The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of ...

Research ArticleThe Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis ofthe Military-Civilian Collaborative Innovation for ChinarsquosSatellite Industry

FangWei andWang Chan

School of Management Northwestern Polytechnical University Xirsquoan 710072 China

Correspondence should be addressed to FangWei fwx1998nwpueducn

Received 16 September 2018 Revised 23 January 2019 Accepted 5 February 2019 Published 21 February 2019

Academic Editor Konstantinos Karamanos

Copyright copy 2019 Fang Wei and Wang Chan This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons AttributionLicense which permits unrestricted use distribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properlycited

The military-civilian collaborative innovation is an implementation path for most countries to develop strategic emergingindustries The satellite industry is an important area in strategic emerging industries Based on the evolutionary game theory webuild an evolutionary game model of Chinarsquos satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation with military enterprisesand civil enterprises as the main participators under the bounded rationality Then we analyze the long-term evolution ofthe system and the factors influencing cooperative stability and perform numerical simulation using Matlab Our researchshows that the cooperative stability of Chinarsquos satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation is positively related tothe cooperation revenue liquidated damages and government incentives and negatively related to basic income RampD costsinformation communication costs technology secondary conversion costs risk costs and betrayal incomeThe reasonable incomedistribution coefficient is conducive to the cooperative stability and we give a primary standard for government incentives Finallycorresponding management implications are put forward

1 Introduction

The satellite industry has always been an important areain Chinarsquos strategic emerging industries [1] contributingenormously to both national defense and regional economicgrowth In the last decade 20 percent of GDP annual growthof China has been driven by strategic emerging industryTraditionally satellite industry under the umbrella of theaerospace industry has been very secretive and under thecontrol of government and military Chinarsquos satellite industrydeveloped in the 1970s In 2014 China permitted the civil-ian companies to enter the Chinese satellite industry andprovided a platform to unleash the potential in the globalsatellite industry of worth 420 billion dollars Currently thesatellite industry is divided into two parts military satelliteindustry and civilian satellite industry Satellite industrialchain consists of the satellite and ground equipment man-ufacturing launching satellite application and operationalservice industry The first three parts are more militaryin nature while satellite application and operation service

industries occupy large proportion in civilian market In2016 China introduced a 5-year plan for strategic emergingindustries which concentrates on the industrial upgradationinnovation and technological development Due to thehigh chances of failure and risk in the satellite industryChinarsquos macro-policies has led to the development of satelliteindustry military-civilian collaborative innovation which isobjectively driven by similar industrial needs of military-civilian and is based on the effective interaction betweenmilitary and civilian technology

Considering the industrial demand and global satel-lite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation hasbecome a necessity for the satellite industry Typicallysatellites have the following applications communicationsweather monitoring resource exploration navigation andinvestigation In addition to the investigation for militarypurposes the other four functions are applicable in militaryand civilian markets Therefore satellites have an attributeof military and civilian sharing regarding functional pur-poses with different emphasis in the field Similar industrial

HindawiMathematical Problems in EngineeringVolume 2019 Article ID 3938716 17 pageshttpsdoiorg10115520193938716

2 Mathematical Problems in Engineering

demands can stimulate civilian enterprises to seek military-civilian cooperation for market development Satellite indus-try reflects the attributes of military-civilian collaborativeinnovation concerning technology application The technol-ogy involved in satellite industry is mostly dual-use The keypoint to distinguish between military and civilian use liesin signal conversion mechanism and information confiden-tiality and there is no distinct difference in transmissionor receiving device Therefore the satellite industry canmaximize the military-civilian collaborative innovation andcarry out technical cooperation and benign interaction Upto April 20 2018 China has more than 200 satellites in orbitand the average annual growth rate of satellite applicationsand strategic emerging industries has exceeded 20

Successful implementation of military-civilian collab-orative innovation has been witnessed to develop strate-gic emerging industries in developed countries Howevermilitary-civilian collaborative innovation is still in its infancyin developing countries and needs strategies to implement iteffectively Reality proved that military-civilian collaborativeinnovation can effectively enhance the ability of transitionfrom peacetime to wartime reduce the transaction costs andimprove the efficiency of social resources utilization It hasbecome urgent and inherent requirement for us to promotemilitary-civilian collaborative innovation to adapt to thetransformation of the worldrsquos national defense industry [2 3]Due to the refinement of social division the intensification ofinternational competition and the acceleration of technologyupdate speed military enterprise alone can hardly bear thecosts and risks of all scientific and technological research anddevelopment and it is impossible to have all the knowledgeand technology needed for sustainable innovation Military-civilian collaborative innovation has become an inevitablechoice for achieving sustainable innovation and sharingresources in Chinarsquos satellite industry However in realitythere are still problems such as uneven distribution ofcooperative benefits and high conversion costs which resultin inefficient military-civilian collaborative innovation andunstable or even broken cooperation Based on this it is ofgreat importance to explore the stability of military-civiliancollaborative innovation in Chinarsquos satellite industry and thisissue needs to be resolved through scientific research

Therefore considering the importance of satellite indus-try in strategic emerging industries governmentrsquos planfor strategic upgradation and sustainable innovation andscarcity of studies exploring stability of military-civiliancollaborative innovation in Chinarsquos satellite industry the aimof this paper is to build a military-civilian collaborativeinnovation evolutionary game model after initial coopera-tion based on the theory of collaborative innovation andevolutionary game theory after extracting the characteristicelements of both sides and refining the model parameters bytaking military enterprises and civilian enterprises in Chinarsquossatellite industry as two sides of the gameThis paper exploresthe dynamic evolution process of military-civilian collabora-tive innovation under bounded rationality analyzes factorsthat affect cooperative stability and uses Matlab simulationto visually display the impact of related parameters Finallymanagement implications are put forward

This paper is structured as follows Section 2 reviewsthe relevant literature on cooperative stability evolutionarygame theory and military-civilian collaborative innovationSection 3 builds the evolutionary game model of military-civilian collaborative innovation for Chinarsquos satellite industrySection 4 analyzes evolutionary stability strategy and influ-encing factors of military-civilian collaborative innovationfor Chinarsquos satellite industry Section 5 is relevant numericalanalysis Section 6 is main conclusions and managementimplications

2 Literature Review

21 Cooperative Stability Based on the interpretation ofstability in different disciplines many scholars have definedcooperative stability from different perspectives and formedthe following views Destabilizing factor determinism Usingcooperative behavior theory it is believed that the trajectoryof cooperation depends on unstable factors [4] Resourcecomplementarity Cooperation to achieve relatively com-plementary resource demand is the most stable state ofcooperation Once this demand is weakened the partnershipwill no longer be stable [5] Game theory The essence ofcooperation in the game process the stability of the alliancebetween multiple agents depends on the equivalence of theinformation obtained Only when the relationship of thegame sides reaches the information symmetry the alliancewill reach a stable state [6] Social dilemma (institutionalism)Institution is the core to ensure cooperative stability which isbased on the effective trustmechanism andmature constraintmechanism [7 8] Also an effective benefits distributionmechanism cooperation performance communication tiesand individual recognition of the organization can enhancethe willingness to cooperate among the multiple agents andmaintain the cooperative stability [9 10]

In summary the description of cooperative stabilityof military-civilian collaborative innovation in the satelliteindustry is as follows After the preliminary cooperationbetween military and civilian satellite industry has beenreached in the process of long-term cooperation due to otherexternal or internal factors of cooperation the state of thecooperative system is disturbed resulting in the volatility andtortuosity of cooperation trajectoryThe system itself can self-resist or mediate so that the overall state restores the originalbalance With the help of external forces the cooperationbetween game sides is more closely related the cooperativewillingness continues to rise and game sides share morecooperation benefits then the system is developing steadilyand eventually reaches a steady state

22 Evolutionary Game Theevolutionary game theory stemsfrom the evolutionary theory of biology following the rulesof natural selection and survival of the fittest It combinesanalytical methods of game theory with dynamic evolutionprocess based on bounded rationality and analyzes howto make the game sides of limited information conduct adynamic game on the vested benefit to maximize the valueThe game sides will continue to learn imitate test andsummarize find the best decisions in the game process

Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3

and finally reach an equilibrium state Evolutionary stabilitystrategy and replication dynamics are two core conceptsin evolutionary game theory [11] The evolutionary stabilitystrategy refers to the status when game sides may not beable to make the optimal decision at the beginning basedon the bounded rationality and need to learn and improvein the game process [12] After some time all game sideswill tend to take a stable strategy Replication dynamics is adynamic differential equation that describes the frequencyor frequentness at which a population adopts a particularstrategy [13] Its core idea is that adoption of a strategy orpayment is higher than the average fitness of the populationand this strategy will be widely recognized in the population

