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The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case ofLaurent Nkunda in Eastern CongoDanielle Beswick aa International Development Department, University ofBirmingham, UKPublished online: 09 Jun 2009.

To cite this article: Danielle Beswick (2009) The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo, The Round Table: The CommonwealthJournal of International Affairs, 98:402, 333-346, DOI: 10.1080/00358530902895428

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The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case ofLaurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo1

DANIELLE BESWICKInternational Development Department, University of Birmingham, UK

ABSTRACT Using evidence from the case of Congo, focusing in particular on the easternKivu provinces, this article argues that the enduring presence of warlords, and the influence oftheir international supporters, remains inadequately addressed by current practices of post-conflict state-building. The dominant contemporary model of state-building currently focuses onthe promotion of liberal democracy as a way of avoiding future conflict, highlighting inparticular the key role of elections. Simultaneously, it emphasises the importance of security anddeveloping a state monopoly on violence. However, in the pursuit of both these ends in Congo,warlord politics and interference from regional powers continue to pose significant challenges.Exploring key aspects of the rebel movement led by Laurent Nkunda in east Congo (2004–2009),this article will illustrate some of the challenges warlordism poses in Congo, focusing particularlyon the shortcomings of a ‘single sovereign’ approach to state-building. In conclusion, theexperience of the Kivus indicates that an approach recognising multiple sovereignties oremphasising significant decentralisation may be more appropriate. Without such a shift inemphasis the notion that Congo is, or will soon become, an empirically functional state is perhapswishful thinking.

KEY WORDS: Congo, governance, state-building, warlords, Laurent Kabila, LaurentNkunda, Kivu, Tutsi, Hutu, genocide, Rwanda

Introduction

The complexity of Congo’s recent history clearly precludes a holistic account ofstate-building in this short article. Instead the focus is on the Kivu provinces in theeast, bordering Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. The article argues that the enduringinfluence of warlords in this region such as Laurent Nkunda, and their regionalbackers, demonstrates the shortcomings of international attempts at state-building.These are shown to frequently emphasise, amongst others, the centrality of electionsas part of a transition to liberal democracy and the need to create a state monopolyon force (Brinkerhoff, 2005, pp. 5–9; Ottaway, 2003).2 As will be shown, both havebeen pursued in Congo with varying degrees of success. Congo may be something ofan extreme case given its size and the dislocation between the east, with its ties to

Correspondence Address: Danielle Beswick, Room 117, JG Smith Building, University of Birmingham,

Edgbaston, Birmingham B17 2TT, UK. Email: d.beswick@bham.ac.uk

The Round TableVol. 98, No. 402, 333–346, June 2009

ISSN 0035-8533 Print/1474-029X Online/09/030333-14 � 2009 The Round Table Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/00358530902895428

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neighbouring states and history of citizenship crises, and the centre of official statepower in Kinshasa. However, in many respects this makes it an excellent case study,with ambitious democracy promotion programmes and the biggest UN peace-keeping mission in the world. Programmes to create a more powerful and effectivecentral state, in essence a largely top-down and externally driven approach to state-building, will be shown to flounder at a local level when confronted by warlordpolitics and regional interference. In the final analysis this may reflect, as Kaplanargues, a failure on the part of international actors to tailor state-buildingapproaches to better reflect Congo’s ‘‘political geography, limited governancecapacities, dearth of infrastructure, and abundant mineral wealth’’ (2007, p. 300). Insuch a context, it is suggested that a focus on strengthening the central state risksreproducing the exclusionary dynamics between capital and peripheral regions whichsustained conflict in the past.

The article first outlines the international approach to state-building taken inCongo, highlighting the particular importance attached to elections and a monopolyon violence. It then goes on to situate the Kivus in a regional and political context,arguing that a history of marginalisation by the state has facilitated the developmentof spaces beyond state control, which have come under influence of warlords,insurgent movements and other states in the region. It will then look at the specificdifficulties that warlords like Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi, pose for state-building. Inconceptualising the key challenge, it argues that international state-buildingprogrammes are hampered by their reluctance to move beyond the idea of a singlesovereign entity, the state, when other actors such as neighbouring states andwarlords may have more relevance and coercive presence on the ground. This isillustrated using the example of Laurent Nkunda’s insurgency in east Congo. Inconclusion, the article argues that the complex layers of authority and influenceaffecting Kivu politics suggests a more productive approach to state-building wouldneed to take these other actors into account, to: ‘‘explore empirically andinterpretively the multiplicity of authorities (and spaces) that exist across andbetween given territories’’ (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008, p. 276).

