Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and ...

Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems AGENDA

NFPA 130 Second Draft Meeting October 2-4, 2018, 8 AM-5 PM

Holiday Inn Orlando – Disney Springs Area Orlando, Florida

1. Call to order. Jarrod Alston, Chair.

2. Introductions and Update of Committee Roster. (Attachment A)

3. Approval of Minutes from First Draft Meeting on Oct. 17-19, 2017. (Attachment B)

4. Staff Liaison Report

a. Review Annual 2019 Revision Cycle (Attachment C)

b. Committee Membership Update (Attachment D)

c. Revision Process Review

5. Review and Act on all 20 Public Comments on NFPA 130. (Attachment E)

6. Task Group Reports. (Attachment F – TG list; Attachment G – Committee Inputs)

a. Passenger Rail (Attachment H)

b. “Exit” Definitions

c. Stations

d. Tunnels

e. “Fire Hazard Analysis” vs. “Engineering Analysis”

f. Ventilation

g. Others

7. Additional Items.

a. Presentation: Bernie Kennedy - Federal Railroad Administration/Volpe National

Transportation System Center’s Fire Safety Research

b. TIA for A.6.3.2.1, 2017 edition – discuss consistency with 2020 edition (Attachment I)

c. Discussion: Guideway crosswalk language (Katherine Fagerlund) (Attachment J)

d. Terminology discussion - “Fire life safety”

e. Task groups for next cycle

8. Schedule Next Meeting. (First Draft meeting in the A2022 cycle must be between June 30,

2020 and December 8, 2020).

9. Adjournment.

1

ATTACHMENT A

2

Address List No PhoneFixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems FKT-AAA

Janna E. Shapiro09/14/2018

FKT-AAA

Jarrod Alston

ChairArup955 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02139-3180Alternate: Matthew W. Davy

SE 8/9/2011FKT-AAA

Richard M. Arvin

PrincipalAnnapolis Fire & Life Safety Engineering508 Kansala DriveAnnapolis, MD 21401-8100Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority(WMATA)Alternate: Neil E. Nott

U 04/04/2017

FKT-AAA

David M. Casselman

PrincipalLea & Elliott, Inc.2505 North State Highway 360, Suite 750Grand Prairie, TX 75050Alternate: Robert W. Falvey

SE 1/1/1990FKT-AAA

James J. Convery

PrincipalAmtrak33 Clearview DriveTinton Falls, NJ 07724

U 04/05/2016

FKT-AAA

Angelina Dorman

PrincipalSouthwire110 Adamson SquareCarrollton, GA 30117

M 08/03/2016FKT-AAA

Thomas Eng

PrincipalLos Angeles County Metro Transportation AuthorityOne Gateway PlazaLos Angeles, CA 90012Alternate: Thomas Alan Langer

U 08/03/2016

FKT-AAA

Katherine Fagerlund

PrincipalJENSEN HUGHES Consulting Canada Ltd.13900 Maycrest Way, Suite 135Richmond, BC V6V 3E2 CanadaAlternate: John F. Devlin

SE 10/23/2003FKT-AAA

Michel Fournier

PrincipalSociete de Transport de Montreal (STM)800 De Maisonneuve East, 15th FloorMontréal, QC H2L 4L8 Canada

U 08/17/2018

FKT-AAA

Charles J. Giblin III

PrincipalMaryland State Fire Marshal’s Office1201 Reisterstown RoadPikesville, MD 21208-3802International Fire Marshals Association

E 8/9/2011FKT-AAA

Bernard J. Kennedy, IV

PrincipalUS Department of TransportationVolpe National Transportation Systems Center55 Broadway, Kendall SquareCambridge, MA 02142-1093US Department of TransportationResearch

RT 04/08/2015

FKT-AAA

William E. Koffel

PrincipalKoffel Associates, Inc.8815 Centre Park Drive, Suite 200Columbia, MD 21045-2107Automatic Fire Alarm Association, Inc.Alternate: Daniel P. Finnegan

M 08/09/2012FKT-AAA

Max Lakkonen

PrincipalInstitute for Applied Fire Safety ResearchPankstrasse 8-10, Haus ABerlin DE, 13127 Germany

RT 08/17/2017

13



FKT-AAA

Pierre Laurin

PrincipalToronto Transit Commission5140 Yonge Street, 6th FloorToronto, ON M2N 6L6 CanadaAlternate: Zoran Radojevic

U 3/4/2009FKT-AAA

Kevin M. Lewis

PrincipalBombardier Transportation1501 Lebanon Church RoadPittsburgh, PA 15236-1491Alternate: Muriel Villalta

M 3/2/2010

FKT-AAA

Silas K. Li

PrincipalParsons Brinckerhoff, Inc.One Penn PlazaNew York, NY 10119Alternate: Andrew Louie

SE 7/14/2004FKT-AAA

Harold A. Locke

PrincipalLocke & Locke Inc.3552 West 2nd AvenueVancouver, BC V6R 1J4 CanadaAlternate: Gary L. English

SE 11/01/1984

FKT-AAA

David Mao

PrincipalUS Department of TransportationFederal Railroad Administration1200 New Jersey Avenue, SERRS-14, MS-25, Room W35-311Washington, DC 20590US Department of TransportationEnforcement

E 1/15/2004FKT-AAA

Steven W. Roman

PrincipalLTK Engineering Services100 West Butler AvenueAmbler, PA 19002Alternate: Ritch D. Hollingsworth

SE 4/3/2003

FKT-AAA

Julian Sandu

PrincipalChicago Transit Authority3701 Oakton StreetSkokie, IL 60076Alternate: Scott W. McAleese

U 7/14/2004FKT-AAA

Henry X. Schober

PrincipalNew York City Transit Auth2 BroadwayNew York, NY 10004Metropolitan Transportation AuthorityNYC TransitAlternate: Thomas P. Kenny

U 04/11/2018

FKT-AAA

Dilip S. Shah

PrincipalAECOM Technical Services, Inc.Tunnel Ventilation Group300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 400Oakland, CA 94612Alternate: Thomas P. O'Dwyer

SE 7/23/2008FKT-AAA

Joshua H. Teo

PrincipalBay Area Rapid Transit District (BART)300 Lakeside Drive, 18th FloorSan Francisco, CA 94612Alternate: Jason Eng

U 08/11/2014

FKT-AAA

Robert C. Till

PrincipalJohn Jay College of Criminal Justice220 E. 57th Street, Apartment 14GNew York, NY 10022Alternate: Bruce Dandie

SE 7/16/2003FKT-AAA

William Ventura

PrincipalFDNY263 Walker AvenueEast Patchogue, NY 11772

E 08/17/2017

24



FKT-AAA

David J. Volk

PrincipalPort Authority Trans HudsonOne Path PlazaJersey City, NJ 07306Alternate: Martha K. Gulick

U 11/30/2016FKT-AAA

Leong Kwok Weng

PrincipalLand Transport Authority, Singapore1 Hampshire Road, Block 10, Level 3Singapore, S219429 SingaporeAlternate: Paul Fok

U 7/16/2003

FKT-AAA

John Powell White

PrincipalIFT/Fire Cause Analysis935 Pardee StreetBerkeley, CA 94710-2623Alternate: Steve Virostek


Steven C. White

PrincipalMTA-Long Island Rail Road93-59 183rd StreetHollis, NY 11423-2323Metropolitan Transportation AuthorityLong Island Rail RoadAlternate: Daniel E. Nichols

E 7/28/2006

FKT-AAA

Bruce Dandie

AlternateRRT PTY LTDPO Box 3835Victoria Point West, QLD 4165 AustraliaPrincipal: Robert C. Till


Matthew W. Davy

AlternateArup60 State StreetBoston, MA 02109Principal: Jarrod Alston

SE 12/08/2015

FKT-AAA

John F. Devlin

AlternateJENSEN HUGHES6305 Ivy Lane, Suite 220Greenbelt, MD 20770JENSEN HUGHESPrincipal: Katherine Fagerlund

SE 1/1/1996FKT-AAA

Jason Eng

AlternateBay Area Rapid Transit District (BART)300 Lakeside Drive18th FloorOakland, CA 94612Principal: Joshua H. Teo

U 08/03/2016

FKT-AAA

Gary L. English

AlternateUnderground Command And Safety23415 67 Lane South WestVashon, WA 98070Principal: Harold A. Locke


Robert W. Falvey

AlternateLea & Elliott, Inc.7345 West Sand Lake Road, Suite 214Orlando, FL 32819Principal: David M. Casselman

SE 1/10/2002

FKT-AAA

Daniel P. Finnegan

AlternateSiemens Industry, Inc.Building Technologies DivisionFire & Security2953 Exeter CourtWest Dundee, IL 60118-1724Automatic Fire Alarm Association, Inc.Principal: William E. Koffel

M 03/07/2013FKT-AAA

Paul Fok

AlternateLand Transport Authority, SingaporeNo. 1 Hampshire RoadBlock 3 #04-00Singapore, 219428 SingaporePrincipal: Leong Kwok Weng

U 7/29/2005

35



FKT-AAA

Martha K. Gulick

AlternatePort Authority of New York & New JerseyOne PATH Plaza, 6th FloorJersey City, NJ 07306Principal: David J. Volk

U 1/18/2001FKT-AAA

Ritch D. Hollingsworth

AlternateLTK Engineering Services100 West Butler AvenueAmber, PA 19002Principal: Steven W. Roman

SE 7/28/2006

FKT-AAA

Thomas P. Kenny

AlternateNew York City Transit Authority2 Broadway, Room D.5.54New York, NY 10004Metropolitan Transportation AuthorityNYC TransitPrincipal: Henry X. Schober

U 03/07/2013FKT-AAA

Thomas Alan Langer

AlternateLos Angeles County Metro Transportation Authority(LACMTA)One Gateway Plaza99-18-06Los Angeles, CA 90012Principal: Thomas Eng

U 08/17/2018

FKT-AAA

Andrew Louie

AlternateWSP Parsons Brinckerhoff1 Penn Plaza, FLoor 2New York, NY 10119Principal: Silas K. Li


Scott W. McAleese

AlternateChicago Transit Authority567 West Lake StreetChicago, IL 60661Principal: Julian Sandu

U 08/17/2015

FKT-AAA

Daniel E. Nichols

AlternateState of New York Metropolitan Transportation AuthorityMetro North Railroad3 Valerie CourtHyde Park, NY 12538Metropolitan Transportation AuthorityEnforcerPrincipal: Steven C. White

E 12/06/2017FKT-AAA

Neil E. Nott

AlternateWashington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)198 Van Buren Street, Suite 300Herndon, VA 20170Principal: Richard M. Arvin

U 10/4/2007

FKT-AAA

Thomas P. O'Dwyer

AlternateAecom125 Broad Street, 16th FloorNew York, NY 10004Principal: Dilip S. Shah


Zoran Radojevic

AlternateToronto Transit Commission5140 Yonge StreetToronto, ON M2N 6L6 CanadaPrincipal: Pierre Laurin

U 11/30/2016

FKT-AAA

Muriel Villalta

AlternateBombardier TransportationP.O. Box 220 StationaKingston, ON K7M 6R2 CanadaPrincipal: Kevin M. Lewis

M 04/11/2018FKT-AAA

Steve Virostek

AlternateFire Cause Analysis935 Pardee StreetBerkeley, CA 94710Principal: John Powell White

SE 11/30/2016

46



FKT-AAA

Arnold Dix

Nonvoting MemberSchool Medicine, UWSLawyer/Scientist16 Sherman CourtBerwick, VIC 3806 Australia

SE 7/29/2005FKT-AAA

Frank J. Cihak

Member EmeritusFJC Transit Consultants9010 Nomini LaneAlexandria, VA 22309-2811

SE 1/1/1982

FKT-AAA

Norman H. Danziger

Member Emeritus11231 Golfridge LaneBoynton Beach, FL 33437

1/1/1975FKT-AAA

Edward K. Farrelly

Member EmeritusE. Farrelly & Associates60 Blanch AvenueHarrington Park, NJ 07640

1/1/1975

FKT-AAA

Janna E. Shapiro

Staff LiaisonNational Fire Protection AssociationOne Batterymarch ParkQuincy, MA 02169-7471

4/20/2017

57

ATTACHMENT B

8

Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems MINUTES

NFPA 130 First Draft Meeting October 17-19, 2017

Sheraton Mesa at Wrigleyville West Mesa, AZ

Part I, Attendance:

Committee Members and Staff:

Name Office Organization

Jarrod Alston Chair Arup

David Casselman Principal Lea & Elliott, Inc.

James Convery Principal Amtrak

Katherine Fagerlund Principal Jensen Hughes

Charles Giblin III Principal International Fire Marshals Association

Bernard Kennedy Principal US Department of Transportation

Thomas Kenny Principal Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Max Lakkonen Principal Institute for Applied Fire Safety Research

Pierre Laurin Principal Toronto Transit Commission

Kevin Lewis Principal Bombardier Transportation

Silas Li Principal WSP

Harold Locke Principal Locke & Locke Inc.

David Mao Principal US Department of Transportation

Luc Martineau Principal Societe de Transport de Montreal (STM)

Steven Roman Principal LTK Engineering Services

Dilip Shah Principal AECOM Technical Services, Inc.

Joshua Teo Principal Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART)

Robert Till Principal John Jay College of Criminal Justice

William Ventura Principal Fire Department City of New York

David Volk Principal Port Authority Trans Hudson

John White Principal IFT/Fire Cause Analysis

Steven White Principal Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Matthew Davy Voting Alternate Arup

Jason Eng Alternate Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART)

Thomas Eng Alternate Los Angeles County Metro Transportation

Daniel Finnegan Alternate Automatic Fire Alarm Association, Inc.

Ritch Hollingsworth Alternate LTK Engineering Services

Scott McAleese Alternate Chicago Transit Authority

Neil Nott (teleconference) Alternate Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Thomas O’Dwyer Alternate AECOM

9

Zoran Radojevic Alternate Toronto Transit Commission

Arnold Dix Nonvoting Member School Medicine, UWS

Janna Shapiro Staff Liaison NFPA

Guests:

John Cockle Parsons Transportation

Robert Schmidt RSCC Wire and Cable LLC

James Conrad Marmon Innovation & Technology

Marcelo Hirschler GBH International

David Plotkin AECOM

Henry Schober New York City Transit Authority

Dan Nichols MTA Metro-North Railroad

Melissa Shurland Federal Railroad Administration

Benjamin Spears LTK Engineering Services

Gil Shoshani RSCC Wire and Cable LLC

Thomas Langer LA County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Brian Lattimer Jensen Hughes

Adrian Milford Jensen Hughes

Andrew Coles Jensen Hughes

Gary English Underground Command and Safety

Ian Ong Mott Macdonald

Part II, Minutes:

1. Chairman Jarrod Alston called the meeting to order at 8:00 AM on Tuesday, Oct. 17, 2017.

2. All attendees delivered their self-introductions. An attendance roster was produced; there

were 30 Committee Members (Principals and Alternates) present. There were also 16

guests and NFPA Staff Liaison Janna Shapiro. Of this total, 1 member was in attendance via

teleconference.

3. Chairman Alston called for a motion to accept minutes of September 2015 meeting (2nd

Draft) of the Technical Committee in San Diego, CA. Motion passed unanimously.

4. Staff Liaison Shapiro provided standard meeting instructions and legal policies.

5. Staff Liaison Shapiro instructed Technical Committee on Roster update and attendance log.

6. Guest Adrian Milford provided an overview presentation of a number of proposals

submitted by Jensen Hughes, including the reorganization of Annex B. The Technical

Committee provided feedback and direction for the task groups developing

recommendations for these proposals.

7. Chairman Alston called for Task Group breakout sessions.

8. The Technical Committee began the review and action process on 85 Public Inputs:

10

a. James Conrad addressed Inputs assigned to the Cables Task Group along with the

Group’s recommendations. Gil Shoshani also gave a presentation on vehicle wiring

prior to addressing the Inputs related to this topic.

b. Katherine Fagerlund addressed Inputs assigned to the Stations Task Group along

with the Group’s recommendations.

c. Steve Roman addressed Inputs assigned to the Vehicle Task Group along with the

Group’s recommendations.

d. Silas Li addressed Inputs assigned to the Ventilation Task Group along with the

Group’s recommendations.

e. Guest Andrew Coles gave a presentation on Public Input #112 and the proposed

reorganization of Annex B, as well as a number of proposed Committee Inputs based

on feedback from the Technical Committee following Adrian Milford’s presentation.

f. Katherine Fagerlund addressed Inputs assigned to the Tunnels (Guideways) Task

Group along with Group’s recommendations.

g. As Chair of the Technical Committee, Jarrod Alston called for actions on all

remaining Inputs.

9. After completing the review of the Public Inputs, additional proposals were brought forward

for discussion:

a. Silas Li presented a proposal for new annex material for the definition of critical

velocity.

b. David Plotkin presented proposals related to noise level criteria, and calculating

evacuation times for tunnel trainways.

c. Katherine Fagerlund presented proposals on behalf of Daniel Finnegan to align NFPA

130 with NFPA 72, as well as proposals relating to upward evacuation on stairs, and

alternative methods for calculating platform occupant load.

d. Harold Locke presented a proposal related to passenger rail systems.

e. Gary English presented proposals relating to standpipe installations in tunnels under

construction, monitoring isolation valves, and concurrent incidents.

f. Staff Liaison Shapiro presented editorial issues to the Technical Committee for

consideration.

11

10. Guest Brian Lattimer provided an overview presentation of railcar fire safety research by

the Federal Railroad Administration and Volpe National Transportation Systems Center.

11. Chairman Alston disbanded the existing NFPA 130 Task Groups with his thanks.

12. Chairman Alston appointed the following Task Groups for future business:

a. Application of 7.2.5: This Task Group will review the application of 7.2.5 to more

than one train in a single ventilation zone. Recommendations will be provided in the

next revision cycle. Task Group members include Gary English (Chair), David Plotkin,

Silas Li, Zoran Radojevic, Harold Locke, Scott McAleese, David Volk, and Joshua Teo.

b. New Annex on AHJ Guidance: This Task Group will review existing NFPA documents

and develop a new annex providing guidance for AHJs, including the roles of the AHJ,

how to handle conflicts between various regulations, prescriptive vs. performance

based design, etc. Recommendations will be provided in the next revision cycle. Task

Group members include Gary English (Chair), Arnold Dix, and Tom Eng.

c. Passenger Rail: This Task Group will review the application of NFPA 130 to passenger

rail systems. The Task Group will be chaired by Harold Locke. Other task group

members will be determined.

d. “Exit” Definitions: This Task Group will review the terminology relating to exits and

propose revisions to ensure correlation of the terminology throughout NFPA 130.

Task Group members will be determined.

e. Tunnel Evacuation Time: This Task group will review the proposal in Committee

Input #64 and develop recommendations for the second draft meeting. Task Group

members will be determined.

13. The Second Draft Meeting was scheduled for Oct. 1-4, 2018, with Oct. 1 being reserved for

Task Group meetings. The location will be determined at a later time. Suggestions included

Chicago, Nashville, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Charleston, and Florida.

14. Chairman Alston called for a motion to adjourn the meeting at 1:00 PM on Thursday, Oct.

19, 2017. Motion passed unanimously.

12

ATTACHMENT C

13

Process Stage Process Step Dates for TCDates for TC

with CC

Public InputStage (First Draft)

Public Input Closing Date* 6/28/2017 6/28/2017

Final Date for TC First Draft Meeting 12/06/2017 9/06/2017

Posting of First Draft and TC Ballot 1/24/2018 10/18/2017

Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot 2/14/2018 11/08/2017

Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot - recirc 2/21/2018 11/15/2017

Posting of First Draft for CC Meeting 11/22/2017

Final date for CC First Draft Meeting 1/03/2018

Posting of First Draft and CC Ballot 1/24/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot 2/14/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot - recirc 2/21/2018

Post First Draft Report for Public Comment 2/28/2018 2/28/2018

Comment Stage(Second Draft)

Public Comment Closing Date* 5/09/2018 5/09/2018

Notice Published on Consent Standards (Standards that received no Comments)Note: Date varies and determined via TC ballot.

Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards (Standards that received no Comments)

Final date for TC Second Draft Meeting 11/07/2018 8/01/2018

Posting of Second Draft and TC Ballot 12/19/2018 9/12/2018

Final date for Receipt of TC Second Draft ballot 1/09/2019 10/03/2018

Final date for receipt of TC Second Draft ballot - recirc 1/16/2019 10/10/2018

Posting of Second Draft for CC Meeting 10/17/2018

Final date for CC Second Draft Meeting 11/28/2018

Posting of Second Draft for CC Ballot 12/19/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot 1/09/2019

Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot - recirc 1/16/2019

Post Second Draft Report for NITMAM Review 1/23/2019 1/23/2019

Tech SessionPreparation (&

Issuance)

Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) Closing Date 2/20/2019 2/20/2019

Posting of Certified Amending Motions (CAMs) and Consent Standards 4/03/2019 4/03/2019

Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards 4/18/2019 4/18/2019

SC Issuance Date for Consent Standards 4/28/2019 4/28/2019

Tech Session Association Meeting for Standards with CAMs 6/20/2019 6/20/2019

Appeals andIssuance

Appeal Closing Date for Standards with CAMs 7/10/2019 7/10/2019

SC Issuance Date for Standards with CAMs 8/07/2019 8/07/2019

TC = Technical Committee or PanelCC = Correlating Committee

As of 4/12/2017

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ATTACHMENT D

15

09/14/2018

Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail SystemsFKT-AAAName Representation Class Office

Distribution by %

Company

Charles J. Giblin III Maryland State Fire Marshal’s Office IFMA E Principal

David Mao US Department of Transportation USDOT E Principal

William Ventura FDNY FDNY E Principal

Steven C. White MTA-Long Island Rail Road MTA E Principal

4Voting Number Percent 14%

Angelina Dorman Southwire M Principal

William E. Koffel Koffel Associates, Inc. AFAA M Principal

Kevin M. Lewis Bombardier Transportation M Principal


Bernard J. Kennedy, IV US Department of Transportation USDOT RT Principal

Max Lakkonen Institute for Applied Fire SafetyResearch

RT Principal


Jarrod Alston Arup SE Chair

David M. Casselman Lea & Elliott, Inc. SE Principal

Katherine Fagerlund JENSEN HUGHES ConsultingCanada Ltd.

JH SE Principal

Silas K. Li Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc. SE Principal

Harold A. Locke Locke & Locke Inc. SE Principal

Steven W. Roman LTK Engineering Services SE Principal

Dilip S. Shah AECOM Technical Services, Inc. SE Principal

Robert C. Till John Jay College of Criminal Justice SE Principal

John Powell White IFT/Fire Cause Analysis SE Principal


Richard M. Arvin Annapolis Fire & Life SafetyEngineering

WMATA U Principal

James J. Convery Amtrak U Principal

Thomas Eng Los Angeles County MetroTransportation Authority

LACMTA U Principal

16

Friday 9 14, Friday

Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail SystemsFKT-AAAName Representation Class Office

Distribution by %

Company

Michel Fournier Societe de Transport de Montreal(STM)

U Principal

Pierre Laurin Toronto Transit Commission U Principal

Julian Sandu Chicago Transit Authority U Principal

Henry X. Schober New York City Transit Auth MTA U Principal

Joshua H. Teo Bay Area Rapid Transit District(BART)

U Principal

David J. Volk Port Authority Trans Hudson U Principal

Leong Kwok Weng Land Transport Authority, Singapore U Principal


28Total Voting Number

17

ATTACHMENT E

18

Public Comment No. 23-NFPA 130-2018 [ Global Input ]

Public comment

NFPA 130, 8.4 Flammability, Smoke and Toxicity Emission

Support of revision

Hazardous effects of toxic components found in smoke emissions are well documented. In "Toxic Twins:HCN and CO" the article discusses the toxic combination of CO / HCN and how these gases at relativelylow concentrations < 200 ppm can cause cardiac arrest and hamper ability to self-rescue. CO and HCN areamong the gases proposed to be included in the standard. Many standards require the testing of smokeemissions for toxic gases. EN 45545 Part 2 Railway Applications Fire Protection on Railway Vehicles Part2: Requirements for Fire Behavior of Materials and Components provides for testing for toxicity in Annex C:Testing Methods for Determination of Toxic Gases from Railway Products. A new standard, currently incommittee, EN 17084 "Fire Protection in Railway Vehicles: Toxicity Testing f Materials and Components"will create a separate standard for toxicity requirements and testing. Passenger aircraft manufactureshave established smoke emission toxicity requirements and been testing compliance for decades. Theseinclude: Boeing BSS 7239; Airbus ABD 0031; Bombardier SMP 800C. Other organizations have recognizedthe need for monitoring and limiting toxic gases in smoke emission. Some of these are: NAVSEADDS-079-1; MIL-STD-231; International Maritime Organization SOLAS(2014) Fire Testing Protocol(FTP)Code 2010 (2012ed) Annex Part 2 Smoke and Toxicity Test. Testing of smoke emissions and limitingtoxic gases in these emissions as a means of protecting people is not new.

Type your content here ...

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

8.4 Flammability, Smoke and Toxicitysupport public comment 102 - NFPA - 130 - 2017 section 8.4

Related Item

• • 102-NFPA 130-2017

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Ritch Hollingsworth

Organization: LTK Engineering Services

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed May 09 17:18:16 EDT 2018

Committee:

Copyright Assignment

I, Ritch Hollingsworth, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyrightin this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intendthat I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or anothersimilar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority toenter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Ritch Hollingsworth, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and theterms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will,upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature

National Fire Protection Association Report https://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ContentFetcher?commentPar...

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Public Comment No. 4-NFPA 130-2018 [ Global Input ]

I simply wish to state I agree wiht the comments Marcelo Hirschler submitted.


Marcelo's comments resolve an issue with the restriction of a material that is the standard for fire safety.

Related Item

• PI-68, PI-69, PI-71, PI-72


Submitter Full Name: Michael Schmeida

Organization: Gypsum Association

Affiliation: GA

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed Apr 25 18:04:37 EDT 2018

Committee:


I, Michael Schmeida, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyrightin this Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intendthat I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or anothersimilar or derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority toenter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Michael Schmeida, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and theterms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will,upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature


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Public Comment No. 22-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. 2.2 ]

2.2 NFPA Publications.

National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471.

NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2018 edition.

NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2019 edition.

NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems, 2019 edition.

NFPA 22, Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection, 2018 edition.

NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems,2020 edition.

NFPA 70®, National Electrical Code®, 2020 edition.

NFPA 72®, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code®, 2019 edition.

NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Particulate Solids,2015 edition.

NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®, 2018 edition.

NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2019 edition.

NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction, 2018 edition.

NFPA 241, Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations, 2019 edition.

NFPA 253, Standard Method of Test for Critical Radiant Flux of Floor Covering Systems Using a RadiantHeat Energy Source, 2019 edition.

NFPA 259, Standard Test Method for Potential Heat of Building Materials, 2018 edition.

NFPA 262, Standard Method of Test for Flame Travel and Smoke of Wires and Cables for Use in Air-Handling Spaces, 2019 edition.

NFPA 275, Standard Method of Fire Tests for the Evaluation of Thermal Barriers, 2017 edition.

NFPA 286, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Evaluating Contribution of Wall and Ceiling Interior Finish toRoom Fire Growth, 2019 edition.

NFPA 703, Standard for Fire Retardant–Treated Wood and Fire-Retardant Coatings for Building Materials,2018 edition.

NFPA 1221, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services CommunicationsSystems, 2019 edition.


This PC adds NFPA 259, in case PC13 is accepted since it is referenced in the text proposed to be added.

Related Public Comments for This Document

Related Comment Relationship

Public Comment No. 13-NFPA 130-2018 [Section No. 4.6]

Related Item

• PI73


Submitter Full Name: Marcelo Hirschler

Organization: GBH International


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21

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:


I, Marcelo Hirschler, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright inthis Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend thatI acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similaror derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter intothis copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Marcelo Hirschler, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and theterms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will,upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature


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Public Comment No. 15-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. 2.3.4 ]

2.3.4 ASTM Publications.

ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.

ASTM C1166, Standard Test Method for Flame Propagation of Dense and Cellular Elastometric Gasketsand Accessories, 2006 (2016).

ASTM D2724, Standard Test Methods for Bonded, Fused, and Laminated Apparel Fabrics, 2007 (2015).

ASTM D3574, Standard Test Methods for Flexible Cellular Materials — Slab, Bonded, and MoldedUrethane Foams, 2017.

ASTM D3675, Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Flexible Cellular Materials Using aRadiant Heat Energy Source, 2017.

ASTM D7568, Standard Specification for Polyethylene-Based Structural-Grade Plastic Lumber for OutdoorApplications, 2017.

ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, 2017 2018 .

ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, 2016a 2018 .

ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, 2016a.

ASTM E162, Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Materials Using a Radiant Heat EnergySource, 2016.

ASTM E648, Standard Test Method for Critical Radiant Flux of Floor-Covering Systems Using a RadiantHeat Energy Source, 2017 2017a .

ASTM E662, Standard Test Method for Specific Optical Density of Smoke Generated by Solid Materials,2017a.

ASTM E814, Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops, 2017.

ASTM E1354, Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for Materials and ProductsUsing an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter, 2017 2018 .

ASTM E1537, Standard Test Method for Fire Testing of Upholstered Furniture, 2016.

ASTM E1590, Standard Test Method for Fire Testing of Mattresses, 2017.

ASTM E2061, Standard Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of Rail Transportation Vehicles, 2015 2018 .

ASTM E2965, Standard Test Method for Determination of Low Levels of Heat Release Rate for Materialsand Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter, 2017

ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-ShapedAirflow Stabilizer, at 750°C, 2016.


date updates and standard recommended in PC14




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2.3.4 ASTM Publications.


ASTM C1166, Standard Test Method for Flame Propagation of Dense and Cellular Elastometric Gasketsand Accessories, 2006 (2016).

ASTM D2724, Standard Test Methods for Bonded, Fused, and Laminated Apparel Fabrics, 2007 (2015).

ASTM D3574, Standard Test Methods for Flexible Cellular Materials — Slab, Bonded, and MoldedUrethane Foams, 2017.


ASTM D7568, Standard Specification for Polyethylene-Based Structural-Grade Plastic Lumber for OutdoorApplications, 2017.

ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, 2017 2018 .

ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, 2016a 2018 .

ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, 2016a.


ASTM E648, Standard Test Method for Critical Radiant Flux of Floor-Covering Systems Using a RadiantHeat Energy Source, 2017 2017a .


ASTM E814, Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops, 2017.

ASTM E1354, Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for Materials and ProductsUsing an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter, 2017.




ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-ShapedAirflow Stabilizer, at 750°C, 2016.


date updates

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4.6* Noncombustible Material and Limited Combustible Material .

