PHILOSOPHICA CRITICA 2, 2016, 2 47 The Debate on Constitutional Courts and Their Authority between Legal and Political Constitutionalism Valerio Fabbrizi, University of Rome – Tor Vergata, IT FABBRIZI, V.: The Debate on Constitutional Courts and Their Au- thority between Legal and Politican Constitutionalism. Philosophica Critica, vol. 2, 2016, no. 2, ISSN 1339-8970, pp. 47-69. The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of political constitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especially with regard to the idea of representation and political sovereignty. At the same time, the intention is to reconstruct the debate between legal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism, starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This de- bate concerns two different approaches: the political one rejects the idea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it may establish a possible rule of the judges (Michelman; Dworkin). It defends the role of Parliament in constitutional matters, in contrast with the role of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as – according to them – it is not open to political participation. Parliament is considered the only place in which we can exercise our constitutional power and in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy; Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitu- tionalism upholds the idea of judicial review, defending the role of the Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993). This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions about constitutional democracy under the banner of political liberalism: 1. What do we mean by counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What is the answer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. What is the role of constitutional courts in demo- cratic regimes and what is their authority within the State? Key words: Political Constitutionalism – Legal Constitutionalism – Judicial Review – Supreme Court – Counter-majoritarian difficulty
The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of politicalconstitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especiallywithregardtothe ideaofrepresentationandpoliticalsovereignty.Atthesametime,theintentionistoreconstructthedebatebetweenlegal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism,starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This de-bateconcernstwodifferentapproaches:thepoliticalonerejectstheidea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it mayestablish a possible rule of the judges (Michelman; Dworkin). ItdefendstheroleofParliamentinconstitutionalmatters,incontrastwiththeroleoftheSupremeCourt,inasmuchas–accordingtothem– it is not open to political participation. Parliament is consideredthe only place inwhichwe can exercise our constitutional powerand in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy;Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitu-tionalismupholds the ideaof judicial review, defending the roleofthe Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993).This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions aboutconstitutionaldemocracyunderthebannerofpoliticalliberalism:1.Whatdowemeanbycounter-majoritariandifficulty?2.Whatistheanswer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give tothisquestion?3.What is theroleofconstitutionalcourts indemo-craticregimesandwhatistheirauthoritywithintheState?
Key words: Political Constitutionalism – Legal Constitutionalism –JudicialReview–SupremeCourt–Counter-majoritariandifficulty
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In The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander Bickel discusses one of the centralquestions of judicial review: the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. As hewrote,“whentheSupremeCourtdeclaresunconstitutionalalegislativeactortheactionofanelectedexecutive,ithindersthewillofrepresentativesoftheactualpeopleof thehere andnow; it exercises control, not inbehalf of theprevailingmajoritybutagainstit.That,withoutmysticovertones,iswhatactuallyhappensanditisthereasonthechargecanbemadethatjudicialreviewisundemocratic”(Ward–Castillo2005,124).
“Thisclaimleadsscholarstoassigngreatimportancetoquestionsofconstitutionalinterpretation, and, consequently, the debate about the counter-majoritariandifficultyhasevolved intoaquest to identify judiciallyenforceableprinciples.Ac-cording to this view, the Court gains democratic legitimacy and authority by en-forceing principles that should supplant those advanced by elected institutions”(Ward–Castillo2005,3).
According toBickel, courts – better than legislature or political power – havethe power to apply and enforce the Constitution, especially in particularly im-portant moments, against the will of legislative majority. According to somescholars,theCourt'sdecisionsabouttheconstitutionalityornon-constitutionalityof a legislative act or constitutional amendment cannot be reversed by theParliamentorbyalegislativemajoritythroughanordinarylegislativeprocedureor judicial review could be considered a “deviant institution in the Americandemocracy” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 124). The Court is regarded counter-majoritarianbecauseitrequiresaspecialjustificationforjudicialreviewwhentheCourtdecidesthatalawisunconstitutional,andthusstrikingitdown,itexercisescontrolagainstmajority,notinitsrepresentation(Ward–Castillo2005,136).So,to present, there are twoways of reasoning. According to the first “empirical”way, the Court – in its decisions – reflects public opinion just like other insti-tutionsdo.AsKennethWardandCeciliaCastillopointout“theCourt’sdecisionsare consistent with public opinion nearly two-thirds of the time, making‘majoritarian’ a more accurate label for the Court than ‘counter-majoritarian’”(Ward–Castillo2005,136).
Additionally,thefactthattheCourtrulesagainstnationalopinionuptoone-thirdofthetimedoesnotmarkitasunusualordeviant”(Ward–Castillo2005,136). The second reasoning focuses on the idea that the Supreme Court isdifferent fromotherbranchesofgovernmentorother institutions,because it isnotanelectiveinstitution.Itsmembersarenotelectedbypeopleandwhentheymakedecisions theydonothave to facevoters.However,although theCourt isdifferent fromelected institutionsandmaybe lessdemocratic, itdoesnotmeanthattheCourtislesslegitimateortotallyillegitimate.Inthissense,“institutionaldifferentiationisacentralfeatureofAmericandemocracy.Ironically,thefactthat
the Court is ‘deviant’ or different from other governing institutionsmakes it anormalandintegralpartofAmericandemocracy”(Ward–Castillo2005,138).A.Bickel insists that judicial review really weakens democratic processes, onlybecause it encourages legislators to shift responsibility of decision-making andgovernancetocourts;inthissense,A.Bickelsays,“reducedresponsibilityinviteslegislative negligence because legislators have an incentive to acquiesce inunconstitutional demands of their constituents and trust the Court to correcttheirmistakes”(Ward–Castillo2005).
AsRichardBellamyunderlines,judicialreviewisjustifiedasacounter-weighttomajoritieswhichwanttochangeconstitutionfortheirownparticularinterests.Inthissense,“Courtsaresaidtoavoidsuchproblemsthroughbeingisolatedfromthe electoral process and independent from government interference. Theirreasoningisguidedbylegalnormsandstandardsofnaturaljusticeinculcatedbytheprofessionaltrainingjudgesreceive,andtheexpectationsandconventionsoflegalandjudicialpracticeandmodesofargument”(Bellamy2013).
Oneofthemostinterestingaspectsaboutthecounter-majoritariandifficultyisthedebatebetweenRonaldDworkinandJeremyWaldron.DworkindefendstheideaofthemorallectureoftheConstitutionandhemaintainstheauthorityofthejudgesasa fundamentalelement in constitutionaldemocracy. Instead,Waldroninsistsonthe ideathatademocracywithout judicialreviewwouldbetterwork,satisfyandenforcethevaluesthatgroundourinstitutionsandourconceptionofjustice.
