Suggesstion of Obama (Nuclear Free World)

8/8/2019 Suggesstion of Obama (Nuclear Free World)

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Journal USA

U.S. DepArtment o StAte / ebrUAry 2010

VolUme 15 / nUmber 2

h://www.aica.gv/uicais/juausa.h

Ittil Ifti Pg:Coordinator Daniel Sreebny

Executive Editor Jonathan Margolis

Creative Director Michael Jay Friedman

Editor-in-Chie Richard W. Huckaby

Managing Editor Bruce Odessey

Production Manager/Web Producer Janine Perry

Graphic Designer Sylvia Scott

Copy Editor Rosalie Targonski

Photo Editor Maggie Sliker

Cover Designer Diane Woolverton

Graph Designer Vincent Hughes

Reerence Specialist Martin Manning

Front Cover: Getty Images

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In 1931, Albert Einstein described himsel as not onlya pacist but a militant pacist. Eight years laterEinstein wrote President Franklin D. Roosevelt that

it may be possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in alarge mass o uranium, by whichvast amounts o power and largequantities o new radium-like ele-

ments would be generated it isconceivable though much lesscertain that extremely power-ul bombs o this type may thusbe constructed. Einstein warnedthe president that Nazi Germanyalready had prohibited the exporto uranium, and he suggestedthat the U.S. government speedup atomic research.

Roosevelt launched theManhattan Project, the top secretU.S.-U.K.-Canada crash eortthat produced the worlds rstatomic bomb. When it detonat-ed, on July 16, 1945, at Alamog-ordo Test Range in New Mexico,the projects scientic director,Robert Oppenheimer, recalledthe words o the bhagavad Gia:Now I am become death, thedestroyer o worlds. Oppen-heimer later would oppose, unsuccessully, development o

the still more earsome hydrogen bomb.Speaking last year in Prague, President Barack Obamaarmed the U.S. commitment to seek a world withoutnuclear weapons. But he also acknowledged that the objec-tive might not be achieved in his lietime. How that goalmight be attained, and why getting there is so dicult, isthe subject o this Jua USA.

Our contributors approach the issue rom every angle.Most agree with President Obamas objective, althoughone, a ormer U.S. national security adviser, argues that

the world may be saer with a ew acknowledged nuclearweapons than with promises that all have been oresworn.Feature essays explore the Treaty on the Non-Prolierationo Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and consider what a treaty

abolishing nuclear weaponsmight look like. We reviewObama administration policy,

and also how the issues lookrom the Russian vantagepoint, and rom the perspectiveo nations that choose not toprolierate. We outline pastarms control eorts someproduced better results thanothers. We ask the question:Why did some nations buildthousands o nuclear weapons?And we prole a program thatalready has eliminated some15,000 nuclear warheads.

When a leading pacistcalls or an atomic bomb andthe man most responsibleor producing it opposesits growing destructiveness,we know that the issues aretangled. When the leader o theUnited States o America setsa goal and in the next sentence

suggests it may not be ully achieved in his lietime, we

know the issues are dicult. We hope readers o thisJuacome to appreciate just how dicult and, mostimportantly, leave us this month determined along withPresident Obama to build a sae and peaceul world, nomatter how long it takes.

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About This Issue

Journal USA 1

I sa ca ad wih cvici Aicas ci sk h ac ad scui a wd wihu

uca was. I aiv. this ga wi achd quick has i ii. I wi akaic ad sisc

U.S. psid baack oaa, Ai 5, 2009


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ThreaT and PromIse

ob CittEllEn O. TauschEr, undErsEcrETaryOf sTaTEfOrarms cOnTrOland InTErnaTIOnal sEcurITyOther people have talked about achieving a worldwithout nuclear weapons. President Obama is tryingto make it happen.

T Tfti f U.s. nuclPlicy

JOsEph cIrIncIOnE, prEsIdEnT, plOughsharEsfundPresident Obama aces plenty o obstacles, especially

cynicism.

Plyig Pctgan InTErvIEwwITh BrEnT scOwcrOfT, fOrmEru.s. naTIOnal sEcurITyadvIsErZero nuclear weapons could make or an even moreunstable world.

nplifti CtibutigEOrgE pErkOvIch, dIrEcTOr, and dEEpTIchOuBEy, dEpuTydIrEcTOr, nuclEarpOlIcyprOgram, carnEgIE EndOwmEnTfOr

InTErnaTIOnal pEacECooperation among the nuclear powers onpreventing prolieration requires upholding thebargain between disarmament and nonprolieration.

Fii, FuiNuclear weapons can achieve their destructive powerin two dierent ways.

By exitig TtirEBEccaJOhnsOn (unITEd kIngdOm), ExEcuTIvE

dIrEcTOr, acrOnym InsTITuTEfOrdIsarmamEnTdIplOmacyThe 2010 review conerence on nuclear weaponsnonprolieration should start laying the groundworkor a treaty abolishing nuclear weapons.

dIsarmamenT aTTemPTs PasTsucc Filu

JErEmI surI, prOfEssOrOf hIsTOry, unIvErsITyOf wIscOnsIn-madIsOnThe 20th century had some successes and some

ailures in arms control.

UnITed sTaTes and rUssIa

Wy t stckpil?JOnaThan rEEd wInklEr, assOcIaTE prOfEssOrOf hIsTOry, wrIghT sTaTE unIvErsITyMaintaining huge and expensive nuclear warheadstockpiles was the cost o peace during the Cold War.

U.s.-rui Blcig actdmITrI TrEnIn (russIa), dIrEcTOr, carnEgIE

mOscOwcEnTErRussian leaders publicly support the idea o a worldree o nuclear weapons but lack a clear strategy toadvance this vision.

U.S. DepArtment o StAte / ebrUAry 2010 / VolUme 15 / nUmber 2

http://www.america.gov/publications/ejournalusa.html

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mgt t mgwttandrEwnEwman (ausTralIa), rEsEarchassOcIaTE, harvard unIvErsITyThanks to the Megatons to Megawatts program,hal o U.S. nuclear energy comes rom dismantled

Russian nuclear warheads.PersPeCTIves

Yug Ppl t t FJOhan BErgEns (swEdEn), rEsEarch assOcIaTE,mOnTErEyInsTITuTEOf InTErnaTIOnal sTudIEsProgress toward a world rid o nuclear weaponsdepends on the worlds young people.

a sf Wl f allJayanTha dhanapala(srI lanka), prEsIdEnT,

pugwash cOnfErEncEsOn scIEncEand wOrldaffaIrsA veriiable global agreement on eliminating nuclearweapons would make all o the worlds people saerequally.

T Citt f n-nuclWp sttIrmaargEllO (argEnTIna), fOundErandchaIr, nOnprOlIfEraTIOnfOrglOBalsEcurITyfOundaTIOn

All countries must learn that abolishing nuclearweapons will enhance the security o allcountries.

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In Prague last April, President Obama set orth anambitious and bold agenda: to achieve the peaceand security o a world without nuclear weapons.

Other presidents have articulated that goal, but President

Obama has made clear that he will aggressively worktoward it.

Achieving a nuclear-ree world, the president said,would take patience and persistence and might nothappen in his lietime. The journey, however, can be asimportant as the destination. Concrete steps we takenow will make us saer and more secure by enhancinginternational security and stability and will help build aoundation or uture steps.

As one o the two nations with the most nuclearweapons, we the United States acknowledge andembrace our responsibility to lead the way in reducing thenumbers and salience o nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, we will maintain a sae, secure, andreliable nuclear arsenal. We will never waver in ourcommitment to deend ourselves, our allies, and ourinterests, and any adversary should know we will deendourselves and punish aggression.

As Secretary o State Hillary Clinton has said,clinging to nuclear weapons in excess o our securityneeds does not make the United States saer. Holdingonto unnecessary weapons does not make us more secure.It makes others eel insecure. It could give some countries

an excuse to pursue nuclear weapons, and it makes ittougher or us to convince others to join us in preventingthat.

U.S.and RUSSia

Our journey toward a world ree o nuclear weaponsalready has begun. The United States and Russia thetwo countries with the largest nuclear weapons arsenals are working to negotiate a legally binding agreement

to succeed the bilateral 1991 START Treaty. Thatagreement, which capped the number o those weapons,

expired in December 2009.The new treaty will enhance our mutual securityand international stability by mandating lower, veriablelevels o nuclear orces.

