The dynamics of relationship promotion: Controlling the automatic inclination to trust.

The Dynamics of Relationship Promotion: Controlling the AutomaticInclination to Trust

Sandra L. Murray and Sarah GomillionUniversity at Buffalo, The State University of New York

John G. HolmesUniversity of Waterloo

Brianna Harris and Veronica LamarcheUniversity at Buffalo, The State University of New York

A dynamic model of how trust regulates relationship promotion is proposed. The model assumes that trust hasboth impulsive (i.e., automatic attitude toward the partner) and reflective (i.e., beliefs about the partner’scaring) forms. Because overriding evaluative impulses requires self-regulatory resources, the model furtherposits that self-regulatory capacity controls whether people strengthen relationship connections in the face ofthreats to reflective trust. Two experiments and 1 longitudinal daily diary study utilizing convergent manip-ulations and measures of self-regulatory capacity supported the model. Results revealed that acute uncertaintyabout a partner’s caring increased relationship-promotive sentiment and behavior when (a) people lackedself-regulatory resources to question impulsively trusting sentiments and (b) when people had self-regulatoryresources available to override impulsively distrusting sentiments. In contrast, acute uncertainty about apartner’s caring decreased relationship-promotive sentiment and behavior when (a) people lacked the self-regulatory capacity to question impulsively distrusting sentiments and (b) when people had the self-regulatorycapacity available to override impulsively trusting sentiments.

Keywords: trust, interdependence, risk-regulation, relationship-promotion, dual process

You may be deceived if you trust too much, but you will live intorment if you do not trust enough.—Frank Crane

Crane’s observations illustrate a delicate and ongoing negotia-tion between romantic partners: treading the balance betweentrusting too much and trusting too little (Murray & Holmes, 2009,2011). In interdependent relationships, trust in a specific partnersignals the safety of seeking connection (Murray & Holmes, 2009;Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006). Thus, Gayle trusting too muchand perhaps expecting a sacrifice that Ron is not willing to makecould invite conflict (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew,1999). But her trusting too little and perhaps hesitating to seekthe emotional support Ron would happily provide could precludeincreases in intimacy (Reis & Shaver, 1988). For interactions to

be rewarding, partners must strike a constantly evolving balancebetween trusting and distrusting one another. The current articlepresents a dynamic, dyadic model of how trust regulates whenpartners promote their relationships and strengthen their connec-tion and when they instead self-protect and pull back.

Impulse and Reflection: Motivating RelationshipPromotion

Trust is an expectation of gain (or loss) through dependence on thepartner (Deutsch, 1973; Holmes & Rempel, 1989). It is experiencedas a state of felt security and comfort (vs. unease) in the partner’spresence. By signaling whether it is safe to depend on one’s partner,trust solves a basic problem of interdependence: It gives partners thepower to mind-read each other’s motivations (Murray & Holmes,2009, 2011). Imagine Gayle wants Ron to listen to her complaintsabout her day when Ron wants to absorb himself in a hockey game.Choosing to disclose to Ron despite the sportscaster chatter on the TVoffers Gayle the gain of feeling truly supported (if Ron turns off theTV and listens) but also leaves her open to the loss of feeling hurt andangry (if he continues watching). To behave in ways that make herfeel safe in such situations, Gayle needs to anticipate Ron’s actions.Because she cannot literally read his mind, she relies on her trust inRon to forecast his behavior and thereby guide her own behavior(Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006; Simp-son, 2007; Wieselquist et al., 1999).

The Signaling Properties of Trust

Dual process conceptualizations suggest that trust has bothautomatic and controlled bases (Murray, Lupien, & Seery, 2012;

This article was published Online First October 29, 2012.Sandra L. Murray, Sarah Gomillion, Brianna Harris, and Veronica

Lamarche, Psychology Department, University at Buffalo, The State Uni-versity of New York; John G. Holmes, Department of Psychology, Uni-versity of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

We would like to thank Dale Griffin for providing statistical consulta-tion, Russell Fazio for sharing his sharp insights on this research, MarkSeery for critiquing drafts of the article, and numerous undergraduateresearch assistants for their assistance in conducting this research. NationalScience Foundation Grant BCS-1143747 awarded to Sandra L. Murrayprovided support for the preparation of the article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sandra L.Murray, Psychology Department, Park Hall, University at Buffalo, StateUniversity of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260-4110. E-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2012 American Psychological Association2013, Vol. 104, No. 2, 305–334 0022-3514/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0030513

