The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy

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The Costs of Non-Europe?Denmark and the CommonSecurity and Defence PolicyGorm Rye Olsen a & Jess Pilegaard aa Department of European Studies , Danish Institutefor International Studies , Copenhagen, DenmarkPublished online: 09 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Gorm Rye Olsen & Jess Pilegaard (2005) The Costs of Non-Europe?Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy, European Security, 14:3,339-360, DOI: 10.1080/09662830500407903

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The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmarkand the Common Security and DefencePolicy

GORM RYE OLSEN & JESS PILEGAARDDepartment of European Studies, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen,

Denmark

ABSTRACT The paper discusses a still more obvious foreign policy dilemma facingDenmark: On the one hand, Denmark has made a proactive foreign policy decision topursue a strategy of influence with the European Union as the most important internationalforum. On the other hand, Denmark has chosen to stay outside the increasingly importantcooperation on defence policy within the EU. As a small state, Denmark is opting for amultilateral strategy, but it has deliberately chosen to limit its commitment to the sameforum. A combination of adaptation theory and theory of small states informs the analysis.It is argued that the Danish opt-out sends an unclear and inconsistent signal to Denmark’spartners which again hampers the possibilities for using Danish coalition power within theEU. Nevertheless, contrary to both theoretical expectations and common sense intuition,there is little to suggest that the opt-out has had negative consequences for Denmark’sinfluence on capabilities in the EU.

We must have the courage to break with our inferiority-complex of being

a small state. We have to understand that a small country can set an

agenda and make itself heard on the international scene. We therefore

have to make a strategy for our foreign and security policies which will

strengthen Denmark’s position in selected fields.

(Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen)1

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, successive Danish governments have fully

endorsed the central foreign policy objective that Denmark should play a

proactive role in international politics.2 Also, there has been broad agreement

Correspondence Address : Gorm Rye Olsen, Danish Institute for International Studies, Department

of European Studies, Strandgrade 56, DK-1401, Copenhagen K. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0966-2839 Print/1746-1545 Online/05/030339�/22 # 2005 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09662830500407903

European Security

Vol. 14, No. 3, 339�/360, September 2005

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that this so-called ‘active internationalism’ should rest on two central

foundations. Firstly, the new foreign policy had to be framed in close

cooperation with other countries within different international organizations.

In 1993, the government published a report on ‘Danish foreign policy towards

the year 2000’ where it was established that the EU, and the European Political

Cooperation (EPC), was ‘the most important platform for Denmark’s relation-

ships to the outside world’.3 Secondly, since the end of the Cold War, Danish

politicians have been willing to deploy soldiers not only in traditional

peacekeeping but also in more offensive operations. The willingness to use

the military instrument has even led some researchers to describe the new

Danish foreign policy as ‘militarized’.4 Because of the marked consensus on

these two elements, it is not a coincidence that the deployment of Danish

soldiers has taken place in close collaboration with other countries. Concretely,

Danish soldiers have been deployed within the frameworks of the United

Nations, NATO and the so-called ‘coalitions of the willing’.5

William Wallace claims that small states like Denmark face a dilemma when

they have to choose a strategy for their foreign policy. In principle, small states

can choose between autonomy and influence.6 In the inter-war period,

Denmark chose autonomy and thereby wrote off the possibility of influencing

the Great Powers. After the Second World War, Denmark increasingly opted

for the influence strategy by participating actively in the work in international

organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EEC.

In the years following the end of the Cold War, the European Union

developed into the most important multilateral forum for the formulation and

implementation of Danish foreign and security policies.7 Denmark participates

actively and constructively in the development of the Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP). The decision to opt for a strategy of influence was

clearly underpinned by the continuing European integration process which,

according to Wallace, has been to the benefit of small states in particular.8

Within the field of security, the EU is often described as the near-ideal

security organization for small member states.9 Nevertheless, Denmark has

chosen to stay outside the cooperation on defence policy within the European

Union. Denmark’s position can be likened to an ‘integration dilemma’, i.e. a

situation where a state has to choose between either giving up a substantial part

of its sovereignty or insisting ‘on its independence with the danger of being

abandoned’.10 In the case of defence, Denmark has chosen ‘independence’ over

‘integration’, and Denmark consequently plays no part in cooperation on the

development of the common defence policy (the ESDP) because of an opt-out

from the Maastricht Treaty, which the Danish government was able to achieve

at the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992. Within the

narrow field of defence policy, Denmark has thus chosen autonomy instead of

influence in relation to the ESDP. Instead NATO, the UN, and most recently

‘coalitions of the willing’ are the organizational frameworks for the attempts to

achieve international influence by means of military instruments.

340 G. R. Olsen & J. Pilegaard

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The paper aims to discuss the still more obvious dilemma which Denmark as

a small state faces because it has chosen a new proactive foreign policy while at

the same time it has chosen autonomy when it comes to defence. The paper

claims that while the opt-out from the ESDP sends a rather muddled and

blurred political signal to Denmark’s allies, until the middle of 2005 it has had

remarkably limited consequences for Denmark’s capacity for influence within

the EU in general.

Formulated more precisely, there is little to suggest that opting out from the

ESDP has had negative consequences for Denmark and for its influence within

the EU except of course within the framework of the ESDP proper. This would

suggest that there is no ‘spill-over’ from defence policy into other policy fields

within European cooperation (although it does not imply that such a negative

effect may not occur in the future). This is remarkable because opting out on

defence makes the Danish foreign, security and defence policies appear

incoherent and consequently unreliable. According to the special Danish version

of small states theory, such contradictory policy signals would be expected to

affect crucial instruments of influence such as reputation, negotiation skills and

diplomatic manoeuvrability negatively. More generally, plain common sense

would seem to point in the same direction: Fully committed members would be

expected to have more influence than ‘reluctant allies’, such as Denmark.

The paper is organized as follows. The first section gives a brief presentation

of the theoretical framework which informs the analysis. Then a short overview

of the development of Danish foreign, security and defence policies in the years

following the end of the Cold War is presented. This presentation is followed by

a historical overview of the most recent developments within the ESDP. The

subsequent section presents a discussion of the content and the political

interpretation of the Danish opt-out from defence cooperation within the EU.

In relation to this discussion of the special problems arising from the opt-out,

recent military crisis management operations carried out by the European

Union are reviewed. The article concludes with a discussion of the con-

sequences of the defence opt-out in relation to the expressed objective of

pursuing a proactive foreign policy.