International Support for State-Building in Congo

When provisional election results were announced in July 2006, Lord DavidTriesman, UK Foreign Office Minister for Africa, congratulated the CongoleseIndependent Electoral Commission for ‘‘delivering the first democratic elections inDRC for over 40 years.’’3 As is frequently the case in post-conflict situations, theseelections were heavily supported by the international community, and served bothsymbolic and practical purposes. They were intended to draw a line under thecountry’s turbulent post-independence history and its experience as an epicentre ofregional conflict, involving eight African states, a range of rebel groups and causing4 million deaths from 1998–2003. They were also regarded as heralding anopportunity for the people of Congo to have an influence on their leadership, andmarking the possibility that the country’s natural resource wealth could be used fornational development rather than as a personal treasury for elites and warlords. Insum, these elections were marketed as a first step towards peace and democracy(Kaplan, 2007). Despite their flaws they were undoubtedly an achievement in

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themselves but, as frequently observed, a focus on elections as a basis for state-building is too simplistic and renders other influential actors and processes largelyinvisible (Zakaria, 1997).

The focus on elections reflects the preference of the international community thatstates after conflict remain intact as sovereign entities and begin a transition todemocracy (Ottaway, 2003). This logic has underpinned international strategies ofpost conflict reconstruction from the end of the cold war to the recent high profileinterventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, confirming that ‘‘the end of the Cold War hasprivileged liberal democracy globally as the most credible basis of governmentallegitimacy’’ (Odukoya, 2007; on Afghanistan see Chesterman, 2002, p. 40). Electionsare therefore seen as a vital mechanism for facilitating ‘‘a war-to-democracytransition within an existing state, in which conflicts on the battlefield or the streetare ended through the sequenced introduction of democracy’’ (Jarstad and Sisk,2008, p. 2, emphasis in original). In Congo, the international state-building agendatherefore had elections as one of its central planks (de Goede, 2006, pp. 92–93), butelections are not enough to build a functioning state and extend its reach across sucha vast territory.

Despite variations in emphasis there are key discernable themes which informmuch of contemporary state-building, reflecting assumptions as to what a stateshould look like and a particular understanding of its main functions, both domesticand international (Wesley, 2008, p. 373). This ‘common ‘‘recipe’’’ also reflects‘‘dominant understandings about the process of the emergence of the modern statethrough the stages of the consolidation of force and the imposition of order’’(Wesley, 2008, pp. 373–374; also Ghani et al., 2005, p. 6). Reflecting this andrecognising Congo’s history of civil and international conflict, a second majorinternational attempt to contribute to state-building has therefore focused oncreating a state monopoly on violence. This is considered vital to restore the rule oflaw, provide security for citizens, secure extensive borders and tackle the looting ofCongo’s resource wealth by warlords and neighbouring states. This expansion of thecoercive reach of the Congolese state was to be achieved by creating a national army,comprising soldiers from the former armed forces and rebel groups, and supportedby a 17,000 strong UN force (MONUC.) However, the state-building agenda hasfaced significant challenges, not least in areas with a history of resistance to theformal state, such as the Kivus.

The Kivus: From State Neglect to Regional War

Situated 1,500 km from Kinshasa, North and South Kivu are a stark demonstrationof the difficulties some African governments face in projecting their authority over avast territory with little infrastructure. As Reno argues, ‘‘Kivu in the east has closercontact with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda than with most of Zaire’’ (1998, pp.149–150).4 However, though geographically isolated from the centre of state powerin Kinshasa, the Kivus have played a pivotal role in Congo’s recent history(International Crisis Group, 2003). Laurent Kabila, a rebel leader who enjoyed themilitary backing of Rwanda and Uganda in replacing President Mobutu in 1998,began his campaign from these provinces. The rebellion against his rule from 1999was similarly formed in this region and aided by neighbouring states. The Kivus are

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a site where local, regional and increasingly international actors have exertedinfluence over key aspects of politics, security and governance. They have a historyof conflict, a legacy of citizenship crises and are heavily affected by the securityconcerns and economic designs of neighbouring states (Vlassenroot, 2006, p. 52;United Nations, 2001).

