): 219.

19 O’Neill, “Nuclear weapons and national prestige” discusses the role of visible, salient demonstrations of power in generating status. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013) discusses the importance of public events in generating common knowledge.

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regional status.20 They may also include direct military confrontation or competition over

spheres of influence, the size of weapons arsenals or the extent of territorial holdings.

Finally, states may attempt to demonstrate their existing influence over international

outcomes in an effort to minimize the appearance of influence by the superior state.21

Status-challenged states are likely to adopt competitive status-seeking strategies

aimed at asserting their ‘rightful position’ in the international system for two primary

reasons.22 First, both humiliation and disrespect engender strong emotional responses

such as anger which increase the likelihood that a state will behave in an aggressive

manner towards others.23 Such emotional reactions to humiliation will lead states to

20 When status is treated as a ‘club good,’ the competitive nature of status-seeking amongst high

status states may be somewhat abated. Larson et al., “ Status and World Order” in Status and World Politics, ed. Paul, et al. , 9 and David Lake, “ Authority, Status, and the End of the American Century”, in Status in World Politics, ed. Paul, et al., 246 – 272.

21 See Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers” and Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 116. 22 Status-threatened states do not always adopt competitive strategies. They may engage in

alternative strategies such as social creativity or social emulation, as laid out in SIT. See Mathias Blanz, Amelie Mummendey, Rosemarie Mielke and Andreas Klink, “Responding to Negative Social Identity: A Taxonomy of Identity M anagement Strategies,” European Journal of Social Psychology 28, no. 5(1998): 697–729; Amelie Mummendey, Thomas Kessler, Andreas Klink and Rosemarie Mielke, “Strategies To Cope with Negative Social Identity: Predictions by Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76, no. 2 (1999): 229; Henri Tajfel, “The Psychological Structure of Intergroup Relations,” in Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. Henri Tajfel ( Academic, 1978), 27- 98; Tajfel et al., “An Integrative theory of intergroup conflict ,“ and Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Shortcut to greatness: The new thinking and the revolution in soviet foreign policy”, International Organization 57, no. 1 (2003): 77–110; Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers” f or applications in international relations. States which lack the capabilities to do so will often turn to a strategy of social creativity in which they attempt to emphasize new dimensions of status on which they prevail. Military and economic constraints following World War II, for instance, left France no choice but to pursue a creative strategy - that of emphasizing its glorious past, its experience as a world leader, and its symbolic value as a long-standing beacon of democracy - following its humiliating performance during the war. See Alessandro Brogi, A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002). States which exist outside of the current normative order and which have repeatedly attempted to gain status through competitive strategies but failed will likely turn to imitating the norms, institutions and values of superior states. See Zarakol, After Defeat .

23 Social psychologists have demonstrated the existence of group-based emotions relating to the fate of one’s group. The degree to which an individual feels such emotions depends upon the degree to which

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first and foremost desire revenge upon the state that directly or indirectly threatened

their status.24 Second, leaders of disrespected and humiliated states will desire to protect

the state’s self image for fear that if they do not, the state will face demotion within

the international status hierarchy.25 This demotion has both instrumental consequences,

in that a decline in status is a decline in influence, but also emotional consequences as

well in that states, like individuals, seek to have a voice and to be respected by those in

their community. Such states therefore seek clear and effective ways to establish

common knowledge within the international community of their state’s distinctive

capabilities, their intention for the state to be perceived as high status and their

expectation that others within the international community will treat it accordingly.26

Humiliated or disrespected states may choose to engage in a number of different

they identify with the group. See Thomas Kessler and Susan Hollbach, “Group-based Emotions as Determinants of Ingroup Identification,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41, no. 6 (2005): 677–685; Bernhard Leidner, Hammad Sheikh and Jeremy Ginges, “Affective Dimensions of Intergroup Humiliation,” PloS One 7, no. 9 (2012): 46375; Diane M. Mackie, Eliot R. Smith and Devin G. Ray, “Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2, no. 5 (2008): 1866–1880; Heather J. Smith and Thomas Kessler, “Group-based Emotions and Intergroup Behavior,” The Social Life of Emotions 2 (2004): 292. For those focusing on group-based humiliation, see Victoria Fontan, “Polarization Between Occupier and Occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq: Colonial Humiliation and the Formation of Political Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 217–238; Jeremy A. Ginges and Scott Atran, “Humiliation and the Inertia Effect: Implications for Understanding Violence and Compromise in Intractable Intergroup Conflicts,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 8, no. 3-4 (2008): 3–4; Lee Shepherd, Russell Spears and Antony S.R. Manstead, “‘This Will Bring Shame on Our Nation’: The Role of Anticipated Group-based Emotions on Collective Action,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49, no. 1 (2013): 42–57.

24 Oded Lowenheim and Gadi Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” Security Studies 17, no. 4 (2008): 685–724 argue that the need for revenge following an international humiliation plays a key role in shaping state behavior. They do not however relate humiliation to status. See also Peter Hays Gries and Kaiping Peng, “Culture Clash? Apologies East and West,” Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 30 (2002): 173–178 and Robert E. Harkavy, “Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif in International Politics,” International Politics 37 (September 2000): 345–368.

25 Such acts may also reestablish the collective esteem of the state as well as shape the beliefs of others. See Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence.

26 Mario Gollwitzer, Milena Meder and Manfred Schmitt, “What Gives Victims Satisfaction When They Seek Revenge?,” European Journal of Social Psychology 41, no. 3 (2011): 364–374 notes that revenge is often not about disrespect by seeking getting back at the wrong-doer, but may also be intended to send a message to third party observers about the costs of infringing on an actor’s rights.

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competitive status-seeking measures at the same time, though the exact competitive

measures a state chooses in response to status threat depends in part on the capabilities

of the state. Status-challenged states with sufficient resources are ideally able to respond

to their emotional and instrumental concerns in the most satisfying and convincing way

possible – by successfully taking revenge on the actor responsible for the status decline.

Revenge may be impossible, however, for states with fewer resources. In such cases, the

preferred response of leaders and the public may diverge. The masses, unconstrained by

concerns about capabilities, are able to focus their attention on the emotional

repercussions of status threat and on revenge against the state responsible for one’s

humiliation or sense of disrespect at all costs.27 Leaders, however, who deem revenge too

risky must still manage the instrumental implications of threats to status, about which

they are likely to care more than does the general public. Leaders may therefore engage

in competitive status-seeking measures against third-party states aimed at influencing

the perceptions of other states even when those measures lack the backing of the

people.28

This article addresses one particular response to humiliation and disrespect:

territorial expansion.29 States are most likely to respond to humiliation and disrespect by

27 This may be especially true in the case that the humiliation involves the loss of territory within

the homeland. 28 As will be shown below, French and German leaders were concerned foremost about altering the

perceptions of other states rather than those of their own publics. They therefore often disregarded the publics’ preferences, which were often anti-imperialist. 29 While this article focuses on cases of imperial expansion, the argument is not limited to discontiguous expansion or only to those states vying for great power status. Contiguous territorial gains may also be used to demonstrate a state’s capabilities. Alfred LeRoy Burt, The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth, from the American Revolution ( Heath, 1956) notes that Russia and Austria had unclaimed contiguous territory upon which to assert their status in the 19th century whereas

13

seeking territory under two conditions. First, they will be more likely to do so when

territory is a symbol of status within relevant status hierarchies. The ability to conquer

and administer vast swathes of territory has served as a symbol of high international

status for much of international history, distinguishing those states with unusual military

capabilities and with the intention to maintain a sufficiently vigorous foreign policy as

would befit preeminent states.30 Support for the norm of territorial integrity by

Western powers, and in particular by the United States, after World War II, however,

rendered colonization and conquest unacceptable forms of behavior for a majority of the

international community.31 Concurrently, technological development enabled the rise of

the European powers did not. States may also engage in numerous competitive status-seeking acts at the same time.

30 France’s ‘policy of prestige’ during the 18th century, for instance, mandated territorial expansion in North America for the sake of disputing British claims to naval superiority and announcing French grandeur to the world. See Peter J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783 (USA: Oxford University Press, 2005), chap. 1; David G. Boyce, Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997 ( Palgrave MacMillan, 1999). The Duc de Richelieu noted in 1816 that France would retake its former colony of French Guiana from Portugal “not because of any real advantage we derive from [it]. . . but because it would be harmful to the dignity both of the King and of the State to concede anything to Portugal to which she has no sort of claim.” Quoted in Henri Brunschwig, Mythes et Realites de L’imperialisme Colonial Francais 1871-1914, (A. Colin, 1960), 14- 15. Russia’s acquisition of extensive amounts of territory in the mid-19th century was motivated by its humiliating loss of territory in the Crimean War and its desire to reassert its status vis-a-vis Britain. See Karl E Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Basic Books, 2009). Much of this expansion occurred even after leaders had concluded that on average the benefits of colonialism did not outweigh the costs. Anthony Pagden’s Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995) describes how by the late 18th century Spain, Britain and France had come to view their colonial enterprises as disastrous experiments. See Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, J. Rhamey, R. Baird and K. Grant, “Status Considerations in International Politics and the Rise of Regional Powers,” in Status in World Politics, ed. Paul, et al., 62 for a definition of great powers which includes, in part, the demonstration of willingness to pursue expansive foreign policies beyond one’s region independent of other states.

31 See Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 215–250 and Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (P r ince ton , NJ : Princeton University Press, 2007).