Small States, Adaptation Theory and Danish International Influence

The analytical framework of the following analysis combines elements from two

theoretical approaches. One theoretical inspiration comes from the further

development of James Rosenau’s theory of adaptation that has been made by

Danish researchers.11 The other source of inspiration comes from the theory of

small states which has also been applied in analyses of Danish foreign policy.12

Both theories focus explicitly on power and influence in international relations

and both are thus clearly pertinent to the agenda of the present analysis.

In his interpretation of the theory of small states, Hans Branner starts from

the distinction between physical and non-physical power resources.13 Small

Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy 341

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states are characterized by possessing limited physical resources as far as GNP,

military power and size of population are concerned. Naturally, small states

have limited possibilities of exerting influence if they try to use such resources

in international politics. However, small states can have considerable influence

when using ‘soft’ or non-physical power resources, such as credibility,

negotiation skills, and resolve.

Just as important, small states command a decisive non-physical power

resource when they participate actively in international organizations. Inter-

national organizations have a special advantage in that they give a structural

framework for exchanging information between big and small states. Participa-

tion in such organizations entails that policy priorities are not only measured in

relation to the physical power resources of the member states. A state can be

influential to the extent that its negotiators command respect and credibility.

The adaptation theory operates with a central variable called ‘influence

capability’, i.e. the state’s ability to influence its external environment. This

variable depends both on the character of the external environment and on

domestic capability factors such as economic and military power. In line with

the theory of small states, the adaptation theory argues that there are obvious

limitations to the international influence opportunities of small states. The two

theories are also in agreement on the significance of international cooperation,

as the adaptation theory emphasizes ‘coalition power’ �/ defined as the ‘ability

to form or operate as an influential party in winning coalitions’14 �/ as a crucial

variable. Nikolaj Petersen stresses that within the European Union, active

participation in the integration process in itself represents an important

influence capability. Finally, there is no doubt that variables such as prestige,

diplomatic ingenuity, reputation, and resolve are extremely important instru-

ments for buttressing a state’s influence capability.15

Parting ways with small state theory, the paper assumes that a traditional

physical power resource such as military power under certain conditions can

actually improve the opportunities of a small state to exert international

influence. If the use of military resources follows from a clear strategy and the

policy seems credible to the international partners of the country in question,

military resources can be a valuable asset even for small states. Following from

the above, it is anticipated that Denmark as a small state can use both its

military power resources and traditional non-physical power resources as

means to improve its coalition power. In line with both theoretical frameworks,

it is assumed that the capacity to enter into winning coalitions is a particularly

important instrument for a small state such as Denmark.16

Transferred to the present case, both theoretical approaches would lead to

the expectation that the special Danish opt-out would weaken Denmark’s

influence capability, as Denmark’s coalition power would have been negatively

affected. However, the present paper argues that until mid-2005 the Danish opt-

out from the ESDP has not had the negative effects which would have been

expected from the theoretical framework presented above. Thus, based on


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‘available empirical evidence’ it has not been possible to substantiate that the

opt-out has had obvious negative consequences for Danish coalition power.

The phrase ‘available empirical evidence’ underlines the contingent character

of the findings: If the ESDP continues to develop as it has done in recent years,

the contradiction between the objectives of the new Danish foreign policy

activism and the defence opt-out will probably become increasingly burden-

some. However, such a scenario lies outside the analytical scope of this article.

Methodological Reflections

It is the aim of the empirical analysis to scrutinize if it is possible to show that

Denmark’s international influence capability has been affected negatively

because of the opt-out from the defence cooperation within the European

Union. The analysis focuses on a number of recent military crisis management

operations where the European Union has been involved as the main

responsible actor. Also, the analysis looks into the relationship with the United

Nations and asks what the still closer cooperation between the UN and the

European Union on crisis management means to Denmark’s coalition power.

The main criterion applied in the analysis is whether it is possible to find

‘empirical evidence’ to support the expectation that Denmark’s influence

capabilities are affected negatively by the opt-out. However, the question of

‘empirical evidence’ requires some comment. According to points of view

presented by Danish civil servants, the ‘damage’ to Danish coalition power

because of the opt-out has been negligible until now. That is, it is difficult to

find ‘empirical evidence’ indicating that Denmark’s ability to operate as an

influential party in winning coalitions has been hampered severely. This

situation is, to a large extent a consequence of the serious and committed

work done by Danish civil servants.17 In order to maintain the image of

Denmark as a serious and committed partner in the EU, such individuals have

performed what is described as ‘compensatory work’ in relation to the partners

in the EU. Moreover, the civil servants have been very keen to play an

unobtrusive role in order to make sure that Denmark cannot be blamed for

curbing the other partners in their efforts to develop the ESDP.

Thus, we face a methodological problem which boils down to an argument

that unless the Danish civil servants �/ according to their own statements �/ had

pursued ‘compensatory’ policies, it would already by mid-2005 have been

obvious that the opt-out from defence had severely restricted Danish influence

capabilities internationally. The position taken here is that it is not feasible to

follow the arguments of the civil servants simply because of the character of the

argument being an ‘if not’. To this is added the obvious fact that the civil

servants are themselves part of the interpretation, which clearly poses serious

methodological problems for the empirical analysis here.

Therefore, the analysis of the Danish influence capabilities will primarily

focus on whether the crucial influence variable ‘coalition power’ is affected


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positively or negatively by the defence opt-out. It is assumed that there is quite

a close connection between coalition power, reputation and resolve, meaning

that coalition power is the dependent variable while high prestige and high

credibility are the independent variables. It is assumed that rather intangible

phenomena such as prestige, reputation and resolve are affected positively if

there is a high degree of correspondence between words and political action. If

there is not a considerable degree of correspondence, the value of credibility,

prestige and will-power will be limited accordingly.

The Development in Danish Foreign, Security and Defence Policies

Since the end of the Cold War, Danish foreign policy and Danish security and

defence policies have been characterized by two significant developments. As

mentioned, there has been a marked readiness to use the military card by

deploying Danish soldiers in crisis areas.18 Running parallel to this increased

willingness to commit Danish military forces, Danish foreign policy has also

become yet more multilateral. The two trends were clearly manifested in

Denmark’s active participation in both traditional UN operations and in

NATO’s military operations in the former Yugoslavia. Within the framework of

the UN, Denmark took the initiative to establish a rapid multilateral reaction

force called SHIRBRIG which came into action for the first time in connection

with a UN monitored cease-fire between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Horn of

Africa in 2000. According to Bertel Heurlin, the clear willingness to deploy

troops abroad shows that after 1989 Denmark became a ‘producer’ of security

instead of the situation during the Cold War, where Denmark was mainly a

‘consumer’ of security.19

The conspicuous determination to use Danish soldiers in operations abroad

has led Steen Rynning to argue that, during the 1990s, Denmark’s international

role evolved from a ‘civilian actor’ to a so-called ‘strategic actor’ in the new

century.20 Denmark was a civilian actor due to its position as a third party

between two warring parties, as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo for example.

