The Application of Industrial Robots in the Soviet Engineering Industry
J U L I A N C O O P E R
Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK
(Received August 1983; in revised Jbrm November 1983)
Despite its scale and impressive rate of development the Soviet industrial robotics programme has received little attention in the West. In many respects the economic and social conditions for the application of industrial robots on a wide scale are favoarable, but many problems are being experienced in securing their practical adoption and effective use. The paper reviews the Soviet robotics programme, the difficulties being encountered and the manner in which they are being tackled.
THE RISE OF SOVIET ROBOTICS
THE SOVIET UNION built its first industrial robot in 1971, although interest in robotics has a much longer history. ~ Various manipulators for use in hostile environments were produced from the early 1960s and remote control robotic devices were created for use in space research, including the famous 'Lunokhod' of 1970. From the mid-1960s the 'father of Soviet robot- ics', the late Academician Ivan Artobolevskii, closely associated with the space research pro- gramme, set in motion a wide-ranging robotics research effort at the State Machine Sciences Institute. Artobolevskii chaired the newly cre- ated Scientific Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences on problems of robots and manipu- lators and from about 1970 began to actively promote the development and use of industrial robots in the Soviet press.
Why the interest in industrial robots? Ini- tially, Soviet engineers and designers appear to have been impressed by American achievements and felt the need to emulate them. In the course of the 1970s, however, it began to be appre- ciated that the industrial robot offered a solu-
This article is based on material gathered from numerous Soviet published sources, only the most important of which have been indicated. It also draws on the author's earlier study [2]. Some of the research was undertaken with the support of the Social Science Research Council.
tion to the increasingly acute problem of labour scarcity. Unfavourable demographic factors have led to a marked reduction in the rate at which new workers are entering the labour force and the position will not improve until well into the 1990s. This problem would be even more acute were it not for the fact that there are very substantial reserves of labour within industry itself; reserves which could be released by further mechanisation and automation. Soviet economists estimate that about 40% of all workers in industry are engaged in un- mechanised hand labour; many of them doing unskilled jobs such as loading and unloading operations and routine assembly work well- suited to the application of robots.
The first official measure to promote the development of industrial robots dates from 1972. In that year the State Committee for Science and Technology issued a decree on the importance of robots and outlined measures for their creation and production. More weighty government backing came in July 1974, when the Council of Ministers adopted a decree on measures for the organisation of production of robots for use in the engineering industry. This decree stressed the importance of robots for the automation of heavy, harmful and monotonous work- -an emphasis which has been maintained ever since. The development of robots was backed by the Twenty-fifth Congress of the
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292 Cooper--Industrial Robots in the Soviet Engineering Industry
Soviet Communist Party in 1976 and the 5-year plan for 1976 to 1980 set a target of a stock of 5000 units of all types by the end of the period. 2 Most significant of all was the adoption by the Party Central Committee in August 1980 of a major resolution "On measures for increasing the production and wide application of auto- matic manipulators in branches of the national economy". This identified the main problem as an insufficient rate of expansion of robot pro- duction and set out a comprehensive set of measures, many of which were subsequently embodied in plans for the industry for the period 1981 to 1985. Thus the industrial robot development programme has enjoyed support and encouragement at the very highest levels.
Major Soviet scientific and technical projects, especially those which involve many or- ganisations and different ministries, are carried out within the framework of so-called Compre- hensive Programmes approved and overseen by the State Committee for Science and Tech- nology. The robotics research and development effort currently forms one of 170 such pro- grammes, drawn up to co-ordinate the activities of 55 higher educational establishments, over a dozen institutes of the Academy of Sciences and almost 70 organisations of industrial ministries. The lead organisation co-ordinating the national robotics R & D effort is the Central Research and Design Institute of Robot Tech- nology and Technical Cybernetics of the Lenin- grad Polytechnicai Institute, under the direc- torship of Professor Evgenii Yurevich. This institute undertakes a wide-ranging research programme, co-ordinates the research of other bodies and carries out comparative testing of all new models to decide which should be put into production. The fact that the lead organisation is attached to an educational institute rather than one subordinated to an industrial ministry is of some significance. By their very nature robots have a wide range of applications in many different industries. In the Soviet Union,
2 According to the usual Soviet definition, an industrial robot is an 'automatic manipulator with programme control'. Distinction is made between programmable industrial robots and simpler, non-reprogrammable 'auto-operators'. The data on output and stocks of robots are therefore broadly comparable with those for most Western countries.
