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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Military Decision-Making Process and Special Forces Mission Planning: A Square Peg for a Round Hole ?"

6.AUTH0RIS) M AJ Thomas M. Joyce, U. S. Army

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7 PERFORMING ORGANIZATICWAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College U.S. Army ATTN:ATZL-SWD-G Ft. Leavenworth,Kansas 66027-1352

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13.ABSTRACT (MaximurrQOOwords) , ■ , r~ ^T~ «• This study examines the adequacy of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) tor use by Special Forces (SF) stalls at the battalion /group level while planning multiDle and simultaneous operations. The research is prefaced by stating the MDMP, in its current form, provides an excellent decision-making tool for the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFOD-A). The author identifies current trends and poientia! hypothesis on why conventional and SF field grade commisioned officers are failing to appropriately apply doctrinal mandates of the MDMP. The research concludes the MDMP is adequate for SF staffs"at the battalion /group level when SFOD-As are mutually supporting or interdependent. When SFOD-As are interdependent, they require synchronization and therefore require SF battalion /group staffs to execute all steps within the MDMP. Ironically, SFOD-As are normally not interdependent and more accurately characterized as mutually exclusive of each other when employed by SF battalions /groups. The author contends the inappropriate application of the MDMP by SF staffs may negatively impact on subordinate SFOD-As. Research on the use of the MDMP enaoies SF staffs at battalion /group level while planning multiple and simultaneous operations to perform their organizational functions in a more efficent and timely manner.

19980731 054 14.SUBJECT TERMS MDMP, Special Forces, FOB,SFOB, AOB,SFOD-A,SOCCE,SOLE,JSOTF,SOCOORD, OPCEN, decision-making, SF Group, SF Battalion, wargaming,commander's intent, COA development, mission analysis.

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USAFPC VI 00

THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND SPECIAL FORCES MISSION PLANNING: "A SQUARE PEG FOR A ROUND HOLE? "

A thesis presented tothe Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITÄR^ ART AND SCIENCE

by

THOMAS M. JOYCE, MAJ, USA B;B.A^ St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas? 1987 M.B.A;? Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York;, 1997

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1998

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

jane QunJTt nransciiD 1

THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND SPECIAL FORCES MISSION PLANNING: "A SQUARE PEG FOR A ROUND HOLE? "

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

THOMAS M. JOYCE, MAT, USA B.B.A., St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas, 1987 M.B.A., Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, 1997

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1998

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Thomas M. Joyce

Thesis Title: The Military Decision-Making Process and Special Forces Mission Planning: "A Square Peg for a Round Hole? "

Approved by:

LTC Mike Findlay, B.S., M.Ä

^JL^^g-^OJ^ - Member LTC Oren Hunsaker, B.S., M.S.

Thesis Committee Chairman

xM Consulting Faculty Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.

Accepted this 5th day of June 1998 by:

J. (£w(uu— , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement).

ABSTRACT

THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND SPECIAL FORCES MISSION PLANNING: "A SQUARE PEG FOR A ROUND HOLE? " by MAJ Thomas M. Joyce, USA, 87 pages.

This study examines the adequacy of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) for use by Special Forces (SF) staffs at the battalion/group level for planning multiple and simultaneous operations. The research is prefaced by stating the MDMP, in its current form, provides an excellent decision-making tool for the Special Forces Operational Detachments (SFOD-A). The study identifies current trends and potential hypothesis on why conventional and SF field grade commissioned officers are failing to appropriately apply doctrinal mandates of the MDMP. The research concludes the MDMP is adequate for SF staffs at the battalion/group level when SFOD- As are mutually supporting or interdependent. When SFOD-As are interdependent, they require synchronization and therefore require SF battalion/group staffs to execute all steps within the MDMP. Ironically, SFOD-As are normally not interdependent and are more accurately characterized as mutually exclusive of each other when employed by SF battalions/groups. The author contends the inappropriate application of the MDMP by SF staffs may negatively impact on subordinate SFOD-As. Research on the use of the MDMP enables SF staffs at battalion/group level while planning multiple and simultaneous operations to perform their organizational functions in a more efficient and timely manner.

in

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

During the research of this thesis I received invaluable assistance from my peers, the thesis

committee, and my family.

Majors William Salter and Darsie Rogers provided insightful observations and tactical

expertise on the MDMP. Their expertise was drawn from their tenures as observer/controllers at

the Army's Combined Arms Training Centers (CTCs). Their assistance was invaluable to my

research.

The collective intellectual feedback provided by my MMAS thesis committee was both

insightful and energetic. The balanced academic approach provided by LTC(P) Mike Findlay

(Chairman), LTC Oren Hunsaker (SME MDMP), and Dr. Christopher Gabel (Combat Studies

Institute) was extremely effective.

Most importantly, thanks goes to Jana and Carrie. As my partners in the CGSC journey

Jana and Carrie were more than patient with the sacrifices incurred from the long hours of classes,

research, and redrafts.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPROVAL PAGE ii

ABSTRACT iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv

LIST OF FIGURES vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vii

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 12

3. MDMP RATIONALE 23

4. SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES 41

5. MDMP RATIONALE AND OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES 52

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 64

APPENDIX

A. ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES 74

B. GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 80

BIBLIOGRAPHY 83

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 87

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. The Military Decision-Making Process 1

2. Hypothesis/Rationale Matrix 6

3. Subordinate Unit Interdependence 24

4. Mission Tasking Process 25

5. Ambient Factors of Conventional Units 26

6. Mission Analysis Steps 28

7. COA Development Rationale 34

8. COA Analysis Outputs 36

9. SF Span of Control 43

10. SFOD-A Non-Interdependence 45

11. SF HQ Mobility/Geographic Location 46

12. SF Mission Tasking Order Process 49

13. MDMP Rationale with SF Operational Differences 67

14. SF Mission Tasking Order Screening Criteria 71

VI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFSAT Air Force Satellite

AM-SSB Amplitude Modulated Single, Side-Band

* AOB Advanced Operating Base

ARI Army Research Institute

CINC Commander-in-Chief

CRP Common Relevant Picture

DoD Department of Defense

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CGSOC Command and General Staff Officers Course

HF High Frequency

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

JSOA Joint Special Operations Area

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

MDMP Military Decision-Making Process

MHz Megahertz

MOOTW Military Operations Other than War

MTP Mission Training Plan

OPSEC Operational Security

OPTEMPO Operational Tempo

OSS Office of Strategic Studies

Vll

PERSTEMPO

PvPD

SAMS

SF

SFOD-A

SOCCE

SOT-A

SOTD

SOF

TACSAT

TASKORDS

UHF

UN

US

USAJFKSWC

Personnel Tempo

Recognition-Primed decisions

School of Advanced Military Studies

Special Forces

Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha

Special Operations Command and Control Element

Special Operations Team-Alpha

Special Operations Training Detachment

Special Operations Forces

Tactical Satellite

Mission Tasking Orders

Ultra-Ffigh Frequency

United Nations

United States

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center

vni

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

This chapter formats the basis for evaluating the adequacy of the Military Decision-

Making Process when used by Special Forces (SF) battalion/group staffs for planning multiple

and simultaneous operations.

Problem Statement

Non-adherence to the doctrinal Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) impedes the

Special Forces (SF) battalion/group staff from discretely planning multiple and simultaneous

operations.

The Military Decision-Making Process

Stepl Receipt of Mission Step 2 Mission Analysis Step 3 Course of Action Development Step 4 Course of Action Analysis Step 5 Course of Action Comparison Step 6 Course of Action Approval Step 7 Orders Production

Figure 1. The Military Decision-Making Process. Source: U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations (Washington DC: GPO, May 1997), 5-2.

Importance of the Study

A segment of the total population of field grade commissioned officers fails to adhere to

the Military Decision-Making Process, as illustrated in Figure 1. These officers fail to correctly

apply the Military Decision-Making Process for two reasons. They either do not fully understand

the Military Decision-Making Process or they deliberately disregard the doctrine. The operative

question is, why do these field grade commissioned officers fail to follow this doctrine? This

research will focus on the sub-population of field grade commissioned officers who view the

Military Decision-Making Process as inadequate.

Contributing to the problem are several environmental influences. Outlined in Appendix

A, these environmental influences play a role in the problem and must be examined to understand

the larger dynamics of the situation. These environmental influences combined with other

institutional influences have cascading consequential effects. As time becomes more and more

constrained by increased environmental/institutional influences, the value of time as a resource

increases exponentially. The usage of inadequate planning tools by Special Forces staffs directly

impacts on subordinate units specifically identified to support contingencies. "Time is the only

nonrenewable resource and is often the most critical resource a unit must manage."1

Background

As contingency deployments increase and the Army's population decreases, staff

efficiency and effective time management by field grade officers become an increasingly

important individual competencies. The initial environmental influences affecting conventional

and SF staffs are further exasperated by the challenge for units to retain field grade commissioned

officers that embody these critical individual competencies. Efficient staff procedures have

become especially essential for Special Forces staffs planning multiple and simultaneous

contingency taskings.

An Army-wide trend of field grade commissioned officers, in ranks from major to

colonel, demonstrating poor staff skills underline the complications for Special Forces units. A

study conducted by the Army Research Institute (ARI) concluded a significant portion of the field

grade officer population exhibited inadequate staff skills. Field grade commissioned officers in

the study demonstrated poor time management skills by failing to visualize future requirements

and quantifying those operational needs within time and space.2

Inadequate staff skills by field grade staff officers translates into less time for subordinate

commands. These observations infer that appropriate levels of analysis may not be completed. It

further implies subordinate units were receiving less time to conduct troop-leading procedures

than if the staff had practiced good staff skills.

This research assumes the analysis conducted by the ARI was a representative sample of

field grade commissioned officers in the Army. The probability sampling theory states that

general statistical trends present in a sample population can be inferred to be constant in a smaller

subset of the same sample population.3 Thus, it is inferred from the ARI study that general

trends in the sample population of field grade commissioned officers are present in Special Forces

field grade commissioned officers.

This inference means that, like conventional units, there are a proportional number of

Special Forces field grade commissioned officers working on staffs at the battalion/group level

who demonstrate poor staff skills. The lack of individual staff skills significantly impede Special

Forces staffs when planning multiple and simultaneous operations. Other staff skill deficiencies

such as non-adherence to decision-making doctrine, impede Special Forces staffs from discretely

planning multiple and simultaneous operations.

Compounding the lack of staff skills present in field grade commissioned officers is this

trend in non-adherence to the Military Decision-Making Process. Research findings in 1993

on tactical planning all indicate that doctrinal concepts and organizational interpretations of the

MDMP differ widely.4 The application of the Military Decision-Making Process, by doctrine,

is one with little variance for innovation and is viewed as a doctrinally mandated tool. "There is

still only one process, however, and omitting steps of the MDMP is not the solution."5

In contrast to Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations, is the ARI's

published report clearly identifying the diverse opinions regarding appropriate application of the

Military Decision-Making Process. The ARI's executive summary states observer/controllers

3

in the field are reporting a disconnect between presentations on doctrine and pre-training and

what gets executed—not solely because of poor training.6

Non-adherence to doctrinal decision-making, impedes Special Forces staffs from

effectively planning. Transitioning staff products from higher to lower echelons is complicated

by individuals' subjective interpretation of the Military Decision-Making Process. The flow of

information is affected and organizational responsibilities are overlooked by the inconsistent

application of the Military Decision-Making Process. Neglected or duplicated coordination

measures occur because of inconsistent understanding the Military Decision-Making Process

application criteria. These consequential effects collectively disrupt the efficient operations of a

unit and more specifically impede the planning of operations by staffs. The use of approved

systems facilitates the rapid and consistent assessment of the situation by minimizing confusion

over the process.7

Linkage of Problem to Research

The lack of organizational adherence to the Military Decision-Making Process doctrine is

not the subject of this research. However, this organizational trend in doctrinal application does

create the basis for this document's primary research question. The trends in the ARI study yield

some interesting implied potential hypotheses on why field grade commissioned officers are not

appropriately applying doctrinal mandates of the Military Decision-Making Process.

In the first hypothesis, field grade commissioned officers simply fail to understand the

Military Decision-Making Process. In the second hypothesis, field grade commissioned officers

view the MDMP criteria as flexible and open to interpretation/derivation.

The first hypothesis of failed understanding by field grade commissioned officers has

obvious implications. The failed understanding slows a staffs processing of mission tasking

orders (TASKORDS) dramatically. Unnecessary and duplicate coordination is executed by the

poorly trained staff. These unnecessary staff procedures do not provide any additional value to

their subordinate units. The expended time in unnecessary staff processes could be used by a

subordinate unit for training and planning.

Also implied in Hypothesis #1 is the issue of Military Decision-Making Process

improvement. If the ARI observations are true, significant numbers of field grade commissioned

officers fail to understand the Military Decision-Making Process. As a result, little intellectual

discussion occurs among field grade commissioned officers regarding the Military Decision-

Making Process. Thus no substantial improvement to the Military Decision-Making Process

(MDMP) can occur.

The second hypothesis for field grade officers failing to adhere to the Military Decision-

Making Process is officers view the process as flexible and open to interpretation. Hypothesis #2

for failing to adhere to Military Decision-Making Process doctrine has two underlining

explanations or rationales. The first rationale for field grade commissioned officers in the study

interpreting the MDMP application criteria as flexible is from misinterpretation of the doctrine.

Field grade officers viewing the Military Decision-Making Process in its current form as

inadequate is the second rationale.

"The commander decides how to shorten the process."8 This statement from chapter five

of the doctrinal Field Manual 101-5 is a potential source of confusion regarding the Military

Decision-Making Process and supports Rationale #1.

The diverse array of references regarding the subject of the Military Decision-Making

Process also contributes to an inappropriate interpretation of the MDMP doctrine. Within the

1984 version of Field Manual 101-5 were multiple tables and various models for the Military

Decision-Making Process. The ARI determined this extensive array of training materials and

references significantly contributed to the organizational confusion between operational users and

field evaluators on the Military Decision-Making Process criteria.9

The adequacy rationale, for failing to adhere to the doctrinal template of the Military

Decision-Making Process, is rooted in the field grade commissioned officer's own perception.

Viewed as inadequate, the Military Decision-Making Process fails to support the planning needs

of various members of the ARI's sample population.

This view that the Military Decision-Making Process is inadequate was further

substantiated by recommendations made in the ARI study. Figure 2, the Hypothesis/Rationale

Matrix, summarizes the potential explanations for non-adherence to the Military Decision-

Making Process doctrine.

Non-Adherence to MDMP Doctrine

Hypothesis #1 Do Not

Understand Doctrine

View Doctrine as Flexible

Rationale #1 Misinterpretation MDMP Inadequate

Hypothesis #2

Rationale #2

Figure 2. Hypothesis/Rationale Matrix.

The executive summary of the APJ's study states doctrinal principles should be evaluated

to better replicate the required human tasks within the process from a naturalistic standpoint

versus the current deductive analytic process. The study continues to recommend a shift in

emphasis of the Military Decision-Making Process from decision-making to a planning

orientation.10 This subject will be further explained in chapter two.