Under Mobutu’s authoritarian rule the eastern provinces were important onlyinsofar as they provided resources. These were used to service patronage networksthrough which Mobutu and his elite controlled the state (see Reno, 1998; Young,1994). Consequently, amongst its many deficits, the government failed to addressrising tensions over citizenship and access to land which defined local politics in theeast. In particular, it ‘‘never successfully determined the political and social positionof the population with a Rwandan background (the Banyarwanda in North Kivuand Banyamulenge in South Kivu)’’ (Vlassenroot, 2006, p. 54; see also Mamdani,2001, pp. 234–263; Prunier, 1997, pp. 195–198; Turner, 2007, pp. 76–105).5 By theearly 1990s the Banyarwanda, numbering less than a million (Mamdani, 2001,p. 235), were increasingly marginalised from political and public life. The province ofNorth Kivu in particular ‘‘progressively escaped government control’’ (Tull, 2003,p. 433). The political exclusion, persecution and dispossession of these groups, somewith ties to neighbouring Rwanda, sowed the seeds of local rebellion against the stateand facilitated the rise of local strong men and warlords.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide further sharpened tensions between Congo’s Tutsiand other ethnic groups, with the arrival in the Kivus of over a million refugees,amongst them hard-line Hutu extremists and perpetrators of genocide (Mamdani,2001, p. 234–263; Orth, 2001). Meanwhile, Mobutu’s ‘divide and rule’ tacticscontinued to worsen the position of the Banyarwanda.6 In late 1996, frustrated bythe unwillingness of the international community to separate militias from refugeesand Mobutu’s lack of attention to its security concerns, Rwanda invaded Congo.Backing a rebel group led by Laurent Kabila (the ADFL7), the Rwandan forces,along with solders from Uganda, facilitated a military victory over Mobutu, forcinghim into exile and installing Kabila as leader in 2001.

Conflict in Kivu and the Natural Resource Dimension

During this conflict (1996–1998) the Rwandan Hutu refugee camps in the Kivus, asource of extreme local tension, were largely emptied. However, though mostreturned to Rwanda, around 30,000 retreated deeper into Congo, sustaining theirmovement by becoming involved in the conflict between Congolese Tutsi and othergroups (Reed, 1998, pp. 140–141). This manifested particularly strongly in the Kivuswhere the dynamics of conflict in Rwanda, namely the genocidal programme carriedout against Tutsi, were re-inscribed on the local political context. Banyarwanda wereleft insecure, neglected and unprotected by the Congolese state. It is in this context ofstate failure that the emergence and continuing relevance of rebel groups claiming toprotect Congolese Tutsi, such as Nkunda’s, must be viewed.

The second Congo war emerged from somewhat similar dynamics to the first. By1998, Kabila’s authority was severely hampered by the ongoing presence ofRwandan and Ugandan troops, ostensibly pursuing rebels from their states. It wasfurther eroded by the presence in his Government of foreign ‘advisers’ from these

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states8 and in response ‘‘Kabila (began to) stoke ethnic hostility against Rwandansand Tutsis’’ (McNulty, 1999, p. 55). Furthermore, to oust the foreign troops in theeast, Kabila’s army began to work in concert with hardline Hutu refugees, nowoperating as the FDLR.9 Partly in response to this threat to regional security, a newrebel movement, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), emerged in the regionand quickly secured backing once again from Uganda and Rwanda.10

This regional interference in the Kivus, and Congolese politics more generally, hadan economic dimension which remains relevant even in 2009, and poses significantchallenges for state-building in Congo. Rwanda in particular has economic interestsin the Kivus, which their interventions helped to facilitate and protect. A detailedUN report went so far as to allege that a scramble for Congo’s mineral wealth was aprimary factor in the continuation of the conflict (United Nations, 2001). Estimatingthat the Rwandan army made US$250million in 18 months from Coltan alone, thereport indicated that intervention forces were effectively paying for themselvesthrough plunder.11 This deprived the Congolese government of income and alsofacilitated the growth of shadow economic networks. Such networks facilitated theexport of Coltan and tin by rebel groups and the intervening militaries, directlycontributing to the high levels of insecurity in the region by financing theiroperations (Global Witness, 2005). They undermined both the idea and the practiceof the Congolese state, demonstrating its inability to exercise a monopoly on forceand depriving it of potential revenues from resource exploitation and taxation.Nevertheless, despite strong economic motivations for countries such as Rwanda toretain a presence in Congo, the allegations of human rights violations andprofiteering led to increased international pressure on the interveners to withdraw.Following the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001, and accession of hisson, Joseph, a series of peace treaties eventually paved the way for the withdrawal ofall foreign forces by 2003, with the exception of MONUC, and the realisation ofmultiparty elections.