“BothWaldronandDworkinviewjudicialreviewintermsofthebroaderquestionofhowasystemofpoliticalinstitutionsshouldmakecollectivedecisions.Buttheydisagree aboutwhetherwe should assess judicial review based on the decisionsthatweexpectjudgestomake.WhileDworkincontendsthatjudicialreviewisjus-tifiedifjudges’decisionsmakeitmorelikelythatthepoliticalcommunitywillman-ifestintegrity,Waldronconcludesthatjudicialreviewoffendsthevalueofequalitythatshouldanimatethepoliticalprocessthatresolvesdisagreementsaboutjustice.According to Waldron, it would offend this value no matter how judges decidecases”(Ward–Castillo2005,155).
because it increasespossibilities forapoliticalcommunityto treatcitizenswithequalconcernandrespect.Inthissense,judicialreviewworkswellifjudgesreachdecisionsthatpromotesocialandpoliticalcooperationandintegrity, iftheirde-
Waldrondefendsjudicialauthorityonlyifitcontributestoabroaderpoliticalprocess;heremarksthatpeoplemustdeveloppoliticalinstitutionstodefendpo-litical integrity.Aswe can see, forWaldron, “in apluralistic society, peoplenotonlyholdcompetingconceptionsofthegoodlife,theyalsodisagreeaboutjustice.Therefore,theymustdevelopproceduresthatcanaddresstheconflictsthatarisefrom these conditions and can do so in a manner that respects the fact ofdisagreement” (Ward – Castillo 2005). Waldron rejects Dworkin's defence ofjudicialreviewandhecontendsthatjudgesdonothavethisauthority.
According to Waldron, we have a loss of democracy if citizens cannotparticipate in public and political decisions, even though we talk about de-mocracy.AswereadinWard,inWaldron'sopinion,“Dworkinelidesthenotionsof a decision about democracy and a decision made by democratic means.WaldronbelievesthatthiselisionpreventsDworkinfromaccountingforthecostto democratic values when a decision about democracy is made throughnondemocratic means” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 157). So, we can argue that –according to Waldron – when nonelected institutions and nonelected officialsmakedecisionsaboutdemocraticsystem,wehaveaweakerdemocracy; leavingconstitutional power in the hands of the judges means depriving people of itsmost important power; so representative power becomes useless because ci-tizens cannot exercise it in constitutionalmatters anddemocratic values.How-ever,Waldrondoesnotsaythatjudicialreviewisnotconsistentwithdemocracy,though he insists that majority rule is the only procedure that resolves con-troversies about democracy and disagreements about justice, and in order torespect citizens´ interest in participating in the discussion this would includeallowingdisagreementaboutthemeaningofdemocracyitself.
LegalconstitutionalismandthedefenceofjudicialreviewAsMarcoGoldonipointsout,forlegalconstitutionalism,therelationshipbetweenlawandmoralityisfundamental; inthissense,thelegitimacyofthelawderivesmainlyfrommoralityandpoliticsissubjecttothelaw.Ashewrites,outsidethelimitsoflegalsystem,politicalconflictswouldleadtoinstabilityanddisorder.WeneedtheConstitutiontoguaranteethenecessaryconditionstohaveademocraticpolitics;Goldoniarguesthat“thebestwaytoachievethisaimistoconceivetheConstitution as a normwhichmust be applied by the courts. In constitutionalrightsprocess,firstofall,weremovesomefundamentalprinciplesfromordinarypolitical discussion and then, we interpret these principles as outside theordinarypoliticalanddemocraticprocesses”(Goldoni2010).
Politicalconstitutionalistsdefend–ononehand–theimportanceofpoliticaldimensionofconstitutionalismand,inthisview,thelawissubjecttopolitics;ontheotherhand,theimportanceofpoliticalsphereoverthelawmakesusturnourattentiontothesocalledinputreasons,becausetheyallowpeopletocommentonlegislative acts and laws that will govern their life (Goldoni 2011). As Goldonihighlighted,politicalconstitutionalismrejectssomebasiccharacteristicsof legalconstitutionalism: for political one, the relationship between citizens and gov-ernment isnotbasedon contractualist terms– inwhich court areguardiansofconstitution–butondirectrelationshipoftrustbetweenpeopleandgovernment.Atthesametime,therearenoquestionsorissues–evenofethical,religiousormoralnature–thatcanbelegitimatelyexcludedfrompoliticaldebate.
Legal constitutionalists suggest four reasons to support judicial review. Thefirstfocusesontheideathatconstitutionalcourtsdealwithindividualcasesandtheyareinabetterpositiontodecideonindividualrights.Thesecondfocusesonthereferencetoabillofrightsasaconstrainttothejudicialinterpretationandasan “aid allowing disputants to focus on the abstract issues at stake” (Goldoni2012).FollowingGoldoni,wesaythat“forpoliticalconstitutionalists,constrainsimposedbylegaltextsandprecedents,giventhevaguenessinherenttolanguageandtherelativecasewithwhichcourtsdepartfrompreviousdecisions,cannotbedeemedtobeparticularlyrelevant”(Goldoni2012,934).Forthethirdreason,wehighlightthatjudicialdecisionscomeintheformofreason-giving,but–Goldoniargues–thisaspectdependsoncontextualinstitutionalsystemsanditdoesnotbelongonlytojudicialpower.Thefourthandlastreasonisbasedontheideathatjudicial review is essential to legitimization of a democratic institution and it isthe only remedy for parliamentarism that protects against the risk of the so-called“tyrannyofmajority”.
“Asoutput-basedprocedure, judicialreviewcanchecktheriskofmajoritarianismwhen democracy, aggregating votes, risks sacrificing individuals to collectivewelfare. Fundamental rights, being ‘individual political goals’, should not besubordinatedto‘notionsofthegeneralinterest’.Theclaimisthat,fromthepointofviewof political constitutionalists, judicial reviewof legislation violates theprin-cipleofpoliticalequalitybecauseitdecidesonissuesofgeneralinterestsasrightsandpowerswithoutgivingtoeverycitizenthepossibilitytoparticipateandtohaveafairsayintheprocess”(Goldoni2012,935).AsBellamypointsout,legalconstitutionalismtakescertainfundamentalcon-
stitutionalprinciplesoutsideofpoliticalsphere,becausetheseprinciplesarecon-sidered as constraints and preconditions for a just political system. Legalconstitutionalists employ two strategies for depoliticizing principles: the firstconsists in establishing constraints and boundaries to political sphere, con-
Thefirststrategytakesdifferentformsfordepoliticizingpolitics:ononehand,Bellamyargues,itisassociatedwithaliberaltraditionexpressed–forexample–by Locke. According to this view, political power exists to protect and ensurecertainpre-politicalrights.AsBellamywrites:
“Politics is limitedbysuchrights in twosenses.Ontheonehand,politicalbodiesandtheiragentsoughtnottointerferewithindividualsinwaysthatmightinfringetheserights;ontheotherhand,theyhaveanobligationtopositivelypromotethem.After all, even ‘negative’ liberty rights, such as the freedom not to be physicallyassaultedbyothers,requirepositivestateactionintheformofapoliceforceandaregularsystemofcriminaljusticeinordertobesecured”(Bellamy2007,147).
Thesecondstrategyfordepoliticizingpoliticstakesanapoliticalformofpoliticstoovercomedisagreements.Suchapoliticalstrategyappealstoparticularmodesofpublicdebatetoremovethesourcesofpartialityandself-interest,leadingtoaconvergence on public interest (Bellamy 2007). In this case, “if all persons areobligedtoargueonabasisofequalitywithothers,sothattheycanonlypursuetheir own good in ways that show equal concern and respect for the good ofeveryoneelse, thenitshouldbepossibletoarriveatareasonableconsensusontherulesthataretogoverntheirexistenceand,onsomeaccounts,evencollectivepoliciestoo”(Bellamy2007,150).