4.6.1*

A material that complies with any of the following shall be considered a noncombustible material:[101:4.6.13.1]

(1) A material that, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn,support combustion, or release flammable vapors, when subjected to fire or heat. [101:4.6.13.1(1)]

(2) A material that is reported as passing ASTM E136. [101:4.6.13.1(2)]

(3) A material that is reported as complying with the pass/fail criteria of ASTM E136 when tested inaccordance with the test method and procedure in ASTM E2652. [101:4.6.13.1(3)]

4.6.2 A material that complies with the requirements found in Section 4.6.14 of NFPA 101 shallbe considereda limited combustible material.


This public comment is a different option for the committee to accept the concept of limited combustible materials within NFPA 130.The concept of "limited combustible materials" has been part of the NFPA system of codes and standards for many years. It represents those materials that fail the criteria of the noncombustibility test (ASTM E136) but do almost nothing in a fire, such as gypsum board and similar materials. The Life Safety Code recognizes two ways in which such materials can be classified: first, the combined use of the ASTM E84 Steiner tunnel and NFPA 259 (heat content oxygen bomb calorimeter test) and second, the use of a massive cone heat release test (not the cone calorimeter but ASTM E2965, which has a much larger heater and a much larger sample) exposing specimens for 20 minutes at a very high heat flux (75 kW/m2) and with very severe criteria).The ICC set of codes has a similar approach to this. In section 703.5.2 the building code says that materials that pass similar type of testing are "acceptable as noncombustible materials". Again, that typically includes gypsum board.

The concept of this type of material is not to allow plastics (they will fail the criteria) but to allow materials that contribute virtually nothing to a fire but don't meet the ASTM E136 requirements (in the case of gypsum board because of the paper covering).

Gypsum board is recognized as a limited combustible material in NFPA documents. Many applications are such that such materials can be used successfully with no loss of fire safety.





Public Comment No. 17-NFPA 130-2018 [Section No. 6.2.8.2]

Public Comment No. 18-NFPA 130-2018 [Section No. 5.2.5.1]


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4.6* Noncombustible Material and Limited Combustible Material .

4.6.1*

A material that complies with any of the following shall be considered a noncombustible material:[101:4.6.13.1]

(1) A material that, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn,support combustion, or release flammable vapors, when subjected to fire or heat. [101:4.6.13.1(1)]

(2) A material that is reported as passing ASTM E136. [101:4.6.13.1(2)]

(3) A material that is reported as complying with the pass/fail criteria of ASTM E136 when tested inaccordance with the test method and procedure in ASTM E2652. [101:4.6.13.1(3)]

4.6.2* Limited-Combustible Material.

A material shall be considered a limited-combustible material where one of the following is met:

(1) The conditions of 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.2, and the conditions of either 4.6.2.3 or 4.6.2.4, shall be met.

(2) The conditions of 4.6.2.5 shall be met.

4.6.2.1 The material shall not comply with the requirements for noncombustible material in accordancewith 4.6.1.

4.6.2.2 The material, in the form in which it is used, shall exhibit a potential heat value not exceeding 3500Btu/lb (8141 kJ/kg) where tested in accordance with NFPA 259.

4.6.2.3The material shall have the structural base of a noncombustible material with a surfacing notexceeding a thickness of ¹⁄8 in. (3.2 mm) where the surfacing exhibits a flame spread index not greaterthan 50 when tested in accordance with ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface BurningCharacteristics of Building Materials , or ANSI/UL 723, Standard for Test for Surface BurningCharacteristics of Building Materials .

4.6.2.4 The material shall be composed of materials that, in the form and thickness used, neither exhibit aflame spread index greater than 25 nor evidence of continued progressive combustion when tested inaccordance with ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of BuildingMaterials, or ANSI/UL 723, Standard for Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of BuildingMaterials, and shall be of such composition that all surfaces that would be exposed by cutting through thematerial on any plane would neither exhibit a flame spread index greater than 25 nor exhibit evidence ofcontinued progressive combustion when tested in accordance with ASTM E84 or ANSI/UL 723.

4.6.2.5 Materials shall be considered limited-combustible materials where tested in accordance with ASTME2965, Standard Test Method for Determination of Low Levels of Heat Release Rate for Materials and

Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter , at an incident heat flux of 75 kW/m 2 for a 20-minute exposure and both of the following conditions are met:

(1) The peak heat release rate shall not exceed 150 kW/m 2 for longer than 10 seconds.

(2) The total heat released shall not exceed 8 MJ/m 2 .

4.6.3 Where the term limited-combustible is used in this standard, it shall also include theterm noncombustible .

(Also add annex note, as follows, and reference to ASTM E2965 and to NFPA 259 in section 2, andrenumber existing 4.7)

A.4.6.2 Materials subject to increase in combustibility or flame spread index beyond the limits hereinestablished through the effects of age, moisture, or other atmospheric condition are consideredcombustible. (See NFPA 259, Standard Test Method for Potential Heat of Building Materials, and NFPA220, Standard on Types of Building Construction.)


See substantiation for PC13 on the same section for further information. The difference between this PC and PC13 is that this one brings in the full criteria from NFPA 101, just as was recommended in the public input, while PC13


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offers a simplified alternative.





Public Comment No. 15-NFPA 130-2018 [Section No. 2.3.4]

Public Comment No. 16-NFPA 130-2018 [Section No. G.1.1]

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Public Comment No. 10-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. 5.2.2.1 ]

5.2.2.1

Building construction for stations shall be in accordance with Table 5.2.2.1 based on the stationconfiguration, except that only noncombustible construction is permitted .

Table 5.2.2.1 Minimum Construction Requirements for New Station Structures

Station Configuration Construction Type

Stations erected entirely above grade and in a separate building:

Open stations Type II (000)

Enclosed station* Type II (111)

Stations erected entirely or partially below grade:

Open abovegrade portions of belowgrade structures* Type II (111)

Belowgrade portions of structures Type II (222)

Belowgrade structures with occupant loads exceeding 1000 Type I (332)

*Roofs not supporting an occupancy above are not required to have a fire resistance rating.


Neither NFPA 5000 nor NFPA 220 use the term "noncombustible construction". Types I (442 or 332) and II (222, 333 or 000) construction are those types of construction "in which the fire walls, structural elements, walls, arches, floors, and roofs are of approved noncombustible or limited combustible materials". Those are the types of construction that are often described as "noncombustible construction", in spite of the fact that they are not called by that designation by NFPA 5000 or NFPA 220. Also, it is clear from NFPA 5000 (and NFPA 220) that Types I and II construction are permitted to include limited combustible construction materials. The intent of the technical committee during the first draft meeting was to exclude the use of "limited combustible materials" from construction, perhaps not being aware that gypsum board is not a noncombustible material but a limited combustible material and gypsum board is typically used in station construction. If the intent of the committee is to prohibit the use of gypsum board in stations (and I strongly oppose that approach) then it needs to add a sentence with wording such as: "except that all materials of construction shall be noncombustible materials" instead of the first draft proposed wording. The result of such wording would be a significant increase in the cost of construction and a potential retroactive concern with existing stations, many of which include gypsum board.

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5.2.2.2

Construction types shall conform to the requirements in NFPA 5000 220 , Section 7.2, unless otherwiseexempted in this standard.


NFPA 130 is an international standard and NFPA 5000 is a US building code. In the past, no editions of NFPA 130 have referenced NFPA 5000. All the relevant information from NFPA 5000 has been extracted into NFPA 220 and that is a standard already referenced in NFPA 130.

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5.2.5.1

Materials used as interior wall and ceiling finish in enclosed stations shall comply with one of the followingrequirements:

(1) The materials shall be noncombustible in accordance with Section 4.6.

(2) The materials shall comply with the following requirements when tested in accordance with NFPA 286:

(3) Flames shall not spread to the ceiling during the 40 kW (135 kBtu/hr) exposure.

(4) Flames shall not spread to the outer extremities of the sample on any wall or ceiling.

(5) Flashover, as described in NFPA 286, shall not occur.

(6) The peak heat release rate shall not exceed 800 kW (2730 kBtu/hr).

(7) The total smoke released throughout the test shall not exceed 1000 m 2 (10,764 ft 2 ).

(8) The materials shall comply with a flame spread index not exceeding 25 and a smoke developmentindex not exceeding 450 when tested in accordance with ASTM E84, except that the materials in5.2.5.1(4) shall be required to be tested in accordance with NFPA 286.

(9) The materials shall be limited combustible materials in accordance with Section 4.6.2.

(10) The following materials shall not be permitted to be used as interior wall and ceiling materials, unlessthey meet the requirements in 5.2.5.1(2) when tested in accordance with NFPA 286:

(a) Foam plastic insulation, whether exposed or covered by a textile or vinyl facing

(b) Textile wall or ceiling coverings

(c) Solid thermoplastics, including, but not limited to, high-density polyethylene (HDPE), solidpolycarbonate, solid polystyrene, and solid acrylic materials that melt and drip when exposed toflame.


As explained in PC13 this adds the permission to use materials that have very limited heat release and very limited flame spread. For example this would allow gypsum board as an interior finish material without additional testing. This will not add fire safety concerns.




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6.2.2 Construction Type.

6.2.2.1* Cut and Cover.

Where trainway sections are to be constructed by the cut-and-cover method, the fire resistance ratings ofperimeter walls and related construction assemblies shall be not less than those associated with Type Inoncombustible or Type II construction, or combinations of Type I or Type II construction, in accordancewith NFPA 220, unless otherwise permitted as a result of an engineering analysis of potential fire exposurehazards to the structure.

6.2.2.2 Bored Tunnels.

Where trainway sections are to be constructed by a tunneling method through earth, unprotected steelliners, reinforced concrete, shotcrete, or equivalent shall be used.

6.2.2.3 Rock Tunnels.

Rock tunnels shall be permitted to utilize steel bents with concrete liner if lining is required.

6.2.2.4 Underwater Tubes.

Underwater tubes shall be constructed of materials or assemblies permitted for use in Type Inoncombustible II (000) construction, in accordance with NFPA 220.

6.2.2.5 Exit and Ventilation Structures.

Remote vertical exit shafts and ventilation structures shall be constructed of materials or assembliespermitted for use in Type I (332) noncombustible construction, in accordance with NFPA 220.

6.2.2.6 Surface.

Construction materials shall be materials or assemblies permitted for use in Type I noncombustibleconstruction, in accordance with NFPA 220, unless otherwise permitted by a fire hazard analysis ofpotential fire exposure hazards to the structure.

6.2.2.7 Elevated.

All structures necessary for trainway support and all structures and enclosures on or under trainways shallbe constructed of materials or assemblies permitted for use in Type I noncombustible or Type II (000)construction, or combinations of Type I or Type II construction, in accordance with NFPA 220, unlessotherwise permitted by a fire hazard analysis of potential fire exposure hazards to the structure.


Neither NFPA 5000 nor NFPA 220 use the term "noncombustible construction". Types I (442 or 332) and II (222, 333 or 000) construction are those types of construction "in which the fire walls, structural elements, walls, arches, floors, and roofs are of approved noncombustible or limited combustible materials". Those are the types of construction that are often described as "noncombustible construction", in spite of the fact that they are not called by that designation by NFPA 5000 or NFPA 220. Also, it is clear from NFPA 5000 (and NFPA 220) that Types I and II construction are permitted to include limited combustible construction materials. The intent of the technical committee during the first draft meeting was to exclude the use of "limited combustible materials" from construction, perhaps not being aware that gypsum board is not a noncombustible material but a limited combustible material and gypsum board is typically used in construction of structures associated with rail systems. If the intent of the committee is to prohibit the use of gypsum board in all construction (and I strongly oppose that approach) then it needs to add a phrase to all subsections with wording such as: "except that all materials of construction shall be noncombustible materials" instead of the first draft proposed wording. The result of such wording would be a significant increase in the cost of construction and a potential retroactive concern with existing structure, many of which include gypsum board.Either way, the use of the term "noncombustible construction" is confusing and will not clarify the committee's intent. Clearly it has been interpreted for years as permitting the use of limited combustible materials, as NFPA 220 recognizes. It needs to be deleted.The committee has provided no justification for requiring all construction to meet Type I construction requirements instead of allowing Type I and Type II construction.The first revision did a good job of recognizing that, in 6.2.2.1, what is being considered is the fire resistance rating.

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6.2.8.2

Rail ties used outdoors at switch or crossover locations shall be made of materials that comply with one ofthe following:

(1) Materials that comply with 6.2.8.1

(2) Fire retardant–treated wood in accordance with NFPA 703

(3) Pressure-treated wood materials that exhibit a flame spread index of not more than 75 when tested inaccordance with ASTM E84

(4) Plastic composite materials that comply with the requirements of ASTM D7568 and exhibit a flamespread index of not more than 75 in accordance with ASTM E84

(5) Limited combustible materials, in accordance with section 4.6.2.

(6) Wood encased in concrete such that only the top surface is exposed


As explained in PC13, limited combustible materials are materials that are almost noncombustible but actually fail the ASTM E136 test although they release very little heat and produce almost no flame spread.




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Public Comment No. 21-NFPA 130-2018 [ New Section after 6.3 ]

Wayfiding Ligting

Type your content here ...

Add 6.3.5.6 Direc on signs size shall be in accordance with Sec on 7.10.6.1 of NFPA 101. Direc on signs materialshall be in accordance with Sec on 7.2.2.5.5.10 of NFPA 101

Add 6.3.5.7 Direc on signs shall be externally con nuously illuminated in accordance with Sec on 7.8.1.3 of NFPA101 to 108 lux (10 ‐candles).

Add 6.3.6 Wayfinding Ligh ng.

Add 6.3.6.1 Wayfinding ligh ng shall be provided to aid passengers during an evacua on of the tunnel. Wayfindingligh ng is used to provide guidance to passengers and delineate an egress route to an emergency exit.

Add 6.3.6.2 Wayfinding ligh ng shall be located at a height of less than 1 meter (3.28 ) above the walking surfacewith spacing not to exceed 10m (32.8 ) intervals.

Add 6.3.6.3 Wayfinding ligh ng minimum maintained illumina on levels at each luminaire, shall be 1 cd.

Add 6.3.6.4 Wayfinding ligh ng shall be off under normal train opera on and automa cally ini ated from theemergence power system upon emergency alarm.

Add 6.3.6.5 Wayfinding ligh ng shall be con nuously available for opera on in the event of an emergency. Wayfinding ligh ng shall be wired separately from emergency distribu on panels.

Add 6.3.6.6 Cross Passages and Emergency Exit doors in egress routes serving the trainways shall be provided with a)illumina on, and b) Emergency Exit Door Marker lights (green commonly used).

Add 6.3.6.6.1 Each Emergency Exit door and an area 2m (6.5 ) beyond the door frame shall be illuminated to 108lux (10 ‐candles). The color of the Exit door area 2m (6.5 ) beyond the door frame shall be different (greencommonly used) to the rest of the tunnel to highlight the exit door.

Add 6.3.6.6.2 Each Emergency Exit door shall be provided with Emergency Exit Door Marker lights (green commonlyused) around the door. The lights shall flash at a frequency of 1 Hz to 2 Hz at an intensity of not less than 150 cd.

Add 6.3.6.6.3 Emergency Exit Door Marker lights shall be off under normal train opera on and automa cally ini atedfrom the emergency power system upon emergency alarm.


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Add 6.3.6.6.4 Emergency Exit Door Marker lights shall be con nuously available for opera on in the event of anemergency and shall be wired separately from emergency distribu on panels.

Add 6.4.8.2 (5) Wayfinding ligh ng

Background informa on about the autor and reason for suggested change.

These suggested addi ons are in keeping with an industry trend to provide wayfinding ligh ng in tunnels. Formalpublica ons that already recommend Wayfinding ligh ng include CIE Technical Report 193 Emergency Ligh ng inRoad Tunnels and NFPA 502 Standard for Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Access Highways Sec on A7.16.6.3.

My name is Lionel Lutley PE, CEng, I am a Principal Electrical Engineer with more than 25 years design experience ofemergency electrical systems design for railways, sta ons, transit, light rail and road tunnel designs in North Americaand worldwide. I am a member of IESNA RP‐22 (Road Tunnel Ligh ng) commi ee and over the past 3 years, I havebeen working with the NFPA 502 commi ee to bring wayfinding ligh ng into North America tunnels.

Jus fica on

During a fire event in a tunnel, smoke may be stra fied (distributed) throughout the tunnel and obscure the ‘normal’and ‘emergency’ ligh ng. Emergency ligh ng is typically located at a height above the walkway where theluminaires may be obscured by smoke. Wayfinding ligh ng and Emergency Exit door ligh ng at lower level and ateach door will enable passengers to navigate to the nearest exits (which may be approximately 2500 feet), to findescape routes more easily in a fire scenario.


Wayfinding lighting in rail tunnels would be added.

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Submitter Full Name: Lionel Lutley

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I, Lionel Lutley, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in thisPublic Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that Iacquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar orderivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter intothis copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Lionel Lutley, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the termsand conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon mysubmission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature


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Public Comment No. 1-NFPA 130-2018 [ Sections 7.6.1, 7.6.2 ]

Sections 7.6.1, 7.6.2

7.6.1

Shafts that penetrate the surface and that are used for intake and discharge in fire or smoke emergenciesshall be positioned or protected to prevent or sufficiently dilute the recirculation of smoke into the systemthrough surface openings such that its concentration is lower than the acceptable criteria .

7.6.2

If the configuration required by 7.6.1 is not possible, surface openings shall be protected by other means toprevent sufficiently dilute the smoke from re-entering the system such that its concentration is lower thanthe acceptable criteria .


Smoke dispersion recirculation studies of underground metro stations with a 1% wind speed profile has resulted in small quantities of smoke concentration re-entering the underground station entrances. The low quantities of smoke does not negatively impact the visibility or the air quality of the egress routes; however, interpretations of the NFPA 130 clause 7.6.1 and 7.6.2 suggests that preventing recirculation of smoke equates to zero parts per million of smoke concentration is allowed to recirculate into the system. This zero ppm of smoke requirement is proving to be difficult to meet without designing large chimney stacks around the underground metro station entrances which is undesirable, costly, and not aesthetically pleasing. Please review, advise, and/or clarify what is meant by 'prevent recirculation'.

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Submitter Full Name: John Van

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Submittal Date: Tue Feb 27 13:50:41 EST 2018

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I, John Van, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in thisPublic Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that Iacquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar orderivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter intothis copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am John Van, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms andconditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon mysubmission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature


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Public Comment No. 19-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. A.5.3.4.1 ]

A.5.3.4.1

The 2003 and previous editions of NFPA 130 required that exit corridors and ramps be a minimum of1.73 m (5 ft 8 in.) wide. There is no technical basis for the previous minimum. The intent of 5.3.4.1 is tomake NFPA 130 consistent with NFPA 101 relative to the minimum 1120 mm (44 in.) corridor width in themeans of egress. NFPA 130 addresses means of egress conditions unique to transit/passenger railfacilities such as open platform edges. In NFPA 101, means of egress facilities are based upon a functionof the persons served (units of width/person served). NFPA 130 introduces a unit of time in determining therequired egress width. This is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the performance requirementsrelated to platform evacuation time and reaching a point of safety.

Assuming a 1120 mm (44 in.) wide side platform per 5.3.4.1 the effective platform width for egress is asfollows:

[A.5.3.4.1a]

The capacity afforded by the effective 355 mm (14 in.) wide platform is:

[A.5.3.4.1b]

An effective 1120 mm (44 in.) wide corridor yields:

[A.5.3.4.1c]

It must be recognized that while strict interpretation of 5.3.4.1 indicates a station could be designed using a1120 mm (44 in.) wide platform with an open edge and sidewall condition, it is impractical to do so,especially when one considers the other requirements of this standard that will affect the platform width,such as the travel distance to the point(s) of egress, the maximum 4-minute platform evacuation time, andthe 6-minute point of safety time.


Formula A.5.3.4.1a, added in the 2017 edition, does not seem relevant, derivation is unclear, is not explanatory, and should be corrected or deleted.

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Submitter Full Name: Suzanne Wertz

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Submittal Date: Tue May 08 10:39:12 EDT 2018

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I, Suzanne Wertz, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright inthis Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend thatI acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similaror derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter intothis copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Suzanne Wertz, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the termsand conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon mysubmission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature


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Public Comment No. 9-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. A.8.6.7.1.3 ]

A.8.6.7.1.3

The electrical properties of data and communication cables should comply with requirements for categorycable or local electrical requirements. Different system authorities specify data and communication cablesthat have specific electrical requirement other than voltage. Examples for train cars communication cablesare Some examples of designations for cables potentially used in rail transportation vehicles include thefollowing: CAT 5, CAT 5E, CAT 6, CAT 7, MVB, WTB, CANBUS, and RS-485.


Grammatical revisions.

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Public Comment No. 7-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. A.12.1.3 ]

A.12.1.3

Traction power cables and control and signaling cables should be constructed according to AREMA10.3.16, or AREMA 10.3.17, as appropriate.


These construction manuals are not standards and are not appropriate for referencing in NFPA 130. Moreover, they refer exclusively to "signal cables" and not to "traction power cables". The titles are: "Recommended Design Criteria for Signal Cable, Non-Armored" and "Recommended Design Criteria for Signal Cable, Armored". The needed requirements for safety are contained in the body of NFPA 130.



Public Comment No. 8-NFPA 130-2018 [Section No. G.1.2.2]

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Public Comment No. 16-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. G.1.1 ]

G.1.1 NFPA Publications.

National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471.

NFPA 72®, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code®, 2019 edition.

NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®, 2018 edition.

NFPA 259, Standard Test Method for Potential Heat of Building Materials, 2018 edition

NFPA 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass DestructionIncidents, 2018 edition.

NFPA 1006, Standard for Technical Rescue Personnel Professional Qualifications, 2017 edition.

NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents, 2017 edition.


standard from PC14




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Public Comment No. 8-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. G.1.2.2 ]

G.1.2.2 AREMA Publications.

American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association, 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 130,Lanham, MD 20706.

AREMA 10.3.16, Recommended Design Criteria for Signal Cable, Non-Armored , 2018.

AREMA 10.3.17, Recommended Design Criteria for Signal Cable, Armored , 2018.


In a separate public comment the removal of the reference to these design manuals as inappropriate is recommended. Therefore the references need to be deleted also.



Public Comment No. 7-NFPA 130-2018 [Section No. A.12.1.3]

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Public Comment No. 6-NFPA 130-2018 [ Section No. G.1.2.5 ]

G.1.2.5 ASTM Publications.





ASTM E1354, Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for Materials and ProductsUsing an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter, 2017 2018 .





date updates

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ATTACHMENT F

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Task Groups for NFPA 130 A2019

Task Group Description Related Input Task Group Chair Task Group Members Status

Passenger Rail Review the application of NFPA 130 to passenger rail systems and develop proposals

FR 63 Harold Locke Kevin Lewis Jarrod Alston David Mao Bernie Kennedy Harold Levitt John Cockle

“Exit” Definitions Review the terminology relating to exits and propose revisions to ensure correlation of the terminology throughout NFPA 130

FR 8 Bill Koffel Pierre Laurin

Stations: Platform Occupant Load

Review the proposed alternative method for calculation of platform occupant load in CI #62 and develop recommendations

CI 62

Katherine Fagerlund Harold Locke Pierre Laurin Zoran Radojevic Luc Martineau Joshua Teo Dave Casselman Charles Giblin James Convery Rick Arvin Steven White Gary English Dilip Shah

Tunnels: Tunnel Evacuation Time “Tunnel” vs. “Enclosed Trainway”

Review the proposal in Committee Input #64 and develop recommendations Review the use of the term “tunnel” vs. “enclosed trainway” along with other associated wording throughout the document and propose revisions to

CI 64 CI 70

Katherine Fagerlund

Arnold Dix Pierre Laurin Zoran Radojevic Luc Martineau Tom Eng Scott McAleese Dave Casselman Rick Arvin Steven White Dilip Shah

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make the terminology consistent

“Fire Hazard Analysis” vs. “Engineering Analysis”

Review the use of the term “fire hazard analysis” vs. “engineering analysis” throughout the document and propose revisions to make the terminology consistent

CI 71 Katherine Fagerlund John White

Ventilation Review the proposed annex language to clarify the intent of the term “critical velocity”

CI 51 Silas Li Rod Falvey Pierre Laurin Zoran Radojevic Tom Eng Peter Senez Andrew Coles Steve Wilchek James Convery David Plotkin Thomas Kenny Tom O'Dwyer Dilip Shah

Notes:

- Arnold Dix and Dan Finnegan have volunteered to participate (not chair) any task groups where we think they can help.

- Need to review CI 65 (no TG for this?)

- Need to review CI 60 (no TG for this?)

- Need to review Katherine’s CI’s: 35-41 – need TG(s) for this or to include in existing TGs?

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ATTACHMENT G

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Committee Input No. 50-NFPA 130-2017 [ Global Input ]

Update extract material as appropriate.


Submitter Full Name: Janna Shapiro

Organization: National Fire Protection Assoc

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Submittal Date: Fri Nov 03 10:13:49 EDT 2017

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

At the second draft meeting, the committee will review and update all of the extracted textas appropriate.

Response Message:

National Fire Protection Association Report http://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ContentFetcher?commentPara...

1 of 26 1/23/2018, 2:20 PM

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See attached Word Document for proposed revisions.

Supplemental Information

File Name Description Approved

NFPA_130_A2019-FD_tunnels.docx




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Submittal Date: Mon Jan 22 15:31:47 EST 2018

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The Committee will review the use of the term "tunnel" vs. "enclosed trainway" along with otherassociated wording throughout the document and propose revisions to make the terminologyconsistent.

ResponseMessage:


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NFPA 130 A2019 Proposed Edits – Enclosed Trainways, Tunnels, etc. Page 1

Table of Contents

Chapter 2 Referenced Publications ........................................................................................................ 2

2.3 Other Publications. ....................................................................................................................... 2

2.4 References for Extracts in Mandatory Sections. .......................................................................... 2

Chapter 3 Definitions ............................................................................................................................. 3

3.3 General Definitions. ...................................................................................................................... 3

Chapter 5 Stations .................................................................................................................................. 4

5.2 Construction. ................................................................................................................................ 4

Chapter 6 Trainways ............................................................................................................................... 5

6.2 Construction. ................................................................................................................................ 5

6.3 Emergency Egress. ........................................................................................................................ 5

6.4 Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems. ...................................................................................... 5

Chapter 7 Emergency Ventilation System .............................................................................................. 6

7.1 General. ........................................................................................................................................ 6

7.3 Emergency Ventilation Fans. ........................................................................................................ 6

7.8 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation Systems. ...................................................................... 6

Chapter 8 Vehicles ................................................................................................................................... 8

Chapter 9 Emergency Procedures .......................................................................................................... 9

9.3 Emergencies. ................................................................................................................................ 9

Chapter 12 Wire and Cable Requirements ........................................................................................... 10

12.3 Temperature, Moisture, and Grounding Requirements. ......................................................... 10

12.4 Wiring Installation Methods. ................................................................................................... 10

Annex A Explanatory Material .............................................................................................................. 11

Annex B Ventilation .............................................................................................................................. 16

Annex C Means of Egress Calculations for Stations.............................................................................. 18

Annex D Rail Vehicle Fires .................................................................................................................... 19

Annex E Fire Hazard Analysis Process .................................................................................................. 20

Annex G Onboard Fire Suppression System ......................................................................................... 22

Annex H Fire Scenarios and Fire Profiles .............................................................................................. 23

Annex I Informational References ........................................................................................................ 25

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Chapter 2 Referenced Publications 2.3 Other Publications. 2.3.1 AMCA Publications. ANSI/AMCA 250, Laboratory Methods of Testing Jet Tunnel Fans for Performance, 2012. 2.4 References for Extracts in Mandatory Sections. NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways, 2017 edition.

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Chapter 3 Definitions 3.3 General Definitions. 3.3.1* Airflow Control Devices. Nontraditional equipment used to minimize tunnel airflow in enclosed trainways, including air curtains, barriers, brattices, tunnel doors, downstands, enclosures, tunnel gates, and so forth. 3.3.12 Critical Velocity. The minimum steady-state velocity of the ventilation airflow moving toward the fire within a tunnel an enclosed trainway or enclosed passageway that is required to prevent backlayering at the fire site. 3.3.28 Guideway. That portion of the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system included within right-of-way fences, outer lines of curbs or shoulders, enclosed trainways tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches, channels, and waterways and including all appertaining structures.

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Chapter 5 Stations 5.2 Construction. 5.2.3 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Intrusion. 5.2.3.1 General. Protection of underground below grade system structures against the accidental intrusion of flammable and combustible liquids shall be provided in accordance with this section. 5.2.3.2 Vehicle Roadway Terminations. Vent or fan shafts utilized for ventilation of underground below grade system structures shall not terminate at grade on any vehicle roadway.

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Chapter 6 Trainways 6.2 Construction. 6.2.2.2 Bored Tunnels. Where trainway sections are to be constructed by a tunneling method through earth, unprotected steel liners, reinforced concrete, shotcrete, or equivalent shall be used. 6.2.2.3 Rock Tunnels. Rock tunnels shall be permitted to utilize steel bents with concrete liner if lining is required. 6.2.3 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Intrusion. 6.2.3.1 General. Protection of underground below grade system structures against the accidental intrusion of flammable and combustible liquids shall meet the requirements of 5.2.3. 6.3 Emergency Egress. 6.3.1.5 Cross-passageways shall be permitted to be used in lieu of emergency exit stairways to the surface where separate tracks in enclosed trainways in tunnels are divided by a minimum of 2 hour–rated fire separations or where trainways are in twin bores. 6.3.1.7 Determination of exit and cross-passageways spacing shall be determined from the ends of contiguous tunnelssections of enclosed trainways. See 7.1.2.1. 6.3.1.8 Where cross-passageways are used in lieu of emergency exit stairways, the interior of the cross- passage shall not be used for any purpose other than as an area of refuge or for access/egress to the opposite tunneltrainway except under the following conditions: 6.4 Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems. 6.4.1.4 Access gates shall be placed as close as practicable to the portals to permit easy access to tunnelsenclosed trainways.