With the active Danish participation in the American-led campaign in

Afghanistan from October 2001, it is however more appropriate to describe

Denmark as a ‘strategic actor’.21 Similarly, there is no doubt that Denmark

acted as a strategic actor in relation to the US-led attack on Iraq on 19 March

2003, when the country provided troops for direct combat actions, just as it had

in Afghanistan.

In summary, since the end of the Cold War, Danish politicians and decision-

makers have used the instrument ‘coalition power’ within the framework of the

European Union, NATO and the UN in order to increase Denmark’s

international influence.22 The active internationalism has combined ‘coalition

power’ with what adaptation theory calls ‘commitment’, where commitment

has shown itself in the extensive deployment of Danish soldiers in international

crisis management missions.


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Denmark has been willing to follow a strategy of ‘commitment’ within the

EU when dealing with the CFSP, where Denmark has played a strong and

proactive role. Also, Danish decision-makers have been willing to adapt

national Danish policy to the common policy when necessary. However, as

soon as the debate has touched upon topics related to the common defence

policy and the ESDP, Denmark has given up its most crucial instrument of

influence �/ namely coalition power �/ by manifesting ‘non-commitment’ and

thereby �/ in principle �/ weakening its influence capability. This means that the

Danish defence strategy within the EU �/ autonomy �/is in direct opposition to

the declared strategy of seeking international influence.

The Development of the European Security and Defence Policy

Parallel to the increasingly prominent role accorded to the military instrument

in Danish foreign policy, a significant expansion took place within EU defence

and security policy cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty from 1992 established

the EU’s responsibility for relevant security questions including the eventual

preparation of a common defence policy as an integrated element of the CFSP.

The Treaty became the starting signal for the development of a new identity

and new tasks for the West European Union (WEU), whose members in 1992

agreed upon the so-called Petersberg tasks. These tasks cover ‘humanitarian

operations and rescue operations, peacekeeping tasks and missions involving

combat troops in crisis management including peacemaking’ (EU Treaty,

article 17, s. 2). This meant that the WEU, and later the EU, in principle

commanded the whole spectrum of military crisis management instruments

from the ‘light’ to the ‘heavy’ missions.

Just as the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990s

was a decisive reason for establishing the CFSP, so did the continued instability

in the Balkans and in Kosovo in the late 1990s underline the need for the

European Union to take the responsibility for security challenges in its own

backyard. At the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 it was

decided to place the Petersberg tasks on top of the ESDP agenda. The aim was

to enable the EU to act as a security and defence actor within the framework of

the UN system. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the Council decided

that by the end of 2003 the EU member countries should be able to deploy up

to 60,000 soldiers in the field for up to 12 months with only 60 days of warning.

The rapid reaction force should be able to carry out the whole range of

Petersberg tasks.23

Notwithstanding these developments, it was obvious that the EU initiative

did not mean that an ‘EU army’ was established, which has been a traditional

Danish concern towards the ESDP.24 On the contrary, the summit stressed that

the new structure should be seen as complementary to NATO cooperation.

Defence in the case of an armed aggression from the outside was still NATO’s

responsibility. That the ESDP cooperation should develop in collaboration


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with NATO was mirrored in the decision to invite European NATO members

that were not members of the EU to participate in possible joint military

operations.

The European defence ministers’ decision in April 2004 concerning the

establishment of the so-called ‘battle groups’ is another important development

of the ESDP. The battle groups consist of around 1,500 soldiers with support

elements. They should be deployable at very short notice, i.e. within 15 days.

The goal is to have two to three battle groups in place before the end of 2005

and five to six before the end of 2007. In principle all EU countries can

contribute to these battle groups.25 Seen from a Danish perspective, it is clearly

interesting that Norway �/ as a non-member of the EU �/ is participating in the

establishment of a battle group together with EU members Finland and

Sweden.

There is little doubt that a significant development of the European Union’s

common foreign policy and common defence policy has taken place. Moreover,

there are no indications that the recent developments towards more common

initiatives and more coordination concerning crisis management and defence

issues in general will become less important within the European Union.26 On

the contrary, chances are that the ESDP will continue to develop along the lines

delineated above. Based on theoretical considerations (and basic common

sense), such a development would be expected to have a negative effect on

Denmark’s coalition power within the EU.

The Danish Opt-out from Defence Cooperation in the EU

The Maastricht Treaty established the responsibility of the European Union to

develop a common defence policy as an integrated element of the CFSP. In the

Danish Parliament there was overwhelming political support for Danish

membership of the European Union, including the provision for cooperation

on defence issues. On 12 May 1992 a comfortable majority of 130 of 179

members of the Danish Parliament voted in favour of ratifying the Treaty on

the European Union, with just 25 votes against. The result was a clear

recommendation to the voters to say ‘yes’ to Danish membership of the

European Union at the referendum on 2 June 1992.27

The referendum attracted great popular interest and the turnout reached 82.3

per cent. A very small majority of just 50.7 per cent voted against Danish

membership of the Union, while the proponents mustered 49.3 per cent of the

votes.28 The Danish politicians were forced to find a special arrangement for

Denmark in the areas where the Danish voters had problems with the new

treaty. At the European Council’s meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992,

Denmark succeeded in obtaining a special arrangement on four selected areas

of which defence policy was one.

The other countries accepted that Denmark needed a legally binding

arrangement in order to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. In return, Denmark


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had to promise not to obstruct any further developments should the other

countries wish to deepen their collaboration in, for example, the field of defence

policy.29 The central formulation in the Edinburgh Treaty reads like this:

The heads of state and heads of government take note [that] . . .Denmark

cannot participate in the preparation and the implementation of decisions

and actions within the Union which affect the defence area but Denmarkwill not hinder that closer cooperation between the member states in this

field takes place.30

In a new referendum on 18 May 1993 on the Maastricht Treaty and the

Edinburgh Agreement, 56.7 per cent voted ‘yes’ while 43.3 per cent voted

against the Treaty.31 With the second referendum, the road was cleared for

Danish membership of the European Union. In relation to the passing of the

Amsterdam Treaty, the Danish opt-outs were simply included in the Danish

protocol to the Treaty. They existed, as it was formulated, ‘before, during and

after’ the conference leading to Amsterdam.32

From the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993

and up to 1 January 2003, Denmark activated its opt-out on defence

cooperation nine times. On each and every occasion, it was in relation to

decisions pertaining to the soft end of the Petersberg tasks.33 Specifically, it was

about the planning of the evacuation of EU civilians from conflict zones, about

so-called joint actions on personnel mines, on contributions of police forces in

Albania, and assistance for mine clearing in Croatia. ‘It was ironic’, notes

Nikolaj Petersen, in that ‘they were all missions which Denmark would usually

have participated in if only it had not been within the framework of the EU.