AccordingtoBellamy,inRawlstheConstitutionisconceivedboth“topreventdemocracyfrominterferingwiththeprivateandpersonalbeliefsandactivitiesofindividuals” and to defend democracy against these interests, removing thediscussion about rights and liberties – and about divisive questions – from thepoliticalagenda.
“In Lecture VI of Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to avoid some of thedifficultiesofapurely‘ideal’politicsbyadoptinga‘dualist’understandingofthere-lationship between democracy and the constitution. According to this thesis,constitutional constraints on ‘normal’ politics result from democratic ‘consti-tutional’politics,mostnotablyattheconventionsthatbringpoliticalregimesintobeing.Henowmaintainsthattheidealpoliticsofpublicreasonneedonlyoperateon these latter sortsofoccasionsorwhen theyare replicatedat timesof judicialreviewbyconstitutionalcourts.Sincetheresultingconstraintsarethemselvestheproduct of popular endorsement, they involve no curtailment of the will of thepeople. Instead, they represent forms of democratic pre-commitment or self-restraint not to overturn the basis of democratic politics itself. As such, they areanalogoustopersonalformsofpre-commitment…andlikethemarepresentedasanexampleofself-governanceandautonomy,ratherthanasanabridgementofourcollectivefreedom”(Bellamy1996,86).
Bellamy's critique of legal constitutionalism – specially in Rawlsian theory –focuses on the idea that if we cannot distinguish between “constitutional” and“normal” politics, at the same timewe cannot portray constitutional judges as“theguardiansofthepeople'sownbestselves”(Bellamy1996;Rawls1993).
InAMatterofPrinciple,Dworkinaskstwoimportantquestionsabouttheroleofthejudges.Thefirst“practical”questionisabouthowjudgescoulddecidehardcases:“DojudgesinUSAorUKmakepoliticaldecisions?Shouldtheirdecisionsbepolitical?”(Dworkin1985).Dworkinadmitsthat judgesmakepoliticaldecisionsinoneway:inmanycasestheirdecisionswillbeapprovedbyonepoliticalgroupand disliked by others, because these decisions can animate moral, ethical orpolitical disputes and controversies, and because – often – these decisionsconcernpoliticalorlegislativeactsenactedbytheparliament.
“Iwanttoaskwhetherjudgesshoulddecidecasesonpoliticalgrounds,sothatthedecision is not only the decision that certain political groupswouldwish, but istakenonthegroundthatcertainprinciplesonpoliticalmoralityareright.Ajudgewhodecidesonpolitical grounds isnotdecidingongroundsofpartypolitics.Hedoesnotdecideinfavouroftheinterpretationsoughtbytheunionsbecauseheis(orwas)amemberoftheLabourparty,forexample.Butthepoliticalprinciplesinwhichhebelieves,like,forexample,thebeliefthatequalityisanimportantpoliticalaim,may bemore characteristic of some political parties than others” (Dworkin1985,9).
rathertheoretical:whatistheruleoflaw?Theanswerisbasedonthedistinctionbetweentwodifferentconceptionsoftheruleoflaw:Dworkincallsthefirst“rule-book” conception (Dworkin 1985); it concerns the idea that the power of thestateshouldneverbeexercisedagainstindividualcitizens,exceptaccordingwiththerulessetoutinthiscommon“rulebook”.Theotherconceptionistheso-called“rights”conception,whichassumesthatcitizenshavemoralrightsandreciprocaldutiesandpolitical rightsagainst the state.According to this conception,moraland political rights have to be recognized and enforced by positive law andthroughcourtsandjudiciary.AsDworkinargues,“itdoesnotdistinguish,astherule-book conceptiondoes, between the rule of law and substantive justice.Onthecontrary,itrequires,aspartoftheidealoflaw,thattherulesintherule-bookcaptureandenforcemoralrights”(Dworkin1985,12).
Dworkindefendsthefactthatjudgesarenotelectedorre-elected,becausethedecisionstheymakearedecisionsthatconcernsparticularcasesandtheyshouldbe immune from popular control. However, Dworkin notes, it follows that thejudges shouldnotmake independentdecisionsabout the “rulebook” (changingor expanding it) because these decisions should be made only under popularcontrol.InUK,instead,whenParliament–electedbypeople–isnotsatisfiedwith
“Legislative time isascarceresource, tobeallocatedwithsomesenseofpoliticalprioritiesand itmaywellbe thata judicialdecisionwouldbeoverruled ifparlia-ment had time to pass every law itwould like to pass, butwill not be overruledbecause Parliament does not. In some cases there is a further difficulty in thisanswer.Whenanissueisthesubjectofgreatcontroversy,thenParliamentmaybedisabled fromchanginga judicialdecision, forpracticalpolitical reasons,becauseany changewould infuriate some powerful section of the community or alienatesomepartsofagoverningcoalition”(Dworkin1985,18).
Thefirstisa“majoritarian”conception,inwhichdemocracyisbasedontheideathat allmattersofprinciple shouldbedecidedbyamajorityvote.According tothis idea of democracy, an institution like judicial review of legislation, whichgivesjudgesthepowertooverturnactsordecisionsapprovedbyaparliamentarymajority,isclearlyundemocratic(Dworkin2006).
On the contrary, democracy couldbeunderstoodas “self-government”of allthepeoplewhorecognizethemselvesas freeandequalmembersof thesociety.Dworkindefendsthisconceptionasmoredemocraticthanthemajoritarianone;on one hand, Dworkin notes that we cannot have real democracy as self-governmentifcitizensdon'thavetheopportunitytoplayanequalpartinpoliti-cal lifeand it includesequalvoting right, equal freedomofexpression inpublicdeliberationsandsoon.Ontheotherhand,wecannothavedemocracyifpeopleasindividualsdon'thaveanequalparticipationingovernment(Dworkin2006).
“According to the alternative view of democracy – youmight call it partnershipdemocracy–majorityruleisn'tevenlegitimate,letalonedemocratic,unlesstheseconditionsareat leastsubstantiallymet.So ifyouadopt thatpartnershipviewofdemocracy the argument that judicial review is in its nature inconsistent withdemocracyfails.Idonotmeanthatconstitutionaldemocracypositivelydemandsastructurelikeours,astructurethatrecordsthedemocraticconditionsinawritten,foundational document and assigns final interpretative authority to courts overwhetherthoseconditionshavebeenmet.Youmightwellthinkthatitwouldhavebeenbettertohavegiventhatresponsibilitytosomespecialelectedbody,thatthedecision we either made or ratified in the nineteenth century to give unelectedjudges that interpretative responsibility was unwise… You can't say that themajority has an automatic, default, title to make those interpretative decisionswithoutbeggingthequestion,becauseofcoursethemajorityhasnotitletogovernunlesstheconditionsaresatisfied.Itbegsthequestiontothinkthattheconceptofdemocracycandictatewhichinstitutionsshouldorshouldnotbegivenfinalinter-pretativeauthority”(Dworkin2006,134).
FrankMichelmanasks twoquestions about constitutionalismanddemocracy:the first asks how is it theoretically possible to reconcile the ideas of self-de-terminationandpopularsovereignty–whicharerelatedtodemocracy–withthelimitsimposedtothepower(relatedtoconstitutionalism)?Thesecondquestionaskshow it canbe legitimated–andwhat shouldbe– the roleof the constitu-tionalorsupremecourtsinsidethesesystems?
