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ritish Society for Middle Eastern Studies

Taliban by Ahmed RashidReview by: Amr SabetBritish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (May, 2003), pp. 93-94Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593252.

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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2003), Carfax ublishing30(1), 93-103 Taylor&FrancisGroup30(1), 93-103

B: REVIEWS: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

TALIBAN. By AHMED ASHID. ondon, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001. 274 pp., text(pp. 1-216) pp + appendices 1-7 (pp. 217-247) + notes (pp. 248-265) + index(pp. 266-274); 16 chapters.Talibanwon a prize from BRISMESwhen it was firstpublishedin 2000, and has beenreviewed in its Newsletter. Since 11 September2001 events, however, the book hasattracted significant renewed interest rendering it appropriateto see how AhmedRashid's account has stood the test of recent regional and global developments.Rashid's Pakistanibackgroundhas especially qualifiedhim not only to become theDaily Telegraph newspaper and the Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent oCentralAsia, Afghanistanand Pakistan,but also to harbournuancedinsights into thecomplexitiesof this increasinglysensitive and unstableregion. Spanninga periodof 21years in the writing, Taliban is the culminationof an interestedpersonalconcern withAfghani affairs since the Soviet invasion of that countryin 1979 until now. The bookis divided into threeparts.The firstpart(chapters1-5) deals with Afghani history andthe recent rise of the Talibanmovement.The second part(chapters6-10) examines theIslamic nature and idiosyncrasies of the movement, its organizationalstructure,itsgender and drugs policies, and its relationship with 'Usama bin Laden. Part three(chapters 11-16) and perhaps the most importantdiscusses the 'New Great Game'involving oil and geopolitics, and impingingon countriessuch as Pakistan,the CentralAsian Republics, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the US. It further follows thealternating ortunes of differentplayers, and the volatile patternof relations, alliancesand counter-alliancesboth within the ethnic mosaic of Afghanistan, and beyond itsborders,with a wide range of internationaland transnationalactors.Fusingthe potentiallyexplosive andhighly chargedelementsof ethnicity, religion, oilandgeopolitics, the CentralAsian powderkeg has become the focus of intense strategicrivalry,and the domainof a rapidlyevolving 'new greatgamesmanship.'It is one withfar reachingand perhapsmuch more serious implicationsthan the 'GreatGame' of thelate nineteenthcenturybetween the imperialpowers of Britain and Russia; a confron-tation which had brought about the modern landlocked buffer State of Afghanistan.Withinthis historical andcurrentcontext Rashid sets the rise of Talibanand, one mightadd in retrospect, ts fall.The Talibanmovement was the 'proclaimed'outcomeof the inherent nsecuritywhichprevailed in Afghanistanafter the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1988, and theensuing civil strife among different former Mujahidinfactions. Under their factionalcontrolAfghani society was increasingly coming to be dominatedby rival groups andmilitiaswhose power struggleactionseventuallydevolved into sheer acts of banditry.Agroupof mullahs and students of religion who came togetherfrom madrassas in bothAfghanistanand Pakistan,became concerned about such chaos and would discuss 'howto change the terriblesituation' (p. 22). From there emerged the idea of Taliban(sgl.tdlib)or 'Islamic students'who sought to dissociate themselves from the party politicsof the Mujahidin,and to project themselves as religious 'seekers' wishing to cleansesociety rather han to access power. The movement chose Mullah Muhammad Umar asits leader in acknowledgementof his piety and unimpeachableIslamic credentials.Itfurtherpresented a clearly defined agenda to restore peace, disarm the population,ISSN 1353-0194 print/ISSN1469-3542 online/03/010093-11? 2003 BritishSociety for MiddleEasternStudiesDOI: 10.1080/1353019032000059117

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REVIEWS:OLITICSNDECONOMICSenforce Shari'alaw and defend the integrityand Islamic characterof Afghanistan(pp.22-23). The idea came to fruitionin 1994, andby 1996, concludedin the meteoricriseof the movement with its control of the capital Kabul, and its subsequenttakeoverofabout90 of the entirecountry.The remaining10 rested in the hands of what cameto be known as the NorthernAlliance, comprisedmainly of Persian Tajiks, TurkmenUzbeks and Shi'i Hazaras. Both sides were supportedby different regional actors:Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, with US acquiescence, supportingthe Taliban, and Iran,Central Asian Republics, India, and Russia supporting he NorthernAlliance. Until 11September 2001 events and the ensuing war by the US, this roughly speaking,constituted he portraitof the shifting militaryandpoliticalscene in thatcountry,andthedirect context within which the 'New Great Game' was being played out.Rashid's deep understandingof the geopolitics of the region makes it difficult tochallenge his overall frameworkof analysis, at least as far as what he says. In anothersense however, it is possible to contest him where he appearsto have committedsomesignificanterrorsof omission. One gets the impressionthat, Rashidhas overlooked,orat least not paid sufficientattention,to the potentiallyincreasingpivotal role that Indiawould andis coming to play, within what is widely perceivedas an evolving American-Israeli-Indianaxis. If such perceptionsare correct,and a peace broughtto Afghanistanis one to be consistent with this axis' agenda,Rashid's claim thatpeace in this countrywould be in the interest of all regional countries concerned, may turn out to beunfounded.Instead,a pax of the kind would very likely involve, including Afghanistanin the axis agendaas a base to contain Iranfrom the east, the dismantlingof the Pakistaninuclearprogramme est in the future it may fall into the hands of an Islamist regime,establishing a hegemonic base to contain Russia and China, and consolidating thegeopolitical reshapingof the MiddleEast, amongpotentiallyotherobjectives.If so, thenan Afghani 'peace' may turn out to be the harbingerof a much wider regional andpossibly global conflagration.

Anothersignificant apse is perhapswhere Rashid overstatesthe case for the absenceof an Americanstrategic ramework n dealingwith the region (p. 176). He fails to makethe connection between the US's initial 'belief' in the Taliban,and its unwillingnesstorein in Saudi and Pakistani supportfor the movement, even after it supposedly hadceased to do so (p. 180). He observes this as a sign of Americanpolicy inconsistency.However, if one were to make the assumption hattherehad been an Americaninterestin manipulatingSunni Taliban n orderto set the conditionsfor a sunni-shi'iIslamic civilwar, or for hostile relations between the two neigbouring countries of Iran andAfghanistan,then whether the US continued to believe in the Talibanor actuallyneverhas, becomes a matter of total irrelevance. This would furtherexplain why the US hasbeen unwilling to restrainSaudi Arabiaand Pakistan from supportingTaliban while itprojected the stance of a distant disinterested,and at times, hostile party. Americaninvolvement would have cast increasing shadows of doubt on a movement alreadyperceived by many Muslims with scepticism. To serve its purpose, Taliban's Islamicimage had to be bolstered.Any perceived Americanpresence would have underminedthis US strategy,one that both existed, and as opposed to Rashid's claims, has beentotally consistent (pp. 178-180). The way Iranhandledthe situation while both SaudiArabiaand Pakistanhave mishandled t may help explain subsequentexplosive events,andalso how the US is likely to pursuethe same strategicobjectivesbothdifferentlyandby directengagement.In the process, countries ike Saudi Arabia and Pakistanmay endup losing on bothaccounts:once when they supportedTaliban,and thenagainwhen theyturnedagainst it. If so, many of Rashid's policy recommendationsmay prove off themark.Nevertheless, his Talibanremains an extremely importantbook, providingfor awealthof information,analysisandbackgroundknowledgeof a regionthat is very likelyto occupy centre stage of world events for years to come.

AMR SABET94

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