A Paper on the Independence of the

Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions

byJulian Rey S. Sabrido

Submitted to

Atty. Paolo EvangelistaAteneo de Davao University

November 21, 2015

Introduction

The Judiciary is one of the three pillars of our government. Some would argue that it is the most powerful branch of the government. But the Court, itself, has discarded this notion and asserted that it is a co-equal branch of the executive and the legislative branch.

It is, however, important to underscore that the judiciary is independent from the other branches. It is its intendance that lends stability of in our government. Imagine our Courts being dictated by our politicians or even influential and wealthy people in our society. Indeed, without such independence, no justice can truly be served.

Although some would argue that the scenario I just described actually exists in the status quo. Perhaps there are some merits in their contentions. There may be some degree of corruption in our judiciary, After all, it’s in a country plagued by fraud and scandals of corruption, who would be shocked that some judge in some municipality accepted a bribe?

The cynism towards our judicial system is inevitable at best and correct at worst. But it would still be important to believe that our justice system works. Our faith in our justice system is fundamental to our faith in our government. As long as we have a judiciary that is free and independent, there is still reason believe in our government and that our leaders are held accountable.

The same is true with our Constitutional Commissions. They were created by our Constitution primarily to hold our government accountable. They are set up in a way that no one could dictate in carrying out their mandates.

This paper will discuss the nature of the Judiciary and the three Constitutional Commissions protected by the 1987 Constitution: the Commission on Elections, Civil Service Commissions and the Commission on Audit. It also seeks to determine the nature and importance of independence among these institutions and how to protect it.

Judicial independence, defined

Judicial independence is one of the most important principles of democratic governments. Primarily, it is the concept that the judiciary needs to be kept away from the other branches of government. That is, courts should not be subject to improper influence from the other branches of government, or from private or partisan interests1.

Judicial Independence is vital aspect to the idea of separation of powers. Separation of powers, as described by the Supreme Court in the case of Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139), is the concept of separation of powers as a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. The court added that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.

The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government2. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution3.

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_independence2 Angara v. Electoral Commissions, 63 Phil. 1393 Id

In Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, where the Court has yet again reasserted its independence from other the jurisdiction of Commission on Audit held the concept of the independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.

In the same case, the Court further explained the two concepts of Judicial Independence under its unique circumstances. Independence, according to the Court, encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.

Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence.

Decisional independence refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law. On the other hand, institutional independence describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government4. Simply put, institutional independence refers to the collective independence of the judiciary as a body.

4 Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC

In the Philippines, the Constitution protects the independence of the judiciary both in its Jurisdiction and fiscal autonomy. Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states that the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Section 6, on the other hand, grants the Supreme Court the exclusive jurisdiction to ha administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof.

To protect it from the other branches of government that control the country’s finances, Section 3, Article VIII further states that the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. Similarly, Section 10 provides that the salary of the members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. There shall be no salary decrease during their continuance.

But the concept of judicial independence is not only based on the constitutional provision. Judicial independence is an inherent character of every democratic government. It is greatly valued and stringently protected every elements posing threats to it by other jurisdictions in the world. In its judgment in the case of MacKeigan v. Hickman, the Canadian Supreme Court held that judicial independence as a constitutional principle fundamental to the Canadian system of government possesses both individual and institutional elements. Actions by other branches of government which undermine the independence of the judiciary therefore attack the integrity of our Constitution5. In Valente v. The Queen, Justice LeDain of Canada enunciated the three core characteristics of judicial independence as:5 MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796, at 825-28

(1) Security of tenure,(2) Financial security, and(3) Administrative independence6.

In the United States, which is where our concept of government is largely based, judicial independence has been a core political value since its founding. A belief in judicial independence, however, exists in the United States alongside an equally strong belief in democratic accountability7. All of its 53 jurisdictions are all largely free to structure their judiciaries as they wish. The lesson from the U.S. experience is that there is no single set of provisions guaranteed to achieve an independent judiciary. Judicial independence takes various forms, shaped by different legal provisions, political traditions, and cultural expectations that have evolved over time and continue to inspire debate and self- reflection8.

In fact, the international community has acknowledged the importance of ensuring that the courts of law in every nation is accorded with independence. In 1985, the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders adopted the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. Among others, the following basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in their task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary9:

1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.