The Obama administration also will ask the Senateto ratiy the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test BanTreaty (CTBT). We do so because the CTBT can makeus saer and more secure. We know this because oursuperb scientists working in the Stockpile StewardshipProgram have honed their technological skills to the

Obamas CommitmentEllen O. Tauscher

ThrEaTand prOmIsE

In Prague President Obama affirmed his determination to work

toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

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point that we no longer need to test nuclear weapons.In addition, President Obama said that the United

States will pursue negotiation o a veriable FissileMaterial Cuto Treaty. The world already has a surplus onuclear bomb-making materials we dont need more

that we have to worry about protecting rom terrorists.In May, the Nuclear Nonprolieration Treaty (NPT)

Review Conerence will seek a consensus among NPTparties to revitalize and strengthen the nonprolierationregime. In plain language that means that every nation nuclear power or not must play an importantrole in curbing the spread o dangerous technologies andstanding united against those who violate internationalnorms and agreements.

President Obama is taking action to ocus attentionon nuclear terrorism. He has called or an internationaleort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within

our years by breaking up black markets, detecting andintercepting materials in transit, and using nancial toolsto disrupt illicit trade.

nUcleaR SUmmit

In September 2009, President Obama chaired aspecial session o the United Nations Security Council. Itadopted U.N. Resolution 1887, outlining comprehensivesteps to strengthen the nuclear nonprolieration regime.The president also announced that he would host aNuclear Security Summit in April 2010 to reach acommon understanding o the threat posed by nuclearterrorism.

Meanwhile, we are conducting a Nuclear PostureReview o our strategic orces. It will undamentallyreassess the role o nuclear weapons in deterring todays

security threats. It can be the document that ends ColdWar thinking.

To enhance our own national security, the reviewshould chart a course that reduces the role o nuclearweapons in our military and diplomatic strategies while

maintaining an eective deterrent as long as theseweapons exist.

There are times when prolieration looks inevitable,when it seems that cascades o countries and non-stateactors might acquire nuclear weapons or material. Yetprolieration can be curbed and stopped.

We have had signicant success. More than 180countries have oresworn nuclear weapons. Morecountries have given up or been denied nuclear weaponsprograms than have acquired them over the past 40 years.

But we also know that the consequences o anotherstate or o terrorists acquiring these horribly destructive

weapons are severe and that we cannot let down ourguard. Thats why nonprolieration, nuclear security, andarms control are at the top o the Obama administrationsnational security agenda.

See also raks psid baack oaa, Hadca Squa, pagu,

Czch ruic[http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_oce/Remarks-

By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered] and U.n.

Scui Cuci rsui 1887[http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-

english/2009/September/20090924173226ihecuor0.5509411.html].


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Journal USA 6

psid oaa has aid U.S. ic a vuaiiai h wds uca was. H acs sacs, scia cicis. Jsh Ciici is sid h pughshas ud, a uic ga-akig udaicusd uca was ic ad cic sui.

President Barack Obama pledged in Prague onApril 5, 2009, to pursue the peace and security oa world without nuclear weapons. Key treaties,

negotiations, and conerences in 2010 will demonstrate

whether he can deliver on his pledge to develop a newU.S. strategy to reduce rising nuclear dangers.

todayS thReatS

The people o the world conront our types o

nuclear threats. The irst is the possibility o a terroristgroup getting a nuclear weapon and detonating it in amajor city. The second is the danger o an accidental,

unauthorized, or intentional use o one o the existing23,000 nuclear weapons held by nine nations today. Thethird is the emergence o new nuclear-armed nations:North Korea today, perhaps Iran tomorrow, and others toollow. The last is the possible collapse o the interlockingnetwork o treaties and controls that has slowed, i notaltogether prevented, the spread o nuclear weapons.

During the 1990s, smart policies reduced thesethreats:

The United States and Russia, who together have

96 percent o the worlds nuclear weapons, negotiatedtreaties that drastically cut their arsenals.

Many states gave up nuclear weapons and weaponprograms, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Iraq,and South Arica.

The United States, Russia, and other nations beganprograms to secure and reduce stocks o nuclear bombmaterials, decreasing the risk that terrorists could get ormake a bomb.

The Transformation of U.S. Nuclear PolicyJoseph Cirincione

Two workers stand by bricks and sand used in furnaces to make uranium, a reminder of North Koreas

accelerating nuclear program.

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Dozens o nations joined theNon-Prolieration Treaty and workedtogether to strengthen and extend itsglobal restraints to almost every nationin the world.

There were serious setbacks,however, including nuclear tests byIndia and Pakistan and developingprograms in North Korea and Iran. In2001, the administration o PresidentGeorge W. Bush adopted a strategyemphasizing U.S. military actionto eliminate oreign regimes that itconsidered hostile and that might getnuclear weapons. This doctrine guidedand supplied the justiication or thewar in Iraq.

The strategy ailed. During the2000s, the threats grew dramaticallyworse:

Al-Qaida-style terrorist groups spread whileprograms to secure nuclear materials ailed to keep pace

raising the risk o nuclear terrorism.

The United States stopped negotiating reductions

with Russia, and both nations drated policies or using

nuclear weapons against conventional targets, including

underground bunkers. The nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran

accelerated, advancing more in the past ve years than

they had in the previous 15. The nonprolieration regime weakened, with

many earing its collapse and the start o nuclear weapon

programs in many new states.

nw yk tisreporter David Sanger wrote recentlythat, ater it became clear Iraq had no weapons o massdestruction, Mr. Bushs theory lost so much credibilitythat he stopped talking about what constituted animminent or severe enough threat or America to actalone.

new Policy

The Obama administration has a new strategicapproach, one less unilateral than the Bushadministrations and more comprehensive than theClinton administrations.

It starts with a recognition that nuclear threatsare connected. For example, ailure to enorcenonprolieration treaty rules expands the probabilityo additional states developing nuclear weapons. This

increases, in turn, the number o sites rom whichterrorists might get weapons. The reverse is also true:Large decreases in global nuclear arsenals could helpgenerate the international cooperation needed to secureand eliminate nuclear materials, making it less likelyterrorists could steal or build a bomb.

The Obama strategy recognizes the central role oU.S. nuclear policy in reducing the threats. As the onlynuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the UnitedStates has a moral responsibility to act, the president saidin Prague. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone,but we can lead it.

Obama joined with Russian President DmitryMedvedev to negotiate new reductions in both nationsweapons. While earlier U.S.Russia joint statements otenocused on the threat o other nations weapons, Obamaand Medvedev on April 1, 2009, ocused instead on theirown weapons and their own obligations. They said:

We committed our two countries to achievinga nuclear-ree world, while recognizing that thislong-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms

control and conlict resolution measures, and their ullimplementation by all concerned nations.The emerging plan can be summarized as reduce,

secure, and prevent. Work on all three levels wouldproceed simultaneously:

Reduce the number o nuclear weapons in theworld and their role in national security strategies beginning with the United States and Russia buteventually including all nuclear-armed states.

Secure all stockpiles o nuclear weapons materials,

Presidents Obama and Medvedev focus on U.S. and Russian obligations.

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preventing nuclear terrorism and building internationalcooperation.

Prevent the emergence o new nuclear statesthrough a combination o tough sanctions to penalizestates that violate their treaty obligations and realistic

engagement to oer these states a more secure non-nuclear uture.Tying these practical steps together is the vision

o a world without nuclear weapons. Once considereda utopian ideal, the elimination o nuclear weapons isnow embraced by a bipartisan alliance among many oAmericas leading national security thinkers. Since theirJanuary 2007 joint op-ed piece in the Wa S Jua,Republicans George Shultz and Henry Kissinger (bothormer secretaries o state) and Democrats William Perry(ormer secretary o deense) and Sam Nunn (ormer U.S.senator) have led a campaign or global nuclear weapons

abolition and or practical steps such as those in theObama plan or moving towards that goal.

Two-thirds o the living ormer national securityadvisers and secretaries o state and deense, includingJames Baker, Colin Powell, Melvin Laird, Frank Carlucci,Warren Christopher, and Madeleine Albright, haveendorsed their vision. Dozens o organizations andresearch institutes now promote this vision and thesesteps. The Obama plan thus represents a broad consensuso leading American security experts and ormer oicials.

tRoUble ahead

However logical on paper, the Obama strategy mustovercome ormidable political and practical obstacles.

Most visible is the opposition o nuclear weaponsproponents. Editorials in some conservative publicationsdenounce the administrations approach as weak andnave. This argument is sustained by some conservativecommentators and think tanks who uphold Cold Warassumptions about the deterrent value o a large nucleararsenal, do not trust veriication regimes, or simply rejectarms control as an approach to international security.

But true nuclear hawks are ew in number, clinging,

as Secretary o State Hillary Clinton says, to nuclearweapons and the ailed policies o the past century.

Perhaps a more critical obstacle is the competitionor the presidents time and energy rom other pressingcrises. Rarely in American history has a new presidentinherited such a broad array o problems, includingtwo wars, a worldwide recession, a health care crisis, anenergy crisis, a deeply divided political system, and theglobal unpopularity o some recent U.S. policies. Though

nuclear policy is an important and personal priority orPresident Obama, it must compete with other issues orhis sustained attention.