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Chapter 7 Emergency Ventilation System 7.1 General. 7.1.2.1* For length determination, all contiguous enclosed trainway and underground system enclosed station segments between portals shall be included. 7.1.2.2* A mechanical emergency ventilation system shall be provided in the following locations:

(1) In an enclosed station (2) In an underground or enclosed trainway that is greater in length than 1000 ft (305 m)

7.1.2.3 A mechanical emergency ventilation system shall not be required in the following locations:

(1) In an open system station (2) Where the length of an underground enclosed trainway is less than or equal to 200 ft (61 m)

7.1.2.4 Where supported by engineering analysis, a nonmechanical emergency ventilation system shall be permitted to be provided in lieu of a mechanical emergency ventilation system in the following locations:

(1) Where the length of the underground or enclosed trainway is less than or equal to 1000 ft (305 m) and greater than 200 ft (61 m)

(2) In an enclosed station where engineering analysis indicates that a nonmechanical emergency ventilation system supports the tenability criteria of the project

7.3 Emergency Ventilation Fans. 7.3.2.2 The fan inlet airflow hot temperature shall be determined using the design fire at a location in the immediate vicinity of the emergency ventilation system track/station inlet(s), as applicable. Airflow rates shall be based upon the rates needed to achieve the tunnel ventilation critical velocity in enclosed trainways or station tenability requirements, as applicable. These airflow rates will most likely be from location(s) that are different then the location for this hot temperature analysis. 7.8 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation Systems. 7.8.3 For electrical substations and distribution rooms serving emergency ventilation systems where the local environmental conditions require the use of mechanical ventilation or cooling to maintain the space temperature below the electrical equipment operating limits, such mechanical ventilation or cooling systems

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shall be designed so that failure of any single air-moving or air-cooling unit does not result in the loss of the electrical supply to the tunnel emergency ventilation fans during the specified period of operation.

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Chapter 8 Vehicles 8.5.1.2 Roof Assembly. 8.5.1.2.2 Vehicles that travel through tunnels enclosed trainways and have a roof that is constructed of a combustible material shall require a fire hazard analysis to demonstrate that rapid fire spread to passenger and crew compartments or local roof collapse is not possible during the exposure period.

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Chapter 9 Emergency Procedures 9.3 Emergencies. The emergency management plan shall address the following types of emergencies:

(1) Fire or smoke conditions within the system structures, including stations, guideways (revenue or nonrevenue), and support facilities

(1) (2) Collision or derailment involving the following: (a) Rail vehicles on the guideway (2) (b) Rail vehicles with privately owned vehicles (3) (c) Intrusion into the right-of-way from adjacent roads or properties (4) Loss of primary power source resulting in stalled trains, loss of illumination, and availability of

emergency power (5) Evacuation of passengers from a train to all right-of-way configurations under circumstances where

assistance is required (6) Passenger panic (7) Disabled, stalled, or stopped trains due to adverse personnel/passenger emergency conditions (8) (7) Tunnel fFlooding of enclosed trainways from internal or external sources (9) Disruption of service due to disasters or dangerous conditions adjacent to the system, such as

hazardous spills on adjacent roads or police activities or pursuits dangerously close to the operational system

(10) Structural collapse or imminent collapse of the authority property or adjacent property that threatens safe operations of the system

(11) Hazardous materials accidentally or intentionally released into the system (12) Serious vandalism or criminal acts, including terrorism (13) First aid or medical care for passengers on trains and in stations (14) Extreme weather conditions, such as heavy snows, high or low temperatures, sleet, or ice (15) Earthquake (16) Any other emergency as determined by the authority having jurisdiction

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Chapter 12 Wire and Cable Requirements 12.3 Temperature, Moisture, and Grounding Requirements. 12.3.2 Ground wires shall comply with the following:

(1) Ground wires installed in a metallic raceway shall be insulated. (2) In underground enclosed stations and trainways, other ground wires shall be permitted to be bare.

12.4 Wiring Installation Methods. 12.4.4 The emergency power, emergency lighting, and emergency communications circuits shall be protected from physical damage by system vehicles or other normal system operations and from fires in the system for at least 1 hour, but not less than the time of tenability, when exposed to fire conditions corresponding to the time-temperature curve in the ASTM E119 fire resistance test by any of the following:

(1) Circuits are embedded in concrete or protected by a fire barrier system in accordance with UL 1724. The cables or conductors shall maintain functionality at the temperature within the embedded conduit or fire barrier system.

(2) Circuits are routed outside the underground enclosed portion of the system. (3) There is diversity in system routing (such as separate redundant circuits or multiple circuits

separated by a fire barrier with a fire resistance rating so that a single fire or emergency event will not lead to a failure of the system).

(4) All circuits consist of listed fire-resistive cable systems with a fire resistance rating in accordance with Section 12.5.

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Annex A Explanatory Material A.3.3.1 Airflow Control Devices. Devises that have been or could be used to minimize airflow rates in enclosed trainways include air curtains, doors, barriers (similar to life rafts with inflatable rings or collars) and gates (guillotine-type doors mounted at tunnel portals). Air curtains have been used to minimize tunnel airflow in transit systems. Barriers are similar to life rafts with inflatable rings or collars and could be used to minimize tunnel airflow. Brattices are parachute- or curtain-like devices that have been used in mine headings to minimize airflow. Doors have been used to minimize tunnel airflow in transit systems. Downstands and enclosures have been used to minimize airflow and smoke movement in rail stations. Gates are guillotine-type doors mounted at tunnel portals and have been used in passenger rail tunnels to minimize tunnel airflow. A.4.2.1 The fire-life safety concepts in this standard are predicated and achieved by providing tenable conditions for evacuation of passengers described in this standard, as follows:

(1) Fire hazard control through use of fire-hardened materials in stations, tunnelsenclosed trainways, and trains

(2) Provision of fire detection, alarm notification, communication systems, and evacuation routes (3) Natural ventilation or mechanical ventilation providing smoke control to maintain tenability (4) Fire safety system reliability through system redundancy and increased safety in emergency

system wires and cables that might be exposed to fire The inclusion of automatic fire suppression systems in stations, tunnelsenclosed trainways, or trains provides an active system that can limit fire growth and thereby assist in reducing risk to life and property. Where such systems are provided, variations to requirements in this standard for materials, communications, systems, or reliability can be considered where supported by engineering analysis as permitted by Section 1.4 and in accordance with good fire protection engineering practice. A.4.4.2 The location and size of a fire can greatly affect the degree of hazard to system occupants. Therefore, the system design must consider specific fire scenarios that could occur. Fire location and size are examples of factors that fire scenarios must consider:

(1) Interior locations. This scenario occurs from a fire that originates within a station or trainway or the interior passenger compartment of the vehicle. Examples of interior fire scenarios include the following:

(a) Fire that begins from an incendiary ignition involving the use of accelerants (b) Trash fire (c) Electrical fire (d) Fire that occurs in a location used for food preparation (e) Luggage storage area fire (f) Fire that occurs from ignition by small open flame onto bedding in an unoccupied

compartment in a vehicle that provides compartments for overnight sleeping (g) Fire that occurs where the vehicle rolls over onto its side and ignition occurs

(2) Exterior locations. This scenario occurs as a result of a fire originating outside the passenger compartment of the vehicle and penetrating the exterior of the vehicle. Examples of exterior fire scenarios include the following:

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(a) Electrical fire in the station, in the trainway, under the vehicle floor, or on the roof that

burns through into the passenger compartment or that causes the vehicle to stop between stations

(b) Trash fire or other type of station, trainway, or under-vehicle equipment or floor fire (c) Fire that occurs from ignition of a fuel spill adjacent to the station, a trainway, or a vehicle

involved in a collision (3) Operating environment. Consequences can increase if a fire occurs when occupants are in the

following locations: (a) In a station, trainway, or passenger-carrying vehicle that is in a stationary location and

unable to move and where egress or rescue access could be hazardous (e.g., underground enclosed trainway or station)

(b) In a passenger-carrying vehicle in motion between stations and at the maximum distance from any station, safe refuge, or point of safety

(1) Fire scenarios that are appropriate for a particular system vehicle and operating environment could not be applicable to another system vehicle and operating environment.

A.4.5 Freight operations are typically subject to regulation by others, and are beyond the scope of this standard. Freight operations can affect life safety from fire hazards due to concurrent operations. The increased hazard includes the potential for rapid fire development to fire heat release rates that can exceed those of a non-freight vehicle, with combustible loads that might support fires that burn for days. The increased hazard also includes non-fire events involving release of materials hazardous to life. The design process should include information exchange and agreement among the freight operator, the passenger services operator and the authority having jurisdiction. All concurrent freight and passenger uses should be given consideration. More detailed consideration of the relative life safety from fire hazards is strongly recommended when applied to underground enclosed facilities, where the confined nature of the space will magnify the hazards. Consideration should include implications of concurrent uses for freight systems operated through or adjacent to passenger stations and concurrent uses for freight systems operated through or adjacent to passenger trainways. A.5.3.5.3 For escalators, contribution to the means of egress capacity can be calculated based on one of the following:

(1) The width used to calculate the capacity of stopped escalators should be based on the tread width plus the width permitted for intrusion of handrails per NFPA 101 — for a 1000 mm (40 in.) tread width, the width used to determine egress capacity will be 1228 mm (48 in.).

(2) Where escalators having a nominal width of 1000 mm (40 in.) will be dedicated for operation in the direction of exit travel at speeds of at least 30 m/min (98 ft/min), such escalators can be permitted to be counted as having a capacity of 75 p/min. This should be considered appropriate only in conjunction with other provisions of this standard, such as the requirement to discount one escalator at each station level. Such escalators should also be connected to emergency power.

This suggested speed is consistent with the maximum speed permitted in ASME A17.1/CSA B44, a bi-national standard. The suggested capacity is consistent with research reported in the Elevator World article

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“Escalator Handling Capacity” and in Pedestrian Planning and Design, by Fruin. Other codes regulating transit station design permit escalator capacity to be based on operating capacity (e.g., Ontario Building Code, Section 3.13, “Rapid Transit Stations,” and London Underground Ltd., LUL Station Planning Guidelines, which both permit a capacity of 100 p/min.). Designers are encouraged to research the latest available data. Unpublished research suggests that where the vertical rise exceeds 15 m (50 ft), the capacity and travel speed for stairs should be adjusted downward by approximately 30 percent to account for fatigue. Additionally, the design should provide enlarged landings to allow pedestrians to rest without impeding egress flow. A.5.4.1 Where an underground enclosed station is part of another building complex, consideration should be given to creating a combined fire command center. A.6.2.2.1 For enclosed trainways, Most tunnels exposed exposure to prolonged fires are heavily damaged leads to heavy damage or collapse, resulting in service disruptions, significant structural damage, and most important, loss of lives (Bothe, Wolinski & Breunese 2003, Khoury 2002, and Tatnall 2002). The sStructural concrete or shotcrete liner can be designed to be fire-resistant withstand the fire load up to a certain period of time while accepting some minor repairable damage to the liner. The fire resistance rating of the tunnel liners can be analyzed. Prompt operation of the an emergency ventilation system can also mitigate damage to the liner. A.6.3.2.3 With reference to NFPA 101, Table 7.2.2.2.1.2(B) (where additional width is required for stairs serving an occupant load of 2000 people or more), exit stairs serving trainways are not required to exceed the minimum width, regardless of the occupant load. This is reasonable considering that evacuation flow from a tunnel an enclosed trainway would be essentially single file, and stairs do not normally converge with other egress routes. A.6.3.3 The egress provided should recognize that for multiple-track tunnelstrainways, there exists the possibility of having to simultaneously evacuate simultaneously the incident train and a non-incident train(s) stranded on the adjacent track(s). A.7.1.1 Separate ventilation systems for tunnels trainways and underground stations can be provided but are not required. Annex B provides information on types of mechanical systems for normal and emergency ventilation of trainways and stations and information for determining a tenable environment. A.7.2.1(3) The time frame required for achievement of the selected operating mode applies to the ventilation system equipment and not to the establishment of the resultant air flows in the tunnels trainways and stations. This would be the time for the emergency ventilation system to achieve the required speed and direction for all related fans and to reach the required position for all dampers and related emergency devices. A.7.2.1(5) This is an equipment exposure duration requirement, not a tenability requirement. Tunnel Emergency ventilation fans, their motors, and all related components should be designed to remain operational for a

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minimum of 1 hour. If the required time of tenability exceeds 1 hour, then the emergency ventilation system should remain operational for that longer period of time. See 7.2.1.1. A.7.5.2 A test plan should be prepared and submitted to the owner and the authority having jurisdiction for review and approval prior to the commissioning tests. The test plan should describe the method of testing and identify pass-fail criteria. As a minimum, the test plan should identify the following items:

(1) The commissioning tests should include individual equipment tests [as indicated in items (2) (2) and (3)] and systemwide tests [as indicated in items (4) through (13)]. (3) The individual fans, dampers, and other devices should be operated to confirm their functionality.

As a minimum, ventilation equipment operation should be initiated at the local primary location for fan operation such as an emergency management panel or fire management panel.

(4) The individual fan and ventilation plant airflows should be measured to confirm that the intended airflows are being delivered. At least one test should be made to measure the time required for the fan plant airflows to reach steady-state from a zero-flow start, and at least one test should be made to measure the time required for the fan plant airflows to reverse from full-forward to full-reverse operation. Subsequent tests should be conducted from Operations Central Control to verify remote fan and damper operation.

(5) The no-fire (or cold) station and tunnel trainway airflows provided by the built mechanical ventilation system should be measured to confirm that the airflows meet the requirements determined by the analysis.

(6) The systemwide tests should be witnessed by the owner, the authority having jurisdiction, the designer or the engineer of record, the contractor, and possibly the ventilation equipment suppliers.

(7) The systemwide testing should be done by a qualified airflow measurement specialist or contractor having previous experience in measuring airflows.

(8) Calibrated instruments providing an air velocity measurement accuracy of ±2.5 percent should be used. The number of points to be measured to convert air velocities to airflows should be determined either by the applicable standard used for the factory acceptance pre-installation testing (such as those published by the Air Movement and Control Association International, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, the International Organization for Standardization or UL) or by a CFD analysis. The test data should be electronically recorded for future use.

(9) The fan(s) that are assumed to be operated and not operated by the analysis should be identified for each scenario being tested.

(10) At least one test should be performed to measure the time required for all the fans used in a fire scenario to reach full operating mode.

(11) The tunnel trainway fire scenarios should be assessed and should include the design cases (i.e., those that determine the ventilation equipment functional capacities) and any other scenarios deemed appropriate. The train(s) should be located in the tunnel trainway as per the scenario, and tunnel airflows upstream of the stopped trains should be measured. It is not necessary to test all scenarios.

(12) The station fire scenarios should be assessed and should include the design cases (i.e., those that determine the ventilation equipment's functional capacities) and any other scenarios deemed appropriate. The station geometry can preclude the necessity of locating trains in the station. Airflows through the station entrances and tunnels sections of enclosed trainway connected to the station should be measured. It is not necessary to test all scenarios.

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(13) The airflows measured should be compared with the “cold flows” predicted by the analysis. If the

measured airflows are less than the predicted airflows, the mechanical ventilation system or its operation should be changed and the test repeated until passing results are achieved. Negative tolerances in the results should not be accepted.

(14) The systemwide testing should be documented by one or more reports. The report should include a description of the scenario tested, the instrumentation used, the names and affiliations of those witnessing the tests, and all test results.

A.8.3.1 Onboard energized electrical equipment not subject to regulation in other sections of this standard should be subject to a fire safety analysis. Where such equipment is listed and/or labeled by a certified listing agency, conditions of that listing should be reviewed in conducting the fire safety analysis to determine the degree to which further analyses of the fire performance of such equipment should be conducted and approved. A.9.4 Tunnels Enclosed trainways more than 610 m (2000 ft) in length should be equipped with emergency tunnel evacuation carts (ETECs) at locations to be determined by the authority having jurisdiction. ETECs should be capable of carrying a capacity of at least four stretchers and a total weight capacity of at least 453.5 kg (1000 lb). ETECs should be constructed of corrosion-resistant materials, be equipped with a “deadman” brake, and safely operate on the rail tracks in the tunnelenclosed trainway.

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Annex B Ventilation B.2.1.5 Noise Levels. Criteria for noise levels should be established for the various situations and potential exposures particular to the environments addressed by this standard. The intent of the recommended criteria is to maintain at least a minimal level of speech intelligibility along emergency evacuation routes. This might require additional noise control measures and acoustical treatment to achieve. Exceptions taken to the recommended noise levels for reasons of cost and feasibility should be as few and as slight as reasonably possible. For example, local area exceptions to the recommended acoustic criteria could be required to be applied for defined limited distances along the evacuation path that are near active noise sources. Other means of providing emergency evacuation guidance using acoustic, nonacoustic, or combined methods might be considered. Starting points for various design scenarios should be considered as follows: (1) Where reliance on unamplified speech is used as part of the emergency response inside a tunnelan enclosed trainway, the speech interference level (SIL) during emergency response from all active systems measured along the path of evacuation at any point 1.52 m (5 ft) above the walking surface should not exceed 78 dBZ Leq “slow” over any period of 1 minute, using the arithmetic average of unweighted sound pressure level in the 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 Hz octave bands. (2) For intelligible communication between emergency evacuation responders and the public, where reliance on amplified speech is used as part of the emergency response within a station, refer to NFPA 72. (3) Where reliance on amplified speech is used as part of the emergency response within a Tunnelan enclosed trainway, the sound pressure level from all active systems measured inside a tunnel along the path of evacuation at any point 1.52 m (5 ft) above the walking surface should be designed to support speech intelligibility of fixed voice communication systems to achieve a measured STI of not less than 0.45 (0.65 CIS) and an average STI of not less than 0.5 (0.7 CIS) as per D.2.4.1 of NFPA 72. Refer to Annex D of NFPA 72 for further information on speech intelligibility for voice communication systems. B.3 Configurations. Configurations can vary among properties, but engineering principles remain constant. The application of those principles should reflect the unique geometries and characteristics of each property. Enclosed stations and trainways might be configured with the following characteristics: (1) High or low ceilings (2) Open or doored entrances (3) Open or screened platform edges (4) End-of-station or mid-trainwaytunnel fan shafts (5) End-of-station or mid-trainwaytunnel vent shafts (6) Single, double, or varying combinations of tracks in tunnels (7) Intersecting tunnelstrainways (8) Multilevel stations (9) Multilevel tunnelstrainways (10) Varying depths below the surface (11) Varying grades and curvatures of tracks and tunnelstrainways (12) Varying blockage ratios of vehicles to tunnel trainway cross-section (13) Varying surface ambient conditions (14) Varying exit points to surface or points of safety

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B.4.2 Draft control can be achieved by the placement of shafts along the tunnel length of the enclosed trainway between stations. Shafts can be arranged with the fan shafts at the ends of stations, with vent shafts mid-trainwaytunnel if required or with vent shafts at the ends of stations and fan shafts mid-trainwaytunnel. End-of-station shaft configurations should be related to the station geometries in the consideration of patron comfort in the station relative to train piston draft effects. B.5.2 Temperature control and ventilation for ancillary areas housing special equipment should reflect the optimum operating conditions for the specific equipment to ensure the availability of critical equipment and should also give consideration for intermittent occupancy by maintenance personnel. These systems should be separate from the emergency ventilation system for stations and tunnels trainways and should be considered in the design of the emergency ventilation system. B.7.2 In a tunneltrainway-to-station evacuation scenario, access to the platform level from the trainway should be considered. B.8.2 Maintenance Activities. Maintenance activities within station and tunnel trainway areas can include heat-, dust-, or fume-producing operations such as grinding, welding, or painting; operation of fuel-powered vehicles or equipment; and other operations that affect tunnel air quality or temperature. If not operating in a fire or other emergency scenario, the tunnel emergency ventilation fans can be used to address the safety and comfort of employees working in the affected tunnel trainway and station areas. In such cases, velocities should consider the comfort levels of employees required to be in the tunnelstrainways. B.8.3 Tunnels Enclosed Trainways in Gassy Ground. Tunnels Enclosed trainways in gassy ground could be subject to ingress of flammable or other hazardous gases. Gases of concern include hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and methane (CH4). The ventilation system should be designed to satisfy two objectives: (1) To avoid pockets of gases forming (2) To achieve dilution of gas inflows through a design crack The ventilation design should be coordinated with the gas detection and alarm system type and the activation levels selected. The design should consider two general conditions: (1) Ongoing or periodic ventilation requirements to meet expected average gas ingress rates (2) Reaction to potential abrupt increases in gas ingress, such as might result from future construction, climate events, or seismic activity

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Annex C Means of Egress Calculations for Stations C.1.5 Multilevel-Platform Stations. (2) In a multi-level enclosed station that is below grade, Iif the fire is on the upper-level platform (for an underground station), an assumption can be made as to the percentage of occupants who might be expected to evacuate the lower level through the normal egress routes versus the percentage who might be expected to exit via emergency stairs. These assumptions will be unique for each system as a function of various parameters, including physical configuration of stations, means of egress, and location of emergency exits; communications facilities to advise passengers, both verbal and signing; level of transit personnel working in stations; and transit personnel emergency procedure responsibilities established for the transit operating authority.

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Annex D Rail Vehicle Fires D.1 Introduction. This annex provides additional information on the hazards associated with burning vehicles and the impact of a burning vehicle on the evacuation of passengers and crew to a point of safety. Emergency evacuation from a vehicle containing a fire could include exiting a vehicle containing the fire to an adjacent vehicle, exiting the train into the operating environment (station, tunneltrainway, etc.) where the train is located, and moving through the operating environment to the point of safety. Chapter 8 contains minimum prescriptive requirements that are intended to provide sufficient time for passengers and crew to safely evacuate from a train containing a fire. This annex provides guidance for designing and evaluating train fire performance. A fire involving a train will have an impact on the conditions in the operating environment, and this type of fire is often used to design emergency systems in operating environments. Chapters 5 through 7 provide requirements on design of the operating environment to ensure that passengers can safely egress to a point of safety. D.4 Vehicle Fire Heat Release Rate History. The heat release rate history of a vehicle fire should include the heat release rate during all stages of the fire. Fires inside of vehicles that are allowed to grow sufficiently large can reach flashover, where all of the items inside of the vehicle ignite. The largest heat release rates are expected after flashover occurs (i.e., postflashover). The heat release rate during postflashover is particularly important since many tunnel trainway and station smoke control system designs are based on the maximum expected heat release rate. The heat release rate of the vehicle fire will also affect the heat that passengers could be exposed to during evacuation. The magnitude of the heat release rate during postflashover will be a function of the amount of air drawn into the vehicle, the material fire properties, and the potential heat release rate of the burning fuels inside of the vehicle. D.4.3 The heat release rate of the train fire will also affect the amount of heat the passengers are exposed to during the evacuation. Larger heat release rate fires will produce longer flames that could extend out of the vehicle openings. If the vehicle is inside a tunnelan enclosed trainway, these flames could impinge on the ceiling and extend down away from the burning vehicle. Radiation from these flames to nearby evacuating passengers could be significant.

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Annex E Fire Hazard Analysis Process

Table E.3 System of Vehicle Fire Hazard Analysis Steps (a) Clearly define fire performance objectives.

Step 1: Define vehicle

performance objectives

and design.

(b) Determine the geometry of the vehicle.

(c) Include other design parameters that might have an impact on a

possible fire, such as a tunnel trainway operating environment, material

controls, fire detection and suppression, or other system procedures.

Step 2: Calculate vehicle

fire performance.

(a) Determine minimum acceptable performance criteria based on the

vehicle design.

(b) Establish standard design fires.

(c) Use predictive calculation and/or model calculations, to determine the

fire performance of the proposed design for a range of design fires.

(d) Create a fire performance graph.

Step 3: Evaluate specific

vehicle fire scenarios.

(a) Examine relevant fire incident experience with same/similar

applications.

(b) Identify the likely role/involvement of application contents in fire. (c) Ask

which fires are most common/likely? Most challenging?

(d) Quantify the burning behavior for chosen scenarios from available fire test data or appropriate small- and large-scale tests.

Step 4: Evaluate suitability

of vehicle design.

(a) Estimate through expert judgment, regulatory guidance, and, when

needed, complementary small- and large-scale tests the effects of

unknowns not accounted for in the fire performance graphs.

(b) Establish the sensitivity of the fire performance graph to known inputs.

(c) Set appropriate design margins.

(d) Determine the acceptability of the design.

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E.3.3 Step 3: Evaluate Specific Vehicle Fire Scenarios. Step 3 evaluates possible vehicle fire scenarios in order to place the fire performance curves in context and to allow the designer to adopt reasonable design margins in the final vehicle design evaluation in Step 4. A significant amount of information relevant to scenario definition can be obtained from historical fire incident experience [10, 11]. Databases such as the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) contain relevant vehicle data, normally segregated into specific categories [12]. Representative fire scenarios include the following: (1) Ignition under a seat by a small source (e.g., crumpled newspaper) (2) Ignition source on top of a vandalized seat (e.g., crumpled newspaper) (3) Overheated equipment (e.g., electrical, HVAC) The location of the train must be also considered in the analysis. For example, the fire risk to occupants is greater if the train is located between stations or within a tunnelan enclosed trainway. More detailed information describing passenger-carrying vehicle fire scenarios is contained in the ASTM guide and the APTA recommended practice cited earlier in Section E.2. Relevant data describing specific fires appropriate for the vehicle application are defined and used as input to the same fire model used in Step 2. The results of these model calculations can be compared to the design fires used in Step 2 to define appropriate design margins for analysis.

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Annex G Onboard Fire Suppression System G.1 Onboard fire suppression systems (e.g., mist systems), while relatively new in the passenger rail and fixed guideway industry, have been successfully used on a number of passenger rail and diesel powered light rail systems outside of the United States. The applications for this type of system can range from protection of diesel engine compartments to the interior of passenger rail vehicles. The use of a fire suppression system could save lives in the incident vehicle during a fire condition; minimize damage to the train, tunneltrainway, and the station which it has entered; reduce or eliminate potential use of station sprinklers; reduce or eliminate the need for down-stands; significantly reduce the impact of designing for fire emergencies on station architecture; reduce tunnel emergency ventilation capacities by approximately 40 percent; reduce the number and/or diameter of emergency ventilation fans at each end of each station and within the tunnelsenclosed trainway, thus reducing structure sizes; decrease shaft airflow cross section areas by approximately 40 percent; and decrease tunnel emergency ventilation shaft portal areas that correspond to the required fans sizes/velocities. When considering the addition of a fire suppression system, several design challenges should be met by the rail vehicle manufacturer. These challenges include the type of extinguishing medium used, which all must be approved by the authority having jurisdiction, the size and number of medium canisters and where on the vehicle to place them for easy access for maintenance; the resultant increased energy consumption caused by the increase in weight of the suppression system; the maintenance intervals; the cost of the system; the testing and commissioning of the system; and the cost and difficulties associated with retrofitting vehicles.

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Annex H Fire Scenarios and Fire Profiles H.2 Fire Scenarios. Representative design fire scenarios include the following: (1) A fire originates outside the vehicle interior, such as below the floor or rooftop. The fire causes the train to stop in a tunnel trainway or station and could burn through the floor or rooftop into the vehicle’s interior. (2) A fire originates in a vehicle’s interior. Some recent train fire studies suggest that an NFPA 130-compliant car will not flashover, unless the event is initiated with two or more liters of a flammable liquid or accelerant. The designer should verify this possibility, as ventilation requirements can vary greatly depending on flashover expectations. (3) The fire spreads from car-to-car. The fire might spread from car-to-car. Parameters that affect this are: the fire resistances of the car ends, whether the interior car doors are left open or closed, whether or not the cars have “bellows” connecting them, the tunnel ventilation moving the heat from the fire site downstream to the next car, whether the car exterior windows are glass or polycarbonate, and whether or not the station has sprinklers. (4) A fire consumes trash, luggage, wayside electrical equipment, and so forth, in the stations or tunnelstrainways. (5) A fire occurs in a nontransit occupancy that is not protected by sprinklers, such as a kiosk or small shop. (6) A fire in a dual-powered vehicle (diesel and electric traction) results from the puncture of a fuel tank or rupture of a fuel line. (7) A fire originates in a maintenance vehicle or work train. If maintenance vehicles are never in the stations or tunnels trainways during periods of revenue operations, then maintenance vehicle or work train fire scenarios do not have to be considered as design fire scenarios. H.3 Fire Profiles. As per 7.2.1(2), critical velocity is the criterion for determining the required tunnel ventilation airflow and hence the ventilation system fan capacities required for tunnel fire incidents in enclosed trainways. The most commonly used software is the Subway Environment Simulation (SES) computer program [1]. The peak fire heat release rate is the primary fire input. H.4 Impacts on Ventilation System Design. The train fire profile has a major impact on the station and tunnel ventilation design of the emergency ventilation system. The design fire scenarios and fire profiles should be determined based on the perceived threats. In response to increased awareness that transit and passenger rail systems are potential terrorist targets, some systems are designed for significant incendiary fires and others are not. The decision could be based on cost, the inferred risk, or a formal threat and vulnerability assessment. H.5 References. The following references are cited in this annex:

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(1) Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., “Subway Environmental Design Handbook (SEDH), Volume II, Subway Environment Simulation Computer Program, SES Version 4.1, Part I User’s Manual,” 2nd edition, February 2002, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC. (2) Li, S., Louie, A., and Fuster, E. “The Impacts of Train Fire Profiles on Station Ventilation System Design,” presented at the 15th International Symposium on Aerodynamics, Ventilation & Fire in Tunnels, Barcelona, Spain, 18–20 September 2013. (3) Chiam, Boon Hui, “Numerical Simulation of a Metro Train Fire,” Fire Engineering Research Report 05/1, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, June 2005. (4) Kennedy, W.D., Ray, R.E., and Guinan, J.W., “A Short History of Train Fire Heat Release Calculations,” presented at the 1998 ASHRAE Annual Meeting, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, June 1998. (5) Sørlie, R. and Mathisen, H.M., EUREKA-EU 499 Firetun-Project: Fire Protection in Traffic Tunnels, SINTEF, Applied Thermodynamics, 1994. (6) Lonnemark, A., et al., “Large-scale Commuter Train Fire Tests — Results from the METRO Project,” presented at the Fifth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, New York, 14–16 March, 2012. (7) Hadjisophcleous, G., Lee, D.H. and Park, W.H., “Full-scale Experiments for Heat Release Rate Measurements of Railcar Fires,” presented at the Fifth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, New York, 14–16 March, 2012. (8) White, N., Dowling, V,. and Barnett, J., “Full-scale Fire Experiment on a Typical Passenger Train, in Fire Safety Science,” Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium, Beijing, International Association for Fire Safety Science, Boston, MA, 2005.

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Annex I Informational References I.1 Referenced Publications. I.1.2.11 TDC Publications. Bothe C., G. M. Wolinski, and A. J. Breunese, "Spalling of concrete tunnel linings in fire," (Re)Claiming the Underground Space, J. Saveur, ed., pp. 227–231, Swets & Zeitlinger Lisse, 2003. Bukowski, R. W., et al. Fire Hazard Assessment Method, NIST Handbook 146, Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 1989. Hadjisophcleous, G., Lee, D.H. and Park, W.H., “Full-scale Experiments for Heat Release Rate Measurements of Railcar Fires,” presented at the Fifth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, New York, 14–16 March, 2012. Khoury, G.A. “Passive Protection Against Fire,” Tunnels and Tunneling International, pp. 40–42. November 2002. Li, S., Louie, A., and Fuster, E. “The Impacts of Train Fire Profiles on Station Ventilation System Design,” presented at the 15th International Symposium on Aerodynamics, Ventilation & Fire in Tunnels, Barcelona, Spain, 18–20 September 2013. London Underground Ltd., LUL Station Planning Guidelines, London, 2015. Lonnemark, A., et al., “Large-scale Commuter Train Fire Tests — Results from the METRO Project,” presented at the Fifth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, New York, 14–16 March 2012. Sørlie, R. and Mathisen, H.M., EUREKA-EU 499 Firetun-Project: Fire Protection in Traffic Tunnels, SINTEF, Applied Thermodynamics, 1994.