6 The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary, by Daniel C. Préfontaine, Q.C. & Joanne Lee7 Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality by Mira Gur-Arie Russell Wheeler8 Id9 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx

2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.

4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.

5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.

6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected.

7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its function

These principles should be taken into account and respected by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and be brought to the

attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature and the public in general10.

Importance of Judicial Independence

Maintaining the independence of judges, justices and other stakeholders of the judiciary from the pressures and influence of other branches of government is vital to ensure that it upholds its mandate of protecting the Constitution and gain the trust and confidence of the citizenry. Such influence could come from any number of sources. It could arise from improper pressure by the executive or the legislature, by individual litigants, particular pressure groups, the media, self-interest or other judges, in particular more senior judges11.

There is increasing acknowledgement that an independent judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law in a free society. This independence may take a variety of forms across different jurisdictions and systems of law. But the same principle always applies, namely the protection of human rights is dependent on the guarantee that judges will be free and will reasonably be perceived to be free to make impartial decisions based on the facts and the law in each case, and to exercise their role as protectors of the constitution, without any pressure or interference from other sources, especially government. This basic premise is crucial to the maintenance of the rule of law (Daniel C. Préfontaine, 1998).

Constitutional Commission and their independence, Explained

10 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-constitution/jud-acc-ind/independence/11 Id

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines mandates the establishment of independent Constitutional Commissions, to wit: the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.Like the judiciary, the independence of the Commissions is likewise assured by the Constitution.

The express establishment their independence is unmistakable in Section 5, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. To ensure this independence is upheld, Section 5 further guaranteed that the Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

The importance of securing the independence of the Constitutional Commissions could be undermined. Like the judiciary, Constitutional Commissions need autonomy to effectively carry out their mandates. It is the very nature of their functions that call for independence from other branches of the government.

The Civil Service Commission (CSC)

The Section 4 of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution defined the mandate of the Civil Service Commission as follow:

The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Section 2 of the same article, meanwhile, lays the far-reaching scope of the Commission’s authority and dominion. It provides that “The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters”.

Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

The COMELEC is the principal government agency tasked by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations concerning the conduct of regular and special elections. It is a body that is designed to be constitutionally independent from the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government to ensure the conduct of free, fair and honest elections12.

The Commission has the power to propose to Congress measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials will be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies13.

12 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=AboutCOMELEC/OrganizationalInfo13 Id.

Created in 1940 by an amendment to the 1935 Constitution, the COMELEC’s membership was enlarged and its powers expanded by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The Commission exercises not only administrative, but judicial and quasi-judicial powers14.

The COMELEC is mandated with the following functions:

14 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=AboutCOMELEC/SpecialProjects/CitizensCharter/HistoryofCOMELEC

1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of and elections, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay official decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purposes of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful credible elections.

5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, of coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission on Elections.

6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of elections laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.

8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer of employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

9. Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

The Commission on Elections was created to address the general dissatisfaction and distrust in the conduct of elections in the country. Before the creation of the COMELEC, the supervision over the conduct of elections was vested in the Executive Bureau, an office under the Department of Interior and later directly vested in the Department itself when the Executive Bureau was abolished.

There was, however, general dissatisfaction over the manner in which elections were conducted under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. There was growing suspicion that Secretaries of the Interior administered election laws not for the purpose of securing honest and free elections, but to serve the political interest of the party in power to which they belonged. They were never entirely free from suspicion of acting with partisan bias.

The close official relationship between the president and the Secretary of the Interior bred suspicion that elections served the incumbent Secretary’s political interest. The Secretary of the Interior was directly responsible to the President and his tenure of office was dependent not only on the pleasure of the President, but also upon the President’s

own continuance in office. This set up only induced increasing distrust in the verdict at the polls.

The situation impelled the National Assembly to propose the creation by constitutional amendment of a Commission on Elections to take over the functions of the Secretary of the Interior relative to elections.

They can be removed from office only by impeachment and are provided with salaries fixed by law which shall not be decreased during their term of office. These are the safeguards to ensure the independence of the Commission15.