The president has identiied another obstacle:a cynicism that spans the political spectrum. Such

atalism, he argues, is our deadly adversary. One seesthis atalism in the thought o those who believe thatsecurity in a world with ewer or without nuclear weaponswould be unveriiable. Or in those who argue that nucleardisarmament is desirable but unachievable, not worthwasted eort. And in those who think it both desirableand achievable, but not by this administration.

Obama addressed all these critics when he told hisPrague audience: There are those who hear talk o aworld without nuclear weapons and doubt whether itsworth setting a goal that seems impossible to achieve.... We know where that road leads. ... When we ail to

pursue peace, then it stays orever beyond our grasp.Obamas success can be measured by his ability to

meet a number o goals he has set or his administration: Senate approval o a new nuclear reduction treaty

with the Russians. A new declaratory posture that reduces the role o

nuclear weapons and opens the door to deeper negotiatedcuts.

Agreement on a joint plan at the presidentsNuclear Security Summit this April to secure all nuclearweapon materials in our years.

A Non-Prolieration Treaty review conerence in

May that unites nations around real enorcement o treatyrules.

Senate approval o the 1996 nuclear test ban treaty.Those deeds would turn the promise o Prague into

the genuine transormation o U.S. nuclear policy.

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Question: Why did the Americans and Soviets build upsuch huge stockpiles o nuclear weapons in the rst place?

Scowcroft: Basically, our notion o nuclear weapons, thatis, the value o nuclear weapons, was to make up or animbalance compared to the Soviet Union in conventionalorces. We hoped to make up or that decit by theawesome potential o nuclear weapons.

And when the Soviets developed nuclear weaponsin order to oset that advantage, I think we thoughtwe had to in order to maintain an edge in terms oquantity and quality and that turned into vigorouscompetition.

Then we developed various devices to deal withthat competition, such as the concept o mutual assureddestruction, which emphasized the awesomeness onuclear weapons, and that once you had destroyedthe opponent as a viable society you didnt need anyadditional weapons.

All o these acets got mixed together into whatbecame the Cold War competition in nuclear arms.

Q: Now President Obama has reiterated the goal o aworld without nuclear weapons. Still, some people in thiscountry think this is a bad idea. What do you think?

Scowcroft: I think the concept has several serious faws.First o all I think its unlikely that we could ever achieve

Playing PercentagesAn Interview With Brent Scowcrot

Technicians work at Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, a country that continues to enrich uranium that could be used for making bombs.

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it. Even trying to achieve it, I think, may get in the wayo doing some more practical things to improve thestability o the nuclear world and to achieve a goal whichI think is perhaps possible, and thereore may be moredesirable, and that is to insure that nuclear weapons are

never used.In addition, while I dont think we could ever get

to zero, i we somehow did, and nothing else changedin the world, it could be a very perilous, unstable world.We cannot erase the knowledge o how to build nuclearweapons and, in a world o zero, just a ew nuclearweapons could make a tremendous dierence. Thereore,I think it would be an extremely unstable world.

So I would instead ocus on changing the charactero the nuclear arsenals in a manner that would makeit most unlikely that there would ever be a resort tonuclear weapons in a crisis. One o the ears in a crisis, or

example, is that he who strikes rst can destroy enough othe opponents weapons that he can survive a retaliatorystrike. The character o the arsenals on each side can beconstructed so that would be unlikely or impossible.

Q: Explain that.

Scowcroft: Let me illustrate. Lets suppose that ournuclear arsenal was composed o 10 submarines with 200weapons on each submarine. I you catch eight o thosein port and can destroy them all with a ew weapons, that

could be a pretty attractive option. On the other hand,lets say each side had a thousand single-warhead ICBMs,which means that it would take more than that to destroythem. So you would be worse o ater a rst strike ratherthan better o.

That is just an illustration o the kind o calculationthat I think we ought to make in discussing the issue withthe Soviet Union developing a mutual nuclear orcestructure such that these weapons are never likely to beused.

Q: Aside rom the United States and Russia, there are

other nuclear-armed countries. So how would yourstrategy apply to those countries?

Scowcroft: I would rst start with the U.S. and theRussian nuclear arsenals and later include the lessernuclear powers. I would hope that there would be strongprotocols in association with the reductions o the majorpowers, resisting the acquisition o nuclear weapons bynew nations.

Q: There are existing protocols aimed to discourage thespread o nuclear weapons, but ...

Scowcroft: To me it is all playing percentages. Whetherour goal is zero nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons that

are never going to be red, the result would be the same:that nuclear weapons are not used. It just seems to methat measures designed that theyre never used are easierto deal with than zero.

Q: Whether its your strategy or the strategy o theObama administration to have a world ree o nuclearweapons, both require political will by a lot o countries.Wheres the political will?

Scowcroft: Nations acquire nuclear weapons or a varietyo reasons. For deterrence, prestige, perhaps to threaten

or coerce. And one has to accompany reductions orattempted elimination with elimination o the reasonsthat they are attractive to possess.

Its not, I think, an accident that in the Non-Prolieration Treaty, the exhortation to go to zero isaccompanied by a similar exhortation o complete anduniversal disarmament. Now i one could get to completeand universal disarmament, is ac you would havezero nuclear weapons.

One o the things I worry about with zero as a policygoal is that you maybe skip over some o the things you

can do to reduce the likelihood in the interim o makingsteps that will help reduce the possibility o nuclear war.Because the tendency is likely to be that i the goal iszero, we should try to get there directly and as quickly aspossible. And i your process is simply one o reducingnumbers, you could get to a point where you have a veryunstable world, where the incentive in a crisis to strikerst could be powerul.

Those are the kinds o things that make me leantoward a more cautious approach to the problem.

Q: How would any reduction or elimination be veried

and enorced?

Scowcroft: It would have to be, especially at thebeginning, quite intrusive. Theres no question aboutthat. But i its intrusive at the margins, it is more likelyto be able to be accommodated by the major powers thani its intrusive to the point that deception could yieldcritical advantage.

It would not be easy, no question about that. But wehave counting rules now. And we have ways theyre


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not perect we haveways to veriy that eachside has done what theycommit to do. We canimprove that, and weshould.

Q: Isnt zero nuclearweapons easier toenorce than some smallnumber o nuclearweapons?

Scowcroft: Notnecessarily. But yourenot going to go to zeroat once, anyway. So eveni youre on your way to

zero, youve got to veriythat your measures toreduce have been carriedout. And then even iyouve reached zero,how do you police zero?Policing zero may be easier than policing numbers, butnot necessarily. The whole verication issue is a problemregardless o the route you travel.

Q: Weve been talking about states having nuclearweapons. Whats the saest way to prevent terrorists romgetting their hands on nuclear weapons?

Scowcroft: I think as a practical matter we need to keepthem out o the hands o terrorists long beore we go tozero. That is an immediate problem, a problem whereit is in the interests o the vast majority o countries tocooperate. Not everyone, certainly. But most. So thereis a common incentive to keep nuclear weapons romspreading.

Q: Are you optimistic that the world can avoid nuclear

war?

Scowcroft: Right now I am. I think the chances o amajor nuclear attack are down dramatically. But thatsless because o the weapons themselves than the changein relationships among the powers that have nuclearweapons. I think that nonuse in itsel creates barriers touse that help reinorce it. There is much we can do toinduce countries that think they need nuclear weapons like Iran, like North Korea, and others to convince

them that they dont need nuclear weapons to eel secure.I think weve made some progress on that. I you

look back 20 years, there were many more countriesaspiring to be nuclear powers than there are at present.Were not out o the woods at all, and, i we ail in Iran,we have a huge problem. Because i Iran succeeds insaying it has the right to enrich uranium, then the resultcould be a stream o countries that dont necessarily wantnuclear weapons but want to be ready i they need themto deal with Iran like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey inthe region and others elsewhere. We would then havea much more dicult world.

Q: How do you persuade Iran and North Korea that theydont need nuclear weapons?

Scowcroft: I think the more dangerous case is Iran

because o the nature o the region in which it is located.We must convince them that continuing to enrichuranium domestically, whether or not their goal is anuclear weapon capability, will decrease, not increasetheir security. That is because other countries in theregion would be likely to ollow suit, with the result beinga more threatening environment in that part o the world.

We should also oer, perhaps together with Russia,that we are prepared to work out a system where theIAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] would

Soldiers and citizens in Pyongyang celebrate a North Korea nuclear test.