Again, the probability sampling theory can be applied to the two distinct hypotheses. In

other words, the Special Forces field grade commissioned officers failing to adhere to doctrinal

application mandates of the Military Decision-Making Process either do not understand the

process or view the process as flexible.

It was previously hypothesized that the original populations of field grade officers view

the Military Decision-Making Process as flexible from the rationalization that the MDMP might

be inadequate. This view is present among the subset of Special Forces field grade commissioned

officer population as well.

The deduced perception of the adequacy rationale is substantiated by the Special

Operations Training Detachment at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Viewed as the

institutional expert for Special Operations Forces tactical planning and employment, the Special

Operations Training Detachment concludes that much of the planning doctrine, designed with

conventional units in mind, is not fully suited for the planning requirements of Special Forces

staffs. Within their quarterly training documents the Special Operations Training Detachment

states, "The guidance provided by US Army manuals is certainly not tailored to SOF

operations."11

Scope

The principal echelon of interest for the analysis of the Military Decision-Making Process

is the Special Forces battalion/group staff level. The use of the conventional Military Decision-

Making Process by Special Forces Operational Detachments (SFOD-As) is not in question. The

Military Decision-Making Process provides an excellent tool for the SFOD-As to conduct their

decision-making. Research on improving the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) for

Special Forces staffs at battalion/group level will enable these organizations to use the MDMP to

perform their organizational functions in a more efficient and timely manner.

Research Questions

1. Is the Military Decision-Making Process adequate to meet the needs of staffs at the

Special Forces battalion/group level when planning multiple and simultaneous operations?

2. Why do field grade commissioned officers fail to adhere to the Military Decision-

Making Process?

3. Why do field grade officers intentionally disregard the Military Decision-Making

Process doctrine?

4. If the Military Decision-Making Process is failing to meet the needs of the

conventional combined arms branches, what is its functionality for Special Forces staffs at

battalion/group level?

5. What are the doctrinal and implied rationales for the sequential steps in the Military

Decision-Making Process?

6. What are the operational differences between conventional combined arms

battalions/brigades and Special Forces battalions/groups?

7. Do the concluded Military Decision-Making Process doctrinal and implied rationales

fit with the operational differences inherent to Special Forces battalions/groups?

8. Given the implied primary rationale for COA development is to synergize

subordinate, interdependent units, why does Special Forces doctrine continue mandating this

process given the absence of interdependence among SFOD-As?

9. What is the origin of this Special Forces organizational fixation on unnecessary

synchronization?

Limitations

A gap in the relative Special Forces (SF) specific material addressing planning and

application of the Military Decision-Making Process by SF staffs will be a limitation in the

research process.

Delimitations

The research does not address organizational design changes to Special Forces

battalion/group staffs due to the current cultural and political trends supporting military

downsizing. The research will not evaluate the adequacy of the Military Decision-Making

Process for Special Forces staffs planning multiple and simultaneous operations during MOOTW

8

(Military Operations Other Than War). This would complicate the research beyond the scope of

available time. A more accurate level of research needs to include the requirements of

conventional combined arms units as well.

Assumptions

The research assumes that organizational and operational differences of Special Forces

battalions/groups were not comprehensively analyzed prior to standardization of the Military

Decision-Making Process, within the SF branch. This research assumes the analysis conducted by

the ARI was a representative sample of field grade commissioned officers in the Army.

Problems

A significant shortage of detailed, intellectual literature focused specifically on the

mission planning criteria necessary for Special Forces operational planning staffs at

battalion/group level is anticipated.

Solutions

The lack of detailed Special Forces specific literature on the subject can be overcome

through the extensive body of knowledge addressing the Military Decision-Making Process

theory. Additionally, the void in SF specific publications can be offset through documents

generated by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), After-Action Reviews (AARs)

documenting post-contingency results, and actual interviews with Special Forces operational

planners who participated in contingencies as well as deployments to any of the Army's Combat

Training Centers (CTCs).

Research Method

The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter two identifies the information

requirements and availability to establish an approach to determining the adequacy of the Military

Decision-Making Process for Special Forces staffs at the battalion/group level. Chapter three

includes further analysis by determining the doctrinal and implied rationale of the seven steps in

9

the Military Decision-Making Process. Chapter four highlights the operational differences

between a conventional combined arms battalion/brigade and a Special Forces battalion/group.

Chapter five evaluates the consistent attributes associated with the development of the Military

Decision-Making Process in support of conventional operations, relative to the operational

differences associated with SF battalions/groups, outlined in chapter four. Chapter six

summarizes the conclusions formulated in the previous chapters of the thesis. The chapter then

finalizes the research question and follows with an examination of some recommendations for

writers of Military Decision-Making Process and Special Forces doctrine. The concluding

chapter completes the discussion with recommendations to Special Forces staffs and leadership.

'US Department of the Army, 'Tactical Decision Making: 'Abbreviated Planning" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center For Army Lessons Learned, 1979), 1-3.

2Jon J. Fallesen, "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Performance Research" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute, September 1993), 16.

3Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1979), 169.

4Jon J. Fallesen, "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Performance Research" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute, September 1993).

5US Department of the Army, FM101-5 Staff Organizations and Operations (Washington DC: GPO, May 1997), 5-27.

6Jon J. Fallesen, "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Performance Research" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute, September 1993), vi.

7US Department of the Army, FM 101-5 Staff Organizations and Operations (Washington DC: GPO, May 1997), 5-1.

8Ibid., 5-27.

9Jon J. Fallesen, "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Performance Research" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute, September 1993), 3.

10Ibid., ix.

10

nUS Army Joint Readiness Training Center. Special Operations Training Bulletin (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, February 1995), 2.

11

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Purpose

The chapter begins with an examination of patterns within the existing literature.

The section then discusses authoritative works on the Military Decision-Making Process.

The chapter concludes with a summation of the key works forming primary sources for the

research.

Background

The US Army's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) has a long and diverse

history. Its beginnings are associated with the Prussian Army's attempts, in the 1700's,1 at

analytical decision-making, but is more commonly associated with more modern

publications in the twentieth century. Two of the original publications include Major Eben

Swift's 1906 booklet on Field Orders, Messages and Reports, and Captain's Roger S.

Fitch's 1909 Estimating Tactical Situations and Publishing Field Orders. Three years later

the Army's decision-making was further standardized as it was introduced to the War

College in 1911 by General Tasker H. Bliss. These documents establish the initial

foundation of what eventually became the US Army's current institutional doctrine for

decision-making.2

After World War II, the US Army integrated some of the German Army's decision-

making methodology from their pre-war operations manual, Truppenfuehrung. In addition,

the Army transitioned to a more centralized decision-making process. This derivation was a

result of the emergence of nuclear weapons and the increased US role in global affairs.3 The

Army's complex evolution of decision-making culminated in the current methodology

known today as the Military Decision-Making Process.

12

Gaps in Existing Knowledge

While the depth of extant knowledge regarding the Military Decision-Making

Process is extensive, significant gaps exist in the current body of knowledge regarding usage

of the MDMP in Special Forces units. Part of the problem is addressed by Major Steve

Fondacaro in his School of Advanced Military Studies monograph published in 1989.

"There are few personnel, active duty or retired, who can honestly call themselves SOF

experts, though many aspire to, especially within the United States. For the most part, those

individuals with the most recent experience have been parties to failures, and as a result have

little credibility."4

The key doctrinal proponent of the Military Decision-Making Process in Special

Forces units is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center

(USAJFKSWC). In the absence of MDMP doctrinal guidance, the Special Operations

Training Detachment (SOTD) of the Joint Readiness Training Center provides some

planning recommendations to fill the gap. Unfortunately, the primary focus and scope of

these organizations' documents are planning and decision-making at the SFOD-A level.

Deductive inferences are once again concluded due to the substantial lack of

institutional references focused on the discrete usage of the Military Decision-Making

Process by Special Forces battalion/group staffs. Patterns in existing knowledge are

delineated into two categories: Traditionalist and Liberalist.

Patterns in Existing Knowledge

Doctrinal patterns in scholarship seem to reflect an intellectual dichotomy in written

documents and organizational interpretation. There currently exists two distinctly different,

diametrically opposed schools of thought regarding the usage of the Military Decision-

Making Process. The Traditionalist view the application of the Military Decision-Making

Process doctrine in its strictest form. The Traditionalist believe the usage of the Military

13

Decision-Making Process and its doctrinal applications are not subject to interpretation or

alteration.

The Liberalist is the second school of thought regarding the Military Decision-Making

Process. The Liberalist believe the Military Decision-Making Process in its current form is

too rigid and is dysfunctional in situations constrained by time. The Liberalist contend the

Military Decision-Making Process is a structured response to complex situations where

choices are unstructured and distinct from each other. The Liberalist reason the Military

Decision-Making Process is the Army's structured replication of the unstructured critical

thinking and reasoning process exemplified in Napoleon, Grant, and Patton. The Liberalist

further contend the Military Decision-Making Process is too tightly focused on selection of

options instead of the creation of options.

Authoritative Works in the Field

The authoritative works in the field include publications from the Department of the

Army, Army Research Institute, and various periodicals, plus unpublished research projects.

The Special Forces doctrinal references Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special

Operations Forces, and Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine For Special Forces Operations, fail to

refer to the use of the MDMP by Special Forces battalion/group staffs for operational

planning. The only reference to the Military Decision-Making Process or decision-making

in thirty-six collective pages from both references is one page of considerations for mission

planning. The assumption for the lack Special Forces specific planning doctrine is current

military doctrine in Field Manual 101-5 is applicable for use in planning Special Forces

missions.

This assumption contrasts with documents produced, published, and distributed

Army-wide from the Special Operations Training Detachment at the Joint Readiness

Training Center (SOTD). As mentioned in this document's "Introduction," the SOTD

14

recognizes certain aspects of US Army doctrine are not tailored to SOF operations.5 The

intent of drafting these support bulletins is to "address issues not covered in current Army or

SOF publications, as well as bridge the gap between conventional doctrine and how it

applies to SOF."6

In the Joint Readiness Training Center Special Operations Training Bulletin? dated

December 1996, the SOTD regurgitates the contents of chapter five of Field Manual 101-5,

Staff Organization and Operations. It includes several applicable Special Forces specific

tips on the MDMP, but does little except rephrase the contents of the baseline doctrine in

Field Manual 101-5.

Another Special Forces specific document that addresses MDMP is the

USAJFKSWC's Special Forces Qualification Course Deliberate Decision-Making and

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield^ dated Feb. 1997.8 This document is an excellent

tool for the SFOD-A, but does not contain any information applicable for use by staffs at the

battalion/group level.

Some of the generic authoritative texts listed below represent a fraction of the

available references available on the Military Decision-Making Process. Although none of

the below mentioned texts reference the Military Decision-Making Process in support of

Special Forces operations, these references are worth mentioning because they provide

significant input to subsequent chapters in this thesis.

Supporting the Traditionalist, Major Fastabend's research entitled "Fighting the

Numbers: The Role of Quantification in Tactical Decision Making,"9 emphasizes US Army

decision doctrine should focus primarily on quantitative and analytical procedures. In his

monograph, Fastabend concludes the Army's increased requirement to efficiently apply

combat power mandates a scientific approach to decision-making be adopted. He

15

recommends the Army incorporate tactical quantification into the framework of theory,

doctrine, training and force development.

Contrary to Major Fastabend's position is the CGSC thesis, "Combat Orders: An

Analysis of the Tactical Orders Process."10 In his analysis, Major John Antal concludes the

decision-making system being used by the Army is generally ineffective. Major Antal

believes the tactical orders process must change in order to meet the requirements of the

future battlefield. The time intensive Military Decision-Making Process has failed to evolve

into a process that can be used in a environment characterized by explosive speeds, immense

distances, and precision munitions.

Other research on the Military Decision-Making Process's adequacy focuses on the

confusing array of references available on the subject. Major Tim Lynch's, "Problem

Solving Under Time Constraints: Alternatives for the Commander's Estimate,"11 concludes

Field Manual 101-5 must explicitly outline what commander's and staffs must do to

abbreviate the process under time constrained situations.12 Major Lynch also recommended

branch specific manuals and Mission Training Plans need standardization with doctrinal

problem solving processes.

Like CGSOC students, School of Advanced Military Studies students have elected

to research the Military Decision-Making Process for various reasons. Major Frame's 1996

monograph entitled "Gazing Into the Crystal Ball Together: Wargaming and Visualization

for the Commander and Staff,"13 is critical of the MDMP. In his writings, Frame concludes

the current Military Decision-Making Process doctrine has shifted the primary responsibility

of wargaming to the staff. Frame writes that narratives in Field Manual 101-5 fail to

articulate the roles and responsibilities of the commander.14 As a result, commanders rarely

wargame with their staff. Consequentially, a common vision is not shared between a staff

and the commander.

16

In addition to CGSOC and School of Advanced Military Studies students,

institutional studies have frequently been sanctioned in order to evaluate the adequacy of the

Military Decision-Making Process. One example of institutional research is the US Army

Research Institute's January 1993 study "Desert Storm Challenges: An Overview of Desert

Storm Survey Responses."15 The ARI conducted an adequacy analysis of the MDMP with

selective Desert Storm participants. Of 1667 responses 1396 or 84 percent said there was not

an overwhelming problem with the Military Decision-Making Process.16

The validity of these conclusions was later questioned after extensive, follow-up

interviews with the participants. Some of the comments stated during interviews represented

notable deviations from the Military Decision-Making Process's doctrinal application

criteria. These deviations from doctrine were apparently ignored by the respondents when

judging the adequacy of the MDMP. The ARI also refuted the survey's adequacy

conclusion due to the large amount of time available to plan the initial attack. In addition,

the over abundance of staff personnel available to surveyed units may have contributed to

conditions not likely to be experienced on future battlefields. ARI also refuted the adequacy

conclusion because a significant percentage of the respondents indicated that once the

ground war started "No process was used."17

Gary Klein's May 1989 Military Review article, "Strategies of Decision-Making,"18

supports the Liberalist school of thought. Klein contends military decision-makers rely too

heavily on analytical decision-making tools like the Military Decision-Making Process. The

article outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the analytical systems and offers a

"recognitional model." Klein agrees with Major Lynch's contention that the Military

Decision-Making Process, in its multi-attribute form, does not work under time pressure

because it takes too long.

17

Klein deduces there axe basically two techniques for solving problems. One model

is Field Manual 101-5's analytical approach. Klein says the other model is the recognitional

approach, used by many experienced decision-makers. The recognitional model avoids

expending time and energy seeking the best option and strives to find a practical option that

works. There is no deliberated option comparison in the recognitional model, therefore

decisions flow quicker. RPD or recognition-primed decisions are a function of a decision-

maker's expertise level. The greater the expertise the larger the percentage of RPDs.