3Detailed specifications of these models and of their foreign equivalents are presented in the recently pub- lished handbook [5].
problems are frequently encountered when re- sponsibility for leading the development of a technology of wide application is vested in a single industrial ministry. The ministry tends to look after its own interests, inter-ministerial links are difficult to establish and unhealthy research and design monopolies can arise. Edu- cational and academic institutes are often in a better position to cater for the needs of industry as a whole.
The development and production of indus- trial robots now involves almost all engineering industry ministries, both civilian and military. The pioneer was the aviation industry, which created and manufactured the first Soviet mod- els and was the largest producer in the period from 1976 to 1980, making 700 units in all. The machine tool industry is now emerging as a major producer; supplying robots for use in forging, press work and machine tool loading applications. In the current 5-year plan it is charged with making 7000 such robots and manipulators. The motor industry has also shown great interest in making and applying robots. A factory of the Tolyatti 'VAZ' associ- ation (the 'Lada' works) is now producing the popular 'MP-9S' small pneumatic robot, devel- oped by the Leningrad Central Research Insti- tute; more than 2000 have been built since 1978. Organisations of the tractor, electronics, radio, instrument building and shipbuilding ministries are also actively involved in robot creation and manufacture. So far most production has been organised by diversifying existing engineering factories, but some ministries are now creating specialised robot factories by converting old works or building new.
To date more than 200 different models of robots and manipulators have been designed in the Soviet Union, of which approximately 50 have been put into production. 3 Of the models planned for production in 1981 to 1985, 42~o will have hydraulic drive, 38~o pneumatic and the remaining 20~o electromechanical, although the share of the latter is to steadily rise. During the same period it is expected that 75 to 80~o of the robots built will be of the simpler types having few degrees of freedom; the rest will have six or more degrees of freedom [7, p. 93; 1, p. 12]. If the structure of applications to date is compared with that in other countries, it is apparent that relatively more are used for cold stamping and foundry work, and less for assem-
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bly and welding, reflecting the bias towards simpler types. During the years 1976 and 1980, the annual output of all types of 'automatic manipulators with programme control (indus- trial robots)' grew steadily, rising from 120 to 1580 units [6, p. 191]. Since then the expansion of output has been very rapid: 3700 robots and manipulators were built in 1981 and a further 5400 in 1982. Annual plans were overfulfilled by up to 40~o, an unusual occurrence in the Soviet economy. In the first nine months of 1983, 7900 units were produced, against a plan for the year of 7700 units and an original 5-year plan target for 1983 of only 5400 [8, p. 15, 10, 3, 4]. The total stock of robots of all types must now be in excess of 10,000 units. But all is not well; of the total number built in 1981 and 1982 one third were not installed. Robots are being con- signed to stores for lack of demand, some customers are cancelling orders and others are bypassing previously installed robots and rever- ting to traditional, unmechanised processes.
TWO PHASES OF SOVIET ROBOTICS
The story is in many respects a familiar one. Initially, from the first appearance of Soviet robots in the early 1970s, their design and use was mainly confined to convinced robot enthu- siasts. Certain factory directors and engineers took an early interest and, aided by R & D organisations, succeeded in successfully install- ing robots on an experimental basis. Some of these pioneers were enterprises of the defence industry and probably benefited from the some- what easier conditions of work in this sector of the Soviet economy. Engineering works in Leningrad were prominent at this time, but elsewhere a few individual factories quickly made the transition from one-off installations to the organisation of group applications. Two cases widely discussed in the media were the Kovrov Mechanical Factory near Vladimir, a defence works also building the 'Voskhod' mo- torcycle, which soon accumulated a stock of more than 50 robots, and the Petrodvorets watch factory near Leningrad, which pioneered the application of small manipulators on a wide scale for watch assembly. These successes helped to generate wide interest and aided the core of enthusiasts in obtaining political back-
ing and resources. Some local Communist Party organisations were quick to appreciate the potential of robots for easing the threatening labour shortage and helped to promote their production and use. During this first phase discussion of robotics in the general press and technical journals was almost exclusively in positive terms, although concern was occa- sionally voiced about the dubious economic viability of some of the applications and the inadequate co-ordination of the whole effort which was giving rise to duplication and little standardisation of the robots and their ele- ments. At this time, the focus of attention was the problem of expanding robot development and production; questions of their application in industry were relatively neglected.