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guarantee a supply o enriched uranium or uel or powerreactors without the right o a national veto as long asIran meets the IAEA rules. That enriched uranium couldbe provided at prices Iran could not possibly matchthrough domestic enrichment. And the IAEA would take

back the spent uel.We have not yet gotten quite that ar. We and the

Russians are part way toward proposing such a deal. Butor a country that isnt determined or other reasons tohave an enrichment capability, that would be a powerulargument.

Those are the kinds o things I would do. For NorthKorea, I would declare that we are prepared, i the DPRKwould orgo nuclear weapons, to oer normal relationsand provide, in conjunction with the Chinese and otherpowers, a security ramework in which it can eel sae and

unthreatened by the United States. It might not work.But I think its worth a try.

th iis xssd i his iviw d cssai fc h viws icis h U.S. gv.

At the White House in May 2009, (from left) Kissinger, Shultz, Nunn, and Perry press their campaign for

abolishing nuclear weapons.

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nuca tiig pi

Many ormer U.S. national security ocials Republicans and Democrats now advocate elimination o

nuclear weapons. At the oreront are Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, ormer secretaries o state underRepublican presidents; William Perry, ormer secretary o deense under a Democratic president, and Sam Nunn,ormer Democratic U.S. senator who chaired the Senate Armed Services Committee. These our men co-wrote twoimportant opinion pieces published a year apart in the Wa S Jua: A World Free o Nuclear Weapons,January 4, 2007, and Toward a Nuclear-Free World, January 15, 2008. [h://www.i.wsj.c/uic/aic_i/Sb120036422673589947.h]A documentary lm, nuca tiig pi, including interviews with the ourmen has been released; a Web site about the lm at h://ucaiigi.g/h.hincludes backgroundmaterial and oers a ree DVD on request.


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Journal USA 13

m ha v, vig uca was iaiquis cai ag h Uid Sas, russia, adChia us gig ws. t achiv his cai,asus us cad uhd h agai wdisaa ad iai. Gg pkvich isvic sid sudis ad dic h nuca picpga a h Cagi edw Iaiapac; Di Chu is h du dic.

The great destructive power o the irst atomicbomb persuaded many leaders o the need to

constrain that power. Thus was born the goal ononprolieration and the search or a nonprolierationregime: a set o norms, rules, institutions, and practicesto prevent both the spread o nuclear weapons and thematerial and know-how necessary to acquire them.

The Nuclear Non-Prolieration Treaty (NPT) o1968 established such a regime, but todays challengesthreaten its stability and eectiveness. Only measures toreinorce the relationship between veriiable disarmamentby the existing nuclear powers and nonprolieration bynon-nuclear states can strengthen cooperation and makeus all more secure.

The United States alone could not stop thespread o nuclear weapons. Once the Soviet Unionacquired the bomb in 1949 and others prepared toollow, nonprolieration became easible only throughcooperation. This was not simple. Not only wouldgeopolitical adversaries have to agree, but states thatpossessed nuclear weapons would need to ind commonground with the vast majority o nations that did not.

The ormer group could not be orced to give uptheir weapons just as the latter could not be orced togive up the right to build their own. Only a regime o

mutually agreed-upon nonprolieration rules could dothat. These rules had to satisy the core interests o thehave-not states while tolerating, at least temporarily, thepossession o nuclear weapons by the states that alreadyhad them.

Ater a series o alse starts, the United States andthe Soviet Union joined the multilateral negotiationthat produced a drat o what became the NPT. The twosuperpowers shared an interest in preventing others romacquiring nuclear weapons. Each also served as protective

patron or many non-nuclear nations. These states couldeschew building their own nuclear weapons i they werecertain their superpower would protect them rom a

threat by the other.

nPt baRgain

The NPT entered into orce March 5, 1970. Itcomprises a set o bargains. The nuclear weapon statesagree to work in good aith toward nuclear disarmament,to transer neither nuclear weapons nor the wherewithalto make them to non-nuclear weapon states, and torecognize the inalienable right o non-nuclear weapon

Nonproliferations ContributionGeorge Perkovich and Deepti Choubey

Egypt maintains this nuclear research center at Inshas and resists

efforts to give the IAEA authority to conduct more effective

inspections.

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states to access nuclear energy or peaceuluses. In return, non-nuclear weaponstates promise not to acquire nuclearweapons.

Under the NPT, disarmament and

nonprolieration should be mutuallyreinorcing. As more states adhere tothe NPT, each nation should gainconidence that its neighbor or adversaryis not developing nuclear weapons andso be more secure in its decision notto prolierate. Existing nuclear statessimilarly should eel able gradually toreduce their stockpiles with an eye towardull nuclear disarmament.

This nonprolieration regime hasbeen remarkably successul, i imperect.

The NPT is among the most universalo treaties: All nations except India,Israel, and Pakistan have joined. North Korea joined butsubsequently withdrew and has tested a nuclear device,becoming the only state to develop nuclear weaponsdespite its NPT obligation not to do so.

Many states have abandoned or reversed clandestineeorts to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq was pursuingsuch a program at the time o the 1990-1991 Gul War.Fearing isolation and outside coercion, Libya endedits eort in 2003 and instead sought internationalcooperation. Taiwan and South Korea stopped nuclearweapons work under secret pressure rom the UnitedStates and ater extracting reairmation o U.S.guarantees o their security. Belarus, Kazakhstan, andUkraine agreed to join the NPT in the early 1990sas the United States and Russia reduced their nucleararsenals and cultivated a climate hospitable or nucleardisarmament. Argentina and Brazil shut down theirnascent nuclear weapons programs, and South Aricarelinquished a secret nuclear weapons stockpile largelyor domestic reasons but no doubt post-Cold Warnuclear arms reductions created norms that pulled them

in that direction.Since 2001, the nonprolieration regime has adaptedto address the previously unimaginable threat o nuclearterrorism. Initiatives to keep nuclear uel and technologyaway rom terrorists include:

bilateral cooperation between the United Statesand Russia;

multilateral commitments rom the Group oEight major industrialized countries;

a nuclear terrorism convention;

the Prolieration Security Initiative; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear

Terrorism; U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, requiring

all U.N. members to take and enorce measures againstthe prolieration o weapons o mass destruction, theirmeans o delivery, and related materials.

RiSkS Remain

Despite these successes, real risks remain. Oneis that the mutually reinorcing relationship betweendisarmament and nonprolieration may be weakening. IIran ignores a U.N. Security Council prohibition againstacquiring nuclear weapons capabilities, and i NorthKorea maintains its nuclear weapons, urther prolierationamong their neighbors becomes more likely as conidencein the nonprolieration regime weakens.

Skeptics in nuclear-armed nations, including theUnited States, argue that neither nuclear arms reductionsnor measures like the global ban on all nuclear tests

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) willdiscourage rule-violators like Iran rom seeking nuclearweapons. Nor, these critics argue, will they persuadeleading non-nuclear weapon states such as Brazil andSouth Arica to cooperate in enorcing nonprolierationrules. History suggests this view is too cynical.

Means exist to buttress conidence. I all states willagree to accept what is called the Additional Protocolto the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) would have the means to undertake more

Minister Roberto Amaral points to map showing uranium mines in Brazil, one of the key

states likely to resist stronger nonproliferation rules.

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eective inspections to ensure that nuclear materials andacilities are not being diverted rom peaceul purposes.This would be especially important in Iran. Throughthe IAEA, states also could negotiate new rules toprevent the urther spread o those uranium enrichment

and plutonium-reprocessing capabilities that heightenprolieration risks. But key non-nuclear weapon statessuch as Brazil, South Arica, and Egypt now block eortsto make the Additional Protocol universal and to shitrom national to international mechanisms or supplyingnuclear uel, in part because they do not believe theestablished nuclear powers are doing enough to make thenuclear order more equitable.

Past successes demonstrate how to meet thesechallenges. Great power cooperation lies behind thosesuccesses. I todays major global powers disagree onhow to address changing technology and new threats,

prolieration becomes more likely.The Iranian crisis shows most vividly that

cooperation among the United States, Russia, and Chinais required to mobilize the U.N. Security Councilslegitimate enorcement authority. The Russians andChinese are more reluctant than the Americans to pursuesanctions and other coercive tactics against noncompliantstates. Among their reasons is a sense that the UnitedStates seeks military superiority over them. By addressingthese concerns, the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductionprocess and strategic dialogue can augment cooperationand build consensus or a stronger stand against suspectedprolierators. The United States and China are beginninga similar process that could lead to cooperation inpreventing nuclear competition and instability in Asia.