Greg Foster, a professor at the Industrial War College contends the critical thinking

and reasoning skills necessary to exploit any non-analytical decision making systems, are

largely discouraged within the military. In his commentary, "Research, Writing, and the

Mind of the Strategist,"19 Foster concludes "pervasive doctrine, regulations, and operating

procedures breed an orthodoxy that drives out originality."20 He believes these factors

within the military organization need to change in order to create an environment that

encourages creative reasoning and thought. Foster states the greatest contradiction for a

profession whose raison d'etre is closely tied to outwitting adversaries is to promulgate an

environment that fails to embrace non-analytical reasoning.21

As a response to the Liberalist research, the academic curriculum at the Command

and General Staff College (CGSC) is currently undergoing some evolution. Lessons were

recently added to the CGSOC that focus on critical and creative thinking. The reasoning

concepts taught in these courses, assist officers in developing their own conceptual process

of figuring solutions to problems. The course modifications are intended to facilitate the

CGSOC student's transition from the world of "direct leadership" at the junior level to

"indirect leadership" at the senior level. The course provides ways to develop a broader and

richer perspective from which decisions can be made. Two key works of the Traditionalist

sad Liberalist schools of thought help conceptualize these perspectives.

18

Key Works

The key document for the Traditionalist view of the MDMP is chapter five, of the

US Army's Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Chapter five describes

the Military Decision-Making Process as a procedure used by the commander and his staff to

arrive at and execute tactical decisions. The process consists of seven steps. The description

identifies what is done by the commander and staff during each step, but it does not describe

the details of how or why to conduct them. As stated in the text "the disadvantage of using

the MDMP is that it is a time-consuming process."22

Supporting the Liberalist school of thought is Jon Fallesen's "Overview of Army

Tactical Planning Performance Research." Jon Fallesen, a behavioral scientist employed by

the Army Research Institute and author of as many as thirty-five research studies on the

Military Decision-Making Process is a noted scholar in this area. In his treatment of tactical

planning Fallesen reviewed available research on the human dimension of planning. The

summation of Fallesen's research concludes that doctrinal mandates to compare options

concurrently and to avoid making early decisions may not be appropriate.23 The findings

determine that alternatives selected without deliberated option comparison, as directed by

current MDMP doctrine, produce equal or better results. Fallesen attributes success in

decision-making to staffs acquiring and understanding information thus improving their

situational awareness. The report indicates that higher quality staff procedures, and a early

decision method enhances a staffs planning success.24

The adequacy of the Military Decision-Making Process emerged in much of the

research summarized in Fallesen's report. At a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)

war fighter, the Army's Division level simulation exercise, a division commander reported

the Military Decision-Making Process was too formal and required too much time under

19

tactical conditions.25 Lower echelon commanders having consternation with the MDMP

were other sources of this research conclusion.

In a recent interview, Fallesen described his perspective on the Military Decision-

Making Process.26 The MDMP, with its very formal structure is synonymous with economic

theory. In economic theory, decisions are made to optimize the outcome with the greatest

benefit and least cost. In the MDMP theory, attributes of a problem can be translated into

certain and unchangeable values. Unfortunately, the dynamics of combat and adversarial

situations conflict with the assumption of certainty that the MDMP theory requires to

operate. In essence, the selection of an alternative, using MDMP theory, creates a false

sense of security in a selected course of action.

Fallesen argued that the Military Decision-Making Process is not a decision-making

process but more accurately defined as a planning or designing tool. He also concluded that

the complexities of developing unique solutions to dynamic situations can not be simply

resolved with flowcharts, diagrams and one chapter of text in Field Manual 101-5.

Fallesen believed, "It is one's knowledge and how they think about that knowledge

that will lead to a better or worse solution and/or decision." Improved critical and creative

thinking is the path by which improvements to tactical planning will occur.

Conclusion

The facts presented in this chapter illustrate a portion of the academic trends at

CGSC and other military training colleges in analyzing the adequacy of the Military

Decision-Making Process for use in military operations. If the Military Decision-Making

Process is failing to meet the needs of the conventional combined arms branches, what is its

functionality for Special Forces staffs at battalion/group level? From this inquiry and the

apparent lack of academic analysis of the Military Decision-Making Process in Special

Forces operations, further research on this subject is substantiated.

20

'US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Special Operations Training Bulletin, (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, December 1996), 3.

2David A. Fastabend, "Fighting by the Numbers: The Role of Quantification in Tactical Decision Making" (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1987).

3Ibid., 1.

4Steve A. Fondacaro, "Airland Battle and SOF: A Proposal for an Interim Doctrine for Joint Special Operations" (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989), 2.

5US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Special Operations Training Bulletin (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, February 1995), 2.

6Ibid., 1.

7US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Special Operations Training Bulletin (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, December 1996),

8US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Special Forces Qualification Course Deliberate Decision-Making and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Ft. Bragg, NC: GPO, February 1997).

9David A. Fastabend, "Fighting by the Numbers: The Role of Quantification in Tactical Decision Making" (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1987).

10John Antal, "Combat Orders: An Analysis of the Tactical Orders Process" (Masters of Military Art and Sciences thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989).

nTim D. Lynch, "Problem-Solving Under Time Constraints: Alternatives for the US Army Commander's Estimate" (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989).

12Major Lynch's 1989 observations were integrated into the May 1997 Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations.

13John E. Frame, "Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Wargaming and Visualization for the US Army Commander and Staff." (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996).

14Major Frame's 1996 observations were integrated into the May 1997 Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations.

15Stanely M.Halpin, "Desert Storm Challenges: An Overview of Desert Storm Survey Responses (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: " US Army Research Institute, January 1993).

21

,6Ibid.

17Ibid., Table 10.

18Gary A.Klein, "Strategies of Decision Making," Military Review (May 1989): 28.

19Gregory Foster, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1996): 111.

20Ibid.

2IIbid., 112.


23Jon J. Fallesen, "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Performance Research" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute September 1993), viii.

24Ibid.

25- Ibid., 11.

26Jon J. Fallesen, interview with author by electronic mail, 16 October 1997. Ft Leavenworth, KS.

22

CHAPTER 3

MDMP RATIONALE

Purpose

This chapter examines in detail the discrete doctrinal and implied rationale for each of the

seven steps within the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The analysis done in this

chapter forms the basis for the overall adequacy evaluation of the Military Decision-Making

Process for use by Special Forces staffs at the battalion/group level. By analyzing the Military

Decision-Making Process rationales, both doctrinal and implied, with Special Forces operational

differences, outlined in chapter four, this research can further determine if the Military Decision-

Making Process is adequate for Special Forces staffs at the battalion/group level. The intent of

this chapter is not to rephrase the contents of FM 101-5's chapter five on how to use the Military

Decision-Making Process, but more importantly determine the doctrinal and implied why of the

process.

Background

The Military Decision-Making Process was developed for war fighting headquarters

characterized by consistent factors common to most combined arms branches. It was these

factors from which the MDMP emerged. The four ambient factors of conventional units are span

of control, interdependent subordinate units, synchronization, and employment criteria.1 The first

factor exhibited in units for which the MDMP has developed is a standardized span of control of

combat forces ranging from three to five major subordinate units.

The second ambient factor from which the Military Decision-Making Process emerged is

the presence of a symbiotic relationship among subordinate units. As shown in Figure 3, this

symbiosis is characterized by units being cognizant of the activities of their brethren adjacent

units. Frequently, the success of an individual unit's mission may be contingent on the

achievements of an adjacent unit. This symbiotic relationship creates interdependent units. This

23

requires their higher headquarters to define success of an operation on the collective attainment of

individual supporting missions. Furthermore, this symbiotic tendency among subordinate units,

demands that staff planners strive for synergy in execution.

Figure 3. Subordinate Unit Interdependence.

Synergy is defined as a process whereby the total output of a well coordinated

organization is greater than the sum of its individual parts. Through staff integration, information

sharing and a mutual understanding of other unit's activities synergy can be achieved.

Additionally, the mutually supporting/symbiotic relationship between subordinate units

requires higher staffs optimize finite resources through centralized planning. Among each other,

interdependent subordinate units, will coordinate directly with each other to further harmonize the

leveraging of resources first initiated by their higher headquarters.

Synchronization is the third ambient factor among conventional units from which the

Military Decision-Making Process emerged. The necessity for operational synergy coupled with

the maximization of finite resources creates a demand for synchronization. The Army's AirLand

Battle doctrine defines synchronization as arranging activities in time and space to mass at the

decisive point.2 The desired synergistic effect and management of finite resources are leveraged

between subordinate units through complex staff synchronization. The Military Decision-Making

Process provides a basis for synchronizing combat power among interdependent units. The fourth 24

factor common to most combined arms branches, from which the Military Decision-Making

Process emanated, is employment criteria.

Mission Tasking Order

Figure 4. Conventional Mission Tasking Order Process.

In combat, military strategists insulate the interdependent/symbiotic attribute of

conventional units by focusing on employing a unit in total. By tasking a unit with missions that

do not enable a Commander to mass and synchronize the unit's combat power, its collective

"punch" is diluted.

Therefore, the mission tasking process for conventional units always consider the

inherent weaknesses of interdependent units when employed. Employing a unit in a piece-meal

fashion inhibits its organic requirement for synergy, and is avoided in most mid-to-high intensity

combat situations. The four ambient factors common to most combined arms units and their

interrelationships are illustrated in Figure 5.


The Military Decision-Making Process, a seven step process, begins with the receipt or

anticipation of a new mission.3

25

Step 1. Receipt of Mission:

A mission is normally issued from a higher headquarters or initiated as a derivation of an

ongoing mission. The order received from a higher headquarters normally provides the what,

when, and why the mission is being tasked to subordinate force as a whole.

"avoid diluting combat power"

Span Of Control

3-5 units

Interdependent Subordinate

Units Synchronization

Employment Criteria

Figure 5. Ambient Factors of Conventional Units.

Occasionally conventional higher headquarters initiate mission tasking orders directing

support from a subordinate unit requiring only a portion of a unit's available combat power.

These taskings are normally processed by staffs in an abbreviated fashion. The commander

typically provides limited guidance for the subordinate unit tasking.

As a result, higher commander must entrust his subordinate commanders with developing

a detailed battlefield visualization for the partial tasking. When these taskings encompass only a

portion of the commander's available combat power, a staff will focus on coordinating finite

resources and charge the subordinate commander with developing a visualization and planning

the lion's share of the mission tasking.

26

For missions requiring the majority of a unit's combat power the commander's

perspective can be translated into a battlefield visualization and later be linked to a concept by

way of the commander's intent. Output of step one of the Military Decision-Making Process is

the first warning order to any subordinate units and the commander's initial guidance to his staff.

The initial commanders guidance to his staff may include, how to abbreviate the Military

Decision-Making Process, initial time allocation, and liaison officers to dispatch. It may

additionally include initial reconnaissance requirements, any authorized movement, and

additional tasks the commander wants the staff to accomplish.

Step 2. Mission Analysis:

The second step in the Military Decision-Making Process is Mission Analysis. The

purpose of the second step of the MDMP is to allow the commander and his staff to see the

terrain, see the enemy, and see themselves, within the context of the higher headquarters' mission

tasking.5

During mission analysis, the commander and staff translate conditions present on the

battlefield into usable data that facilitates developing methods to accomplish the mission. They

do so by analyzing various portions of the higher headquarters' mission tasking order. The

higher's mission statement and concept of operations, the commander's intent two levels up, the

current situation and resources available are only some of the areas staffs analyze and coordinate

to identify the desired endstate.6

The desired conclusion of the second step of the Military Decision-Making Process is a

staff that has a shared visualization of an operation in time and space consistent with their

commanders intent and the intents of commander's two echelons above.7 Critical to achieving

this condition within a staff is the commander's articulation of his battlefield visualization.

Battlefield visualization is the process whereby the commander develops a clear

understanding of his current state with relation to the enemy and environment. Then the

27

commander envisions a desired endstate including the sequence of activities moving his force

from its current state to endstate.8

The staff assists the commander with his visualization by collecting, processing,

analyzing and transforming data into knowledge. But, the commander must be able to first

implant his vision of the operation into the minds of his staff.9 The battlefield visualization is a

key component to the remaining steps of the Military Decision-Making Process.

Each of the succeeding steps within the Military Decision-Making Process builds on the

information analyzed in the previous steps.10 The staff must successfully complete step two

before proceeding to step three. The second step, mission analysis, of the Military Decision-

Making Process is composed of seventeen sub-steps. See Figure 6.


Model

Stepl Receipt of Mission I Step 2 Mission Analysis ► <T Step 3 Course of Action Development ^ Step 4 Course of Action Analysis Step 5 Course of Action Comparison Step 6 Course of Action Approval Step 7 Orders production

Mission Analysis

A~ Step 1 Analyze the Higher Headquarters' Order *- Step 2 Conduct Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Step 3 Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks Step 4 Review Available Assets Step 5 Determine Constraints Step 6 Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions Step 7 Conduct Risk Assessment Step 8 Determine Initial CDR's Critical information Requirements Step 9 Determine Initial Reconnaissance Annex Step 10 Plan Use of Available Time Step 11 Write the Restated Mission Step 12 Conduct a Mission Analysis Briefing Step 13 Approve the restated Mission Step 14 Develop the Initial Commander's Intent Step 15 Issue the Commander's Guidance Step 16 Issue a Warning Order Step 17 Review Facts and Assumptions

Figure 6. Mission Analysis Steps. Source: U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1997), 5-5.

Sub-Step 1. Analyze The Higher Headquarters' Order: In this step of mission analysis a

commander and staff evaluate their higher headquarters' intent statement, concept of operation

and how other interdependent units are vertically and horizontally nested.

28

Nested plans embody a concept which articulates their interdependent linkage of main

and supporting efforts in a synchronized manner from corps through battalion. Symbiotic,

interdependent relationships are optimized when units understand how they are nested both

vertically and horizontally. The horizontal linkage between main and supporting efforts ensures

the action of a unit will take place in concert with those units on their left and right.

Sub-Step 2. Conduct Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB): IPB is an

analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, weather, and

terrain for all types of operations. The purpose of the IPB is the generation of intelligence

products allowing the staff to see the terrain and how it will impact on the operation. Using

products generated from the IPB process, the commander and staff can identify high value targets

(HVTs) and high payoff targets (HPTs) in the battle area.12 IPB allows the unit to see how the

enemy will fight. IPB is the responsibility of all staff members and includes the commander.

Staff officers assist the S2 in developing the situation template within their own areas of

expertise.13

The output for this phase of mission analysis is a modified combined operations overlay

(MCOO) and enemy situation templates. The output might also include an initial intelligence

collection plan which may result in the deployment of reconnaissance assets.

Sub-Step 3. Determine Specified. Implied. And Essential Tasks: These tasks are

identified and analyzed in relation to a unit's current location/situation to include potential areas

of operation in the future. Resource requirement forecasting for these identified tasks is also

conducted during this phase of mission analysis.

The output for this step within mission analysis is a tentative list of tasks to be executed

during a given operation. Within this overall list is a sub-list of tasks to be executed in order to

accomplish the mission.14 These are the essential tasks.