As an added measure, the constitution also grants fiscal autonomy to enable the COMELEC to operate effectively, efficiently and free from political interference. The constitution mandates that "funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, will be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, will be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission.16

Furthermore, the Constitution assures the security of the seven year-tenure of the members of the Commission. Reappointments are also prohibited. As quoted by Justice Antonio Carpio in his separate opinion in the case of Funa v. Villar, Justice JBL Reyes Dissenting Opinion in Visarra further elucidated how Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution, on the terms of office of the members of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), should be interpreted. Justice Reyes explained:

It is clear from the provisions above-quoted that, being, acutely conscious of the crucial importance of the functions of the

15 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=AboutCOMELEC/SpecialProjects/CitizensCharter/HistoryofCOMELEC16 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=AboutCOMELEC/OrganizationalInfo

Commission on Elections to candidates for elective positions, and aware of the consequent pressures and influences that would be brought to bear upon the Commissioners, the framers of this part of the Constitution sought as much as possible to shield the Commission members from any force or influence that might affect them in the discharge of their duties. To this end, the Constitution not only disqualified the Commissioners from holding outside interests that might be affected by their official functions (section 3); it expressly protected the Commissioners against danger of possible retaliation by (a) giving them a fixed term of nine (9) years, not terminable except by impeachment, and by (b) prohibiting any diminution of their salaries during their term of office. The Constitution went even further: cognizant that human conduct may be influenced not only by fear of vindictiveness but also, and even more subtly and powerfully, by prospects of advancement, our fundamental law has likewise provided that members of the Commission on Elections (c) may not be reappointed, and that (d) their salaries may not be increased during their terms. The plain purpose of all these safeguards is that the Commissioners, once appointed and confirmed, should be free to act as their conscience demands, without fear of retaliation or hope of reward; that they should never feel the inducement of either the stick or the carrot. For only the man who has nothing to fear, and nothing to expect, can be considered truly independent. 

Upon these premises, the promotion of Dr. Gaudencio Garcia from Associate Commissioner to Chairman of the Commission, with the attendant higher compensation and pre-requisites, violated the Constitutional prohibition against both reappointment and salary increase. If, by express mandate of the fundamental charter, a Commissioner cannot be validly reappointed, not even to the same position that he has occupied, I can see no excuse for holding that he may validly be appointed again to a higher position within the Commission. It is undeniable that a promotion involves a second appointment, i.e., a reappointment that is expressly forbidden by the Constitution. 

And if the legislature may not lawfully increase the Commissioners salaries during their terms of office, by express constitutional inhibition, how in the name of good sense may the Chief Executive grant such an increase to an Associate Commissioner via a promotional appointment to the Chairmanship?

As Justice Carpio pointed out, it is notable that Justice Reyes’ dissenting opinion was later on adopted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution and abandoned the majority opinion.

The Commission on AuditThe Commission on Audit (COA) is an independent

constitutional commission established by the Constitution. It is the country’s Supreme State Audit Institution. The Philippine Constitution declares its independence as a constitutional office, grants it powers to audit all accounts pertaining to all government revenues and

expenditures/uses of government resources and to prescribe accounting and auditing rules.

The scope of power and authority of the Commission is mandated in Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The said provision provides that the Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis:

a. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;

b. Autonomous state colleges and universities;c. Other government-owned or controlled corporations

and their subsidiaries; andd. Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or

equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.However, where the internal control system of the

audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.

The Commission shall submit to the President and Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the

Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by law17.

Like other Constitutional Commissions, the tenure of the members of COA is also seven years. Reappointments in any case are likewise prohibited. In his dissent on the case Funa v. Villar where the petitioner assailed the reappointment of President Benigno Aquino to the respondent as the Chairman of the Commission, Justice Antonio J. Carpio said that the purpose of the constitutional Prohibition against reappointments is to preserve the independence of COA.

In his separate opinion, Justice Carpio explained

Since the framers of the 1987 Constitution adopted the dissenting opinions in Visarra, Villars promotion from Commissioner to Chairman is clearly a reappointment expressly prohibited by the 1987 Constitution18.

The prohibition must apply to all kinds of reappointment if we are to honor the purpose behind the prohibition. The purpose is to ensure and preserve the independence of the COA and its members. The members of the independent constitutional commissions, in the wise words of Justice JBL Reyes

xxx should be free to act as their conscience demands, without fear of retaliation or hope of reward; that they

17 Section 4, Article IX-D, 1987 Constitution18 Funa v. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

should never feel the inducement of either the stick or the carrot. For only the man who has nothing to fear, and nothing to expect, can be considered truly independent. XXX 

A COA member, like members of the other independent constitutional commissions, may no longer act with independence if he or she can be rewarded with a promotion or reappointment, for he or she will likely do the bidding of the appointing power in the expectation of being promoted or reappointed. This Court has a sacred duty to safeguard the independence of the constitutional commissions, not make them subservient to the appointing power by adopting a view that is grossly and manifestly contrary to the letter and intent of the Constitution.