Similarly, cooperation among the United States,Russia, and China will be necessary to bring the CTBTinto orce and to negotiate a ban on urther production oissile materials or nuclear weapons.

diSaRmament, nonPRolifeRation

The relationship between disarmament and

nonprolieration remains crucial. I existing nuclearweapon states do not reduce their arsenals, keynon-nuclear weapon states will likely resist strongernonprolieration rules. I these weapons remain thecurrency o great power, emerging powers such as Brazil,Egypt, South Arica, and Iran might oppose urtherlimits on acquiring them. Even i the security advantageso nuclear prolieration are debatable (Is a nuclearpower more secure i its neighbors eel threatened andthemselves build nuclear arsenals?), considerations o

perceived justice and national pride may prove politicallymore compelling.

Multilateral nuclear arsenal reductions may requireirst ending both nuclear tests and all production o issilematerial or weapons. Treaties achieving these objectives

may be the most easible ways to bring India, Pakistan,and Israel into the disarmament process, and thereorecloser to the nonprolieration regime.

Tension over the trade-os among nonprolieration,disarmament, and o a third actor nuclear energytrade impedes progress on the speciic steps thatwould advance each objective, leaving the world lesssecure and prosperous than it could otherwise be. Nolonger can one or two superpowers impose rules. Thenumber o states that must now cooperate a numberthat only begins with the United States, Russia, andChina means that a satisactory outcome cannot be

grounded in double standards. As long as a small numbero states have advantages that they would deny others, theothers will resist.

President Obama has recognized this problem andconcluded that the most eective way to deter nuclearweapons use is to stop prolieration and that the onlysustainable way to prevent prolieration is to motivate allstates to live without nuclear weapons, however long ittakes to achieve this ultimate goal. As the president put itin his April 2009 speech in Prague:

Some argue that the spread o these weaponscannot be stopped, cannot be checked thatwe are destined to live in a world where morenations and more people possess the ultimatetools o destruction. Such atalism is a deadlyadversary, or i we believe that the spread onuclear weapons is inevitable, then in someway we are admitting to ourselves that the useo nuclear weapons is inevitable.

To prevent this terror, Obama expressed Americascommitment to seek the peace and security o a world

without nuclear weapons.

See also piai Scui Iiiaiv[http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm], th Ga Iiiaiv Ca nuca tis[http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm], and U.n. Scui Cucirsui 1540[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm].



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Nuclear weapons achieve exponentially increasingnuclear chain reactions by dierent designs,

ssion and usion.Fission bombs, oten called atomic bombs,

detonate when neutrons bombard the ssile material,uranium or plutonium isotopes, splitting the atomsinto lighter elements and releasing vast amounts oenergy in the process.

There are two types o ssion bombs. One type,a gun-assembly device, uses an explosive propellantto shoot one mass o ssile material into another; thebomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II

was o this type. The other type, an implosion device,uses a chemical explosive to compress plutonium intoa critical density to create the chain reaction; the bombdropped on Nagasaki was o this type.

Fission bombs can release an amount o energyup to the equivalent o about 500,000 tons o theexplosive chemical TNT. The ssion bomb thatdestroyed Hiroshima had the power o an estimated15,000 tons o TNT.

The destructive power o usion bombs, alsoknown as thermonuclear devices and hydrogen bombs,vastly exceeds that o ssion bombs. The UnitedStates rst exploded an H-Bomb in 1952; theSoviet Union, in 1953. The biggest usion bomb everdetonated the Soviet Unions Tsar Bomba, testedin 1961 released energy equivalent to an estimated50,000,000 tons o TNT.

Fusion bombs actually work by both ssionand usion. In a typical two-stage weapon, the ssilematerials detonate rst to compress and heat theusion uels, such as hydrogen isotopes tritium and

deuterium, to tens o millions o degrees. Just as inthe sun, the chain reaction in the second stage usesthe hydrogen atoms into heavier helium atoms andreleases vast amounts o energy in the process.

Fission, Fusion

DestructivepowerequivalentintonsofTNT

LittleBoyfissionbombdroppedonHiroshima,1945 ~15,000

U.S.B53fusionbomb,decommissionedin1987 ~9,000,000

CastleBravofusionbomb,mostpowerfulevertestedbyU.S.,1954 ~15,000,000

SovietTsarBomba,mostpowerfulevertested,1961 ~50,000,000

Sources: Encyclopedia Britannica, Wikipedia

ExamplesofNuclearWeaponsYield

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I addii agig x ss ucadisaa, h 2010 viw cc uca iai shud sa aigh gudwk a a aishig ucawas. rcca Jhs is xcuiv dic h Ac Isiu DisaaDiac i egad.

While the current nuclear weaponsnonprolieration regime shouldbe supported and strengthened,

the existing Treaty on the Non-Prolieration

o Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not have theright mix o obligations and powers to bringabout a world ree o nuclear weapons.

Achieving that goal requires a universalnuclear weapons abolition treaty. As agreementon and ratication o such a treaty willnot happen soon, the 2010 NPT ReviewConerence, scheduled or May in New York,should establish nuclear abolition as theobjective o uture nonprolieration eorts.The conerence should also commit to thenext interim steps on reducing the role onuclear weapons in security doctrines and thenumbers in existing arsenals, while laying thegroundwork to make the world ree o nuclearweapons.

U.S. can lead way

Much o the world reacted with relie andexcitement when, in an April 2009 speech inPrague, President Barack Obama stated withconviction Americas commitment to seek the

peace and security o a world ree o nuclear weapons.The president clearly understood the challenges hewould ace in achieving that goal. He addressed the needto reduce the role o nuclear weapons in national securitystrategies, to pursue urther concrete disarmament steps,and to undertake a global eort on nuclear security,including strengthening the practical application oregulations to stop dangerous materials and technologiesrom alling into the hands o people that might want touse nuclear weapons to threaten or attack others.

The importance o the Prague speech lies in twocore themes: 1) recognition that nonprolierationand disarmament become sustainable only whennuclear weapons lose (and are perceived to have lost)their military, political, and security value; and 2) theimportance o civil society. We are here today becauseenough people ignored the voices who told them thatthe world could not change, Obama said. We are heretoday because o the courage o those who stood up andtook risks.

Beyond Existing Treaties

The 2005 NPT review conference was unable to adopt any agreements.

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I Obama can ollow up withpractical policies and measures toreduce both the perceived value and thenumbers o nuclear weapons, the UnitedStates could lead other key states to

break through the nuclear impasse.

nPtS mixed RecoRd

The NPT (agreed 1968, cameinto orce 1970), as extended andupdated by the 1995 and 2000 reviewconerences, is the cornerstone o thenonprolieration regime born ater the1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. It obligatesnon-nuclear states to orgo developmento nuclear weapons and requires nuclear

states to move toward disarmament.It also permits the transer o nucleartechnology to states pursuing nuclear energy programs ormedical, energy, and other non-military purposes.

With 189 states as parties, the NPT has enormousnormative infuence, but its Cold War genesis has let itwith weaknesses that make it dicult to strengthen theNPTs structure and implement powers suciently toprevent the spread o nuclear weapons and materials togovernments and terrorists that are determined to havethem.

Review conerences take place every ve years, andthe record is decidedly mixed. In 1990, the conerenceended in deadlock ater the United States reused tocommit to negotiating a Comprehensive Test BanTreaty (CTBT), despite that objective being endorsedin the NPT. Subsequently, the exposure o clandestinenuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea revealed theinadequacy o NPT saeguards and other compliancemechanisms. As a consequence, the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) developed the Additional Protocolto strengthen its inspection powers and supplement thesaeguards required o non-nuclear weapon states.

By 1995, the United States was leading the wayin multilateral negotiations on a CTBT in Geneva. Inaccordance with the original treaty, which set an initial25-year duration or the NPT, the 1995 conerencerequired a decision to be taken on whether and or howlong to extend the treaty.

The tough diplomatic negotiations over our weeksresulted in the 1995 conerence deciding to extendthe NPT indenitely ater strengthening treaty reviewprocesses and adopting a number o principles and

resolutions crated to move with determination towardsthe ull realization and eective implementation o thetreaty provisions. Among these principles was the settingo universal adherence to the treaty as an urgent priorityand a call or establishment o internationally recognizednuclear-ree zones, especially in regions o tension, suchas in the Middle East.

The disarmament section o the Principles andObjectives comprised three basic elements: conclusiono a CTBT, a treaty to cap the military production ossile material such as plutonium and highly enricheduranium, and the determined pursuit ... o systematicand progressive eorts to reduce nuclear weapons globally,with the ultimate goal o eliminating those weapons.CTBT negotiations concluded successully with a treatyin 1996, but negotiations on a Fissile Material CutoTreaty (FMCT) ailed to get under way.