29

Sub-Step 4. Review Available Assets: The commander and staff examine the current

task organization and conduct an analysis of the specified and implied tasks to be accomplished

with the available logistics and combat power.15 If shortages exist, additional resources are

identified/requested to support mission execution. Output for this step is a resource shortage

list.16 Additionally, the commander and staff determine an initial task conceptualization of units

on the battlefield while weighing current and anticipated capabilities with tasks assigned.

Sub-Step 5. Determine Constraints: Constraints are defined as a requirement, directed

by a higher headquarters, to do something or a prohibition on action.17 Constraints are normally

outlined within the higher headquarters' scheme of maneuver, concept of operations and

coordinating instructions.

Sub-Step 6. Identify Critical Facts And Assumptions: Facts are statements of known

details concerning the situation. Assumptions are theories about the current situation presumed to

be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions must meet the validity and necessity test. A valid

assumption is one which is likely to be true. The necessity test is whether an assumption

identified by a staff is essential for continued planning. If planning can continue without the

assumption, it is unnecessary and should be discarded.

Sub-Step 7. Conduct Risk Assessment: When assessing risk the commander and staff

must evaluate two kinds of risk, tactical and accidental risk. Tactical risk is associated with the

enemy on the battlefield. Accidental risk is associated with all the other potential hazards to the

operation.19 The Risk Management Process consists of five steps: Identify hazards, assess

hazards, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement controls, supervise and evaluate.20

Sub-Step 8. Determine Initial Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR):

CCIR is sub-composed of three distinct components. These components assist the commander

with his or her visualization. CCIR serve as a screening tool for information flowing to the

commander. The CCIR outline information crucial to the commander in making decisions.

30

CCIR sub-components are priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly

information (EEFI), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR).

PIR is the tool around which reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting revolves. It is

how the commander visualizes the enemy. PIR assists in answering questions that must be

answered in order to accomplish the mission.21 An example of PIR, is the location of an enemy's

regimental artillery group (RAG).

EEFI is the tool around which operational security measures (OPSEC) and force

protection efforts are focused. It summarizes friendly information the commander believes needs

to be protected from enemy reconnaissance/collection assets. EEFI is an attempt to discern what

information is essential to the enemy in order to defeat friendly units.22 An example of EEFI, is

the location of a friendly division's aviation brigade's tactical assembly area.

FFIR provides focus to the staff about friendly adjacent and subordinate unit information

needed by the commander to make informed and timely decisions.23 An example of FFIR is the

readiness status of Ml Als within the unit.

Sub-Step 9. Determine Initial Reconnaissance Annex: The IPB and CCIR combine to

identify intelligence collection requirements. These requirements become the focal point for the

reconnaissance plan of the unit. Collection and recon assets are employed as soon as possible to

provide information to the commander and staff to facilitate continued planning efforts.

Sub-Step 10. Plan Use Of Available Time: This critical task of the analysis evaluates the

time line provided by the higher headquarters, with the estimated time to accomplish the essential

tasks. An analysis of the time required to execute the essential tasks evaluated against the

enemy's time line. This analysis provides windows of opportunity for the friendly unit to exploit

and conversely when the friendly unit is at risk to enemy activity. Available time can be

maximized via warning orders, allowing subordinate units to initiate parallel planning.

31

Sub-Step 11. Write The Restated Mission Statement: The restated mission statement is a

clear concise statement of the task or tasks to be accomplished by the commander and the purpose

to be achieved.26 Carl Von Clausewitz summarized the function of purpose, "Purpose takes

precedence over task: If a battalion is ordered to drive an enemy from the hill, a bridge, etc., the

true purpose is normally to occupy that point. The destruction of the enemy's force is only a

means to an end, a secondary matter. If mere demonstration is enough to cause the enemy to

abandon his position the objective has been achieved."

Sub-Step 12. Conduct A Mission Analysis Briefing: The briefing emphasizes relevant

conclusions reached during the analysis. This is a key initial step in developing and

disseminating the commander's battlefield visualization among the staff. It provides the

commander and the staff with a uniform reference point from which they later initiate course of

action development.

Sub-Step 13. Approve The Restated Mission: This represents the commander's

concurrence that the staffs proposed restated mission statement satisfies the requisites of the

higher headquarters as well as his own assessment.

Sub-Step 14. Develop The Initial Commander's Intent: Intent links the commander's

battlefield visualization with the concept of operations.28 The commander's intent does not

include the "method" by which the force will get from its current state to the end state.29 It

establishes the foundation and direct linkage for the battlefield visualization.30

Sub-Step 15. Finalize and Issue the Commander's Guidance: To further disseminate his

battlefield visualization, the commander issues additional guidance to the staff after the mission

analysis brief. This guidance will provide additional information to the staff on how to proceed

through the remaining portion of the Military Decision-Making Process. Specific guidance to the

staff is crucial if the intent of the staff planning is to maximize available time for the subordinate

units.

32

Sub-Step 16. Issue A Warning Order: Immediately after the staff receives the

commander's guidance, they issue a warning order to subordinate and supporting units.

Sub-Step 17: Review Facts And Assumptions: Facts and assumptions should be

reviewed throughout the process. As assumptions become facts or invalid, and facts simply

change, modifications to the plan may be in order. These changes must be assessed by the

commander and staff on how they impact on the operation.

Step 3. Course of Action Development

Course of action (COA) development is the first phase in a series of analytical steps used

to synchronize interdependent subordinate units in a synergistic fashion. Another implied

rationale of course of action development is to leverage finite resources among subordinate units

at the decisive moment of an engagement.

A course of action developed as an output of this step must meet four criteria.31 A course

of action must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, and distinguishable. A suitable course of action

complies with the commander's guidance. A feasible course of action meets the mission

requirements within available time, space, and resources. An acceptable course of action is

subjectively evaluated by the cost required with advantage gained. The advantage achieved must

justify the cost, especially with regard to casualties. Distinguishable CO As differ from others in

the use of reserves, task organizations, day or night operations, or different schemes of maneuver.

As mentioned earlier "synchronization is the arranging activities in time and space to

mass at the decisive point."32 Course of action development enables staffs to develop a

synergistic plan, via synchronization, to accomplish an assigned mission. As shown in Figure 7,

course of action development provides synchronized concepts with optimized finite resources at

the decisive time and place.33

Courses of action developed centrally to achieve synergy among subordinate units is the

goal of course of action development. The output for the third step in the Military Decision-

33

Making Process is one or more courses of action addressing the enemy COAs, as directed by the

commander. In summary, the implied rationale for course of action development is a deliberate

attempt to design unpredictable, synergistic methods using interdependent subordinate efforts

while simultaneously leveraging finite resources.

Figure 7. COA Development Rationale.

Course of action development, consists of six sub-tasks. The steps within course of

action development are analyze combat power, generate options, array initial options, develop the

scheme of maneuver, assign headquarters, and prepare course of action statements and sketches.

Sub-Step 1. Analyze Combat Power: Combat power is the effect of combining the

elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership in combat against the enemy. In this

sub-step of course of action development the commander and staff integrate and apply the effects

of these elements with other battlefield operating systems (BOS) to generate overwhelming

combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost.

Sub-Step 2. Generate Options: The staff generates several courses of action capable of

defeating the enemy's courses of action. In each course of action the staff determines the 34

decisive point. The decisive point is identified and is the focus for the main of for the unit. All

other tasks enhance the main effort in a synergistic method and are called supporting efforts. The

purpose of the main effort relates directly to the overall mission of the headquarters

synchronizing its subordinate units. The purposes of supporting efforts relate directly to the main

effort.36

Designating a point of main effort and supporting efforts help units and their staffs to

allocate resources accordingly. They provides focus to the operation while setting priorities,

determining risks, promoting unity of effort, and facilitating understanding of the commander's

intent.37

Sub-Step 3. Array Initial Forces: The initial array of forces provides the total number of

units needed and furthers the methods of dealing with the enemy during scheme of maneuver

development.38 If the number arrayed is greater than the number available, the course of action

may be deemed unacceptable and the shortfall is added to the initial requirement for additional

resources identified in mission analysis.

Sub-Step 4. Develop Scheme of Maneuver: The scheme of maneuver describes how the

synchronized, interdependent subordinate units will accomplish the commander's intent. Step

three of the Military Decision-Making Process, course of action development, provides the output

used in the remaining three analytical steps of the MDMP.

Step 4. Course of Action Analysis:

Step four of the Military Decision-Making Process has eight sub-steps assisting in the

analysis process.39 The purpose of this step is to further refine and synchronize the COAs in time

and space.40 The key outputs for this step are refined course of actions. Other outputs are

illustrated in Figure 8.

35

Step 5. Course of Action Comparison:

Step five's inputs are refined derivations of the outputs of step three, course of action

development, of the Military Decision-Making Process. Through the use of decision criteria

selected by the commander and staff as well as each COA's relative advantages/disadvantages a

comparison is done of all the course of action options. The output for this step is a recommended

course of action, presented to the commander in a decision brief.

COA Analysis Outputs

1. Modifications of COAs 2. Task Organization Requirements 3. Synchronization Refinements 4. Projected Enemy Defeated 5. Additional Support Requirements 6. Additional C2 requirements 7. Potential Branches and Sequels 8. Decision Points 9. CCIR Refined

Figure 8. COA Analysis Outputs. Source: William Salter, "Combat Decision-Making Process (CDMP)," (National Training Center, Ft Irwin, Ca., 1995), 22.

Step 6. Course of Action Approval:

The sixth step in the Military Decision-Making Process is course of action approval.

Course of action approval is the commander's decision on the course of action he or she believes

most advantageous42

Step 7. Orders Production:

Step seven of the Military Decision-Making Process graphically and verbally portrays the

unit's operation to accomplish the mission.43 The output for this step is a clear understanding of

the mission, subordinate unit's specified tasks and purpose in support ofthat mission.

36

Conclusion

The current doctrine associated with Military Decision-Making Process is the

culmination of years of development and experimentation. The underlying purpose for the

Military Decision-Making Process however, has remained unchanged during its evolution-to

synergize the effects of subordinate, symbiotic members. Thus, the overarching implied rationale

for conventional combined arms battalion and brigade staffs to use the Military Decision-Making

Process is simple. These staffs use the Military Decision-Making Process to synchronize

interdependent, mutually supporting subordinate units and optimize among them finite resources

required to secure the commander's intent.

The relationship of the third step, course of action development, with the remaining steps

in the Military Decision-Making Process is to provide the initial process by which the remaining

steps further develop the CO As into viable courses of action and eventually an operational plan.

The cascading derivation of outputs initially processed from the course of action development

step through orders production may all be traced back to the course of action development.

Without the need for the course of action development step, the remaining COA processing steps

are immediately nullified and unnecessary.

Mission tasking orders lacking the organizational requirement of synergy among

interdependent subordinate units may allow expeditious orders processing by higher staffs. Staff

expediency of these mission tasking orders increases available time and provides subordinate

units with more time to conduct their own MDMP and troop leading procedures. Focusing staff

efforts of certain portions of the MDMP allows them to gain (and pass down) better situational

awareness as described in Jon Fallesen's successful staff attributes.

'The ambient factors of conventional units were deduced by the author of this thesis during his research.

37

2US Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993),

2-8.


4Ibid., 5-5.

5William Salter, "Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP)" (Ft. Irwin, CA: US Army National Training Center, Observer/Controller Operations, 1995. Photocopied), 4.

6US Army Command and General Staff College, C310 Combat Operations (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff Officers Course, GPO, July 1997), 15.



William Salter, "Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP)" (Ft. Irwin, CA: US Army National Training Center, Observer/Controller Operations, 1995. Photocopied), 4.

10US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Special Operations Trainingßulletin (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, December 1996), 6.

UUS Army Command and General Staff College, C310 Combat Operations (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff Officers Course, GPO, July 1997), 17.

12US Department of the Army, FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington DC: GPO, May 1989), 1-1.


14Ibid., 5-7.

,5Ibid.

16Ibid.

17Ibid.

18Ibid.

19Ibid., J-2.

20Ibid.,J-l.

38

21Ibid., 5-8.

22Ibid.

23Ibid.

24Ibid.

25Ibid.


27Ibid.

28US Department of the Army, FM 71-100 Division Operations (Washington DC: GPO, August 1996), 3-22.


30Ibid.

3,Ibid.,5-ll.

32US Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 2-8.


34Ibid., 5-14.


36Ibid., 5-12.

37US Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 6-6.


39

39The focus of this chapter is on the rationale/purposes of the MDMP. The inputs to step four of the MDMP are derivatives of CO A development. As a result, a detailed discussion of the sub-steps and their rationales were required in COA development. The eight sub-steps of the COA analysis are process oriented and are irrelevant to this research. Critical to the research is the overall rationale for each step and its organic output.

^William Salter, "Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP)" (Ft. Irwin, CA: US Army National Training Center, Observer/Controller Operations, 1995. Photocopied), 4.


42Ibid., 5-26.

43 William Salter, "Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP)" (Ft. Irwin, CA: US Army National Training Center, Observer/Controller Operations, 1995. Photocopied), 4.

44i Ibid.


40

CHAPTER 4

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Purpose

This chapter highlights the operational differences of a Special Forces battalion/group to

further formulate the adequacy evaluation of the Military Decision-Making Process for Special

Forces staffs. The output of this chapter will be compared with the Military Decision-Making

Process rationales discussed in chapter three.

Background

Within the Special Forces operating environment the Military Decision-Making Process

has been completely institutionalized. After its inception as a combined arms branch in 1987, the

Special Forces branch embraced many operational, doctrinal and organizational concepts of the

conventional branches. The Special Forces leadership wanted the branch to quickly assimilate

into the main stream Army.

Some of the many challenges the Special Forces leadership oversaw included

standardization of terminology and doctrine consistent in content and design to conventional

Army items and doctrine. These evolutions, within the Special Forces branch, were necessary

and have significantly contributed to the branch's improved readiness and interoperability with

other Army units.

The use of the Military Decision-Making Process, in Special Forces units, was another

evolution in the branch providing standardization and logic to the mission planning cycle. The

rationale for implementing this useful tool was well founded and provided Special Forces

planners with a uniform mechanism to develop orders in a linear, succinct fashion.

The integration of Army doctrine into the Special Forces branch served the organization

well. However, operational differences between conventional combined arms branches and the

Special Forces branch exist. These operational differences provide impetus for additional

41

analysis of the Military Decision-Making Process for use by Special Forces staffs at the

battalion/group level while planning multiple and simultaneous operations.

Operational Differences

As a component of Army Special Operations Forces (SOF), Special Forces (SF) units

plan and conduct military operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. In peacetime, conflict,

and war a Special Forces unit's unique operational characteristics contrast them significantly

from other conventional combined arms branches. Operational differences exist in span of

control, unit interdependence, and functions of their respective headquarters.

Span of Control

In variation to a conventional combined arms branch with a combatant span of control

ranging between three and five maneuver units, a Special Forces battalion/group commander may

have as many as eight combatant subordinate units. As shown in Figure 9, Special Forces

subordinate units under the control of a battalion/group headquarters might include Special

Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFOD-As), Special Operations Command and Control

Elements (SOCCE), Advanced Operating Bases (AOB), Special Operations Teams-Alpha (SOT-

A). On occasion and depending on mission basis, a Special Forces battalion/group might have

operational control of a conventional US/coalition maneuver unit.