14

new status symbols such as nuclear weapons, space missions and aircraft carriers.32 That

Putin’s recent acts of territorial aggression in the previous Soviet sphere appear to be

motivated in large part by a desire to reassert Russian status following humiliating

and disrespectful treatment by the West, however, suggests that some states continue to

view territorial expansion as an effective means of asserting great power status.33 While a

majority of states still prescribe to the norm of territorial integrity, alternative status

hierarchies arguably exist which maintain more traditional status models in which

territory remains a viable path to preeminence.34 Putin’s determination to pursue

expansion in the face of strong Western opposition suggests that he may be signaling his

expectation of heightened status to those states that doubt the legitimacy of the current

Western normative structure.

Second, the likelihood that states will pursue territorial expansion following a threat

to status depends on whether or not territory played a role in the initial instance of

32 See Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,”

International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 54–86; David Kinsella and Jugdep S. Chima, “Symbols of Statehood: Military Industrialization and Public Discourse in India,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 3, (2001): 353-373; O’Neill, “Nuclear weapons and national prestige” ; Baldev Raj Nayar and Thazha Varkey Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Lilach Gilady, “Conspicuous Waste in International Relations,” Robert Ross, “China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the US Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 46 – 81; David Scott, “India’s Drive for a ‘Blue Water’ Navy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10, no. 2 (2008). Technological advance also propelled the rise of the dreadnought battleship as a symbol of status at the turn of the 20th century. See Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics.” Also Robert J Art, The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower: New Weapons and Weltpolitik in Wilhelminian Germany (Sage Publications, 1973).

33 See Forsberg et al., “Status and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy”; Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-first Century ( P r i n c e t o n , N J : Princeton University Press, 2014). While all fifteen of the previous Soviet states expressed support for territorial integrity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, their support can largely be attributed to pressure from the West. Zacher, “ The Territorial Integrity Norm,” 222.

34 As Larson and Shevchenko’s “Status Seekers,” 74 notes, numerous status hierarchies may exist at the same time.

15

humiliation or disrespect. The loss of territory is a source of significant international

humiliation; states which have been humiliated through the loss of territory are likely to

respond by engaging in territorial aggression aimed at reacquiring lost domains, if they

are able, or at taking territory elsewhere in order to signal their intentions of maintaining

the expansive foreign policy of a high status state. Similarly, if a state’s sphere of

influence has been disrespected, the disrespected state will likely assert the right to

claim territory, either disputed or otherwise, as would befit a state of its desired status.

Alternative Theories of Status-Seeking

This theory of status assertion overlaps to some degree with other status-based

theories of behavior. Social Identity Theory (SIT) posits that groups want to maintain

positive, distinctive identities and that a n unfavorable comparison with a reference

group engenders a desire to enhance one’s position.35 While states may choose to seek

status through less competitive strategies such as imitation and social creativity, they are

more likely to seek status through a strategy of social competition when the borders

between groups appears to be ‘impermeable.’36 Disrespect can be understood as a signal

of impermeability – as a sign that higher status states are unwilling to accept new

members into their ranks. Impermeability, however, suggests a sustained state of

restricted access over time, not solely in the form of disrespect. I argue instead that a

single instance of disrespect may be sufficient to lead states to engage in competitive

assertions of status. Instances of humiliation also increase the likelihood of competitive

35 Tajfel, “The Psychological Structure of Intergroup Relations.” 36 Social competition is the attempt to gain status at the expense of a particular rival by attempting to

outdo the superior state along dimensions of status on which they excel. The definition therefore is more specific than the concept of status competition examined in this paper.

16

strategies, though they are not signals of boundary impermeability. I also argue that

status-challenged states with sufficient capabilities are likely to first pursue competitive

strategies over imitation or social creativity for a number of reasons. First, as

suggested above, because humiliation and disrespect engender anger, they serve as a

trigger for aggressive action.37 Second, because competitive strategies rely upon

established bases of status, they are less risky than a strategy of creativity with which a

state may or may not succeed in establishing new dimensions of status. Finally,

competitive strategies also enable status-threatened states to send a more targeted

signal to states that have disrespected it than do imitation or creativity. This signal often

involves vigorously exercising the right or pursuing the exact interest that the

disrespected state was originally denied.

Wohlforth (2009) presents an alternative model, arguing that a state will compete

for status when it matches higher status states in some but not all of the key material

dimensions of status.38 He argues that periods of power transition create the conditions

for status ambiguity in which states have an incentive to strive for preeminence. I

argue, however, that while instances of humiliation and disrespect may be more likely

to occur during shifts in relative capabilities, states also experience humiliation and

disrespect when the distribution of capabilities is relatively stable and unambiguous.39

37 Mackie et al., “Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations” notes that whether or not this is

true depends upon the relative strength of the humiliated party. In “ Humiliation and the Inertia Effect,” Ginges et al. demonstrate that humiliation amongst Palestinians led to passivity rather than action, but under experimental conditions in which there is no lag between the humiliating prime and one’s reaction. Logically, actor’s responses to humiliation change over time as they regain their sense of power.

38 See Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” 38 - 40. 39 Instances of humiliation will be more likely as states experience relative decline in capabilities.

Disrespect may be more likely as states capabilities rise relative to others and dominant states are reluctant to acknowledge the shift. The European conquest and dominance over China in the middle of the 19th

17

Because of the difficulty of objectively measuring how one’s characteristics rank relative

to others, states obtain estimates of their status through the amount of consideration

they receive from others. Instances of disrespect allow for such estimates and therefore

serve as triggers for status seeking, whether the underlying distribution of forces is

shifting or not. Finally, realist analyses of status competition (e.g. Gilpin 1981) view

military aggression as arising from inconsistency between a state’s degree of influence

and its military power as states seek to demonstrate relative military capability.40 I

argue, in contrast, that status is partly but not wholly based on relative capabilities

and that direct military conflict is one among many status-seeking strategies. States

need not engage in direct conflict with rivals or in costly displays of capability or

resolve in order to demonstrate their ranking relative to others. Numerous less risky and

less costly status-seeking strategies, such as the extension of imperial control or the

adoption of policies opposed to dominant states, are available to humiliated and

disrespected states which allow them to signal the status they expect to hold in the

international system.

In summary, I argue that states which have been disrespected or humiliated and

century which served as the beginning of China’s “Century of Humiliation” did not result from a shift in military capabilities, but from stronger European forces coming into contact with a Chinese force which turned out to be weaker than it expected.

40 According to Gilpin, ‘prestige’ is the reputation for power; it rests in relative military capability,

though you know you have it when you can achieve your aims without using power. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, ( Cambridge University Press, 1981), 30 - 34. See also Michael D. Wallace, “Power, Status, and International War,” Journal of Peace Research 8, no. 1 (1971): 23–35; a n d Thomas J. Volgy and Stacey Mayhall, “Status Inconsistency and International War: Exploring the Effects of Systemic Change,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 1 (March 1995): 67–84 on status inconsistency.

18

which possess the capability to do so are likely to engage in acts that befit states of their

desired status. Status-threatened states do so in order to demonstrate their existing

influence in the international system and their intention to hold high status in the

future. This theory is demonstrated below through analysis of the initial acts of conquest

in the Scramble for Africa.

These cases were chosen for several reasons. First, territorial expansion, and

imperial expansion in particular, is so often attributed to material logics. Thus, the

cases of French and German expansion provide a hard test of the theory that fears of

declining status drive international behavior. Second, substantial documentary and

secondary source material is available on all facets of these cases, which is not true for

more contemporary instances of expansion. Third, these acts of conquest are of inherent

historical interest. They represented significant policy shifts for both France and

Germany. Expansion into Tunisia was France’s first act of conquest on the African

continent in over 20 years. The flag planted by Germany in South West Africa in 1884

was its first planted abroad. Understanding the motivation behind these consequential

policy shifts is essential to understanding the flurry of imperial conquest that

occurred in the years that followed.

The Scramble for Africa, 1881 - 1884

Over the seven decades prior to the Scramble in Africa, European states had shown

relatively little interest in establishing colonies in Africa. Prior to 1881, France and

Britain, the dominant powers of the time, held just under 4% of African territory, mostly

19

in the northern and southernmost tips of the continent.41 In the four-year period between

1881 and 1884, France, Germany and Britain annexed approximately four times that

amount. France acted first, annexing Tunisia in April of 1881 and then territory in the

Congo in November of 1882. In both cases, French leaders were motivated to reassert

French membership in great power club by international events which they believed cast

France’s long-standing great power status into doubt.42 The relatively new German state,

prompted by perceived British disrespect of its rights as an emerging power within the

great power club, then decided to acquire its first colonies ever, taking land in South

West in and East Africa between April and June of 1884. The adoption of expansionary

policies by France and Germany set off a series of policy shifts by Britain and Italy that

eventually led to the conquest of the continent.

The First Cases of French Expansion, 1881 - 1882: Tunisia and Congo

On April 28, 1881, thirty-six thousand French troops arrived on the shores of Tunisia in

what is considered to be the first act of expansion in the Scramble for Africa.43 By

May 8th, French troops had acquired Tunis and the second largest city Bizerta and

established a formal protectorate over Tunisia. For decades prior, the French had lacked

41 See Table 1. Data taken from Tir et al., “ Territorial changes, 1816–1996: Procedures and Data.” Of this expansion occurring prior to 1881, just 156,473 km2, or 13%, were taken at the hands of the British around South Africa while 87% was taken by the French, primarily in Algeria over a period of 40 years.

42 From November 1882 on, France actively pursued territory in Africa, taking land in Benin, Djibouti and Gabon by the end of 1884.