However, the practical significance was less important than the symbolic.’34

Generally, the opt-out has been interpreted by successive Danish govern-

ments in a rather permissive way, allowing Denmark to participate in the

debates in the Council of Ministers on motions for decisions and actions with

implications for the defence area. In relation to discussions on the strengthen-

ing of the European defence dimension, the government has referred to the

argument that, in principle, it is only the adoption of formal legal documents

affecting the defence area which falls within the opt-out. Among other things,

the government has participated in the discussions, and it has endorsed public

statements within this field. However in the run-up to the European Council in

Helsinki in December 1999 and in Lisbon in March 2000, the government

chose to refer to the opt-out. By so doing, the government wanted to signal that

the implementation of these decisions could be anticipated to affect the opt-

out.35

In spite of the opt-out, the Helsinki summit was followed by a Danish

decision to participate in the work of the three military political committees

which were to implement the ESDP. At the so-called commitment conference in

October 2000, where a number of countries both within and outside the EU


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committed forces to the coming EU rapid reaction force, the Danish defence

minister Hans Hækkerup participated without promising troops for the force.

Denmark could participate in the general planning of the ESDP, but the

country had to abstain from participating in the concrete implementation at the

operational level.36

In summary, up to 2003, the Danish opt-out on defence seems mainly to have

had symbolic significance, while the practical significance was limited.

However, even if the EU had only carried out minor operations at the soft

end of the Petersberg tasks, the inconsistency of Danish policy may have

weakened Denmark’s credibility as a coalition partner. The country’s participa-

tion in the discussions of motions for decisions and actions in the Council,

coupled with non-participation in the passing of formal legal documents, must

seem inconsistent to other member countries, raising questions as to the

commitment of Denmark. The same impression is left by the fact that

Denmark participates in the three military committees implementing the

ESDP, but is unwilling to commit soldiers to the EU rapid reaction force.

The European Union’s Military Crisis Management Operations

The following brief examination of the EU’s recent military crisis management

operations has a dual aim. First, it is to show that Denmark’s opt-out from this

type of operations appears increasingly difficult to justify because both the

objectives of the operations and the actual implementation were clearly and

unambiguously within the scope of the proactive Danish foreign and defence

policies. Theory as well as plain common sense would predict that the coalition

power of the country would be negatively affected by this inconsistent policy.

Secondly, the aim is to raise the critical question whether it is possible to show

or indicate that Denmark’s international influence capability has been affected

negatively because of the opt-out from defence cooperation within the

European Union.

Operation ‘Concordia’, Macedonia 2003

On 31 March 2003 the EU launched its first military mission ever. It was given

the code name ‘Concordia’ and took place in the Former Yugoslav republic of

Macedonia (FYROM). The EU force was to contribute to secure the

implementation of the so-called Ohrid Agreement from August 2001, which

settled the imminent conflict between the Slavs and the Albanians in FYROM.

During 2001, armed clashes between the Slav majority and the Albanian

minority broke out.37 The clashes became particularly threatening when the

Albanian guerrilla organization NLA started an offensive which resulted in the

capture of several towns. The EU, NATO and the USA threw themselves into

the conflict in order to get it under control before it escalated into a regular war

between the government army and NLA.38


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The EU troops took over the tasks from NATO which had had the

responsibility for observing the Ohrid Treaty. The EU soldiers were to patrol

the ethnic Albanian part of FYROM which borders Albania, Serbia and

Kosovo.39 The operation was carried out on the request of the government of

FYROM, and it was backed by a UN Resolution.40 Thirteen EU members

participated while Denmark and Ireland chose not to participate. Moreover, 14

non-EU members contributed troops to the operation, Even though Operation

‘Concordia’ appeared as an EU operation, it relied on NATO equipment,

command structures and planning capacity under the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’

arrangement. Therefore, the operation was simultaneously a test case for the

strategic cooperation on crisis management between the EU and NATO.

Because of its opt-out, Denmark had to pull out its troops from FYROM

when the EU took over the peace-supporting operation. Interestingly, the EU’s

involvement was supported by the Danish prime minister Anders Fogh

Rasmussen. In a public speech on Europe, he stressed that it was in the

interest of Denmark that the EU developed its military capacity to carry out

peace-enforcement operations and humanitarian tasks in Europe, for example

in the Western Balkans.41

Moreover, it is worth noting that Denmark had to pull out its soldiers from a

peacekeeping operation which was acceptable as long as it took place under the

aegis of NATO. Operation Concordia was finalized on 15 December 2003 and

was followed by an EU police mission, where 200 policemen were deployed.

Because it was now a civilian operation, Denmark could again participate in

the form of the deployment of six Danish police officers.

It seems obvious that nothing would have prevented Denmark from

providing soldiers for Operation Concordia �/ if only the EU had not had

overall responsibility for the mission. It was a classical peacekeeping mission

which was, moreover, backed by a Security Council resolution. The non-

participation is manifestly inconsistent judged against the ambition to pursue a

proactive foreign policy in close collaboration with existing international

organizations and based on the official policy of supporting the United

Nations. As a consequence, it can be assumed that the lack of participation in

the EU operation in FYROM affected the coalition power of Denmark

negatively.

However, the partners within the European Union were fully aware of the

Danish position prior to the launching of Operation ‘Concordia’ and it has not

been possible to find indications that the non-participation in this particular

EU operation had negative consequences for Denmark’s possibilities to exert

international influence. It may partly be explained by the simple fact that the

other EU members have accepted the existence of the Danish opt-out which

was made very clear at the 1999 Helsinki summit. This means that the partners

of Denmark do not expect anything from Denmark when it comes to concrete

defence operations under the aegis of the EU.42 Apparently, it has not

weakened the credibility and influence of Denmark in the EU more generally.


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This lack of observable consequences for Denmark’s coalition power may or

may not be due to the concerted compensatory efforts of Danish civil servants,

but it might just as well indicate that all EU members fully recognize that

Denmark has an opt-out from missions like ‘Concordia’.

Operation ‘Artemis’, Congo 2003

On 12 July 2003 the EU Council of Ministers adopted a ground-breaking

resolution within the framework of the ESDP. For the first time ever, the

Council decided to deploy a pure EU military force in a crisis management

operation outside Europe. The operation was given the code name ‘Artemis’

and was also the first ESDP operation in Africa.43 It is important to stress that

it took place on the basis of a UN resolution. It is also worth noting that

Operation ‘Artemis’ was the first fully independent military EU mission ever

even though it had a very significant contribution of French troops. The

operation was implemented without using NATO facilities under the Berlin

Plus Agreement.