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0030513

Murray et al., 2011). Impulsive trust corresponds to automaticattitudes toward the partner (Murray, Holmes, & Pinkus, 2010;Murray et al., 2011). Such attitudes are thought to orient people totheir social worlds. More positive automatic associations signalobjects that are safe and approachable, whereas more negativeautomatic associations signal objects that should be avoided(Alexopoulos & Ric, 2007; Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010; Banse, 2001;Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Chen & Bargh, 1999;Fazio, 1986; Olson & Fazio, 2008). Because attitudes have thissignaling function, automatic evaluative associations toward thepartner can forecast the partner’s caring and responsivenessthrough immediate evaluative associations to his or her presence.Gayle’s more positive automatic attitude signals that Ron is safeand approachable, whereas her more negative attitude signals thathe should be treated more warily.

Supporting this assumption, people who make more positiveassociations to their partner on the Implicit Association Test (IAT)report greater security in their relationships (Zayas & Shoda,2005). Unconsciously conditioning more positive automatic asso-ciations to the partner also makes people feel safer in their com-mitments. People subliminally conditioned to associate their part-ner’s name with positive words report greater confidence in theirpartner’s love and commitment (Murray et al., 2011, Experiments1 and 2). However, such evaluative conditioning does not affectjudgments of the partner’s desirability, suggesting that positiveautomatic associations to the partner specifically foster a sense ofsafety (i.e., trust).

Reflective trust corresponds to consciously considered beliefsabout the strength of the partner’s caring and commitment (Hol-mes & Cameron, 2005; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Murray &Holmes, 2009; Shallcross & Simpson, 2012; Wieselquist et al.,1999). Thus, Gayle’s reflective trust in Ron is captured through hercurrent belief that Ron values her specific qualities and feels closeand committed to her (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000). Thismeta-perspective on one’s value to the partner also signals thepossibility of good or bad things to come through dependence.However, this definition departs from early ones that located trustin dispositional judgments of the partner’s dependability and pre-dictability (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). It locates reflectivetrust in a dyadic judgment about the partner’s devotion to oneself,a definition shared by models of attachment, interdependence, andtrust (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Murray, Holmes, & Collins,2006; Murray & Holmes, 2009; Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004;Wieselquist et al., 1999).

In any given situation, even the best, most caring and trustwor-thy partner can behave badly (Kelley, 1979). Therefore, for im-pulsive trust and reflective trust to effectively co-signal when toconnect and when to pull back, at least one of these sentimentsshould be reactive to short-term changes in perceived risk (Holmes& Rempel, 1989; Simpson, 2007). Automatic evaluative associa-tions typically change through gradual processes of associativelearning in concrete situations, whereas deliberative beliefs canchange quickly through novel, abstract reasoning (Baccus, Bald-win, & Packer, 2004; Fazio, 1986; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006;Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).Because conscious beliefs can adapt quickly to short-term changesin the available evidence (Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell & McConnell,2006; Wilson et al., 2000), acute changes in reflective trust might

better mirror immediate changes in perceived risk than automaticevaluative associations to the partner.1

In romantic relationships, accumulated, objective behavioralexperience does appear to more strongly condition long-termchanges in impulsive trust than reflective trust. For instance,newlyweds whose partners behaved less responsively early inmarriage evidenced less positive automatic evaluative associationsto their partner after 4 years of marriage. However, such earlyexperiences did not predict later explicit beliefs about their part-ner’s caring (Murray et al., 2010). Instead, reflective trust canchange quickly to match one’s perception of ongoing events(Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Kashy, 2005; Mikulincer &Shaver, 2003; Murray, Bellavia, Rose, & Griffin, 2003; Murray,Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). For instance, peoplereport acute declines in their trust in their partner’s caring whenthey are immersed in situations in which they feel less powerfulthan their partner (Overall & Sibley, 2008). Similarly, low self-esteem people report drops in reflective trust on days when theyhave failed at work, whereas high self-esteem people report in-creases in trust on such days (Murray, Griffin, Rose, & Bellavia,2006). People high on attachment anxiety also report less trust intheir partner’s caring when discussing a major rather than a minorrelationship problem (Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996).