Unit Interdependence

Prior to any mission, SFOD-As and other Special Forces units are sequestered from each

other for planning and rehearsals. Referred to as the isolation phase, this compartmentalization of

subordinate units is a significant matter of operational security (OPSEC). "SFOD-As and other

teams committed to separate missions and separate operational areas are isolated to preclude

mission compromise."

The isolation phase grew out of the need for extreme secrecy in training clandestine

special operation forces in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during WWII. The idea was

42

not only to preserve secrecy and instill in agents the necessity of concealing their actions from

others, but to remove as many distracters as possible from the training. The practice of

compartmentalization prevented agents who might be captured from compromising the remaining

operations.2

Colonel Aaron Bank, the founder of Special Forces, served in the OSS and used his

WWII experiences as the model for Special Forces doctrine and organization. In today's

ambiguous environment, isolation continues to be important when operational security is critical.

SF

ADCON

SF SOCCE

• • • •

SF SF

SF AOB

• • • '•

SF SF

Figure 9. SF Span of Control.

Compartmentalization of Special Forces units contrasts with General Depuy's

organizational concept of horizontal nesting. Horizontally and vertically nested by the Special

Forces battalion/group staff, the SFOD-As, for security purposes, are not always made cognizant

of how their respective missions are horizontally nested relative to other deploying Special Forces

subordinate units. See Figure 10. General Depuy explained this concept best, "Allowing your

subordinates to understand how their "why" directly or indirectly supports the units around them

increases understanding and reduces uncertainty."3

43

ITie compartmentalization of subordinate Special Forces units further indicates that

synergy among these units is not an operational requirement. In fact, SFOD-As are not typically

massed in a complex, synchronized manner. Force multiplication rather than direct force

application is the SFOD-A's forte.4 These subordinate Special Forces units are accurately

described as mutually exclusive from one another. Furthermore, the success of one SFOD-A is

not normally dependent on the success or failure of another SFOD-A.

This contrasts with the level of unit interdependence present in conventional combined

arms branches. The purpose of unit interdependence in the combined arms branches is to achieve

a collective synergy. Conventional combined arms units are nested, but are individually aware of

how they are horizontally nested with units to their left and right. The horizontal linkage between

main and supporting efforts ensures the action of one unit takes place in concert with those units

on their flanks.5

Functions of Respective Headquarters

The functions of the Special Forces battalion/group headquarters are different than the

conventional combined arms battalion/brigade headquarters. Functions of the Special Forces

battalion/group headquarters during operations, differ from their conventional counterparts in

mobility, and staff processing.

Mobility: The Special Forces battalion/group headquarters are different than the

conventional combined arms battalion/brigade headquarters for its lack of mobility. Special

Forces headquarters do not maneuver against its adversaries. Special Forces headquarters prepare

and control non-interdependent subordinate units during specified missions.

The Special Forces headquarters, due to its lack, of organic mobility and combat power

assets is typically located in a fixed location, normally situated in a secured rear area. Site

selection for a Special Forces headquarters' requires a location considered permissive for SOF

44

operations. These sites require host nation support and therefore are located in locales where

level III hostile activities are at a minimum.

• •

Special Operations

Area

Figure 10. SFOD-A Non-Interdependence.

The Special Forces battalion/group headquarters' operational functions coupled with its

organic inability to maneuver causes it to be separated from its subordinate units by substantial

geographic distances. The Special Forces battalion/group headquarters is commonly co-located

or within close proximity of its respective Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)

headquarters. See Figure 11. Contrary to a Special Forces headquarters, is an infantry

battalion/brigade headquarters, which has the capability to maneuver and is normally located

within close proximity of its subordinate maneuver companies.

45

Staff Processing: Authorities disagree on this point, but the optimum range or span of

control that can be effectively managed is normally not in excess of five to eight subordinates or

units, doing routine activities.6 The more specialized and complex the activities, the shorter the

span of control.

From the monitoring and reporting function of the expanded combatant span of control,

the Special Forces Staff has a greater requirement than its combined arms counterpart. Within

Special Forces units, individuals demonstrating a high degree of initiative is a small part of why

Special Forces battalion/group staffs can monitor such vast arrays of subordinate units.

Contributing to the Special Forces staffs capacity to monitor an extended span of control is lack

of unit interdependence between SFOD-As.

<z

SF

Figure 11. SF HQ Mobility/Geographic Location.

The extensive and sometimes elaborate spans of control are complicated for the Special

Forces battalion/group staffs to monitor. In most cases, the Special Forces battalion/group staff

supporting a contingency requires additional personnel to augment its normal staffing to oversee

the myriad of functioning subordinate units.

The fixed location of the Special Forces headquarters' site significantly reduces the

administrative and planning burden of the SF staff. It enables its staffs to focus on subordinate

units and disregard the complicated mobility considerations common to combined arms units. 46

These considerations include accounting for displacement of the operations center while

simultaneously maintaining command and control of subordinate units. The location of the

Special Forces headquarters in a secure area, isolated from Level III enemy threats, allows the

staff to disregard complex staff planning for displacement of the operations center.8

Another significant difference between staff processing of the conventional combined

arms headquarters and the Special Forces battalion/group headquarters is the complex

synchronization of subordinate units during execution phases. The normal lack of

interdependence among Special Forces subordinate units infers that complex, centralized

synchronization by the SF staff is virtually eliminated. Coordination of subordinate Special

Forces units by their staffs at the battalion/group level is more simplified due to the autonomous

nature of the SF mission profiles.

Resource allocation and prioritization is required by an Special Forces staff at the

battalion/group level, but these coordinations normally occur during the infiltration and

exfiltration phases, not during execution phases. The Special Forces battalion/group staffs rarely

have to plan the complex tasks of synchronizing subordinate SFOD-As at the decisive moment of

an engagement. Also different from the conventional headquarters and subsequently effecting

staff processing is the typically sequential process by which Special Forces headquarters receive

their numerous mission tasking orders (TASKORD) for SF missions.

The nature of the Special Forces environment, and the respective staffing processes

during contingencies provide unique administrative challenges for the Special Forces commander

and staff. The nature of the mission tasking process within Special Forces is a function of the

emergent missions in which its Special Forces forces are employed.

Special Forces units empower a CINC or JTF commander with a versatile force

multiplier and characteristically are employed against strategic and operational targets. This agile

force enables a CINC to exploit success and seize initiative on short notice. As a result, not all

47

Special Forces missions can be anticipated during contingency planning or during its initial stages

of execution.

Special Forces battalion/groups may be task organized subordinate to a Joint Special

Operations Task Force (JSOTF). After the initial phases of a contingency plan or operations

order are completed, Special Forces mission tasking orders assume an emergent nature. Mission

tasking orders (TASKORD) are transmitted to the battalion/group staff for further analysis. The

JSOTF staff exploits the autonomous nature of the SFOD-As and designs most emergent

TASKORDs to be directly tasked to SFOD-As.

On rare occasion, a battalion/group commander may elect to further task organize a

mission tasking order to be executed by multiple subordinate units. This is not the norm and

occurs with SFOD-As being supported by CA, PYSOP, or SOT-As. Unusual would describe a

mission tasking order requiring two SFOD-As to simultaneously support each other.

Additionally, these JSOTF TASKORDs are sequentially spaced over time in uneven and

sporadic patterns as a function of mission requirements identified by a CINC or JTF commander.

A Special Forces staff may receive emergent a TASKORD twenty-four hours after arriving in a

operational theater. The initial TASKORD may be followed by other distinctly different

TASKORDs with only minutes or hours separating the different taskings. Subsequent

TASKORDs may not be received by the Special Forces battalion/group headquarters for days or

weeks after the initial volleys of TASKORDs were issued. See Figure 12.

This contrasts significantly with the process by which conventional combined arms

branches receive their TASKORDs. A conventional combined arms branch receives mission

tasking orders deliberately designed to optimize their finite combat power in a unified state.

Conventional planners will insulate a conventional unit's inherent

interdependent/symbiotic attribute by focusing on employing a conventional unit in total. By

48

tasking a unit with missions that do not enable a commander to mass and synchronize the unit's

combat power, its collective "puncH' is diluted.

In summary, employed SFOD-As, the sword of Special Forces units, are not

interdependent with other employed SFOD-As. These subordinate Special Forces units are not

massed to achieve any synergistic effect and therefore require minimal coordination by their

respective staffing headquarters. The stated synchronization of SFOD-As, defined in FM 100-5,

implies that SFOD-As are "arranged in time and space to mass at the decisive point."9 In most

cases, SFOD-As are not massed at an engagement's decisive point. This significant operational

difference in unit interdependence greatly simplifies the planning and execution requirements

placed on the Special Forces staffs at battalion/group level.

X

JSOTF

N+90^

N+95

N+97

N+98

N+101

N+125

N+200

SF

Mission Tasking

Order #7

fe SF

w h w

h w h w

p

w — 'W

Figure 12. SF Mission Tasking Order Process.

The unique Special Forces mission tasking order process optimizes the force

multiplication capability of the non-interdependent SFOD-As, by employing the SF units in an

individualistic, piece-meal fashion. Furthermore, span of control principles also indicate relative

conclusions about the operational differences of Special Forces units.10 These principles infer the

staff processes executed to support the expansive Special Forces span of control are more 49

simplified than their conventional combined arms counterparts. Therefore, the staff management

challenge of the increased Special Forces span of control is significantly offset by the lack of

synchronization required during the planning and execution phases of a mission.

Conclusion

Significant operational differences exist between Special Forces and conventional forces

in terms of span of control, subordinate unit interdependence, and functions the respective

headquarters. These subtle differences, and other attributes not mentioned, further suggest an

adequacy analysis of the MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process) may be in order for Special

Forces staffs at the battalion/group level while discretely planning multiple and simultaneous

operations.

!US Department of the Army, FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations,. (Ft. Bragg,, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, April 1990), 6-8..

2US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Special Forces Qualification Course Deliberate Decision-Making and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Ft. Bragg, NC: GPO, February 1997), 4.

3 US Army Command and General Staff College, "Instructors Guide to Teaching Mission Analysis" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Tactics Division, August 1997. Photocopied), 3.

4John Collins, Green Berets, SEALS, andSpetsnaz (Washington DC: Pergamon- Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc. 1987), 24.


6Albert Shapero, Management Techniques for Professional People (London: The Free Press, Collier Macmillian Publishers, 1985), 7.

7Lester R. Bittel, Organizational Management (Chicago, IL: Mcgraw-Hill Book Co. 1980), 137.

8"Level I Threats - a variety of enemy actions which can be defeated by base defenses. Level II Threats - enemy actions which exceed the capability of base defense forces to defeat, but can be defeated by early response forces normally MPs. Level III Threats - enemy actions which necessitate the commitment of a tactical combat force." (idem, FM 71-100 Division Operations, 2-17).

50

9US Department of the Army, FM100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 2-8.

10/ Albert Shapero, Management Techniques for Professional People (London: The Free

Press, Collier Macmillian Publishers, 1985), 7.

51

CHAPTER 5

MDMP RATIONALE AND SF OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Purpose

This chapter begins with a comparison of the Military Decision-Making Process

doctrinal and implied rationales developed in chapter three with Special Forces operational

differences, outlined in chapter four. The chapter then discusses the negative aspects of

unnecessary synchronization. The chapter concludes with an examination of "why" Special

Forces doctrine continues to mandate course of action development of non-interdependent SFOD-

As.

Conflicts

The primary purpose of the Military Decision-Making Process is to synchronize

interdependent subordinate units to achieve a synergistic effect while optimizing finite resources.

Interdependent subordinate units are defined as elements with mutually supporting relationships

among each other. The success of one interdependent unit is contingent on the successful

achievements of other members in the symbiotic relationship. The higher headquarters of these

interdependent units defines success of an operation on the collective attainment of individual

supporting efforts.

The survival of one element in the symbiotic relationship is often contingent upon the

success of its partner. Staffs overseeing this symbiotic relationship are mandated with the task of

optimizing the potential of each interdependent member. Staffs achieve this by focusing the

collective effort of the group in a synergistic manner. The output of the synchronized

organization, as a whole, is greater than the sum of its individual efforts.

Synchronization is the manipulation of finite resources and combat power at the decisive

time and place to achieve the desired effects.1 This definition presupposes the fact that the

decisive time and place arise during the execution phase of a multi-phased operation. To assume

52

otherwise violates the definition of synchronization in the Army's Field Manual 100-5

(Operations). Synchronization includes the allocation of finite resources during the decisive

moments of an operation.

Finite resources are combat multipliers added, at the decisive moment, to the effects of

combat power, to energize the synergistic effects of the interdependent units to an even greater

level. The timing of finite resources is a critical component for understanding its definition.

Resources, constrained or otherwise, are particularly finite at the decisive moment of an

engagement. Fire support, considered finite at a decisive moment of engagement, assumes

different characteristics during other phases of an operation. Assets, short on supply, but not

contributing to the engagement's decisive moment are not considered finite.

Infiltration/exfiltration assets and communications equipment, considered critical and not always

available in desired quantities, are not finite resources.

The allocation of finite resources at the engagement's decisive moment is a critical

component of the Military Decision-Making Process. The massing of the unit's combat power at

the engagement's decisive moment energized with available finite resources can provide a

decisive advantage to a unit confronting a numerically superior foe. Confusion often exists at the

Special Forces battalion/group level regarding the differentiation between finite resources and

limited resources.

Special Forces doctrinal writers overlooking the subtle SF operational differences and

failing to validate them in doctrinal publications create another organizational issue. Following

the nondoctrinal guidance provided by JRTC's SOTD, a handful of Special Forces units are

strictly applying the MDMP doctrine, designed for conventional forces with interdependent

subordinate units, while planning their SF operations. This void in the USAJFKSWC's doctrinal

guidance, is especially clear when Special Forces battalion/group staffs reach step three in the

MDMP, course of action development.

53

Allocation of aviation platforms used during infiltration/exfiltration of SFOD-As is

commonly an issue argued by battalion/group staffs supporting course of action development at

the SFOD-A level. Infiltration/exfiltration platforms are limited resources not finite resources

used at an engagement's decisive moment.

Aviation planning doctrine mandates a ground tactical plan be developed prior to the

integration of rotary wing assets. "The foundation of a successful air operation is the ground

tactical plan. All other air planning stages are based on the ground tactical plan."2 In other words

the aviation infiltration and exfiltration support is a derivation of the scheme of maneuver

developed by the executing unit or SFOD-A.

Air assault operations involving one or two aircraft and personnel do not require much

planning time. These missions require approximately six hours planning time for the supporting

aviation unit .3 Air movement operations, with one or two aircraft, will probably not plan fire

support. However, aircrews will understand how to contact fire support and recovery assets if

necessary.4 Aviation assets are critical and always constrained, but good asset management and

staff procedures can offset most resource shortages.