The aim of Operation Artemis was to stabilize the security situation in the

crisis-ridden Ituri Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and

thereby improve the humanitarian situation in and around the main town

Bunia. The background for the start of Artemis was concretely that the

humanitarian situation in the province had been hastily deteriorating for some

time. The still more serious security situation meant that it was both difficult

and dangerous to deliver emergency assistance to many areas in the province.

For more than a year the UN personnel had asked for a reinforced UN

presence in Ituri. Many observers warned that a new outbreak of violence could

threaten the ongoing national process aimed at reaching a negotiated

settlement to the conflicts in the DRC.44

In this situation, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked for the

establishment of a coalition of willing nations that were ready to make an end

to the humanitarian crisis in Ituri. At the same time the coalition should secure

an interim solution until it was possible to deploy an effective UN force in the

province.45 Even though France acted as the so-called framework nation for the

operation, a number of EU countries plus a number of future EU members and

non-European countries provided personnel for the whole operation. From a

Danish point of view, it is particularly interesting that the traditionally neutral

Sweden provided soldiers for the mission to a total of almost 2,000.46

Evaluated against the declared objectives, the mission was fairly successful.47

A number of central aims had been achieved. First of all, the security situation

in Bunia was improved markedly. Secondly, the presence of the EU soldiers

ensured that a large percentage of the many refugees could return to the main

town. Also, economic life picked up again as the improved security situation

made it possible for emergency assistance to be distributed on a much larger

scale than before. Operation ‘Artemis’ was also a success since the EU troops


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could hand over control to a regular UN force at a date agreed upon

beforehand.48 Finally, it must not be forgotten that ‘Artemis’ cleared the way

for the EU to enter into a much larger operation aimed at rebuilding not only

Ituri but also other parts of the Congo.49

Summing up, there was nothing in the aims or the implementation of

Operation Artemis which made it impossible for Denmark to participate �/ if

only the EU had not had the overall responsibility. Moreover, the mission was

carried out based on a clear UN mandate. Evaluated on the basis of Denmark’s

existing policy for peace-support operations and the declared policy of

Denmark in supporting the UN in situations like the one in the DRC, it surely

must have been puzzling for partner countries to note that Denmark did not

even provide a symbolic contingent of troops. Following the theoretical

framework, the Danish policy on Operation Artemis would be expected to

have had a negative effect on Danish coalition power within the EU. To be

more precise, it is highly unlikely that the policy has strengthened Denmark’s

reputation and negotiation position within the EU now that, twice in a row,

Denmark chose not to participate in crisis management operations that

successive Danish governments have traditionally supported.

On the other hand, the European Union did not have any problems

supplying the necessary troops for the operation and, therefore, the lack of

Danish soldiers participating did not affect the deployment of the EU force.

Moreover, the EU partners knew in advance and accepted that Denmark had

the opt-out and there were consequently no expectations that Denmark would

supply troops. It has not been possible to find indications that the

circumstances around the Congo operations affected Denmark’s influence

capabilities negatively. This may, of course, also be because of the committed

work of Danish civil servants performed in order to ‘compensate’ for the

official Danish policy. However, there is no available empirical evidence

buttressing such a statement.

EU and UN Cooperation on Crisis Management

Based on the positive experience from Operation ‘Artemis’, the EU Council of

Ministers and the UN Secretary General adopted a joint declaration on future

expanded cooperation between the UN and the EU on crisis management in

particular in the Balkans and in Africa. In the UN there seems to be a clear

recognition that a rapid reaction force like the one in Congo during the summer

of 2003 holds promising perspectives. Because the UN has had great problems

in marshalling troop contingents that can be rapidly deployed in crisis

situations, it has been necessary for the organization to look for other

solutions.50 The EU and the UN made an agreement that a joint mechanism

should be established for consultation aimed at strengthening coordination and

cooperation on future crisis management in Africa and in the Balkans. The


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declaration clearly emphasized that the responsibility for maintaining interna-

tional peace and security is with the UN and with the Security Council.51

There is little doubt that the success of the Ituri operation contributed to

buttressing the political coalitions in the EU that favour the further develop-

ment of the ESDP. It led to the suggestion in 2004 of establishing a joint EU

reaction force which should be equipped to fight in the most demanding areas

of the world, including Africa. The British newspaper The Independent

concluded on this background that ‘most operations would be undertaken

only with the support of the United Nations, and aim to help peacekeeping and

stabilize failed states in European spheres of influence, particularly Africa. The

model would be the EU mission in Congo last year’.52

An analysis of the perspectives of an expanded EU�/UN cooperation

emphasizes that both organizations will benefit from more cooperation and

coordination of their activities:

In military aspects of crisis management, the UN needs the EU more than

the EU needs the UN. The EU can help the UN in areas where it lacks the

means to intervene such rapid deployment . . .The UN can provide the

EU with the legality and the political legitimacy for its operation.53

Finally, the analysis underlines that the formalization of the cooperation

between the two organizations �/ as an added bonus �/ gives the EU increasing

influence within the UN and in particular in the Security Council.54

As mentioned, there was nothing in Operation ‘Artemis’ that made it

impossible for Denmark to provide troops for the mission. The operations

arguably strengthened the UN, which has been official Danish policy for a long

time; and most recently established in relation to Denmark’s seat on the

Security Council in 2005 and 2006. Novosseloff points out that EU influence

within the UN seems to increase thanks to operations like Artemis.55 By being

an active partner in the peacekeeping activities of the EU, Denmark can not

only buttress the UN; it can also strengthen the influence of the EU within the

world organization. Both elements can be assumed to support the coalition

power of Denmark, which improves the possibilities to pursue a proactive

foreign and security policy. Staying outside and not participating in an

operation like Artemis in the DRC, Denmark weakens its possibilities for

pursuing a proactive foreign policy.

Operation ‘Althea’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In December 2004, the European Union launched its biggest military operation

to date as the Union took over the responsibility from NATO for the

peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. The operation, code named EUFOR,

consisted of 7,000 soldiers coming from no less than 33 countries. Almost all

EU countries participated with troops. It is worth noting that a number of


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neutral countries such as Finland, Ireland and Sweden provided soldiers.