However, the history of state neglect, the involvement of external forces withinterests to protect in the east and the development of shadow economic networksfacilitated by conflict provided excellent conditions for the emergence of local strongmen or warlords. Neither the 2007 elections nor the attempts to re-constitute themilitary and improve security have succeeded in effectively incorporating the Kivusinto the Congolese state primarily because they have not challenged these underlyingfactors. External actors such as Rwanda therefore continue to exert influencethrough support for local proxies, in this case the warlord Laurent Nkunda, inspaces beyond the coercive reach of the state.

Warlords: Features and Strategies

There is a growing international interest in such territories as east Congo, referred to,problematically, as ‘‘ungoverned spaces’’ (Commission for Africa, 2005; Dagne,2002). Much analysis has focused on these spaces as sources of insecurity for thedeveloped world; however, this is only part of the story. Such zones of contestedauthority are sites of potential innovation in governance and challenge the notion ofzero-sum sovereignty. Current state-building approaches fail to capture thisinnovation because they adopt what Heathershaw and Lambach have termed a

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‘‘single sovereign perspective,’’ which ‘‘assumes the individuality of the state and failsto capture how international strategies are subverted, appropriated and resisted onthe ground’’ (2008, p. 276). Resistance to the Congolese state by groups such asNkunda’s, and even appropriation of sovereign functions, is not new. It is part of alonger term trend by which local leaders and strongmen have interacted with thoseattempting to influence events in ‘their’ space, pursuing what Bayart refers to as astrategy of extraversion (2000). Warlords are therefore just one set of actors within acomplex web of authority and control which invariably exists in spaces that areneglected by or beyond the coercive reach of the state (Nordstrom, 2004). Duffieldrefers to these as ‘‘borderlands,’’ arguing:

In those shifting zones of political instability where we may think theborderlands exist—Sierra Leone, Congo, Kosovo, Colombia, Chechnya andEast Timor, and so on—the situation on the ground invariably proves to bemore complex and ambivalent than the images of regression suggest. (2002,p. 1052; also Duffield, 2001)

Warlords may be just one actor within this complex picture of authority and control,but, as in the Kivus, they may be an extremely important one. The challenge theypose to the state is not only in the arena of monopoly on violence but also, asoutlined earlier in the case of resource wealth, as a competitor for economicresources and local, or indeed regional, political influence.

There is considerable debate around the defining characteristics of a warlord. Forthe purpose of this discussion I adopt Jackson’s useful approach, which outlines thecharacteristics of a warlord with reference not only to their behaviour and strategiesbut also in terms of the political economy and state context in which they exist. Inthis analysis, warlords display five key characteristics, they: often emerge in thecontext of a collapse of centralised power; use violence to reassert power locally; mayreplace formal social and military structures with gang mentality; may evolve somegovernance structures (performing ‘state’ functions such as tax collection in theabsence of centralised authority); and frequently have links to international trade(Jackson, 2003, pp. 137–139). The links between warlords in Congo and the regionaland international economy, particularly the shadow economy, are well documented(United Nations, 2001). Warlord integration into global economies, both shadowand formal, reflects Duffield’s contention that ‘‘Southern political actors, institutionsand social groups have critically interrogated their condition and appropriated andtransformed the opportunities of liberal globalization’’ (2002, p. 1056). Indeed, thepersistence of warlord politics in parts of sub-Saharan Africa goes hand in hand withtwo key trends in Africa’s international relations: privatisation and globalisation.

The Challenge of Warlords to Contemporary State-Building

Warlords are key actors in post conflict societies for a variety of reasons, not leastbecause they often carry out sovereign functions within internationally recognisedstates. This is a form of privatisation which may take place with the tacit or explicitconsent of the state (see Reno, 2004, p. 95–119; Hibou, 2004). As mentionedpreviously, international state-building efforts in DRC since the end of the conflict

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have focused primarily on enhancing empirical statehood, or the ability to effectivelyand physically govern territory defined under international law. They have thereforesought to improve the ability of the state to provide security, particularly byfacilitating the creation of a new national army incorporating former warringgroups. Warlords however regularly challenge such attempts to expand state controlinto the areas in which they operate, and Congo is no exception.