The 2000 NPT Review Conerence took placein even more contentious conditions. India and thenPakistan had conducted several nuclear explosions each inMay 1998. In October 1999, the U.S. Senate declined to

ratiy the CTBT.Despite these obstacles, a coalition o seven non-nuclear weapon states negotiated directly with the vedeclared nuclear weapon states on a program o actionon nuclear disarmament that led the 2000 conerenceto consensus on the most substantial nal documentever. Participants strengthened the language on nucleardisarmament, IAEA inspections, universal NPTadherence, and saety and security.

When NPT parties met again in May 2005,

Residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 2005 showed the NPT parties meeting in New York

their support for nuclear nonproliferation.

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though, the review conerence was unable to adopt anyagreements at all. The United States repudiated its earlierdisarmament commitments and wanted to ocus onlyon noncompliance by countries such as Iran and NorthKorea. Non-nuclear weapon states criticized insucient

progress toward disarmament by the nuclear weaponstates. The Arab countries wanted more progress towardsachieving their objective to make the Middle East a zoneree o nuclear and all weapons o mass destruction, whileIran reused to accept any criticism o its own nuclearprogram, which many eared could be used to producenuclear weapons in the uture. The dierences proved toogreat to bridge.

todayS needS

For any chance o a successul review conerence

in 2010, the parties must not only heed warnings rompast conerences but also rethink todays requirementsor achieving nuclear security, nonprolieration, anddisarmament.

A number o signs suggest that the 2010 conerencewill meet with greater success than its immediatepredecessor. The CTBT is unlikely to be a majorstumbling block this time. More than 150 o the 180signatory states now have ratied the test ban treaty.While it still lacks nine o the required raticationsto enter into orce, both the United States and Chinasay that they intend to pursue ratication and work toensure that other countries do so as well. While the U.S.Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999, President Obama haspledged an aggressive new eort to win its approval.

A Preparatory Committee or the 2010 reviewconerence has endorsed a number o measures,including:

universal NPT participation; strengthened safeguards against proliferation,

including enhanced inspections o nuclear acilities;

guarantees of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear

energy as long as programs conorm to nonprolieration

requirements; commitments to improve the safety and security

o national programs and the transporting o nuclear

materials;

support for negotiations on further nuclear

weapon-ree zones, with a specic eye on regional

nonprolieration and disarmament in the Middle East;

measures to address treaty withdrawal (to prevent

others emulating North Korea);

the importance o civil society engagement,including disarmament and nonprolierationeducation.

More undamentally, 21st-century nuclear securityand prolieration challenges require moving beyond the

NPT. President Obamas Prague speech reinorces thegrowing understanding that true security requires not justthe reduction and management o nuclear arms but theirelimination. The 2010 disarmament talks should aim totransorm the Cold War nonprolieration regime into anuclear abolition regime or security in the 21st centuryand beyond.

Leaders who want peace and security in a nuclearweapons-ree world must lay the oundations now.They must render nuclear weapons less valuable bydening and enacting rigorous legal, technical, saety,and verication requirements. They must also create

the ethical understandings, political commitments,cooperative international security arrangements, practicalcontrols, and verication institutions necessary to makenations eel secure without nuclear weapons.

Another step is to stigmatize nuclear weapons asinhumane and unusable or everyone. Beore the treatiesprohibiting the production and possession o biologicaland chemical weapons were agreed (in 1972 and 1993,respectively), nations took the important rst step odeclaring that the use o such inhumane weapons wouldbe considered a crime against humanity. I a similarstep were taken now to ban the use o nuclear weapons,it would greatly strengthen nonprolieration anddisarmament eorts.

Nuclear weapons abolition has been discussed in theUnited Nations or decades and promoted by a numbero governments. In October 2008, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon outlined a ve-point disarmamentplan and suggested work begin on a ramework oseparate, mutually reinorcing instruments or a nuclearweapons convention, backed by a strong system overication, as has long been proposed at the UnitedNations.

In 2010, generalized concerns and exhortations willnot suce. I that is all that the conerence can achieve,then the ink will barely be dry beore cracks in thenonprolieration regime begin to reappear and widen. Farbetter or nations to move boldly ahead to assure a utureree rom the threat or use o nuclear weapons.



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th 20h cu had s succsss ad s aius ias c. Ji Sui is e. Gd x ss his a h Uivsi Wiscsi-madis.

waShington naval aRmS confeRence

The Washington Naval Arms Conerence, insession rom November 12, 1921, to February6, 1922, produced the irst major international

disarmament agreements since the Congress o Viennain 1815. The conerence also marked the emergence othe United States as a major diplomatic actor, despitethe countrys rejection o the Treaty o Versailles at the

end o the First World War.Led by U.S. Secretary o State Charles EvansHughes, the Washington Conerence produced threemajor treaties. These aimed to stabilize the internationalbalance o power. In addition, they embodied popularhopes around the world or disarmament and peaceulcooperation among major states.

The Five Power Naval Limitation Treatysigned on February 6, 1922, by the United States, the

United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Italy restrictedthe signatories to a ixed ratio o battleships andbattle cruisers (capital ships). The signatories alsoagreed to an unprecedented 10-year holiday in theconstruction o new capital ships. For every ive capitalships maintained by the United States and the UnitedKingdom, Japan would now maintain three, and Franceand Italy would maintain 1.75.

In practice, this meant a reduction in the size oeach nations post-World War I navy. The ship ratiosavored the United States and the United Kingdom,but the Japanese received many beneits in the northernPaciic, their primary area o naval operations. As part

o the treaty, the United States pledged not to expandits naval acilities in the Philippines, Guam, WakeIsland, or the Aleutians. The British pledged not toexpand their acilities in Hong Kong.

AFour Power Pact signed by the United States,the United Kingdom, Japan, and France on December13, 1921 accompanied the Five Power Treaty. TheFour Power Pact terminated the Anglo-Japanese

Successes and Failures

dIsarmamEnT aTTEmpTs pasT

The 1921-22 Washington Naval Arms Conference produced three major treaties.

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Alliance o 1902 andcreated protectedspheres o interest in thePaciic or each o the

signatories. Each pledgedto settle uture disputesthrough arbitration, notwar.

The conerenceclosed with a lotyNine-Power Treaty signedby the United States,the United Kingdom,Japan, France, Italy,China, Belgium, theNetherlands, and

Portugal on February6, 1922. This treatydeended the principleso the Open Door in China, irst articulated by ormerU.S. Secretary o State John Hay in 1899. The ninepowers agreed to respect the territorial integrity o post-imperial China and to take no actions to limit accessto the region. Each signatory would have the right totrade in the vast China market.

The Washington Naval Arms Conerence pointedto an optimistic uture or cooperation among themajor military powers ollowing the devastation othe First World War. It set a precedent or uturearms control negotiations, particularly in the secondhal o the Cold War. Unortunately, the treatiessigned in 1921 and 1922 lacked irm veriication andenorcement mechanisms. Many o the signatories,particularly Japan, violated the treaties in the nextdecade. These violations contributed to the outbreak othe Second World War in the Paciic.

the baRUch Plan

The Baruch Plan was the irst major proposal orthe international regulation o atomic energy, presentedto the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission bythe United States on June 14, 1946.

The Baruch Plan emerged rom the deliberationso an American committee chaired by Under Secretaryo State Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal, thechairmano the Tennessee Valley Authority one othe largest power utilities in the world.

Working closely with scientists, Acheson andLilienthal had proposed the creation o an AtomicDevelopment Authority, under United Nationsauspices, to oversee the distribution o nuclear issilematerials and the operation o acilities that werecapable o producing nuclear weapons.

Acheson and Lilienthal also sought to create alicensing procedure or countries seeking peaceulnuclear energy capabilities. Licensing would, theyhoped, encourage the civilian use o nuclear energy andhelp ensure its non-weapons purposes.

President Harry Truman chose Bernard Baruch, thedistinguished businessman and White House adviser, topresent the plan to the United Nations. Controversially,Baruch revised Achesons and Lilienthals proposal.Baruch would have required more rigorous andintrusive regulation o all nuclear energy research andproduction civilian and military through anAtomic Development Authority.

Baruch also called or prohibiting any state rom

developing a new nuclear weapons capability. TheAtomic Development Authority would be empoweredto seize national acilities and resources, and the UnitedNations Security Council stripped o the power toveto sanctions against violators o the nuclear weaponsprohibition. I adopted, Baruchs proposal would haveessentially rozen the U.S. nuclear monopoly andprevented the development o a Soviet capability.

The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan.