According to the British daily The Guardian it was ‘a concrete manifestation of

how the EU’s embryonic Common Foreign and Security Policy �/ shattered by

division over the invasion of Iraq �/ can be put into practice’.56 The background

to Operation ‘Althea’ was the general agreement at the NATO meeting in

Istanbul in June 2004, to bring the NATO-led operation to an end because of

the improved security situation in the country.

The EU took over the tasks of NATO based on a unanimously approved

resolution in the UN Security Council. Resolution No. 1551 of 9 June 2004

expressed a very positive attitude to the intentions of the EU to engage militarily

in Bosnia-Herzegovina.57 When the EU Council of Ministers on 15 November

the same year took the formal decision to launch operation ‘Althea’, it once

again took place against the background of a unanimously adopted resolution

in the Security Council58 authorizing the EU to a Chapter VII action.59

The military operation of EUFOR was carried out by means of support from

NATO and in agreement with the Berlin Plus Deal. Even though the EU had

the formal command, it was a clear agreement that the EU and NATO would

cooperate closely after the EU took over responsibility for the peacekeeping.

The EU and NATO made an agreement about mutual use of tactical reserves

which could be used both by EUFOR and by NATO in its operation in Kosovo

(KFOR). The opt-out from defence cooperation within the EU meant that

Denmark had to make clear from the start that Danish armed forces deployed

in the NATO operation in Kosovo could not be placed under EU command.

Therefore, they could not be used as reinforcement of EUFOR should a crisis

situation occur in Bosnia.60

Danish soldiers participated in the NATO-led force (SFOR) in Bosnia which

was a new formation as the operative framework was NATO and not the UN.61

However, the Danish soldiers were withdrawn in 2003 when it became clear that

the EU would be taking over the NATO mission. When the EU in December

2004 took over responsibility for the security in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

Danish soldiers had left the country long before. Danish troops remained in

Kosovo as part of the KFOR force, but with strict reservations towards a

possible reinforcement role in Bosnia.

Not surprisingly, Don Lynch and Antonia Missiroli concluded that

Operation Althea

marks a new step in the development of the ESDP in terms of size and

ambition. It also confirms the rising role of the EU as a primary

European security provider . . .The contrast with European policy a

decade ago in 1994 could not be greater. EU member states are united

and pursue common policy objectives.62

If this conclusion is accepted, it is possible to establish that Denmark stands

out in two respects in relation to the European development. Obviously, the


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opt-out means that Denmark has little or no influence on the development of

the ESDP including the specific course it may take in the future. Moreover, it

means that Denmark does not participate in the development of the EU as a

provider of European security even though Denmark still plays a role as

‘subcontractor’ of ‘soft security’. The reservation over the question of the

possible reinforcement by KFOR troops in Bosnia may be the first tangible

issue where it is possible to indicate that the opt-out has consequences for the

country’s international influence capabilities. The official evaluation of the

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs63 thus clearly suggests that these reserva-

tions make Denmark a less interesting partner for other countries not only

within the EU but also for NATO non-EU members.

Moreover:

other countries know that Danish contributions cannot be discussed

when dealing with EU operations and Denmark therefore becomes a less

interesting partner. A concrete example has already been observed:

Denmark had offered to become the ‘lead nation’ on a project concerning

air transport capacity under the aegis of NATO. A number of othercountries had shown interest and were positive towards the Danish

solution. However, Denmark had to withdraw its offer because a number

of countries insisted that the capacities had to be available to both NATO

and the EU.64

The above quotation is from an official memorandum sent from the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Parliament and clearly

suggests that during 2005 the opt-out started to have consequences for

Denmark’s influence possibilities not only within the EU but also in NATO.

Finally, operation ‘Althea’ revealed a potential problem for Denmark’s

ambition to play a proactive role internationally. Until the launching of

‘Althea’, the crisis management operations of the EU had been either strictly

military or civilian. However, during the planning phase of Althea, a mixed

operation covering both civilian and military instruments was seriously

considered. To the extent that this is indicative of future developments,

Denmark will invariably run into problems with contributing civilian compo-

nents and civilian instruments. In summary, operation Althea is the first EU

operation where it is possible to argue that the negative consequences of the

opt-out started to show. Having stated this, as of mid-2005 it may still be

difficult to evaluate the actual extent of the negative consequences.

Concluding Discussion

It is now possible to have a general discussion of whether the special Danish

policy in relation to the ESDP has harmed or can be expected to harm the

overall aim for Danish foreign policy to pursue a proactive foreign policy. The


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discussion will be structured on the basis of the criteria presented in connection

with the presentation of the analytical framework.

Foreign Policy Goals and Denmark in the UN Security Council

The aim of Denmark’s active international engagement in the years following

the Cold War has been to pursue a proactive foreign policy, aimed at exerting

maximum influence on international developments. When Denmark in the

autumn of 2004 was chosen as one of the ten non-permanent members of the

UN’s Security Council for the years 2005 and 2006, the country obtained a

unique possibility to pursue these objectives. One of the crucial aims for

Denmark in the Security Council is to work in favour of improving the ability

of the UN in crisis management in order to coordinate the different efforts of

the UN.65 By means of the seat in the Security Council, Denmark would make

a special effort for Africa and here in particular for the many conflict-ridden

countries.66

Not only does the Security Council spend more than 60 per cent of its time

on Africa,67 it is estimated that up to 80 per cent of the personnel deployed in

peacekeeping activities for the UN are stationed in Africa.68 However, in recent

years, the UN has experienced increasing problems with recruitment of soldiers

in the member countries for peacekeeping operations in Africa.69 Here the

agreement between the EU and the UN could be one of the crucial instruments

which can secure soldiers for crisis management operations in Africa. While

Denmark sits in the Security Council, but also afterwards, there can be no

doubt that it will support every serious initiative aimed at stabilizing the

security situation in Africa. If in future situations the EU is going to provide

soldiers to the UN from its rapid reaction force, Denmark will no doubt

support such a step. On the other hand, Denmark itself will not be able to

provide soldiers for such EU conducted operations.

The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller, has formulated the

problem in relation to the Danish membership of the UN Security Council

quite poignantly:

As a matter of fact, we can end in the paradoxical situation where Denmark

will one day sit in New York and ask the EU to carry out crisis management

tasks for the UN. But when the next day we sit in the Council of Ministers

in Brussels, we may have to abstain from heeding the call of the UN, which

we have actively participated in getting through the Security Council . . .The

opt-out prevents us from participating in a number of areas where the EU

takes on the responsibility for meeting the new challenges which are also

ours: To make peace and security in our neighbouring areas.70

Evaluated on the basis of the aims of foreign policy, Denmark’s membership

of the Security Council can contribute to undermine the coalition power of the


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country both within the UN but even more so within the EU. The inconsistent

Danish policy makes it very difficult but not impossible for the Danish

decision-makers to participate in ‘winning coalitions’. However, the conclusion

is primarily valid for Denmark’s coalition power and influence possibilities

within the Union.