43 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism argue that the crisis in Egypt in 1882 prompted the Scramble for Africa as British moves led to French countermoves of expansion. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, C.W. Newbury and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, “French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa,” The Journal of African History 10, n. 2 (1969): 253–276 and Sanderson, “The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture?,” however, convincingly refute this argument.

20

any clear colonial calling or policy. Nevertheless, the French government, led by Jules

Ferry and Leon Gambetta, opted to conquer over 116,000 km2 of Tunisian territory.

This section will show this significant shift towards a forward policy in Africa was

motivated not by material, strategic or domestic considerations, as previous explanations

of imperial expansion in Africa suggest, but by the fear that other states would perceive

a permanent decline in French status if France did not act to reassert its intention to

remain a great power following its humiliating loss in the Franco-Prussian War and

the loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

Though France and Britain had competed around the globe for international

preeminence throughout the 18th century, their fates diverged in the 19th century.

Britain prevailed as the paramount seafaring and colonial power throughout the

century.44 France, on the other hand, had been defeated in the Napoleonic Wars and

struggled in its attempts to found a Second French Empire in Mexico and Algeria.45 In

1871, ‘l’annee terrible’, the country experienced its deepest humiliation yet: its

shocking defeat and the loss of 15,000 square kilometers in Alsace and Lorraine to a

supposedly weaker Prussia.46 While Prime Minister E mile Ollivier had entered the

Franco-Prussian war ‘with a light heart,’ failing to recognize the shortcomings of France’s

44 Britain controlled roughly 8 million square miles with major colonial holdings in Canada, Australia,

India and South Africa in 1871. 45 See S.S.H. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (F. Cass, 1963), 171. By

1870, France possessed territory only in Algeria and Cochinchina. 46 The humiliation of quickly losing to Prussia was arguably greater than losing after years of fighting

against many other powers. See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery ( N e w Y o r k : Picador, 2003). As Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1981) notes, the blow to French self-esteem was particularly intense since the French had announced its importance to their image and then lost, suffering a larger blow than they might have without such a declaration.

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military preparedness in the face of a larger, modernized Prussian force, the war ended

with Paris occupied and with Wilhelm I crowned German Emperor in the Hall of

Mirrors at Versailles.47 The defeat called into question France’s very existence as a

Great European power. Disraeli, for instance, commented in 1875 that he did “not see

any prospect of the revival of France as a military puissance. She is more likely to be

partitioned than to conquer Europe again.”48

The 1870s was a period of withdrawal and retrenchment for France as it

struggled to recover both economically and militarily from the war. While France

managed to return to its pre-1871 military capabilities by 1881, it remained humiliated

by the loss of the war and in particular by the loss of the provinces.49 Prime Minister

Leon Gambetta famously remarked that the French should ‘think of [the loss of the

territories] always, but speak of it never.’ The French people demanded revenge against

Chancellor Bismarck and the newly crowned German Emperor; they demanded the return

of the provinces. Germany ten years later however had become even stronger.

Attempting to exact revenge, French leaders realized, would risk further humiliation

however and the solidification of France’s decline in the eyes of others.50 French leaders

47 Elements of the treaty, such as the parade of Prussian soldiers down the Champs-Elysees, were

written in with the clear intention of humiliating the French. Alice L Conklin, Sarah Fishman and Robert Zaretsky, France and Its Empire Since 1870 (Oxford University Press, 2009), 31.

48 Letter from Disraeli to Lady Bradford in 1875. Quoted in Jean Ganiage, “France, England and the Tunisian Affair,” in France and Britain in Africa, ed. William Roger Louis and Prosser Gifford and (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 43.

49 The claim about relative military capabilities is supported by CINC data from Tir et al., “Territorial Changes, 1816–1996.”

50 As James Cooke puts it, following the humiliation of 1871, “Any offense to the national honor of the Third Republic simply could not be tolerated by patriotic Frenchmen.” James J. Cooke, New French Imperialism, 1880-1910: The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion (David & Charles, 1973): 15 - 17. Jules Ferry in particular had emphasized the need for caution. France needed to rebuild before reengaging in international affairs or else it would face a worse defeat.

22

sought not only the psychological satisfaction of revenge, but also the opportunity to

reassert France’s status as a first ranked power within the international community.51

French Chamber member Chailley-Bert described it most clearly, stating: “We had been

beaten in 1870. We had been demoted . . . from our position as the dominant power in

Europe and almost master of the world to the status of a second-class power. We were

dreaming of some event or effort through which we should later seek to recover our

position as a first-class power.”52 French leaders desired to prove that France maintained

the stamina to remain a great nation and by 1881, they had become convinced that the

annexation of Tunisia offered the means to do exactly that.53

Why then did France focus its efforts to reassert its status on Tunisia?

Territorial expansion abroad allowed France to remind the European community of its

ability to project imperial power abroad, as befit a Great Power, as well as its strength as

a seafaring nation.54 The act of expansion, however, also signaled France’s intention to

remain active in world affairs and to assert the rights it had long been afforded as a great

power.55 A failure to do so would equate to an implicit acceptance of a lesser position. As

Prime Minister Jules Ferry put it, “Should we steer French policy into a blind alley with

our eyes transfixed on the Vosges Mountains, leaving everything to be done, managed,

51 See Brunschwig, Mythes et Realites, 176. See also pp. 55 - 58. 52 Quoted in Ibid. p. 177. 53 See Winfried Baumgart and Ben V Mast, Imperialism: The Idea and Reality of British and French

Colonial Expansion, 1880-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982): 56. Also Henri Brunschwig, “Anglophobia and French African Policy,” in France and Britain in Africa, ed. Gifford and Louis, 23 - 24.

54 France did not perceive status to be gained only with expansion in Africa, but also in Asia from Saigon to Cochin China. See Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 75 - 88.

55 As Gabriele Hanotaux, later Minister of Foreign Affairs, put it, France engaged in Tunisia to prove its ‘savoir-faire et son energy.’ See Gabriel Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine 4, Furne ( 1903), 639.

23

and decided on without us and around us? This would lead to the bankruptcy of our

rights.”56

While the annexation of Tunisia came ten years following France’s defeat, the

subject of a French Tunisia did not first emerge in 1881. Rather, the idea was first

planted in the minds of French leaders three years earlier at the Congress of Berlin.

While it is unclear who first proposed the idea, both Bismarck and Salisbury advocated

a free hand for France in Tunisia at the 1878 meeting.57 Recognizing the building French

demand for resurgence and revenge on Germany amongst the French people, Bismarck

attempted to divert ‘the ambitions’ of the French away from Germany by offering French

Foreign Minister Waddington the opportunity for territorial expansion along the shores of

North Africa.58 British Lord Salisbury desired the annexation of Cyprus; an unchallenged

march into Tunisia was thought to be compensation for French acquiescence. That

France’s two most recent military rivals supported France’s actions in Tunisia did not

undermine France’s attempt to reassert its great power status both to the international

community as well as to itself. Both Bismarck and Salisbury expected French status

concerns to trigger a need for France to engage in a vigorous display of its great

56 Quoted in Ibid., p. 79. 57 For a thorough relevant history of the events prior to and in Berlin, see Thomas Francis Power,

Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism (King’s Crown Press, 1944): 35 - 38. 58 Bismarck was also motivated by the fear that French enmity for the Germans would lead to a

disastrous Franco-Russian Alliance. Bismarck had a plan to satisfy the ambitions of each European power at the Congress by providing them territory equivalent to their perceived esteem. He encouraged England to take Egypt, Russia to take Bulgaria, and France and Italy to carve out influence around the Mediterranean. See William L. Langer, “The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis, 1878-1881, I,” The American Historical Review 31, no. 1 (1925): 59-60 and Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy. While Waddington happily returned home from the Congress with Tunisia in his pocket, he was nearly as delighted that France once again was received at the tables of the Great Powers of Europe. See Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 37.

24

power status and merely sought to channel these aggressions away from the European

continent.59

France did not immediately send troops into Tunisia, however. While Waddington,

who became the Prime Minister of France in the following year, had immediately been

attracted to the idea of a resurgent French Empire, he realized he first needed the

support of the French public.60 The French people, weary from the long fight in

neighboring Algeria, became suspicious upon hearing that expansion into Tunisia was

being considered at the urging of Bismarck.61 Was he trying to distract them from a

surprise attack? Was he trying to divert their attention from the stolen provinces?62

Bismarck addressed these exact concerns quite directly to Saint-Vallier, the French

Ambassador to Berlin, disavowing the first possibility, but fully acceding to the

second. He had no Machiavellian intentions, he claimed. He did however want to

distract France from the pain caused by that “hole in the Vosges,” arguing that a ‘grand

pays’ like France deserved satisfaction for and distraction from her lost lands. While he

could not offer to return Alsace and Lorraine, he did believe that the conquest of

59 Both European leaders recognized the humiliation associated with France’s loss of territory. Bismarck had opposed the annexation of the provinces for fear that French humiliation would come back to bite him. Salisbury stated in 1871 that the ‘ceded [French] territory would be a constant memorial of humiliation.’ Quoted in A.L. Kennedy, Salisbury, 1830-1903: Portrait of a Statesman (J. Murray, 1953): 71. He further predicted that the French would act in response to the loss .

60 Waddington requested that the French General Counsel in Tunisia Theodore Roustan draft a protectorate treaty for Tunisia four days after he returned home from Berlin. Before Roustan was able to present the treaty to the Bey of Tunisia, Waddington called him to stop, citing domestic concerns. Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914. Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1ere Serie, Paris, 1929, Vol. III. Nos. 337 and 339. This series will be referred to as DDF from here on.