The enthusiasm and interest generated during the first phase of robotics led many factory directors to order robots, although frequently only single examples and induced a wide range of organisations to design and build new models, often on a one-off basis. Expectations were high that benefits would be quickly real- ised. Industrial ministries and regional agencies began to draw up ambitious plans for robot use, sometimes without detailed investigation of the real needs of individual enterprises; indeed, some enterprises found that they had been allocated robots 'from above', with little or no consultation. It was at this time that output began to expand rapidly, although predom- inantly of the simpler models. In short, robotics had become fashionable. So began the second phase, characterised by the appearance of a series of problems which to some extent have tarnished the positive image of robotics and have led to a widening gap between robot supply and demand. What are these difficulties and how are they being tackled?
LABOUR SKILLS
Many Soviet enterprises are now experiencing a shortage of appropriately trained personnel to install, maintain and repair robots. As so often happens and not only in the USSR, the or- ganisation of suitable education and training for an important new technology has lagged behind demand, partly because the specific nature of the new skills and the rate of growth of require- ments were for some time not appreciated. Moreover, the training of engineers was initially
294 Cooper--Industrial Robots in the Soviet Engineering Industry
orientated more towards the design and pro- duction of robots, rather than their use. Special courses for robot engineers have now been organised at a number of higher educational establishments, including the Moscow Bauman Higher Technical School, which mainly serves the priority branches of industry, the Moscow Machine Tool Institute and the Polytechnics of Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Tula, Krasnodar and other cities. By 1985 it is intended that some 30 educational institutes will be providing courses for robotics specialists. The situation has been even less favourable with respect to lower level technical personnel and skilled workers: courses for the latter were organised for the first time during the 1982 to 1983 academic year at some schools of the state occupational train- ing system. From the point of view of skills, those enterprises with previous experience of numerically controlled machine tools are gener- ally in a better position to cope with robots than those without. However, there is also evidence that managers unenthusiastic about robots use the shortage of appropriate skills as a con- venient pretext for inaction. At some of the more dynamic enterprises various forms of on-the-job training have been organised, includ- ing voluntary evening schools for interested personnel.
ECONOMIC VIABILITY
During the first phase of development some ambitious claims were made for the potential economic return to be derived from expenditure on robotics and for the likely gains in terms of labour displacement. As practical experience accumulated, assessments tended to become more sober and, at times, even pessimistic. Soviet industrial robots are not cheap. The popular 'MP-9S' manipulator built on a volume basis costs 8000 roubles (more than £7000 at the current official exchange rate) while more ver- satile, heavier-duty models can cost 40,000 roubles and more. The annual direct labour costs of a displaced worker amount to approx. 3000 roubles. However, the robots are generally employed on a two shift basis, thereby replacing two workers and improving the rate of return. As actually realised rates of return often proved to be less than envisaged, many robot enthusi- asts began to argue, not without justice, that the usual economic choice criteria did not ade-
quately reflect the full benefits of robot use. In this they were partially successful. Now, in assessing the economic viability of robotisation, account is taken of direct cost savings plus a supplement obtained by applying a coefficient to wage costs. This is intended to capture some of the wider benefits from the point of view of society, including some social security payments and savings from reduced accident rates and absenteeism. Furthermore, to enhance the at- tractiveness of robots for the individual enter- prise, a special procedure has been adopted according to which bonus funds are supple- mented by an amount also intended to reflect additional savings not covered by the usual factory cost calculation methodology.
As for labour savings, it is evident that many users underestimated the requirements for set- ting up and servicing the robots, especially in cases where only single units or small numbers were involved. As a journalist observed in a recent critical article, robots are supposed to free people from manual labour, but in the process they create a need for additional manual labour, albeit of higher skills. Given the very extensive nature of the robotics programme, it is extremely unlikely that any overall labour saving has been achieved yet and it is notable that the frequently cited estimates of the poten- tial labour savings ignore the additional job requirements the programme itself generates. Global estimates of the potential labour dis- placement have nevertheless become more sober over time. Writing in 1975, V. Myasnikov, a leading automation specialist of the State Com- mittee for Science and Technology, foresaw the possibility of installing 60 to 80,000 robots in the engineering industry, displacing approxi- mately 250,000 people, i.e. about 3.5 people per robot. Yurevich, in 1980, envisaged the possi- bility of installing 120,000 robots by the end of the decade, displacing about 350,000 workers, or almost three per robot. Recently, more modest claims have been advanced: according to the current five-year plan, between 1981 and 1985 some 34,000 robots are to be installed, displacing more than 70,000 people, or just over two persons per robot. It is interesting that the Ministry of Instrument Making and Means of Automation ('Minpribor'), when it adopted a very ambitious programme of robotisation in 1982, envisaged the installation at its enterprises of no less than 30,000 robots and manipulators
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providing a saving of 45,000 jobs by the end of 1986.