Evolutionary game theory has been widely used indecision-making production management project man-agement supply chain management social networks etcTongyao Feng [14] analyzed the behavior evolution trend ofboth parties using evolutionary game theory the results indi-cate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both coop-eration and noncooperation and the evolutionary resultsare influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes Wei He [15] constructed a model based onthe dynamic evolutionary game theory which incorporatesseveral main factors influencing the development of modularproduction network Qianqian Shi [16] developed an evolu-tionary game model to explore the cooperation tendency ofmultiple suppliers gaining a deeper insight into the suppliersrsquocooperative relationships Chengrong Pan [17] employed theevolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperation betweenthe microgrid and conventional grid with the discussionfocusing on the factors that influence the game playersrsquoselection of strategies and additionally made a numericalsimulation analysis Congdong Li [18] analyzed the mutualevolutionary regularity of the private sector and govern-ment supervision department and the influence of publicparticipation level on public and private behavior based onevolutionary game theory Si-hua Chen [19] established anasymmetrical evolutionary game model of enterprise super-vision to regard contextual factors and individual factorsas risk preferences of knowledge workers Qing Sun [20]designed a computational system that integrates the side theevolutionary game and the social network which grasps thedynamic evolution features in information adoption gameover time and explores microlevel interactions among usersin different network structure under various scenarios

23 Military-Civilian Collaborative Innovation Regardingtheoretical application many scholars apply collaborativeinnovation theory to the military-civilian integration strat-egy Trainor [21] discussed how a large organization withdisparate operating elements could learn from experiencewhich is illustrated through a case study of the US Armyenhancing learning for its organizations involved in develop-ing base camps to support military forces worldwide basedon military-civilian collaborative Brickey [22] demonstratedthe successful application of knowledge management theorybetween theUSmilitary and civil communities enriching thetheoretical system of military-civilian collaborative innova-tion Merindol [23] took the application of dual-use policies

in the framework of Knowledge-Oriented Policies (KOP) inFrance from 1990 to 2000 as an example research conclusionis that dual-use policies represent now a dimension centralto military RampD policies and should not be understoodonly as a civilian-military transfer mechanism Totimeh [24]explored and identified the qualitative case study with thesuccess factors needed to successfully implement knowl-edge management in a military-civilian organization Molas-Gallart [25] discussed a conflict between private defensefirms and government procurement agencies related to intel-lectual property management issues that emerged duringthe privatization process of the main UK defense researchestablishment and it is concluded that in the process ofmilitary-civilian collaborative innovation among differentsides ldquopartnershiprdquo can effectively resolve intellectual prop-erty disputes and enhance the efficiency of collaborativeinnovation

Secondly research has been carried out on the importantrole institutional standards influencing factors and coun-termeasure research ofmilitary-civilian collaborative innova-tion Mclvor [26] discussed the significance of the military-civilian integration strategy and believed that military-civilian collaborative innovation is conducive to the overalldevelopment of the national defense economy and the civilianeconomy Jeong [27] took the trend of the technical efficiencyof the Korean national defense firms in 1990ndash2005 as theresearch object by applying Stochastic Frontier Analysis(SFA) The results show that military-civilian collaborativeinnovation can effectively improve the speed of nationaltechnology innovation Yun Zhikai [28] believed that theintellectual property system could be continuously createdand improved under the military-civilian collaborative inno-vation system and under this system intellectual propertyrights can be fully pushed into the process of scientificresearch and development production and management Topromote healthy development of military-civilian collabo-rative innovation and dual-use technology it is necessaryto adjust the military-civilian standardization system [29]Kulve [30] believed that the realization and popularization ofsocial and technological networks are conducive to military-civilian collaborative innovation from the perspective ofrational allocation of resources such as science and tech-nology talents and capital Yepes [31] studied the imple-mentation process of collaborative innovation managementsystem from the five factors of technology observation inno-vation planning and implementation of innovative projectstechnology transfer and results in protection Lavallee [32]proposed a countermeasure to promote the developmentof dual-use technology based on the global perspective torealize the synergy between the military and civilian sectorsRoss [33] studied the influencing factors of the operationalperformance of the military-civilian collaborative innovationteam and provided effective suggestions

Regarding industrial application since 2008 affected byfinancial crisis many countries have begun to vigorouslydevelop strategic emerging industries that represent a newround of economic growth and technological revolutionin order to stimulate economic growth Strategic emergingindustries are based on major technological breakthroughs


and major development needs they are those industries withintensive knowledge and technology low consumption ofmaterial resources great growth potential and good compre-hensive benefits and have a major leading and driving role inthe overall and long-term development of the economy andsociety Adopting military-civilian collaborative innovationin strategic emerging industries and then attaching impor-tance to the mutual transformation of military technologyand civil technology such as renewable energy bioengineer-ing aerospace Internet of Things and other industries haveachieved a series of results

According to those mentioned above existing literaturemostly focuses on the internal operational mechanism influ-encing factors and countermeasure research of military-civilian collaborative innovation at the macro level There arenot many quantitative studies on the mathematical model ofmilitary-civilian collaborative innovation at the micro leveland it is mostly how to achieve the cooperation between themilitary-civilian analyze the timing and conditions of thecollaborative innovation and less study the stability of themilitary-civilian collaborative innovation process after thecooperation Based on evolutionary game theory we buildan evolutionary game model of Chinarsquos satellite industrymilitary-civilian collaborative innovationwithmilitary enter-prises and civil enterprises as the main participators underthe bounded rationality Then we analyze the long-termevolution of the system and factors influencing cooperativestability and perform numerical simulation using Matlab

3 Evolutionary Game Model of ChinarsquosSatellite Industry Military-CivilianCollaborative Innovation

31 Problem Description and Model Hypothesis Before theevolutionary game model building it is necessary to clarifythe responsibilities objectives and mutual interests of eachgamersquos multiple agents to identify the key influencing factorsof the military-civilian collaborative innovation relation-ship stability in Chinarsquos satellite industry For the sake ofanalysis the satellite industry has been simplified into twodepartments the military sector and the civilian sector Itis assumed that military enterprises and civilian enterprisesare the two major decision-making sides of the evolutionarygame model [34] The common goal pursued by these twosides is collaborative innovation which refers to sharingresources complementing each other and cooperating tocomplete product RampD and production and sharing costsand benefits In addition to the common demands two gamesides also have a different emphasisMilitary enterprisesmustmeet the basic standards of national security because of theirpolicy speciality and confidentiality The civilian enterprisescan rely on military enterprisesrsquo favorable resources to themaximum extent develop technological innovation breakdown technical barriers grab market share minimize costsand maximize benefits The difference between the military-civilian collaborative innovation sides has led to an increasein product standardization costs At the same time variousrisks brought about by the external environment and marketcompetition have made the game sides in an information

asymmetric state However after the initial cooperation ofthe game sides is reached based on bounded rationality it isdifficult to determine the next strategic taking At this timeit is necessary to repeat trials and games absorb experienceand adjust strategies and finally form a stable strategy

Based on the above discussion the following basichypotheses are made

Hypothesis 1 After the initial cooperation between the mil-itary enterprise and civilian enterprise the two sides basedon bounded rationality continue to learn and adjust theirstrategies in the process of collaborative innovation untilthey reach a balanced strategy Assume that the strategiccombination of the two sides in the game is continuing coop-eration quit in the midway then the probability of militaryenterprise taking the strategy of continuing cooperation is119909 (0 le 119909 le 1) and the probability of military enterprisetaking the strategy of quit in the midway is 1 minus 119909 Similarlythe probability of civilian enterprise taking the strategy ofcontinuing cooperation is 119910 (0 le 119910 le 1) and theprobability of civilian enterprise taking the strategy of quitin the midway is 1 minus 119910Hypothesis 2 Setting two game sides whether to take thestrategy of continuing cooperation or the strategy of quitin the midway there are basic benefits based on theirtechnological advantages military enterprise income is 1198771and civilian enterprise income is 1198772 If both game sides take astrategy of continuing cooperation and share the benefitsof cooperation 119877 and there is a coefficient of the incomedistribution 1198891 1198892( 1198891 + 1198892 = 1) military enterprise obtainsthe cooperative benefits 1198891119877 and civilian enterprise obtainsthe cooperative benefits 1198892119877 After initial cooperation theinformation obtained by the two sides in the follow-upcooperation will be asymmetry system defects and otherreasons which will cause the two sides not to take advantageof each other and the technical cooperation and sharing ofresources to create certain difficulties then they will take thestrategy of quit in the midway and collaborative innovationexists in name only At this point both sides have only basicbenefits 1198771 and 1198772 If one side takes the strategy of quit inthe midway it has the first advantage and the initiative rightrather than the side who insists on continuing cooperationthen after learning the sharing technology the unilateraltermination of the cooperative relationship the technologicalinnovation alone obtains the technology spillover benefitswhich are called betrayal incomes The betrayal incomes ofthe military enterprise are 1198701 and the betrayal incomes ofthe civilian enterprise are 1198702Hypothesis 3 After initial cooperation between militaryenterprise and civilian enterprise if the two sides chooseto continue to cooperate they will continue to invest incollaborative innovation According to the inherent differ-ences between the two sides in the management systemtechnical standards and product purposes the cost can bedivided into three categories The first is the RampD costthe RampD cost of the military enterprise is 1198621 and theRampD cost of the civilian enterprise is 1198622 The second is the