Communications are important throughout the operation, like trained personnel. Without

such assets, employment of a capability would not be possible. The primary means of long-range

communications for the SFOD-A is the high frequency (HF), single, side band radio and the ultra

high frequency (UHF) single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) radio. They provide amplitude

modulated-single, side band (AM-SSB) and frequency modulated (FM) capabilities over the

frequency range from two to eighty MHz.5

TACSAT provides reliable, highly portable communications for use over extended

ranges without regard to terrain interference. The system operates in the UHF band between two

hundred twenty five MHz and four hundred MHz. The ground terminals use UHF satellite

54

systems (fleet satellite (FLTSAT) and Air Force satellite (AFSAT) space segments).6 SFOD-As

operate the UHF and HF systems in a data burst mode using data burst devices.7

TACSAT radios require strategic apportionment of limited satellite channels. Satellite

usage is controlled by the Communications-Electronics Directorate J-6 supporting a theater

commander. Unfortunately, SFOD-As are typically apportioned a small percentage of the

available satellite time in a theater.

The superlative advantage of TACSAT employed with SFOD-As is the real-time voice,

communications capability providing the battalion/group commander with timely intelligence

during deep operations. Planners too commonly assume this capability will be readily available

for employment with a SFOD-A. As a result, tactical satellite distribution among employed

SFOD-As is an organizational rationalization argued by staffs supporting SFOD-A course of

action development at the battalion/group level. Unfortunately, the Communications-Electronics

Directorate supporting a theater commander typically views the allocation of TACSAT channels

to command and control nodes as a priority superceding the efforts of employed SFOD-As.

Special Forces staffs expend an inordinate amount of time deliberating an initial

allocation of TACSAT channels, that are later retracted by the Communications-Electronics

Directorate. Staffs expending time developing SFOD-A COAs contingent on tactical satellite

support is a frequently wasted endeavor.

SFOD-As are highly adaptable forces requiring little support during short term special

reconnaissance and direct action missions.8 Staff work requiring synchronization among SFOD-

As to achieve a synergistic effect is an anomaly. Coordination is required for

infiltration/exfiltration phases and as well as contingencies, but rarely at the decisive moment of

the SFOD-A's mission execution. This is because of the SFOD-A's mutually exclusive nature

relative to other employed Special Forces units. The success of one SFOD-A is not in any way

linked to the success or failure of another employed SFOD-A. Given that the rationale for course

55

of action development is to synergize, subordinate, interdependent units, why does Special Forces

doctrinal proponents like JRTC's SOTD, continue to mandate this process given the absence of

interdependence among SFOD-As?

SF MDMP Doctrine

The Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD) at JRTC is a non-doctrinal

proponent of the Military Decision-Making Process within Special Forces. SOTD has rilled the

void in the absence of MDMP specific doctrine produced by USAJFKSWC. SOTD is a staunch

advocate of Special Forces battalions developing and analyzing course(s) of action for their non-

interdependent subordinate SFOD-As. The SOTD doctrinal bulletins addressing the nuances of

Special Forces operations and their "fit" within the Military Decision-Making Process

unintentionally amplify the complexities of Special Forces missions. The average non-Special

Forces reader of these bulletins is impressed by the amount of detailed staff planning claimed to

be doctrinally executed in such a short amount of time. These testaments imply the planning,

employment and subsequent execution of these missions is a complex endeavor.

On the contrary, the simplicity involved with planning an Special Forces special

reconnaissance mission is analogous with an infantry squad reconnaissance led by a captain. The

squad is additionally augmented with a warrant officer, master sergeant and nine senior non-

commissioned officers. The basic tasks of a SF mission profile are akin to what an infantry

battalion commander expects his junior non-commissioned officers to execute with a squad of

unseasoned enlisted personnel. Clearly, the personnel within the SFOD-A are capable of

developing and analyzing three distinct COAs including all relative branches and sequels that

need consideration during planning.

The SOTD further presupposes "battalion staffs visualize the battle from the SFOD-As

perspective because the more information and resources the staff can provide to the SFOD-A, the

better."9 The primary implied rationale concluded by this research for course of action

56

development is to synchronize interdependent subordinate units not to provide information.

SFOD-As are normally non-interdependent and therefore rarely require true doctrinal

synchronization. Special Forces battalion/group staffs often waste significant planning time

developing unnecessary SFOD-A COAs. This critical process is immediately repeated again by

the tasked SFOD-A(s). As a result two organizations perform identical actions sequentially. This

unnecessary redundancy in the staff processing of Special Forces mission tasking orders wastes

valuable planning/rehearsal time and is the impetus for this research.

SF Doctrinal Consequences

The Special Forces doctrinal fixation on staffs developing COAs at the SFOD-A level is

a result of Special Forces battalion/group staffs attempting to identify their respective role in

Military Decision-Making Process. Multiple, simultaneous, and non-interdependent Special

Forces missions run contrary to conventional missions and the ambient factors from which the

Military Decision-Making Process emerged. The non-interdependent nature of Special Forces

operations leaves battalion commanders and staffs without a "doctrinal" basis to conduct their

mission planning. The Special Forces battalion/group staffs quest for a significant role in the

Military Decision-Making Process, stems from the significant role conventional battalion/brigade

staffs play during the Military Decision-Making Process.

Manipulating and posturing large interdependent, military formations with bold

maneuvers against an adversary is the typical vision of what a conventional forces' staff devotes

itself to during the Military Decision-Making Process. This significant role the conventional staff

assumes stems from their unit's organizational requirement to achieve synergy among symbiotic,

interdependent subordinate units.

The "shadow warfare" of Special Forces operations contradict organizational norms

associated with conventional operations. The significant organizational expectation of roles

conventional staff members shoulder in the process generates confusion for Special Forces staffs

57

defining their own role in the process. The conventional organizational expectation to synergize

symbiotic, interdependent, subordinate units coupled with the autonomous nature of SFOD-A

employment frequently leaves Special Forces commanders and staffs struggling to find a weighty

part in the process. As a result, Special Forces non-doctrinal publications intellectualize

unnecessary processes due to the larger Army's cultural expectation of the conventional staff

responsibilities in the Military Decision-Making Process.

In response to SOTD's recommendation for Special Forces staffs to develop COAs for

SFOD-As, battalion/group staffing procedures are often drafted to focus the staff on macro details

of their respective COAs. Ironically, this non-doctrinal recommendation directing a staff to

develop these COA(s) overlooks the simplistic tactics required in SFOD-A employment and

mission execution. The simplicity of these mission profiles often induces staffs to gravitate

toward the tactical details of mission execution. This is an unintentional response by Special

Forces leaders and staffs, but it satisfies their penchant for a useful purpose in the misunderstood

process. A staff's unintentional inclination to gravitate toward tactical details of an SFOD-A's

concept, often non-doctrinally rationalized in an effort to allow SFOD-As more rehearsal time,

has several negative side effects.

After strategizing SFOD-A concepts, Special Forces battalion commanders and staffs

often attempt to inculcate the specifics of their analysis to subordinate SFOD-As in the form of

"how" to execute the mission. Unfortunately, the battalion/group commander is many times

tainted with pre-conceived conceptual notions from his primary staffs preceding course of action

analysis. "COA Blinders," created by bis staffs best intentions, predictably canalize the tasked

SFOD-A's course of action development in the direction of the higher commander and staffs

perspective.

Higher commanders often become fixated with one course of action, the execution of

which is everything regardless of whether or not the enemy cooperates. Special Forces

58

battalion/group commanders fixated on a specific course of action frequently adjust poorly to

other innovative and "out of the box" ideas an executing SFOD-A commander may develop

during his own analysis. This command/staff quirk stifles subordinate initiative and usurps

critical thinking.

The consequences of this kind of senior/subordinate interaction is obvious. Subordinates

are continually frustrated and feel no ownership from a plan that is described in specifics on

'how' to execute. Individuals feel stifled working under these conditions and take no satisfaction

in work because of a commander's inability to empower subordinates. The mission has a greater

propensity for success if subordinates are allowed to assume some ownership in the concept's

development.

Additionally, this Special Forces headquarters' idiosyncrasy undermines the decision-

making authority of subordinates, trained to plan and conduct the mission. This exemplifies the

behavior Greg Foster so eloquently illustrated in his Joint Force Quarterly article, "This is

precisely the type of orthodoxy and pervasive doctrine that drives out originality and suppresses

critical thinking within the military."10 Originality and critical thinking are the same non-

analytical skills necessary to exploit dynamic and unpredictable events on the battlefield. This

Special Forces staff/leader idiosyncrasy is also poor leadership as it inhibits leader development

of subordinates.

The organizational confusion about the Military Decision-Making Process, created by the

lack of doctrinal guidance, is further exacerbated by other challenges when Special Forces staffs

attempt to plan multiple and simultaneous operations. The first challenge complicating the

Special Forces staff effort is the cyclic nature of the SF mission tasking process. The second

challenge is to maintain a large enough staff to contend simultaneously with numerous non-

interdependent Special Forces mission taskings. And the third is SOTD's recommendation for

battalion/group staffs to develop SFOD-A courses of action. This unnecessary synchronization

59

increases the work load of the staff exponentially. And in a time constrained environment

characterized by twenty-four hour operations, the final unnecessary requirement to develop

distinct COAs for each of the multitude of employed SFOD-As almost seems unattainable by a

normal staff.

In a effort to meet SOTD's recommendations as well as the operational attributes, Special

Forces battalion/groups create staff planning cells to cope with these divergent planning

detractors. Staff members and their assistants are semi-compartmentalized in an effort to

complete the recommended staff processing work. Staff primaries and their subordinate

assistants are dispersed among numerous autonomous planning cells. The innovative approach to

the unnecessary requirements is effective, but detracts from staff unity of effort. Staffs not

mutually embracing the same issues may detrimentally impact the battalion/group commander's

visualization.

A key component of commander's visualization in TRADOC PAM 525-200-1 is the

shared awareness of a common relevant picture. The common relevant picture shared only

among the Special Forces battalion/group staff is the tool facilitating the horizontal nesting of the

SFOD-A's efforts. Special Forces staff members semi-compartmentalized into planning cells to

develop SFOD-A COAs will have a distinct common relevant picture (CRP) for each subordinate

SFOD-A. Each SFOD-A CRP will be mutually exclusive of the other SFOD-As in the

battalion/group. The natural tendency for each staff planning cell is to focus on their respective

SFOD-A tasking. This tendency detracts the primary effort of the battalion/group staff away

from their commander's overall common relevant picture for his unit as a whole.

With the disconnects between the Military Decision-Making Process and Special Forces

operations further complicated by SOTD's recommendations to do course of action development,

one may ask, what is the origin of this Special Forces organizational fixation on unnecessary

synchronization?

60

Conclusion

Firstly, there is little scholarly work done on the application of the Military Decision-

Making Process for Special Forces operations. This is a function of first understanding the

Military Decision-Making Process, and applying it appropriately to the distinct characteristics

associated with Special Forces operations. Thus the paradox and title of this thesis, The Military

Decision-Making Process and Special Forces Mission Planning: "A Square Peg for a Round

Hole?" Pervasive Special Forces organizational norms viewing persons capable of non-

analytical thought and reasoning as "pinheads" also inadvertently contributes to the lack of

scholarly work in these critically needed areas.

Secondly, the problem is not with the Military Decision-Making Process as a conceptual

process, but rather in the failure of Special Forces personnel to truly understand the process.

Furthermore, understanding the process is an educational dilemma and only part of the problem.

The root of the Special Forces organizational fixation on unnecessary synchronization is more

significantly an organizational culture problem.

The Special Forces organizational culture in peacetime is a function of the Army's larger

organizational culture. The Army's system has not always nurtured the actual delegation of

authority or real individual initiative.11 Today's Army praises directive control, but in reality

practices detailed control.12 The characteristics associated with detailed control and in turn

rewarded by the Army's peacetime organizational culture are symptomatic of the analytical

leader.

The Army appears to reward in peacetime individuals who embody analytical leadership

attributes. These include individuals exhibiting a technical orientation, who always want more

details. These individuals believe in detailed study of an issue, loath to be wrong and therefore

are unhurried to answer or make decisions.13

61

Without the obvious success and failures of combat, peacetime success starts to depend

on statistical excellence.14 In peacetime, the analytical leaders fare better in promotions from

their ability to conceptualize, report, and document their statistical achievements. More

importantly, their managerial persona appears to fit better in the peacetime complexities of higher

command.15 These characteristics leading the analytical leader to peacetime success frequently

causes analytical leaders to over control their subordinates.16

Complicating the situation is the Army's organizational environment subtly suppressing

innovation and "out of the box" solutions. Individual officers questioning procedures viewed

organizationally as fundamental ruffle mainstream military thought and are categorized as

mavericks.17

All these organizational influences of the larger Army culture trickle down into the

Special Forces community. Belief systems of members within organizations can influence the

internal goals/policies later translating into an organizational culture.18 In essence, the Special

Forces organizational fixation on unnecessary synchronization may be a disguise of a cultural

penchant for detailed control.19

Military Decision-Making Process is an adequate tool for use at the SFOD-A level.

However, the use of the Military Decision-Making Process by Special Forces staffs at the

battalion/group level for discretely planning multiple and simultaneous operations requires further

discussion.

'"Synchronization is arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point,' US Department of the Army. FM100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 2-8.

2US Department of the Army. FM 1-113 Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations (Washington DC: GPO, September 1997), 3-12.

3Ibid., 3-21.

4Ibid., 4-7.

62

5US Department of the Army. FM11-32 Combat Net Radio Operations (Washington DC: GPO, October 1990), 2-1.

6Ibid.,10-l.

7Ibid„ 10-8.

"Andrew Harris, "Presidents, Generals, and Green Berets: Explaining Cyclical support of US Special Operations Forces" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland College Park, 1993), 7.

9US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Special Operations Training Bulletin (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, December 1996), 17.

'"Gregory Foster, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist," Joint Force Quarterly {Spring 1996): 111.

"Micahel D. Maher, "The Overcontrolling Leader: The Issue Is Systems," Army, September 1997, 9.

David J. Lemelin, "Misunderstanding Synchronization: An Army Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette. (November 1994): 26.

I3Micahel D. Maher, "The Overcontrolling Leader: The Issue Is Systems," Army, September 1997, 9.

,4Ibid., 10.

15Ibid.

,6Ibid.

17Ibid., p. 9.

18James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy-What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989), 101.

David J. Lemelin, "Misunderstanding Synchronization: An Army Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette. (November 1994): 26.

63

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

Purpose

This chapter first summarizes the conclusions formulated in the previous chapters of the

thesis. The chapter then finalizes the research question and follows with an examination of some

recommendations for writers of Military Decision-Making Process and Special Forces doctrine.

It concludes with recommendations to Special Forces battalion/group staffs and leadership

applying the Military Decision-Making Process to SF operations.

Summary of Research

Initially the thesis identified the research problem: Non-adherence to the doctrinal

Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) impedes the Special Forces (SF) battalion/group

staff from discretely planning multiple and simultaneous operations.