Impulse Control: Calibrating Relationship Promotion

Figure 1 presents the dynamic trust-control model of relation-ship promotion that emerges from these assumptions about thenature of impulsive and reflective trust. In this model, acute dropsin reflective trust function as a kind of alarm bell—one that signalsthe need to adjust closeness to the partner in a way that restores asense of security in one’s dependence (Murray, Holmes, & Collins,2006). Imagine that Gayle chooses to disclose to Ron, but im-mersed in an exciting play, he ignores her and continues to watchthe hockey game. Such an unexpectedly negative event provokesa search for explanation (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990). Question-ing one’s value in the eyes of others is both painful and motivating(Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Therefore, as Gayle wonders whetherRon cares more about the hockey game than about her, she needsto take some action to alleviate her feelings of vulnerability andrestore her sense of security.

The risk-regulation model assumes that people restore securityin the face of uncertainty about their partner’s caring by regulatingthe strength of their interdependent bond. Specifically, people canpromote the relationship by seeking renewed closeness, or instead,they can self-protect by seeking greater physical or psychologicaldistance (Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Rubin, 2010; Derrick,Leonard, & Homish, in press; Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006;Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998; Overall & Sib-ley, 2009). What kind of security-restoring behavior is Gayle’sacute drop in reflective trust likely to provoke? Will she approachand forgive his lapse, noting to herself that it is the playoff game,or will she instead avoid and castigate him for his thoughtlessness?

1 People might also have automatic evaluative associations to specificfeatures of the situation, in addition to their more general automaticevaluative associations to their partner. We return to this point in theGeneral Discussion.

306 MURRAY, GOMILLION, HOLMES, HARRIS, AND LAMARCHE

Paths A–C in the trust-control model of relationship promotionassume that acute drops in reflective trust elicit competing goals.First, uncertainty about the partner’s caring activates the state goalto be prudent and circumspect and not act on impulse (Path A inFigure 1; Cavallo, Fitzsimons, & Holmes, 2010; Murray, Derrick,Leder, & Holmes, 2008). For instance, when people recount per-sonally threatening partner transgressions, they are quicker toidentify caution-related words in a lexical decision task (Murray etal., 2008). People led to question their partner’s caring also per-form better on an anagram task when it is framed in terms ofavoiding losses, a prevention frame that fits the goal to be prudent,than when it is framed in terms of seeking gains, a promotionframe that opposes the goal to be prudent (Cavallo et al., 2010).Second, uncertainty about the partner’s caring also activates eval-uative associations to the partner and, thus, the chronic automaticinclination to trust (or distrust) because evaluative associations tothe partner can help disambiguate the situation at hand (Paths B–Cin Figure 1; Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010; Higgins, 1996; Murray etal., 2011, 2012).

Thus, acute drops in reflective trust simultaneously activatechronic impulses to trust (or distrust) the partner and the compet-ing situational goal or motivation to be prudent or circumspect andnot act on such impulses. However, acting on the self-regulatorygoal to be circumspect requires the exercise of self-control. Forthis reason, Path D in the trust-control model ascribes a central roleto the availability of self-regulatory resources, such as those sup-plied by dispositional self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000),a short-term glucose surge (DeWall, Deckman, Gailliot, & Bush-man, 2011; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008), or the availability ofworking memory capacity (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Friese,Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2009; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wi-ers, & Schmitt, 2008; Olson & Fazio, 2008; Pronk, Karremans,Overbeek, Vermulst, & Wigboldus, 2010; Pronk, Karremans, &Wigboldus, 2011; Ritter, Karremans, & van Schie, 2010;Schmeichel, 2007).