Nkunda’s insurgency, like many others, has defined itself primarily in relation tothe perceived failures of the central state. His party, the National Congress for theDefence of the People (CNDP), claims it is primarily concerned with protection ofCongolese Tutsi from the genocidal forces that arrived in the Kivus from Rwanda.In evidence, he cites co-operation between the new Congolese armed forces(FARDC) and groups attacking Tutsi in Congo and seeking to ‘finish the genocide’in Rwanda (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen, 2007). These claims, that theCongolese government has failed to provide security in the east and that Nkunda’sgroup is filling a state function in doing so, are not without merit. Indeed, theCongolese Army have been accused of human rights abuses arguably on a par withthose of Nkunda’s rebels. However, his claim to be a protector of Tutsi is certainlyproblematic, given that the brutal tactics of his forces have increased local animositytowards Congolese Tutsi (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen, 2007). The government’sinability to exercise an effective monopoly on force means that different groups,including those led by warlords, local militias and MONUC, provide some localisedsecurity in the areas they control, however intermittent and flawed it may be inpractice.

The existence of areas beyond the effective control, or interest, of the Congolesegovernment has therefore facilitated the growth in power of private actors (Tull,2003, p. 431; de Goede, 2006, p. 91). And, as Duffield points out, ‘‘If one temporarilysets aside the brutal and coercive methods involved . . . [warlords] can be presentedas new and innovative ways of projecting political power’’ (Duffield, 1998, p. 67). Byestablishing narratives of local legitimacy which challenge the empirical effectivenessof the state, warlords attempt to carve out their power base. Through recourse toviolence and creation of fear, one of Jackson’s warlord characteristics, they can alsoexercise influence over areas much larger than the small size of the group wouldsuggest.12

The following section examines other aspects of Nkunda’s insurgency whichsignificantly undermine international attempts at state-building in Congo: hisadoption of some of the symbolic trappings of statehood; his local militarysuperiority over the FARDC and MONUC; and his ties to Rwanda, effectivelyacting as a protector of the neighbouring state’s security and economic interests inthe Kivus. Finally, it briefly examines why, despite his military dominance in NorthKivu, Nkunda did not call for the secession of what some have termed his ‘‘shadowstate’’ (Boshoff, 2007). It is suggested that although warlords may ‘‘possess thecapability to create separate states by virtue of their de facto control’’ (Reno, 1998,p. 172), their strength is often directly related to their position within regional andlocal political and security dynamics. As with the dramatic fall of Nkunda in 2009,attempts to formalise power in regions of uncertain sovereignty may threatendelicate regional balances and, as in this case, lead external sponsors to rethink theircommitment to an ambitious warlord.

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State-Building and Security in North Kivu: Nkunda, the RCD and Mixage

Nkunda played a role in both of the wars in central Africa. Having fought alongsidethe RPF force which ended the Rwandan genocide, he returned to Congo in 1996and joined the Rwandan-backed insurgency which brought Laurent Kabila topower. During the second Congo war, he became a capable military leader within theRCD-Goma (henceforth RCD),13 another Rwandan-backed group, which con-trolled up to a third of Congo’s territory by 2002. As Tull describes, the RCD soughtto establish some of the trappings of a proto-state, but despite creating new flags,ministries and bureaucratic procedures through which to ‘govern,’ it overwhelminglyrelied on appropriating previous strategies of control and domination used byMobutu’s regime (2003, pp. 433–436; see also Reno, 1998, p. 172). In this sense, theRCD did not create a new governing structure or fundamentally transform theexercise of sovereign power in North Kivu, and the same is arguably true ofNkunda’s movement a few short years later.

Nkunda was offered a role as a General in the new Congolese army as a part of thereintegration of rebel forces in 2003, however, he refused to report to Kinshasa andby 2004 had retreated to North Kivu with other former RCD fighters, rejecting theauthority of the transitional government. From 2004–2008, supported by Rwanda,he continued to resist the authority of the state. His forces carried out assaults on theprovincial capitals of North and South Kivu, fighting against MONUC, RwandanHutu militia and the Congolese Army. His attacks, though brutal and often leadingto human rights abuses by troops under his command, were justified by hissupporters as necessary to protect Tutsi in Congo and, by extension, those inRwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Augmenting Rwanda’s economic interests inthe Kivus, this is a second strand of the explanation for Rwanda’s backing of aCongolese warlord. One of Nkunda’s primary challenges to the Congolese state, andto international attempts to build an effective state in Congo, has therefore been inthe arena of security. Indeed, his re-emergence on the national political stage wasannounced with an audacious attack on the South Kivu capital, Bukavu, in June2004. Justifying his actions with reference to recent attacks on Banyamulenge in theregion, Nkunda’s forces were able to quickly occupy the town. According to humanrights groups, his soldiers also killed and raped dozens of civilians, despite thepresence of a MONUC force (Christian Science Monitor, 2008). Though he laterwithdrew his forces, this demonstrated to both local and regional audiences therelative ineffectiveness of MONUC and the FARDC.