Table 1 Payment matrix

Payment Matrix civilian enterprisecontinuing cooperation 119910 quit in the midway 1 minus 119910

military enterprisecontinuing cooperation 119909 1198891119877 + 119866 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 119862 + 119866 minus 11986311198892119877 + 119866 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 119862119891 1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862quit in the midway 1 minus 119909 1198771 + 1198701 minus 119862 1198771 minus 1198631119866 + 119862 minus 1198632 minus 119862119891 1198772 minus 1198632

information communication cost due to lack of convenientcommunication channels the information communicationcost of the military enterprise is 1198681 and the informationcommunication cost of the civilian enterprise is 1198682 The thirdis secondary conversion cost due to differences in technicalstandards the secondary conversion cost of the militaryenterprise is 1198623 and the secondary conversion cost of thecivilian enterprise is 1198624 Also compared with military enter-prise civilian enterprise has the risk of losing market sharewhen conducting collaborative innovation cooperation andwe record the losses caused by these risks in the civilianenterprise as the cost risk 119862119891 that is to say the greater thecost risk of civilian enterprise the greater the 119862119891 In theprocess of cooperation if one of the sides takes the strategyof quit in the midway it will be required to pay the othersidersquos liquidated damages 119862 When civilian enterprise takesthe strategy of quit in the midway the damage caused to themilitary enterprise is 1198631 and when military enterprise takesthe strategy of quit in the midway the damage caused to thecivilian enterprise is1198632Hypothesis 4 Promoting military-civilian collaborative in-novation in Chinarsquos satellite industry can expedite devel-opment of SampT expand economic construction acceleratemarketization and industrialization of scientific researchresults and adjust the national and regional economic andindustrial structure Therefore to improve the success rate ofmilitary-civilian collaborative innovation in Chinarsquos satelliteindustry the government provides policy support and finan-cial incentives to participate in active cooperation strategiesTo facilitate analysis of the problem governmentrsquos variouspreferential measures are quantified as 119866

From the above four hypotheses an evolutionary gamepaymentmatrix formilitary-civilian collaborative innovationin Chinarsquos satellite industry can be obtained as shown inTable 1

32 Establishing Dynamic Equations According to evolu-tionary game payment matrix shown in Table 1 in theprocess of military-civilian collaborative innovation theexpected benefit of a military enterprise taking a strategy ofcontinuing cooperation is

1198801119860 = 119910 (1198891119877 + 119866 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623)+ (1 minus 119910) (119862 + 119866 minus 1198631) (1)

The expected benefit of a military enterprise taking astrategy of quit in the midway is 1198801119861 = 119910(1198771 + 1198701 minus 119862) +(1 minus 119910)(1198771 minus 1198631)

The average expected benefit is 1198801 = 1199091198801119860 + (1 minus 119909)1198801119861The expected benefit of a civilian enterprise taking a

strategy of continuing cooperation is 1198802119860 = 119909(1198892119877 + 119866 minus1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 119862119891) + (1 minus 119909)(119866 + 119862 minus 1198632 minus 119862119891)The expected benefit of a civilian enterprise taking a

strategy of quit in the midway is 1198802119861 = 119909(1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862) +(1 minus 119909)(1198772 minus 1198632)The average expected benefit is 1198802 = 1199101198802119860 + (1 minus 119910)1198802119861To facilitate the analysis of cooperative stability of

military-civilian collaborative innovation we build the repli-cation dynamic equation for the game sides to take a strat-egy of continuing cooperation The replication dynamicequation for the military enterprise to take a strategy ofcontinuing cooperation is as follows

119865 (119909) = 119889119909119889119905 = 119909 (1198801119860 minus 1198801) = 119909 (1 minus 119909)sdot [119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 + (1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701) 119910]

(2)

The replication dynamic equation for the civilian enter-prise to take a strategy of continuing cooperation is asfollows

119872(119910) = 119889119910119889119905 = 119910 (1198802119860 minus 1198802) = 119910 (1 minus 119910)sdot [119866 + 119862 minus 119862119891 minus 1198772 + (1198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702) 119909]

(3)

The collaborative innovation evolution game of militaryenterprise and civil enterprise can be described by two-dimensional dynamic systems consisting of differential equa-tions (2) and (3)

Let 119865(119909) = 0 119872(119910) = 0 we can get the systemrsquos fiveequilibrium points (119909 119910) as (0 0) (0 1) (1 0) (1 1) ((1198772 +119862119891 minus 119862 minus 119866)(1198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702) (1198771 minus 119862 minus 119866)(1198891119877 minus1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701))4 Analysis of the Evolutionary StabilityStrategy and Influencing Factors ofMilitary-Civilian Collaborative Innovationin Chinarsquos Satellite Industry

Military-civilian collaborative innovation is a process ofcontinuous integration adaptation and perfectionWhen thetime 119905 tends to infinity do military and civilian enterprisetake a strategy of continuing cooperation or quit in themidway This involves evolutionary game stability problemin the process of military-civilian collaborative innovation


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ forallＳ[01] Ｓ0lt0

Figure 1 Phase diagram in Condition 1

10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ

forallＳ[01] Ｓ0gt1


and a stable state must have the robustness to small distur-bances to become an evolutionary stability strategy Combin-ing the hypotheses above and the replication dynamic systemaccording to stability theorem of the differential equationwhen derivative of 119865(119909) or 119872(119910) is less than 0 and 119909 or 119910is itself the equilibrium point of the steady state then 119909 or 119910is evolutionary stability strategy of the game sides Next weuse the local stability of the Jacobian matrix to verify whetherthe strategy combination formed by the two game sides is anevolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and analyze the factorsthat influence the choice of strategy

41 Stability Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Strategy forMilitary Enterprise Derivation of 119865(119909) with respect to 119909results in the following derivative

1198651015840 (119909) = (1 minus 2119909)sdot [119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 + (1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701) 119910] (4)

When F1015840(x) lt 0 then 119909 is an evolutionary stabilizationstrategy Let

1199100 = 1198771 minus 119862 minus 1198661198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701 (5)

The following are discussions of the military enterprisersquoscollaborative innovation strategy choices with phase dia-grams showing the dynamic changes of the strategy (Figures1ndash6)

Condition 1 1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701 gt 0 119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 gt 0obtained bymathematical operations 1198891119877+119866minus1198621minus1198681minus1198623 gt1198771 + 1198701 minus 119862 That is to say if the military enterprise takesa strategy of continuing cooperation the benefits obtainedare higher than those when a strategy of quit in the midwayis taken forall119910 isin [0 1] 1198651015840(1) lt 0 then 119909 = 1 is the militaryenterprise ESSThe result of the gamebetween the two sides isthat under this condition nomatterwhat strategy the civilian

10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ

forallＳ[01] Ｓ0lt0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ forallＳ[01] Ｓ0gt1


enterprise takes the military enterprise will take a strategy ofcontinuing cooperation based on limited rationality

Condition 2 1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701 gt 0119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 lt 0and minus(119862 + 119866 minus 1198771) gt 1198891119877 minus 1198701 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 obtainedby mathematical operations 1198891119877 + 119866 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 lt1198771 + 1198701 minus 119862 That is to say if the military enterprise takesa strategy of continuing cooperation the benefits obtainedare lower than those when a strategy of quit in the midwayis takenforall119910 isin [0 1] 1198651015840(0) lt 0 then 119909 = 0 is the militaryenterprise ESSThe result of the gamebetween the two sides isthat under this condition nomatterwhat strategy the civilianenterprise takes the military enterprise will take a strategy ofquit in the midway based on limited rationality

Condition 3 1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701 gt 0 119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 lt 0and minus(119862 + 119866 minus 1198771) lt 1198891119877 minus 1198701 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 obtained bymathematical operations 1198891119877+119866minus1198621minus1198681minus1198623 gt 1198771+1198701minus119862


That is to say if the military enterprise takes a strategy ofcontinuing cooperation the benefits obtained are higherthan those when a strategy of quit in the midway is takenWhen 119910 gt 1199100 1198651015840(1) lt 0 then 119909 = 1 is the militaryenterprise ESS When 119910 lt 1199100 1198651015840(0) lt 0 then 119909 = 0 isthe military enterprise ESS The result of the game betweenthe two sides is that under this condition which strategythe military enterprise will take is based on the strategicprobability of civilian enterprise

Condition 4 1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701 lt 0 119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 lt 0obtained bymathematical operations 1198891119877+119866minus1198621minus1198681minus1198623 lt1198771 + 1198701 minus 119862 That is to say if the military enterprise takesa strategy of continuing cooperation the benefits obtainedare lower than those when a strategy of quit in the midwayis taken forall119910 isin [0 1] 1198651015840(0) lt 0 then 119909 = 0 is the militaryenterprise ESSThe result of the gamebetween the two sides isthat under this condition nomatterwhat strategy the civilianenterprise takes the military enterprise will take a strategy ofquit in the midway based on limited rationality

Condition 5 1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701 lt 0 119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 gt 0and minus(119862 + 119866 minus 1198771) gt 1198891119877 minus 1198701 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 obtainedby mathematical operations 1198891119877 + 119866 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 lt1198771 + 1198701 minus 119862 That is to say if the military enterprise takesa strategy of continuing cooperation the benefits obtainedare lower than those when a strategy of quit in the midwayis taken When 119910 gt 1199100 1198651015840(0) lt 0 then 119909 = 0 is the militaryenterprise ESS When 119910 lt 1199100 1198651015840(1) lt 0 then 119909 = 1 isthe military enterprise ESS The result of the game betweenthe two sides is that under this condition which strategythe military enterprise will take is based on the strategicprobability of civilian enterprise