Path E in the trust-control model assumes that acute drops inreflective trust motivate the security-restoring regulation of one’s

own relationship-promotive sentiments and behavior. However,the way in which a sense of security is restored depends on one’sautomatic impulse to trust and the self-regulatory resources onehas available to heed the competing goal to be circumspect andprudent. The assumption that uncertain reflective trust activatesboth the automatic impulse to trust and the motivation to poten-tially override such an impulse might seem inefficient. But theautomatic inclination to trust (or distrust) one’s partner representsa general solution to a wide range of situations. Gayle’s automaticevaluative association to Ron conveys her best guess to safety,absent other information, much like a sample mean represents thebest guess at an individual score. Situations, like people, vary. Intrust-relevant situations, the coincident goal to be circumspect andquestion such associations affords a means of fine-tuning behav-ioral inclinations to fit the specific situation as self-regulatoryresources allow. Consistent with this logic, models of mutualresponsiveness have predicted and shown that trust-relevant situ-ations activate specific automatic impulses that can later be cor-rected to fit broader relationship goals (Murray & Holmes, 2009,2011).

Succumbing to trusting impulses. When self-regulatory re-sources are limited, acute drops in reflective trust should provokesecurity-restoring sentiment and behavior that mirror impulsivelytrusting sentiments—an assimilation effect. Imagine an impul-sively distrusting Gayle in the hockey-watching scenario. WhenRon ignores her solicitations, her automatic sentiments signal herto be distrusting (Murray et al., 2011). If Gayle is low on self-regulatory resources, she has little capacity to override such awarning signal. Therefore, being less impulsively trusting shouldcompound her conscious uncertainties about his caring. Her com-pounded inclination to distrust should then push her to self-protect(Path E), perhaps castigating Ron angrily (Finkel & Campbell,2001). Now imagine an impulsively trusting Gayle. Her automaticsentiments signal the safety of approaching her partner Ron (Mur-ray et al., 2011). Therefore, being more impulsively trustingshould make her experience of conscious uncertainty about hiscaring much more benign. In this way, her automatic inclination to

Impulsive trust associations

Reflectivetrust beliefs

Situated Goals

Own Relationship-

PromotiveBehavior

Partner Relationship-

PromotiveBehavior

Inclination to Trust

Self-RegulatoryResources

Inclination to TrustB

C

A

D

E

F

Figure 1. The trust-control model of relationship promotion.

307AUTOMATIC INCLINATION TO TRUST

trust should motivate her to promote her relationship (Path E),forgiving Ron for his misstep.

Existing research provides preliminary support for these hypoth-eses. For instance, uncertainty about a partner’s caring is actuallya positive physiological and phenomenological experience forpeople who are high in impulsive trust and chronically low inworking memory capacity (Murray et al., 2012). When led tobelieve their partner perceives a long list of faults in them, suchimpulsively trusting people exhibit greater psychophysiologicalchallenge reactions (i.e., higher cardiac output, lower total periph-eral resistance) and decreased apprehension about being evaluatedby the partner while giving a speech, as compared to controls. Incontrast, questioning a partner’s caring is a decidedly negativeexperience for people who are low on impulsive trust and chron-ically low in working memory capacity. Such impulsively distrust-ing people exhibit greater psychophysiological threat reactions(i.e., lower cardiac output, higher total peripheral resistance) andgreater apprehension in response to the same source of uncertainty.Similarly, doubts about the partner’s caring automatically motivateapproach for people who are high on impulsive trust and experi-mentally depleted of executive resources (Murray et al., 2011).When depleted, people who are high on impulsive trust are quickerto identify positive traits in their partner when they are remindedof how their partner can violate their trust—a forgiving, approach-oriented response. In contrast, when depleted, people who are lessimpulsively trusting automatically withdraw from their partnerwhen they are reminded of how their partner can violate their trust.

Overcompensating for trusting impulses. The associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model, a major theoretical frame-work on implicit attitudes, assumes that people utilize self-regulatory resources to check the validity of automatic evaluativeassociations against other goals and beliefs (Gawronski & Boden-hausen, 2006, 2011). Self-regulatory resources essentially givepeople license to cross-examine evaluative associations to thepartner and to the situation itself for their legitimacy. In relation-ships, the capacity to do a consistency check may invalidate suchassociations and supply the motivation to override the automaticimpulse to trust (or distrust). Consequently, when self-regulatoryresources are ample, acute drops in reflective trust could provokeregulatory sentiments and behavior that contradict impulsivelytrusting sentiments—a paradoxical contrast effect. Why would thisbe the case?