Michelmananswers the firstquestion throughwhathe calls “theparadoxofconstitutionaldemocracy”, that is thedifficultreconciliationbetweentwooppo-sedprinciplessuchassovereigntyandlimitationofthepower.Assomescholarsnote,Michelmanidentifiestwo“conflictingprinciples”atthebaseofinstitutionalsystems: “on one hand, the ideal of government subject to law (as constitu-tionalism) and – on the other hand – the ideal of government through popularwill (as democracy)” (Michelman 1999). These principles are opposed becauseeachofthemrequiresdifferentconsiderations:ononehand,democraticprinciplerequires that the choices about fundamental laws fall within the sphere ofdemocratic decision-making; on the other hand, the principle of constitutiona-lism requires that at least some of fundamental laws and rights are left out ofdemocraticpoliticaldecisions(Michelman1999).
In Michelman's view, the problem of undemocratic nature of unelectedconstitutional judges would be resolved if citizens could directly interpret theconstitution.
“Asimplewaytodoitistoabolishjudicialreview.IfCongressorastatelegislaturestands chargedwith enacting laws that the laws of lawmaking prohibit, or withfailingtoenactlawsthatthelawsoflawmakingcommand,letthevotersdecidethechargesatthenextelections.Theycanfindouthowcandidatesstandonthematterandelect thosewhowillcarryout thepeople’s judgment,repealingtheoffendinglaworenactingthemissingone.Congressthenisnotthejudgeofitsowncause,orafoxsettoguardthepeople’schickens.Congressmayhaveacause,butthepeopleare the judge;Congressmaybea fox,but thepeopleare theguard.Tomake theCourt the judge and the guard is, from the standpoint of democracy, to put theCourt in the people’s rightful place. So it might be and has been contended”(Michelman1999,21–22).
RichardBellamy–reworkingJeremyWaldron'sthesis–givesusthedefinitionof“circumstances of politics” when he says that “circumstances of politics arecircumstances where we disagree about both the right and the good, yetnonethelessrequireacollectivedecisiononthesematters.Consequently,thecon-stitution cannot be treated as a basic law or norm” (Bellamy 2007, 5). On one
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hand, according to this view, constitution cannot be considered a fundamentalnorm,butaquestionwhichcanbesubjectofpoliticaldebate;ontheotherhand,constitution is identifiedwithpolitical rather than legal system, especiallywiththewayspoliticalpowerisorganizedandmanaged.
Other fundamental issue for political constitutionalism is the principle ofmajorityrule,and–asGoldoniwrites–itrespectsequalityamongcitizensintwoways: “ononehand, it recognizes to eachopinionanequal importanceand theequal opportunity to contribute to the final result of the decision; on the otherhand,majority rule devotes equal consideration to the differences, because thedecisionthatitallowstoadoptisnotinfluencedbypossibleresultstowhichtheprocedureleadsus”(Goldoni2011,346).As Marco Goldoni reminds us, in Rawlsian political theory, reasonable dis-
agreementconcernsonlyconceptionsofgood,butwecanreachanoverlappingconsensus on constitutional essentials and on the conception of justice. Fun-damentalrightsandlibertiesmustbeoutofordinarypoliticaldiscussionandtheinterpretation about principles and fundamental rules is related to the publicreasonandtoSupremeCourt,whichisitsexemplar(Goldoni2011;Rawls1993).
“Forpoliticalconstitutionalists,publicreasontakesplurallyproceduralcharacter-risticsandmainlyelectoral.Inapluralanddemocraticsociety,itidentifiesitself–oninstitutional level–withparliamentand–onprocedural level–withelectoralmoments. Benefits offered by centrality of parliament are twofold. The first isprobably themost important: parliamentsprotect rightsbetter than court.Natu-rally,courtsareresponsibleforrespectofindividualrights.Butthecoreofpoliticalconstitutionalists'sargumentdisputestocourtstheabilitytodeliberatebetterthanparliaments – on these themes – and with more attention for disadvantagedpeople”(Goldoni2011,349).
Another importantaspect is that– forpolitical constitutionalists–parliament
has political accountability in front of citizens. It means that government isresponsible in front of parliament,which is expressionof popularwill. Instead,the court – especially the Supreme Court – has no political responsibility. AsGoldoni observes, this is not aproblem forpolitical constitutionalistswhen theactivityofthecourtsisfocusedoninterpretationofthelawsoronlegaldisputes.Instead, theproblemariseswhen courts discuss about political issues (like, forexampleabouttheprinciplesofajustdemocraticsociety).Finally,courtsarenot
underpopularcontrolbecausejudgesarenotelectedbypeople(Goldoni2011).We can argue that “political constitutionalism defends the idea that the onlyconstitution, able to protect rights, enforce the rule of law and the politicalsystem, shouldbe found indemocraticprocess itself. So, according to thisposi-tion,constitutionisapoliticalprocess,notanorm.Thisprocess,basedonprinci-pleofpolitical equality, is both constituent and constituted, according amonistconceptionofdemocracy”(Goldoni2011,352).Legalconstitutionalismalsodefendsthesocalledstructuralentrenchment.For
legal interpretation, individual rights precede politics and political process andtheyare“entrenched”inaconstitutionorinabillofrights.Somescholars–likeMichelman, for example – propose the conception of unenumerated rights, theideathattherearesomeimportantrightsoutsidethedisponibilityof legislativemajorities so that they cannot change or overturn the democratic system(Michelman; Ferrajoli; Ferrara). According to this interpretation “...people canenterthepoliticalprocessinsofartheyareendowedwithcertainrightswhichlieoutside therealmofpolitics.As theserightsarerecognizedasbeingevidentonthe basis of reason or as natural rights, their content should not be left to thebargainingthattypicallycharacterizespoliticaldecision-making”(Goldoni2012,931).These rightsareprotected frompolitical andparliamentarydebate in thesensethattemporaryparliamentarymajoritiescannotcallthemintoquestion.
Rightsarenotleftundertheexclusiveprotectionoflegislationandparliamen-taryactivity,becauselegislationis“morepronetobeguidedbyutilitarianconsi-derations in decision-making process” (Goldoni 2012). If, for political constitu-tionalists,rightsarenotbasedonanindividualisticground,butontheprincipleof common good, for legal constitutionalists instead, rights are based on indi-vidual interestsandtheydefendthemfromgovernment.So,asregardspoliticalrepresentation and democratic sovereignty, according to political constitutio-nalists,thebestwaytoensurethecommongoodandtorespectthepopularwillis to develop a system of equal votes, majority rule and political competitionbetween the parties. According to this discussion, the best way to achieve apolitical and institutional equilibrium to guarantee the principle of politicalequality is the so-calledneo-parlamentarism (Goldoni 2012;Waldron1999).AsMarcoGoldoninotes:
“Parliamentisseenbypoliticalconstitutionalistsastheonlyinstitutionwhichcanexpressthepluralityofopinionsandrespectdisagreementswhileatthesametimereachinganauthoritativedecision.Waldronhaselegantlysummeduptheauthor-itative character of the activity of the parliament in the following terms: ‘the au-thorityofa lawis itsemergence,underspecifiedprocedures,asa ‘unum’outofapluralityofideas,concerns,andproposals,incircumstanceswherewerecognizeaneed for one decision made together, not many decisions made by each of usalone’”(Goldoni2012,935).