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See attached Word Document for proposed revisions.



NFPA_130_A2019-FD_analysis.docx




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Mon Jan 22 15:34:42 EST 2018

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The Committee will review the use of the term "fire hazard analysis" vs. "engineering analysis"throughout the document and propose revisions to make the terminology consistent.

ResponseMessage:


3 of 26 1/23/2018, 2:20 PM

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NFPA 130 A2019 Proposed Edits – Engineering and Fire Hazard Analysis. Page 1

Table of Contents

Chapter 3 Definitions ............................................................................................................................. 2

3.3 General Definitions. ...................................................................................................................... 2

Chapter 5 Stations .................................................................................................................................. 3

5.2 Construction. ................................................................................................................................ 3

Chapter 6 Trainways ............................................................................................................................... 4

6.2 Construction. ................................................................................................................................ 4

Chapter 7 Emergency Ventilation System .............................................................................................. 6

7.1 General. ........................................................................................................................................ 6

Chapter 8 Vehicles ................................................................................................................................... 9

Chapter 11 Control and Communication System Functionality, Reliability, and Availability ............... 11

Annex A Explanatory Material .............................................................................................................. 12

Annex B Ventilation .............................................................................................................................. 18

Annex C Means of Egress Calculations for Stations.............................................................................. 19

Annex D Rail Vehicle Fires .................................................................................................................... 20

Annex E Fire Hazard Analysis Process .................................................................................................. 21

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Chapter 3 Definitions 3.3 General Definitions. 3.3.16* Engineering Analysis. A system analysis that evaluates all the various factors of relative to specific objectives for system performance. 3.3.16.1* Fire Hazard Analysis. A specific type of engineering analysis relative to the contribution of a material, component, or assembly to the overall fire hazard and the estimation of the potential severity of fires that can develop under defined fire scenarios.

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Chapter 5 Stations 5.2 Construction. 5.2.2 Construction Type. 5.2.2.1 Building construction for all new enclosed stations shall be not less than Type I or Type II or combinations of Type I and Type II noncombustible construction as defined in NFPA 220, in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 101, Chapter 12, for the station configuration or as determined by fire hazard analysis of potential fire exposure hazards to the structure. 5.2.7 Combustible Furnishings and Contents. 5.2.7.1* Where combustible furnishings or contents not specifically addressed in this standard are installed in a station, a fire hazard analysis shall be conducted to determine that the level of occupant fire safety is not adversely affected by the furnishings and contents. 5.3.3* Capacity and Location of Means of Egress. 5.3.3.1* Platform Evacuation Time. There shall be sufficient egress capacity to evacuate the platform occupant load as defined in 5.3.2.5 from the station platform in 4 minutes or less. 5.3.3.2* Evacuation Time to a Point of Safety. The station shall be designed to permit evacuation from the most remote point on the platform to a point of safety in 6 minutes or less. 5.3.3.3* For stations where the concourse is protected from exposure to the effects of a fire at the platform by distance, geometry, fire separation, an emergency ventilation system designed in accordance with Chapter 7, or as determined by an appropriate engineering analysis, that concourse shall be permitted to be defined as a point of safety. 5.3.3.7* Engineering Analysis.

Modification of the evacuation times and travel distances shall be permitted based on an engineering analysis by evaluating material heat release rates, station geometry, and emergency ventilation systems.

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Chapter 6 Trainways 6.2 Construction. 6.2.2 Construction Type. 6.2.2.1* Cut and Cover. Where trainway sections are to be constructed by the cut-and-cover method, perimeter walls and related construction shall be not less than Type I or Type II or combinations of Type I or Type II noncombustible construction as defined in NFPA 220, as determined by an engineering fire hazard analysis of potential fire exposure hazards to the structure. 6.2.2.6 Surface. Construction materials shall be not less than Type II (000) noncombustible material as defined in NFPA 220, as determined by a fire hazard analysis of potential fire exposure hazards to the structure. 6.2.2.7 Elevated. All structures necessary for trainway support and all structures and enclosures on or under trainways shall be of not less than Type I or Type II (000) or combinations of Type I or Type II noncombustible construction as defined in NFPA 220, as determined by a fire hazard analysis of potential fire exposure hazards to the structure. 6.2.5 Combustible Components. 6.2.5.1 Where combustible components not specifically addressed in this standard are installed in a trainway, a fire hazard analysis shall be conducted to determine that the level of occupant fire safety is not adversely affected by the contents. 6.2.5.2 The fire hazard analysis required by 6.2.5.1 shall meet the following criteria: (1) It shall include, as a minimum, an examination of peak heat release rate for combustible elements, total heat released, ignition temperatures, radiant heating view factors, and behavior of the component during internal or external fire scenarios. (2) It shall determine that, if a fire propagates beyond involving the component of fire origin, a level of fire safety is provided within an enclosed trainway commensurate with this standard. 6.2.9 Green Track. 6.2.9.2

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The design of green track shall be based upon an engineering fire hazard analysis of environmental factors. 6.3 Emergency Egress. 6.3.1 Location of Egress Routes. 6.3.1.10 For open-cut trainways, an engineering analysis shall be conducted to evaluate the impact of the trainway configuration on safe egress from a train fire to a point of safety. 6.3.1.11 Where the engineering analysis indicates that the configuration will impact tenability beyond the immediate vicinity of the fire, egress routes shall be provided such that the maximum distance from any point within the open-cut section to a point of egress from the trainway shall not be more than 381 m (1250 ft). 6.4.7 Ventilation. 6.4.7.1 Except as described in 6.4.7.2 and 6.4.7.3, emergency ventilation shall be provided in enclosed trainways in accordance with Chapter 7. 6.4.7.2* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for occupied spaces shall not be required in tail track areas where engineering a fire hazard analysis indicates that a fire on a train in the tail track area will not impact passengers or passenger areas. 6.4.7.3* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for occupied areas shall not be required in storage track areas where the storage track has no openings along its length to passenger trainway areas and where an engineeringfire hazard analysis indicates that a fire on a train in the storage track area will not impact passengers or passenger areas.

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Chapter 7 Emergency Ventilation System 7.1 General. 7.1.2.4 Where supported by engineering analysis, a nonmechanical emergency ventilation system shall be permitted to be provided in lieu of a mechanical emergency ventilation system in the following locations: (1) Where the length of the underground or enclosed trainway is less than or equal to 1000 ft (305 m) and greater than 200 ft (61 m) (2) In an enclosed station where engineering analysis indicates that a nonmechanical emergency ventilation system supports the tenability criteria of the project 7.1.2.5 In the event that an engineering analysis is not conducted or does not support the use of a nonmechanical emergency ventilation system for the configurations described in 7.1.2.4, a mechanical emergency ventilation system shall be provided. 7.1.3 The engineering analysis of the ventilation system shall include a validated subway analytical simulation program augmented as appropriate by a quantitative analysis of airflow dynamics produced in the fire scenario, such as would result from the application of validated computational fluid dynamics (CFD) techniques. The results of the analysis shall include the no-fire (or cold) air velocities that can be measured during commissioning to confirm that a mechanical ventilation system as built meets the requirements determined by the analysis. 7.2.2 Point-extract ventilation systems shall be permitted subject to an engineering analysis that demonstrates the system will confine the spread of smoke in the tunnel to a length of 150 m (500 ft) or less. 7.2.3 The design shall encompass the following: (1) *Fire scenarios and fire profiles (2) Station and trainway geometries (3) The effects of elevation, elevation differences, ambient temperature differences, and ambient wind (4) A system of fans, shafts, and devices for directing airflow in stations and trainways (5) A program of predetermined emergency response procedures capable of initiating prompt response from the operations control center in the event of a fire emergency (6) A ventilation system reliability engineering analysis that, as a minimum, considers the following subsystems: (a) Electrical (b) Mechanical

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(c) Supervisory control 7.2.4 Criteria for the system reliability analysis in 7.2.3(6) shall be established and approved. 7.2.4.1 The analysis shall consider as a minimum the following events: (1) Fire in trainway or station (2) Local incident within the electrical utility that interrupts power to the emergency ventilation system (3) Derailment (4) The loss of a fan that results in the most adverse effect on the ventilation system performance 7.3 Emergency Ventilation Fans. 7.3.2.1 The fan inlet airflow hot temperature shall be determined by an engineering analysis, however, this temperature shall not be less than 150°C (302°F). 7.3.2.2 The fan inlet airflow hot temperature shall be determined using the design fire at a location in the immediate vicinity of the emergency ventilation system track/station inlet(s), as applicable. Airflow rates shall be based upon the tunnel ventilation critical velocity or station tenability requirements, as applicable. These airflow rates will most likely be from location(s) that are different then the location for this hot temperature analysis. 7.3.5.1 Nonemergency ventilation airflows that do not impact the emergency ventilation airflows shall be permitted to be left operational where identified in the engineering analysis. 7.3.6 Critical fans required in battery rooms or similar spaces where hydrogen gases or other hazardous gases might be released shall be designed to meet the ventilation requirements of NFPA 91. 7.3.6.1 These fans and other critical fans in automatic train control rooms, communications rooms, and so forth, shall be identified in the engineering analysis and shall remain operational as required during the fire emergency. 7.5 Testing.

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7.5.2* The no-fire (or cold) airflows provided by the installed mechanical ventilation system shall be measured during commissioning to confirm that the airflows meet the requirements determined by the engineering analysis. 7.7 Emergency Ventilation System. 7.8 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation Systems. 7.8.1 The design of the power for the emergency ventilation system shall comply with the requirements of Article 700 of NFPA 70. 7.8.1.1 Alternatively, the design of the power for the emergency ventilation system shall be permitted to be based upon the results of the electrical reliability engineering analysis according to 7.2.3(6), as approved.

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Chapter 8 Vehicles 8.2* Compliance Options. Passenger-carrying vehicles shall be designed to meet the prescriptive requirements of Section 8.3 through Section 8.10 or the engineering analysis requirements of Section 8.11. 8.3.3 Methods used to isolate ignition sources from combustible materials shall be demonstrated to the authority having jurisdiction to be suitable through testing and/or fire hazard analysis. 8.4 Flammability and Smoke Emission. 8.4.1.3.1 A fire hazard analysis shall also be conducted that considers the operating environment within which the seat or mattress assembly will be used in relation to the risk of vandalism, puncture, cutting, introduction of additional combustibles, or other acts that potentially expose the individual components of the assemblies to an ignition source. 8.4.1.10* Materials used to fabricate miscellaneous, discontinuous small parts (such as knobs, rollers, fasteners, clips, grommets, and small electrical parts) that will not contribute materially to fire growth in end use configuration shall be exempt from flammability and smoke emission performance requirements, provided that the surface area of any individual small part is less than 100 cm2 (16 in.2) in end use configuration and an appropriate fire hazard analysis is conducted that addresses the location and quantity of the materials used and the vulnerability of the materials to ignition and contribution to flame spread. 8.4.1.15* Portions of the vehicle body that separate the major ignition source, energy sources, or sources of fuel load from vehicle interiors shall have fire resistance as determined by a fire hazard analysis acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction that addresses the location and quantity of the materials used, as well as vulnerability of the materials to ignition, flame spread, and smoke generation. These portions shall include equipment-carrying portions of a vehicle's roof and the interior structure separating the levels of a bi-level car but do not include a flooring assembly subject to Section 8.5. In those cases, the use of the ASTM E119 test procedure shall not be required. 8.4.2* Materials intended for use in a limited area of the vehicle and not meeting the requirements of Table 8.4.1 shall be permitted only after an appropriate fire hazard analysis establishes, within the limits of precision, that the material produces a contribution to fire hazard equal to or less than a material meeting the appropriate criteria of Table 8.4.1, where the alternative material is used in the same location to fulfill a function similar to the candidate material.

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8.5.1.2 Roof Assembly. 8.5.1.2.2 Vehicles that travel through tunnels and have a roof that is constructed of a combustible material shall require a fire hazard analysis to demonstrate that rapid fire spread to passenger and crew compartments or local roof collapse is not possible during the exposure period. 8.5.2 Vehicle Sides and Ends. A fire hazard analysis shall be conducted to demonstrate that fires originating outside the vehicle shall not extend into the passenger and crew areas before the vehicle is evacuated. 8.11 Engineering Analysis Option. 8.11.1* General. The requirements of this section shall apply to fixed guideway and passenger rail vehicles designed to meet the engineering analysis option permitted by Section 8.2 and to meet the goals and objectives stated in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. 8.11.1.1 In the application of Section 8.11, engineering analysis design activities shall be carried out by an individual or entity having qualifications acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. 8.11.1.2 In the application of Section 8.11, the design, engineering analysis, and documentation shall be approved. 8.11.2* Basis for Engineering Analysis. 8.11.2.1 For this engineering analysis option, the broad goals and objectives specified in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 shall be converted into specific performance criteria based on the unique features and operating environment of the vehicle. 8.11.2.2 These specific criteria shall be used as the basis of the engineering analysis.

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Chapter 11 Control and Communication System Functionality, Reliability, and Availability 11.2 Train Control. 11.2.1* A reliability engineering analysis shall be performed to consider the ability of control systems to maintain communications and the ability to reposition vehicles during a fire emergency.

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Annex A Explanatory Material A.3.3.16 Engineering Analysis. Engineering Analysis is a broad term that encompasses a range of different objectives and performance criteria. The complexity of the analysis and the factors requiring consideration are situation dependent and require the user to have sufficient understanding of the objectives, assumptions, and analysis tools being implemented. General examples from within this document include analysis intended to provide justification for the modification of evacuation time/travel distance requirements, analysis to support the use of a concourse area as a point of safety, and analysis relative to the use of a nonmechanical ventilation system in lieu of a mechanical emergency ventilation system. A written report of the analysis should be submitted to the authority having jurisdiction, indicating recommended fire protection method(s) that will provide a level of fire safety commensurate with this standard. The objectives, assumptions, sources of data, and degree of conservatism incorporated into the analysis should be addressed. A.3.3.16.1 Fire Hazard Analysis. The term fire hazard analysis generally refers to analyses that are performed relative to the specific fire performance of materials, components, and assemblies for the purposes of addressing the subsequent contribution to the overall fire hazard and the resulting impact on occupant fire safety. A fire hazard analysis can provide an estimate of the potential severity of fires that can develop under defined fire scenarios. This analysis can encompass consideration of factors that include but are not limited to, quantities of materials, vulnerability of materials and components to ignition, propensity for flame spread, and smoke generation. The formulation of a fire hazard analysis is subjective and dependent upon the expertise of the user. The material provided in Annex E, although specifically addressing fire hazard analysis for vehicles, provides additional guidance relative to the steps that might be involved in a fire hazard analysis . A written report of the analysis should be submitted to the authority having jurisdiction, indicating that a level of fire safety commensurate with this standard will be achieved. A.4.2.1 The fire-life safety concepts in this standard are predicated and achieved by providing tenable conditions for evacuation of passengers described in this standard, as follows: (1) Fire hazard control through use of fire-hardened materials in stations, tunnels, and trains (2) Provision of fire detection, alarm notification, communication systems, and evacuation routes (3) Natural ventilation or mechanical ventilation providing smoke control to maintain tenability (4) Fire safety system reliability through system redundancy and increased safety in emergency system wires and cables that might be exposed to fire

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The inclusion of automatic fire suppression systems in stations, tunnels, or trains provides an active system that can limit fire growth and thereby assist in reducing risk to life and property. Where such systems are provided, variations to requirements in this standard for materials, communications, systems, or reliability can be considered where supported by engineering analysis as permitted by Section 1.4 and in accordance with good fire protection engineering practice. A.5.2.7.1 The fire hazard analysis should determine that the fire does not propagate beyond the component of fire origin and that a level of fire safety is provided within the station commensurate with this standard. Computer modeling, material fire testing, or full-scale fire testing should be conducted, as appropriate, to assess fire performance in potential fire scenarios. A.5.3.3 The means of egress capacity factors and travel speeds are consistent with observed pedestrian movement within congested areas of passenger stations as represented by level of service E/F in Pedestrian Planning and Design, by Fruin. Patronage can vary for different user groups periodically or change over time. Modification could be warranted based on engineering analysis. A.5.3.3.7 Where automated spreadsheet calculations or computer-based software programs are used, the means of egress analysis should include documentation detailing all input parameters and algorithm(s). A.5.3.5.7(2) The intent is to keep escalators running in the direction of egress in order to provide more efficient evacuation flow. Where escalators are an integral means of egress component in deep stations, the provision of emergency power for the escalators should be considered when supported by risk analysis. A.5.3.6.4(7) Where supported by this analysis, the necessity for emergency recall should be considered. A.6.4.7.2 The intent of the standard is to provide a reasonable level of life safety for occupants. However, the risk faced in non-passenger areas where trains are merely stored or cleaned is significantly different from that in passenger areas (6.4.7.2 and 6.4.7.3 do not apply to maintenance and yards areas). This is because there are fewer ignition sources and fewer people, and the occupants will be either familiar with their surroundings (in the case of staff) or trained to react in hazardous locations (in the case of emergency responders). The standard continues to require ventilation and all other protective features, including compliant egress from these areas. Paragraphs 6.4.7.2 and 6.4.7.3 eliminate the requirement for the emergency ventilation system to meet the tenability criteria for other occupied areas. The standard permits tenability criteria in these areas to be reduced, provided that a fire hazard n engineering analysis shows that a fire in these areas will not impact areas occupied by passengers.

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A.7.1.2.1 Segments should be considered contiguous where an opening at the top is less than 15 m (50 ft) in length. An engineering analysis to determine the aerodynamic coupling between the segments should be performed where the segments are separated by an opening less than the full width of the segment or are between 15 m (50 ft) and 100 m (328 ft) in length. For segments to be considered separate, the engineering analysis should confirm that the separation between segments is adequate to prevent migration of smoke into the adjacent segment. A.7.1.2.2 Individual project geometries can impose constraints that make the length requirement of 7.1.2.2(2) onerous to meet. Proposals to the authority having jurisdiction for relief based on engineering analysis might be made to address this. The following elements and performance goals should be considered in the development and justification of an alternative approach. A mechanical system intended for the purpose of emergency ventilation can be considered for waiver from an enclosed trainway if the length of the enclosed trainway is less than or equal to the length of that system’s most prevalent train, provided that each vehicle within that most prevalent train permits a protected passenger egress route from each vehicle to the one (or two) adjoining vehicles. A rationale for selection and acceptance of the most prevalent train would be part of the justification. Conversely, a mechanical system intended for the purpose of emergency ventilation should not be waived in an enclosed trainway if the length of the enclosed trainway is equal to or greater than twice the NFPA recommendation (see 6.2.2.2) for the maximum distance that an evacuating passenger should have to travel before reaching an emergency exit stairway [381 m (1250 ft)]. The need for a mechanical system intended for the purpose of emergency ventilation should be analyzed further (as approved) if an enclosed trainway meets one of the following criteria: (1) The length of the enclosed trainway is less than 762 m (2500 ft) but greater than that of the system’s most prevalent train. (2) The length of the enclosed trainway is less than that of the system’s most prevalent train and each vehicle within that most prevalent train does not permit a protected passenger egress route from that vehicle to the one (or two) adjoining vehicle(s). In the event that no analysis is performed or the justification is not approved, the default enclosed trainway design should include an emergency ventilation system. A.7.2.6 The time of tenability should consider the possibility of one or more egress paths being blocked by fire or smoke (as may be demonstrated by engineering analysis) and for other considerations that are not accounted for in the egress capacity calculations. (See B.2 for additional information to be considered.) A.7.5.2

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A test plan should be prepared and submitted to the owner and the authority having jurisdiction for review and approval prior to the commissioning tests. The test plan should describe the method of testing and identify pass-fail criteria. As a minimum, the test plan should identify the following items: (1) The commissioning tests should include individual equipment tests [as indicated in items (2) and (3)] and systemwide tests [as indicated in items (4) through (13)]. (2) The individual fans, dampers, and other devices should be operated to confirm their functionality. As a minimum, ventilation equipment operation should be initiated at the local primary location for fan operation such as an emergency management panel or fire management panel. (3) The individual fan and ventilation plant airflows should be measured to confirm that the intended airflows are being delivered. At least one test should be made to measure the time required for the fan plant airflows to reach steady-state from a zero-flow start, and at least one test should be made to measure the time required for the fan plant airflows to reverse from full-forward to full-reverse operation. Subsequent tests should be conducted from Operations Central Control to verify remote fan and damper operation. (4) The no-fire (or cold) station and tunnel airflows provided by the built mechanical ventilation system should be measured to confirm that the airflows meet the requirements determined by the engineering analysis. (5) The systemwide tests should be witnessed by the owner, the authority having jurisdiction, the designer or the engineer of record, the contractor, and possibly the ventilation equipment suppliers. (6) The systemwide testing should be done by a qualified airflow measurement specialist or contractor having previous experience in measuring airflows. (7) Calibrated instruments providing an air velocity measurement accuracy of ±2.5 percent should be used. The number of points to be measured to convert air velocities to airflows should be determined either by the applicable standard used for the factory acceptance pre-installation testing (such as those published by the Air Movement and Control Association International, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, the International Organization for Standardization or UL) or by a CFD analysis. The test data should be electronically recorded for future use. (8) The fan(s) that are assumed to be operated and not operated by the analysis should be identified for each scenario being tested. (9) At least one test should be performed to measure the time required for all the fans used in a fire scenario to reach full operating mode. (10) The tunnel fire scenarios should be assessed and should include the design cases (i.e., those that determine the ventilation equipment functional capacities) and any other scenarios deemed appropriate. The train(s) should be located in the tunnel as per the scenario, and tunnel airflows upstream of the stopped trains should be measured. It is not necessary to test all scenarios. (11) The station fire scenarios should be assessed and should include the design cases (i.e., those that determine the ventilation equipment's functional capacities) and any other scenarios deemed appropriate.

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The station geometry can preclude the necessity of locating trains in the station. Airflows through the station entrances and tunnels connected to the station should be measured. It is not necessary to test all scenarios. (12) The airflows measured should be compared with the “cold flows” predicted by the analysis . If the measured airflows are less than the predicted airflows, the mechanical ventilation system or its operation should be changed and the test repeated until passing results are achieved. Negative tolerances in the results should not be accepted. (13) The systemwide testing should be documented by one or more reports. The report should include a description of the scenario tested, the instrumentation used, the names and affiliations of those witnessing the tests, and all test results. A.8.2 Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) requirements for passenger rail car and locomotive cab fire safety are contained in 49 CFR 238. The requirements of 49 CFR 238, Section 103, are that interior materials be tested and meet certain flammability and smoke criteria and that floor fire endurance be tested. In addition, the requirements contain detailed fire safety analysis requirements for new equipment, to reduce the risk of personal injury and equipment damage caused by a fire to an acceptable level. The fire safety analysis requirements include the use of a formal safety methodology and written documentation of the analysis. In addition, the vehicle design and material selection are required to consider potential ignition sources; the type, quantity, and location of materials; and the availability of rapid and safe egress to the equipment exterior under conditions secure from fire, smoke, and other hazards. The ventilation system is required to not contribute to the lethality of a fire. Passenger railroads are also required to determine the extent to which overheat detection and fire suppression systems must be installed to ensure sufficient time for the safe evacuation of passengers and crew. In addition to the specific fire safety requirements in 49 CFR 238, Section 103, other sections of the FRA requirements include fire safety–related provisions for passenger rail vehicles. Minimum requirements for fuel tanks for new passenger locomotives are intended to protect the fuel tanks against crushing and puncture in a collision or derailment. Requirements for passenger car electrical systems are also included. Conductor sizes must be selected on the basis of current carrying capacity, temperature, and other characteristics, and power dissipation resistors must be adequately ventilated to prevent overheating and be electrically insulated. The resistors and main battery system must be designed to prevent combustion. Such features can reduce the risk of fire ignition and spread in a collision or derailment and thus affect the necessity for and circumstances of emergency evacuation. Other CFR requirements are for passenger rail car and locomotive crashworthiness, as well as emergency exit and emergency responder access features. Annex E provides guidance relative to fire hazard assessments referenced in Section 8.3 through Section 8.10. A.8.3.1 Onboard energized electrical equipment not subject to regulation in other sections of this standard should be subject to a fire safety hazard analysis. Where such equipment is listed and/or labeled by a certified listing agency, conditions of that listing should be reviewed in conducting the fire safety hazard analysis to

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determine the degree to which further analyses of the fire performance of such equipment should be conducted and approved. A.8.4.1.1 ASTM E162 might not be suitable for materials that exhibit flaming running or flaming dripping because the test apparatus is not designed to accommodate this kind of burning behavior. A fire hazard analysis seeking to demonstrate the acceptability of such materials as permitted in 8.4.2 should include not only the contribution to the generation of heat and smoke at the original ignition site but also any contribution resulting from burning material that melts and/or flows away from that site. The fire hazard analysis also should address the risk of spread to and ignition of other car components from either of these potential ignition sources. A.8.4.2 The greater the anticipated effect of the material on fire performance, the more complex the fire hazard analysis is likely to be. A.8.11.2 Section 4.3 includes specific objectives necessary to achieve desired goals. Further guidance relative to the engineering analysis option for compliance could include explanatory material regarding performance-based compliance in other documents, such as NFPA 101.

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Annex B Ventilation B.2.4 Modeling Accuracy. Where modeling is used to determine factors such as temperature, visibility, and smoke layer height, an appropriate sensitivity analysis should be performed.

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Annex C Means of Egress Calculations for Stations C.1.3 Center-Platform Station Sample Calculation. Table C.1.3 lists the data for the exiting analysis of the sample center-platform station. C.1.4 Side-Platform Station Sample Calculation. Table C.1.4 lists the data for the exiting analysis of the sample side-platform station.

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Annex D Rail Vehicle Fires D.2 Initial Fire Development Inside Vehicles. D.2.1.1 The ignitibility, heat release rate, and smoke and toxic gas production can be measured in the ASTM E1354 cone calorimeter. It is recommended that all combustible materials on a train be tested in the cone calorimeter. At a minimum, tests should be conducted at a heat flux of 50 kW/m2 in duplicate. For a more detailed evaluation of the material performance, cone calorimeter tests should be performed at three different heat fluxes where the material ignites (e.g., 25, 50, and 75 kW/m2). The cone calorimeter can also be used to measure the critical heat flux of the material, which is the lowest heat flux at which the material will ignite. The critical heat flux can be used to determine the ignition temperature of the material. analysis to predict flame spread along materials will require the more detailed set of cone calorimeter data along with the critical heat flux of the material.

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Annex E Fire Hazard Analysis Process E.1 Introduction. This annex was prepared to provide expanded understanding of the process required to conduct a fire hazard analysis for fixed guideway and passenger rail vehicles. NFPA 101 [1] and other cited references provide more complete information. E.2 Fire Hazard Analysis. The prescriptive-based vehicle fire performance requirements in Chapter 8 of this standard are based on individual material tests. With the use of the fire hazard analysis process, it should be possible to ascertain the fire performance of vehicle materials and assemblies in the context of actual use. The result of such a fire hazard analysis should be a clear understanding of the role of materials, geometry, and other factors in the development of fire in the specific vehicles studied. By identifying when or if specific conditions are reached such that materials begin to contribute to the fire hazard, fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems vehicle designers and authorities having jurisdiction will have a better foundation on which to base appropriate vehicle and system design and the evaluation of the fire performance of such vehicle designs. By showing the relative contribution of a particular design feature or material, it is possible to make a more realistic assessment of the necessity for specific vehicle design requirements to meet fire/life safety objectives and criteria. The SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection Analysis and Design of Buildings [2] provides a framework for these assessments. Other useful references include ASTM E2061 [3] and APTA PR-PS-RP-005-00 [4]. On May 12, 1999, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issued a rule containing passenger rail equipment fire safety regulations [5]. The FRA issued a clarification/revision of the fire safety regulations on June 25, 2002 [6]. 49 CFR 238.103 requires that materials used for passenger rail cars and locomotive cabs meet certain fire safety performance criteria and that fire safety (e.g., hazard) analysis be conducted for all new and existing rail passenger equipment. In addition, scenarios are used to assess the adequacy of vehicle designs considered and ultimately selected. Accordingly, initiating events as referenced from the ASTM rail fire assessment guide [3] are specified for analysis. Although developed for the analysis of existing equipment, the APTA- recommended fire safety practice provides a framework and resources for the application of fire hazard analysis in vehicles that might be applicable to new or retrofitted equipment. Finally, it is important to note that the fire hazards relating to the vehicle-operating environment must be considered. If the outcome predicted by assessment of the scenarios evaluated is bound by the performance criteria stated, then the objectives will have been met, and the life safety characteristics of a proposed vehicle design can be considered to be consistent with the goals of this standard. It must be assumed that if a design fails to comply with the life safety goals and objectives and associated performance criteria, the design must be changed and reassessed iteratively until satisfactory performance levels are attained. On June 25, 2002, the FRA published a Federal Register Notice that clarified several items relating to the fire tests and performance criteria, and revised certain parts of the fire safety analysis requirements [6].