First, in situations that provoke uncertainty, people high onself-regulatory capacity might check their automatic evaluativeassociations to their partner against other beliefs and memories.Typically, people have a large reserve of information about theirpartner, a mixed bag of evidence with conflicting evaluative im-plications (Zayas & Shoda, 2012). Therefore, when Sally checksthe validity of her inclination to distrust Harry, the times he wasreally thoughtful and considerate are likely to be especially salientto her (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). But when Gayle checksthe validity of her inclination to trust Ron, the times when hedisappointed her in the past are likely to be especially salient toher. In fact, forgiving a partner can actually elicit the partner’sfuture transgressions, suggesting that inclinations to forgive mightthemselves be associated with negative memories (McNulty,2010). If such biased memories surface, the generated memoriesshould contrast against the partner’s current behavior, making thebehavior appear more benevolent to the impulsively distrusting,

high-resource perceiver and more worrisome to the impulsivelytrusting, high-resource perceiver.

Second, in situations that provoke uncertainty, people high onself-regulatory capacity might also check any automatic evaluativeassociations to the situation itself against other beliefs and mem-ories. For instance, when people high on self-esteem have suffi-cient self-regulatory resources available, they defensively recon-strue situations that provide reason to worry about their partner’scaring as being essentially benign or even positive (Cavallo, Hol-mes, Fitzsimons, Murray, & Wood, 2012). Therefore, for peoplehigh on self-regulatory capacity, a general tendency to questionand invalidate initial evaluative associations might also motivatethem to override the automatic impulse to trust (or distrust) theirpartner in specific situations.

Thus, for people high in self-regulatory capacity, the generalproclivity to cross-examine and try to validate automatic associa-tions may make the safety (or warning) signal supplied by impul-sive trust worthy of suspicion. Once such an automatic impulsebecomes questionable, overturning it may require compensatorybehavior. Specifically, suppressing impulsively distrusting incli-nations may necessitate playing up the reasons to trust the partner(Kunda & Spencer, 2003). If such compensation occurs, acuteuncertainty about the partner’s caring should actually strengthentrusting inclinations and increase relationship-promotive behaviorfor impulsively distrusting people who are high on self-regulatorycapacity. Consistent with this logic, people who are motivated tocontrol their racial biases overcompensate; the stronger their au-tomatic inclination to avoid the targets of their prejudice, thegreater their behavioral willingness to approach them (Olson &Fazio, 2008). In contrast, suppressing impulsively trusting im-pulses may necessitate playing up the reasons to distrust thepartner. If such overcompensation occurs, acute uncertainty shoulddecrease trusting inclinations and undermine relationship promo-tion for impulsively trusting people who are high on self-regulatory capacity.

Interpersonal consequences. Path F in the trust-controlmodel assumes that heeding (vs. overriding) one’s own automaticimpulse to trust the partner in the face of uncertainty elicitsself-fulfilling changes in the partner. One partner’s willingness totrust and promote the relationship typically elicits the other part-ner’s willingness to trust and similarly connect. In fact, interde-pendence theorists assume that partners can only find evidence ofone another’s trustworthiness by first taking the risk of trusting(Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Kelley, 1979; Rusbult & Van Lange,2003). Once offered, one partner’s willingness to trust and connect(e.g., solicit support) gives the other partner the opportunity toprove his or her trustworthiness (e.g., provide support). Con-versely, one partner’s tendency to distrust and distance (e.g.,leveling an accusation) stifles the other partner’s willingness toconnect and prove his or her trustworthiness (Rusbult, Verette,Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). Illustrating such self-fulfillingprophecies, rejection-sensitive women behave more negativelytoward their partner during conflicts and elicit more rejectingpartner behavior in return (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri,1998). People who feel less valued by their partner also treat theirpartner coldly on days after they feel rejected, which only thenelicits their partner’s annoyance (Murray et al., 2003).

Therefore, if Gayle is impulsively distrusting and short onself-regulatory resources, Gayle experiencing acute doubts about


Ron’s caring as reason to distance from him should also provokeRon’s avoidance of her. But if she has the self-regulatory capacityavailable to override impulsively distrusting sentiments, Gaylecompensating for such uncertainty by connecting might insteadelicit Ron’s willingness to connect to her. In contrast, if Gayle isimpulsively trusting and short on self-regulatory capacity, experi-encing acute doubts about Ron’s caring as reason to connectshould also elicit Ron’s willingness to connect to her. But if shehas the self-regulatory resources available to override impulsivelytrusting sentiments, ruminating about her reasons to be uncertainand withdrawing might provoke Ron’s tendency to distance fromher.