61 Upon hearing this news, protests filled the streets of Paris. Even those French statesmen who had worked closely with Bismarck assumed the worst of Bismarck’s intentions.

62 Thomas Pakenham, Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 - 1912 (New York: Abacus, 1992), ch. 7 and Henri Wesseling and A.J. Pomerans, Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914 (Westport, CT : Praeger, 1996), 28.

25

Tunisia would help ‘soothe France’s amour proper and satisfy its natural and legitimate

need for expansion.’63 In addition to his concern about the attitude of the French public, Waddington

was concerned about how the Italian government would react to a French move on Tunisia.

France had long been competing with Italy for influence in the territory.64 Upon hearing

rumors that France had been offered a free hand in Tunisia in 1878, Italy began a series of

diplomatic moves intended to counter French influence there.65 Prime Minister Freycinet

became particularly worried in 1879 when the Italian government paid more than four

times the asking price for a Tunisian railway. Convinced by Roustan, his man on the

ground, that France could not allow a lesser-ranked Italy to enhance its status before

France reestablished its own, Freycinet prepared to send troops into Tunis.66 French action

in Tunisia stalled, however, when Jules Ferry replaced Freycinet on September 23, 1880.

At the time that Ferry took office, neither Ferry, who would later become France’s

most ardent imperialist, nor Leon Gambetta, the leader of the opposition, showed any

interest in engaging in military action in Tunisia. Saint Vallier, Ambassador to Berlin,

had entreated Foreign Minister Saint Hillaire on January 26, 1881, imploring:

Save our country from the new humiliation, the new ‘amoindrissement’

63 DDF, Vol. III. Nos. 304, 307. As noted in Baumgart and Mast, Imperialism, 59-60, the practice of

allowing an adversary to overcome the sting of defeat was seen frequently in the 19th century. In Bismarck’s private correspondence, he emphasized the need to avoid a clash with France. Contrary to standard realist arguments, Bismarck was most concerned that another military engagement would thoroughly annihilate France now that Germany was so much stronger. See Pakenham, Scramble for Africa, 118.

64 The number of Italians in Tunisia was as high as 30,000 in 1880, while the number of French at the time was closer to 3,000. The Italians engaged in the vast majority of trade there as well. See Luigi Villari, The Expansion of Italy (London: Faber & Faber, 1930), 57- 58.

65 For a full description of the diplomatic competition in Tunisia between 1878 and 1881, see Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 38 - 42.

66 DDF, Vol. III, no. 109.

26

(lessening) that threatens us. . . We have our backs to the wall and Europe is

watching us to judge if we are still something; one act of firmness, or

energetic will. . . and we will resume our place in the good opinion of other

nations.67

Failure to act, he added, could relegate France to the ranks of Spain.68 Convinced by

the plea, Saint-Hillaire approached Ferry who expressed concern about domestic

and parliamentary opposition.69 The decision to invade, therefore, depended largely

on the position of Gambetta, whose change of heart on the matter can be

pinpointed to a conversation he had on March 23 with the Director of Political

Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baron de Courcel. A career diplomat,

Courcel had never taken an interest in commercial or financial matters. Rather, he

was long interested in the need to protect French honor and standing in the

world. According to his memoirs, Courcel pled his case for French expansion into

Tunisia to Gambetta exactly along these lines.70 Great power status was ephemeral,

he argued; action in Tunisia would bring honor to France and would stabilize

France’s international position. At no point in this pivotal conversation did Courcel

mention commercial or financial motivations in Tunisia. Gambetta was said to have

67 Ibid., No. 376. 68 Sanderson, “The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture? ,” 9. 69 Ferry responded, ‘Action in Tunis in an election year, my dear Saint-Hilaire, do not think of it.’

Quoted in Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine, vol. 4, p. 650. Gambetta was far more interested in focusing on continental affairs. See Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 48.

70 For detailed reference to Courcel’s memoirs, see Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine, vol. 4.Vol. IV, 650 - 652. Also Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 50, Jean Ganiage and Daniel Hemery, L’Expansion Coloniale de la France S ous la Troisieme Republique, 1871-1914 (Paris: Payot, 1968), 74 - 76.

27

left the meeting a convert, later that week announcing t h a t “In Africa, France will

take the faltering first steps of the convalescent.”71

After Gambetta pressed his followers into conversion, Jules Ferry quickly came on

board, requesting authorization to send troops immediately.72 In the eyes of his domestic

opponents, Ferry had played into the hands of Bismarck, had cost France the

friendship of Italy, and had provoked the British.73 His government was immediately

overthrown. Yet despite the opposition of the masses, French statesmen believed that

France was on course to reestablish itself in the eyes of other nations. Gambetta wrote

Ferry privately upon the signing of the treaty with the Bey of Tunis that “there will be

people everywhere who will not like it, but they will have to put up with it. France is

becoming a Great Power again.”74 That France had retrieved her status as a first-ranked

power by adopting a vigorous and expansive policy in Tunisia became a part of national

rhetoric.75

Alternative Explanations for the French Occupation of Tunisia

Not only did the key discussions amongst French leaders leading up to the invasion of

Tunisia in April of 1881 contain remarkably little consideration of the material, strategic or

social benefits that Tunisia might provide, the annexation lacked logical rationales along

these lines.76 First, France had little reason to expect any material windfall. While El

71 Quoted in R. Hyam, “The Partition of Africa,” The Historical Journal 7, no. 1 (1964): 154 -169. 72 Years later, Ferry attested the immense influence Courcel had in these affairs. See Power, Jules

Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 52. While raids of the Tunisian Kroumir tribes into Algeria were presented as the primary cause, the documents clearly attest that this was merely pretext for the intervention. Ibid., 51.

73 See George H Kelly, The Political Development of the French Overseas Empire Volume 3 (Stanford University Press, 1955).

74 Quoted in Estournelles de Constant, La Politique Francaise en Tunisie, 1891, p. 182. 75 See Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871-1914, chaps. 8 - 12. 76 Power in Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism remarks that references to raw

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Dorado myths about Sudan were pervasive at the time, there were few such myths

about Tunisia.77 French experience in neighboring Algeria had not engendered dreams

of profit or natural abundance. Rather, as one French explorer put it in 1870, the only

thing of plenty in Algeria was the desert and the only thing ‘plentiful in the desert was

air.’78 Moreover, by 1870, over 300,000 lives had been lost attempting to quell unrest in

neighboring Algeria. While the different domestic and demographic features of Tunisia

suggested that it would likely be easier to quell than had been Algeria, this did not

alter expectations about the degree to which North African colonies would materially

benefit the French state.

Moreover, there is little evidence that the French state engaged in expansion in

Tunisia at the behest of French coalitions of colonialists or entrepreneurs with parochial

interests. As Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1976) describes, French business remained

largely indifferent to colonial expansion throughout the 19th century and largely

clashed with the interests of the small and relatively inchoate colonial parties.79 While

French entrepreneurs with significant interest in Tunisian markets did campaign for

financial protections, there is no evidence that they had interest in or campaigned for full

materials, to potential markets, or other economic factors were ‘conspicuously lacking from Ferry’s creed.’ See pp. 196- 198.

77 See Sanderson, “The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture? ,” pp. 12 - 13. 78 Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925, p. 177. French President Grevy argued

at the time that Tunisia was not worth ‘un cigar a deux sous.’ Quoted in Ibid., p. 28. Tunisia in the 1870s was in bad financial and domestic straits. Twenty percent of the population had perished in famines in 1867 and 1868. The government was essentially bankrupt. Upon annexing the country, France assumed responsibility for Tunisia’s mounting international debts. Wesseling et al., Divide and Rule, 18.

79 Christopher M Andrew and AS Kanya-Forstner, “French business and the french colonialists”, The Historical Journal 19, no. 04 (1976): 981–1000. Wesseling et al. in Divide and Rule notes that pro-colonial coalitions did not become powerful in France until the turn of the century. See also Christopher M Andrew and Alexander Sydney Kanya-Forstner, “The French Colonial Party: Its Composition, Aims and Influence, 1885–1914,” The Historical Journal 14, no. 1 (1971): 99–128.

29

occupation of the territory.80 Even if special interests had petitioned French leaders for

expansion, the near-unanimous opposition of the French public to colonial expansion and

its suspicion that colonial enterprise benefited the few while costing the many made

support for special interests in an election year extremely costly while providing little

electoral advantage for French leaders.81

Additionally, the annexation of Tunisia made little strategic sense for France. Most

importantly, it did not serve France’s primary security imperative of maximizing its

continental security.82 Since France’s shocking defeat in 1871, France had become isolated

on the European continent while Germany had continued to grow in power. French

strategic concerns would have been better served by consolidating French economic and

military resources in order to shore up its defenses within Europe, rather than engaging

in far-flung colonial exploits with few perceived material benefits, as many argued at

the time.83 To many French politicians, colonies were more than a mere distraction;

80 See Wesseling et al., Divide and Rule and Andrew et al., French Business and the French Colonialists.

None of the large French companies with significant interests in Tunisia appear to have applied any pressure on French politicians for military action. This included the two companies with the largest financial investments in Tunisia as well as the railway company that had received concessions to build in Tunisia. A representative of a smaller company, the Compagnie Coulombel, which dealt in esparto grass, did urge the French counsul-general towards military action, though this request remained unknown to Jules Ferry prior to invasion. For more detail on the role of private interests, see Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 52 - 53. Moreover, while industrial production was increasing in France at this time, industrialists did not expect to find a market for these goods in Tunisia. See Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 197.

