Stephen M. MaurerScience Policy PP190-01/PP290-01April 13, 2006

WMD Terrorism: Risks & Responses

Introduction

TerrorismIntentCapability

CBRN Technology(Mostly B and R)

ViewpointsBarriers to EntrySocial PsychologyCost-Benefit

Necessary Conversations

Overview

IntentRational GoalsThe Case for Mass ViolenceThe Case for WMD

Capabilities

Necessary Conversations

Terrorism

Intent

Terrorism

The Rational Actor Hypothesis

Thanatos & Romanticism

The Socialists Patients Collective (1975)Cult and Suicide AnalogiesYouth

Terrorism

Traditional Rationales for Terrorists:

“No Alternative”Revolution – Destroying and Replacing the StateDestroying the EconomyPublicity & PropagandaObtaining Concessions/Forcing WithdrawalProvoking a CrackdownCatalyzing Diplomacy/Foreign InterventionSupporting Major Military OperationsCredibilityBlocking Political SolutionsMoneyHolding Territory

Terrorism

Traditional Rationales for Sponsors

Large vs. Small Sponsors

Benefits:A Cheap Foreign Policy CapabilityIncreases Nuisance Value

But Only if Sponsor Can Renounce.

Drawbacks:Difficult to Terminate Miscalculation (El Dorado Canyon)IsolationInconsistent With WMD

Terrorism

Mass ViolenceLibyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 (February 1973)Operation Mt. Carmel (July 21, 1973)September 11

Is Mass Violence a Sensible Strategy?

Terrorism

Deaths in “Total Wars.”

Napoleonic WarsFrance (5%)

American Civil WarNorth (1.4%) South (2%)

World War IFrance (4.4%) German (3%)

World War IIGermany (6%)Japan (2.7%) USSR (18%)

Terrorism

TerrorismNovel Weapons

Western Front (1914)US and England (1930s)London (1940) Berlin (1944)Korea (1950)Baghdad (2005)

Lessons: People are ResilientModern State is ResilientWMD

Capabilities

Terrorism

Terrorism

Probabilities of FailureLone Actors vs. ComplexityTechnologyTradecraftGetting People to DieGetting People to Kill

Simple AttacksSuicide Bombers (25% failure rate)

Complex AttacksIsraeli “Wrath of God” TeamsNazi Saboteurs

9/11 Conspiracy

Mid-1999: KSM gives Hazmi, Abu Bara, and Khallad basic training in English phrases, reading phone books, renting apartments, etc.

1999: Yemeni citizens Khallad and Abu Barra cannot obtain visas and are unable to learn English.

Mid-1999 Yemeni police arrest Khallad by mistake as part of the Cole investigation. Khallad’s father gets him released.

January 2000 Hazmi and Mihdar enter the US. KSM relaxes security so that they can receive support from San Diego Mosque.

Terrorism

9/11 Conspiracy

March 2000 Mihdar starts “ranting and raving” over a security deposit.

May 2000: Hazmi and Mihdar give up trying to learn English. Flight school becomes impossible.

June 2000: Mihdar goes AWOL and tells his cousin that Bin Laden is planning five attacks in the US. Bin Laden prevents KSM from firing him.

June 2000 Hazmi is bored in Mihdar’s absence and asks KSM for permission to search for a wife on the Internet. He tells a coworker that that he will “become famous.”

Terrorism

9/11 Conspiracy

May 2000 Atta, el Shehhi and Jarrah complete flight training. – January 2001 Atta is a rude and abusive student. Fourth Hamburg plotter fails to obtain entry visa.

October 2000 KSM sends Moussaoui to Malaysia for flight training, but Moussaoui decides to work on a different plot instead. KSM recalls Moussaoui, and sends him to the US for flight training. Interviewed by FBI on August 15 2001 and arrested on immigration charges the following day.

2000-2001: Nine “muscle hijackers” fail to obtain travel documents, back out, or are removed by the leadership. Pilot hijackers meet muscle hijackers and help them rent apartments, etc.

Terrorism

9/11 Conspiracy

Summer 2001 Atta, el Shehhi, al Hamzi, Jarrah, and Hanjour make at least six trips to Las Vegas.

Sept. 11, 2001: Hanjour, Mihdar and one muscle hijacker are flagged by CAPPS. Fourth airliner hijacking fails.

Terrorism

Can Terrorism Afford Failure?

BudgetMorale: Messianic Expectations,

Example, and Futility.