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For legal constitutionalists, there are pre-political features that limit publicreasoning;forexample,fundamentalrightsshouldbeconsideredaspre-politicalfortheirnatureandbecausetheyrepresentalimitonmajorityrule.Whencertainissuesareindiscussion,wecanachieveasortofgeneralconsensusafteraproperdeliberationanddebate(Goldoni2012).
“Public reason, according to Rawls, is limited to ‘constitutional essentials’ andmattersofbasic justice.Theconceptual setting forRawls’s constructionofpublicreason is the original position. Through this device, citizens endowed with dualmoralpower(asenseofjusticeandaconceptionofthegood)anddeprivedoftheknowledgeoftheirownsocialandeconomicstatus,choosetwoprinciplesofjusticeonwhich tworationalagentscanapparentlyreachanagreement. It iseasierandmore probable that individuals placed in the original positionwill find ‘a sharedpointofview’intheprinciplesofjusticeand,sinceconstitutionalessentialshavetobe designed ‘to choose themost effective just constitution’. The same principleswillconstituteguidingoutputreasons.ForRawls,inawell-orderedpolity,citizenslegitimatelyexpecttheirrepresentativestoactanddecideaccordingtotheideaofpublic reason. Although Rawls concedes that the Supreme Court is not the onlypossible seat of public reason, traces of his legalistic understanding of publicreasonaredisseminatedthroughouthistexts.ThetestRawlsproposestoadoptasawayofcheckingwhetheracitizenisactingaccordingtotheideaofpublicreasonisquitetelling:weshouldask‘howwouldourargumentstrikeuspresentedintheformofaSupremeCourtopinion?’”(Goldoni2012,937–938).
Forpolitical constitutionalists instead,Rawlsianpublic reasonunderestimatesdisagreementbecause“italreadyfilterssomeof itsmoreunsettlingexpressionsthroughanidealizedprocedure”(Goldoni2012);asRawlspointsout,theideaofrights and fair constitution is supported and defended by themost reasonablepolitical conception of justice, and not by the result of an ordinary politicalprocess (Rawls 1993). So, Bellamy's and Waldron's critiques to Rawlsianconstitutionalism are focused on the fact that Rawlsian idea of public reasonimplies the total absence of any reference to political process. In his critique,Bellamy argues that Rawls “depoliticizes” public reason and excludes consti-tutionalessentialsfromanykindofdebate,disputeorcontestation.So,“Rawls’spublic reason is thepractice of a reasonwhere conflict is reduced as primarilyinvolving doctrines and overcome by resorting to a device that enables theemergenceofconsensus”(Goldoni2012).
Especially inRawls, theconstitutional system ischaracterizedby the ideaofeffectively depoliticizing fundamental political rights and liberties, not only ta-kingtheserightsoutsidethepoliticalagenda,butremovingfromtheagendathemost divisive issues and all those values and principles “thatmight lead us tointerpret thepoliticalvalues in conflictingways” (Bellamy2007).Bellamycriti-cizes Rawlsian position arguing that this insulation is impossible and undesir-
able, because it risks excluding important issues from free and democratic dis-cussion.
“Theresult,he(Rawls)claims,willbeastablepoliticalsettlementbasedonmutualtolerance.Bycontrast,Ishallarguethisproposedinsulationofthepoliticalspherefrompeople’sprimeconcerns isnotonly impossiblebutalsoundesirable. Itpre-vents politics from performing its crucial function of reconciling differencesthroughnegotiationanddebate. It also risksexcluding importantminority issuesfromthepoliticalagendaandtherebydelegitimizing thepublicsphere– theveryproblemRawls seeks to avoid.Moreover, it assumeswhat it purports to show –namely,thatafunctioningdemocracyrequiresthatcitizensadoptacertainviewofdemocraticvalues”(Bellamy2007,102).
Bellamyargues thatdemocracy canallowgovernment topossess a legislative
majority to make important political decisions, especially when this majorityhavewon the supportof a largeelectoralplurality in freeand fair elections. Sothat, the electoral process amount to a model of public reasoning in which“citizensareshownequalconcernandrespectasrightsholderswhendecidingontheircollectivearrangements”(Bellamy2007).
Bellamyhighlightsthat,insomesituations,theclaimofgovernmentstobethevoice of the people which express a legislative majority are far weaker, so –consequently–theneedandthe legitimacyofan independent institutionwhichworks as a check of their power becomes stronger. According to Bellamy'sinterpretation,therearethreeargumentsthatweshouldfollow:
“Thefirstiswhenexecutiveshavetorespondtoanexceptionalcrisisthatwasun-anticipated in any partymanifesto andwhere, as in threats to national security,thereisanespecialriskthatcivil libertiesmaybeoverlookedasaresultofpreci-pitateactiontomeetanemergency.Thesecond iswhen legislatingonmattersofprivatemoralitythatnonethelesshaveapublicdimension:issuessuchasabortionandgaymarriagefitthiscategory,forexample.Finally,therearelawsandpoliciesinvolving ‘discrete and insularminorities’, whomay be unable to build electoralcoalitionswithothergroupsandhencehavenoelectoralcloutwherebytheirinte-restsmightbeprotected”(Bellamy2007,249).
Each of these three arguments is pivotal in constitutional and democratic
debate.Firstofall–asregardsthefirst,aboutexceptionalcrisis–sometimesit'snecessary tomake emergency legislation to fight threats such as terrorism. AnexampleistheUSAPatriotAct,enactedbyPresidentGeorgeW.Bushafter9/11attacks againstTwinTowers.AsBellamyunderlines, the terroristic threats andthe fear of governments to be blamed for failing to adequately protect citizensagainstterrorismaregoodreasonsforsacrificinglibertytohavemore“security”.Sointhesecasesitisnecessarytohaveabigmajoritytoenactthislegislation,but
JeremyWaldronhas remarked thatmoral questions, for example, havepro-duced a strong but free and democratic discussion about abortion, As Bellamynotes, “(Waldron) attributes the degree of mutual recognition between pro-choiceandprolifemovement,whoweretobefoundwithinallparties,tothefactthat neither side was being forced to concede they were wrong in their inter-pretationofmattersof fundamentalpoliticalprinciple” (Bellamy2007,253). Inthissense,politicalprocessrequiresrecognizingthattherearetwoormoresidesof the question at stake and that they deserve to be treatedwith equality andrespect.AccordingtoBellamy,freevotesmaybeextendedtodifferentissues(so,alsotomoralandethicalissues).
“Some republican theorists have argued that free votes ought to be extended tomore issuesandbecomethenormfor legislativedebatesonmattersofprinciple.However, the key to the legitimacy of parliament lies in its being both rep-resentative and accountable. Parties, as we saw, play a vital role in this regardbecause they make it possible for views on a range of policies to be broughttogether in ways that render legislators delegates of the electorate. On the rareoccasions legislation relating to personal morality is necessary, then free votesseemappropriatebecausetheseissuescutacrossthedominantpartydivisions.Inthiscase, the legislature isactingasa roughmicrocosmof thenationasawhole.But that isnot thenormalbasisonwhichparliamentoperates.Onmost issuesofpublicpolicy,theagendahasbeensetatthegeneralelectionandparliament’sroleistoreflectvotinginthatpopulararena”(Bellamy2007,254–255).