Caveats

Before proceeding, two points about the boundary conditions forthe trust-control model are in order. Because uncertainty about thepartner’s caring sets risk-regulation processes in motion, impulsivetrust should have its most pronounced effects in the face of suchuncertainty. Indeed, the model does not predict interactive effectsfor impulsive trust and self-regulatory capacity absent such astimulus. Moreover, the predictions we set forth should only holdin circumstances where distrust represents uncertainty, not decidednegativity. Most dating and marital relationships are satisfying andcommitted (Karney & Bradbury, 1995). In such relationships, trustand distrust involve differences in degree, not kind. Therefore, weuse the terms trust and distrust to refer to differences in certaintyalong a largely positive scale.

Research Strategy and Hypotheses

The present research builds on a recent dual process model oftrust. Prior research revealed that trust has both impulsive andreflective forms and that depleting self-regulatory resources po-tentiates the effects of impulsive trust (Murray et al., 2011, 2012).However, the proposed trust-control model is the first to positshort- and long-term behavioral and dyadic consequences of part-ners being more or less capable of overriding the automatic im-pulse to trust or distrust. The present research is also first toexamine whether enriched self-regulatory resources allow peopleto override and behaviorally counter impulsive trust. It also ex-plores the novel idea that the proclivity to cross-examine automaticattitudes motivates people high in self-regulatory capacity to over-

ride the impulsive trust signal in situations of uncertainty. Wedesigned two experiments and one longitudinal daily diary study toprovide convergent hypothesis tests. Because prior research sup-ports Paths A–C in the trust-control model, the present researchfocuses on the regulation of relationship promotion (Paths D–F).

Across studies, we assessed impulsive trust through automaticevaluative associations to the partner on the IAT (Murray et al.,2011, 2012). In Studies 1 and 2, we threatened reflective trust andsupplemented the capacity for self-control by inducing participantsto consume glucose. We then measured automatic (Study 1) andcontrolled (Study 2) relationship-promotive behavior and senti-ment. In Study 3, a longitudinal daily diary study of marriedcouples, we investigated the short- and long-term dyadic conse-quences predicted by the trust-control model. We indexed self-regulatory resources through dispositional measures of self-controland working memory capacity and reflective trust through dailyvariation in perceptions of the partner’s caring and love. Wemeasured relationship promotion through short-term changes indaily behavior (e.g., providing support, not being critical, provid-ing a communal favor) and long-term changes in closeness andcommitment (because such sentiments are known to motivaterelationship-promotive behavior; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).

Figure 2 presents the conceptual model that guided our hypoth-esis tests. It stipulates that the effect of reflective trust on relation-ship promotion depends on the interactive influence of impulsivetrust and self-regulatory capacity. Namely, we expected acutedrops in reflective trust to elicit different security-restoration strat-egies when people lacked the self-regulatory resources needed todiscount the impulsive trust signal than when people instead pos-sessed the self-regulatory resources needed to discount the impul-sive trust signal.

For people who were more impulsively distrusting, we expectedacute uncertainty about the partner’s caring to decrease relation-ship promotion when self-regulatory capacity was limited and toincrease relationship promotion when such resources were abun-dant. However, for people who were more impulsively trusting, weexpected acute uncertainty about the partner’s caring to promoterelationship promotion when self-regulatory capacity was limitedand to decrease relationship promotion when such resources wereabundant. Put another way, we expected drops in reflective trust toincrease relationship-promotive behavior and sentiments whenpeople could not override impulsively trusting sentiments and

Own Reflective

TrustBeliefs

Own/Partner Relationship-

Promotive Behavior

Own Self-Regulatory

Resources

Own Impulsive Trust

Associations

Figure 2. Conceptual model of the hypotheses.


when they had the capacity to override impulsively distrustingsentiments. In contrast, we expected drops in reflective trust todecrease relationship promotion when people could not overrideimpulsively distrusting sentiments and when they could overrideimpulsively trusting ones.2