Necessary Conversations (I)

Neither Peace Nor WarTalking about CasualtiesLow Probability, High Consequence EventsBusiness as Usual: Pork Barrel, Bioshield

Terrorism

WMD

ChemicalBiologicalRadiologicalNuclear

WMD

Nuclear

Nuclear Weapons

Atom Bombs vs. H-Bombs. Blast, Flash, Fallout.

Doing Policy:

Barriers to Entry“The Secret of the Atomic Bomb”The Plutonium RouteThe Enriched Uranium RouteA Surprisingly Durable Barrier

No Go Theorems?Approximately true for Nuclear…

A Quick Way Home?Clever TechnologiesState SponsorsTheft

Nuclear

Overview

IntroductionPhysics + Health PhysicsEstimating the DamageWould the Public Be Sensible?Necessary Conversations

Radiological

Introduction

“Radiological Dispersion Devices”

Very Low Barriers to Entry

Weapons of Mass Disruption?

Radiological

Richard Muller, “The Dirty Bomb Distraction,Technology Reviewhttp://muller.lbl.gov/TRessays/29-Dirty_Bombs.htm

1400 Curies Cesium-137

@ 1km2: 140 REMs/yr.@10km2: 13 REMs/yr

An Easy Physics Problem:Curies Rads

Radiological

Brooke Buddemeier, “Misuse of Radioactive Material: First Responder Considerations” (2003), http://www-cms.llnl.gov/seaborginstitute/training/radiological_response_2.pdf

Curies Rads (Computer)

1 REM

0.1 REM

0.01 REM

Radiological

Health Physics: Benchmarks0.6 REM/year Denver

0.5 REM/year Radiation Workers

Radiological

Can

cer

Indu

ctio

n R

ate

20

40

60

80

100

2400

Late (stochastic) effects follow a

linear or linear quadratic relationship

rem

Courtesy: Christine Hartmann-Siantar, LLNL

Health PhysicsRads Expected Excess Cancers

Dose (in Rads) 2,400

(Over 30 years)

=

Radiological

Ottawa U – International CenterFor Low-Dose Radiation Research(Jan. 2002)

Radiological

Caveat: 20 REM = ???

One Year, No Evacuation:

1km2 1000 people @ 140 REMs = 60 deathscf. Sept. 11

10km2: 10,000 people @ 13 REMs= 60 deathscf. Fallon Cancer Cluster

Radiological

What Will It Cost?

Direct (Negligible)EvacuationClean Up

Radiological

Evacuation

Richardson et al. One week/400,000 people$4.1 billion estimate

Benefit @ EPA $6.1m/life standard:~ 100 deaths ~ $600m

Radiological

CleanUp

Scenario 1) Formal Plans: 0.1 REM/yearNational Response

Plan Protective Action Guide

Scenario 2) Public Panic

Radiological

Would the Public Really Panic?

Imaginability + MemorabilityDread + Familiarity(Banning the Threat is Not an Option)Manner of Death

Examples: Nuclear Weapons, Radon, Denver,

WWII Bombing

Radiological

Scenario 3: Elite Panic.

ABC and NBC: “Several hundred thousand dollars...”

Hart Senate Office Building“More than $23 million…”

Brentwood Post Office“More than $100 million…”

Radiological

Necessary Conversations (II)The Response is The Damage.

Discussing Dirty Bombs Ex Ante.

ChallengesNuclear Power PoliticsCheap Shots and “Everyone Knows…”A Tipping Dynamic?

Radiological

World War IWorld War IIBarriers: A Very Industrialized Weapon(Bhopal)

Chemical

Biological

OverviewHistoryBarriers to EntrySynthetic Biology

HistoryBetween the WarsWorld War IIThe Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?Classical ProgramsThe Soviet Program

Biological

Barriers to EntryIdentifying OrganismsObtaining Pathogen CulturesHardiness, Virulence, Antibiotic ResistanceManufacturing & SafetyDelivery

Wet AgentDry AgentContagious Disease

Biological

Not Just Biology

Knowledge More Than Equipment

Biological

Synthetic BiologyIdentifying OrganismsObtaining Pathogen CulturesHardiness, Virulence, Antibiotic ResistanceManufacturing & SafetyDelivery

Wet AgentDry AgentContagious Disease

Biological

Biological

Synthetic BiologySelf-Governance

ScreeningExperiments of ConcernReporting Dangerous BehaviorCollecting Safety/Security KnowledgeInvest in New Technologies

Necessary Conversations (III)

PrognosisShort-RunLong-Run: Not Like the A-Bomb?

Biological

Stephen M. MaurerScience Policy PP190-01/PP290-01April 13, 2006

WMD Terrorism: Risks & Responses