Finally, the thirdargument (about “insularminorities”)concerns the fact that,
in case of small and concentrated ethnical minorities, it would be possible todevolve special powers to these regions. The problem, Bellamy argues, rises incase of territorially dispersed or isolated groups, that risk to be politically andelectorallyinsignificantandrisknothavingtheirinterestsconsideredfairlyatall.Toavoidtheserisks,“significantminoritiescanoftenbeimportantpoliticalalliesin the formation of coalitions, giving thempolitical influencewell beyond theirvotingstrength”(Bellamy2007).Itmeansthattheexistenceofdifferentculturalorethnic,orreligiousminorities–withtheirneeds–isnotpoliticallyisolated.Itis always possible to devote political attention to theseminorities, even if – insomecase–theyseemtobeisolated.Bellamydefendstheideaof“circumstancesofpolitics”asatooltoenforcedemocraticsystem.
Within the circumstances of politics, the commitment to equality of concern andrespectthatanimatesmostcontemporarytheoriesofrightsandtheruleoflawcanonlybemetviaaformofself-rulethatsatisfiestheconditionofnon-domination.Asystemofequalvotesandmajorityrulecomplieswiththiscriterionbyofferinga
procedural form of public reasoning that provides a fair means for ‘hearing theotherside’.Competitionbetweenpoliticalpartiesfurtherreinforcesthissystembypromoting theresponsivenessofpoliticalagents to theircitizenprincipalsandofcitizenstoeachother(Bellamy2007,259).
putsanon-politicalandunrepresentativeinstitutionabovelegislativeanddemo-craticinstitutions.Bellamy'sideaisthatitdoesn'tmeantheexistingdemocraciesareperfectandjudicialreviewisnecessarilyimperfect.AccordingtoBellamy,“thedemocraticarrangementsfoundintheworld’sestablishedworkingdemocraciesaresufficienttosatisfytherequirementsofrepublicannon-domination,whereasalleffortstoimproveonsucharrangementsthroughjudicialinterventioncreateconditionsofdomination.Judicialreviewunderminestheequalityofconcernandrespect between citizens that lies at the heart of the constitutional project andthat democratic processes serve to secure” (Bellamy 2007, 260). In anotherpassage,Bellamyinsiststhat“thecounter-majoritariananddominatingcharacterof judicial review, alongwith the parallel drawbacks ofmost forms of became-ralism and many neo-federal arrangements, erode yet further the equality ofvotesandtheincentivestowardsresponsibilityandaccountabilityofpoliticians”(Bellamy2007).
Bellamyalsodiscussesthreepossible“qualities”ofthecourts,especiallywithregardtotheirdemocraticcharacter.Thefirstconcernsthe ideathat thecourtsarenotcounter-democraticbuttheyupholddemocraticconstitutionalidealsandtheycanbeconsideredasanexemplaryofatruedemocraticprocess.Inthisfirstargument,BellamyreferstoRawlsandtohis ideathatUSSupremeCourt isthe“exemplarofpublic reason” (Bellamy2013;Rawls1993); in referring toRawls,BellamyarguesthatCourtscouldbedemocraticinthreeways:
“First,itupholdstheprinciplesthatareintrinsictothedemocraticpublicsphere.Itmay override certain decisions of that democratic process but only to preservedemocracy.Second,theCourtdeliberatesinanideallydemocraticwaybecauseitisconstrainedwhenitcomestodecidingissuesthatraise‘constitutionalessentials’toonlyemploypublicreasons–reasonsthatsimplyreflectthevaluesofademocraticsocietyandprocess–whenreachingits judgment.Thirdly,theCourthasademo-craticmandatefromthepeople,astheauthorisersoftheconstitutionandtheulti-matearbitersofhowitshouldbeinterpreted”(Bellamy2013,338).
“normal” politics from “constitutional” politics. Normal politics ismade by par-liamentand it isdemocratically legitimatedbyapolitical andelectoralprocess,whichinvolvesmajorityrule;atthesametime,this“political”stageissubjecttoa
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higher law (the constitution) that is legitimated and protected by a super-majoritarianandundemocraticcourt(Bellamy2013).
PoliticalconstitutionalistslikeJeremyWaldronandRichardBellamycriticizesthis argument, arguing that it confuses popular sovereignty with democracy(Waldron1999;Bellamy2013).ThismeansthatWe,thePeoplemaybesovereign,but itdoesnotmeanthatthe institutiontheychoosewouldbe ipso factodemo-cratic, because they could use their sovereign power to establish a non-demo-cratic regime. Democratic legitimacy implies that the political system be reallydemocratic,notonlyinitsestablishment.
The second quality of the courts refers to the idea of “participatory democ-racy”. This argument follows Philip Pettit's distinction between “authorial” and“editorial” – or “contestatory” – democracy. Authorial democracy involves citi-zens in collective policies,within electoral systems. As Bellamy highlights, “theclaim to democratic legitimacy stems from the electoral process being a publicmechanism that allows citizens to advance their interests on an equal basis toeachother”andthe,later,Bellamyaddsthat“withinthecontextofagivencaseaCourtwill hear from all affected parties. In thisway, the legal forum comes toreflect the wider political forum” (Bellamy 2013, 345). This implies that legalforumcanreflectpoliticalforum,althoughlegalreasonsforblockingorsupport-ing certain issues aredifferent frompolitical or electoral reasons; in legal case,forexample,itwillbespecificimpactofaspecificissuediscussedbycourt.
“Above all, the final determination of a case lies not with the litigators but thejudiciary.ItistheirvotealonethatcountsinCourt–indeed,nobodyelsehasarighttovote.Evenifthecampaignsandhearingsthemselveswereasfreeandequalasthe electoral process, a crucial element is missing – it is not the parties to thisprocesswhodeterminetheoutcome.Litigationofferstherighttopetitionforrightsbutisnotitselfarighttodefineanddeterminetherightsofthecollectivity.Thus,thecredentialsoflitigationasamodeof‘authorial’democracyareweak”(Bellamy2013,346).
On theotherhand, judgescanonlydecideacase focusingon legislationoronconstitution that has itself been democratically endorsed. “These constrains”,Bellamy writes, “move litigation towards the model of ‘editorial’ democracy’”(Bellamy2013).Thiscasefordemocraticlegitimacycanberelatedtosomethinglike Rawlsian idea of public reason and “it assumes that the editorial rulesprovided by constitution reflect a democratic consensus as to the norms of ademocraticsocietyandthattheycanbeappliedinanimpartialwaythatreflectsthisconsensusbytheCourt”(Bellamy2013).
either fail togetahearingatallorwhoseveryright tobe treatedasworthyofahearing is being denied. As a result, those who litigate in this spirit argue thateither the process was deficient or that the decision itself denies them theirdemocratic rights.Yet,wesawhowthesemattersprove impossible todeterminewithout the judiciary taking a position on the verydisagreements about politicaljustice that may have been at issue in the legislative process. Thus, an intenseminority,whofeelverystronglyinfavourofapolicythattherestofthepopulationfeelmoderatelyopposedto,mayarguetheelectoralprocesshasletthemdownbynotappropriatelyweightingtheintensityoftheirviews.However,evenifthiscaseis treated as a ‘mere’ procedural issue it raises contentious and burdensomejudgementsoverprocessrights”(Bellamy2013,347).