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Documentation of assessment parameters, such as those used with scenarios, is critical. The approval and acceptance of a fire/life safety design is dependent on the quality of the documentation used in this process. E.3 Overview of Fire Hazard Analysis Process for Vehicles. The information in this section is based on a research study sponsored by the FRA. Additional details of the research program are available [7]. ASTM E2061 [3] provides resources and references for the application of fire hazard analysis techniques to rail vehicles but is not intended to provide a specific prescriptive standard or method. Part of the purpose of NFPA 130 is to provide such a specific method for the application of fire hazard analysis tools and the ASTM guide when applied to specific vehicle designs. Traditionally, fire hazard analysis techniques involve a four-step process for the evaluation of a product or products in a specific scenario. The four steps are as follows: (1) Define the context. (2) Define the scenario. (3) Calculate the hazard. (4) Evaluate the consequences. [8] For the analysis of vehicles, this process limits the evaluation to the contribution of specific materials and products without providing an overall assessment of the fire performance of the entire system. The traditional four-step evaluation process can be extended to better reflect the minimum appropriate performance of the overall vehicle system while maintaining the evaluation of a specific design compared against the required baseline. For this systems-based analysis, the process is also conducted in four steps, as follows: (1) Define vehicle performance objectives and design. (2) Calculate vehicle fire performance. (3) Evaluate specific vehicle fire scenarios. (4) Evaluate vehicle car design suitability. Steps 1 and 4 are largely subjective and depend on the expertise of the user. Step 2 can involve hand calculations or some use of computer modeling software. The heart of Step 2 is a sequence of procedures to calculate the development of hazardous conditions over time, to calculate the time needed by occupants to escape under those conditions, and to estimate the resulting effects on the vehicle occupants, based on tenability criteria. In addition to evaluating the hazard resulting from specific materials and components used in the vehicle design, Step 2 determines the worst-case fire that allows the overall vehicle system to meet chosen design criteria. Step 3 evaluates the specific fires that are likely to occur. Step 4 compares the results of Steps 2 and 3 and evaluates the appropriateness of the calculations performed, as well as determines whether the proposed design meets the performance objectives and design established in Step 1. The procedure in Table E.3 shows each step in the process tailored for rail vehicle design. Table E.3 System of Vehicle Fire Hazard Analysis Steps

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E.3.1 Step 1: Define Vehicle Performance Objectives and Design. Both the proposed performance objectives and the vehicle design must be defined. Clear goals and objectives with well-defined acceptance criteria quantify the minimum acceptable performance that must be met in the final vehicle design. These will all be provided by the responsible fixed guideway transit or passenger railroad system, by the authorities having jurisdiction, and by expert engineering judgment based on the performance of the existing acceptable vehicle designs and the operating environment. For example, an objective might be to provide life safety for passengers in the event of a fire or to minimize damage to property. Performance criteria are more specific and might include limits on temperature of materials, gas temperatures, smoke concentration or obscuration levels, concentration of toxic gases, or radiant heat flux levels, to allow for sufficient time to evacuate occupants to a point of safety. The analysis requires a detailed understanding of the geometry (e.g., configuration) of the system being considered, including construction materials, sizes, and connections for all compartments, typical furnishings, and other design parameters that might affect the fire. Such parameters might include fire detection or suppression systems, ventilation systems, and emergency exits and procedures. E.3.2 Step 2: Calculate Vehicle Fire Performance. The second step determines the response of the vehicle system to a range of chosen design fires. This response can be expressed in the form of one or more fire performance graph(s), which present the calculated design criterion as a function of the size of the fire. In addition, the minimum acceptable performance criteria are determined by calculation or specification. For example, a fire performance graph might show the available egress time as a function of the fire size in a vehicle, and the minimum acceptable performance criterion might be the time necessary for passengers to safely evacuate the vehicle. These criteria can be specified by the fixed guideway transit or passenger railroad system, by authorities having jurisdiction, or by expert engineering judgment based on the performance of the existing acceptable designs. Once the detailed problem has been defined, this information can be used as input to a hand calculation or computer fire model to predict conditions within each compartment of the vehicle as a function of time. For this analysis, these conditions include temperature, hot gas layer position (typically termed interface height), visibility, and toxic gas concentrations throughout the car. These conditions are used to calculate tenability within the car. Conditions are considered untenable when there is a threat to passenger life safety, evaluated as an elevated temperature, products of combustion exposure, or a combination of the two. The time at which conditions within the vehicle become untenable for each design fire are plotted as a function of the size of the design fire to produce a fire performance graph for each application. The calculation of minimum necessary egress time, whether from a building or a vehicle, involves many assumptions. Several models can be used to increase the confidence in the egress time calculation. It is important to remember that the minimum necessary egress time does not include panic, scattered luggage in a postcrash vehicle, or bodily injury to occupants prior to evacuation commencement. An appropriate design margin applied to the model time should account for such limitations. Typically, a factor of 2 is used as a design margin [9]. E.3.3 Step 3: Evaluate Specific Vehicle Fire Scenarios.

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Step 3 evaluates possible vehicle fire scenarios in order to place the fire performance curves in context and to allow the designer to adopt reasonable design margins in the final vehicle design evaluation in Step 4. A significant amount of information relevant to scenario definition can be obtained from historical fire incident experience [10, 11]. Databases such as the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) contain relevant vehicle data, normally segregated into specific categories [12]. Representative fire scenarios include the following: (1) Ignition under a seat by a small source (e.g., crumpled newspaper) (2) Ignition source on top of a vandalized seat (e.g., crumpled newspaper) (3) Overheated equipment (e.g., electrical, HVAC) The location of the train must be also considered in the analysis. For example, the fire risk to occupants is greater if the train is located between stations or within a tunnel. More detailed information describing passenger-carrying vehicle fire scenarios is contained in the ASTM guide and the APTA recommended practice cited earlier in Section E.2. Relevant data describing specific fires appropriate for the vehicle application are defined and used as input to the same fire model used in Step 2. The results of these model calculations can be compared to the design fires used in Step 2 to define appropriate design margins for analysis. E.3.4 Evaluate Suitability of Vehicle Design. Taking into account the results of the calculations and using engineering judgment, experience, and the requirements of the authorities having jurisdiction, an appropriate design margin is decided upon and applied to the minimum acceptable criteria. If the worst-case vehicle fire scenarios are all less hazardous than the minimum criteria multiplied by the design margin, then the vehicle design is said to be acceptable. Finally, the results of any analysis should be challenged by the user's common sense and experience. Results that violate these should be questioned and resolved. Comparisons should be made to data from similar experiments or actual passenger train fires wherever possible. If such data are not available, it might be advisable to conduct verifying tests in situations where public safety is at risk. The outcome of the fire hazard analysis will be a statement of whether the vehicle design under consideration constitutes a threat above acceptable limits. Further analysis can ascertain whether compartmentation, detection and suppression systems, and other intervention strategies can further minimize the fire hazard.

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Committee Input No. 51-NFPA 130-2017 [ Section No. 3.3.12 ]

3.3.12* Critical Velocity.

The minimum steady-state velocity of the ventilation airflow moving toward the fire within a tunnel orpassageway that is required to prevent backlayering at the fire site.

A.3.3.12

The prevention of backlayering as defined might include allowance of smoke backflow upstream of the firesource within the zone made untenable due to radiant heat emission. See also B.2.2.




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Committee Statement: The proposed revisions clarify the intent of critical velocity.

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Committee Input No. 62-NFPA 130-2017 [ New Section after 5.3.2.5 ]

5.3.2.6 Alternative Method for Calculation of Platform Occupant Load

5.3.2.6.1

In this section, the term station platform shall refer to the area of a station used primarily by passengersboarding and alighting trains.

5.3.2.6.2

For the purpose of calculating the maximum occupant load, the station platform area shall be the standingarea bounded by one of the following:

(1) The platform edge or platform screens along the platform edges

(2) A boundary dimension parallel to the patform edge or platform screen for side platforms (platformsserving only one track)

5.3.2.6.2.1

The station platform area shall exclude the following:

(1) Any obstructions including lift shafts, voids, escalators, and staircases

(2) Run-off zones directly in front of escalators and staircases

5.3.2.6.3

The maximum occupant load for each platform in a station shall be the sum of the maximum standing loadplus the maximum train load.




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Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Experience shows that projected ridership and headways might not always be reliable as a basis forpredicting occupant loads for future growth. Area density and train capacity would provide certainty(and thus cost-saving in terms of design adjustments). Alternatively, introduce a requirement for OLto consider sensitivity factors (e.g., a range of growth factors and headway intervals). It is recognizedthat further development of this proposal would require better understanding of applicability as itrelates to existing 5.3.2.5. It might also require modification to account for rural vs. urban stations.The implications of this proposal need to be fully vetted. This proposal is based on a concept in LTAProposed changes to SFSRTS 2012.

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Committee Input No. 65-NFPA 130-2017 [ Sections 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3, 6.2.1.4, 6.2.1.5 ]

Sections 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3, 6.2.1.4, 6.2.1.5

6.2.1.2

The standpipe system shall be installed before the enclosed trainway has exceeded a length of 61 m(200 ft) beyond any access shaft or portal and shall be extended as work progresses to within 61 m (200 ft)of the most remote portion of the enclosed trainway.

6.2.1.3

Standpipes shall be sized for approved water flow and pressure at the outlet, based upon the maximumpredicted fire load.

6.2.1.4

Reducers or adapters shall meet the following criteria:

(1) Be provided and attached for connection to the contractor's hose

(2) Be readily removable through the use of a fire fighter's hose spanner wrench

6.2.1.5

Risers shall meet the following criteria:

(1) Be identified with signs as outlined in 6.4.5.7

(2) Be readily accessible for fire department use

(3) Be protected from accidental damage




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Committee Statement

Committee Statement: These sections will be deleted if the language is incorporated into NFPA 241.

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Committee Input No. 64-NFPA 130-2017 [ New Section after 7.2.6.2 ]

7.2.6.3*

Where calculating time of tenability in an enclosed trainway, the evacuation time shall consider the walkingsurface and dimensions of the egress path, the exits from the train vehicle, and the effect of the trainwayenvironment on the evacuating passengers, in establishing the egress travel speed.

A.7.2.6.3

An evacuation study of the Stockholm Metro reported a measured mean evacuation travel speed of 1.1meters/second (216 feet/minute) for a track bed egress path. [Evacuation of a Metro Train in anUnderground Rail Transportation System: Flow Rate Capacity of Train Exits, Tunnel Walking Speeds andExit Choice. Fridolf et al, February 2015]. This travel speed should be reduced by at least 50% for egresspaths along walkways which are designed in accordance with the minimum requirements of 6.3.2.1, in orderto account for single file evacuation flow with no space for passing. The flow rate of tunnel exit doorsshould be computed as per the criteria of 5.3.7.1, and shall have a minimum clear width of 810 mm (32 in.)as per 6.3.2.4. See B.2.3.




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CommitteeStatement:

In 5.3.4.4 and 5.3.4.5 the Standard provides criteria for computing egress travel speeds, and in5.3.7.1 the Standard provides criteria for computing the flow rate of exit doors, for calculatingevacuation times of stations; but no such guidance is given in the Standard for calculating theevacuation times of tunnel trainways, as a factor in establishing the time of tenability to bemaintained by the tunnel emergency ventilation system. Other issues that need to be addressedinclude issues of mobility impaired, where required within the standard, pinch points between thevehicle and the wall.

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Committee Input No. 60-NFPA 130-2017 [ Section No. 10.1 ]

10.1* General.

10.1.1

An emergency communication system shall be provided throughout fixed guideway transit and passengerrail systems in accordance with this chapter.

10.1.1 2

Emergency communications systems shall be designed, installed, commissioned, inspected, tested, andmaintained in accordance with NFPA 72, except as modified herein.

10.1.3

When a mass notification system is provided, it shall be installed and maintained in accordance with NFPA72 .




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CommitteeStatement:

The concept of Mass Notification Systems is a part of today’s life safety design and reviewprocess. NFPA 72 is one of the first national standards to outline the process for a Risk Analysisand installation requirements for a Mass Notification System.

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Committee Input No. 41-NFPA 130-2017 [ New Section after B.1 ]

[See attached Word document for proposed changes]



CI_41.docx




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Submittal Date: Thu Nov 02 14:36:59 EDT 2017

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

New Annex material to provide further guidance regarding key concepts, intent, andobjectives for emergency ventilation system design.

Note that numbering in attached Word document is based on the consolidation of the annexmaterial (see FR #34).

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B.2 Context of NFPA 130 Emergency Ventilation Considerations and Requirements B.2.1 Key Concepts These concepts are fundamental to an understanding of the goals and objectives relative to requirements for emergency ventilation in transit systems: (1) Tenability: Tenability in the context of this Standard relates to a

fire event in a portion of the transit system and is defined in Chapter 3 as “an environment that permits the self‐recue or survival of occupants.”

(2) Open and Enclosed: Tenability is influenced by concepts of “open” and “enclosed”, which in the context of a transit system is intended to refer to the relative propensity for the configuration of a station, guideway or portion thereof to allow unhindered venting of the products of combustion to atmosphere without significantly impacting the tenability of passenger evacuation routes. Where an “enclosed” configuration threatens that propensity, mitigating measures are required, which in station public areas and trainways, generally requires the provision of mechanical smoke control. For stations, these concepts relate directly to provisions that allow non‐fire‐separated circulation routes used for normal passenger circulation to serve also as emergency egress routes.

(3) Evacuation Time: Evacuation time is the fundamental concept that drives requirements related to tenability. The intent is for the evacuation time along each portion of the egress path to be less than the time that portion of the evacuation route remains tenable.

B.2.2 Stations

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B.2.2.1 Background Provisions in NFPA 130 for smoke control in stations relate primarily to train fires. The intent inherent in Chapter 5 is to address the potential for fires originating from other sources through requirements for non‐combustible construction, fire compartmentation, fire suppression and restrictions on combustibles in station public areas. NFPA 130 Chapter 5 stipulates a baseline requirement that stations be designed to achieve evacuation of the calculated occupant load within 4 minutes or less. Documents recording the development of the Standard indicate that the original intent was for the 4‐minute platform clearance time to provide for evacuating occupants away from potential exposure to a train fire. From the Technical Committee’s response to Log #130‐46 in the Technical Committee Documentation from the 1982 Fall meeting:

The stipulated time is intended as a baseline for determining the required capacity and maximum travel distances for platform egress routes considering only the occupant load calculated in accordance with Section 5.3.2 against the egress flow capacities and travel speeds stipulated in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5. It is not intended that this calculation be required to account for delays due to products of combustion or debris along an egress route or delays due to the movement of those who are unable to achieve self‐evacuation. In coordinating this requirement with requirements for tenability as described in Section B.3.1 in Annex B, the intent is for tenability to be evaluated along egress routes once occupants leave the platform, with the goal of moving all occupants to a point of safety within 6

113

minutes as stated in Section 5.3.3.2. The evaluation of tenability on the platform should only be required where the design does not comply with the required 4‐minute platform clearance time in Section 5.3.3.1 or the common path of travel requirements in Section 5.3.3.6. In that case, the tenability evaluation would be for purposes of exploring whether conditions will support longer evacuation times. B.2.2.2 Objectives The objectives of the emergency ventilation system depends upon the purpose(s) that the system is serving. For aboveground enclosed stations the emergency ventilation system may only be intended to address station train fire scenarios, whereas for underground systems the same emergency ventilation equipment may be used to respond to station fire incidents and tunnel fire scenarios in the adjacent guideways (and provide needed ventilation for normal and congested operating modes – see Annex D) using different ventilation response modes. The fundamental objectives of an emergency ventilation system within stations are to: (1) Exhaust smoke from a train fire while drawing in fresh make up

air through the station (2) Maintain tenability of means of egress serving the platform (3) Provide protection of point(s) of safety Schematics illustrating the application of these objectives to general enclosed station configurations are provided in Figure B.2.2.2(a) through Figure B.2.2.2(d).

114

Figure B.2.2.2(a) Typical enclosed station

Figure B.2.2.2(b) Enclosed interchange station

Figure B.2.2.2(c) Enclosed station with platform above concourse

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Figure B.2.2.2(d) Enclosed station with concourse open to the platform

B.2.3 Tunnels B.2.3.1 Background As for stations, NFPA 130 provisions for smoke control in trainways relate primarily to train fires. The potential for fires originating from other sources is addressed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 12 requirements for non‐combustible construction, fire compartmentation and restrictions on combustibles in enclosed trainways.

116

B.2.3.2 Objectives Tunnel emergency ventilation strategies could include longitudinal, semi‐transverse or transverse ventilation. A longitudinal ventilation strategy is typically used for single track rail tunnels, utilizing the same emergency ventilation equipment serving the stations (with supplementary jet fans or mid‐tunnel shafts where deemed necessary). In a longitudinal ventilation strategy the fundamental objective is to provide an evacuation path from the location of the fire. This is accomplished by producing a longitudinal air velocity that is sufficient to prevent backlayering (the movement of smoke and hot gases counter to the direction of the ventilation airflow). The longitudinal velocity that is required to meet this objective is calculated on the basis of the critical velocity. See Figure B.2.3.2(a) and Figure B.2.3.2(b).

Figure B.2.3.2(a) Longitudinal ventilation with insufficient velocity

to prevent backlayering

Figure B.2.3.2(b) Longitudinal ventilation with sufficient velocity

(exceeding critical velocity) to prevent backlayering

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Committee Input No. 37-NFPA 130-2017 [ Section No. B.2 ]


B.2 Tenable Environments.

B.2.1 Environmental Conditions.

Some factors that should be considered in maintaining a tenable environment for periods of short durationare defined in B.2.1.1 through B.2.1.5.


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B.2.1.1 Heat Effects.


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(See also I.1.2.12.) Exposure to heat can lead to life threat in three basic ways:

(1) Hyperthermia

(2) Body surface burns

(3) Respiratory tract burns

For use in the modeling of life threat due to heat exposure in fires, it is necessary to consider only twocriteria: the threshold of burning of the skin and the exposure at which hyperthermia is sufficient to causemental deterioration and thereby threaten survival.

Note that thermal burns to the respiratory tract from inhalation of air containing less than 10 percent byvolume of water vapor do not occur in the absence of burns to the skin or the face; thus, tenability limitswith regard to skin burns normally are lower than for burns to the respiratory tract. However, thermal burnsto the respiratory tract can occur upon inhalation of air above 60°C (140°F) that is saturated with watervapor.

The tenability limit for exposure of skin to radiant heat is approximately 1.7 kW·m-2. Below this incidentheat flux level, exposure can be tolerated almost indefinitely without significantly affecting the time availablefor escape. Above this threshold value, the time to burning of skin due to radiant heat decreases rapidlyaccording to Equation B.2.1.1a.

[B.2.1.1a]

where:

t = time in minutes

q = radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

As with toxic gases, an exposed occupant can be considered to accumulate a dose of radiant heat over aperiod of time. The fraction equivalent dose (FED) of radiant heat accumulated per minute is the reciprocalof tIrad.

Radiant heat tends to be directional, producing localized heating of particular areas of skin even though theair temperature in contact with other parts of the body might be relatively low. Skin temperature depends onthe balance between the rate of heat applied to the skin surface and the removal of heat subcutaneously bythe blood. Thus, there is a threshold radiant flux below which significant heating of the skin is prevented butabove which rapid heating occurs.

Calculation of the time to incapacitation under conditions of exposure to convected heat from air containingless than 10 percent by volume of water vapor can be made using either Equation B.2.1.1b or EquationB.2.1.1c.

As with toxic gases, an exposed occupant can be considered to accumulate a dose of convected heat overa period of time. The fraction equivalent dose (FED) of convected heat accumulated per minute is thereciprocal of tIconv.

Convected heat accumulated per minute depends on the extent to which an exposed occupant is clothedand the nature of the clothing. For fully clothed subjects, Equation B.2.1.1b is suggested:

[B.2.1.1b]

where:

tIconv = time in minutes

T = temperature (°C)

For unclothed or lightly clothed subjects, it might be more appropriate to use Equation B.2.1.1c:

[B.2.1.1c]

where:


T = temperature (°C)

Equations B.2.1.1b and B.2.1.1c are empirical fits to human data. It is estimated that the uncertainty is ±25


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percent.

Thermal tolerance data for unprotected human skin suggest a limit of about 120°C (248°F) for convectedheat, above which there is, within minutes, onset of considerable pain along with the production of burns.Depending on the length of exposure, convective heat below this temperature can also causehyperthermia.

The body of an exposed occupant can be regarded as acquiring a “dose” of heat over a period of time. Ashort exposure to a high radiant heat flux or temperature generally is less tolerable than a longer exposureto a lower temperature or heat flux. A methodology based on additive FEDs similar to that used with toxicgases can be applied. Provided that the temperature in the fire is stable or increasing, the total fractionaleffective dose of heat acquired during an exposure can be calculated using Equation B.2.1.1d:

[B.2.1.1d]

Note 1: In areas within an occupancy where the radiant flux to the skin is under 2.5 kW · m-2, the first termin Equation B.2.1.1d is to be set at zero.

Note 2: The uncertainty associated with the use of this last equation would be dependent on theuncertainties with the use of the three earlier equations.

The time at which the FED accumulated sum exceeds an incapacitating threshold value of 0.3 representsthe time available for escape for the chosen radiant and convective heat exposures.

As an example, consider the following:

(1) Evacuees lightly clothed

(2) Zero radiant heat flux

(3) Time to FED reduced by 25 percent to allow for uncertainty in Equations B.2.1.1b and B.2.1.1c

(4) Exposure temperature constant

(5) FED not to exceed 0.3

Equations B.2.1.1c and B.2.1.1d can be manipulated to provide the following:

[B.2.1.1e]

where:

texp = time of exposure (min.) to reach a FED of 0.3

This gives the values in Table B.2.1.1.

Table B.2.1.1 Maximum Exposure Time

Exposure Temperature

Without

Incapacitation

(min.)°C °F

80 176 3.8

75 167 4.7

70 158 6.0

65 149 7.7

60 140 10.1

55 131 13.6

50 122 18.8

45 113 26.9

40 104 40.2


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B.2.1.2 Air Carbon Monoxide Content.

An exposed occupant can be considered to accumulate a dose of carbon monoxide over a period of time.This exposure to carbon monoxide can be expressed as a fractional effective dose, according to EquationB.2.1.2a; see B.2.1.2.1, reference [1] [page 6, equation (2)]:

[B.2.1.2]

where:

Δt = time increment in minutes

[CO] = average concentration of CO (ppm) over the time increment Δt

It has been estimated that the uncertainty associated with the use of Equation B.2.1.2a is ±35 percent. Thetime at which the FED accumulated sum exceeds a chosen incapacitating threshold value represents thetime available for escape for the chosen carbon monoxide exposure. As an example, consider thefollowing:

(1) Time to FED reduced by 35 percent to allow for the uncertainty in Equation B.2.1.2a

(2) Exposure concentration constant

This gives the values in Table B.2.1.2 for a range of threshold values.

Table B.2.1.2 Maximum Carbon Monoxide Exposure

Time

(min)

Tenability Limit

AEGL 2 0.3 0.5

4 -- 1706 2844

6 -- 1138 1896

10 420 683 1138

15 -- 455 758

30 150 228 379

60 83 114 190

240 33 28 47

A value for the FED threshold limit of 0.5 is typical of healthy adult populations [1], 0.3 is typical in order toprovide for escape by the more sensitive populations [1], and the AEGL 2 limits are intended to protect thegeneral population, including susceptible individuals, from irreversible or other serious long-lasting healtheffects [2].

The selection of the FED threshold limit value should be chosen appropriate for the fire safety designobjectives. A value of 0.3 is typical. More conservative criteria may be employed for use by especiallysusceptible populations. Additional information is available in references [1] and [3].

B.2.1.2.1

The following references are cited in B.2.1.2:

(1) “Life threat from fires — Guidance on the estimation of time available for escape using fire data,”ISO/DIS 13571, International Standards Organization, 2006.

(2) “Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals, Volume 8,” Committee on AcuteExposure Guideline Levels, Committee on Toxicology, National Research Council. National AcademiesPress, Washington DC, 2010.

(3) Kuligowski, E. D., “Compilation of Data on the Sublethal Effects of Fire Effluent,” Technical Note 1644,National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2009.

B.2.1.3 Smoke Obscuration Levels.

Smoke obscuration levels should be maintained below the point at which a sign internally illuminated at 80lx (7.5 ft-candles) is discernible at 30 m (100 ft) and doors and walls are discernible at 10 m (33 ft).


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B.2.1.4 Air Velocities.

B.2.1.4.1

Air velocities in enclosed stations and trainways should be greater than or equal to 0.75 m/sec (150 fpm).

B.2.1.4.2

Air velocities in enclosed stations and trainways that are being used for emergency evacuation or byemergency personnel should not be greater than 11.0 m/sec (2200 fpm).

B.2.1.5 Noise Levels.

Criteria for noise levels should be established for the various situations and potential exposures particularto the environments addressed by this standard. The intent of the recommended criteria is to maintain atleast a minimal level of speech intelligibility along emergency evacuation routes. This might requireadditional noise control measures and acoustical treatment to achieve. Exceptions taken to therecommended noise levels for reasons of cost and feasibility should be as few and as slight as reasonablypossible. For example, local area exceptions to the recommended acoustic criteria could be required to beapplied for defined limited distances along the evacuation path that are near active noise sources. Othermeans of providing emergency evacuation guidance using acoustic, nonacoustic, or combined methodsmight be considered. Starting points for various design scenarios should be considered as follows:

(1) Where reliance on unamplified speech is used as part of the emergency response inside a tunnel, thespeech interference level (SIL) during emergency response from all active systems measured alongthe path of evacuation at any point 1.52 m (5 ft) above the walking surface should not exceed 78 dBZLeq “slow” over any period of 1 minute, using the arithmetic average of unweighted sound pressure

level in the 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 Hz octave bands.

(2) For intelligible communication between emergency evacuation responders and the public, wherereliance on amplified speech is used as part of the emergency response within a station, refer toNFPA 72.

(3) Where reliance on amplified speech is used as part of the emergency response within a tunnel, thesound pressure level from all active systems measured inside a tunnel along the path of evacuation atany point 1.52 m (5 ft) above the walking surface should be designed to support speech intelligibility offixed voice communication systems to achieve a measured STI of not less than 0.45 (0.65 CIS) and anaverage STI of not less than 0.5 (0.7 CIS) as per D.2.4.1 of NFPA 72. Refer to Annex D of NFPA 72 forfurther information on speech intelligibility for voice communication systems.


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B.2.2 Geometric Considerations.

Some factors that should be considered in establishing a tenable environment in stations are as follows:

(1) The evacuation path requires a height clear of smoke of at least 2 m (6.6 ft). For low-ceiling areas,selection of the modeling method and the criteria to be achieved should address the limitationsimposed by ceiling heights below 3 m (9.84 ft). At low-ceiling areas in an evacuation path, beyond theimmediate vicinity of a fire, smoke should be excluded to the greatest extent practicable.

(2) The application of tenability criteria at the perimeter of a fire is impractical. The zone of tenabilityshould be defined to apply outside a boundary away from the perimeter of the fire. This distance will bedependent on the fire heat release rate, the fire smoke release rate, local geometry, and ventilation andcould be as much as 30 m (100 ft). A critical consideration in determining this distance will be how theresultant radiation exposures and smoke layer temperatures affect egress. This consideration shouldinclude the specific geometries of each application, such as vehicle length, number of vehicles open toeach other, fire location, platform width and configuration, and ventilation system effectiveness, amongothers, and how those factors interact to support or interfere with access to the means of egress.

(3) The beneficial effects of an emergency ventilation system during a fire incident will not becomecompletely available until the system is operated and reaches full capacity. During the time betweeninitiation of a fire incident and the desired ventilation response achieving its full capacity, the smokecan spread into the intended zone of tenability. The ventilation system should have sufficient capacityto counter this pre-ventilation smoke spread. Whenever possible, the design of the space geometryshould consider arrangements to minimize the pre-ventilation smoke spread. The overall extent of pre-ventilation smoke spread should also be considered with respect to its potential effect on egress.

(4) During the emergency ventilation response, short-term transient events due to step-like changes ingeometry can momentarily provide a significant boost to the fire heat and smoke release rates.Examples include vehicle doors opening or the failure of vehicle windows. The ventilation systemshould have sufficient capacity to counter such short-term transients affecting smoke spread.

B.2.3 Time Considerations.

Some factors that should be considered in establishing the time of tenability are as follows:

(1) The time for fire to ignite and become established

(2) The time for fire to be noticed and reported

(3) The time for the entity receiving the fire report to confirm existence of fire and initiate response

(4) The time for all people who can self-rescue to evacuate to a point of safety

(5) The time for emergency personnel to arrive at the station platform

(6) The time for emergency personnel to search for, locate, and evacuate all those who cannot self-rescue

(7) The time for fire fighters to begin to suppress the fire

B.2.4 Modeling Accuracy.

Where modeling is used to determine factors such as temperature, visibility, and smoke layer height, anappropriate sensitivity analysis should be performed.



CI_37.docx




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Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Annex guidance relative to tenability criteria has been updated to incorporate technical referencesfor the source material rather than reproducing information directly from a technical document withinsufficient reference. The intent is to refer to a document more regularly updated rather thanincorporating material that may go out of date or require additional maintenance.


ResponseMessage:


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B.2 Tenable Environments. This section describes factors used in assessing tenability in a station or tunnel environment. These factors should be considered as guidelines rather than absolutes, to be applied after due consideration of the parameters described in Section B.4.6. Table B.2 outlines suggested tenability criteria, which are discussed in further detail in the following sections. Table B.2 Tenability Criteria Guidelines

Criteria ValueHeat Effects Air saturated with water vapour < 60 °C

Radiant heat exposure < 2.5 kW/m²

Carbon Monoxide

Maximum (few minutes)

Average (first 6 minutes of exposure)

Average (first 15 minutes of exposure)

remainder of exposure

≤ 1700 ppm

≤ 1138 ppm ≤ 683 ppm ≤ 114 ppm

Smoke Obscuration

80 lux sign discernable at 30 m

Walls and Doors discernable at 10 m

Velocity ≤ 11 m/s air velocity along any path of emergency egress travel

Height 1.8 m above the floor

B.2.1 Environmental Conditions.

Some factors that should be considered in maintaining a tenable

environment for periods of short duration are defined in B.2.1.1

through B.2.1.5.

B.2.1.1 Heat Effects.

(See also I.1.2.12.) Exposure to heat can lead to life

126

threat in three basic ways: (1) Hyperthermia

(2) Body surface burns

(3) Respiratory tract burns

For use in the modeling of life threat due to heat exposure in fires, it is

necessary to consider only two criteria: the threshold of burning of the

skin and the exposure at which hyperthermia is sufficient to cause

mental deterioration and thereby threaten survival. Heat exposure of

occupants during fires is a function of temperature and radiant heat

flux.

Further detail regarding the guidance in the following sections is available in reference (1).

B.2.1.1 Temperature

Note that thermal burns to the respiratory tract from inhalation of air

containing less than 10 percent by volume of water vapor do not occur

in the absence of burns to the skin or the face; thus, tenability limits

with regard to skin burns normally are lower than for burns to the

respiratory tract. However, thermal burns to the respiratory tract can

occur upon inhalation of air above 60°C (140°F) that is saturated with

water vapor.

B.2.1.2 Radiant Heat

The tenability limit for exposure of skin to radiant heat is approximately

1.7 kW·m-2. Below this incident heat flux level, exposure can be

tolerated almost indefinitely without significantly affecting the time

available for escape. Exposure to radiant heat fluxes of 2.5 kW∙m‐2

can be tolerated for several minutes, and above Above this

threshold value, the time to burning of skin due to radiant heat

decreases rapidly according to Equation B.2.1.1a. B.2.1.2a

127

[B.2.1.12a]

where:

t = time in minutes

q = radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

For situations where occupants are required to pass under a hot smoke layer in order to escape, this radiant flux corresponds approximately to a hot layer temperature of 200 °C. B.2.1.3 Accumulated Heat Exposure As with toxic gases, an exposed occupant can be considered to

accumulate a dose of radiant and convected heat over a period of time.