The Danish possibilities for exerting influence in the UN can no doubt be

optimized by providing troops for the UN peacekeeping and peace-supporting

operations in, for example, Africa. In most such cases, Danish soldiers would

hardly end up cooperating with troops from EU countries or from NATO

countries. Because the UN has had such great problems with recruiting

peacekeeping soldiers from Western countries in particular, the organization

has increasingly relied on troops from developing countries to carry out such

missions in Africa. In conclusion, if Denmark wants to use its military power

resources to pursue a proactive Danish foreign policy, it has to do so without

cooperating with its most important foreign policy partners in the European

Union.

Coalition Power, Prestige, Reputation and Will Power

Based on the report on the development of the Danish defence opt-out, DUPI

concluded in March 2000 that:

it ought to be clear that the other EU countries do not pay the same

attention and give the same weight that they would have to the Danish

points of view that are formulated during the ongoing negotiations on the

defence dimension had there been no opt-out. There is reason to believe

that this situation impacts on other areas of the common foreign and

defence policy . . .The other EU countries may wonder why Denmarkdoes not participate in activities that Denmark would have supported

wholeheartedly if they took place in all other organizational frameworks

but the EU and the West European Union.71

It has to be emphasized that this conclusion was formulated before the

European Union in 2003 began to function as a serious actor in military crisis

management missions. The development that started with Operation ‘Con-

cordia’ in FYROM in 2003 only contributed to further expose the Danish

policy as inconsistent, thus weakening its credibility to the partners in the

European Union.72 Nevertheless, it has not been possible to find indications

that since the DUPI report was published in 2000 the inconsistent Danish

policy towards the ESDP has had the negative consequences for Danish

coalition power that could be expected.

Denmark can still pursue an international proactive foreign policy within the

framework of the European Union as long as the EU does not integrate its

civilian and its military operations more than is already the case. However,


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there are clear signs that the EU will launch operations that mix civilian and

military instruments as in the Sudan in 2005.73 What remains is Danish

participation in NATO-led operations like the one in Afghanistan or in

American-led coalitions like the one in Iraq.

It cannot be denied that participation in this type of operation can give

Denmark influence on the international agenda, in Washington if not inBrussels. On the other hand, there is a clear tendency among many countries in

Europe to seek partners that can participate in the development of multi-

national capacities which can be used both in NATO and in EU operations.

This is also obvious among the Nordic countries where Sweden and Finland

cooperate with Norway in establishing one of the EU battle groups.74 Such a

development will hamper Denmark’s influence capabilities even further.

Finally, it is pertinent to comment briefly on the theoretical framework used

for interpreting the empirical data. The theories as well as common sense seemto point towards a conclusion that Danish influence capabilities are severely

affected by the inconsistent Danish policy towards the ESDP. However, there

was not sufficient empirical evidence to support such a conclusion. Having

stated this, it is not possible to make out if this is because of the compensatory

efforts of the Danish civil servants causing a methodological problem as far as

the conclusion is concerned: The opt-out might have had negative conse-

quences, but we simply do not know if we use the criterion ‘available empirical

evidence’. Neither do we know if the lack of empirical evidence of possiblenegative consequences is caused by the countervailing measures made by

Danish civil servants. Summing up, the available information points towards a

conclusion that the opt-out from defence has only had a limited negative effect

on Denmark’s ability to enter into winning coalitions in the European Union as

an influential party.

No matter which interpretation is the most ‘correct’ one, it is necessary to

have some reservations about the analytical value of the theoretical framework.

The paper has not been able to present a more accurate indication of‘international influence’. Through the paper, the reference has been to

international influence without any specification. Moreover, the paper has

assumed that deployment of armed forces can improve Denmark’s influence

capabilities in general. Nevertheless, the paper has not produced any strong

evidence that this has actually been the case. This leaves us with an inconclusive

result. Maybe the deployment of Danish military forces improves Denmark’s

influence capabilities as it seems to be the official political position, but it may

equally be that the deployment of Danish soldiers does not basically changeDenmark’s coalition power, which is exactly what the theory predicts.

Notes1 Th. Larsen, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. I godt vejr og storm (Copenhagen: Gyldendal 2000).2 H.-H. Holm, ‘Danish Foreign Policy Activism: The Rise and Decline’, in B. Heurlin and H.

Mouritzen (eds.) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2002 (Copenhagen: DUPI 2002) pp. 22�/3; N.


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Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 (København: Gyldendal 2004); H.-H.

Holm, ‘Denmark’s Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic

Constraints’, in B. Heurlin and H. Mouritzen (eds.) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997

(Copenhagen: DUPI 1997) pp. 52�/80.3 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 445.4 B. Heurlin, ‘Nye prioriteringer i dansk udenrigspolitik’, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1993

(DUPI: København 1994) pp. 45�/6; M. V. Rasmussen, ‘What’s the use of It? Danish Strategic

Culture and the Utility of Armed Force’, Cooperation & Conflict 40/1 (2005) pp. 67�/89.5 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 613.6 W. Wallace, ‘Small European States and European Policy-Making: Strategies, Roles, Possibilities’,

in W. Wallace et al . (eds) Between Autonomy and Influence: Small States and the European Union ,

Arena report No. 1/1999 (Oslo: Arena 1999) pp. 11�/26.7 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 .8 Wallace, ‘Small European States and European Policy-Making’, p. 11.9 A. Wivel, ‘The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the

Development of the EU as a Security Actor’, Journal of Common Market Studies 43/2 (2005) pp.

393�/412.10 M. Kelstrup, ‘Small States and European Political Integration. Reflections on Theory and

Strategy’, in T. Tiilikainen and I.D. Petersen (eds.) The Nordic Countries and the EC

(Copenhagen: Political Studies 1993) p. 154.11 C. Due-Nielsen and N. Petersen, ‘Denmark’s Foreign Policy since 1967: An Introduction’, in C.