The thirdargumentconcerns the ideaof the“courtsasrepresentativedemoc-
racy”and it isessentiallyrelated to the ideaof “representation”; itconsistsofanegative and positive thesis. According to the negative thesis, the democraticcritiqueofthecourtsfailsbecause,inrepresentativedemocracies,thelegislationcannot be regarded as something that reflects popular will. In this sense, leg-islation is the result of deliberation of representatives in parliament or leg-islature; but at the same time, representatives arenotdelegatesor constituent,buttheycanbeconsideredastrustees(Bellamy2013).
“As such, a democratic case against judicial review based on the equal right ofcitizens to participate in legislation proves as telling against the legislature as itdoes against constitutional Courts. For legislators likewise possess a superiorvotingweighttoordinarycitizensandexercisetheirindependentmoraljudgmentwhen making decisions concerning the whole of the political community, oftengoing against the express wishes of the citizens who voted for them” (Bellamy2013,349).
delegate and trustee fails to take into account the full range of representativeroles that politicians play in their office. In his article, Bellamy quotes JanMansbridge'sdistinctionbetween “promissory”, “anticipatory” and “gyroscopic”conception of representation (Bellamy 2013; Mansbridge 2003). The first con-ception mainly corresponds to the delegatory model, in which representativesare delegates by electoral body and they has to keep fidelity to their electoralpromises. So, “representatives belong to parties and are subject to party disci-pline,andthefindingsofthemanifestoresearchgroupsuggestthatonceelectedpartiesdokeepfaithtotheirelectoralpromisestoaremarkabledegreepromisesare often vague policy goals, so representatives may still act as trustees anddeliberate over the appropriatemeans tomeet these promised ends” (Bellamy2007). According to anticipatory conception, representatives could be sensitiveto new attitudes or needs among the electorate that follow new political
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circumstances or respond to the success or failure of previous policies. In thissense,representativesareabletoanticipatewhatthevotersthinkandwhatthevoterwill approve in the next election (Bellamy2013). Finally, representativesmayhavetofaceunanticipateddecisions.AsBellamyargues:
“… In doing so voters may be able to expect they will decide in expected wayswithoutexternal incentivesbecause theyhavebeenselectedon thebasisof theirpriorbeliefsandconvictions.Here,representatives fit into thethirdcategoryandact as gyroscopes, rotating around a set of relatively stable convictions. Even so,although their authority derives for the most part from the process of autho-risation,theyareliabletobeheldaccountableshouldtheyactotherthanexpected”(Bellamy2013,350).
This means that representatives follows and are sensitive to popular will andvoterpreferencesandtheyareindialoguewiththem,differentlyfromjudiciary.Judges can be categorised in gyroscopic and anticipatory argument: gyroscopicargument concerns with the selection of judges, which is directly subject topoliticalcontrol,but–Bellamyargues–evenwherethere'sgreaterindependencefrom political power, courts hope that their decisions gained consensus by thegovernmentandtheelectorate.But,otherwise,“theyriskbothalossoflegitimacyand an implementation deficit, given there are many ways a judgment can beblocked or undermined through half-hearted, underfunded or delayed com-pliance.Asaresult,theypracticeaweakformofanticipatoryrepresentation,sothat – as Robert Dahl highlights – ‘Courts follow the polls’ to the extent ofreflecting sustained, national popular opinion” (Bellamy 2013, 350). In the lastpartofhisarticle,Bellamyhighlightsthat:
“Legislatorsareonlytrusteestoalimiteddegree.Totheextentjudgesare,thenthedegreetheycanbetrustedtoupholddemocraticvaluesdoesnotrestonthenormsembedded in the Constitution or its periodic endorsement by referenda – argu-ments akin to those of Rawls criticised earlier. Rather, their representativenessstemsfromavarietyofindirectdemocraticpressures.Onceagain,thedemocraticlegitimacy of the Court arises from its beingwithin an electoral political systemratherthanindependentfromit”(Bellamy2013,350).
Jeremy Waldron makes a distinction between democracy and popular sove-
reignty,inwhichtheprincipleofpopularsovereigntyrequiresthatpeopleshouldhavewhatever constitution,whatever formof government theywant (Waldron1999), but popular sovereignty does not remove or ignore existing differencesamongthevariousformsofgovernment fromwhichpeoplehavethepossibilitytochoose.Inthissense,hereferstoJohnLockeandThomasHobbes,underliningthattheyarguethatthepeoplehadtherighttovestlegislativepowerinasingleindividual, in a small group of individuals or in an assembly. For Hobbes, the
sovereign power could not be vested in a democratic assembly, instead Lockebelieved incollectivebodyasvestedof thispower.AsWaldronstresses, “... thedistinction between a democratic method of constitutional choice and thedemocratic characterof the constitution that is chosen is clearestwhenwecanpointtoafoundingmomentinthelifeofapoliticalsociety(amomentofconsti-tutional choice) and distinguish between the decision-procedures used at themoment and the decisions-procedures which it was decided to employ in allsubsequentpoliticaldecision-making”(Waldron1999,256).
Defendingthe“ruleofjudges”
Inthislastpartofmyarticle,Itrytoclarifythetheoreticalframeworkofdiscus-sion, identifying three different lines of reasoning, that represent three mainways of interpreting the counter-majoritariandifficulty and the question of theso-called“ruleofjudges”indemocracy.Thefirstretracesthelegalconceptionofconstitutionalism,defendingtheideaofjudicialreviewanditsdemocraticlegiti-macyinfrontofthepeople(Rawls1993;Dworkin1985);thesecondretracesthepolitical critique to legal version andhighlights theposition of some importantauthors that reject the institutionof judicial review,defending–on theirpart–theroleoftheparliamentinconstitutionaldecision-making.
ForRawlsian liberal constitutionalism, in a constitutional regime characteri-zed by a strong judicial review, public reason is considered as the reason ofSupremeCourt.Rawlsian legal constitutionalism is alsobasedonadualist con-ception of democracy and it defends a distinction between “supreme” law and“ordinary”law.“Supreme”lawisexpressedbyconstituentpowerandittakesitsauthoritybythepeople.AsRawlsunderlines,constitutionalpowercannotbelefttothelegislativebranch.InRawlsianconception,SupremeCourtprotectsconsti-tutionalessential included inabillof rights fromthe legislationofa temporaryparliamentarymajorityorfromtheinterestsofaparticularpoliticalgroup.
Rawls defends his idea of democratic constitutionalism, highlighting that “ifthe Court assumes this role and it plays it well, it's wrong to call it sic andsimpliciter undemocratic; but it is counter-majoritarian respect to the ordinarylaw,because,withthepowerofjudicialreview,theCourtcandeclareitunconsti-tutional. The Court is not counter-majoritarian respect to the supreme law,provided that thedecision itmakes is reasonable inagreementwith theconsti-tution, with its amendments and with its interpretations in political mandate”(Rawls1993,212).
TheroleoftheSupremeCourtinRawlsiantheoryisstrictlyrelatedtotheideaofpublicreason;citizensandlegislators,Rawlsargues,canvoteaccordinglywiththeirmoral convictionsorwith their comprehensive viewswhen constitutional
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essentials ormatters of fundamental justice are not at stake.WhenRawls saysthattheCourtistheexemplarofpublicreason,hemeansthatthejudgescannotrefers to theirmoral values or to their comprehensivedoctrines but theymustonlyrefertotheconstitutionanditsprecedents.