81 Ibid., 27. 82 Burt, The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth, From the American Revolution, 510

argues that the French did expand into Tunisia in effort to meet their strategic goals. France confronted demographic disadvantages and could make up for them by acquiring Tunisian men to fight Germany. There is little evidence however that France ever planned to incorporate or train Tunisian men within the French military. William Roger Louis, “The Berlin Congo Conference,” in France and Britain in Africa, eds. Gifford and Louis notes that any talk of adding men to the French military was placed in the context of reestablishing French status as a great power rather than in the context of existential security. See pp. 174 - 175.

83 See Cooke, New French Imperialism and Agnes Murphy, The Ideology of French Imperialism, 1871-

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they were a liability. As one prominent Bonapartist argued, colonies were ‘costly in

peacetime and dangerous in wartime.’84 Conquest and colonial administration would

dissipate the country’s strength just when she was most concerned with her continental

security.85 France also did not expand out of a concern about relative gains or a desire to

balance recent territorial gains by others. The annexation of Tunisia followed a period

of relative calm amongst the European powers; no state had acquired African territory

outside of South Africa in more than ten years.

Finally, French leaders were not swayed to expand into Tunisia by domestic

considerations. As stated above, protests broke out in the street upon word that

Bismarck was in support of the move and the government was quickly overthrown

following the invasion. The public, driven by an emotional desire for revenge and

unconstrained by thoughts of relative military capabilities, desired the return of the

lost provinces at any cost and viewed expansion into arenas farther afield as attempts

to divert their attention away from France’s rightful revanchist goals against Germany.

If anything, the French masses viewed colonies as a luxurious and costly distraction,

providing little commercial, economic or strategic benefit.86 As one newspaper described

at the time, “There has never been an epoch nor a country more indifferent to distant

adventures than the Third French Republic87. . .” French leaders, on the other hand,

1881 (Catholic: University of America Press, 1948). Clemenceau, an ardent anti-colonialist, argued that expansion into Tunisia was a strategic mistake that would prove to be a “military liability for freedom of action on the continent.” Quoted in Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 66.

84 Quoted in Ibid., 57. 85 See Ganiage, “France, England and the Tunisian Affair,” 53. Also see Brunschwig, Mythes et

Realites, 77 - 80. 86 Ganiage, “France, England and the Tunisian Affair ,” 53. 87 Quoted in Mary Evelyn Townsend and Cyrus Hendersen Peake, European Colonial Expansion Since

31

confronted more instrumental concerns about French demotion in the eyes of others and

viewed the move into Tunisia to be a clear signal to the international community that

France intended to remain in the great power club. French Expansion in the Congo, November 1882

In mid-1882, French leaders were generally satisfied with the statement made by

their larger footprint on the North African shore; they had no plans for a sustained march

through Africa. Another humiliating international event occurred, however, this time

diplomatic in nature, which would lead France to fully adopt a forward expansionary

policy in Africa, starting with an act of annexation in the Congo. Though French leaders

had long expressed disinterest in the Congo, on November 12, 1881, Duclerc submitted

for ratification an agreement signed by French explorer de Brazza and Makoko, chief of

the Bateke, in which the chief promised to “cede his territory to France. . . and his

hereditary rights of supremacy.”88 This case of French expansion cannot be understood

1871 (JB Lippincott, 1941). Also, while French leaders had expressed belief in the ‘safety valve’ function of colonies, such a desire to stave off domestic unrest through expansion fails to explain why France expanded when it did. Civil unrest had existed for more than a decade. See Wesseling et al., Divide and Rule, 17 - 18.

88 The French government had stated it had no interest in the Congo in 1880 when de Brazza set off. When de Brazza returned in 1881 with the signed treaty, Prime Minister Freycinet indicated it was a matter for the AIA, the charter company which had supported the trip, and not for the French government, which was officially not interested in the interior of Africa. See Jean Stengers, “King Leopold and Expansion in the Congo,” in France and Britain in Africa, ed. Louis and Gifford, 474. This again provides support against the theory that French leaders engaged in expansion at the behest of special interests, as Snyder in Myths of Empire might suggest. In September 1882, de Brazza informed the Belgian Foreign Minister that he was convinced that “neither the [French] government nor the Chambers would do anything [with regards to his treaty].” Ibid. De Brazza’s expeditions into the Congo coincided with those of Leopold II of Belgium, who cherished hopes of increasing Belgian prestige through colonial expansion. Leopold perceived colonies as ‘a means of giving us a more important place in the world’ – as a means to greatness. See V. Viaene, “King Leopold’s Imperialism and the Origins of the Belgian Colonial Party, 1860–1905,” The Journal of Modern History 80, no. 4 (2008): 741–790; Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (Palgrave Macmillan, 1996): 54. The desirability of the land in and of itself was secondary. As stated in Galbraith et al., The British occupation of Egypt , “Leopold wanted an empire anywhere. He wanted to

32

without considering the impact of the Egyptian Crisis, which had played out in the

months prior, on French attitudes.89

In the late 1870s, the British and French had assumed direct control over Egyptian

finances in an effort to protect the substantial financial investments of their citizens in the

face of a series of Egyptian economic crises. This gradual encroachment of Europeans

in Egyptian affairs engendered an Egyptian national movement that targeted British

and French bondholders in particular. Over the course of 1882, nationalist efforts to

eradicate European influence and to oust Egypt’s European-backed leader led to British

and French reprisals and a cycle of escalating violence. By mid-July, Gladstone became

convinced that direct military intervention was necessary.90 While his true motivation for

initiating an attack on the nationalist leader Urabi has been debated,91 we do know that

Gladstone initially proposed a joint attack on nationalist forces by both Britain and

France.92 Freycinet supported quelling the dissent, but wanted to avoid direct action in

Egypt, fearing the backlash of public support at the mounting costs of intervention.93 In annex any land anywhere and even land which others had abandoned.”

89 For a detailed account of the Egyptian Crisis and on British motivations, see Hopkins, The Victorians and Africa, G.N. Sanderson, England, Europe & the Upper Nile, 1882-1899: A Study in the Partition of Africa (University Press, 1965), chap. 1, Pakenham, Scramble for Africa, chap. 8 and Wesseling et al., Divide and Rule, 29-31. Also Agatha Ramm, Great Britain and France in Egypt, 1876 - 1882, in France and Britain in Africa, ed. Louis and Gifford.

90 Worried about angering the other European powers, Britain wanted to act only with their consent. On July 23, 1882, the six European powers agreed that the Suez Canal should be protected at whatever cost. See DDF, Vol. III, No. 455.

91 Robinson et al., Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, vol. 131 argue that the British were protecting the Suez Canal amidst the ‘anarchy’ of the nationalist revolt. Hopkins in The Victorians and Africa however argues that the British were prompted by the desire to protect the economic interests of British citizens and to achieve domestic political gains for the Liberal Party. See also Galbraith et al., The British Occupation of Egypt; D. Halvorson, “Prestige, Prudence and Public Opinion in the 1882 British Occupation of Egypt,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 56, no. 3 (2010): 423–440.

92 DDF, Vol. III, No. 408. 93 Freycinet had proposed the naval bombardment of Alexandria in May, but they increasingly

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lieu of an all-out invasion, Freycinet proposed joint intervention to protect access to the

Suez Canal. Even this more limited plan, however, failed to win the support of the French

Chamber, leading to Freycinet’s resignation the following day on July 30, 1882. In

August, 40,000 British troops entered Egypt alone, quickly occupying Cairo and

Alexandria and taking control of the Suez Canal. By October, the status quo in Egypt

had been irreparably altered; Gladstone requested a renegotiation of the distribution of

influence in the country, effectively omitting a role for France. The era of French

influence in Egypt was officially over. British troops, however, would remain on the

ground until 1936.94

The primary point of interest of this case for the purpose of assessing the role of

status concerns in the Scramble for Africa is less the British motivations for

occupation than the impact of the event on the French. France had considered itself as

having rights in Egypt superior to those of the other European Powers since the time

of Napolean.95 Though the blame for French inaction lay solely with the French

people and French Chamber, Egypt quickly became synonymous with an almost

intolerable affront to French self-esteem.96 The loss of Egypt was spoken of by some

disagreed with the British proposal to follow up any bombardment with Turkish ground forces.

94 Britain ended up in Egypt through ‘muddleheadedness’ and miscalculation rather than an intentional expansionist colonial policy. The British Foreign Secretary Lord Granville claimed that the conquest of Egypt had been ‘forced’ upon them and bemoaned to Lord Spencer that the British takeover of Egypt was “a nasty business, and we have been much out of luck.” Quoted in Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, 33.

95 This was according to an American consul in Cairo. See Sanderson, England, Europe & the Upper Nile, 114.

96 See Raoul Girardet, Le Nationalisme Francais: Anthologie, 1871-1914, volume 68 (Seuil, 1983) for numerous quotes and Jean Stengers, “L’Imperialisme Colonial de la Fin du XIX-siecle: Mythe ou Realite,” The Journal of African History 3, no. 3 (1962): 469-491. Also Sanderson, England, Europe & the Upper Nile, 115. The French press claimed that France had made a fool of itself in allowing itself to be supplanted.

34

in the same sentence as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, referred to as the “second disaster”

with consequences almost as disastrous for France as the war of 1871.97 This

humiliation, though self-imposed, engendered within France a renewed desire to assert

France’s status for fear that France would otherwise be reduced to the level of Italy or

Spain.98 While French leaders had not initially planned any expansion beyond Tunisia, the

notion that further annexation in Africa could compensate France for any decline in status

resulting from the Egyptian affair started to take root shortly after the British invasion.99

A few weeks after Gladstone’s October request to renegotiate the status quo in Egypt, the

French government ratified de Brazza’s treaty in an act of ‘patriotic grandeur.’100 King

Leopold of Belgium recognized that this new instance of French humiliation would impact

French colonial policy, informing Queen Victoria, “In Paris they are raging; they seek

a twofold revenge, against the Germans and for the success of the British in Egypt.