Condition 6 1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701 lt 0 119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 gt 0and minus(119862 + 119866 minus 1198771) lt 1198891119877 minus 1198701 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 obtained bymathematical operations 1198891119877+119866minus1198621minus1198681minus1198623 gt 1198771+1198701minus119862That is to say if the military enterprise takes a strategy ofcontinuing cooperation the benefits obtained are higherthan those when a strategy of quit in the midway is takenforall119910 isin [0 1] 1198651015840(1) lt 0 then 119909 = 1 is the military enterpriseESS The result of the game between the two sides is thatunder this condition no matter what strategy the civilianenterprise takes the military enterprise will take a strategyof continuing cooperation based on limited rationality

42 Stability Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Strategy forCivilian Enterprise Derivation of 119872(119910) with respect to 119910results in the following derivative

1198721015840 (119910) = (1 minus 2119910) [119866 + 119862 minus 119862119891 minus 1198772+ (1198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702) 119909]

(6)

When M1015840(y) lt 0 then y is an evolutionary stabilizationstrategy Let

1199090 = 1198772 + 119862119891 minus 119862 minus 1198661198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702 (7)

10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0gt1


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0



Condition 1 1198892119877minus1198622 minus1198682minus1198624 minus1198702 gt 0119866+119862minus119862119891minus1198772 gt 0obtained by mathematical operations 1198892119877 + 119866 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus1198624 minus 119862119891 gt 1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862 That is to say if the civilianenterprise takes a strategy of continuing cooperation thebenefits obtained are higher than those when a strategy ofquit in the midway is taken forall119909 isin [0 1] 1198721015840(1) lt 0then 119910 = 1 is the civilian enterprise ESS The result of thegame between the two sides is that under this condition nomatter what strategy the military enterprise takes the civilianenterprise will take a strategy of continuing cooperationbased on limited rationality

Condition 2 1198892119877minus1198622minus1198682minus1198624 minus1198702 gt 0119866+119862minus119862119891minus1198772 lt 0and minus(119866+119862minus119862119891minus1198772) gt 1198892119877minus1198702minus1198622 minus1198682minus1198624 obtained bymathematical operations 1198892119877 + 119866 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 119862119891 lt1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862 That is to say if the civilian enterprise takesa strategy of continuing cooperation the benefits obtainedare lower than those when a strategy of quit in the midwayis takenforall119909 isin [0 1] 1198721015840(0) lt 0 then 119910 = 0 is the civilianenterprise ESS The result of the game between the two sidesis that under this condition no matter what strategy themilitary enterprise takes the civilian enterprise will take astrategy of quit in the midway based on limited rationality


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1


Condition 3 1198892119877minus1198622minus1198682 minus1198624 minus1198702 gt 0119866+119862minus119862119891minus1198772 lt 0and minus(119866 + 119862 minus 119862119891 minus 1198772) lt 1198892119877 minus 1198702 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624obtained by mathematical operations 1198892119877 + 119866 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus1198624 minus 119862119891 gt 1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862 That is to say if the civilianenterprise takes a strategy of continuing cooperation thebenefits obtained are higher than those when a strategy ofquit in the midway is taken When 119909 gt 1199090 1198721015840(1) lt 0then 119910 = 1 is the civilian enterprise ESS When 119909 lt 11990901198721015840(0) lt 0 then 119910 = 0 is the civilian enterprise ESS Theresult of the game between the two sides is that under thiscondition which strategy the civilian enterprise will take isbased on the strategic probability of military enterprise

Condition 4 1198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702 lt 0 119866 + 119862 minus 119862119891 minus1198772 lt 0 obtained by mathematical operations 1198892119877+119866minus1198622 minus1198682 minus 1198624 minus 119862119891 lt 1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862 That is to say if the civilianenterprise takes a strategy of continuing cooperation thebenefits obtained are lower than thosewhen a strategy of quitin the midway is taken forall119909 isin [0 1] 1198721015840(0) lt 0 then 119910 = 0is the civilian enterprise ESS The result of the game betweenthe two sides is that under this condition no matter whatstrategy the military enterprise takes the civilian enterprise

will take a strategy of quit in the midway based on limitedrationality

Condition 5 1198892119877minus1198622 minus1198682minus1198624 minus1198702 lt 0119866+119862minus119862119891minus1198772 gt 0and minus(119866 + 119862 minus 119862119891 minus 1198772) gt 1198892119877 minus 1198702 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624obtained by mathematical operations 1198892119877 + 119866 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus1198624 minus 119862119891 lt 1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862 That is to say if the civilianenterprise takes a strategy of continuing cooperation thebenefits obtained are lower than those when a strategy ofquit in the midway is taken When 119909 gt 1199090 1198721015840(0) lt 0then 119910 = 0 is the civilian enterprise ESS When 119909 lt 11990901198721015840(1) lt 0 then 119910 = 1 is the civilian enterprise ESS Theresult of the game between the two sides is that under thiscondition which strategy the civilian enterprise will take isbased on the strategic probability of military enterprise

Condition 6 1198892119877minus1198622minus1198682minus1198624 minus1198702 lt 0119866+119862minus119862119891minus1198772 gt 0and minus(119866+119862minus119862119891minus1198772) lt 1198892119877minus1198702minus1198622 minus1198682minus1198624 obtained bymathematical operations 1198892119877 + 119866 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 119862119891 gt1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862 That is to say if the civilian enterprise takesa strategy of continuing cooperation the benefits obtainedare higher than those when a strategy of quit in the midwayis taken forall119909 isin [0 1] 1198721015840(1) lt 0 then 119910 = 1 is the civilianenterprise ESS The result of the game between the two sidesis that under this condition no matter what strategy themilitary enterprise takes the civilian enterprise will takea strategy of continuing cooperation based on limitedrationality

43 Stability Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Strategiesof Game Sides Above we analyzed the military and civilianenterprisersquos respective stability strategy under six conditionsBy combining these conditions two game sides can bedivided into the following three situations

In the first situation both game sides do not affect eachother in taking strategy which meets military enterpriseCondition 1 or Condition 2 or Condition 4 or Condition 6and also meets civilian enterprise Condition 1 or Condition 2or Condition 4 or Condition 6 There are 16 combinations inthis situation

In the second situation when the two sides of the gametake the strategy only one sidersquos strategic behavior is affectedby the other side which meets military enterprise Condition1 or Condition 2 or Condition 4 or Condition 6 civilianenterprise Condition 3 or Condition 5 military enterpriseCondition 3 or 5 and civilian enterprise Condition 1 orCondition 2 or Condition 4 or Condition 6 There are 16combinations in this situation

In the third situation both sides of the game influenceeach other when taking a strategy which meets militaryenterprise Condition 3 or Condition 5 and meets civilianenterprise Condition 3 or Condition 5 There are 4 combi-nations in this situation

We use the local stability of the Jacobian matrix to verifythe evolutionary stability strategy combinations that mayexist in the three situations The partial derivatives of 119865(119909)and119872(119910) are respectively taken for x and y and the Jacobianmatrix is as follows


Table 2 Evolutionary stable point under conditions combination of military-civilian

Combination Military Enterprise Condition1 2 3 4 5 6

Civilian Enterprise Condition

1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

119869= ((1 minus 2119909) [119862 + 119866 minus 1198771 + (1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701) 119910] (1 minus 119909) (1198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701) 119909

(1 minus 119910) (1198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702) 119910 (1 minus 2119910) [119866 + 119862 minus 119862119891 minus 1198772 + (1198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702) 119909])(8)

It can be seen from Table 2 that whether it is situation 1situation 2 or situation 3 after long-term evolution there arefour combinations of evolutionary stability strategies (11)(10) (01) (00) The final specific evolution directionmainly depends on the factors of military-civilian collabora-tive innovation cooperation evolution game matrix and theinitial state of the system

Further analysis of Table 2 shows that under the 36conditionrsquos combinations the cooperation ofmilitary-civiliancollaborative innovation under 27 combinations is brokenUnder 8 combinations there is the only evolutionary stabilitypoint (11) that is both the game sides take a strategy ofcontinuing cooperation and the cooperation between themilitary and civilian enterprise has continued to be main-tained There is only one combination and the long-termevolutionary stable points are combined into (11) and (00)

According to the above analysis the reason for thetermination of the military-civilian collaborative innovationcooperation process is as follows the total income earned byone or both sides of the game is lower than the total incomeobtained when the game is withdrawn From the perspectiveof income the cooperation income of two game sides doesnot reach the expected income or the income distributionis uneven that is the allocation of d1 d2 is unreasonableor the cooperative income is lower than the independentRampD profit The betrayal benefits brought about by the gamesidersquos breach of contract also increase the risk of cooperationfailure The incentives given by the government need to befurther increased with targeted and differentiated rewardsfor different game sides From the perspective of cost theRampD cost information communication cost and technologysecondary conversion cost invested by both game sidesexceed the budget Due to the high market risk the lossesincurred by one side are too high In addition liquidated

damages are set too low resulting in reduced binding and areduced probability of successful cooperation