The minority likewise points out that after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, then President Corazon C. Aquino promoted then Commissioner Eufemio Domingo to Chairman, after Chairman Teofisto Guingona resigned to run for a Senate seat.

The Constitution likewise guarantees the autonomy of the Commission in its conduct of its functions. Section 2 (2), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that the Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or

unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

The Constitution, likewise, protects the jurisdiction of COA. Section 3 prohibits any law exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

Protecting the independence of the judiciary and Constitutional Commissions

1. Securing Tenure and Compensation

Security of tenure and compensation are often described as the hallmarks of an independent judiciary. Common sense dictates that in order for judges to be impartial and independent, they will need to have the security of their jobs and that their families are well-provided. Take these two away and all that we will have are judges giving in and even seeking the approval of our politicians.

Safeguards are in places in no less than the Constitution itself to secure the tenure and compensation of the members of the judiciary and constitutional commissions. The security of tenure of judges and members of the Constitutional Commissions is well-estabished in the Constitution. As provided by Section 11 of Article VIII, justices and justices shall hold office until they retire at age seventy or become incapacitated to discharge duties of their office. The power to discipline judges and order their dismissal was also conferred upon the Supreme Court.

As with their compensation, Section 10, Article VIII prohibits any decrease in the compensation of the members of the judiciary during their continuance in the office. But the question still remains on whether their compensation is enough to prevent them from being dissuade them from resorting into corruption or bribery. Accoding to Supreme Court Justice Ma. Lourdes Serreno, judges have to live a middle class life. They should be able to send their children to college.

In a report by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism which studied the descrepensies between the decalred income of Supreme Court Justices in their Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth and the income reported by the Commission on Audit, it was revealed that the Justices were amongst the highest paid public officials in the country. While that may be true for the Justices, such is not the case for judges in the lower courts. In fact, it has been reported that some courts now are in need of judges. Being a judge seems is increasingly becoming an unattracted job for the competent lawyers because of its very low pay19.

Jose Midas Marquez, the high court’s spokesperson and administrator, said the unattractive financial packages for judges in the first and second level courts had discouraged “brilliant” lawyers from joining the judiciary. At present, he said judges handling at least 300 cases in metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts receive a monthly salary of “only” P60,000 plus P20,000 in allowances20. The Supreme Court (SC) has pushed for

19 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/63635/lower-courts-lack-judges-due-to-low-unattractive-pay20 Id.

its order for the increase in the compensation and allowances of justices and judges nationwide21

If this is the case, it would not be difficult to think that some of the judges, auditors, or commissioners would be persuaded to accept inducements or bribes from the other interested people.

2. Disallowing Local Government Units’ Subsidy to Judges

The independence of the judiciary is not only threatened by regulation of its finances. It is likewise weakened by the influence of politicians even in the local level. Many local government units now provide special allowances to judges. Cebu City government appropriated a total of P 11,664,000.00 for subsidy to the employees for all courts in the city, including Court of Appeals Judges in Cebu with a monthly subsidy of P25,000, and P20,000 for the Regional Trial Court Judges for the year 201422. Meanwhile, the Makati City government increased its allowances to judges to P12,000 in 200723.While the intentions of these allowances may be to

support the meager income of our judges, as pointed out by Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo Law School, the LGUs’ contributions may threatens judicial independence.

ConclusionThe independence of our courts and the Constitutional

Commissions is beyond question. They are fundamental to our existence for their independence to be jeopardized. As with all other aspects of governance, there may be 21 http://www.interaksyon.com/article/21545/sc-reiterates-call-for-raise-in-pay-of-justices-and-judges22 http://www.cebucity.gov.ph23 http://www.makati.gov.ph/portal/roms/docs/ORD.%202007/2007-006.pdf

challenges confronting the independence of these institutions. But perhaps as brought about by our history, there has been many safeguards in our Constitution and jurisprudence protecting them. What we will need to do is to fully enforce them and remain vigilant of the forces that threaten the independence of these valued institutions.