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Bernard Baruch presented the U.S. proposal for atomic energy regulation at the United Nations in June

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Historians have debated whether the original Acheson-Lilienthal proposal would have made more progress.That appears unlikely, as the Soviets had alreadyembarked on their own major nuclear weaponsdevelopment project. Nonetheless, the Baruch Planand its Acheson-Lilienthal predecessor began theinternational discussion about the regulation o nuclearweapons that produced the Nuclear Non-ProlierationTreaty in 1968.

oPen SkieS

On July 18, 1955, Geneva, Switzerland, hosted theirst summit o the most powerul world leaders sincethe Potsdam Conerence 10 years earlier. The 1955meeting included U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower,British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, French PrimeMinister Edgar Faure, and two Soviet leaders: NikolaiBulganin and Nikita Khrushchev. In the two years since

Jose Stalins death in 1953, it remained unclear whowould lead the Soviet Union.

On July 21, 1955, Eisenhower made a dramaticproposal to the assembled leaders, calling or anagreement on what he called Open Skies between themajor powers. According to this proposal, the majorCold War states would allow each other to conductopen aerial surveillance o their territory. Free lyoversby aircrat and, eventually, satellites would allow orincreased transparency.

Eisenhower believed that transparency wouldreduce irrational and exaggerated ears about enemyintentions and thereore stabilize international relations.He also understood that the Soviet Union beneitedrom the greater secrecy imposed on its closed society it could posture, blu, and conspire inside itsterritory more easily than the open democracies inWestern Europe and the United States.

Attending the Geneva summit were (from left) Bulganin, Eisenhower, Faure, and Eden.

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Unwilling to reduce the secrecy in their society,the Soviet leaders quickly rejected Open Skies.Nonetheless, military aircrat reconnaissance andsatellite programs later in the decade made overheadtransparency a practical reality. Still later, U.S. andSoviet and then Russian leaders would return toEisenhowers call or enhanced overhead transparency inpursuit o international stability.

StRategic aRmS limitation tReaty

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I),signed by U.S. President Richard Nixon and Sovietleader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, 1972,was the irst arms control treaty that expressly limitedthe construction o new nuclear weapons.

According to the treaty, the two superpowers

pledged not to expand their already-bloatedintercontinental ballistic nuclear missile arsenals or iveyears. They also pledged not to build new submarine-launched nuclear missile platorms without retiringan equivalent number o old intercontinental orsubmarine-launched missiles.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)accompanied SALT I. This treaty limited thesuperpowers to no more than two antiballistic missile

sites in their respective countries. This treaty aimedto assure that neither side could hope to protect themajority o its population rom a nuclear attack.According to the logic o nuclear deterrence, theprospect o mutually assured destruction wouldencourage continued caution and war avoidance byCold War leaders.

SALT I began a process o serious and sustainedarms control discussions between the United Statesand the Soviet Union. It became a centerpiece o a1970s dtente that eatured greater East-West scientiic,economic, and cultural cooperation.

On June 18, 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carterand Brezhnev signed a second, expanded StrategicArms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), but ater theSoviet invasion o Aghanistan later that year the U.S.Senate never ratiied the agreement. Nonetheless,

Carters successor, President Ronald Reagan, continuedto abide by the unratiied SALT II pledges. Thenegotiations surrounding SALT I and SALT II provideda oundation or Reagans ar-reaching arms controlagreements with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev inthe last years o the Cold War.

Nixon and Brezhnev sign the SALT I agreement in Moscow in May 1972.

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StRategic aRmS RedUction tReaty

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),signed on July 31, 1991, by U.S. President GeorgeH.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,marked the end o the Cold War. For the irst time,the two superpowers agreed to equalize the size o theirnuclear arsenals and undertake serious reductions in

existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) hadonly limited uture weapons construction. START cutdeeply into existing stockpiles.

According to START, both the United States andthe Soviet Union would maintain no more than 1,600strategic nuclear delivery systems. They would reducetheir respective nuclear arsenals to 6,000 strategic

warheads each, no more than 4,900 o which could beplaced on ballistic missiles. This represented a 30-40percent reduction in each nations overall strategicnuclear orces. On May 23, 1992, the successornuclear states to the Soviet Union Russia, Ukraine,Kazakhstan, and Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocolto START. The latter three nations gave up the nuclearweapons on their territory, and Russia assumed all

o the inherited Soviet obligations under START.Oicially ratiied on December 5, 1994, START hadan initial duration o 15 years, with possible ive-yearextensions ater that.


The last U.S. Minuteman II missile silo is imploded in December 1997 in accordance with

START.

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t the height o the Cold War, the United Statesand the Soviet Union had between them tens othousands o nuclear warheads. Ultimately, none

were ever used in anger. Why did these two superpowersbuild up such colossal stockpiles o nuclear weapons,particularly i both sides hoped never to use them? Theanswer is complex.

Should war have ever broken out during the ColdWar, both the United States and Soviet Union intendedto use nuclear weapons against opposing military orces,industrial targets, and urban centers.

Each side came to see early on that a nuclearwar would be enormously destructive to itsel, to itsopponent, and, indeed, to the rest o the world. As aresult, both superpowers came to view nuclear weapons

principally as a deterrent that would give each side secondthoughts about going to war.

Ater the utter devastation o the Second WorldWar, ew wished a confict that promised to be evenmore destructive. In the end, the expense o maintainingenormous stockpiles o nuclear warheads was the costo peace between the two superpowers or more than 50years.

The United States concluded in the late 1940s thatit needed a large number o nuclear weapons or severalreasons. Because surprise attacks, such as the one at PearlHarbor, might well occur at the outset o uture wars,

the United States would build an arsenal so large that itsability to retaliate would survive any attack.

cold waR

These ideas developed even beore the United Statesully identied the Soviet Union as its chie rival. As theCold War unolded, it was clear the Soviets had a strong

numerical advantage in conventional orces. Should warbreak out, the Soviets could easily overwhelm U.S. andNATO armies in the opening weeks. The United Statesconcluded that only atomic weapons could oset thatadvantage.

Ater the Soviets detonated their own atomic bombin 1949, negating the U.S. advantage, and gained anally in the Peoples Republic o China, U.S. ocials

ultimately chose to build the more powerul hydrogenbomb and to implement a major conventional andnuclear buildup to meet the Soviet threat.

By the early 1950s, the United States was on its wayto having a major nuclear arsenal. It elded some 1,600medium- and long-range bombers to the Soviets 200.Both sides built up tactical weapons as well, including,or example, atomic eld artillery and nuclear depthcharges.

A number o reasons accounted or the scale o theU.S. nuclear buildup rom 1948 until the middle 1960s.

First, the United States had until the early 1960s

imperect inormation about the Soviet Unions truemilitary strength (high-altitude reconnaissance aircratand satellites began to provide better inormation). As aresult, it wildly overestimated Soviet industrial capacity.

Second, the United States continued to ear Sovietconventional superiority in Europe. Tactical atomicweapons were viewed as the counter. The massiveRed Army could gain little by overrunning Europeanterritory were it then subject to a devastating nuclearcounterattack.

Third, President Dwight Eisenhower sought to usea massive nuclear buildup as a way to preserve peace.

Such an arsenal would be comparatively cheaper andless disruptive to the U.S. economy than a sustainedpeacetime conventional buildup to match the numericallysuperior Soviet orces. Eisenhowers threat to escalate anyconfict to a ull-out nuclear war massive retaliation would deter the Soviet Union while also restrainingU.S. allies and even the United States itsel.

Why the Stockpiles?Jonathan Reed Winkler

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Peak StockPile

The nuclear stockpile had to be high, however,to ensure that U.S. nuclear orces could still carry outwartime missions despite accidents, eective Sovietdeenses, and losses to any Soviet rst strike. At itspeak in 1966-1967, the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpileamounted to 31,000, with some 2,200 strategic bombersand missiles to carry them.

Fears o surprise attack abated in the 1960s with theadoption o submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It wasnearly impossible to know where all nuclear-poweredsubmarines were at any one time under the ocean. As aresult, both sides could be condent that the other could

not launch a surprise attack and escape retaliation.The Soviet and U.S. reliance on a triad o strategicnuclear orces manned bombers, land-based missiles,and submarine-launched missiles meant mutuallyassured destruction (MAD). The idea o MAD conrmedthat nuclear war would be unwinnable and helped tostabilize the Cold War.

Despite this concept o MAD, the Soviet Unionembarked on a substantial nuclear weapons buildup

through the second hal o the Cold War to catch up andin some areas surpass the United States, while the UnitedStates ocused instead on Southeast Asia. At its peak in

1986, the Soviet nuclear warhead stockpile is understoodto have exceeded 40,000. Soviet strategic delivery systemspeaked at approximately 2,500 bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and land-based missiles in 1979.

Though the marginal utility o the additional nuclearweapons built in the later Cold War was small, theirpresence made the idea o nuclear war so unthinkablethat it was avoided. Though expensive, that was the priceor averting catastrophe.