Some individual robot applications have apparently generated quite substantial labour savings. The Orel 'Prompribor' association, for example, has organised an elaborate system for the assembly of thermoregulators for domestic refrigerators with the use of almost 70 robots and manipulators. Overall, the workforce has been reduced by 350 and by 1985 a further 400 robots are to be installed, displacing more than 1300 workers [16]. At the above-mentioned Petrodvorets watch factory the widescale use of manipulators in the assembly shop has substan- tially reduced labour requirements: the intro- duction of 172 units led to a reduction of the number employed on assembly work from 1500 to 1000, i.e. almost three workers per robot [17]. Thus robot advocates do have some positive examples to draw on in countering the scep- ticism induced by poorly conceived applica- tions.
TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION ORGANISATION
Many of the problems experienced have arisen from attempts to install robots without adequate consideration of the technology and its impact on the organisation of production. In the initial phase of rising enthusiasm many enterprises acquired, or built for themselves, single examples of robots, usually of a simple pick-and-place variety for use with machine tools and press equipment and inserted them into existing processes to replace manual trans- fer of work pieces. Many managers and en- gineers were disappointed with the outcome; breakdowns were frequent, plant idle time in- creased, spoilage rates grew, robots and ma- chines were damaged, etc., etc., In quite a number of cases reported in the press the robots were eventually withdrawn and the more flexible and resourceful human links restored. It was not appreciated that the application of robots re- quires meticulous work organisation, with a smooth rhythm and regular quality of work- pieces and blanks. The usual general culture of production at Soviet engineering plants is sim- ply not high enough to permit robot applica-
4 One of the earliest presentations of this philosophy was an article by Yurevich [9].
tions of this type. Furthermore, the robots, not always of high precision, were sometimes used with old machines leading to inevitable failures. Now the main producers of metal forming equipment are increasingly supplying their products with built-in manipulators; some in- deed are insisting that they will supply integral units and nothing else. But managers unwilling to meet the demanding conditions for their effective use are simply installing the machines and removing the manipulators-a costly and wasteful process.
Some lessons were soon drawn by Yurevich and other leading robotics specialists in Lenin- grad and elsewhere. Firstly, it was realised that it was irrational to install single examples; group applications were considered more viable from both economic and organisational points of view. Secondly, it was argued that robots should not be seen simply as mechanical substitutes for people in existing processes. The real solution lies in the design de novo of integral robotised production processes, in other words to create what are termed in the Soviet Union RTK (robotised technical complexes). 4 Yurevich and others have advocated the creation of a set of standard RTK for the most frequently encoun- tered processes and also outlined their potential for the organisation of future flexible manu- facturing systems (or GAP in Soviet terminology--flexible automated production units). A priority of the current 5-year plan is the development of almost 40 different RTK for future widescale use in industry. In the mean- time, efforts are being directed towards edu- cating managers and engineers in the need for a properly organised and considered approach to robot applications of a simpler kind. Some enterprises, usually the larger ones, have or- ganised specialised robot subdivisions, groups and offices. A large role is being played in some towns and regions by special commissions and working groups convened on a voluntary basis on the initiative of local Party committees. These bodies facilitate co-ordination and the pooling of experience by disseminating informa- tion, organising seminars, studying potential applications and, in Leningrad and elsewhere, by selecting certain leading factories as testbeds for robotics with a view to the later wide diffusion of their experience. One ministry very actively engaged in robotics, 'Minpribor' (the main producer of robot control systems), has
296 Cooper--Industrial Robots in the Soviet Engineering Industry
organised 19 territorial centres of robotisation to assist enterprises and to facilitate contact with organisations of other ministries.
PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS
A striking feature of the second phase of robotics in the Soviet Union has been the increasingly extensive discussion of 'psycho- logical barriers' to their introduction and use, both in relation to managerial personnel and, more recently, shop floor workers. There is little doubt that robotics was over-sold during the first phase and exaggerated expectations gained wide currency. As practical experience accumu- lated and realisation spread that robots did not offer the apparently effortless means of raising labour productivity that many initially believed, some reaction set in. Scepticism developed and, in some cases, even hostility towards robots began to appear. This attitudinal change was manifested in various ways. Some enterprises which had earlier ordered robots cancelled them, citing changed requirements or lack of trained personnel as excuses, or even offering no explanation at all. Others accepted the ordered robots and then quietly consigned them to the factory stores without attempting to install them. The directors of some such enterprises were later publicly shamed when workers wrote to the press to complain of negative attitudes to new technology at their places of work. From the many published accounts of experience with robots it is apparent that the enterprise director is a crucial figure: if he (or, more rarely, she) is positively disposed to robotics the inevitable problems can usually be overcome; if not, little progress is made. It is notable that in 'Min- pribor' the first step in realising its ambitious programme for building and installing 30,000 robots by the end of 1986 was a vigorous campaign to win the support of enterprise direc- tors in the industry. In this ministry, the robot- isation drive is being led by a working group headed by the first deputy minister, giving it considerable authority. Some important enter- prises were already led by robot enthusiasts, including the above-mentioned Orel and Pet- rodvorets works, but many other directors have been less convinced. The territorial centres of the ministry were asked to supply the centre with lists of directors of enterprises in their respective regions who showed a lack of enthu-
siasm for the new technology. To everyone's surprise the final list included the names of directors of some of the most prestigious fac- tories of the industry. The delicate task of winning them over was tackled by organising, for the sceptics, a special conference devoted to a careful examination of the pros and cons of robotisation. This was apparently successful: it is claimed that the majority of directors have been won to support the programme. By August 1983 more than 3000 robots and manipulators had been installed at 130 enterprises of the ministry, about half the total [15]. However, it was also found necessary to improve the financial rewards for managers, engineers and workers involved in applying robots--the minis- try has adopted a special measure permitting directors to spend up to 70~o of the savings achieved on bonuses of various kinds. In this ministry, robot consciousness is being stimu- lated by other means, including the organisation of exhibitions and educational events and the wide dissemination of publicity material bearing the symbol of clasped human and mechanical hands.
Psychological problems have been encoun- tered not only at the level of senior manage- ment; recently attention has been drawn in the press to negative attitudes on the part of some workers. Robots fully set up and working smoothly have mysteriously developed faults forcing reversion, at least temporarily, to the previous manual processes. In one case, at a well known enterprise, robots had to be protected from the workers (and not the other way round) by the erection of metal grills to stop inter- ference in their operation. Nevertheless, a heavy slab of metal still fell on them 'from somewhere on high'. Management responded by raising the grills to the roof! [11] These manifestations of hostility have been met with puzzlement and concern. After all, it is argued, in the Soviet economy there is no fear of unemployment, indeed there is an acute and growing labour shortage. Robots are being installed predom- inantly to replace workers in low-skilled, heavy and unpleasant work situations and those dis- placed are usually offered more attractive op- tions. The problem is that in many existing applications the smooth working of the robots is to some extent dependent on worker per- formance in closely related activities. In time, workers come to resent the unrelenting demands
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imposed by their mechanical assistants. Two solutions have been proposed. It has been argued that more comprehensive technical and organisational systems must be created, so de- signed as to minimise direct pressure on the remaining human participants. At the same time, it has been recognised that ergonomists and other psychologists must be involved in the creation of robotised production systems so as to ensure harmonious 'man-robot' relations. Some psychological research into robotics has been undertaken in the Soviet Union, but so far it has not found practical application.
THE NEXT PHASE?
The production of robots and manipulators is growing with great rapidity: in January 1983 the monthly output was 400 units; by July it had reached 1000, and in September 1300. Plans are being constantly revised upwards. At the same time awareness is growing that robotisation is not a simple solution to the problem of labour scarcity. New previously unsuspected difficulties are being encountered and the lesson is being learnt that enthusiasm alone is not enough. Official concern was voiced in a Pravda editorial early in August. Soviet robotics appears to be entering a new, third phase, marked above all by concern for questions of the application of robots rather than their creation. Now the approach of 'Minpribor' and some successful regions is being widely propagated; spontaneity and enthusiasm are giving way to organisation and sober consideration. However, even at the level of organisation many problems remain. Ministries like 'Minpribor' are working in rela- tive isolation from one another: as so often in the Soviet economy, horizontal co-ordination is weaker than vertical. The idea of regional centres is sensible, but there is a real danger that each ministry will create its own network. (There are 20 engineering ministries alone, with- out considering other industries now beginning to show interest in robotics). Inter-ministerial co-operation is being promoted through two principal channels. Firstly, through the 'com- prehensive programme' supervised by the State Committee for Science and Technology, but this is orientated more to the design and production of robots than their application. Secondly, through the local commissions and working groups sponsored by Party organisations, but
these lack strong powers to enforce effective co-ordination. The ideal solution would be to form a network of inter-ministerial robotics centres serving the whole of industry, but there is no obvious body to which they could be subordinated.