Non-adherence to doctrinal decision-making hampers staff product transitions from

higher to lower echelons. Information flow is affected and organizational responsibilities are not

fulfilled by inconsistent application of the Military Decision-Making Process. Neglected or

duplicated coordination measures from non-adherence. These consequential effects disrupt

efficient unit staff operations and collectively impede the planning of operations. The use of

approved processes facilitate the rapid and consistent assessment of the situation by minimizing

confusion.1 More significantly, the nonapplication of doctrine wastes the most valuable resource,

time.

The thesis initially described that non-adherence of the Military Decision-Making

Process mandates is in part due to a significant population of field grade commissioned officers

viewing the process as inadequate. The probability sampling theory induced that this inadequacy

is also perceived by the Special Forces sub-population of field grade commissioned officers.

From this conclusion emerged the primary research question: Is the Military Decision-Making

64

Process adequate to meet the needs of staffs at the Special Forces battalion/group level when

planning multiple and simultaneous operations?

The thesis continued with an analysis of applicable literature on the Military Decision-

Making Process's two schools of thought regarding its adequacy. The Traditionalist is a

proponent of Field Manual 101-5's strict interpretation of the analytical process. Traditionalist

view the Military Decision-Making Process as adequate and not subject to innovation. The

Liberalist, views the Military Decision-Making Process as inadequate, especially in time

constrained situations. Liberalists believe the time intensive Military Decision-Making Process

has failed to evolve into a process that can be used in a environment characterized by explosive

speeds, immense distances, and precise munitions. The Liberalist school of thought is followed

by the sub-population of Special Forces field grade commissioned officers viewing the Military

Decision-Making Process as inadequate.

The critical implied rationale outlined in chapter three was the explanation for step three

in the process, course of action development. COA development's implied rationale is defined as

a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable synergistic methods using interdependent efforts

while simultaneously leveraging finite resources. The thesis further defined finite resources as

combat multipliers injected at the decisive moment of an engagement.

The seven steps of the Military Decision-Making Process can be further categorized into

four sub-components: receipt of mission; mission analysis; options processing; and orders

production. By grouping course of action development with its subsequent steps in the process,

analysis, evaluation, comparison, decision, the options processing sub-component is founded.

All the steps in the options processing sub-component of the Military Decision-Making

Process are linked directly to the unit's requirement to achieve synergy among its subordinate,

interdependent units in conjunction with the finite resources supporting the mission. Chapter

65

three concluded mission taskings void of a requirement for synergy among interdependent

subordinate units may allow for expeditious orders processing by the higher staffs.

Chapter four outlined the major Special Forces operational differences from conventional

combined arms branches. Special Forces operational differences exist in span of control,

subordinate unit interdependence, and functions of the headquarters. Functions of the Special

Forces headquarters differ from conventional units in their geographic location and staff

processing. The key component of this chapter is the normal lack of interdependence between

subordinate SFOD-As. Additionally, SFOD-As are not normally massed at an engagement's

decisive time and place. SFOD-As are non-interdependent and mutually exclusive of each other.

The success of one SFOD-As is not dependent on the success of another SFOD-A. In other

words, there is no operational synergy normally required among subordinate SFOD-As.

Chapter five outlined the conflicts between the Military Decision-Making Process

rationale and the Special Forces operational differences. A major conflict between the two

chapters emerged between the rationale for course of action development and the lack of

interdependence typically present among Special Forces battalion/group subordinate units. Non-

interdependent SFOD-As do not require a synergistic output. Without a requirement for synergy

among subordinate SFOD-As, coupled with an employment criteria void of the need to mass

SFOD-As at the decisive time and place, synchronization may not be necessary. Thus Special

Forces mission taskings void of a requirement for synergy among their subordinate

interdependent units may allow/permit expeditious orders processing by the higher staffs.

Recommendations

During the initial stages of its development, as a professional combat arms branch in

1987, the standing Special Forces training and doctrine institution may have overlooked these

subtle organizational differences. Fully implementing the conventional Military Decision-

Making Process criteria for use in Special Forces units may be a function of an inability to

66

succinctly articulate these operational differences and how they contradict the specific rationales

of the Military Decision-Making Process criteria.

MDMP Rationale

Purpose of COA Development

A deliberate attempt to design unpredictable synergistic methods, using interdependent subordinate efforts while simultaneously leveraging finite resources.

SF Operational Differences

SFOD-As are:

Won- Interdependent

Not massed at an engagement's decisive moment.

Figure 13. MDMP Rationale Conflicts with SF Operational Differences.

All battlefields require commanders to make and execute decisions faster than the enemy.

Therefore the commander must always strive to optimize time available. He must not allow a

process to become inordinately time consuming.2 The high tempo operations of the modern

battlefield require rapid, "close enough" acceptable decisions that allow the command to decide,

move and execute in the limited time available.3 To avoid loss of time during planning

commanders and staff must ensure they accurately understand the process.4

The potential impact of an inappropriate linkage between a doctrinal process, developed

for a specific conventional organizational requirement, and usage ofthat process for a

significantly different organization can be significant. Given the tempo of current Army

deployments to support contingencies, specifically Special Forces battalions/groups, SF staffs

must optimize time by not applying unnecessary processes to non-applicable circumstances.

Optimizing available time by higher Special Forces staffs provides maximum allocations of time

for the SFOD-As to plan and rehearse their forthcoming missions. Simply answering the primary

research question, "Is the Military Decision-Making Process adequate to meet the needs of staffs

67

at the Special Forces battalion/group level when planning multiple and simultaneous operations

?" is only part of the solution.

The Military Decision-Making Process is adequate for Special Forces battalion/group

staffs when subordinate SFOD-As are interdependent and require a synergistic output. When

SFOD-As are massed with other SFOD-As or are mutually supporting each other's effort at their

higher's mission decisive point, these units need synchronization.

Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organizations and Operations

An informal observation can be deduced from much of the research conducted during this

thesis. "Synchronization" is one of the most extensively misunderstood and subsequently

misused terms used by field grade commissioned officers. The term "synchronization" is often

mistakenly substituted for simple coordination. Field Manual 100-5 Operations states,

"Synchronization is arranging the activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point."

Activities executed, but not directly supporting the massed effects of combat power at the

decisive moment of an engagement are often incorrectly referred to as synchronization. As Field

Manual 100-5 implies in the above definition, these activities may be more doctrinally

appropriate using another term. Therefore, further clarification of the context and use of

"synchronization" is needed. The implied rationale of the Military Decision-Making Process,

specifically course of action development, fits with "synchronization" when appropriately used in

accordance with Field Manual 100-5's one sentence definition.

Including the Military Decision-Making Process rationales might improve the

organizational awareness of this process and its application in using the process in future

scenarios. The Field Manual 101-5 text is void of rationales for most of the steps within the

Military Decision-Making Process. The key to intellectually understanding this process is by

including the "why" for each step.

68

The doctrine must also recognize and empower commanders with more flexibility in

abbreviating the process. As the thesis suggests, subtle conflicts potentially exist when applying

the Military Decision-Making Process to Special Forces operations. These conflicts further

suggest the Military Decision-Making Process may be appropriately abbreviated by modifying or

eliminating steps in the process. To offset the difficulties in applying the Military Decision-

Making Process to Special Forces operations the doctrinal field manual for the Military Decision-

Making Process, Field Manual 101-5, might include with the rationales, caveats for Special

Forces units specifically addressing the conflicts inherent with their unique operational

differences.

Field Manual 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

Discussions with Special Forces officers at CGSC confirmed some interesting trends.

These Special Forces officers were acutely aware of the absence of MDMP doctrine and SOTD

recommendations for SFOD-A course of action development by Special Forces staffs at the

battalion/group level. However, these officers' higher Special Forces headquarters elected to

disregard SOTD's guidance and issue their mission tasking orders to subordinate SFOD-As after

only an abbreviated macro-mission analysis.

These same Special Forces officers suggested the lack of specific guidance in Field

Manual 31-20 Doctrine For Special Forces Operations on use of the Military Decision-Making

Process by SF battalion/group staffs is an intentional effort to leave its interpretation and

application to the Special Forces commander. These suggestions from Special Forces and other

SOF officers in CGSC reinforce the trends concluded by the ARTs research on the application of

the Military Decision-Making Process doctrine. The adherence hypothesis deduced in the initial

chapters of this thesis is also informally confirmed by these comments. The Military Decision-

Making Process doctrine currently directs only one process and omitting the steps in the process

is not an option available to any commander.

69

These CGSC Special Forces officers also demonstrate the need for SF specific caveats in

Field Manual 101-5 and specific doctrinal guidance in SF specific manuals (Field Manual 31-30).

The void in Special Forces specific manuals on the application of the Military Decision-Making

Process by Special Forces battalion/group staffs is further confused by JRTC's Special

Operations Training Detachment (SOTD) bulletins.

SOTD's intellectualized rationale for Special Forces battalion/group staffs executing

course of action development for SFOD-As is to provide more information to the SFOD-A. In

the absence of any doctrinal rationales outlined in Field Manual 101-5, this research concluded

the implied rationale for course of action development, step 3 in the Military Decision-Making

Process is "a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable synergistic methods using interdependent

subordinate efforts while simultaneously leveraging finite resources." SOTD's rationale contrasts

significantly with the implied rationale developed in this thesis. Clarification of the Military

Decision-Making Process application criteria for Special Forces operations within the SF

doctrinal manual may minimize the significant contrasting interpolations emerging between

some operational staffs in the Special Forces battalions/groups and information provided to fill

the doctrinal void by SOTD.

SF Staffs and Leadership

Staff expediency takes many forms, but typically a decision-making process should strive

to link the discrete requirements of the mission with the specific rationales of each step within the

Military Decision-Making Process. For example, if synergy among subordinate SFOD-As is not

required and the detachments are not massed requiring synchronization, a commander might

advise his staff to abbreviate the Military Decision-Making Process and delegate SFOD-A course

of action development to his detachment commanders. This will free the Special Forces staff to

concentrate on other macro-details of the operation. And more importantly it will, provide

increased amounts of time for subordinates to do their respective troop leading procedures.

70

Special Forces staffs should focus on acquiring relevant information. Jon Fallesen's

research indicates an early decision method enhances a staffs success.5 Relevant information is

better attained by staffs focusing on situational data. Monitoring and translating data into usable

information through deductive reasoning is the greatest contribution a staff can provide to its

subordinate units.

The real challenge for Special Forces battalion/group commanders and staffs is

accurately determining if synchronization is required by a SFOD-A's higher staff. The critical

component of whether synchronization is required is determining if subordinate SFOD-As are

interdependent. Interdependent SFOD-As require synchronization.

Will the SFOD- As need to be

massed to achieve

success ?

— YES

Will the SFOD-As require mutual

support from one another to be successful ?

^

Does this mission tasking order

require more than one SFOD-A ?

YES NO _

NO BN / GRP Staff

Conduct Macro-Analysis only. (MDMP Steps 1 & 2)

Does the mission tasking order

require the SFOD-A to have external support at the

decisive moment of their respective

mission.

— NO

YES

SFOD-A(s) are interdependent

and require synchronization. BN / GRP staff

develop COAs for SFOD-As.

Figure 14. SF Mission Tasking Order Screening Criteria.

An early decision method for Special Forces staffs at the battalion/group level might

include incorporating screening criteria during their initial staff analysis. See Figure 14.

71

Screening criteria enables a Special Forces staff to quickly decipher whether SFOD-As are

interdependent and thus require synchronization. The requirement of synchronization mandates

the development of COAs for subordinate SFOD-As.

By using the recommended SF Mission Tasking Order Screening Criteria, Special Forces

battalion/group staffs are able to succinctly decide whether detailed SFOD-A course of action

development is required. More importantly, Special Forces battalion/group commanders and

staffs are better equipped to optimize available time on the battlefield.

The lack of Special Forces doctrine addressing the use of the MDMP by battalion/group

staffs creates two basic problems. Some segments of the Special Forces field grade population

view the current MDMP doctrine as inadequate due to the operational differences among

conventional and Special Forces missions. Their non-adherence can be blamed on the MDMP's

strict doctrinal requirements prohibiting modification of the process steps. Non-adherence to

doctrinal procedures creates confusion among a organizational members because the

administrative staff expectations are not uniform.

The second problem created by the lack of Special Forces doctrine is the strict adherence

to MDMP doctrinal guidelines designed for use in conventional operations. The thesis has shown

that in the absence of Special Forces specific doctrine interpolation can create undesirable

consequences. Without taking into account the purpose of course of action development, i.e.

synchronization of subordinate interdependent units, redundant staff efforts occur wasting

valuable time. The obvious solution to the problem is definitive guidance in Special Forces

specific manuals on the application of the MDMP for use by battalion/group staffs while planning

multiple and simultaneous operations.

:US Department of the Army, FM101-5 Staff Organizations and Operations, (Washington DC: GPO, May 1997), 5-1

72

2US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Estimate of the Situation, AAR slide presentation (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Training Detachment, October 1995), 3.

3US Army Command and General Staff College, The Tactical Decision-Making Process, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: GPO, July 1993), 1-4.

4US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Estimate of the Situation, AAR slide presentation (Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Training Detachment, October 1995), 4.

5Jon J. Fallesen, "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Performance Research" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute, September 1993), viii.

73

APPENDIX A

ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES

Purpose

The purpose of this appendix is to outline the environmental influences impeding the

Special Forces (SF) battalion/group staffs from discretely planning multiple and simultaneous

operations.

Environmental Influences

Change is the theme of the nineties. Change is in every aspect of life and permeates

every institution. In the US culture the mindset of change is everywhere regardless of how one

see it, good, bad or indifferent. Change has also come to the Army and can be attributed to many

influences and dynamics.

The society of the US has recently undergone a political paradigm shift. Emphasis is

changing from foreign policy issues in the fifties and sixties to domestic issues of the nineties.

This has had a significant impact on Army members. Many of the cause and effect attributes of

this change are readily recognizable. Others are not so clear and require a complicated

understanding of historical, social, and organizational forces. This change in focus, from foreign

affairs to domestic issues, has indirectly contributed to the organizational chaos the Army is

currently enduring.

The environmental influences that impede Special Forces staffs from discretely planning

multiple and simultaneous operations are initially imbedded in the recently emerging US political

agenda. The sudden ending of the Cold War in the late 1980's removed the Soviet Union as

America's primary external enemy. Numerous changes began to appear as a result of the

democratic revolution in the former Soviet Union. Democracies within the former Soviet Bloc

emerged wanting freedom, democracy, and peace. These emerging nations also wanted to

minimize the threat of war and eliminate poverty.

74

Allocation of resources for military expenditures clearly imposes a substantial demand on

any nation's finite resources in terms of labor, raw materials, capital and intermediate goods.

Worldwide, military usage accounted for about six percent of all goods and services produced.1

Military demands each year were approximately one-third as great as all investment in productive

plant and equipment.2

World-wide, the resources spent on military hardware has on average decreased by ten

percent or more, with developing countries reducing expenditures as much as industrial nations.