Study 1

Study 1 tested the hypothesis that increasing the self-regulatoryresources available for self-control allows people to override theautomatic impulse to trust (or distrust) their partner when they areuncertain of their partner’s caring. We increased the self-regulatory resources available for self-control by administeringglucose (DeWall et al., 2011; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Masi-campo & Baumeister, 2008).3 We threatened reflective trust byleading experimental participants to believe that their partner wascompiling a long list of the participant’s most serious faults—amanipulation that has proven to undermine trust in the partner’scaring and love (Murray et al., 2002, Experiment 3). We measuredautomatic inclinations to relationship-promote by examining howquickly participants identified positive and negative traits in theirpartner. We utilized this measure of partner valuing becausequickly ascribing virtues, but not faults, provides a means ofdrawing closer to the partner, whereas quickly ascribing faults, butnot virtues, pushes the partner away (Murray, Holmes, & Collins,2006).

When impulsively distrusting participants had not consumedglucose and thus had relatively more limited self-regulatory re-sources available, we expected those in the uncertain reflectivetrust condition to value their partner less than controls. But whenimpulsively distrusting participants had consumed glucose andthus had greater capacity to override this warning signal, weexpected participants in the uncertain reflective trust condition toovercompensate for the automatic impulse to distrust and actuallyvalue their faultfinding partner more. In contrast, for impulsivelytrusting participants who had not consumed glucose and thus hadrelatively more limited self-regulatory capacity available, we ex-pected participants in the uncertain reflective trust condition tovalue their partner more than controls. But when impulsivelytrusting participants had consumed glucose and thus had greatercapacity to override this safety signal, we expected participants inthe uncertain reflective trust condition to overcompensate for theautomatic impulse to trust and value their faultfinding partnerless.4

Method

Participants. Thirty-six couples involved in exclusive rela-tionships participated. One couple was dropped for eating within 3hr of the experiment, contrary to instructions, and four coupleswere dropped because of computer failures to record responses,leaving 31 couples. Participants averaged 18.8 years in age (SD �0.84); relationships averaged 19.1 months (SD � 14.6).

Procedure. Participants believed they would be participatingin two separate studies on consumer preferences and interpersonalrelationships. Participants first completed demographic questions,a partner-specific version of the IAT, and the practice trials for thepartner categorization measure. Participants in the supplementedresources condition then consumed a 2-ounce Berry Blast liquid

glucose shot (Miller, Pattison, DeWall, Rayburn-Reeves, &Zentall, 2010). Participants in the control resources conditionconsumed a 2-ounce shot of Mi0 drink flavor (sweet tea flavor,zero calories, no sugar). All participants then spent approximately8 min completing a consumer preferences survey to afford time forthe glucose to be metabolized.

Next, target participants in the uncertain reflective trust condi-tion were led to believe that their partner was spending an inordi-nate amount of time listing qualities in the target that the partnerdisliked, a procedure that leaves the target participant concernedabout the partner’s caring and commitment (Murray et al., 2002,Experiment 3). To achieve this end, the target participant receiveda one-page questionnaire that asked him or her to list importantaspects of the partner’s character that he or she disliked. Theinstructions also stated that participants should not list more thanone such quality if that was all that easily came to mind. Althoughthe targets believed that their partner received an identical ques-tionnaire, the partners actually received a one-page questionnairethat asked them to list as many of the items in their dormitoryroom, bedroom, or apartment as they could generate (and a min-

2 The predicted contrast effects for people high in self-regulatory capac-ity represent the strong form of the override hypothesis (i.e., uncertainreflective trust increases relationship promotion for impulsively distrustingpeople and decreases relationship promotion for impulsively trusting peo-ple who are high on self-regulatory capacity). A weaker form of theoverride hypothesis would also support the trust-control model. Consideran impulsively distrusting Gayle who is high in self-regulatory capacity. Aswe reasoned, overriding the automatic impulse to distrust the partnernecessitates accentuating compensatory reasons to trust the partner. Ratherthan turning uncertainty into a reason to approach the partner more, suchcompensation might simply curb the inclination to distance. Now consideran impulsively trusting Ron who is high in self-regulatory capacity. As wereasoned, overriding the automatic inclination to trust the partner necessi-tates accentuating competing reasons to distrust the partner. Rather thanturning uncertainty into a reason to distance, such refutation might simplycancel out the impetus to connect to the partner. If such effects were tooccur, the predicted three-way interaction would have a different pattern.Specifically, for an impulsively distrusting Gayle who is low in self-regulatory capacity, uncertainty about the partner’s caring should decreaserelationship promotion. However, for an impulsively distrusting Gayle whois high in self-regulatory capacity, uncertainty might simply lose thiscapacity (i.e., a null rather than contrast effect for uncertain reflectivetrust). In contrast, for an impulsively trusting Ron who is low in self-regulatory capacity, uncertainty should increase relationship promotion.However, for an impulsively trusting Ron who is high in self-regulatorycapacity, uncertainty might lose this capacity (i.e., a null rather thancontrast effect of uncertain reflective trust). We predicted contrast effectsfor people high in self-regulatory capacity (i.e., the strong form of theoverride hypothesis) because heightening the import of preferred goals canaid in the suppression of nonpreferred goals (Cavallo & Fitzsimons, 2012).