Looking further into the future, much stress is now being placed on the potential of flexible manufacturing systems for providing adaptable, 'peopleless' technology, exploiting to the full the possibilities of robotics and computerised control. Some experience has already been accumulated. One publicised installation is at the Dnepropetrovsk Electric Locomotive Works. This system is built on the basis of existing NC machines for the machining of up to 370 different components. A 3-fold increase of labour productivity is claimed [12]. A large- scale research effort is now underway and the first engineering specialists in this new field graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Aviation Instrument Building in the spring of 1983. Other educational establishments are now organising suitable courses. An important fac- tor facilitating this development is the marked improvement in Soviet electronics and com- puting over the last decade: microprocessors and microcomputers are now becoming widely available. Close contact is being maintained with similar work in the GDR, Bulgaria and other East European countries and Western developments are being monitored with consid- erable attention. It appears that the Moscow 'Moskvich' car plant has been singled out as a testbed for flexible production systems, the fac- tory is now being reconstructed with a view to installing the latest technology permitting rapid future model changes [13]. 'Minpribor' intends to create at least 12 different flexible manu- facturing systems by the end of 1986 as a prelude to their wide diffusion in the industry in the latter part of the decade.
The development of FMS will probably re- quire the further technical improvement of the robots at present built by Soviet industry. To date the most successful models have been of the simpler variety and problems have been experi- enced in building very accurate, electro- mechanical types. The lack of suitable small electric motors has been a major constraint. Research into adaptive robots with sensors is being actively pursued at a number of centres, while the Leningrad Central Institute is working
298 Cooper--Industrial Robots in the Soviet Engineering Industry
on mobile robot transporters for parts handling. This drive to advance robot technology is benefiting from co-operation within the frame- work of Comecon, notably with Bulgaria, which has experience of manufacturing Western mod- els under licence ('Versatran' and Fanuc) and the GDR and, with less publicity, contacts with Western firms. Fanuc Ltd. of Japan has installed an advanced 22-robot body welding system at the Tolyatti Vehicle factory 5 and are reported to be supplying the Soviet robot industry with both hardware and know-how.
CONCLUSION
The Soviet robotics programme provides an interesting case study of a country attempting to rapidly advance a significant new technology. The national commitment to robotisation is very substantial. No information is available on the overall investment in the programme, but it is known that 'Minpribor' alone is spending 250 million roubles (£220m) on its 5-year project and that the research programme of the higher educational sector is receiving 70 million roubles (£62m) during the current 5-year plan. The economic and social environment is in many respects highly favourable, not least be- cause of the existence of a labour shortage and a firmly maintained policy of full employment. Nevertheless, the experience has shown that commitment, enthusiasm and resources are not themselves sufficient conditions for success. Robots cannot be imposed on reluctant enter- prises from 'above' or 'outside'. Their effective application makes demands on both managerial personnel and workers which many may prefer to avoid, especially in the non-competitive cli- mate of the Soviet economy. It is being learnt
5 The system is described in [14], but this article makes no reference to its Japanese origin.
that ambitious national and industry-wide re- search and development programmes need the backing of local assistance, education and en- couragement. On the other hand, the commit- ment to robotics is understandable. Not only does it offer a powerful potential for raising labour productivity, even more so in the future when FMS have been evolved, but it also pro- vides a lever for raising the general production culture of the Soviet engineering industry. In this sense the robotics effort is complementary to the social and legal disciplinary campaign which has so far characterised the post- Brezhnev regime. Much Western comment on robot developments in the USSR has tended to one-sidedly focus on the many problems graph- ically related in the Soviet press. This is surely a mistake; a mistake which could lead to missed trade opportunities and neglect of lessons which could be usefully learnt.
i Statistik, Moscow. 7. Planovoe Khozyaistvo (1982) No. 6. 8. Planovoe Khozyaistvo (1982) No. 10. 9. Pravda 5 May 1977.
10. Pravda 23 January 1983. 11. Pravda 11 April 1983. 12. Pravda 20 April 1983. 13. Pravda 25 April 1983. 14. Sotsialisticheskaya lndustriya, 9 December 1982. 15. Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, 6 August 1983. 16. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 14 July 1983. 17. Trud, 11 September 1982.
ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE: Dr JM Cooper, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, The University of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK.