Leading the trend to lower military expenditures were countries with or experiencing economies

in transition or emerging democracies. Other countries downsizing military expenditures

included nations that changed their form of government, democracies, and countries at war.3

Within the US, political efforts to balance the federal budget without reducing

entitlement programs still remains a political priority. This political agenda creates downward

pressure on the Department of Defense to cut expenditures. As a result of changes in military

expenditures the Department of Defense continues to reduce its organizational size and costs.

With a reduction in the perceived threat coupled with a political resistance to reducing public

entitlements, its easy to visualize why the military is under such pressure to reduce its operating

costs.

Active duty personnel in the Army decreased from 770,000 in 1989 with 402,000

civilians to the current strength total of 495,000 active duty personnel and 249,000 civilian

employees4 The change in active and DA civilians from 1989 through 1996 represents a

collective reduction in personnel of thirty-six percent. However in 1998 and 1999, the civilian

structure will endure additional reductions in personnel.

These environmental influences create organizational turmoil for the Army. They

generate an imbalance between the operational demand for military units and the limited number

of units available. As the DoD reduced its operating budget and trimmed its force structure,

75

world-wide regional/operational requirements for military forces increased. The pro-military

civilian leadership attempted to justify the remaining, but still declining force structure by using

the military for increased humanitarian, civic, and peacekeeping operations. The supply of

military personnel declined as the demand for military units increased. Secretary Perry

summarized the situation best, "Since the end of the Cold War, the increased pace of military

operations means military people are, on average, away from home more often."5

In the overarching Special Operations Forces (SOF) community, operational tempo has

increased substantially in recent years. In 1995, SOF forces conducted 2,675 deployments to 137

countries reflecting an increase from 1994 of twenty-three percent.6

Another environmental influence that indirectly impacts Special Forces units and their

respective staffs is personnel tempo. The number of available Special Forces personnel declined

proportionally with the rest of the active component population. This decline negatively affects

the pool of available soldiers and officers available to serve on Special Forces battalion/group

staffs. The personnel reductions were further complicated by structure increases in some major

commands. In other words, during the military drawdown, the decrease in the total population of

personnel has not been balanced with a proportional decrease in the size of the force structure.

Force levels have been reduced by one third over the past ten years while the Office of the

Secretary of Defense's support staff has increased by forty percent.7

Emphasizing this recent DoD trend was a recent General Accounting Office study stating

that more than forty-five percent of all active-duty personnel are assigned to "infrastructure"

functions.8 Infrastructure functions include support agencies but more importantly headquarters

and major commands. Further supporting this purported trend was another report from the

Defense Science Board. In the report, the Defense Science Board reported only twenty percent of

all active-duty forces serve in combat assignments.9 This indicates that the Pentagon's overhead

is consuming too many people and resources at a time when combat forces are being cut back.10

76

The recent unbalanced trend between personnel and force structure creates an elevated

demand for personnel to serve in critical positions or billets, outside of combat units, for longer

periods of time. These critical billets are commonly viewed as less than desirable, by individual

servicemembers, due to geographic location or position requirements. Never the less, the demand

to backfill the sometimes less desirable, critical positions causes increased turnover of the less

critical positions in combat units.

This exponential demand on the decreased Special Forces field grade officer pool is

referred to as "personnel tempo." The expertise of Special Forces field grade commissioned

officers is inversely proportional to personnel tempo. As personnel tempo increases the expertise

level of the Special Forces field grades decreases. This means that personnel available to fill

Special Forces staffs at the battalion/group level will be assigned for shorter periods of time.

Shorter tours mean less time to master the job and thus more people rotating through a given

position. This means that more Special Forces field grade officers with less expertise are serving

on battalion/group staffs. This decreased level of expertise in Special Forces field grade officers

clearly impedes Special Forces staffs from discretely planning multiple and simultaneous

operations.

Another environmental influence that affects Special Forces staffs is operational tempo.

Even with the decline of the Soviet Union and its military alliance the Warsaw Pact, the US

military has continued to be actively engaged along the full spectrum of potential military

operations. While all services have experienced high deployment rates since the Gulf war, the

percentages of Army and Air Force personnel deployed have more than doubled.11

As more Special Forces field grade officers with less expertise serve on battalion/group

staffs the likelihood of these units deploying to support a contingency has increased. Special

Forces units have been fully integrated into the unified commands' peacetime engagement and

crisis response contingency plans. Special Forces units' adaptability and cultural orientation

77

provide the unified commands with a large return from a relatively small, low-risk investment.

Therefore, the discrete employment of Special Forces units and other SOF units, has increased.

Defense Secretary William Perry defined the success of SOF in Haiti, "The role of our Special

Operations Forces was a key to our success."12 Peace Operations, categorized under the heading

of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), are one of the activities that has seen

increased participation by Special Forces units.

The United States has a vested financial interest in supporting peace operations,

specifically UN missions. By sharing the financial burden of preserving international peace and

security with other nations, the US can further its own internal fiscal and political agendas. In

1996, 70,000 personnel served under the UN flag. The US provided 3,305 personnel or five

percent of the UN forces.13

Humanitarian and refugee assistance operations have also contributed to the increase in

Special Forces operations tempo. During fiscal year 1995, 104 countries benefited from US

humanitarian assistance.14 Some of these countries included Bosnia, Cuba, Haiti, and Iraq.

The Army's imbalance of personnel to operational demand illustrates one of many

catalysts for improved staff efficiency. Staff efficiency means maximizing available time by

expediting processes and eliminating unnecessary procedures. Thus, further refinement of the

current body of decision-making doctrine may be appropriate.

]Wassily Leontif, Military Spending: Facts and Figures Worldwide Implications and Future Outlook (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3.

2Ibid.

3"Military Expenditures: Will the Post-1985 Decline be Sustained?" Financial Development, December 1993, 24.

4Ibid.

5US Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President, (Washington DC: GPO, March 1996), 27.

78

6Ibid., 202.

7Jack Weible. "House Rebukes White For Failure to Deliver Reform." Army Times, February 26, 1997, 10.

8Ibid.

9Ibid.

10Ibid.

nUS Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President, (Washington DC: GPO March 1996), 27.

12US Department of Defense, United States Special Operations US Army Command 1996 Posture Statement, (Macdill AFB, FL:GPO, 1996), 2.

13US Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President, (Washington DC: GPO, March 1996), 7.

,4Ibid., 9.

79

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

Advanced Operating Bases: A command, control, and support base established and

operated by the SF company.1

Battle Operating Systems: Includes intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense,

mobility, and survivability, CSS and C2. They provide a structure for integrating and

synchronizing critical combat activities on the battlefield.

Civil Affairs: Those places or activities of a commander which embrace the relationship

between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or

occupied country or area when military forces are present.

Joint Special Operations Area: A restrictive area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a

joint force commander to a joint special operations component commander to conduct special

operations.

Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): A single, established, and proven analytical

process, created from an adaptation of the Army's analytical approach to problem solving.5

Military Operation«; Other Than War: Military activities during peacetime and conflict

that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between organized forces.6

Mission Tasking Order: Sometimes referred to as a TASKORD, it is a formal written

notification of a unit to begin planning and on order execute specific missions.

Peace Operations: An umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities

with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and

two complimentary, predominately military, activities (peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement).8

Psychological Operations: Planned operations to convey selected information and

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and

ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

80

Special Forces: Military units that plan, conduct, and support special operations in all

operational environments in peace, conflict, and war.10

Special Operations : Special operations are actions conducted by specially organized,

trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or

psychological objectives by nonconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive

areas. They are conducted in peace, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with

operations of conventional forces.11

Special Operations Command and Control Element: The focal point for coordination and

synchronization where prolonged contact between conventional and maneuver forces are

required.12 The SOCCE commander advises the supported conventional commander on the

capabilities and limitations of supporting SF teams and provides required communications links.

Special Operations Forces: Those forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to

conduct special operations or provide direct support to other SOF. They provide a versatile

military capability to defend US national interests. Army SOF includes the 75th Ranger

Regiment, Civil Affairs units, Psychological Operations Units, Army Special Operations

Aviation, and Special Forces units.14

Special Operations Team-Alpha: A small section of personnel from a SF battalions MI

detachment that can provide signal intelligence and electronic surveillance measures, but is

incapable of conducting independent operations in a hostile environment.15

'US Department of the Army. FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (Ft. Bragg,, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, April 1990), 5-9.

2US Department of the Army. FM 100-15 Corps Operations. (Washington DC: GPO, October 1996), 2-9.

3Ibid., glossary-6.

4US Department of the Army. FM 100-25 Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces (Ft. Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, December 1991), glossary-22.

81

5US Department of the Army. FM101-5 Staff Organizations and Operations. (Washington DC: GPO, May 1997), 5-1.

6US Department of the Army. FM 100-5 Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), glossary-6.

7John Thompson, LTC, "USAJFKSWC SOF Joint Doctrine," Slide presentation given to CGSOC SF students (Ft. Bragg, NC: Department of Joint Doctrine, September 1997.)

8US Department of the Army. FM 100-23 Peace Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, December 1994), 111.

9US Department of the Army. FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (Ft. Bragg,, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, April 1990), glossary-10.

10Ibid., 5-1.

"Ibid., 1-4.

:2US Department of the Army. FM 100-25 Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces (Ft. Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, December 1991), 4-36.

13US Department of the Army. FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (Ft. Bragg,, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO), April 1990.

I4US Department of the Army. FM 100-25 Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces (Ft. Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, December 1991), 2-1.

,5Ibid., 13-4.

82

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Bittel, Lester R. Organizational Management. Chicago, IL: Mcgraw-Hill Book Co. 1980.

Collins, John M. Green Berets, SEALS, andSpetsnaz Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc. 1987.

Kegley, Charles W. and Eugene Wittkopf. American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process. 4th ed. New York, NY: St Martins Press, 1991.

Leontif, Wassily. Military Spending: Facts and Figures Worldwide Implications and Future Outlook. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Royle, Trevor. A Dictionary of Military Quotations. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1987.

Shapero, Albert. Management Techniques for Professional People. London: The Free Press, Collier Macmillian Publishers, 1985.

Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations. 6th ed. Chicago, EL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy-What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989.

Periodicals

"Military Expenditures: Will the Post-1985 Decline be Sustained?" Financial Development. December 1993,24-26.

Depuy, William E. "Concepts of Operation: The Heart of US Army Command, The Tool of Doctrine." Army. August 1988,26-32.

Foster, Gregory, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist." Joint Force Quarterly. (Spring 1996): 111-15.

Klein, Gary A. "Strategies of Decision Making." Military Review. (May 1989): 27-35.

Lemelin, David J. "Misunderstanding Synchronization: An Army Perspective."Marine Corps Gazette. (November 1994): 26-28.

Maher, Micahel D. "The Overcontrolling Leader: The Issue Is Systems." Army. September 1997, 9-11.

Weible, Jack, "House Rebukes White For Failure to Deliver Reform." Army Times. February 26, 1997, 10.

83

Government Documents

Fallesen, Jon J. "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Performance Research." Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute, September 1993. (ADA 273 273-2.)

Halpin, Stanely M. "Desert Storm Challenges: An Overview of Desert Storm Survey Responses." Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Research Institute, January 1993.

US Army Command and General Staff College. C310 Combat Operations. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff Officers Course, GPO, July 1997.

US Army Command and General Staff College. The Tactical Decision-Making Process. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: GPO, July 1993.

US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. Special Forces Qualification Course Deliberate Decision-Making and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Ft. Bragg, NC: GPO, February 1997.

US Army Joint Readiness Training Center. Estimate of the Situation. AAR slide presentation. Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Training Detachment October 1995.

US Army Joint Readiness Training Center. Special Operations Training Bulletin. Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, February 1995.

US Army Joint Readiness Training Center. Special Operations TrainingBulletin. Ft. Polk, LA: Special Operations Directorate, December 1996.

US Department of the Army. FM1-100 Army Aviation Operations. Washington, DC: GPO, February 1997.

US Department of the Army. FM 1-113 Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. Washington DC: GPO, September 1997.

US Department of the Army. FM 11-32 Combat Net Radio Operations. Washington DC: GPO, October 1990.

US Department of the Army. FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. Ft. Bragg,, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, April 1990.

US Department of the Army. FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Washington DC: GPO, May 1989.

US Department of the Army. FM 71-100 Division Operations. Washington DC: GPO, August 1996.

US Department of the Army. FM 100-5 Operations. Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993.

US Department of the Army. FM 100-5 Operations. Washington, DC: GPO, May 1986.

84

US Department of the Army. FM100-15 Corps Operations. Washington DC: GPO, October 1996.

US Department of the Army. FM 100-23 Peace Operations. Washington, DC: GPO, December 1994.

US Department of the Army. FM 100-25 Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces. Ft. Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWC, GPO, December 1991.

US Department of the Army. FM 101-5 Staff Organizations and Operations. Washington DC: GPO, May 1997.

US Department of the Army. 'Tactical Decision Making: 'Abbreviated Planning." Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center For Army Lessons Learned, 1979.

US Department of the Army. "US Army FY 97 Greenbook. Washington DC: GPO, 1997.

US Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President. Washington DC: GPO, March 1996.

US Department of Defense. United States Special Operations US Army Command 1996 Posture Statement. Macdill AFB, FL:GPO, 1996.

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Crain, William. "Battle Staff Operations: Synchronization of Planning at Battalion and Brigade Level." Masters of Military Art and Sciences thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989. (ADA 212-518)

Davis, John A. 'Tactical Decision Making: A Proposed Evaluation Criteria Model For The Infantry Battalion's Tactical Estimate During Offensive Operations." Masters of Military Art and Sciences thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1993. (ADA 272-883)

Duncan, Frank E. "A Logical Approach to Decision-Making For the Battalion US Army Commander on the Battlefield." Masters of Military Art and Sciences thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1978. (ADA 057752-3)

Fastabend, David A. "Fighting by the Numbers: The Role of Quantification in Tactical Decision Making." School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1987. (ADA 191438-4)

Fondacaro, Steve A. "Airland Battle and SOF: A Proposal for an Interim Doctrine for Joint Special Operations." School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989. (ADA 215563-2)

85

Frame, John E. "Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Wargaming and Visualization for the US Army Commander and Staff." School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996. (ADA 324318-3)

Kershaw, Michael M. "The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces," Masters of Military Art and Sciences thesis, Naval Post Graduate School. Monterey, CA, 1994.

Harris, Andrew. "Presidents, Generals, and Green Berets: Explaining Cyclical support of US Special Operations Forces." Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland College Park, 1993.

Lynch, Tim D. "Problem-Solving Under Time Constraints: Alternatives for the US Army Commander's Estimate." School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989. (ADA 225-425)

Maxwell, David S. "Special Forces Missions: A Return to the Roots For a Vision of the Future," Masters of Military Art and Sciences thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1995.

Salter, William. "Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP)." Ft. Irwin, CA: US Army National Training Center, Observer/Controller Operations, 1995. Photocopied.

Thompson, John, LTC. "USAJFKSWC SOF Joint Doctrine," Slide presentation given to CGSOC SF students, Ft. Bragg, NC, Department of Joint Doctrine, September 1997.

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86

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