Ironically, Nkunda has also used some of the international resources andprogrammes designed for state-building to consolidate his position ‘outside’ or incompetition with the state. In 2007, he agreed to participate in mixage, part of theprocess of incorporating his troops into the FARDC. Though this may seem anunusual strategy for a warlord, it reflects a pragmatic calculation on Nkunda’s part.Integration offered the chance of formalising his status in North Kivu and achievinghis military objectives of destroying or repatriating Rwandan Hutu militias.Essentially, Nkunda used the integration process as a resource to pursue his ownobjectives. The experiment was however short lived. By March 2007, as Boshoff(2007) reported: ‘‘Instead of diluting Nkunda’s power and reining in his abuses,(integration) reinforced his strength. His soldiers were all given new uniforms and

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received salaries, but they remained largely independent of the government army.’’Even after abandoning mixage, Nkunda’s military strength was reinforced byfrequent trips to Rwanda to recruit fighters from the Congolese refugee camps andreportedly, by direct military aid from Rwanda.14 This reflects the continuation ofRwandan influence in the Kivus, despite the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in 2002,through proxy groups. However, as we shall see, proxies are only useful so far asthey serve the purpose of their backer and in Nkunda’s case, attempts to re-define hisposition vis a vis the Congolese state were pivotal in his downfall.

Creation of the CNDP and Symbols of Statehood

In 2007, Nkunda established a political party, the CNDP. This reflects an attempt, aswith mixage, to consolidate power in North Kivu and, mimicking the earlier RCDstrategy, the CNDP began to develop symbols of statehood along with mechanismsfor governing. The evidence does not however indicate that Nkunda wanted tobecome part of the Congolese government; his statements all indicated a steadfastdetermination to remain in North Kivu rather than following his regional precursorsto Kinshasa. Boshoff characterised the situation in 2007 as follows:

Nkunda is going around North Kivu telling large crowds that his party is thereto protect everybody and urging them to join . . . he promises the communitieshe is going to develop their facilities including the provision of free education tochildren, medical facilities and electricity. CNDP loyalists are acquiringmachines to repair roads in these areas. He is also replacing Congolese policeat police stations with CNDP-recruited police and hoisting the flag of theCNDP at these installations . . . In short, what we are seeing is the creation of analternative or a shadow state in North Kivu. (Boshoff, 2007)15

However, developing symbols of statehood does not necessarily signal intent toformally secede. Tull argues that the RCD never intended to create an empirical statebased on popular legitimacy, partly because its ultimate aim was to take power inKinshasa (2003, pp. 432–436, 445). The same could potentially be said of the CNDP,but given Nkunda’s unwillingness to accept a commission that required deploymentoutside North Kivu, and his refusal to redeploy outside the region during the mixageprocess, CNDP attempts to develop trappings of statehood may have been pursuedwith a greater expectation of permanency.

The failure of mixage, along with Nkunda’s attempts to develop state-like qualitiesin North Kivu reflects one of the key challenges to state-building in Congo andindeed elsewhere in Africa. Actors such as Nkunda may attempt to set up enclavesunder their control but this does not necessarily mean they reject the state outright,or alternatively, that they can be easily co-opted into a system of electoraldemocracy. De Goede (2006) describes the elections in Congo as the foundation of a‘‘warlord peace’’ in which the international community attempted to co-opt warringparties into a democratic system to reduce their incentive to fight.16 This would, intheory, help to create the security that is necessary for development anddemocratisation. However, Nkunda’s power is heavily tied to his position in NorthKivu, where he can rationalise his military presence by citing the failings of the

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Congolese state and protect the interests of his external patron, Rwanda. This wouldmake integration of such an individual into a national peace settlement somewhatmore difficult. His unwillingness to relinquish his position in the region proved a keystumbling block to the creation of a state monopoly on force which, as Wesleyargues, underpins contemporary approaches to state-building (Wesley, 2008;Christian Science Monitor, 2008).