They want to expand in every direction. Tunis is not enough; they want the Niger and the

Congo in Africa.”101 French inaction in Egypt had called into question France’s

97 See Ibid., 114-116, and Christopher Andrew, Theophile Delcasse and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898-1905 ( Macmillan, 1968) for the impact of the loss of Egypt on Delcasse and his later policy towards Egypt during the Fashoda crisis.

98 Stengers, L’Imperialisme Colonial de la fin du XIX-Siecle lays out the stages of French reaction to the Egyptian crisis leading to the annexation of the Congo. Also Baumgart and Mast, Imperialism, 60.

99 Ibid., 59 - 62. For arguments in this vein, see the parliamentary debates on November 15, 1882 and December 12, 1882 in Assemblee Nationale, “Debats parlementaires,” Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise, 1882. Also Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa . and Brunschwig, Mythes et Realites.

100 Journalists and leaders alike perceived that the annexation of the Congo arose out of a hit to French self-esteem. The French regarded expansion into the Congo “as an enterprise of great patriotism” with France wanting “to recoup her eviction from the Nile by the English by evicting the Belgians and the Portuguese from the northern parts of the Congo territory,” said The Koelnische Zeitung. Quoted in Stengers, King Leopold and Expansion in the Congo, p. 165. The French press played a role in publicizing the French humiliation in Egypt and the nationalist need for France to assert itself elsewhere. In this case, unlike in Tunisia, the French public was largely supportive of expansion in the Congo, though they had heard little to nothing about the material or strategic advantages of taking land there.

101 Quoted in Ibid, 166.

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intentions to once again be a preeminent seafaring power with unmatched influence.

Action in the Congo would serve to reiterate these intentions to both a domestic and an

international audience.102

Importantly, this move to ratify the annexation of the Congo in an effort to

repair France’s image was in all other ways rash. The government did so without at all

examining the financial or international implications of the treaty. Not only were leaders

not guided by material or strategic interests in ratifying the treaty, they knew virtually

nothing about the whereabouts or the characteristics of the annexed lands. As Stengers

has put it, “Never has a government submitted to parliamentary ratification a treaty of the

reality and results of which it knew so little.”103 To date the French government had also

taken great care to not provoke the British in their quest for greater influence. The

British up to this point had expressed little interest in west Africa, a region its leaders

acknowledged as having little material or economic value, leaving Duclerc convinced

that it’s annexation provided the least costly way for France to signal its intention to

maintain great power status.

Early German Expansion, 1884: Angra Pequena, Togo and the Cameroons

Amongst European statesmen, there had been no more ardent anti-imperialist

than Bismarck. In 1868, he defended Prussian abstention from colonial expansion,

saying:

102 This quest for renewed prestige in the Congo continued under Ferry when he returned to office in

February the following year. In search of Parliamentary support, he pressed the fact that enlarged French holdings in equatorial Africa would contribute significantly to the stature, the glory and the prestige of France. See Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, 88- 91.

103 Quoted in Ibid., 475. See also Baumgart and Mast, Imperialism, 62.

36

The advantages which people expect from colonies for the commerce and

industry of the mother country are mainly founded on illusions, for the

expenditure very often exceeds the gain. . . , as is proved by the experience of

England and France in their colonial policy.104

Bismarck had yet to change his tune by 1881, a year before France annexed Tunisia,

stating “I don’t like colonies at all. They are only good as supply posts.”105 He worried

not only about a colonial drain on resources and the costs associated with administering

them, but was also about the drain on German military capabilities as colonies would

require protection from powerful naval fleets which Germany did not at the time

possess. Furthermore, Bismarck had serious misgivings about becoming more reliant

on parliament or individual states and about increasing the tax burden or federal deficit

in order to amass funds to support colonial initiatives.106 He maintained his anti-

colonial policy up until only a few months prior to Germany’s first act of annexation

in April 1884, turning down parochial requests for colonial establishment in South West

Africa and East Africa as late as December 1883.107 Between April and October of

1884, however, Bismarck claimed territory first at the South West African port of Angra

Pequena, current day Namibia, and then in Togo and the Cameroons.

104 Quoted in Helmet Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings until the Second World War (Hurst & Co., 1986), 17. For more quotes to this effect, see Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 3: The Period of Fortification, 1880–1898 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). 105 Ibid., p.114. 106 See William Otto Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History ( Frank Cass and Co., 1962), 10

- 12, Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918, 76 and Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany , 122 - 123.

107 Hal Ashby Turner, “ Bismarck’s Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?,” in Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, ed. Prosser Gifford and William R o g e r Louis, ( N e w H a v e n , C T : Yale University Press, 1967) 59 - 66.

37

What explains this dramatic change of heart? Given his persistent doubts about

the utility of colonization, why ultimately did Bismarck decide to follow Britain,

France, and Belgium into the colonizing fray? Historians have long debated the impetus

for this shift in policy.108 They have largely rooted their explanations in general economic,

financial and social trends of the time, citing the desire for economic growth, the desire

for a solution to overpopulation and domestic discontent, and finally the desire for

electoral support from imperialist domestic interest groups.109 As will be shown,

however, each of these general explanations confronts serious challenges.110 Analysis of

the statements surrounding Bismarck’s shift in attitude indicate instead that his decision

to annex was in direct reaction to the high-handed and overly assertive colonial policy of

the British. In particular, Bismarck felt it necessary to signal to Britain Germany’s

intentions to exercise its right to annex territory abroad, a right it believed it was

afforded by its status as a relatively new great power. He believed that a failure to

assert rights associated with great power status risked demotion of Germany’s

newfound status.

British Indifference, German Status and African Colonies

108 See W.O. Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 -1885 ( Philadelphia Press, 1937);

Mary Evelin Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1922); Gifford and Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa; Taylor et al., Germany’s First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885. The difficulty in assigning motivation is largely attributed to Bismarck as the singular and often equivocating source of German foreign policy.

109 Many have refuted A.J.P. Taylor’s controversial argument that Bismarck’s expansion into Africa was aimed at angering the British in order to draw closer to the French. Sanderson in “The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture?” notes that it is not clear why the Germans needed a quarrel with England to arrive at this outcome nor why he would have aimed to anger Britain through colonial expansion rather than exploiting British strategic vulnerability in Egypt. See also Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 -1885 .

110 These explanations focus on placing German expansion into a larger trend rather than on the exact events and statements made by German statesmen in the months preceding the first case of German annexation in Africa.

38

Bismarck first received a request for the official “protection of the flag of the German

Empire” from Herr Luderitz, a factory owner in Angra Pequena, in November of

1882.111 Bismarck felt it necessary, as he had in the past, to first inquire with the

British who held territory in the vicinity before extending consular protections to

German citizens in Africa, a testament to the extent that Bismarck above all had

prioritized maintaining good relations with the British and respecting their interests

abroad.112 In February 1883, Bismarck wrote to notify London of Luderitz’s request,

stating that Germany “would be happy to see England extend her efficacious protection

to the German settlers in those regions” and adding that Germany “naturally reserved

the right to grant protection herself if the settlements in question lay outside England’s

influence. . .”113 Bismarck’s intention was to provide basic consular protections, but only

in the case that the British were not willing to extend their own.114 The British

understood this inquiry to be very much in keeping with Bismarck’s ardent anti-colonial

stance.

Six months later, Bismarck, however, had yet to receive any indication from the

British as to their interests in the area. In September, he requested for the German embassy

in London to make a “cautious inquiry” to the British with the intention of establishing

British intentions towards the territory as well as the basis of any claim to title of the

111 Recognizing that the improbability that his request would be denied, Luderitz downgraded his request to that of the basic consular protections afforded all German citizens abroad in January 1883.

112 The British held only the guano-rich Walfisch islands off the coast. 113 Translated from the German in Turner, Bismarck’s Imperialist Venture, 57 - 58. Many related

German communiques are in Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 -1885, 32 - 39. 114 He continued throughout the months that followed to deny requests for anything more than consular

protection even in African locales where German trading interests were directly and immediately threatened by the British.

39

land that the British might have had. He requested the ambassador inquire about

provisions the British might make for the protection of German traders in the case

that title was claimed.115 Response was again, however, slow in coming. On November

12th, ten months after his initial inquiry, an increasingly impatient Bismarck again asked

the British directly if they claimed sovereignty over the territory.116 Only on November

17th did Bismarck receive an official British response. It stated that although the British

had no interest in, title to, or intention to occupy Angra Pequena, they would perceive

“any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign power...[to] infringe their legitimate

rights.”117 This response left Bismarck surprised and incensed. The British were

effectively declaring a ‘Munro[sic] doctrine for Africa,’118 attempting to unfairly exclude

the influence of all other powers from the continent regardless of whether Britain had

interest in or intention to occupy the territory or not.119 Setting aside his concerns

about raising the ire of the British as well as his doubts about the advantages of

imperialism, he responded in December with a strongly worded letter requesting that

Britain provide a legitimate basis for its claim and citing an extensive list of the

115 Ibid., pp. 35. 116 Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885, 167. 117 Quoted in Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, 124. 118 Letter from Bismarck to Count Munster, May 25th, 1884. E.T.S. Dugdale, German Diplomatic

Documents 1871-1914: Bismarck’s Relations with England 1871-1890, volume 1. 119 This perception was augmented by the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of February 1884

which designated the mouth of the Congo River as Portuguese territory. Given Portugal’s role as a British puppet, the treaty was perceived to be a veiled attempted by the British to expand their influence. See Hal Ashby Turner, “Bismarck's Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?,” in Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, ed. Gifford and Louis, 65. This high- handed behavior by the British was not limited to Africa. In January of 1884, London rejected Bismarck’s claims for a joint commission to address German claims to Fiji.