The long-term evolution of the system contains a totalof 9 combinations of conditions at point (11) Among themunder 8 combinations when the game side takes a strategy ofcontinuing cooperation and the return is greater than thenet incomeobtained taking a strategy of quit in themidwaythere is a unique game equilibrium state (11) According tothe 9 combinations the common conditions can be obtainedas shown in formula (9) the basic criteria for governmentincentive selection are calculated by this formula

1198891119877 + 119866 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 gt 1198771 + 1198701 minus 1198621198892119877 + 119866 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 119862119891 gt 1198772 + 1198702 minus 119862 (9)

We solve the basic standard of G119866 gt 1198771+1198701minus119862minus(1198891119877minus1198621 minus1198681 minus1198623) and 119866 gt 1198772 +1198702 minus119862minus (1198892119877minus1198622 minus1198682 minus1198624 minus119862119891)The basic standards show that under the conditions of

basic RampD income cooperation income betrayal incomeliquidated damages RampD and communication costs tech-nology secondary conversion cost and cooperation risk theintensity of government incentives must at least compensatefor the difference between the benefits of the continuedcooperation strategy and the gains from the withdrawal andthen the military-civilian collaborative innovation coopera-tion is likely to continue so that the entire game system willeventually move toward a stable state of cooperation

The situation in which the military-civilian collabora-tive innovation evolutionary stability point is (11) (00) isthe combination of military enterprisersquos Condition 3 andcivilian enterprisersquos Condition 3 Under this combinationit can be obtained from the local stability analysis of theJacobian matrix that (10) and (01) are the unstable pointsof the long-term evolution game if det(119869)|(1199090 1199100) lt 0 and


M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x

Figure 13 Phase diagram of the military-civilian collaborativeinnovation evolution

tr(119869)|(1199090 1199100) = 0 then (1199090 1199100) is the saddle pointM whichis the critical point of evolutionary stability results PuttingFigures 3 and 9 on the same coordinate plane we can get thedynamic phase diagram of the military-civilian collaborativeinnovation evolution as shown in Figure 13

44 Analysis of the Factors Affecting Military-Civilian Collab-orative Innovation Strategy We explore stability problem inthe process of military-civilian collaborative innovation thatis the process of (xy) tends to (11) To analyze the factorsaffecting cooperative stability between two game sides wechoose the evolutionary stability point (11) (00)

According to Figure 13 the final evolutionary stabil-ity of military-civilian collaborative innovation cooperationgame is as follows two sides take a strategy of continuingcooperation and two sides take a strategy of quit inthe midway The long-term evolutionary stability strategyhas a dependence on initial state and when initial stateis near the saddle pointM the small changes in initialstate will affect final evolution of the cooperative game ofmilitary-civilian collaborative innovation When initial stateis in theAMDQ polyline area military-civilian collaborativeinnovation cooperative game system will converge toQ(00)steady state that is the two sides take a strategy of quit inthemidwayWhen initial state is in theAMDB polyline areathe military-civilian collaborative innovation cooperativegame system will converge toB(11) steady state that is thetwo sides take a strategy of continuing cooperation andcollaborative innovation activities will continue Thereforethe final evolutionary stability results of the military-civiliancollaborative innovation and evolution system may continueto cooperate with the initial point or may be the terminationof cooperation Therefore with the difference of initialpoints the final evolutionary stability of the military-civiliancollaborative innovation and evolution system may be theresult of continuing cooperation or may be quit in the

Table 3 Analysis of the factors affecting military-civilian collabo-rative innovation strategy

Influencing factor Partial derivative Impact on S2119877 + uarr1198771 1198772 minus darr119866 + uarr1198701 1198702 minus darr1198891 1198892 119862 + uarr1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 minus darr119862119891 minus darr1198681 1198682 minus darrmidway whose evolutionary state tends to depend on theregionalAMDQ area S1 and regionalAMDB area S2When S1gt S2 the state of collaborative innovation and evolutionsystem tends to collide with cooperation when S2 gt S1the collaborative innovation and evolution system tends tocontinue the cooperation between two sides We explore thefactors affecting the cooperative stability of military-civiliancollaborative innovation that is analyze the factors affectingthe S2 area

1198782 = 1 minus 12 ( 1198772 + 119862119891 minus 119862 minus 1198661198892119877 minus 1198622 minus 1198682 minus 1198624 minus 1198702

+ 1198771 minus 119862 minus 1198661198891119877 minus 1198621 minus 1198681 minus 1198623 minus 1198701)(10)

From this formula the factors affecting the S2 area can bedivided into two categories the income category

119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)

and the cost category

119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)

S2 is used to obtain partial derivatives for the aboveparameters as shown in Table 3

It can be seen from Table 3 thatR is cooperation benefitin the process of military-civilians collaborative innovationWhen it grows the saddle pointMmoves to theQ point andthe regionalAMDB area S2 increases After long-term evolu-tion both game sides are more likely to trend towardB (11)point that is two game sides take a strategy of continuingcooperation However if the basic incomeR1 R2 of twogame sides continues to grow even exceeding the cooperativeincome game sides tend to take a strategy of quit in themidway due to the consideration of optimal input-outputratio The betrayal gainK1 K2 is negatively correlated withthe stability of collaborative innovation In particular if thecooperative income R does not meet expectations and thebetrayal incomeK1 K2 grows to a certain extent then bothgame sides tend to take a strategy of quit in the midwaybased on interest considerations to avoid more losses

To mobilize the enthusiasm of the military-civilian enter-prises to participate in collaborative innovation the govern-ment gives positive incentives G to game sides who maintain


collaborative innovation cooperative stability SinceG is apart of the income of both game sides whenG exceeds thebasic standard it can promote evolution path of military-civilian cooperation to pointB and improve the stability ofcollaborative innovation

Since the monotonicity of S2 to d1 is uncertain S2 per-forms second-order derivation on d1 and the second deriva-tive is less than 0 indicating that S2 has a maximum valueford1 Similarly S2 also has a maximum value for d2 That isto say there is an optimal distribution coefficient formilitary-civilian collaborative innovation which makes the militaryand civilian enterprises tend to take a strategy of continuingcooperation which is conducive to a win-win situation

C1 C2 C3 C4 I1 I2 are the cooperative costs of col-laborative innovation invested by both military and civilianenterprises When these costs increase the regionalAMDBarea S2 decreases indicating that the probability of the gamesides taking a strategy of continuing cooperation becomessmaller which may lead to the breakdown of cooperationThe reasonable explanation for this is that after the invest-ment in RampD costs and technology secondary conversioncosts exceed the budget the military and civilian enterpriseincrease the communication cost due to the difference in themanagement mechanism system in the end the cooperativeincome did not reach the expected basic income of the gamesides or even a lower value and then the collaborative inno-vation cooperation relationship was terminated C indicatespenalty costs in the cooperative process and the penalty costsare positively correlated with the area of S2 This means thatboth the military and civilian enterprises are more inclined totake a strategy of continuing cooperationunder the effectiveand strict restraint mechanism reducing the moral hazardand thus improving the collaborative innovation cooperativestability Above discussion on the costs is based on thepremise shared by both the military and civilian enterprisesCompared with the military enterprises the market riskbrings a large cost lossCf to the civilian enterprises WhenCfis getting bigger and bigger beyond the risk estimation of thecivilian enterprises the process of collaborative innovationis difficult to maintain or even the relationship is brokenIn combination with the actual situation the market risk isdynamicWhether it is for the military or civilian enterprisesthe risk loss is a hidden danger worthy of attention anddynamic risk management is necessary

In summary in the process of military-civilian collab-orative innovation the cooperative stability of cooperationbetween two game sides is affected by their respective basicincome cooperation revenue betrayal income governmentincentives various costs of investment liquidated damagesoptimal distribution coefficient etc

5 Numerical Analysis

Based on the above analysis of evolutionary stability of bothgame sides under different conditions we take the militaryand civilian enterprises in satellite industry as examplesassign values to each parameter performnumerical evolutionand simulation analysis and then useMatlab software tosimulate the dynamics evolution process of strategic selection

between the military and civilian enterprises To visuallydemonstrate and verify the influence of relevant factors andinitial state on the stability of military-civilian collaborativeinnovation cooperation process the evolutionary game sta-bility strategy of both sides is selected to simulate the (11)condition combination state

The characteristics of satellite industry are that devel-opment of the military industry and technological break-throughs canpromote simultaneous development of the civil-ian industry and technological advancement of the civilianindustry will drive the growth of themilitary industry in turnThe two sides promote each other and depend on each otherto form a symbiotic relationship of synergy and commongrowth From the perspective of technical attributes thetechnology of satellite industry can be transferred betweenthemilitary and civilian industryMoreover satellite industryis an industry with a blurred border of military-civilianand a high degree of common assets The products andbusiness levels are relatively similar and boundaries willbecome increasingly blurred That is the status of military-civilian collaborative innovation in these industries has acertain foundation and industrial barriers are relatively easyto break at the same time it has very large market potential