Inpolitical critiqueof constitutionalism, instead,we can find that importantpolitical constitutionalists likeBellamy,Waldron andTushnet,move theirmaincriticismto legalconstitutionalviewarguingthat thecounter-majoritariandiffi-cultyisarealproblemfordemocracy,Infacttheybelievethattheso-called“ruleof judges” can represent an undemocratic way to solve matters concerningconstitutionalessentials. In thissense,unelected judgeshavenopopularautho-ritytorejectaconstitutionalamendmentortoconsiderasunconstitutionalale-gislative act. This critique is obviously basedonmonistmodel of democracy inwhichthereisnosupremeorconstitutionalcourtandinwhichtheprotectionofconstitutionallibertiesandrightsisinthehandsofparliamentandoflegislativemajorities,whichareexpressionofpopularwillandsovereignty.Itmeansthatinthis position there's also a strong rejection of any form of judicial review oflegislation and I consider Mark Tushnet as one of the strongest critics of thisinstitution.
In his most relevant work, Tushnet notes that the question of the scope ofjudicialreviewisbasedonsomeideas:ononehand,differentlyfromdecisionsbyunelectedjudges,decisionsbyelectedlegislatorshavefullydemocraticlegitimacyandjustification,and,ontheotherhand,itimpliesthatlegislatorshaveabroaderauthority to make judgments (Tushent 1999). Tushnet replies to legal consti-tutionalists'opinionsarguingthat:
“Some defences of judicial review rely on formalist doctrines so that courts cancontrol officials who, the judges believe, are less capable than the judges them-selves.Thatapproachmakessenseto the judges,but itshouldnotmakesensetotheofficials.Alegislatorshouldbeabletosay,‘WhoaretheytotellmethatI’mnogood at my job?’ Where the court’s constitutional interpretation is shaped by aformalist judgmentthat legislatorsarenotasgoodas judgesatdeterminingwhattheConstitutionmeans,alegislatorwouldonlyreinforcethatjudgmentbythinkingthat the Constitution itself required the doctrines the judges develop” (Tushnet1999,61).
Anothercritiqueconcernsthefactthat,althoughlegalconstitutionalistsdefendjudges independence frompolitics, judicial review inUnitedStates isconnectedtoordinarypolitics,anyway.SoasTushnetwrites, judgesarenominatedbythepresidentandconfirmedbytheSenateandtheyarenotchosenbylegalexpertsaccording to their legal experiences. In that sense, the nomination and con-firmationofthejudgesaredeeplypoliticalprocess;itreflectsthepoliticaldirec-tion in the Congress and the political side in the Presidency. So, Tushnet asks,whereisthis“independence”?
“Attimespresidentswillrelyonthejudgmentsofrespectedlawyersaboutwhothebestnomineeis,andattimespresidentswillcalculatehownominatingonepersonwill appeal to political interest groups. In both cases the president is concernedabouthowthenominationwillaffecthisorherpolitical standingwith importantconstituencies. At times senatorswill defer to a president’s choices and at timesthey will vigorously interrogate the nominee. In both cases the senators areconcerned about how their behaviourwill playwith their constituents. At timesinterestgroupswillmobilizetheirconstituentsaroundanomination,andattimestheywillnot.Nominationpoliticsarepolitics,afterall.”(Tushnet1999,152).
Conclusion.Howtorespondtothesearguments
In conclusion of my paper I want to try to propose a third argument aboutrepresentationinconstitutionaltheory.Aswehaveseen,theproblemconcerningcounter-majoritarian difficulty is a real question that deserves much attentionanditstillanimatesalargedebatewithinliberaldemocraticconstitutionalism.
Now, thequestions I tried toanswer in thispaperare three:1.Whatdowemean with counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What are the answers the twomodels of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. Can we propose a thirdanswerthatincludestheothertwo?
Ifwefollowlegalconstitutionalism,wehavetomovefromRawlsianconcept-tion of public reason and from the related conception of Supreme Court as itsperfect exemplar (Rawls 1993). At the same time, we should consider the factthat thereare constitutionalprinciples that shouldbekeptoutside thepoliticaldiscussionand,consequently,outside theavailabilityof temporarypoliticalma-jorities. Inthissense,accordingtoMichelman's ideaofunenumeratedrights,wecannotput fundamentalrightsunderordinarypoliticalactivityandassumethatthey are subject to what Luigi Ferrajoli and especially Alessandro Ferrara callstructuralentrenchment.
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Secondly we consider that constitutional judges do not represent an active“political” power and they do not draw their authority from popular vote, butfromconstitutionitself.AsDworkinnotes,wecannotconsiderjudgesastrusteesorrepresentativesofapoliticalparty,butweshouldregardthemasguardiansoftheConstitutionandoftheprinciplesensuredinit.Soitmeansthatwhenconsti-tutional essentials are at stake, we cannot consider judges as undemocratic,becauseinthesecasesthebasicprinciplesofthedemocracyitselfareatstakeandonlyjudges–independentfrompolitics–canguaranteethem.
So,Courtsaremaybebettersituatedandequippedtorecognizeandenshrinethese new conditions of pluralism; probably the discussion about some newrightscannotbeleftinthehandsoftheparliamentbecauseprobablyparliamentis tooconstrainedbepolitical reason forwhichapoliticalgroupscouldboycotttheacknowledgementof suchrights formoralorethical reasons.Let's take, forexample, the current discussion within Italian Parliament about the so-called“stepchild-adoption” by gay couples. Conservative parties in Italy, according tomoralandethicalbasis,aretryingtoboycottthepromulgationofthislaw.
USSupremeCourt,initslastObergefellSentencehasdeclaredgaymarriageaconstitutional right and it has noted that – in US constitutional system –whenconstitutional rights and constitutional essentials are at stake, citizens cannotwaitforlegislativeproceduresbeforeassertingafundamentalright.Inthatsense,SupremeCourtremarksthat“...therightoftheindividualisnottobeinjuredbythe unlawful exercise of governmental power” (Supreme Court 14-556, 2015).This sentencerepresentsoneof themost interestingexamplesofpublic reasonandoneofthemostrecentandimportantcontributionsonconstitutionaltheory.The Court remarks that, when individual rights are violated, the ConstitutionrequiresredressbytheCourt,notwithstandingthemoregeneralvalueofdemo-craticdecision-making.ItentailsthattheCourtisopentoindividualcitizenswhocometoittovindicateafundamentalright,evenwhenthemajoritydisagreesorthelegislativerefusestoact(SupremeCourt14-556,2015).
BibliographyBELLAMY R. (1996): Pluralism, Liberal Constitutionalism and Democracy: A
Critique of John Rawls's (Meta)political Liberalis. In: Meadowcroft, J. (eds.):The Liberal Political Tradition: Contemporary Reappraisals, Edward Elgar,Cheltenham,77–100.
BELLAMY, R. (2007): Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of theConstitutionalityofDemocracy,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge.
GOLDONI, M. (2012): Two Internal Critiques of Political Constitutionalism. In:InternationalJournalofConstitutionalLaw,10(4),926–949.
MANSBRIDGE, J. (2003): Rethinking Representation. In: The Americal PoliticalSciencesReview,97,4,515–528.
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