Unlike states, warlords can also switch their positions and allegiances extremelyrapidly, making it difficult to co-opt them into a post-conflict settlement. Until late2008, Nkunda’s strategies had focused on consolidating the CNDP position in NorthKivu and securing the ongoing support of Rwanda. However, after a CNDP assaulton the North Kivu capital, Goma, in October 2008, Nkunda began to hint at acampaign to unseat the government in Kinshasa (Christian Science Monitor, 2008).Though evidence remains limited, it seems Nkunda may have been attempting tosecure a seat at the political table, trying to carve out a formally recognised positionas protector of the region, based on his existing nascent governance structures andmilitary effectiveness. However, regardless of whether it was mere posturing, histhreat to escalate the conflict between the CNDP and the Congolese government(and by extension MONUC) had the potential to re-ignite a regional war17 and ledto Rwanda facilitating his removal.18

Nkunda’s downfall as a warlord in eastern Congo may potentially make state-building in Congo easier, but it does not reflect a success on the part of theCongolese government or international actors in their attempts to incorporate theregion into the Congolese state. Instead, it is a stark demonstration of the influenceof another actor, in this case Rwanda, in the politics and security of Congoleseterritory. Nkunda’s removal shows that the security, and arguably the integrity, ofthe Congolese state remain contingent on the actions of warlords and regionalneighbours. The holding of elections and the creation of a new national army havetherefore been so far unsuccessful in transforming the position of the Kivus innational and regional politics, and in extending the sovereignty of the Congolesestate to this contested region.

Conclusion

International actors in Congo may be spending vast sums on reconstructing theCongolese state, but they are yet to develop strategies which can incorporate oreffectively challenge the non-liberal actors and networks that cross borders and mayactively subvert processes of state-building. Warlords such as Nkunda, through amixture of (often limited) popular appeal, military power and external backing, arein constant competition with the state. Furthermore, through their strong crossborder links, in Nkunda’s case with Rwanda, they encourage us to consider not onlythe possibility of warlords as leaders of proto-states or shadow states, but also aspower brokers mortgaging territory of one state on behalf of or in concert withanother.

Currently, events in east Congo appear to primarily reflect decisions and policiesmade in Kigali rather than Kinshasa, illustrated by Rwanda’s willingness to back,and in Nkunda’s case remove, warlords who have acted as their proxies (Tull, 2003,pp. 442–443). Rwanda’s influence in the Kivus is a powerful illustration of the

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multiple sovereignties that exist in regions poorly governed by the state in Africa.Not only are warlords poorly accounted for in post-conflict state-building, butneither is the influence of their international and regional backers effectively tackled.This demonstrates what can be considered a fatal flaw of many state-buildingstrategies in Africa: the focus on one source of sovereign power in a region where thestate has historically been only one amongst many competing authorities.

In difficult environments such as that in Congo, with little history of effective statecontrol, the state may be far from the most significant actor influencing people’s liveson the ground. In seeking to build effective states with the ability to secure andadminister their territory in such challenging circumstances, international ap-proaches may therefore need to follow the advice of Kaplan (2007), adopting astrategy that emphasises regional and local level governance rather than reinforcinga central government which, historically, has seemed unable or disinclined to providebasic security, much less development, in border regions. In sum, as long as state-building starts from the fiction that Africa’s states are single sovereign entities,ignoring or trivialising the myriad other actors with significant influence on theground, democratisation efforts and security reforms will falter and regions such asKivus will continue to defy incorporation into a global system of states.

Notes

1. Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by Laurent Kabila in 1997. In this

article, the country will be referred to as Zaire when discussing the Mobutu era and Congo thereafter,

not to be confused with the neighbouring state Congo-Brazzaville.

2. By the end of the second war in central Africa (1998–2003), Congo was seen by many as a failed state.

As Bøas and Jennings point out, liberal approaches to state-building have a tendency to view failed

states ‘‘through the dominant lens of Western security interests’’ whereby differences in the state

targeted for reconstruction are inevitably overlooked or disregarded and ‘‘policy interventions thus

assume a standardised form on the basis of what has worked in other places before’’ (2005, p. 388).

3. UK Department for International Development, ‘Statement from Hilary Benn and Lord Triesman on

announcement of provisional results in the DRC presidential elections,’ 17 November 2006.