Methodology for establishing tenability criteria and estimating the

accumulated heat exposure using additive Fractional Effective Dose

(FED) for radiation and convective heat can be found in reference (1).

The fraction equivalent dose (FED) of radiant heat accumulated per minute

is the reciprocal of tIrad.

Radiant heat tends to be directional, producing localized heating of

particular areas of skin even though the air temperature in contact with

other parts of the body might be relatively low. Skin temperature depends

on the balance between the rate of heat applied to the skin surface and

the removal of heat subcutaneously by the blood. Thus, there is a

threshold radiant flux below which significant heating of the skin is

prevented but above which rapid heating occurs.

Calculation of the time to incapacitation under conditions of exposure to

convected heat from air containing less than 10 percent by volume of

water vapor can be made using either Equation B.2.1.1b or Equation

B.2.1.1c.

As with toxic gases, an exposed occupant can be considered to

accumulate a dose of convected heat over a period of time. The fraction

equivalent dose (FED) of convected heat accumulated per minute is the

128

reciprocal of tIconv.

Convected heat accumulated per minute depends on the extent to which

an exposed occupant is clothed and the nature of the clothing. For fully

clothed subjects, Equation B.2.1.1b is suggested:

[B.2.1.1b]

where:


T = temperature (°C) For unclothed or lightly clothed subjects, it might be more appropriate to use Equation B.2.1.1c:

[B.2.1.1c]

where:


T = temperature (°C) Equations B.2.1.1b and B.2.1.1c are empirical fits to human data. It is

estimated that the uncertainty is ±25 percent.

Thermal tolerance data for unprotected human skin suggest a limit of

about 120°C (248°F) for convected heat, above which there is, within

minutes, onset of considerable pain along with the

production of burns. Depending on the length of exposure, convective

heat below this temperature can also cause hyperthermia.

The body of an exposed occupant can be regarded as acquiring a “dose”

of heat over a period of time. A short exposure to a high radiant heat flux or

temperature generally is less tolerable than a longer exposure to a lower

temperature or heat flux. A methodology based on additive FEDs similar to

that used with toxic gases can be applied. Provided that the temperature in

the fire is stable or increasing, the total fractional effective dose of heat

acquired during an exposure can be calculated using Equation B.2.1.1d:

129

[B.2.1.1d]

Note 1: In areas within an occupancy where the radiant flux to the skin is

under 2.5 kW · m-2, the first term in Equation B.?2.1.1d is to be set at

zero.

Note 2: The uncertainty associated with the use of this last equation

would be dependent on the uncertainties with the use of the three earlier

equations.

The time at which the FED accumulated sum exceeds an incapacitating

threshold value of 0.3 represents the time available for escape for the

chosen radiant and convective heat exposures.

As an example, the values in Table B.2.1.3 are determined using the FED

methodology in reference (1) with the following assumptions: consider

the following: (1) Evacuees are lightly clothed

(2) Zero radiant heat flux (the accumulated radiation term tends to 0 where radiant heat flux is below 2.5 kW/m2)

(3) Time to FED reduced by 25 percent to allow for uncertainty in the equations estimating accumulated convective heat Equations B.2.1.1b and B.2.1.1c

(4) Exposure temperature constant

(5) FED not to exceed 0.3, consistent with recommended design limit that are more conservative to allow for sensitive members of the exposed population

Equations B.2.1.1c and B.2.1.1d can be manipulated to provide the following:

[B.2.1.1e]

where:

130

texp = time of exposure (min.) to reach a FED of 0.3

This gives the values in Table B.2.1.1.

Table B.2.1.3 B.2.1.1 Maximum Exposure Time

Exposure Temperature Without Incapacitation (min.)

C° F°

80 176 3.875 167 4.760 140 10.1 55 131 13.6 50 122 18.8 45 11 26.9 40 104 40.2

B.2.1.2 B.2.1.4 Air Carbon Monoxide Content.

An exposed occupant can be considered to accumulate a dose of

carbon monoxide over a period of time. This exposure to carbon

monoxide can be expressed as a fractional effective dose, according to

the methodology outlined Equation B.2.1.2a; see B.2.1.2.1, reference

[1] (2) [page 6, equation (2)]:.

[B.2.1.2]

where:

?t = time increment in minutes

[CO] = average concentration of CO (ppm) over the time increment ?t It has been estimated that the uncertainty associated with the use of

131

Equation B.2.1.2a is ±35 percent. The time at which the FED

accumulated sum exceeds a chosen incapacitating threshold value

represents the time available for escape for the chosen carbon

monoxide exposure. As an example, the values in Table B.2.1.4 for

a range of threshold values are determined considering the

following: consider the following:

(1) Time to FED reduced by 35 percent to allow for the uncertainty in Equation B.2.1.2a the equation for fractional effective dose

(2) Exposure concentration constant

This gives the values in Table B.2.1.2 for a range of threshold values. Table B.2.1.2 B.2.1.4 Maximum Carbon Monoxide Exposure Time Tenability Limit

(min) AEGL 2 0.3 0.5

4 ‐‐ 1700 2844 6 ‐‐ 1138 1896 10 420 683 1138 15 ‐‐ 455 758 30 150 228 379 60 83 114 190 240 33 28 47

132

A value for the FED threshold limit of 0.5 is typical of healthy adult

populations [1] (2), 0.3 is typical in order to provide for escape by

the more sensitive populations [1] (2), and the AEGL 2 limits are

intended to protect the general population, including susceptible

individuals, from irreversible or other serious long-lasting health

effects [2] (3).

The selection of the FED threshold limit value should be chosen

appropriate for the fire safety design objectives. A value of 0.3 is

typical. More conservative criteria may be employed for use by

especially susceptible populations. Additional information is

available in references [1] (2) and [3] (4).

B.2.1.2.1

The following references are cited in B.2.1.2:

(1) “Life threat from fires — Guidance on the estimation of

time available for escape using fire data,” ISO/DIS 13571,

International Standards Organization, 2006.

(2) “Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne

Chemicals, Volume 8,” Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline

Levels, Committee on Toxicology, National Research Council.

National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2010.

(3) Kuligowski, E. D., “Compilation of Data on the Sublethal Effects of Fire Effluent,” Technical Note 1644, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2009.

B.2.1.3 B.2.1.5 Smoke Obscuration Levels.

Smoke obscuration levels should be maintained below the point at which a sign internally illuminated at 80 lx (7.5 ft-candles) is discernible at 30 m (100 ft)

and doors and walls are discernible at 10 m (33 ft).

B.2.1.4 B.2.1.6 Air

Velocities. B.2.1.4.1

133

B.2.1.6.1

Air velocities in enclosed stations and trainways should be greater

than or equal to 0.75 m/sec (150 fpm).

B.2.1.4.2 B.2.1.6.2

Air velocities in enclosed stations and trainways that are being used

for emergency evacuation or by emergency personnel should not

be greater than 11.0 m/sec (2200 fpm) where occupants may be

present. Maximum air velocities in enclosed stations and

trainways should not be averaged over cross sectional areas of

concourses, platforms, corridors, or stair/escalator openings.

B.2.1.5 B.2.1.7 Noise Levels.

Criteria for noise levels should be established for the various

situations and potential exposures particular to the environments

addressed by this standard. The intent of the recommended criteria

is to maintain at least a minimal level of speech intelligibility along

emergency evacuation routes. This might require additional noise

control measures and acoustical treatment to achieve. Exceptions

taken to the recommended noise levels for reasons of cost and

feasibility should be as few and as slight as reasonably possible. For

example, local area exceptions to the recommended acoustic criteria

could be required to be applied for defined limited distances along the

evacuation path that are near active noise sources. Other means of

providing emergency evacuation guidance using acoustic, nonacoustic,

or combined methods might be considered. Starting points for various

design scenarios should be considered as follows:

(1) Where reliance on unamplified speech is used as part of the

emergency response inside a tunnel, the speech interference level

(SIL) during emergency response from all active systems measured

along the path of evacuation at any point 1.52 m (5 ft) above the

walking surface should not exceed 78 dBZ Leq “slow” over any period

134

of 1 minute, using the arithmetic average of unweighted sound

pressure level in the 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 Hz octave bands.

(2) For intelligible communication between emergency evacuation

responders and the public, where reliance on amplified speech is

used as part of the emergency response within a station, refer to

NFPA 72.

(3) Where reliance on amplified speech is used as part of the emergency response within a tunnel, the sound pressure level from all active systems measured

inside a tunnel along the path of evacuation at any point 1.52 m (5 ft)

above the walking surface should be designed to support speech

intelligibility of fixed voice communication systems to achieve a

measured STI of not less than 0.45 (0.65 CIS) and an average STI of

not less than 0.5 (0.7 CIS) as per D.2.4.1 of NFPA 72. Refer to Annex

D of NFPA 72 for further information on speech intelligibility for voice

communication systems.

B . 1 2 References.

The following references are cited in this annex: (1) Purser, D.A., McAllister, J.L.., “Assessment of Hazards to

Occupants from Smoke, Toxic Gases, and Heat”, in the SFPE

Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 5th Edition, Volume III,

Chapter 63, Springer, 2016.

(2) “Life threat from fires — Guidance on the estimation of time

available for escape using fire data,” ISO/DIS 13571, International

Standards Organization, 2006.

(3) “Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne

Chemicals, Volume 8,” Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline

Levels, Committee on Toxicology, National Research Council.

National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2010.

135

(4) Kuligowski, E. D., “Compilation of Data on the Sublethal Effects of Fire Effluent,” Technical Note 1644, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2009.

(5) Li, S., Louie, A., and Fuster, E. “The Impacts of Train Fire Profiles on Station Ventilation System Design,” presented at the 15th International Symposium on Aerodynamics, Ventilation & Fire in Tunnels, Barcelona, Spain, 18–20 September 2013.

(6) Chiam, Boon Hui, “Numerical Simulation of a Metro Train Fire,” Fire Engineering Research Report 05/1, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, June 2005.

(7) Kennedy, W.D., Ray, R.E., and Guinan, J.W., “A Short History of Train Fire Heat Release Calculations,” presented at the 1998 ASHRAE Annual Meeting, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, June 1998.

(8) Peacock, R.D., Braun, E., “Fire Safety of Passenger Trains – Phase I: Material Evaluation (Cone Calorimeter)”, NISTIR 6132, Building and Fire Research Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, March 1999.

(9) Peacock, R.D., Reneke, P.A, Averill, J.D., Bukowski, R.W., Klote, J.H., “Fire Safety of Passenger Trains – Phase II: Application of Fire Hazard Analysis Techniques”, NISTIR 6525, Building and Fire Research Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, December 2002.

(10) Peacock, R.D., Averill, J.D., Madrzykowski, D., Stroup, D.W., Reneke, P.A., Bukowski, R.W., “Fire Safety of Passenger Trains – Phase III: Evaluation of Fire Hazard Analysis Using Full‐Scale Passenger Rail Tests”, NISTIR 6563, Building and Fire Research Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, April 2004.

(11) Milford, A., Senez, P., Calder, K., Coles, A., “Computational Analysis of Ignition Source Characteristics on Fire Development in Rapid Transit Vehicles”, Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Fire in Vehicles, 131‐142, Berlin, Germany, 1‐2 October, 2014.

136

(12) Milford, A., Calder, K., Senez, P., Coles, A., “Computational Study of Tunnel Ventilation Effects on Fire Development in Rapid Transit Vehicles”, Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, 381‐390, Marseille, France, 12‐14 March, 2014.

(13) Coles, A., Wolski, A., and Lautenberger, C., “Predicting Design Fires in Rail Vehicles”, 13th International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels (ISAVV 13), New Brunswick, New Jersey, 13‐15 May, 2009.

(14) Lautenberger, C., Wong, W.C., Coles, A., Dembsey, N., and Fernandez‐Pello, A.C., “Comprehensive Data Set for Validation of Fire Growth Models: Experiments and Modeling”, Interflam 2010, Nottingham, UK, July 2010.

(15) Fire in Transport Tunnels – Report on Full‐Scale Tests, EUREKA‐Project EU 499: FIRETUN, Editor Studiengesellschaft Stahlanwendung e.V, November 1995

(16) Poon, L.,Lau, R., “Fire Risk in Metro Tunnels and Stations”, International Journal of Performability Engineering, Vol. 3, No. 3, 355‐368, July 2007.

(17) Ingason, H., Kumm, M., Nilsson,D., Lonnermark, A., Claesson, A., Li, Y.Z., Palm, A., The Metro Project: Final Report, Studies in Sustainable Technology, Malardalen University, 2012.

(18) Hadjisophocleous, G., Lee, D.H., Park, W.H., “Full‐scale Experiments for Heat Release Rate Measurements of Railcar Fires”, Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, 457‐466, New York, USA, 14‐16 March, 2012.

(19) Ingason, H., “Design Fires in Tunnels”, Second International Symposium on Safe and Reliable Tunnels: Innovative European Achievements, Lausanne, 2006.

(20) White, N., Dowling, V., Barnett, J., “Full‐scale Fire Experiment on a Typical Passenger Train”, Eight International Symposium on Fire Safety Science, 1157‐1168, Beijing, China, 2005.

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(21) Bowman, I., Tooley, D., “Towards a Risk‐Informed Approach for Specifying Design Fire Size in Transit Tunnels”, Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, 193‐204, Montreal, Canada, 16‐18 March, 2016.

(22) Kumm, M., “Carried Fire Load in Mass Transport Systems”, Malardalen University, Studies in Sustainable Technology SiST 2010:04

(23) Sardqvist S., “Initial Fires ‐ RHR, Smoke Production and CO Generation from Single Items and Room Fire Tests”, Institute of Technology ‐ Department of Fire Safety Engineering, Lund University, Sweden, April 1993.

(24) Babrauskas, V., “Heat Release Rates”, in the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 5th Edition, Volume I, Chapter 26, Springer, 2016.

(25) Stroup, D.W., Madrzykowski, D., “Heat Release Rate Tests of Plastic Trash Containers”, Test FR 4018, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2003.

(26) Lee B.T., “Heat Release Rate Characteristics of Some Combustible Fuel Sources in Nuclear Power Plants”, NBSIR 85‐3195, US Department of Commerce, July 1985.

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Committee Input No. 38-NFPA 130-2017 [ New Section after B.2.1 ]




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B.2.2 Application and Zone of Tenability in Stations Tenability criteria such as those described in Section B.2.1 are established based upon considerations of wayfinding (visibility) and survivability (thermal effects and toxicity) for evacuating occupants. Tenability in stations is usually predicted by computational fluid dynamics (CFD) programs. The design fire profile is an input to the CFD programs, which predict temperatures, visibilities, and carbon monoxide concentrations as a function of the three‐dimensional location in the station and the time since the initiation of the fire. B.2.2.1 Passengers Able to Self‐Rescue For the evacuation of ambulatory passengers who are able to use all available egress routes for the purposes of evacuation, visibility evaluated in accordance with the information in Section B.2.1.3 is generally the most onerous tenability criterion as they locate and navigate the means of egress. The visibility criteria of Section B.2.1.3 is most directly applicable where passengers are locating and moving towards exits. For platforms that are designed in accordance with the means of egress and dead end requirements of NFPA 130, travel times are relatively short and the majority of the platform clearance time will be driven by queueing. Where occupants are queued at the base of stairs or escalators, the required wayfinding capacity to continue onto the means of egress is limited and criteria specific to visibility of 10 m to walls and doors and 30 m to a light emitting exit sign is less relevant than survivability criteria of thermal effects and toxicity. The visibility criteria are therefore applicable to: (1) Navigation and way finding on the means of egress (stairs and

escalators) serving the platform, and (2) Egress paths to a point of safety.

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B.2.2.2 Passengers Not Able to Self‐Rescue In the context of evacuation of occupants from a public transit system, those who are potentially unable to self rescue in the event of a fire would be passengers with a physical condition or disabilities that would impair their ability to navigate non‐accessible egress routes. In the absence of a barrier free path of travel, these occupants will require assistance from emergency personnel in order to evacuate. Measures that could be incorporated in the design of a system to address life safety for passengers unable to self rescue could include: (1) implementation of emergency waiting areas where the

survivability criteria can be maintained, (2) implementation of areas of refuge that provide a physical barrier

between occupants and the effects of fire, or (3) continued operation of elevators during an emergency to

provide a barrier‐free path of egress for non‐ambulatory passengers.

B.2.2 B . 2 . 3 Geometric Considerations.

Some factors that should be considered in establishing a tenable

environment in stations are as follows:

(1) The evacuation path requires a height clear of smoke of at least

2 m (6.6 ft). For low-ceiling areas, selection of the modeling method

and the criteria to be achieved should address the limitations

imposed by ceiling heights below 3 m (9.84 ft). At low-ceiling areas

in an evacuation path, beyond the immediate vicinity of a fire, smoke

should be excluded to the greatest extent practicable.

(2) The application of tenability criteria at the perimeter of a fire is

impractical. The zone of tenability should be defined to apply outside a

boundary away from the perimeter of the fire. This distance will be

dependent on the fire heat release rate, the fire smoke release rate,

local geometry, and ventilation and could be as much as 30 m (100 ft). 141

A critical consideration in determining this distance will be how the

resultant radiation exposures and smoke layer temperatures affect

egress. This consideration should include the specific geometries of

each application, such as vehicle length, number of vehicles open to

each other, fire location, platform width and configuration, and

ventilation system effectiveness, among others, and how those factors

interact to support or

interfere with access to the means of egress.

(3) The beneficial effects of an emergency ventilation system during a

fire incident will not become completely available until the system is

operated and reaches full capacity. During the time

between initiation of a fire incident and the desired ventilation response achieving its full capacity,

142

the smoke can spread into the intended zone of tenability. The

ventilation system should have sufficient capacity to counter this pre-

ventilation smoke spread. Whenever possible, the design of the space

geometry should consider arrangements to minimize the pre-

ventilation smoke spread. The overall extent of pre-ventilation smoke

spread should also be considered with respect to its potential effect on

egress.

(4) During the emergency ventilation response, short-term transient

events due to step-like changes in geometry can momentarily provide

a significant boost to the fire heat and smoke release rates.

Examples include vehicle doors opening or the failure of vehicle

windows. The ventilation system should have sufficient capacity to

counter such short-term transients affecting smoke spread.

B.2.3 B . 2 . 4 Time Considerations.

Some factors that should be considered in establishing the time

of tenability are as follows: (1) The time for fire to ignite and

become established





(6) The time for emergency personnel to search for, locate, and

evacuate all those who cannot self-rescue


B.2.4 B . 2 . 5 Modeling Accuracy.

Where modeling is used to determine factors such as temperature,

visibility, and smoke layer height, an appropriate sensitivity analysis

143

should be performed.

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Committee Input No. 40-NFPA 130-2017 [ Sections B.2.2, B.2.3 ]


Sections B.2.2, B.2.3


Some factors that should be considered in establishing a tenable environment in stations are as follows:

(1) The evacuation path requires a height clear of smoke of at least 2 m (6.6 ft). For low-ceiling areas,selection of the modeling method and the criteria to be achieved should address the limitationsimposed by ceiling heights below 3 m (9.84 ft). At low-ceiling areas in an evacuation path, beyond theimmediate vicinity of a fire, smoke should be excluded to the greatest extent practicable.

(2) The application of tenability criteria at the perimeter of a fire is impractical. The zone of tenabilityshould be defined to apply outside a boundary away from the perimeter of the fire. This distance willbe dependent on the fire heat release rate, the fire smoke release rate, local geometry, and ventilationand could be as much as 30 m (100 ft). A critical consideration in determining this distance will be howthe resultant radiation exposures and smoke layer temperatures affect egress. This considerationshould include the specific geometries of each application, such as vehicle length, number of vehiclesopen to each other, fire location, platform width and configuration, and ventilation systemeffectiveness, among others, and how those factors interact to support or interfere with access to themeans of egress.

(3) The beneficial effects of an emergency ventilation system during a fire incident will not becomecompletely available until the system is operated and reaches full capacity. During the time betweeninitiation of a fire incident and the desired ventilation response achieving its full capacity, the smokecan spread into the intended zone of tenability. The ventilation system should have sufficient capacityto counter this pre-ventilation smoke spread. Whenever possible, the design of the space geometryshould consider arrangements to minimize the pre-ventilation smoke spread. The overall extent of pre-ventilation smoke spread should also be considered with respect to its potential effect on egress.

(4) During the emergency ventilation response, short-term transient events due to step-like changes ingeometry can momentarily provide a significant boost to the fire heat and smoke release rates.Examples include vehicle doors opening or the failure of vehicle windows. The ventilation systemshould have sufficient capacity to counter such short-term transients affecting smoke spread.


Some factors that should be considered in establishing the time of tenability are as follows:






(6) The time for emergency personnel to search for, locate, and evacuate all those who cannot self-rescue




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Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Editorial changes and additions are for the following reasons:

• Align tenability evaluation height (1.8m) with reference Codes and standards, i.e. IBC andNFPA 5000

• Remove general distance guidance that is subject to misinterpretation and provide link toconsiderations for the application of tenability criteria

• Add reference standard applicable to fire service response


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Some factors that should be considered in establishing a tenable

environment in stations are as follows:

(1) Tenability of the The evacuation path requires a height clear of

smoke should be evaluated at a height of at least 21.8 m (6.6 ft)

from the floor. For low-ceiling areas, selection of the modeling

method and the criteria to be achieved should address the

limitations imposed by ceiling heights below 3 m (9.84 ft). At low-

ceiling areas in an evacuation path, beyond the immediate

vicinity of a fire, smoke should be excluded to the greatest extent

practicable. Upon activation of emergency ventilation fans in

stations, the resulting airflow characteristics and turbulent

mixing typically disrupts smoke stratification, and the concept

of a define smoke layer generally becomes invalid,

particularly in the vicinity of the fire and the areas of the

station between the fire and the extract points.

(2) For tunnel fire scenarios the evacuation path is considered to be upwind of the train where a longitudinal emergency ventilation strategy is implemented.

(2) (3) The application of tenability criteria at the perimeter of a fire is

impractical. The zone of tenability should be defined to apply outside a

boundary away from the perimeter of the fire, maintaining context on

wayfinding and survivability considerations as discussed in Sections

B.2.2.1 and B.2.2.2. This distance will be dependent on the fire heat

release rate, the fire smoke release rate, local geometry, and

ventilation and could be as much as 30 m (100 ft). A critical

consideration in determining this distance will be how the resultant

radiation exposures and smoke layer temperatures (i.e; the

survivability criteria) affect egress. This consideration should include

the specific geometries of each application, such as vehicle length,

number of vehicles open to each other, fire location, platform width and

147

configuration, and ventilation system effectiveness, among others, and

how those factors interact to support or

interfere with access to the means of egress.

(3) (4) The beneficial effects of an emergency ventilation system

during a fire incident will not become completely available until the

system is operated and reaches full capacity. During the time

between initiation of a fire incident and the desired ventilation response achieving its full capacity, the smoke can spread into the intended zone of tenability. The ventilation system should have sufficient capacity to counter this pre-ventilation smoke spread. Whenever possible, the design of the space geometry should consider arrangements to minimize the pre-ventilation smoke spread. The overall extent of pre-ventilation smoke spread should also be considered with respect to its potential effect on egress.

(4) (5) During the emergency ventilation response, short-term

transient events due to step-like changes in geometry can

momentarily provide a significant boost to the fire heat and smoke

release rates. Examples include vehicle doors opening or the failure

of vehicle windows. The ventilation system should have sufficient

capacity to counter such short-term transients affecting smoke

spread.


The time of tenability should be considered in conjunction with the

considerations of B.2.2.1 and B.2.2.2. Some factors that should be

considered in establishing the time of tenability are as follows:





148


(6) The time for emergency personnel to search for, locate, and

evacuate all those who cannot self-rescue


Context for the response and deployment time for emergency personnel, such as professional fire departments, should be evaluated on the information contained in documents and standards such as NFPA 1710 and input from the appropriate fire departments or emergency response personnel.

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Committee Input No. 39-NFPA 130-2017 [ New Section after D.5 ]




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B.11 Fire Scenarios and Risk B.11.1 Performance Based Design Analysis and design of emergency ventilation systems for stations and guideways inherently incorporates performance based design, as engineering analysis is conducted for defined scenarios and the results of the analysis is evaluated against established criteria. In a given project the analysis assumptions, design fires, model parameters, and acceptance criteria all contribute to the underlying level of risk that is being used for the purposes of design. The SFPE Guide for Performance Based Design Error! Reference source not found. provides guidance relative to establishing credible scenarios and considering the potential impact on the design given the associated risk context: “A design fire scenario that is highly improbable and too conservative can lead to an uneconomical building design, which can cause the building not to be built or be functional. On the other hand, a design fire scenario developed using a non‐conservative approach, e.g., a long incipient phase or a slow rate of fire growth, could lead to a building design in which there is an unacceptably high risk to occupants” Key analysis parameters, such as the design fire, that are appropriate to a project will depend on what is considered as acceptable risk for the purposes of design, which may vary depending on the jurisdiction or project. The perception of what is acceptable risk may also vary between the parties involved on a specific project, and requires input and understanding from the stakeholders. The overall goals and objectives could be unique for different projects. Establishing analysis assumptions and performance criteria that are based upon those specific objectives is fundamental to understanding the level of risk that is being design to.

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B.11.2 Evaluating Risk Zero risk is not an achievable goal, and the concept of absolute safety is not obtainable. The risk associated with a design fire is a product of the probability of occurrence and the potential consequence. Further information regarding risk analysis approaches such as risk binning, and other important considerations can be found in NFPA 550, NFPA 551, and references Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found.. In evaluating design fires and consequence rankings in a risk binning approach, the SFPE Guide for Performance Based Design suggests the maximum potential consequence should be identified for the largest realistic events of each type that under consideration, with 95 percent coverage of all possible event coverages. The value of 95 percent is suggested in this context because this value is readily accepted in other engineering fields Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found.. B.11.3 Suggested Methodology Based upon the preceding information, a generalized methodology for the identification and evaluation of potential design fires is outlined below. (1) Evaluation and identification of potential fire scenarios in a risk

context considering factors such as: a. Detailed vehicle information including consideration of new

and/or existing rolling stock, and material fire performance. Potential fire development characteristics should be considered for all types of vehicles that will be in use for the system.

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b. Ignition mechanisms and conditions for fire development c. Anticipated combustible contents and other mitigating

measures within the station public areas (2) Evaluation of probability and potential consequence for

identified fire scenarios (3) Risk evaluation and stakeholder input to establish a reasonable

risk profile for the purposes of design (4) Analysis of the ventilation system relative to project objectives,

design fire scenarios, and acceptance criteria corresponding to design risk profile

Table B.11.3 presents a generalized example evaluation of train vehicle design fires for a new transit system with modern fire hardened vehicles. Table B.11.3 Example evaluation of rolling stock design fire evaluation

Approximate Peak Fire Size

Likelihood

escription

< (Y) MW Anticipated

Localized ignition and fire development remains concentrated to the immediate area of fire origin/equipment component level failure. DESIGN

>95% (Y – X) MW

Credible Large ignition source resulting in fire development to adjacent combustible materials within the train, fire spread involving a portion of the vehicle. DESIGN

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Depending upon stakeholder input, in the above example the range of design fire sizes of < X MW may be determined to correspond to >95% of possible events for the given project when evaluated in a risk context, and a design fire size of X MW may be established as the risk profile that is considered acceptable for the purposes of design. In this context, the required performance of the emergency ventilation system would be analyzed in detail relative to the established acceptance criteria for tenability and system performance for risk levels A and B.

B.11 B.12 References

The following references are cited in this annex:




(Z)+ MW Highly Unlikely

Extreme ignition scenario sufficient to drive fire development throughout the vehicle, with sufficient conditions and ventilation to result in full vehicle involvement. MITIGATION

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Committee Input No. 35-NFPA 130-2017 [ Sections H.2, H.3 ]


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Sections H.2, H.3

H.2 Fire Scenarios.

Representative design fire scenarios include the following:

(1) A fire originates outside the vehicle interior, such as below the floor or rooftop. The firecauses the train to stop in a tunnel or station and could burn through the floor or rooftop intothe vehicle’s interior.

(2) A fire originates in a vehicle’s interior. Some recent train fire studies suggest that anNFPA 130-compliant car will not flashover, unless the event is initiated with two or more litersof a flammable liquid or accelerant. The designer should verify this possibility, as ventilationrequirements can vary greatly depending on flashover expectations.

(3) The fire spreads from car-to-car. The fire might spread from car-to-car. Parameters that affectthis are the fire resistances of the car ends, whether the interior car doors are left open orclosed, whether or not the cars have “bellows” connecting them, the tunnel ventilation movingthe heat from the fire site downstream to the next car, whether the car exterior windows areglass or polycarbonate, and whether or not the station has sprinklers.

(4) A fire consumes trash, luggage, wayside electrical equipment, and so forth, in the stations ortunnels.

(5) A fire occurs in a nontransit occupancy that is not protected by sprinklers, such as a kiosk orsmall shop.

(6) A fire in a dual-powered vehicle (diesel and electric traction) results from the puncture of afuel tank or rupture of a fuel line.

(7) A fire originates in a maintenance vehicle or work train. If maintenance vehicles are never inthe stations or tunnels during periods of revenue operations, then maintenance vehicle orwork train fire scenarios do not have to be considered as design fire scenarios.


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H.3 Fire Profiles.

As per 7.2.1(2), critical velocity is the criterion for determining the required tunnel airflow andhence the ventilation system fan capacities required for tunnel fire incidents. The most commonlyused software is the Subway Environment Simulation (SES) computer program [1]. The peak fireheat release rate is the primary fire input.

Tenability in stations is usually predicted by computational fluid dynamics (CFD) programs. Thedesign fire profile is an input to the CFD programs, which predict temperatures, visibilities, andcarbon monoxide concentrations as a function of the three-dimensional location in the station andthe time since the initiation of the fire. Any combustible materials that could contribute to the fireload at the incident site should also be evaluated.

Several references provided a reasonably good overview of a number of methodologies forpredicting design fire profiles [2][3][4]. More recent methodologies include, but are not limited to,the following:

CFD Modeling of Fire Profiles with Cone Calorimeter Tests of Train Materials. This methodologyincludes cone-calorimeter tests of train materials and computer modeling of fire growth and decayfor a fire that originated in a train’s interior in the presence of accelerants. Several CFD programshave been used in predicting fire profiles for transit and rail projects in the United States since2005. The CFD programs are validated for their intended use and predict pre- and post-flashoverfire profiles. When selecting a computer program, it is important to select the program that bestfits the need of the problem rather than to select the program based on availability. The followingconditions should be considered when building a CFD model for predicting fire profiles: 1)quantity and properties of accelerants; 2) fire characteristic of car interior materials measuredaccording to ASTM E1354; 3) layout of the car interiors, including seating layouts, orientations,and dimensions; 4) bags and luggage carried by passengers; 5) overall thermal transmissionvalue for vehicle body; 6) openings, including windows and doors; 7) oxygen levels; and 8)mechanical and natural ventilation.