Based on the above-mentioned satellite industryrsquos devel-opment status and future market potential combined withthe evolutionary game model of military-civilian collabo-rative innovation we should consider the following basicconditions when assigning values to the parameters thecooperative benefits of the joint innovation between the gamesides must exceed their respective basic benefits based onthe higher investment cost and basic technology advantagesmilitary enterprisersquos income distribution coefficient basicincome betrayal income and research and developmentcosts are higher than the civilian enterpriseThe initial assign-ment of each parameter is as follows (unit millionRMBexcept 1198891 1198892(1198891 + 1198892 = 1))

1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y

Figure 14 The dynamic evolution process of military-civilianstrategies in different initial states

1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)

According to the set parameter values the saddle pointMis calculated as (12 25) Randomly set the initial six ini-tial states of the military-civilian cooperation (01 08)(03 05) (05 02) (09 03) (07 05) (06 09)ThroughMatlab simulation the dynamic evolution processof game strategies after long-term evolution is predicted asshown in Figure 14

It can be seen from Figure 14 that when (x y) fallsin theAMDB region it gradually converges to (1 1) andwhen (x y) falls in theAMDQ region it gradually convergesto (0 0) which verifies that the stability of civil-militarycollaborative innovation process is related to initial state ofthe system

By the initial assignment of the above parameters thevalue of the government incentive G is changed to visuallydemonstrate the impact of government incentives on themilitary-civilian collaborative innovation cooperative stabil-ity In order to make military-civilian collaborative innova-tion in the initial state tend to be stable according to the basicstandard formula ofG Ggt10 is calculated

WhenG=10 as shown in Figure 15 military-civiliancollaborative innovation cooperation in the six randomlyselected states tends to (00) in the long-term evolutionprocess This shows that when government incentive G doesnot reach the basic standard one of two game sides fails tomeet the expected total income of cooperation willingnessto cooperate with collaborative innovation will decrease withtime and the state of cooperation between two game sideswill be unstable or even ruined

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y

Figure 15 The dynamic evolution process of military-civilianstrategies at G=10

WhenG=1314 as shown in Figure 16 the initial stateof (0108) (0305) (0502) military-civilian collabora-tive innovation has changed from failure to stable cooper-ation because government incentive G is higher than thebasic standard compensating for the difference betweenmilitary and civilian enterprises losses and enhancing theconfidence of collaborative innovation cooperation that isG plays a positive role in the stability of game systemWhen initial state of is (09 03) (07 05) (06 09)steady state has been reached under the condition ofG=13and whenG is increased to 14 this does not significantlyimprove civil-military cooperation the two sides whichtends to be (11) The explanation is that government incen-tives may have marginal effects and further research isneeded to get the scope of implementation of governmentincentives

We then select representative factors and analyze theirimpact on the dynamic evolution process of military-civiliancollaborative innovation Taking C I2 andC3 as examplesthe dynamic process of strategic evolution between two gamesides is visually demonstrated The specific process is asfollows

51 Liquidated Damages C Except forC the values ofother factors are consistent with the initial settings of theparameters WhenC=8 10 12 and initial state is (01 08)(03 05) (07 05) (0903) the dynamic evolution processof two game sides strategies is shown in Figure 17 Withthe increase of liquidated damagesC the strategic evolutiondirection of both game sides gradually evolved from theunstable state (00) to the stable state (11) This shows thatliquidated damages have a positive effect on the stability ofthe process of military-civilian collaborative innovation thatis the higher the liquidated damages the more likely thatthe two game sides tend to take a strategy of continuingcooperation which is in line with the actual situation


(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y

Figure 17 The dynamic evolution process of military-civilianstrategies atC=8 10 12

52 Information Communication Cost of Civilian EnterpriseI2 Except for I2 the values of other factors are consistentwith the initial settings of the parameters When I2=2 4 68 10 and the initial state is (04 04) the dynamic evolutionprocess of game sides strategies is shown in Figure 18When I2 continues to increase the value of the civilian I2exceeds civilian enterprisersquos acceptable range the civilianenterprise tends to take a strategy of quit in the midwayand at the same time the convergence rate is acceleratedFigure 19 also verifies that under same conditions when thecost of information communication gradually increases and

I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

yFigure 18 The dynamic evolution process of civilian strategiesat I2=2 4 6 8 10

(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

Figure 19 The dynamic evolution process of military-civilianstrategies at I2=2 4 6 8 10

exceeds budget the cooperative relationship of the military-civilian collaborative innovation is also shattered This showsthat the cooperative stability of military-civilian collaborativeinnovation will be negatively affected by I2

53 Technology Secondary Conversion Cost of MilitaryEnterprise C3 Except forC3 the values of other factorsare consistent with the initial settings of the parametersWhenC3=3 5 6 9 11 and the initial state is (04 04)the dynamic evolution process of the game sides strategies is


C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X

Figure 20 The dynamic evolution process of military strategiesatC3=3 5 6 9 11

(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y

Figure 21 The dynamic evolution process of military-civilianstrategies atC3=3 5 6 9 11

shown in Figure 20 WhenC3 continues to increase in orderto avoid more losses the military enterprise tends to take astrategy of quit in the midway and at the same time theconvergence rate is accelerated Figure 21 also verifies thatunder the same conditions when secondary conversion costgradually increases the strategic evolution direction of bothgame sides gradually evolved from the state (11) to (00)This shows that the cooperative stability of military-civiliancollaborative innovation will be negatively affected byC3

6 Main Conclusionsand Management Implications

61 Main Conclusions The long-term evolutionary gameof military-civilian collaborative innovation in the satelliteindustry has four stable points namely (11) (10) (01)(00) and its evolution direction depends on the initialstate and factor values of the military-civilian collaborativeinnovation evolutionary game system

By analyzing the factors leading the military-civiliancollaborative innovation in satellite industry to tend to stablestate (11) the following conclusions are drawn The higherthe basic income RampD cost information communicationcost technology secondary conversion cost and betrayalincome the higher the market risk and the more unfavorablethe cooperative stability between the two sides whereasthe liquidated damages government incentives cooperativeincome and reasonable income distribution coefficient areconducive to cooperative stability At the same time thearticle gives basic standards for government to promotethe incentives for cooperation between military and civilianenterprises

Based on the characteristics of Chinarsquos satellite industrywe useMatlab to simulate the above conclusions vividlydemonstrate the dynamic evolution process of the military-civilian strategies and verify the impact of relevant factorson the cooperative stability of military-civilian integrationcollaborative innovation

62 Implications for Researchers In the evolutionary gamemodel we have simplified the setting and classification ofthe relevant parameters in the model to facilitate the analysisand solution The game set only two major participantsmilitary enterprises and civilian enterprises In the satelliteindustry military-civilian collaborative innovation networkthere are many participants involved and the parameters ofthe model are more complicated The follow-up research canbe extended to the situation of military-civilian collaborativeinnovation cooperation composed of multiple agent suchas third-party intermediaries or financing institutions andresearch institutes

In Section 5 through the analysis of the characteris-tics of Chinarsquos satellite industry we have determined theevaluation criteria of the model parameters and assignedthe relevant parameters The simulation result shows thedynamic evolution process of themilitary-civilian integrationcollaborative innovation In order to make the conclusionmore scientific and accurate the follow-up research can beverified by empirical research on military-civilian collabo-rative innovation in different industries and the evaluationindex system and evaluation method can be constructed tocomprehensively and accurately assess the military-civiliancollaborative innovation cooperative stability

Although this paper explores the cooperative stabilityof the military-civilian collaborative innovation for Chinarsquossatellite industry it provides reference material and anextended example for other researchers to explore the collab-orative innovation of military-civilian integration in differentcountries in terms of the assumption of evolutionary game


model the form of payment matrix the solution and analysisof the model andMatlab simulation analysis

63 Implications for Government From the perspective ofpromoting the cooperative stability of military-civilian col-laborative innovation in Chinarsquos satellite industry the gov-ernment needs to do top-level planning strengthen top-level design functions coordinate overall development thor-oughly study the structure and appeals of relevant stake-holders and scientifically formulate and rigidly implementrelevant policies and mechanisms to create environment andconditions that can encourage civilian enterprises to entersatellite industry or to start businesses in the satellite industryThe details are as follows

Governmentrsquos policy supports and guarantees Forinstance for enterprises that actively participate in themilitary-civilian collaborative innovation especially civilianenterprises government grants necessary tax incentives andfinancial subsidies simplifies the civil-military coordinationprocedures and offers low-interest loans to the satelliteindustry At the same time government can also simplifyloan processes and standards and encourage large-scaledefense groups to conduct in-depth cooperation with civilianenterprises through material subsidies and preferential pol-icies

Government should focus on improving relevant lawsand regulations and intellectual property protection to en-hance the security of the satellite industryrsquos military-civiliancollaborative innovation policy environment meanwhilegovernment can also improve the relevant content in thestrategic planning of military-civilian collaborative inno-vation from national defense law to local regulations soas to suppress betrayal behavior and speculation throughthe improvement of the legal system In addition relevanttechnologies in the satellite industry should adopt nationalstandards and industry standards and gradually realize theintegration of military and civilian standards Government issupposed to improve laws and regulations on the transforma-tion of dual-use SampT achievements in the satellite industryprovide legal guarantees for the transformation and promotethe application of dual-use SampT achievements