Due-Nielsen and N. Petersen (eds.) Adaptation and Activism: The Foreign Policy of Denmark

1967�/1993 (Copenhagen: DUPI/DJØF 1995) pp. 11�/54; N. Petersen, ‘National Strategies in the

Integration Dilemma: The Promises of Adaptation Theory’, in H. Branner and M. Kelstrup

(eds.) Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options (Odense: Odense

University Press 2000) pp. 72�/99; N. Petersen, ‘Mod en generel teori om adaptiv politik’, Politica

21/2 (1989), pp. 174�/88; H. Mouritzen, Finlandization. Towards a General Theory of Adaptive

Politics , (Aldershot: Gower 1988); H. Mouritzen et al ., European Integration and National

Adaptations. A Theoretical Inquiry (New York: Nova Science Publishers 1996).12 H. Branner, Det ny Europa �/ international politik i forandring (København: Columbus 2005).13 Ibid., p. 40 ff., 204 ff.14 Petersen, ‘National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma’, p. 79.15 Ibid., p. 79 ff.; Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave

2003).16 Branner, Det ny Europa , p. 120 ff.17 Confidential interview, Copenhagen, August 2005.18 Heurlin, ‘Nye prioriteringer i dansk udenrigspolitik’, pp. 45�/6; Rasmussen, ‘What’s the use of

It?’; Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 .19 Heurlin, ‘Nye prioriteringer i dansk udenrigspolitik’, p. 33.20 Rynning, S., ‘Denmark as a strategic actor? Danish Security Policy after 11 September’, in P.

Carlsen and H. Mouritzen (eds.) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003 (Copenhagen: DIIS 2003)

pp. 23�/46.21 Ibid.22 Petersen, ‘National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma’; Nielsen and Petersen, Adaptation and

Activism .23 Conclusion of the Presidency, 11.12.1999 annex IV.24 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 522; DUPI, Udviklingen i EU siden

1992 pa de omrader, der er omfattet af de danske forbehold (Copenhagen: DUPI 2000) p. 248.25 J.Y. Haine, ‘The Union Inaugural Address’, in J. Pilegaard (ed.), The Politics of European

Security (Copenhagen: DIIS 2004) pp. 39�/54.26 B. Griegerich and W. Wallace, ‘Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment of European

Forces’, Survival 46/2 (2004) pp. 163�/82; A. Treacher, ‘From Civilian Power to Military Actor:

The EU’s Resistible Transformation’, European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2004) pp. 49�/66; S.


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Duke, ‘The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for Secure

Alliances ion a Better World’, European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2004) pp. 459�/81; S. Biscop,

‘Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’, European Foreign Affairs

Review 9 (2004) pp. 509�/27.27 DUPI, Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 pa de omrader, p. 226; Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt

Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 506 ff.28 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 509, 511 ff.29 DUPI, Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 pa de omrader, p. 230; Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt

Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 514 ff.30 DUPI, Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 pa de omrader, pp. 230�/31.31 Ibid., p. 232.32 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 235.33 DUPI, Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 pa de omrader, p. 24, http://www.wu-oplysningen.dk.34 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 536.35 DUPI, Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 pa de omrader, p. 246.36 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 538.37 U. Schneckener, Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management. Test Case Macedonia , Working

paper # 14 (European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg 2002) pp. 30 ff.; D. Madunic,

Makedonien �/ fremgangsrik krishantering pa Balkan (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet

2003) pp. 2 ff.; K. S. Hansen and A. Strangfeld, ‘Usikker fremtid for Makedonien’, in K.S.

Hansen (ed.) Stabilitet pa Balkan? (Copenhagen: DUPI 2003) pp. 117�/34.38 Schneckener, Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management , pp. 30 ff.; Madunic, Makedonien

�/ fremgangsrik krishantering pa Balkan , pp. 7ff; Hansen and Strangfeld, ‘Usikker fremtid for

Makedonien’, pp. 127 ff.39 D. Lynch and A. Missiroli, ‘ESDP operations’, 2004, http://www.iss-eu.org/ESDPoperations.40 UNSCR, no. 1371, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4381st meeting, on 26 September 2001

on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2001.41 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 239.42 Confidential interview, Copenhagen August 2005.43 C. Gegout, ‘Causes and Consequences of the EU’s Military Intervention in the Democratic

Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation’, European Foreign Affairs Review 10 (2005), pp. 427�/

43.44 F. Faria, Crisis Management in Sub-Sahara Africa. The Role of the European Union , Occasional

Paper no. 51 (Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies 2004) pp. 39�/40.45 UNSCR, no. 1484, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4764th meeting, on 30 May 2003 on the

Democratic Republic of the Congo , 2003.46 Faria, Crisis Management in Sub-Sahara Africa , p. 42.47 UN, Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, Peacekeeping

Best Practices Unit. Military Division, October 2004, p. 16 f.48 Faria, Crisis Management in Sub-Sahara Africa , pp. 43 ff.49 Ibid., p. 45.50 UN, Operation Artemis , p. 16.51 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis management, New York, 24 September 2003,

(signed by Kofi Annan and Silvio Berlusconi), 2003.52 The Independent , London, 19 February 2004.53 A. Novosseloff, EU�/UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects (New

York: International Peace Academy 2004), pp. 13 and 1.54 Ibid., p. 5.55 A. Novosseloff, EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects (New

York: International Peace Academy 2004), p. 5.56 The Guardian , London, 2 December 2004.57 UNSCR, no. 1551, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5001st meeting on 9 July 2004

concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 2004.


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58 UNSCR, no. 1575, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5085th meeting on 22 November 2004

concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 2004.59 Lynch and Missiroli, ‘ESDP operations’, n.p.60 Udenrigsministeriet, Notat, ESDPs udvikling med særlig henblik pa oprettelsen af den civil-militære

celle. J.nr.: SP,500.K.1-1, 13 June 2005.61 Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 1973�/2003 , p. 461.62 Lynch and Missiroli, ‘ESDP operations’, n.p.63 Udenrigsministeriet, Notat, ESDPs udvikling med særlig henblik pa oprettelsen af den civil-militære

celle.64 Ibid.65 P.S. Møller, ‘Udenrigsministerens besvarelse af folketingsforespørgsel om dansk FN politik (FT

55)’, 27 April 2004, http://www.um.dk.66 MoFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africa in the 21st Century. An Analytical Overview

(Copenhagen: MoFA 2004).67 W. Shawcross, Deliver US from Evil. Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict

(London: Bloomsbury 2000).68 Møller, ‘Udenrigsministerens besvarelse af folketingsforespørgsel om dansk FN politik’.69 Eric G. Berman and K. E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (Geneva:

UNIDIR 2000) pp. 379ff, 39ff; Møller, ‘Udenrigsministerens besvarelse af folketingsforespørgsel

om dansk FN politik’.70 Møller, P. S., ‘Tale ved DIIS-seminar i Eigtveds Pakhus’, 16 September 2004, http://www.um.dk.71 DUPI, Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 pa de omrader, p. 247.72 Berlingske Tidende, Copenhagen, 2 December 2004.73 Udenrigsministeriet, ESDPs udvikling med særlig henblik pa oprettelsen af den civil-militære celle.74 Ibid.


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The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy

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