40

numerous British disavowals of their title to and interest in the area over the years.120

Upon delivering Bismarck’s response to the British, Count Munster, Germany’s

ambassador in London, felt the need to soften Bismarck’s language, suffused as it was

with impatience and annoyance. This inquiry too went unanswered for six months,

however, leaving Bismarck to fume in March that the British had handled the Angra

Pequena affair, “not only with indifference but with severity and deliberate injustice.” On

April 24, 1884, without receiving any response to his strongly worded note, Bismarck

ordered the German flag to be planted at the port and Germany took responsibility for

protection of the Angra Pequena settlement.

Within a few months, Bismarck’s hope that the British would extend sovereignty

over the Angra Pequena territory in order to protect German traders had morphed

into anger at Britain’s unfair treatment and a desire to teach Britain a lesson that it

could not ride roughshod over the interest of other European powers.121 As a result, he

proceeded to acquire not only Angra Pequena but also territory within Togo and the

Cameroons, failing to notify the British of the latter until after the fact.122 Following

these initial annexations, Bismarck felt it necessary to convey his annoyance at British

high-handed behavior. Stating that Germany would not abide by the “arrogance and

120 He had sent a similar inquiry to London in 1880, for instance, upon the request of protection of

missionaries in South West Africa, to be told that London had no interest in the area and would not be able to extend such protections.

121 Stig Forster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Ronald E. Robinson, Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford University Press, 1988), 153; Turner, “ Bismarck’s Imperialist Venture.”

122 There is evidence that Bismarck intentionally deceived the British as to his true intentions in April and May, allowing them to believe he was only extending consular protections most likely so that the annexations would be a fait accompli. Ibid., p. 71. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, vol. 1.

41

selfishness of the English for ever,” he wrote to Munster that “. . . the Munro[sic] Doctrine,

that monstrosity in International Law, was being applied in favor of England to the

coast of Africa. . . This naıve egoism is in itself an insult to our national feeling . . . The

‘quod licet Jovi, etc.’ cannot be applied to Germany.”123 Why was it that England

forbade others from the right to colonize, a right which England practiced so actively,

Bismarck wondered?124 It was exactly this sense of a British double standard – the

British belief that its elevated status somehow privileged it in ways that it was unwilling

to grant to others – that prompted Bismarck’s colonial turn. A failure to assert

Germany’s right to acquire colonies, a right Germany should be afforded because of its

high status, in the face of such disrespect would threaten Germany’s status over the long

term. Bismarck declared as such to Munster:

London is not showing the consideration to our overseas trade to which it is

entitled. If we fail to push our rights with energy, we shall risk, by letting

them sink into oblivion, falling into a position inferior to England, and

strengthening the unbounded arrogance shown by England and her

Colonies in opposition to us. . . Seeing the want of consideration shown in

British colonial policy, modesty on our part is out of place.125

It was not simply the extension of British influence around the globe, but the fact that

the British extended their influence without due consideration for those of near-

123 Letters from Bismarck to Count Munster, May 25th, and June 1st, 1884. Dugdale, German

Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914 , vol. 1. 124 Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 - 1885 , 72. 125 Letter from Bismarck to Count Munster, August 7, 1884. Dugdale, German diplomatic documents

1871- 1914 , vol. 1.

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equivalent status that motivated Bismarck to annex territory abroad, an act reserved for

those with great power status.126

For its part, London was shocked upon hearing of the German claims. The British

had long taken Bismarck at his anti-colonial word and had not expected his change of

heart regarding German colonies. They felt it necessary to apologize for the slight, with

Granville claiming to have been guided by the belief in Bismarck’s anti-colonialism

when he deemed German colonial inquiries to be of secondary importance. Beyond a

mere apology, the British focused on righting the wrong with a spirit of generosity. The

British cabinet decided in mid-June that Bismarck, who they recognized was greatly

irritated with the British Government because of Angra Pequena, “was to have all he

wanted.”127 In September of 1884, Gladstone made clear his low regard for the quality

of Germany’s new colonies, stating: “The world contains other waste places in want of

occupants which would reward plantation better than these. Great Britain is very far

from grudging their annexation to Germany. Colonization is costly and troublesome

work.”128

Bismarck’s lesson for the British was not finished however.129 Following months

of conspiring with the French about how to confront unchecked British arrogance in 126 See Forster et al., Bismarck, Europe and Africa . This explanation was supported by Bismarck’s son, the only person who according to Bismarck, possessed knowledge of all of his secrets. He claimed that Bismarck had been motivated first and foremost by the need to check British arrogance. Robert O Collins, The Partition of Africa: Illusion or Necessity?, vol. 67, (John Wiley & Sons, 1969), 91.

127 Quoted in Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 -1885, 97. Sir William Harcourt apologized profusely to Prince Herbert Bismarck on June 22, ad indicated that Germany could have all of Fiji and any land she might be interested in in Africa. See Ibid., 99.

128 Thomas Curson Hansard, Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series [1830-1891]., TC Hansard, 1891, 978- 979.

129 Murray in “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics” has shown that this was just the beginning of a long period of German status assertions continuing into the next century. German status concerns motivated its policy of Weltpolitik and its pursuit of an imperial navy and dreadnought battleships.

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Africa, Bismarck convened the Berlin Conference in November 1884, a gathering intended

to address the ‘miniature scrambles’ starting to multiply along the African coasts, but

intended to have a far greater symbolic significance.130 For Bismarck, who had only

entered the colonial game in the few months prior, there was no greater recognition of

Germany’s status as an imperial great power than British willingness to convene in Berlin

in order to discuss African affairs.131

Alternative Explanations for the First Stage of German Imperialism

As with discussions leading up to France’s early acts of annexation in Africa,

Bismarck’s correspondence and recorded conversations regarding Germany’s first acts of

imperial expansion contained little reference to material, economic or strategic

calculations. Moreover, expansion into Angra Pequena lacked a logical economic or

strategic rationale. Bismarck had little reason to expect great material reward in the

region.132 Numerous reports had circulated prior to annexation about the barren deserts

of South West Africa, a place devoid of water but replete with restless natives.133 Prior to

official annexation, one German explorer reported back that the port was ‘inhospitable

130 That the conference was intended as a further lesson to the British was made clear in part by Bismarck intention to declare it an international rule that colonial land be occupied in order for a claim to be legitimate. See Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, “Consequences of the Foundation of the German Empire: Colonial Expansion and the Process of Political-Economic Rationalization,” in Bismarck, Europe and Africa. The Berlin Africa Conference and the Onset of Partition, eds. Stig Forster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Ronald E. Robinson, (Oxford University Press, 1988), 105–20.

131 Robinson has described the conference as a ‘ritual drama signifying a change in seniority between sibling nations.’ To dramatic effect during the conference, Bismarck declared to the Reichstag ‘the astonishment’ of the British at ‘their cousins, the land rats [taking] suddenly to seafaring’ and warned Britannia that its hegemony overseas was over. Ronald Robinson, “ The Conference in Berlin and the Future in Africa, 1884–1885,” in Bismarck, Europe, and Africa, ed. Forster, et al., 8 - 9. This was despite having fully supported British colonial expansion not a year earlier.

132 See quotes attesting to how little value he expected there in Brunschwig, Mythes et Realites, 75. See also Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa, 16-20; Woodruff D. Smith, The German Colonial Empire (University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 27- 34.

133 von Strandmann, Consequences of the Foundation of the German Empire, 107.

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even for a penal colony.’134 Another stated, “It is one of the least economic coasts on

earth. . . no tree, no bush, no leaf is to be seen, nothing but sand.”135 Furthermore, the

British had held islands directly off the coast since 1867 but had never expressed the

slightest interest in the region, attesting to the area’s lack of obvious natural appeal.

Even if there had been abundant material resources within the region, extracting them

would have required a significant amount of infrastructural development, investments

Bismarck was absolutely not willing to make. Even after official annexation,

Bismarck’s attitude toward the colonies remained one of ‘indifference,’ much to the dismay

of the explorers and few settlers there, and official colonial policy was that the state

would play as small a role as possible in colonial administration or protection.136

Furthermore, he had little reason to believe that private investors would fill the need for

capital given their reluctance to fund colonial exploits in the years before and long after

annexation.137

It is also very unlikely that Bismarck was substantially swayed by the possibility of

generating economic growth through the acquisition of new markets or by an increase in

German exports to South West Africa. The German economy had been hit hard by

the economic crisis of 1873, a crisis caused by industrial over expansion funded by

war reparations paid by France following its loss in the Franco-Prussian War.

134 Quoted in Turner, Bismarck’s Imperialist Venture, 60. 135 Another German explorer, upon visiting the new protectorate, exclaimed “What a terrible desert we

have acquired.” Both quoted in Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 3, 134. 136 His colonial model differed dramatically from the hands-on French approach in that he desired for the

state to play as small a role as possible in the administration and protection of the colonies von Strandmann, Consequences of the Foundation of the German Empire, 106 - 107.

137 African investments were deemed to be highly risky, and with safer more profitable investments closer to home and abroad on other continents, not worth the risk. Ibid.