4. Trade ties across the Rwanda-DRC border are also significant, particularly in goods such as oil and

potatoes.

5. Banyamulenge are a largely Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi population, based primarily in the South

Kivu region of DRC around the hills of Mulenge. They are primarily descendants of economic

migrants who left Ruanda-Urundi in the late 19th century, supplemented by Rwandans fleeing

persecution after Rwandan independence. Since Congo’s independence the East, which is also home to

a Hutu population in North Kivu, has experienced successive conflicts over access to land and the

question of who is actually ‘Congolese’.

6. Not least in 1996, when the state supported a decree which ‘‘stripped Zairian citizenship from people

of Rwandan-Tutsi ancestry and directed them to give up their property’’ (Reno, 1998, p. 161).

7. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo.

8. For example a Rwandan, James Kabarebe, had become the DRC Army Chief of Staff. Kabarebe

currently holds this same position in Rwanda.

9. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.

10. Once again, Rwanda’s leaders felt that their interests in tackling the refugee issue could be best served

by direct military intervention. This demonstrated a lack of confidence not only in the Kabila regime

after its cooperation with the genocidaires, but also in the ability of others such as the UN mission in

the DRC (MONUC) to provide the degree of security on the DR Congo-Rwanda border that the

Rwandan government demanded. This lack of confidence in MONUC is also reflected in articles by

Rwanda’s pro-government media. See ‘Strange UN force in the DRC,’ The New Times (Kigali), 4–6

November 2005, p. 9.

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11. Coltan is an abbreviation of Columbite-Tantalite, an ore found in abundance in Congo, which is used

in electronic equipment including mobile phones and computer systems. Similar accusations were also

made against Uganda (Points 135–142).

12. See for example Vinci (2005) on the manifestation of this phenomena with regard to the insurgency in

northern Uganda.

13. By 1999, the RCD had split into two factions, one backed by Rwanda (the RCD-Goma) and the

other by Uganda (RCD-Bunia.) The two clashed in 2004, reportedly over access to mineral wealth

in east Congo, and by 2003 the RCD-Goma controlled over a third of Congo’s territory (Tull, 2003,

p. 434).

14. These reports are based on a confidential UN report, which claimed that the FARDC

had been cooperating with Hutu militias to fight Nkunda in 2008, whilst Rwanda had supplied

aid and child soldiers to Nkunda to back his campaign. See ‘DR Congo rebels ‘‘stalling talks,’’’

BBC News Online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/africa/7776990.stm, accessed 11 December

2008.

15. See also the CNDP Programme which calls for ‘Adoption of federalism as an innovative and

performing form of political governance of the country’ in CNDP Seven Point Programme, http://

www.cndp-congo.org/minimumprog.php, point 4, accessed 20 January 2009.

16. The elections did succeed in bringing together some of Congo’s key warlords and militia leaders,

though there is ample evidence of corruption and inefficiency which suggests that their commitment to

liberal democracy remains lip-service (de Goede, 2006, p. 94). As de Goede also points out, the

international efforts to incorporate warlords into the peace process and later to secure their

participation in elections may encourage warlord behaviour in the future, ‘‘reproducing conflict

instead of ending it’’ (2006, p. 92).

17. The possibility of Rwanda re-intervening in Congo was raised even as early as 2005, as reflected in

local newspaper reports in Kigali which commented: ‘‘History should whisper into Kabila’s ears that

this dilly-dallying with a plethora of rebel groups is not bound to profit him in any way, other than

putting his country in another round of ‘African world war.’’’ See ‘DRC-a failed state,’ The New

Times (Rwanda), 30 September–10 October 2005, p. 9.

18. Ostensibly invited by Rwanda to Kigali to discuss operations against the Hutu militias in Eastern

Congo, Nkunda was arrested by his erstwhile backers in January 2009. Rwanda’s actions in

arresting Nkunda may seem surprising. However, they must be viewed from the perspective of the

Rwandan regime, which has economic interests in the Kivus. Until recently these interests, as well as

Rwanda’s border with Congo, were believed to be protected by Nkunda and his forces, but a shift

in focus from regional power to national destabilisation is no longer in Rwanda’s interests

(International Crisis Group, 2003). It is likely that Kigali will now seek a new proxy in the region

and attempt to consolidate their networks of influence in Kivu during their joint-operations with the

FARDC.

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