Full-Scale Fire Tests. A handful of full-scale train fire tests have yielded data to estimate the fireprofiles. The 1995 EUREKA project [5] showed that an intercity train reached a peak fire heatrelease rate of 12 MW in 25 minutes, while a Metro train car reached a peak fire heat release rate of35 MW in 5 minutes. A Baku Metro train fire (Azerbaijan, 1995) was estimated to reach 100 MW inabout 30-45 minutes, and in 2002 a Frankfurt Metro fire model reached 5.6 MW in 30 minutes [3].The fire profile studies focused on accidental fires such as debris or transient car loadingsbecoming ignited or mechanical failure causing the train car itself to ignite.

More recent full-scale fire tests have focused on fires where a deliberate attempt was made toignite and flashover the train car. The full-scale fire tests in Sweden [6] used a commuter train andfound that the maximum fire heat release rate of 76.7 MW was achieved in 12.7 minutes in one ofthe tests, and the corresponding value for another test with the train walls and ceiling covered byaluminum was 77.4 MW and occurred 117.9 minutes after ignition. The general shape of the twofire curves are almost the same. Other full-scale fire tests in Canada used a subway car, whichreached a maximum FHRR of 52.5 MW in 2.3 minutes, and a railway car, which reached a peakFHRR of 32 MW in 18 minutes [7]. A fourth test was performed in Australia, where a passenger railcar reached a maximum FHRR of 13 MW in 2.3 minutes [8].

Modern trains that are fire hardened have not been readily tested. Research has been on oldermodel trains where the degree of fire hardening has not been quantified. Initiating fires in order tocombust the trains have been disproportionately large in consideration of the ignition sourcetypically found on a train and have been conspicuously located in the worst-case location in orderto combust the train. The above results in a premature growth to the combustible lining materialson the train than would ordinarily be present from ignition sources; this yields extremely largefires that overcome the fire hardening characteristics and result in very large peak heat releaserates. Consideration should also be given to ventilation conditions, different types of liningmaterials, especially at the ceilings, and the interconnection of train cars.



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B . 4 Fire Scenarios.

Representative design fire scenarios include the following:

(1) A fire originates outside the vehicle interior, such as below the

floor or rooftop. The fire causes the train to stop in a tunnel or station

and could burn through the floor or rooftop into the vehicle’s interior.

(2) A fire originates in a vehicle’s interior. Some recent train fire studies suggest that an NFPA 130-compliant car will not flashover, unless the event is

initiated with two or more liters of a flammable liquid or accelerant.

The designer should verify this possibility, as ventilation requirements

can vary greatly depending on flashover expectations.

(3) The fire spreads from car-to-car. The fire might spread from car-to-

car. Parameters that affect this are the fire resistances of the car ends,

whether the interior car doors are left open or closed, whether or not

the cars have “bellows” connecting them, the tunnel ventilation moving

the heat from the fire site downstream to the next car, whether the car

exterior windows are glass or polycarbonate, and whether or not the

station has sprinklers.

(4) A fire consumes trash, luggage, wayside electrical equipment,

and so forth, in the stations or tunnels.

(5) A fire occurs in a nontransit occupancy that is not protected by

sprinklers, such as a kiosk or small shop.

(6) A fire in a dual-powered vehicle (diesel and electric traction)

results from the puncture of a fuel tank or rupture of a fuel line.

(7) A fire originates in a maintenance vehicle or work train. If maintenance vehicles are never in the stations or tunnels during periods of revenue operations, then

maintenance vehicle or work train fire scenarios do not have to be

considered as design fire scenarios.

B . 5 Fire Profiles.

As per 7.2.1(2), critical velocity is the criterion for determining the

162

required tunnel airflow and hence the ventilation system fan capacities

required for tunnel fire incidents. The most commonly used software is

the Subway Environment Simulation (SES) computer program [1]. The

peak fire heat release rate is the primary fire input.

Tenability in stations is usually predicted by computational fluid

dynamics (CFD) programs. The design fire profile is an input to the

CFD programs, which predict temperatures, visibilities, and

163

carbon monoxide concentrations as a function of the three-dimensional location in the station and the time since the initiation of the fire. Any combustible materials that

could contribute to the fire load at the incident site should also be

evaluated.

Several references provided a reasonably good overview of a number

of methodologies for predicting design fire profiles [1(1)][2][3]. More

recent methodologies include, but are not limited to, the following:

CFD Modeling of Fire Profiles with Cone Calorimeter Tests of Train

Materials. This methodology includes cone-calorimeter tests of train

materials and computer modeling of fire growth and decay for a fire

that originated in a train’s interior in the presence of accelerants.

Several CFD programs

have been used in predicting fire profiles for transit and rail projects in

the United States since 2005. The CFD programs are validated for their

intended use and predict pre- and post-flashover fire profiles. When

selecting a computer program, it is important to select the program that

best fits the need of the problem rather than to select the program

based on availability. The following conditions should be considered

when building a CFD model for predicting fire profiles: 1) quantity and

properties of accelerants; 2) fire characteristic of car interior materials

measured according to ASTM E1354; 3) layout of the car interiors,

including seating layouts, orientations, and dimensions; 4) bags and

luggage carried by passengers; 5) overall thermal transmission value

for vehicle body; 6) openings, including windows and doors; 7) oxygen

levels; and 8) mechanical and natural ventilation.

Full-Scale Fire Tests. A handful of full-scale train fire tests have yielded

data to estimate the fire profiles. The 1995 EUREKA project [5] showed

that an intercity train reached a peak fire heat release rate of 12 MW in

25 minutes, while a Metro train car reached a peak fire heat release

rate of

35 MW in 5 minutes. A Baku Metro train fire (Azerbaijan, 1995) was

164

estimated to reach 100 MW in about 30-45 minutes, and in 2002 a

Frankfurt Metro fire model reached 5.6 MW in 30 minutes [3]. The fire

profile studies focused on accidental fires such as debris or transient

car loadings becoming ignited or mechanical failure causing the train

car itself to ignite.

More recent full-scale fire tests have focused on fires where a

deliberate attempt was made to ignite and flashover the train car. The

full-scale fire tests in Sweden [6] used a commuter train and found that

the maximum fire heat release rate of 76.7 MW was achieved in 12.7

minutes in one of the tests, and the corresponding value for another

test with the train walls and ceiling covered by

aluminum was 77.4 MW and occurred 117.9 minutes after ignition. The

general shape of the two fire curves are almost the same. Other full-scale

fire tests in Canada used a subway car, which reached a maximum

FHRR of 52.5 MW in 2.3 minutes, and a railway car, which reached a

peak FHRR of 32

MW in 18 minutes [7]. A fourth test was performed in Australia, where

a passenger rail car reached a maximum FHRR of 13 MW in 2.3

minutes [8].

Modern trains that are fire hardened have not been readily tested.

Research has been on older model trains where the degree of fire

hardening has not been quantified. Initiating fires in order to combust

the trains have been disproportionately large in consideration of the

ignition source

typically found on a train and have been conspicuously located in the

worst-case location in order to combust the train. The above results in a

premature growth to the combustible lining materials on the train than

would ordinarily be present from ignition sources; this yields extremely

large fires that overcome the fire hardening characteristics and result in

very large peak heat release rates.

165

Consideration should also be given to ventilation conditions,

different types of lining materials, especially at the ceilings, and the

interconnection of train cars.

B.5 Train Interior Fires The development of a fire inside a vehicle is dependent on the fire performance of interior finish materials, the size and location of the initiating fire, the size of the enclosure where the fire is located, the interconnection of train cars, and the ventilation into the enclosure. B.5.1 Burning Behavior and Analysis The burning behavior of rail vehicle materials and the potential for fire development has been evaluated using assembly‐ and bench‐ scale testing, as well as numerical modelling using a range of different methodologies. Fire testing of passenger rail interior materials was conducted by NIST under a comprehensive fire safety research program (4)(5)(6) utilized ignition scenarios that included ignition under a seat by small source that was representative of crumpled newspaper, ignition by a small gas burner on top of a seat, and ignition of a newspaper‐filled trash bag fire on top of a seat. Using materials that met current Federal Railway Administration (FRA) requirements at the time of the testing in the 1990s, it was found a significant ignition source (such as a large trash bag along with a 25 kW gas burner) was necessary to sustain flame spread. Computational Fluid Dynamics modelling has been employed in some studies to estimate fire development. Computational analysis of fire development using material properties is complex and context of model parameter uncertainty and the limitations of the methodology that is employed should be fully understood and maintained within

166

the evaluation of model results. The approaches that have been employed include a prescribed burning rate approach (2)(7)(8), with model parameters for material burning characteristics derived from cone calorimeter testing, and more advanced pyrolysis modelling approaches (9)(10). Pyrolysis modelling allows for the effect of incident thermal radiation on the burning behavior of materials to be accounted for in the modelling of flame spread with various materials. However, pyrolysis modelling adds a significant level of complexity relative to the modelling approach adopted in this study, and subsequently requires additional input parameters for materials. These pyrolysis input properties require detailed derivation from experimental measurements using numerical optimization methods. The ignition and potential fire development characteristics of modern transit materials was further examined by Coles et al (9) using a coupled CFD/pyrolysis model in conjunction with bench‐scale and assembly‐scale fire testing. The analysis found that more extreme ignition sources (such as introduced flammable liquid spills with a minimum heat release rate potential of 500 kW) could cause fire spread beyond area of initiating fire, but it was unlikely that small localized fires (such as a trash fire) would lead to fire spread beyond the area of origin. The following parameters are important considerations when conducting CFD analysis of fire development: 1) initiating fire size and characteristics; 2) fire characteristic of car interior materials; 3) layout of the car interiors, including seating layouts, orientations, and dimensions; 4) other fuel loading such as bags and luggage carried by passengers; 5) overall thermal transmission value for vehicle body; 6) openings, including windows and doors; 7) oxygen levels; and 8) mechanical and natural ventilation. B.5.2 Full Scale Vehicle Testing Context

167

A limited number of full‐scale train fire tests and estimates from actual fire incidents have yielded data regarding heat release rate and growth behavior. A number of these tests and incidents are summarized in Table B.6.1.2, with the appropriate interior materials, ignition source (or sources when multiple ignition events were used), and ventilation conditions identified. Table B.5.2 Summary of measured and estimated heat release rates and associated context

Description

Peak Heat Release Rate (MW)

Time to Peak Heat Release Rate (minutes)

Materials and Ignition Context

EUREKA Intercity (test 1992)

12 25 German IC train with steel body, with legacy interior materials. Upholstery listed as rubberized hair, fleece, and lenzing. Hard fibre ceiling with sprayed cork and HPL with sprayed insulation in sidewalls. Ignition by 6.2 kg of accelerant. Tunnel air velocity 0.5 m/s. (19)

168

Description




EUREKA Intercity Express (test 1992)

19 80 German ICE train with steel body, with modern materials at the time of test. First ignition by 6.2 kg of accelerant, fire development ceases after 18 minutes. Second ignition source of 170 wood sticks and 12.3 kg of accelerant is added. Heat release rate below 10 MW for approximately 65‐70 minutes. Tunnel air velocity 0.5 m/s. (19)

EUREKA Metro (test 1992)

35 5 Aluminum body subway train. Seat materials of “latest” design at time of test, other interior materials of “former” design. Ceiling materials listed as sprayed cork, HPL/GF/Foam. Wall materials listed as HPL, sprayed cork, and coreboard. Tunnel air velocity 0.5 m/s. (19)

Baku Metro (fire 1995)

100 (Est)

30‐45 Fire cause reported to be related to an electrical failure. Train approximately 30 years old, with 90% of interior materials estimated to be flammable. (20)

169

Description




METRO Commuter (test 2009‐2012)

76.7 12.7 X1 train dating to 1970’s with underlying plywood flooring with (PVC) glued carpets, and original combustible interior lining and an additional fire load of 351 kg of luggage. Ignition by igniting 1L of petrol with burning fibre board. Ventilation was applied throughout the test using a Mobile Ventilation unit with a volumetric flowrate of 60.3 m3/s. (21)

170

Description




METRO Commuter ‘Refurbished’ (test 2009‐2012)

77.4 118 ‘Refurbished X1’ train to be similar to a modern C20 carriage for Stockholm metro. Underlying plywood flooring with bitumen rubber carpets,1.5 mm thick aluminum wall panels with underlying stone wool insulation, interior surfaces were covered incombustible covering. Seats replaced with ones consistent with C20 carriages. First ignition was achieved by igniting 1L of petrol with burning fibre board. After approximately 110 minutes fire development had largely stopped, so 10L of diesel was applied to 5 pieces of luggage that were then placed into the train car, with rapid ignition and fire development resulting from this second major introduced ignition source. Ventilation was applied throughout the test using a Mobile Ventilation unit with a volumetric flowrate of 60.3 m3/s. (21) .

171

Description




Carleton Subway Car (test 2011)

52.5 9 Legacy Korean subway car with interior materials dating to before modern fire safety guidelines. Tunnel exhaust fan system initially set to 66 m3/s and ramped up to 132 m3/s after 6 minutes. For ignition, a sand propane burner with a HRR of 75kW for the first 3 minutes and 150 kW for the following 8 minutes was placed in the corner of the car. (22)

Carleton Railway Car (test 2011)

32 18 Legacy Korean railway car with interior materials including polyester fiber‐reinforced plastic (FRP) wall panels, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) floor covering, glass fiber insulation, urethane foam for seats, and polyester fiber for seat covers. Tunnel exhaust fan system initially set to 66 m3/s and ramped up to 132 m3/s after 3 minutes. For ignition, a sand propane burner with a HRR of 75kW for the first 3 minutes and 150 kW for the following 8 minutes was placed in the corner of the car. (22)

172

Description




British Rail Sprinter (test)

16 NA Test details not published. (23)

British Rail Sprinter (test)

7 NA Test details not published. (23)

Australian Passenger Rail (Test 2005)

13 2.3 Carriage materials include a stainless steel shell, plywood flooring with carpet. Interior materials such as seating were used and a mixture that was selected from salvaged and spare parts stock. Seat cushions were lined, flexible polyurethane seat foam, with varying fire retardant constituents. Ignition source was 1 kg of crumpled newspaper (approximately 170 kW) on the floor in a corner behind the end seat shell, ignited using a gas flame. (24)

The research conducted largely used older rolling stock where the degree of fire hardening has not been quantified. Initiating fires in order to drive fire development to the point of full vehicle involvement in the trains have generally been disproportionately large in consideration of a credible ignition source typically found on a train. Further, the objective of this approach was not documented.

173

The above results in a premature growth to the combustible lining materials on the train than would ordinarily be present from ignition sources; this yields extremely large fires that overcome the fire hardening characteristics and result in very large peak heat release rates. Accordingly, the peak fire sizes and burning characteristics reported from full scale fire testing of a specific rail vehicle inherently contain risk context relating to the specific material ignition properties, the igniting scenario and location, ventilation conditions within the vehicle, and the overall train configuration. For many of these tests the context of the interior materials and ignition scenarios cannot be correlated to NFPA 130 criteria, as interior materials and/or ignition source characteristics are disproportionate to what would be expected for modern vehicles. In general, the majority of these tests would correlate with a risk level that far exceeds 95% of possible outcomes for modern, fire hardened vehicles (refer to Section B.5.3). Most full vehicle tests have been conducted with longitudinal ventilation inducing flow along the length of the test vehicle within a tunnel segment. This type of ventilation condition may be representative for tunnel fire locations with a longitudinal emergency ventilation strategy, but would be less representative of ventilation conditions for a station where an all‐exhaust emergency ventilation strategy is implemented. Given that these factors are the most significant parameters affecting potential fire development in a train car, the peak heat release rate and growth behavior from these full scale tests have varied significantly and the context of each of these tests (material age and composition, configuration, available ventilation, ignition source, ignition location) should be technically substantiated if the data is to be considered in the estimation of peak fire size or growth rate behavior for a modern vehicle design. B.5.3 Train Exterior Fires

174

Testing and analysis relative to exterior ignition scenarios for rolling stock have not been readily reported in the literature. An exterior fire event for a train vehicle would typically correlate with a local equipment failure, or an ignition source related propulsion, third rail power, or braking systems. In accordance with Chapter 8, floor and roof assemblies are required to provide minimum fire exposure durations to protect the passenger compartment from exterior fire development for the period of occupant evacuation. The potential fire development for an exterior fire will depend upon factors including but not limited to the exterior equipment, traction power configuration, exterior train materials, ignition source, and ventilation conditions.

B . 1 1 References.


(1) Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., “Subway

Environmental Design Handbook (SEDH), Volume II, Subway

Environment Simulation Computer Program, SES Version 4.1, Part I

User’s Manual,” 2nd edition, February 2002, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC.

(2) Li, S., Louie, A., and Fuster, E. “The Impacts of Train Fire

Profiles on Station Ventilation System Design,” presented at the 15th

International Symposium on Aerodynamics, Ventilation & Fire in

Tunnels, Barcelona, Spain, 18–20 September 2013.

(3) Chiam, Boon Hui, “Numerical Simulation of a Metro Train Fire,”

Fire Engineering Research Report 05/1, Department of Civil

Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand,

June 2005.

175


(5) Sørlie, R. and Mathisen, H.M., EUREKA-EU 499 Firetun-Project: Fire Protection in Traffic Tunnels, SINTEF, Applied Thermodynamics, 1994.

(6) Lonnemark, A., et al., “Large-scale Commuter Train Fire Tests —

Results from the METRO Project,” presented at the Fifth International

Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, New York,

14–16 March, 2012.

(7) Hadjisophcleous, G., Lee, D.H. and Park, W.H., “Full-scale

Experiments for Heat Release Rate Measurements of Railcar Fires,”

presented at the Fifth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and

Security, New York, 14–16 March, 2012.

(8) White, N., Dowling, V,. and Barnett, J., “Full-scale Fire

Experiment on a Typical Passenger Train, in Fire Safety Science,”

Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium, Beijing,

International Association for Fire Safety Science, Boston, MA, 2005.




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177






178

Committee Input No. 36-NFPA 130-2017 [ New Section after H.3 ]




CI_36.docx




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

New Annex material is added to incorporate technical context and references relating tocombustible materials, fire test data, and other considerations related to design fires in publicspaces within stations.


ResponseMessage:


26 of 26 1/23/2018, 2:20 PM

179

B.5.4 Public Area Fires In platform and concourse public areas of stations that are of non‐combustible construction and have interior finishes that are limited in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 5, the ignition and potential contribution to combustion of station materials is negligible. Generally, accumulation of significant transient fuel load within these areas of a transit station would not be expected to occur if regular housekeeping and maintenance of the stations occurs. A potential trash fire at the platform or in the concourse would be anticipated to be limited by the size of an individual trash receptacle, which may present a more likely ignition location, or some other transient combustible material such as luggage, which is far less likely (17)(17). Examples of the measured peak heat release rates for trash and other transient combustibles that would likely be present on a transit platform or concourse are summarized in Table B.6.3. For each of these tests the peak heat release rate would generally be short duration, and the fire load should and burning duration be considered along with the peak heat release rate in the evaluation of potential fire hazard of trash and other transient fuels. Table B.5.4 Measured Heat Release Rate Characteristics for Trash and Transient Combustibles

Burning Item Approximate Peak HRR [kW]

Reference

Plastic pram with plastic tires filled with textiles (15.1 kg)

750* (18)

Large backpacker’s rucksack (kg 12.5 kg)

250 (18)

Suitcase (14.7 kg) 250 (18)

180

Burning Item Approximate Peak HRR [kW]

Reference

Small suitcase – Cabin bag (9.1 kg) 150 (18)

Polyethylene wastebasket (0.6 kg) filled with shredded paper (0.2 kg)

15 (19)

Luggage filled with clothes 120 (hard suitcase) 25 (soft suitcase)

(20)

Trash bag filled with paper (1.17 kg) 140 (20)

Amtrak trash bags from overnight trains (1.8 ‐ 9.5 kg)

30 – 260 (5)

136 L plastic trash containers loaded with cellulosic debris

150 ‐ 300 (21)

Two plastic trash bags with 9.1 kg crumpled paper

109 (22)

Two 40 gal. (151 L) trash bags with 11.4 kg rags, 7.7 kg paper towels, 5.9 kg plastic gloves and tape, 5.9 kg methyl alcohol

119 (22)

Two 50 gal. (189 L) plastic trash can with 13.6 kg crumpled paper

109 (22)

Two trash bags with 4.6 kg crumpled paper and 31.8 folded computer paper

40 (22)

* total burning duration above 150 kW approximately 5 minutes

Design fires with steady burning at the peak heat release rate of 1 – 2 MW have been used for various transit projects for concourse and platform ‘trash’ fire scenarios. On the basis of fire load, these design fires exceed credible values for the associated risk when compared with what would be a credible trash/transient combustible material fire in a modern NFPA 130 compliant circulation space. For example,

181

a 1‐2 MW design fire with a ‘medium’ t2 growth rate and a 20 minute duration would correspond to complete combustion of a fire load of approximately 1 – 1.8 GJ. This fuel load is extreme when compared to the actual contents that these scenarios are intended to represent, such as the energy release measured from trash bags (0.04 to 0.11 GJ for 1.8 to 9.5 kg Amtrak trash bags (5)(5)) and pieces of luggage (approximately 0.008 to 0.18 GJ (18)(18)). Public area design fires should be examined with caution as unrealistic fire scenarios may introduce additional ventilation system or operational procedure complexity that is not beneficial for the level of safety of the overall system, especially where emergency ventilation modes to address overly conservative trash fire scenarios may conflict with ventilation modes for train vehicle fires or could lead to delay in initiating emergency fans during a train fire event or, worse, inappropriate fan operation. B.5.5 Retail and Other Occupancy Fires Stations may include non‐transit occupancies, such as retail shops, kiosks, and stands. Non‐system occupancies are required to be fire separated from station public areas per 5.2.4.5, and agent’s/information booths are required to be of non‐combustible construction. Where stations are integrated with non‐system occupancies, the non‐system occupancy fire hazards, protective measures, and potential impact on occupants should be evaluated considering the full station environment holistically.

B . 1 1 References.


(1) Li, S., Louie, A., and Fuster, E. “The Impacts of Train Fire Profiles on Station Ventilation System Design,” presented at the 15th

182

International Symposium on Aerodynamics, Ventilation & Fire in Tunnels, Barcelona, Spain, 18–20 September 2013.








(9) Coles, A., Wolski, A., and Lautenberger, C., “Predicting Design Fires in Rail Vehicles”, 13th International Symposium on

183

Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels (ISAVV 13), New Brunswick, New Jersey, 13‐15 May, 2009.










184





185

ATTACHMENT H

186

NFPA 130 TG Passenger Rail August 26, 2018

Report of the TG on Passenger Rail

August 26, 2018

At our last meeting in Mesa, AZ., the Committee agreed to a proposed revision to 1.1.1 together with a

new Annex note.

A TG undertook a further review of the Standard to develop suggested revisions for the Committee’s

consideration. TG members included Harold Locke, Jarrod Alston, Harold Levitt, Kevin Lewis, David Mao,

Bernard Kennedy and John Cockle.

This task was in response received regarding the impracticability of applying the requirements of NFPA

130 to passenger rail which also reflected the experience of some members of the Committee.

By way of background a Passenger Rail TG was formed circa 1998 and charged with developing

requirement for Passenger Rail to be added to NFPA 130. The attached Word file is the ROPF 1999 from

the TG with the proposed revisions. Note that many of the provisions were by way of a

recommendation. For example, Chapter 2 Stations clause 2.1.1 had an appendix note indicating that this

Chapter might be useful for passenger rail. Chapter 3 Trainways was written in a similar fashion. In other

words the TG and the Committee recognised that it was no appropriate to adopt holus bolus all of the

requirements as many were not applicable to Passenger Rail. The ROPF was adopted by the Committee

and first appeared in the 2000 edition.

With the change in the NFPA Manual of style these appendix notes were deleted virtually without any

consideration to the implications or prior consideration by the Committee. The second attachment is an

extract of the ROP A2006. You will note that I was the lone voice opposed to this revision both at the

ROP and ROPF stages. Thus, the restructuring of the standard was completed for the 2003 edition and

then relevant annex notes were voted out for the 2007 standard.

Included below is an extract from David Mao highlighting some of the difficulties experienced by a

railroad operator in applying the requirements of NFPA 130. An experience similar to what has occurred

in Canada.

“Good morning, Harold and Jarrod,

I am following this issue up.

Some members of NFPA 130 discussed the issue last November. It surfaced again, as my

colleague at Federal Railroad Administration asked me again if NFPA 130 can clarify our

intension in regard to the applicability of “Station Platform,” “Area of Safety,” and “Means of

Egress.”

187

NFPA 130 TG Passenger Rail August 26, 2018

I am forwarding the email transactions of last November, as well as Amtrak’s Intercity Passenger

Platform Projects Interpretation of Applicable Codes, for you to understand that how Amtrak

interpret the Codes.

Essentially, Amtrak is insisting that the NFPA 130 standard applicable all stations. This leads to

the need for specific number of emergency exits, area of refuge, even for the stations in the

rural areas where the characteristic of hazard is not the same as those in the inner cities.

To help you understand the issue more, I am quoting Mr. Richard Cogswell’s concern below:

“However, Amtrak is insisting that they must comply with all aspects of NFPA 130 at hundreds of

passenger stations around the country, which are above ground in the middle of nowhere (some

are in the Iowa cornfields or the Mojave Desert) with only a concrete slab platform and a

minimalistic shelter of some kind. They are insisting that they must provide a fenced in “refuge

area” at both ends of the concrete platform as well as at least two access points to the

platforms and other things, because “NFPA 130 requires them. ”

Since there are a great number of train stations in the rural area, one can imagine the cost

associated with this interpretation.

Could we come up with an effective language in the NFPA 130 Technical Committee’s Station

Task Group to see if this intention can be clarified to reflect the practical situations?

Your input is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

David Mao”

The third attachment is a draft revision to the Standard which basically removes the incumbence

on railroad operators to comply with all of the requirements of the Standard but allow them and

other agencies to adopt the Standard as a “guide”. This may be viewed by some members as

removing material from the Standard but the reality is it is still there and available to be used in

a more practical manner.

188

John: Thank you for your comment. It is not the intention to remove Passenger Rail from the Standard but rather to remove the requirement for compulsory compliance with all of the requirements that are not appropriate. This is in line with the recommendations of the original TG. The Standard can always and has been adopted as a “Guide” by an operator or anyone else for that matter. I have to close off comments at this stage as I will shortly be going abroad for four weeks and need to submit a report to NFPA before I leave so as to be included in the agenda for the Committee meeting in October. As there has been little to no interest in this topic from the members I do not intend to convene a TG meeting October 1. Harold From: Cockle, John Sent: Monday, August 20, 2018 8:43 AM To: Shapiro, Janna; 'Jarrod Alston'; bigtough50; kevin.lewis; david.mao; bernard.kennedy Cc: halocke1 Subject: RE: NFPA 130 TG Passenger Rail Janna, Thank you for the reminder, much appreciated. I’ve been turning over in my mind how to respond to this. I heard the discussion at last Fall’s TC meeting regarding applicability to passenger rail systems and understand the concern over trying to apply all the requirements of NFPA 130 to a tunnel in Montana that sees one passenger train per day, or an open-air platform station in rural Pennsylvania (for instance). However there are passenger rail facilities where applying the FLS requirements of NFPA 130 (or a variation thereof) would be appropriate. Example include tunnels in California that handle 96 passenger trains per day, and commuter rail stations in suburban environments with frequent headways but open environments. In my opinion, the wholesale removal of “passenger rail systems” from NFPA 130 would be a mistake. I’d like to suggest instead a revision to the proposed second paragraph in the Annex A Explanatory Material of Section A.1.1.1 as follows:

If Passenger Rail Systems is added to the list of exception in Section 1.4 (new) it will be much harder to apply NFPA 130 in the future, as opposed to allowing systems to apply for an equivalency.

189

This is my first crack at revising this language – I look forward to hearing what others might think. Regards, John Cockle, CSP

From: Shapiro, Janna Sent: Monday, August 20, 2018 5:42 AM To: 'Jarrod Alston' ; bigtough50; kevin.lewis; david.mao; bernard.kennedy; Cockle, John <John.Cockle Cc: halocke1 Subject: RE: NFPA 130 TG Passenger Rail Task group members, As a reminder, Harold has asked for your feedback. Please respond THIS WEEK with either suggestions for changes, or simply to say that you agree with the proposals. Either way, please acknowledge that you have reviewed the materials. Thank you, Janna Shapiro Engineer | NFPA

1 Batterymarch Park

Quincy, MA 02169-7471

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(Office) 617-984-7136

(Cell) 617-990-2827

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From: halocke1 Sent: Monday, July 30, 2018 11:37 PM To: 'Jarrod Alston' ; bigtough50; kevin.lewis; david.mao; bernard.kennedy; john.cockle Cc: Shapiro, Janna Subject: NFPA 130 TG Passenger Rail

190

mailto:[email protected]

https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.nfpa.org_&d=DwMFAg&c=Nwf-pp4xtYRe0sCRVM8_LWH54joYF7EKmrYIdfxIq10&r=nuNAzWuGyukkG3zyVC6V3A34eismJggbLoa9lo6blCQ&m=H6eeAjQFoQUrx4gQ06g-fwEgIQH-iChcETl86dLXM90&s=v4nVMu5Rl23mMnkrZ9bJH0aTErfCE2kGr1J2R2UJWfE&e=

Firstly, thank you all for volunteering to assist in this assignment to undertake a review and revise the current edition of the Standard with respect to Passenger Rail. If you are aware of any other potential candidates to join the conversation, please let me know. By way of background a Passenger Rail TG was formed circa 1998 and charged with developing requirement for Passenger Rail to be added to NFPA 130. The attached Word file is the ROPF 1999 from the TG with the proposed revisions. Note that many of the provisions were by way of a recommendation. For example, Chapter 2 Stations clause 2.1.1 had an appendix note indicating that this Chapter might be useful for passenger rail. Chapter 3 Trainways was written in a similar fashion. In other words the TG and the Committee recognised that it was no appropriate to adopt holus bolus all of the requirements as many were not applicable to Passenger Rail. The ROPF was adopted by the Committee and first appeared in the 2000 edition. With the change in the NFPA Manual of style these appendix notes were deleted virtually without any consideration to the implications or prior consideration by the Committee. The second attachment is an extract of the ROP A2006. You will note that I was the lone voice opposed to this revision both at the ROP and ROPF stages. Thus, the restructuring of the standard was completed for the 2003 edition and then relevant annex notes were voted out for the 2007 standard. At our last meeting in Mesa, AZ., the Committee agreed to a proposed revision to 1.1.1 together with a new Annex note. Included below is an extract from David Mao highlighting some of the difficulties experienced by a railroad operator in applying the requirements of NFPA 130. An experience similar to what has occurred in Canada.