Government plays a guiding role in policy by strengthen-ingmarket standardization management for its role ofmarketregulation and enforcement Government can also promotethe two-way flow of powerful resources between the militaryand civilian enterprises and form a market mechanism withclear national defense and market demand From the per-spective of factors affecting cooperative stability of military-civilian collaborative innovation it is recommended that thegovernment take the lead in cooperating with authoritativeand independent institutions to supervise the whole processof cooperation ensuring that collaborative innovation andcooperation are carried out smoothly and efficiently andderogatory behavior can be avoided

The cooperative stability of military-civilian collaborativeinnovation can be maintained by using the Internet plusservice model thinking to build a platform for informationexchange and interaction between the military and the civil-ian enterprise through the big data cloud computing and

other technologies so as to enrich the information involvedin collaborative innovation and improve the efficiency andaccuracy of information communication Establishing aplatform for the transformation of dual-use SampT achieve-ments in the satellite industry is recommended such as thehigh-technology enterprise incubation center in addition todeveloping third-party intermediary service organizationsMilitary-civilian intermediary service system and military-civilian information exchange system need to be improved topromote the application of civilized achievements in nationaldefense technology and the application of militarized resultsof advanced civilian technologies

64 Implications for Game Sides For both sides of the gamemaintaining a friendly cooperative relationship can proceedfrom the following aspects

Promote a win-win situation and risk assessment mecha-nism Build an effective competition mechanism supervisionmechanism evaluation mechanism and incentive systemAchieve the effect of one investment and two outputs basedon mutual development Regarding risk management aprofessional evaluation committee composed of governmentdepartments experts from scientific institutions and repre-sentatives from the game sides will make detailed predictionsand demonstrations onmilitary-civilian cooperation projectsin the satellite industry coordinate development effectivelyallocate resources and implement risk sharing to avoidpotential risks as much as possible

Establish a reasonable proportion of cooperative incomedistribution Interest is the direct driving force for coopera-tion between the two game sides and the reasonable distri-bution of benefits can promote the cooperative stability Athird-party evaluation agency may be introduced to considerthe cost comprehensive contribution and risk assumed byboth sides in the process of cooperation and reasonablydistribute the cooperative income in dynamic manner Whilemaximizing the benefits of cooperation we should satisfy theinterests of the game sides as much as possible and avoidincome disputes in the system

To increase the benefits of military-civilian collaborativeinnovation in the satellite industry we encourage the diver-sification of cooperation forms such as joint developmentand commissioned development Bring into play the role ofthe enterprisersquos innovative main body and carry out technicalresearch with large-scale enterprises and scientific researchinstitutions that have both scientific research and technicalstrength

To improve the cooperative willingness of the game sidesand adjust the cooperative status a reasonable staged contractcan be formulated or the contract can be continuouslyrevised and improved to avoid disputes in the coopera-tion process and help maintain the harmony of the gamesides Other participants can be introduced in capital andtechnology RampD such as financial institutions universitiesand research institutes to form new business models tosolve the problems of high RampD costs high cost of sec-ondary technology conversion and difficulty in research anddevelopment


Data Availability

The simulation data used to support the findings of this studyare included within the article

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

This research was funded by Projects of the National SocialScience Foundation of China grant number [18BGL020]Our research team is grateful to Ms Stefania Ascarelli forprofessionally correcting the English of this manuscriptdiligent proofreading and suggesting improvements of styleand structure

References

[1] J Yongfeng ldquoAn empirical study on patent activities in Chinarsquoshigh-tech industry a case study of satellite industryrdquo Science ampTechnology Progress amp Policy vol 3 pp 70ndash74 2015

[2] L-Y Sun C-L Miao and L Yang ldquoEcological-economicefficiency evaluation of green technology innovation in strate-gic emerging industries based on entropy weighted TOPSISmethodrdquo Ecological Indicators vol 73 pp 554ndash558 2017

[3] P-A Balland ldquoProximity and the evolution of collaborationnetworks evidence from research and development projectswithin the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) industryrdquoRegional Studies vol 46 no 6 pp 741ndash756 2012

[4] L-Y Wu K-Y Chen P-Y Chen and P-J Tung ldquoRevisitingassociations between specific asset investment and loyal andcooperative behavior a complexity theory perspectiverdquo Journalof Business Research vol 69 no 9 pp 3545ndash3552 2016

[5] F Chen Q Meng and F Li ldquoHow resource informationbackgrounds trigger post-merger integration and technologyinnovationA dynamic analysis of resource similarity and com-plementarityrdquo Computational and Mathematical OrganizationTheory vol 23 no 2 pp 167ndash198 2017

[6] A Parkhe ldquoStrategic alliance structuring a game theoreticand transaction cost examination of interfirm cooperationrdquoAcademy of Management Journal vol 36 no 4 pp 794ndash8291993

[7] M Zeng and X-P Chen ldquoAchieving cooperation in multipartyalliances a social dilemma approach to partnership manage-mentrdquo Academy of Management Review vol 28 no 4 pp 587ndash605 2003

[8] J D Sanchez de Pablo Gonzalez del Campo I Pena GarcıaPardo and F Hernandez Perlines ldquoInfluence factors of trustbuilding in cooperation agreementsrdquo Journal of BusinessResearch vol 67 no 5 pp 710ndash714 2014

[9] N Myhr ldquoBusiness-to-business partnerships an empiricalexamination in a supply chain contextrdquo Canadian Journal ofChemical Engineering vol 86 no 3 pp 347ndash355 2008

[10] K Mignonac O Herrbach and S Guerrero ldquoThe interactiveeffects of perceived external prestige and need for organiza-tional identification on turnover intentionsrdquo Journal of Voca-tional Behavior vol 69 no 3 pp 477ndash493 2006

[11] D Friedman ldquoEvolutionary games in economicsrdquo Economet-rica vol 59 no 3 pp 637ndash666 1991

[12] S N Evans A Hening and S J Schreiber ldquoProtected polymor-phisms and evolutionary stability of patch-selection strategiesin stochastic environmentsrdquo Journal of Mathematical Biologyvol 71 no 2 pp 325ndash359 2015

[13] S Sati A Ippisch and K Graffi ldquoDynamic replication con-trol strategy for Opportunistic Networksrdquo in Proceedings ofthe International Conference on Computing Networking andCommunications (ICNC rsquo17) pp 1017ndash1023 IEEE January 2017

[14] T Feng S Tai C Sun and Q Man ldquoStudy on cooperativemechanism of prefabricated producers based on evolutionarygame theoryrdquo Mathematical Problems in Engineering vol 2017Article ID 1676045 6 pages 2017

[15] W He ldquoA dynamic evolutionary game model of modularproduction networkrdquo Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Societyvol 2016 Article ID 6425158 9 pages 2016

[16] Q Shi J Zhu and Q Li ldquoCooperative evolutionary game andapplications in construction supplier tendencyrdquo Complexityvol 2018 Article ID 8401813 13 pages 2018

[17] C Pan and Y Long ldquoEvolutionary game analysis of coopera-tion between microgrid and conventional gridrdquo MathematicalProblems in Engineering vol 2015 Article ID 103206 10 pages2015

[18] C Li X Li and Y Wang ldquoEvolutionary game analysis of thesupervision behavior for public-private partnership projectswith public participationrdquoMathematical Problems in Engineer-ing vol 2016 Article ID 1760837 8 pages 2016

[19] S-H Chen ldquoAn evolutionary game model of knowledge work-ersrsquo counterproductive work behaviors based on preferencesrdquoComplexity vol 2017 Article ID 3295436 11 pages 2017

[20] Q Sun and Z Yao ldquoEvolutionary game analysis of competitiveinformation dissemination on social networks an agent-basedcomputational approachrdquo Mathematical Problems in Engineer-ing vol 2015 Article ID 679726 12 pages 2015

[21] T E Trainor D M Brazil and T Lindberg ldquoBuilding knowl-edge from organizational experience approaches and lessonslearned from us army base camp workshopsrdquo EngineeringManagement Journal vol 20 no 2 pp 37ndash45 2008

[22] J Brickey and S Walczak ldquoA comparative analysis of profes-sional forums in the United States army and hybrid commu-nities of practice in the civilian sectorrdquo International Journal ofStrategic Studies vol 35 no 6 pp 1ndash29 2012

[23] V Merindol and D W Versailles ldquoDual-use as knowledge-oriented policy France during the 1990-2000srdquo InternationalJournal of Technology Management vol 50 no 1 pp 80ndash982010

[24] L Totimeh ldquoApplication of knowledge management in amilitary-civilian organization focusing on naval sea systemscase studyrdquo Dissertations ampTheses-Gradworks vol 12 no 4 pp117ndash130 2010

[25] J Molas-Gallart and P Tang ldquoOwnership matters Intellectualproperty privatization and innovationrdquoResearch Policy vol 35no 2 pp 200ndash212 2006

[26] RMcIvor andPHumphreys ldquoEarly supplier involvement in thedesign process Lessons from the electronics industryrdquoOmega vol 32 no 3 pp 179ndash199 2004