45

Attention after the crisis shifted towards a need for larger markets to absorb German

industrial goods.138 The completely undeveloped, largely unpopulated area around

Angra Pequena however offered no possibility of boosting the demand for such goods.139

Substantial infrastructural investment would be required to create an industrial

marketplace but, as mentioned, neither the government nor German capitalists were

willing to front such investments.140 In keeping with more particularist explanations of

expansion, such as that of Snyder (1991), domestic financial and trading groups did

propagandize for German expansion overseas.141 The vast majority of these groups,

however, w as small in size and influence and generated little direct financial or

commercial involvement in Africa prior to or after the formation of the colony.142

Additionally, Bismarck historically had had no problem keeping interest groups at bay.

By assuming direct control over Angra Pequena, Bismarck met the demands for

protection by the traders at the Angra Pequena post. As the case evidence suggests

above, however, the protection of German trading interests there was more a side effect

of Bismarck’s primary aim of signaling German status to the British than it was a

motivating aim in itself.

Another oft-cited explanation for German expansion into Africa was growing social

138 Hobsbawm, Age of Empire 1875-1914 .

139 von Strandmann, Consequences of the Foundation of the German Empire, 106 - 107. 140 Famous German explorer Friedrich Fabri complained in 1885 of the inertia of ‘our financiers and

capitalists’ in colonial matters. See Ibid., 110. 141 Snyder argues that German expansion was far more likely to occur when German domestic politics

was cartelized and run by groups of elites, from 1890 to 1918, or was dominated by a single dictator as it was in the 1930s and 40s than it was under the unitary oligopoly of Bismarck. S n y d e r , M y t h s o f E m p i r e , 68 - 69, 99.

142 As Smith notes in The German Colonial Empire, the largest trading group advocating overseas expansion was facing bankruptcy at the time. See pp. 7 - 10.

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unrest due to the economic crisis and booming population and the resulting need to

acquire territory for German settlement abroad.143 Germany held too many people,

the argument went, and expansion abroad could act as a ‘safety valve’ to prevent disorder

if domestic conditions became too difficult.144 For many of aforementioned reasons,

however, emigration to the African colonies was not perceived as an attractive

opportunity for settlement. Beleaguered by a lack of investment, the regions suffered

from poor communication, insufficient resources, and the hostility of native populations.

Very few Germans ever emigrated to German colonies in Africa. By 1913, only 23,500

Germans lived within all of Germany’s African holdings.145

Finally, Bismarck was not motivated by strategic motivations in his choice to

annex African colonies. The locations of the colonies were determined far more by what

territories were available at the time and by the position of German explorers on the

ground than they were by any foresighted strategic calculations. Prior to annexation,

Bismarck believed colonial adventures generated strategic weakness. The German

empire, scattered in far-flung regions across the continent, lacked geographical unity and

presented exactly the challenge to effective defense that Bismarck had feared.

Conclusion

143 Wolfgang Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918, chap. 5. The British also had the impression that Bismarck’s colonial shift was prompted by the jingoistic demands of the German public. Bismarck’s letters do convey a desire to take electoral advantage of growing nationalist sentiment. See Louis and Gifford, Britain and Germany in Africa, 24. It appears however that Bismarck strategically released information about the arrogant British treatment of German interests to the German press in order to arouse such popular anti-British, pro-colonial sentiments. See Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 -1885 and Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, 56 - 59.

144 The population increased by 25% to 50 million between 1871 and 1890. See Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 3, 116.

145 Forster et al., Bismarck, Europe and Africa , 125.

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This article has demonstrated that humiliated and disrespected states are likely to

engage in competitive status-seeking behavior and that they are often willing to do so in

spite of their material and strategic interests. The cases above demonstrate that

responses to humiliation and disrespect need not involve demonstrations of one’s

military effectiveness relative to that of potential rivals. France, in a move that

undoubtedly changed few minds about its military capability relative to that of

potential European rivals, handily acquired control of the bankrupt Tunisian government

within less than two weeks. Similarly, Germany’s initial act of imperialism involved little

more than planting a flag at a remote, barren port. Rather, both states sought to signal

their expectation of holding higher status by exercising the prerogatives associated with

their desired status.

Because it often threatens the status, security and interests of other states, status

seeking engendered by humiliation and disrespect often has a significant impact on

international behavior. Germany’s decision to become an empire, for instance,

generated status concerns for Italy, leading it to embark upon a colonial policy of its

own.146 While in 1882 President Mancini privately decried the system of territorial

colonies as ‘sterile and harmful . . . a source of weakness rather than of strength,’ in May

1884, he ordered the occupation of Massawa in current-day Eritrea in January of

1885.147 The timing of this shift in attitude can be pinpointed almost exactly to

146 See Alessandro Brogi, “Competing Missions: France, Italy, and the Rise of American Hegemony in

the Mediterranean,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 4 (2006): 741–770; Collins, The Partition of Africa; Robert Hess, “Germany and the Anglo-Italian Colonial Entente,” in Britain and Germany in Africa, eds. Louis and Gifford; Cedric James Lowe and Frank Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940, Vol 8 ( Taylor & Francis, 2001); Sanderson, “The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture?.”

147 May 20, 1884. Lowe et al., Italian Foreign Policy, 1870 - 1940, 37.

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Bismarck’s imperial debut. Italian statesman came to see German actions as setting a

new precedent that threatened the relegation of Italy to a lower status.148 As one diplomat

stated at the time, “Germany had acted; Italy must act.”149 If Italy were to ever acquire

its ‘place in the sun’, it would have to ‘abandon prudence’ and engage in costly African

expansion like the other European powers.150

The French and German adoption of forward policies in Africa also presented

direct threats to Britain’s unchallenged status as the preeminent seafaring power. With

the French ratification of the Congo treaty and the possibility of French ownership of

much of the west coast of Africa, the British began to detect a consistent French policy

of anti-British antagonism.151 British leaders also increasingly confronted the antagonistic

intentions of the ‘young and ambitious’ Germany, which was continuing its assault on

Britain’s ‘Munro [sic] policy’ in the west. Over time, British leaders came to realize that

if Britain were to remain a preeminent power, they could not allow themselves to be

‘cheeked by Bismarck or anyone else.’152 Without a ‘positive and vigorous effort’ to assert

British rights as the preeminent power, Britain would be left behind, suffering the

148 Italy’s claim to great power status during the late 19th century was tenuous at best. See R.J.B. Bosworth, Italy, The Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

149 Quoted in Ibid., p. 14. 150 January 27, 1885. Quoted in Carlo Zaghi, PS Mancini, L’Africa e Il Problema del Mediterraeno,

1884- 1885 (G. Casini, Roma, 1955). The Italian statesman di Rudini later acknowledged that Italy had sought colonies “in a spirit of imitation . . . for pure snobbism.” Quoted in Langer, The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis, 1878-1881, I , 281.

151 See Boyce, Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997, 14 - 16. Aside from the Cape Colony Egypt, Britain had opted against major expansion into Africa in the 19th century, despite its unrivaled ability to do so through most of the period.

152 Chamberlain in 1885. Quoted in Taylor et al., Germany’s First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885, 71. As late as December 1884, Prime Minister Gladstone was writing to Granville regarding further British expansion, “I see great objection to it; and generally considering what we have got I am against entering into a scramble for the remainder.” December 7, 1884. Quoted in Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 -1885, 164.

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inevitable decline of an empire. As The Times put it, “With the colonies massed around

us we can hold our own in the ranks of the world Powers . . .without them we must sink

to the position of a merely European kingdom a position which for England entails slow

but sure decay.” British leaders agreed, with Chamberlain stating that a failure to

expand further would ‘strike at the root cause of our great position.’153 By the turn of

the century, Britain – the once reluctant imperialist – had acquired possession of over

roughly one-quarter of the entire African continent.154 The European powers collectively

had assumed control of 95% of the entire African continent.

While concerns about status have not generated similar competition for territory

over the last century, recent territorial claims by Russia and China suggest that the

potential for status-driven conquest remains.155 The likelihood that states in the

contemporary system will seek status through territorial expansion increases in cases in

which states’ spheres of interest are disrespected by prominent powers within the

international community. Territorial expansion, however, is only one of many ways that

states in the contemporary international system may assert their status following instances

of humiliation or disrespect. States may choose to lead multilateral interventions, to

conduct weapons tests or to form regional economic institutions.156 Regardless of the

153 By 1890, Britain’s transition to a self-conscious imperialistic power was complete. It became, as

Porter has described, like a “cock-bird, blowing up his feathers to assert his dominance to rivals.” B. Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970 (New York: Longman, 1975), 119.

154 Sanderson, “The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture?,” 28. 155 China has also referenced its “Century of Humiliation” in connection with its controversial

territorial claims in the South China Sea. See William A Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 2 (2004): 199–218; William A. Callahan, “The Cartography of National Humiliation and the Emergence of China’s Geobody,” Public Culture 21, no. 1 (2009): 141–173; David Scott, “India’s Drive for a Blue Waternavy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10, no. 2 (2008). 156 Following Bill Clinton’s 1995 decision to offer a visa to Taiwanese President Lee Deng-hu, China

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exact competitive status-seeking strategy contemporary states engage in, we should expect

the general conditions outlined in this article to apply. States that have been humiliated or

disrespected will be likely to engage in competitive behaviors in an effort to secure their

status. As with French and German conquests in Africa in the 1880s, the actions such

states take in the contemporary world are likely to have far-reaching consequence

engaged in missile tests over Taiwan. See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David Lampton (Stanford University Press, 2001). China’s recent move to create the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as an alternative to the World Bank can also be understood as an act of status competition.

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