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n 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev oeredhis vision o a nuclear-ree world. Gorbachevs newthinking helped reverse the nuclear arms race and

spark a series o agreements reducing strategic arsenals.Nearly a quarter-century later, the Russian leadershiphas returned to reliance upon the doctrine o nucleardeterrence. While Russian leaders do not challengePresident Obamas long-term vision o a world ree onuclear weapons, and Russia continues to negotiate newagreements to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, nucleardeterrence is even more entrenched in the thinking o theRussian security community today than during the ColdWar. There are at least two reasons or this.

First, Russia is a relatively weak conventional militarypower. In Gorbachevs days, the Soviet Union deployedmore tanks than the rest o the worlds countries combinedand kept hal a million men in a high state o readinessin Eastern Europe. A decade later, when Russian leaderVladimir Putin wished to suppress Chechen separatism, heound amid a million-strong military that the genuinelycapable orce numbered only about 65,000. Since the end

o the Soviet Union, China has been buying many moreRussian combat aircrat than Russias own air orce.Russias current military reorm is ar more successul

at dismantling the existing military organization than atbuilding its 21st-century successor. For the irst time ever,Russia is a conventional military underdog on both o itsstrategic lanks, in Europe and Asia. Nuclear deterrence isMoscows answer to that strategic dilemma.

Second, Russia insists on retaining the strategicindependence that characterizes a great power. This requires

U.S.-Russia Balancing ActDmitri Trenin

Russia relies on nuclear deterrence because of relatively weak conventional forces.

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a rough equality between U.S. and Russiannuclear arsenals. Absent nuclear weapons,the Russo-American military equationbecomes heavily skewed in avor o theUnited States.

To put it dierently: I other actorsremain unchanged, a world ree onuclear weapons is a world sae or U.S.conventional military hegemony. Lessobvious but equally true, Russias nuclearadvantage over its Chinese neighborbalances Chinas increasing conventionalstrength. The price o great-powerdom,or Russia, is dependence on nuclearweapons, acceptance o the inherentinsecurity they bring, and reliance uponnuclear deterrence. But advances in

military technology hold the potential toupset this equation.

Russia thereore links its endorsemento strategic arms reductions to constraints on newtechnologies such as missile deenses and what it callsweaponization o space. Both are areas where the UnitedStates is perceived as holding the advantage. Russia alsoadvocates expanding the U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue toinclude China.

A crucial step here would be to link U.S. and Russianmissile deenses in a joint system. This would obviatereliance on mutually assured destruction. Deterrence would,at last, become a thing o the past. In principle, the Russiangovernment avors cooperation toward this goal. For themoment, however, it lacks a clear strategy o reaching thenew strategic world.

A world ree rom nuclear weapons would be a worldtransormed. Such a world would require mutual trustamong the major powers (above all, the United States,

Russia, and China), cooperation on strategic deenses, and awide-ranging security collaboration among them that wouldconsign conventional military balances (and imbalances) tohistory.

This is a tall order by any standard. Yet without it aworld ree rom nuclear weapons will remain a dream ora nightmare.


Russias nuclear arsenal balances Chinas conventional strength; this Chinese soldier

participates in a 2009 China-Russia military exercise.

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uclear power provides 20 percent o U.S.electricity, and roughly hal o that total is

generated by nuclear reactors ueled by uraniumthat came rom a Russian nuclear weapon. The Megatonsto Megawatts program is responsible or this remarkableachievement.

Established by the 1993 U.S.-Russia Highly EnrichedUranium Agreement, the Megatons to Megawattsprogram will by 2013 have converted 500 metric tonso highly enriched uranium (HEU) rom dismantledRussian nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium(LEU) suitable or U.S. commercial reactors. As o

December 31, 2009, 382 metric tons o HEU had beenrecycled into 11,047 metric tons o LEU, equivalent tomore than 15,000 nuclear warheads eliminated.

how doeS it woRk?

When a nuclear warhead is disassembled, the HEU

metal is separated rom the rest o the weapon, choppedup into shavings, puried, converted into a gas, andmixed with uranium containing mostly an isotope thatcannot sustain an explosive chain reaction a processcalled down-blending.

Conversion and dilution o the HEU takes placein Russia, and the resulting LEU is shipped to USECacilities in the United States to be abricated into reactoruel. USEC was ormerly the United States Enrichment

Megatons to MegawattsAndrew Newman

A worker blends down highly enriched uranium pellets.

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Corporation, part o theDepartment o Energy untilprivatized in 1998.

USEC paystkhsaks(TENEX),

the executive agent or Russia,the market price less a modestdiscount or the LEU. USECalso replaces the amount onatural uranium displacedby the down-blended LEU.USEC then sells the LEU toU.S. energy utilities as uel.

who benefitS?

Megatons to Megawatts

provides nancial incentivesto dismantle thousands owarheads, destroys hundredso tons o weapons-gradematerial, and employs thousands o Russian nuclearworkers all at very modest cost to the U.S. taxpayer.Without this deal, the prolieration risks rom Russiasnuclear complex during the 1990s would have been argreater.

beyond 2013

While Megatons to Megawatts is a nonprolierationsuccess story, it will come to an end in 2013, and Russiastill has hundreds o tons o HEU beyond the stocksneeded or its military program. Rosatom (the Russiangovernments Atomic Energy Corporation) is notinterested in extending the agreement. Rosatom ocialscomplain that the United States and USEC (as the soleexecutive agent) use their economic leverage unairly,pointing to the below-market price USEC pays ordown-blended Russian LEU and to a 1992 antidumpingduty imposed on U.S. imports o Russian enrichment

products. The U.S. ear was that Russia would foodthe U.S. market with cheap uranium, but the duty issupposed to be phased out beginning in 2011.

Russia, or its part, has had on occasion a somewhatunrealistic approach to the commercial nuclear market or example, setting a foor price or selling uraniumwell above world market prices.

Another reason the current deal will end is thatdown-blending HEU is less lucrative than enriching

uranium, and Rosatom expects to sign deals supplyingenriched uranium to U.S. utilities directly in 2010.

There are, however, ways to restructure theagreement that would allow Russia to make billions odollars in prot and support its strategic objectives oexpanding nuclear power and nuclear exports by blendingdown more o its excess HEU. Ultimately, both Russiaand the United States should declare all HEU beyondthe stocks needed to support small uture nuclear weaponstockpiles and their naval programs to be excess,down-blend it to reactor uel, and keep the material inmonitored storage until the commercial market is readyto absorb it.

See also U.S.-russia High eichd Uaiu Ag[http://www.nti.org/db/nispros/russia/ulltext/heudeal/heuull.htm].

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USEC plant in Kentucky that processes low-enriched uranium for energy.

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Todays world leaders

have ceded to thenext generation the

goal o achieving a nuclearweapons-ree world. In thepast, young people aroundthe world have oten drivenpolitical, cultural, social,and intellectual movements,achieving progress that oldergenerations had discardedas illusions. To meet thechallenge o eliminatingnuclear weapons, youthscontributions must yet againgo beyond mere idealism.But how?

First, rising leadersmust, through educationand collaboration withoreign peers, seek tounderstand the world as itis and not as it was. TheCold War paradigm and

obsolete arguments aboutthe utility o nuclear deterrence continue to poison thedebate. I the next generation o decision makers does notreevaluate the relevance o nuclear weapons in combatingcontemporary threats, it will be equipped with 20th-century tools to ght 21st-century security problems.Beore we can substantively reduce warheads on theground, we must rst reduce their value in our minds.

Second, since all humanity has a stake in abolishingnuclear weapons, todays youth must emerge to identiy

themselves not only as citizens o nations but as memberso a global community. Disarmament will require trust,and this will be hard to achieve i national partisanshipis the sole guiding principle in international politics. Wecannot allow our oreathers conficts and prejudicesto deeat the goal o a nuclear weapons-ree world. Thedestruction o the last nuclear warhead will coincide

with the age o greater globalsolidarity.

Third, when arguingthe merits o completelyabolishing global nucleararsenals, youth should rerainrom demonizing those whodisagree. Dierences overthe end goal o eliminatingnuclear weapons must notprevent us rom working rstto signicantly reduce theirnumbers. Lets talk about theright issues at the right time.

Being the only group witha chance to create conditionsor a world ree o nuclearweapons is both an inspiringand daunting realization. Eveni todays young people do noteliminate nuclear weaponswithin our lietimes, let itnot be because o timidity orpassivity in conronting thisgreat threat. Our example must

encourage those who comeater us to continue the endeavor that began at the dawno the 21st century. It alls to us to create the conditionsor a world without nuclear arms. I we do, our mark onhistory will be everlasting.

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Young People to the ForeJohan Bergens

As here in China in 1995, young people are still leaders in the

campaign against nuclear weapons.

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Suggesstion of Obama (Nuclear Free World)

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