“Good morning, Harold and Jarrod, I am following this issue up. Some members of NFPA 130 discussed the issue last November. It surfaced again, as my colleague at Federal Railroad Administration asked me again if NFPA 130 can clarify our intension in regard to the applicability of “Station Platform,” “Area of Safety,” and “Means of Egress.” I am forwarding the email transactions of last November, as well as Amtrak’s Intercity Passenger Platform Projects Interpretation of Applicable Codes, for you to understand that how Amtrak interpret the Codes. Essentially, Amtrak is insisting that the NFPA 130 standard applicable all stations. This leads to the need for specific number of emergency exits, area of refuge, even for the stations in the rural areas where the characteristic of hazard is not the same as those in the inner cities. To help you understand the issue more, I am quoting Mr. Richard Cogswell’s concern below: “However, Amtrak is insisting that they must comply with all aspects of NFPA 130 at hundreds of passenger stations around the country, which are above ground in the middle of nowhere (some are in the Iowa cornfields or the Mojave Desert) with only a concrete slab platform and a

191

minimalistic shelter of some kind. They are insisting that they must provide a fenced in “refuge area” at both ends of the concrete platform as well as at least two access points to the platforms and other things, because “NFPA 130 requires them. ” Since there are a great number of train stations in the rural area, one can imagine the cost associated with this interpretation. Could we come up with an effective language in the NFPA 130 Technical Committee’s Station Task Group to see if this intention can be clarified to reflect the practical situations? Your input is greatly appreciated. Sincerely, David Mao”

The third attachment is a draft revision to the Standard which basically removes the incumbence on railroad operators to comply with all of the requirements of the Standard but allow them and other agencies to adopt the Standard as a “guide”. This may be viewed by some members as removing material from the Standard but the reality is it is still there and available to be used in a more practical manner. I would appreciate you reviewing this document and submitting your comments by August 17. If revising the document please use track changes. At that stage I will make a determination of the need for a conference call or preparing a revised draft. Unfortunately I will be on vacation the month of September prior to our next Committee meeting. In closing I would like to acknowledge the help I received in preparing this draft from Janna Shapiro, without whose help we would not have this document to review! Harold Locke & Locke Inc.

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192

NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems

1.1.1*

This standard shall cover life safety from fire and fire protection requirements for fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems, including, but not limited to, stations, trainways, emergency ventilation systems, vehicles, emergency procedures, communications, and control systems.

A.1.1.1

Vehicle maintenance facilities are not addressed by this standard because requirements for that occupancy are provided in other codes and standards. Where vehicle maintenance facilities are integrated or co-located with occupancies covered by this standard, special considerations beyond this standard might be necessary.

For passenger rail systems, application of requirements in this standard should include due consideration of intent where conditions associated with such systems suggest that variations of the literal requirements are appropriate. Examples include systems where passenger platforms are not within the station bui lding, calculation of occupant load for systems with very long headways, and provisions for emergency access and fire suppression in very long tunnels in rural areas.

1.1.2

Fixed guideway transit and passenger rail stations shall pertain to stations accommodating only passengers and employees of the fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems and incidental occupancies in the stations. This standard establishes minimum requirements for each of the identified subsystems.

1.1.3 1.1.4

Except as required by 1.1.3, Tthis standard shall not cover requirements for the following: 1. Passenger Rail Systems

1.2. Conventional freight systems

2.3. Buses and trolley coaches

3.4. Circus trains

4.5. Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations

5.6. Any other system of transportation not included in the definition of fixed guideway transit system(see 3.3.64.1) or passenger rail system(see 3.3.64.2)

6.7. *Shelter stops

A.1.1.3(6)

A shelter stop is a location along a fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system for the loading and unloading of passengers that is located in a public way and is designed for unrestricted movement of passengers. A shelter stop can have a cover but no walls or barriers that would restrict passenger movement.

1.1.41.1.3

To the extent that a system, including those listed in 1.1.3(1) through 1.1.3(6), introduces hazards of a nature similar to those addressed herein, this standard shall be permitted to be used as a guide, including those systems listed in 1.1.4(1) through 1.1.4(7).

1.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this standard shall be to establish minimum requirements that will provide a reasonable degree of safety from fire and its related hazards in fixed guideway transit and passenger rail system environments.

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1 + Numbering Style: 1, 2, 3, … + Start at: 1 +

Alignment: Left + Aligned at: 0.47" + Tab after: 0.72"

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1.3.1

This standard shall apply to new fixed guideway and automated transit and passenger rail systems and to extensions of existing systems.

1.3.4

This standard shall also apply as a basis for fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems where nonelectric and combination electric-other (such as diesel) vehicles are used. Where such vehicles are not passenger-carrying vehicles or are buses or trolley coaches, the standard shall not apply to those vehicles but shall apply to the fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems in which such vehicles are used.

3.3.3 Authority.

The agency legally established and authorized to operate a fixed guideway transit and/or passenger rail system.

3.3.24 Fire Scenario.

A set of conditions that defines the development of a fire, the spread of combustion products in a fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system, the reaction of people to the fire, and the effects of the products of combustion.

3.3.29 Guideway.

That portion of the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system included within right-of-way fences, outer lines of curbs or shoulders, tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches, channels, and waterways and including all appertaining structures.

3.3.59 System.

See 3.3.64.1, Fixed Guideway Transit System, or 3.3.64.2, Passenger Rail System.

3.3.64.2 Passenger Rail System.

A transportation system, utilizing a rail guideway, operating on right-of-way for the movement of passengers within and between metropolitan areas, and consisting of its rail guideways, passenger rail vehicles, and other rolling stock; power systems; buildings; stations; and other stationary and movable apparatus, equipment, appurtenances, and structures.

3.3.65.2 Passenger Rail Vehicle.

A vehicle and/or power unit running on rails used to carry passengers and crew.

4.2.1*

The goals of this standard shall be to provide an environment for occupants of fixed guideway and passenger rail system elements that is safe from fire and similar emergencies to a practical extent based on the following measures:

1. Protection of occupants not intimate with the initial fire development

2. Maximizing the survivability of occupants intimate with the initial fire development

5.1.3.2

Where contiguous nonsystem occupancies share common space with the station, where incidental occupancies are within the station, or where the station is integrated into a building used for nonsystem occupancy of which is for neither fixed guideway not automated fixed guideway transit systemsnor passenger rail, special considerations beyond this standard shall be necessary.

6.3.5.5

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Enclosed trainways greater in length than the minimum length of one train shall be provided with directional signs as appropriate for the emergency procedures developed for the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system in accordance with Chapter 9.

6.4.1.7

If no adjacent or crossing roadways exist for the elevated trainway, access roads at a maximum of 762 m (2500 ft) intervals shall be required.

7.8.1.2

The emergency ventilation circuits routed through the station public areas and trainway shall be protected from physical damage by fixed guideway transit or passenger rail vehicles or other normal operations and from fire as described in 12.4.4.

8.6.1 General Construction.

All motors, motor control, current collectors, and auxiliaries shall be of a type and construction suitable for use on fixed guideway transit and passenger rail vehicles.

8.8.3.3*

The emergency lighting system storage batteries shall have a capacity capable of maintaining the lighting illumination level at not less than 60 percent of the minimum light levels specified in 8.8.3.1 for a period of time to permit evacuation but in no case less than 60 minutes. the following periods: 1. 60 minutes for a fixed guideway transit vehicle

2. 90 minutes for a passenger rail vehicle

A.8.8.3.3

Depending on the location of the train, the time necessary to initiate and complete the evacuation of passengers from the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail vehicle to a point of safety can exceed 1 hour. The minimum period of time for the vehicle emergency lighting system power supply is consistent with NFPA 101, APTA PR-E-S-013-99, and the FRA regulation.

8.11.1* General.

The requirements of this section shall apply to fixed guideway and passenger rail vehicles designed to meet the engineering analysis option permitted by Section 8.2 and to meet the goals and objectives stated in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.

9.1.1

The authority responsible for the safe and efficient operation of a fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system shall anticipate and plan for emergencies that could involve the system.

9.2.1

Operational procedures for the management of emergency situations shall be predefined for situations within the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system.

9.5* Participating Agencies.

Participating agencies to be summoned by operators of a fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system to cooperate and assist, depending on the nature of the emergency, shall include the following:

1. Ambulance service

2. Building department

3. Fire department

4. Medical service

5. Police department

6. Public works (e.g., bridges, streets, sewers)

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or numbering, Font Alignment: Auto

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7. Sanitation department

8. Utility companies (e.g., gas, electricity, telephone, steam)

9. Water department (i.e., water supply)

10. Local transportation companies

11. Red Cross, Salvation Army, and similar agencies

10.1* General.

An emergency communication system shall be provided throughout fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems in accordance with this chapter.

11.2.3

For fixed guideway and passenger rail systems that do not have an operator on board, the controls shall accommodate the remote repositioning of trains.

A.5.3.4.1

The 2003 and previous editions of NFPA 130 required that exit corridors and ramps be a minimum of 1.73 m (5 ft 8 in.) wide. There is no technical basis for the previous minimum. The intent of 5.3.4.1 is to make NFPA 130 consistent with NFPA 101 relative to the minimum 1120 mm (44 in.) corridor width in the means of egress. NFPA 130 addresses means of egress conditions unique to transit/passenger rail facilities such as open platform edges. In NFPA 101, means of egress facilities are based upon a function of the persons served (units of width/person served). NFPA 130 introduces a unit of time in determining the required egress width. This is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the performance requirements related to platform evacuation time and reaching a point of safety.

B.6 Impacts on Ventilation System Design.

The train fire profile has a major impact on the station and tunnel ventilation design. The design fire scenarios and fire profiles should be determined based on the perceived threats. In response to increased awareness that transit and passenger rail systems are potential terrorist targets, some systems are designed for significant incendiary fires and others are not. The decision could be based on cost, the inferred risk, or a formal threat and vulnerability assessment.

E.1 Introduction.

This annex was prepared to provide expanded understanding of the process required to conduct a fire hazard analysis for fixed guideway and passenger rail vehicles. NFPA 101 [1] and other cited references provide more complete information.

E.2 Fire Hazard Analysis.

The prescriptive-based vehicle fire performance requirements in Chapter 8 of this standard are based on individual material tests. With the use of the fire hazard analysis process, it should be possible to ascertain the fire performance of vehicle materials and assemblies in the context of actual use. The result of such a fire hazard analysis should be a clear understanding of the role of materials, geometry, and other factors in the development of fire in the specific vehicles studied. By identifying when or if specific conditions are reached such that materials begin to contribute to the fire hazard, fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems vehicle designers and authorities having jurisdiction will have a better foundation on which to base appropriate vehicle and system design and the evaluation of the fire performance of such vehicle designs. By showing the relative contribution of a particular design feature or material, it is possible to make a more realistic assessment of the necessity for specific vehicle design requirements to meet fire/life safety objectives and criteria……

E.3.1 Step 1: Define Vehicle Performance Objectives and Design.

Both the proposed performance objectives and the vehicle design must be defined. Clear goals and objectives with well-defined acceptance criteria quantify the minimum acceptable performance that must be met in the final vehicle design. These will all be provided by the responsible fixed guideway transit or

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passenger railroad system, by the authorities having jurisdiction, and by expert engineering judgment based on the performance of the existing acceptable vehicle designs and the operating environment. For example, an objective might be to provide life safety for passengers in the event of a fire or to minimize damage to property. Performance criteria are more specific and might include limits on temperature of materials, gas temperatures, smoke concentration or obscuration levels, concentration of toxic gases, or radiant heat flux levels, to allow for sufficient time to evacuate occupants to a point of safety……

E.3.2 Step 2: Calculate Vehicle Fire Performance.

The second step determines the response of the vehicle system to a range of chosen design fires. This response can be expressed in the form of one or more fire performance graph(s), which present the calculated design criterion as a function of the size of the fire. In addition, the minimum acceptable performance criteria are determined by calculation or specification. For example, a fire performance graph might show the available egress time as a function of the fire size in a vehicle, and the minimum acceptable performance criterion might be the time necessary for passengers to safely evacuate the vehicle. These criteria can be specified by the fixed guideway transit or passenger railroad system, by authorities having jurisdiction, or by expert engineering judgment based on the performance of the existing acceptable designs……

Substantiation:

These proposed changes are in response to comments passed to the Committee, the experiences of some members and to recapture the original intent of the Committee in adopting the first TG report in the NFPA 130-2007 edition.

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From the 1999 ROPF

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Commented [FK1]: Chapter 2 is now Chapter 5 and no longer includes this annex note. Please check editions since this to see when the annex note disappeared and why.

Commented [KT2R1]: Standard restructuring occurred between the 2000 and 2003 editions “Editorial restructuring, to conform with the 2000 edition of the NFPA Manual of Style” The annex notes were lost in the 2007 edition, See attached excerpt from 2006 ROP

Commented [FK3]: See above comment.

Commented [FK4]: Same comment as for Stations

Commented [KT5R4]: See my reply above. The attached excerpt covers both chapter 5 and 6.

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From 1999 ROCF

Sept 22. Continuation of 1999 ROCF

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2003 ROP

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130-2

Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 130 ________________________________________________________________ 130-1 Log #148 Final Action: Accept (Entire Document) ________________________________________________________________ SUBMITTER: William D. Kennedy, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows: 1.1.1 This standard shall cover fire protection requirements for passenger rail , underground, surface and elevated fixed guideway transits and passenger rail systems, including trainways, vehicles, and vehicle maintenance and storage areas, and for life safety from fire in fixed guideway transit and passenger rail system stations, trainways, vehicles and outdoor vehicle maintenance and storage areas. 1.1.2 Fixed guideway transit and and passenger rail stations shall pertain to stations accommodating only passengers and employees of the fixed guideway transit and passenger rails systems and incidental occupancies in the stations. This standard establishes minimum requirements for each of the identified subsystems. 1.1.3(5) Any other system of transportation not included in the definition of fixed guideway transit system (see 3.3.52.1) or passenger rail (see 3.3.52.2) system. 3.3.45 Station Platform. The area of station, used primarily for loading and unloading system vehicle passengers Section 3.3.51 Trainway. This portion of the guideway in which the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system 4.1.1 Fire safety on fixed guideways transit and passenger rail systems shall be achieved through a composite of facility design, operating equipment, hardware, procedures, and software subsystems that are integrated to provide requirements for the protection of life and property from the effects of fire. 4.2.2 The standard is prepared with the intent of providing minimum requirements for those instances where noncombustible materials (as defined in 3.3.29) are not used due to other considerations in the design and constructions of the fixed guideway and passenger rail systems elements. 4.3.1 Occupant Protection. Fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems shall be designed, constructed, and maintained to protect occupants who are not intimate with the initial fire development for the time needed to evacuate or relocate them, or defend such occupants in place during a fire or fire related emergency. 5.1.2.1 The primary purpose of a station shall be or the use of the fixed guideway transit and passenger rail passengers who normally stay in a station structure for a period of time no longer than that necessary to wait for and enter a departing, system vehicle or to exit the station after arriving on an incoming fixed guideway transit or passenger rail vehicle. 5.1.2.2 Where contiguous commercial occupancies are in common with the station, or where the station is integrated into a building the occupancy of which is neither for fixed guideway, transit nor for passenger rail, special considerations beyond this standard shall be necessary. 5.4.8 Conductors for emergency lighting and communications shall be protected from physical damage by system vehicles or other normal system operations and from fires in the system by either of the following: (1) Suitable embedment or encasement (2) Routing of such conductors external to the interior underground portions of the transit system facilities 5.5.2.1 The occupant load for a system station shall be determined based on the emergency condition requiring evacuation of that station to a point of safety. 5.5.2.4.1 The basis for calculating the platform occupant load shall be the peak hour patronage figures as projected for design of a new system or as updated for an operating system. 5.7.2.2 The central supervising station and each system station shall be equipped with an approved emergency voice/alarm communication system so that appropriate announcements can be made regarding fire alarms, including provisions for giving necessary information and directions to the public upon receipt of any manual or automatic fire alarm signal. 5.7.2.3 Emergency alarm reporting devices shall be located on passenger platforms and throughout the fixed guideway transit and passenger rail stations such that the travel distance from any point in the public area shall not exceed 91.4 m (300 ft) 100 m (328 ft) or 90 m (295 ft) unless otherwise approved by the authority having jurisdiction ****5.7.2.3 NEEDS FURTHER DISCUSSION TO DETERMINE A VALUE 5.7.4.1 Each underground fixed guideway transit or passenger rail station shall be equipped with a standpipe system of either Class I or Class III type, as defined by NFPA 14. 5.7.4.3.1 In addition to the usual identification required on fire department connections for standpipes, there shall also be wording to identify the fire department connection as part of the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail stations system. 6.1.2.2 Evacuation shall take place only under the guidance and control of authorized, trained system employees or other authorized personnel as warranted under an emergency situation. 7.1.1* This chapter defines the requirements for the environmental conditions and the mechanical and nonmechanical ventilation systems used to meet those requirements for a fire emergency in a system station or guideway mainway as required by Sections 5.3 and 6.2.2.

7.1.2.1 For length determination, include all contiguous enclosed trainway and underground system station segments between portals. 7.1.2.2 A mechanical emergency ventilation system shall be provided in the following locations: (1) In an enclosed system station (2) In a system underground or enclosed trainway that is greater in length than 204.8 m (1000 ft) 300 m (984 ft) 7.1.2.3 A mechanical emergency ventilation system shall not be required in the following locations: (1) In an open system station. (2) Where the length of an underground trainway is less than or equal to 61 m (200 ft) 60 m (197 ft) 7.7.7* All conductors for emergency ventilation fans and related emergency devices shall be protected from physical damage by system vehicles or other normal system operations and from fires in the system by embedment, encasement, or location. [Deleted: fixed guideway transit or passenger rail ] A.5.1.1. This chapter is written for fixed guideway transit stations but can be useful for passenger rail stations A.6.1.1. this chapter is written for fixed guideway transit stations but can be useful for passenger rails stations. SUBSTANTIATION: The above sections have been revised to include passenger rail systems. Sections A.5.1.1 and A.6.1.1 can be deleted because Sections 5.1.1 and 6.1.1 explicitly state that Chapters 5 (Stations) and 6 (Trainways) apply to passenger rail, as well as fixed guideway systems. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 27 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 FETSKO, MACLENNAN EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: LOCKE: This proposal is a substantive technical change to the standard which requires a review by a new Passenger Rail TG, as requested at the last committee meeting held to review the ROP comments for the current edition of the Standard. In my experience with Passenger Rail Systems, many of the requirements in 130 are neither appropriate nor practical to achieve. For example, for stations headways, occupant load calculations and exiting are not necessary as in the majority of cases passenger rail systems have station stops at grade. Similarly, it would be difficult to comply with many of the requirements for trainways and tunnels, particularly in rural and mountainous areas. The existing requirements in the Appendix are sufficient guidance for the designer to take into consideration those aspects of 130 that are appropriate and sensible to employ. COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE MARKOS: 1) Agree with intent to clarify that the various chapters of the Standard apply to all components of both fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems. Since the proposed revisions to Chapter 1 clearly clarify the applicability of the standard to both types of systems and the definitions in Chapter 3 define those systems, it is not necessary to repeat the phrase “fixed guideway transit ” “transit”and “passenger rail” in section throughout the document. Accordingly, 5.1.2.1, 5.7.2.3, 5.7.4.1, 7.7.etc., in the proposal and throughout the standard, should be revised to delete those phrases. However, a further recommendation is that when “vehicle (s) is used in the standard, it be preceded by “passenger carrying” as a generic term to include both “fixed guideway transit” and “passenger rail” vehicles to avoid repetition of the two vehicle types, yet exclude other types of vehicles, i.e., locomotives which do not carry passengers. 2) 4.1.1 Change the word “on” following the phrase “Fire safety” to “of” 3) 4.3.1 Revise lower case “s”of word “system” to “S” 4) 5.1.2.1 Correct “or” following the phrase “shall be” to read “for” 5) 7.1.1 Substitute “trainway” instead of guideway in correction for “mainway” to be consistent with the title of Chapter 6 and usage in the other chapters. Check for consistent usage of “trainway” throughout standard. Since the Committee Meeting vote at the December 2002 ROC Meeting was almost evenly divided relating to acceptance of applicability of the Station and Guideway chapters to Passenger Rail, and due to the great number of proposals for the 2006 cycle, I concur with Mr. Locke’s wish to have the Station and Guideway chapters carefully reviewed by a new Passenger Rail Task Group prior to the Comment deadline and/or prior to the final ROC Committee meeting in October, 2005 to determine the benefits and negative impact of their application to passenger rail stations and guideway. For example, I had understood the added exclusion of “shelter stop” from the standard scope (section 1.1.3), as accepted by the Committee (see Proposal 130-7) would perhaps address Mr. Locke’s and other members’concerns for those greatly lower capacities, however.. However, since the inclusion of a definition for “shelter stop” was rejected by the Committee, lack of clarity may cause unnecessary difficulties in interpretation. See my comment for 130-17. Moreover, I do not necessarily agree, that, for construction of new stations and guideways, passengers using them should not be provided the same level of safety as those traveling on new fixed guideways. Busy passenger rail stations located underground (e.g., Philadelphia and NYC) stations serve high capacities of passengers who do at times require evacuation. The current Annex A notes for Chapter 5 and 6 are very general and do not explain how or which parts of those Chapter may be “useful” for passenger rail stations.

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ATTACHMENT I

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NFPA 130-2017 Edition Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems TIA Log No.: 1403 Reference: A.6.3.2.1 Comment Closing Date: TBD Submitters: Katherine Fagerlund, Jensen Hughes Consulting Canada Ltd. www.nfpa.org/130 1. Revise A.6.3.2.1 to read as follows:

A.6.3.2.1 Maintaining a clear space above the walking surface is important to ensure that projections do not encroach into the means of egress. The envelope created by the boundary limits defined by this paragraph is intended to gradually change gradually and symmetrically from point to point. With respect to clearances to the vehicle, the measurements should be to the static vehicle envelope. (See Figure A.6.3.2.1.)

Figure A.6.3.2.1 Unobstructed Clear Width for Trainway Walkway.

Substantiation: The existing graphic included in Annex A Section A.6.3.2.1 is not accurately scaled and does not adequately illustrate that the dimensions are to be measured symmetrically across a central axis. This has led to misinterpretation for some transit projects. The proposed graphic provides more detail regarding the dimensional intent. The NFPA 130 Technical Committee approved a First Revision for the A 2019 cycle that is consistent with this interpretation. The Technical Committee also approved FI No. 130-14-1 for

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the 2014 edition of NFPA 130, which is also consistent with this interpretation. Given that FIs are applicable only to the edition for which they are issued, this TIA seeks to provide the same interpretation for the 2017 edition of NFPA 130 to create consistency for all editions currently in use. Emergency Nature. The proposed TIA intends to offer to the public a benefit that would lessen a recognized (known) hazard or ameliorate a continuing dangerous condition or situation. Existing design/build contracts are generally bound by the edition in force at the time of Contract closing. This TIA is needed to create consistency in the design of guideway egress routes for contracts awarded with reference to the 2014 versus 2017 editions of NFPA 130.

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ATTACHMENT J

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1

Shapiro, Janna

From: Fagerlund, Katherine <[email protected]>Sent: Saturday, July 7, 2018 7:47 PMTo: halocke1; Shapiro, JannaCc: 'Jarrod Alston'; Coles, AndrewSubject: RE: NFPA 130 Question

Whoops, I just noted a numerical reference error in my the highlighted text in my proposed revisions, corrected below… Katherine Fagerlund JENSEN HUGHES O: +1 604-295-3427 | C: +1 778-896-5044

From: halocke1 [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: July‐07‐18 4:37 PM To: Fagerlund, Katherine <[email protected]>; 'Shapiro, Janna' <[email protected]> Cc: 'Jarrod Alston' <[email protected]>; Coles, Andrew <[email protected]> Subject: RE: NFPA 130 Question Katherine/Janna: Yes I would generally agree with the comments below. Steps up or down are frequently required for the transition from/to a track crossover to the walkway or a platform end. Common sense and construction experience must prevail over literal interpretation of the written words. Practically we cannot “catch” all construction variations in the standard. Harold

From: Fagerlund, Katherine [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Saturday, July 7, 2018 3:31 PM To: Shapiro, Janna <[email protected]> Cc: Jarrod Alston <[email protected]>; Coles, Andrew <[email protected]>; Harold Locke <[email protected]> Subject: RE: NFPA 130 Question Hi, Janna. Yes, all is well here, though crazy busy as usual. You? Response: This would be so much clearer had the originator of the question provided a schematic. If I interpret the text correctly, I think the question is whether the entire crossing needs to be level with the top of rails. If so, that is not the intent. Instead, what’s meant is that, where the crosswalk goes over the track bed, there should be some sort of infill that will reduce the tripping hazard caused by the protrusion of the rails above the walking surface. For parts of the egress path leading to the track crossing, it’s normal to have step‐downs or step‐ups. Also, because of trainway geometry, it’s normal for those ‘steps’ to deviate from conventional rise/run dimensional requirements, though effort should be made to comply to the extent possible. Other thoughts:

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2

Looking again at the related NFPA 130 clauses, I think a rewrite could help. The relevant clauses were not touched in the First Revision, so that would suggest that we’re not allowed to touch these sections. But are edits that don’t impact technical requirements permitted? The rest of this email explains edits that I’d suggest if we’re permitted. All of the following clauses are related.

6.3.1.1* The system shall incorporate a walk surface or other approved means for passengers to evacuate a train at any point along the trainway so that they can proceed to the nearest station or other point of safety.

6.3.1.2 Walkway continuity shall be maintained at special track sections (e.g., crossovers, pocket tracks).

6.3.1.3 Walkway continuity shall be provided by crosswalks at track level.

6.3.3.1 Walking surfaces serving as egress routes within guideways shall have a uniform, slip-resistant design.

6.3.3.2 Guideway crosswalks shall have a uniform walking surface at the top of the rail.

6.3.3.3 Where the trainway track bed serves as the emergency egress pathway, it shall be nominally level and free of obstructions.

6.3.3.4 Except as permitted in 6.3.3.3, walking surfaces shall have a uniform, slip-resistant design. Regarding the specific question that was asked in your email, I think the main problem is the lack of a link between two sections that are pretty far apart in the text—i.e., 6.3.1.3 and 6.3.3.2. Using lists per Manual of Style 3.3.1.2, I’d suggest the following rewrite:

6.3.1 Location of Egress Routes

6.3.1.1* The system shall incorporate a walk surface or other approved means for passengers to evacuate a train at any point along the trainway so that they can proceed to the nearest station or other point of safety.

6.3.3 Egress Components

6.3.3.1 Where evacuation along the trainway is provided by egress paths intended for walking:

6.3.3.1 (1) Walking surfaces serving as egress routes within guideways shall have a uniform, slip-resistant design.

6.3.3.3 (2) Where the trainway track bed serves as the emergency egress pathway, it shall be nominally level and free of obstructions.

6.3.3.4 Except as permitted in 6.3.3.3, walking surfaces shall have a uniform, slip-resistant design. (this is redundant with new 6.3.3.1(1), previously 6.3.3.1)

6.3.1.2 6.3.3.2 Walkway continuity shall be maintained at special track sections (e.g., crossovers, pocket tracks) as follows:

6.3.1.3 (1) Walkway continuity shall be provided by crosswalks at track level.

6.3.3.2 (2) Guideway crosswalks shall have a uniform walking surface at the top of the rail.

We could also further improve the language that is specifically related to the crosswalk part of the egress path:

(new 6.3.3.2(2)) The walking surface of the crosswalk shall be nominally level with the top of the rails. I’d also suggest new Annex language for new 6.3.3.1 as follows (with perhaps a cross‐reference in 6.3.3.2):

The geometry of steps provided to facilitate elevation changes along a guideway walkway should comply to the extent possible with requirements in the applicable building code. Where strict compliance is not achievable, special markings should be considered.

Katherine Fagerlund JENSEN HUGHES O: +1 604-295-3427 | C: +1 778-896-5044

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3

From: Shapiro, Janna [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: July‐06‐18 10:42 AM To: Fagerlund, Katherine <[email protected]> Subject: NFPA 130 Question Hi Katherine, Hope all is well! I have a 130 egress question that I was hoping you could help with: “Part of Phase 2 of the Washington Metro Dulles Extension involves providing an NFPA 130 (2014) compliant emergency egress path from a disabled train at any point on the train way to a passenger station or other point of egress from the train way. For Phase 2 a large portion of the pathway is the two foot wide cable trough running adjacent to the tracks. Track crosswalks are provided at the ends of stations to permit passengers to proceed from a disabled train via the walkways which are on the outside of the dual tracks to landings leading to the station platforms which are on the opposite side of the tracks. Art. 6.3.3.2 of NFPA 130 states that crosswalks must be level with the top of the rails. Because the cable trough has been installed lower than the top of the rails a portion of the egress path is proposed to have one or two steps in it where the crosswalk elevation is more than four inches above the cable trough walkway. Likewise some landing areas preceding the steps and ramps to the station platform were built at another elevation from the top of rails. Our concern is that the crosswalk level with the rails extends across the track to the ends of the supporting cross ties and that steps are acceptable in the continuing walkway beyond the ends of the ties up or down to the height of the cable trough and or landing. Your opinion regarding the above as being an acceptable understanding of the NFPA 130 requirements is requested.” Chad and I took a look at 130 and our initial reaction is no, there cannot be any steps in the guideway crosswalk, but we are not sure what exactly is considered the crosswalk – does it only extend to the ends of the cross ties? Or is it all the way to the walkway? We also aren’t sure how the crosswalk is supposed to tie into the walkway. Are there normally steps to get up to the walkway? Thanks for your help! Janna Shapiro Engineer | NFPA 1 Batterymarch Park Quincy, MA 02169-7471 [email protected] (Office) 617-984-7136 (Cell) 617-990-2827 www.nfpa.org National Fire Protection Association The leading information and knowledge resource on fire, electrical and related hazards. IT’S A BIG WORLD. LET’S PROTECT IT TOGETHER.™ Important Notice: Any opinion expressed in this correspondence is the personal opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the official position of the NFPA or its Technical Committees. In addition, this correspondence is neither intended, nor should it be relied upon, to provide professional consultation or services. Confidentiality: This e-mail (including any attachments) may contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information, and unauthorized disclosure or use is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender and delete this e-mail from your system.

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