[27] K-I Jeong J-D Lee and C Lee ldquoProfitability gains of koreandefense firms technological progress or cost shiftingrdquo AsianJournal of Technology Innovation vol 18 no 2 pp 219ndash2392010

[28] Y Zhikai ldquoA research on the scientific and technologicalintellectual property rights under the system of the military and


civilian unionrdquo Scientific Management Research vol 26 no 3pp 107ndash110 2008

[29] CM SchnaubeltTowards a Comprehensive Approach Integrat-ing Civilian and Military Concepts of Strategy NATO DefenseCollege Rome Italy 2011

[30] H T Kulve and W A Smit ldquoCivilian-military co-operationstrategies in developing new technologiesrdquo Research Policy vol32 no 6 pp 955ndash970 2003

[31] V Yepes E Pellicer L F Alarcon and C L Correa ldquoCreativeinnovation in spanish construction firmsrdquo Journal of Profes-sional Issues in Engineering Education amp Practice vol 142 no1 Article ID 04015006 2016

[32] T M Lavallee ldquoCivil-military integration the politics of out-sourcing national securityrdquo Bulletin of Science Technology ampSociety vol 30 no 3 pp 185ndash194 2010

[33] K G Ross M Wisecarver C A Thornson D A Peluso andM K Roberts Development of a Competency Model for Civil-Military Teaming Springer International Publishing 2017

[34] L Zhao J Sun andH Zhang ldquoAn analysis of civil-military inte-gration technology collaborative innovation behaviorrdquo Scienceamp Technology Progress amp Policy vol 32 no 13 pp 111ndash117 2015

Hindawiwwwhindawicom Volume 2018

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Submit your manuscripts atwwwhindawicom


demands can stimulate civilian enterprises to seek military-civilian cooperation for market development Satellite indus-try reflects the attributes of military-civilian collaborativeinnovation concerning technology application The technol-ogy involved in satellite industry is mostly dual-use The keypoint to distinguish between military and civilian use liesin signal conversion mechanism and information confiden-tiality and there is no distinct difference in transmissionor receiving device Therefore the satellite industry canmaximize the military-civilian collaborative innovation andcarry out technical cooperation and benign interaction Upto April 20 2018 China has more than 200 satellites in orbitand the average annual growth rate of satellite applicationsand strategic emerging industries has exceeded 20

Successful implementation of military-civilian collab-orative innovation has been witnessed to develop strate-gic emerging industries in developed countries Howevermilitary-civilian collaborative innovation is still in its infancyin developing countries and needs strategies to implement iteffectively Reality proved that military-civilian collaborativeinnovation can effectively enhance the ability of transitionfrom peacetime to wartime reduce the transaction costs andimprove the efficiency of social resources utilization It hasbecome urgent and inherent requirement for us to promotemilitary-civilian collaborative innovation to adapt to thetransformation of the worldrsquos national defense industry [2 3]Due to the refinement of social division the intensification ofinternational competition and the acceleration of technologyupdate speed military enterprise alone can hardly bear thecosts and risks of all scientific and technological research anddevelopment and it is impossible to have all the knowledgeand technology needed for sustainable innovation Military-civilian collaborative innovation has become an inevitablechoice for achieving sustainable innovation and sharingresources in Chinarsquos satellite industry However in realitythere are still problems such as uneven distribution ofcooperative benefits and high conversion costs which resultin inefficient military-civilian collaborative innovation andunstable or even broken cooperation Based on this it is ofgreat importance to explore the stability of military-civiliancollaborative innovation in Chinarsquos satellite industry and thisissue needs to be resolved through scientific research

Therefore considering the importance of satellite indus-try in strategic emerging industries governmentrsquos planfor strategic upgradation and sustainable innovation andscarcity of studies exploring stability of military-civiliancollaborative innovation in Chinarsquos satellite industry the aimof this paper is to build a military-civilian collaborativeinnovation evolutionary game model after initial coopera-tion based on the theory of collaborative innovation andevolutionary game theory after extracting the characteristicelements of both sides and refining the model parameters bytaking military enterprises and civilian enterprises in Chinarsquossatellite industry as two sides of the gameThis paper exploresthe dynamic evolution process of military-civilian collabora-tive innovation under bounded rationality analyzes factorsthat affect cooperative stability and uses Matlab simulationto visually display the impact of related parameters Finallymanagement implications are put forward

This paper is structured as follows Section 2 reviewsthe relevant literature on cooperative stability evolutionarygame theory and military-civilian collaborative innovationSection 3 builds the evolutionary game model of military-civilian collaborative innovation for Chinarsquos satellite industrySection 4 analyzes evolutionary stability strategy and influ-encing factors of military-civilian collaborative innovationfor Chinarsquos satellite industry Section 5 is relevant numericalanalysis Section 6 is main conclusions and managementimplications

2 Literature Review

21 Cooperative Stability Based on the interpretation ofstability in different disciplines many scholars have definedcooperative stability from different perspectives and formedthe following views Destabilizing factor determinism Usingcooperative behavior theory it is believed that the trajectoryof cooperation depends on unstable factors [4] Resourcecomplementarity Cooperation to achieve relatively com-plementary resource demand is the most stable state ofcooperation Once this demand is weakened the partnershipwill no longer be stable [5] Game theory The essence ofcooperation in the game process the stability of the alliancebetween multiple agents depends on the equivalence of theinformation obtained Only when the relationship of thegame sides reaches the information symmetry the alliancewill reach a stable state [6] Social dilemma (institutionalism)Institution is the core to ensure cooperative stability which isbased on the effective trustmechanism andmature constraintmechanism [7 8] Also an effective benefits distributionmechanism cooperation performance communication tiesand individual recognition of the organization can enhancethe willingness to cooperate among the multiple agents andmaintain the cooperative stability [9 10]

In summary the description of cooperative stabilityof military-civilian collaborative innovation in the satelliteindustry is as follows After the preliminary cooperationbetween military and civilian satellite industry has beenreached in the process of long-term cooperation due to otherexternal or internal factors of cooperation the state of thecooperative system is disturbed resulting in the volatility andtortuosity of cooperation trajectoryThe system itself can self-resist or mediate so that the overall state restores the originalbalance With the help of external forces the cooperationbetween game sides is more closely related the cooperativewillingness continues to rise and game sides share morecooperation benefits then the system is developing steadilyand eventually reaches a steady state

22 Evolutionary Game Theevolutionary game theory stemsfrom the evolutionary theory of biology following the rulesof natural selection and survival of the fittest It combinesanalytical methods of game theory with dynamic evolutionprocess based on bounded rationality and analyzes howto make the game sides of limited information conduct adynamic game on the vested benefit to maximize the valueThe game sides will continue to learn imitate test andsummarize find the best decisions in the game process






























(2)



(3)





10 x

＞Ｒ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ










10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ













(6)



10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0gt1


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0






10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1
















1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018





































(2)



(3)





10 x

＞Ｒ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ










10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ













(6)



10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0gt1


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0






10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1
















1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018






























(2)



(3)





10 x

＞Ｒ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ










10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ













(6)



10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0gt1


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0






10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1
















1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018






















(2)



(3)





10 x

＞Ｒ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ










10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ













(6)



10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0gt1


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0






10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1
















1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018









10 x

＞Ｒ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ










10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ

＞Ｎ



10 x

＞Ｒ

＞ＮＳgtＳ0

ＳltＳ0


10 x

＞Ｒ













(6)



10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0gt1


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0






10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1
















1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018















(6)



10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x0gt1


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0






10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1
















1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018









10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0lt0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ xgtx0

xltx0


10 y

＞y＞Ｎ

forallx[01] x 0gt1
















1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018












1 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)

2 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

3 (11) (00) (11)(00) (00) null (11)

4 (10) (00) (00) (00) (10) (10)

5 (10) (01) null (01) (01)(10)

(10)

6 (11) (01) (11) (01) (01) (11)













M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018









M

A B (11)

D (10)Q (00)

(01)

y

x










119877 1198771 1198772 119866 1198701 1198702 1198891 1198892 (11)


119862 1198621 1198622 1198623 1198624 119862119891 1198681 1198682 (12)














1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018


















1198891 = 06119877 = 701198771 = 251198621 = 101198681 = 61198701 = 141198623 = 7119862 = 101198892 = 041198772 = 201198622 = 51198682 = 61198702 = 7


(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018









(1225)

(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


1198624 = 4119862119891 = 6119866 = 13

(13)





(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=10

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y






(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018









(0108)

(0305)

(0502)

(0903)

(0705)

(0609)

G=13G=14

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y


X

(0108)

(0305)

(0903)

(0705)

C=8C=10C=12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 100

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y



I2 =2I2 =4I2 =6

I2 =8I2 =10

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12


(0404)

I2=2I2=4I2=6

I2=8I2=10

Y

09

08

07

06

05

04

03

02

01

0

1

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X





C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018









C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

2 4 6 8 100 1 3 5 7 9t

minus02

0

02

04

06

08

1

12

X


(0404)

C3 =3C3 =5C3 =6

C3 =9C3 =11

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10X

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

Y
























Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018






















Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018









Data Availability




Acknowledgments


References












































Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018























Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018















Journal of












Journal of







Volume 2018






Volume 2018








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