3 Recent work has questioned whether the consumption of glucoseactually increases the capacity for self-control (Masicampo & Baumeister,2008) or increases one’s motivation to expend available resources to exertself-control (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Kurzban, 2010; Molden et al., in press).Fortunately, this distinction is not central to our use of glucose becauseincreasing one’s capacity and/or one’s motivation to exert self-controlshould both have the same effects within the model.

4 We based our hypotheses in Studies 1 and 2 on the assumption thatparticipants in the no-glucose condition had less self-regulatory capacityavailable than participants in the glucose condition. However, we did notactively deplete self-regulatory capacity in the no-glucose conditions (be-yond any depletion that might come from having fasted). Thus, the no-glucose conditions presented a conservative test of the assimilation hy-potheses for people low in self-regulatory resources. We return to this issuein the General Discussion.


imum of 25 items). Through this subterfuge, target participantsspent a few minutes waiting while they believed their partnercontinued to list their many faults. (The experimenter stoppedpartners 5 min after the target participant finished if the partnerwas still writing.) For couples in the control condition, target andpartner participants both received the questionnaire that askedthem to list important aspects of their partner’s character that theydisliked. Target participants in the control condition typicallyfinished the task coincident with the partner (and had no reason tothink that the partner perceived a troubling number of faults).

All participants then completed 240 target trials for the partnercategorization task. Finally, participants completed a manipulationcheck (i.e., “How many negative aspects of your character do youthink your partner listed?”, “Did your partner list more negativethings about your character than you expected?”), were probed forsuspicion, and were debriefed.

Measures.Impulsive trust. The IAT measure contained seven blocks

(Murray et al., 2011). Participants categorized words belonging tofour categories: (a) pleasant words (e.g., vacation, pleasure), (b)unpleasant words (e.g., bomb, poison), (c) words associated withthe partner (e.g., partner’s first name, partner’s last name, partner’snickname or term of affection, descriptive term such as boyfriendor girlfriend, and partner’s date of birth), and (d) words notassociated with the partner (e.g., first name not associated withpartner, last name not associated with partner, date of birth notassociated with partner, state not associated with partner, countrynot associated with partner).5 The words in Categories c and dwere generated idiographically. The computer prompted partici-pants to answer a series of questions that created words that wereuniquely descriptive of their partner (Category c) or to choosefrom a list of names, dates, states, and countries that were notassociated with their partner (Category d; Scinta & Gable, 2007;Zayas & Shoda, 2005). The critical blocks in this version of thepartner IAT consisted of the compatible pairing blocks (practiceand test blocks), in which participants used the same response keyto respond to pleasant words and partner words, and the incom-patible pairing blocks (practice and test blocks), in which partici-pants used the same response key to respond to unpleasant wordsand partner words. We computed IAT scores for each participantfollowing the improved scoring algorithm procedure recom-mended by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). We deletedtrials with latencies above 10,000 ms; participants who had laten-cies below 300 ms on more than 10% of the trials were removed.For the practice and test blocks separately, we subtracted theaverage response latency during the compatible block from theaverage response latency during the incompatible block, dividedby the pooled standard deviation from these critical blocks. TheIAT scores are computed as the average of these two quotients(Greenwald et al., 2003). Higher scores reflect more positiveevaluative associations.

Implicit partner valuing. This measure (adapted from Dodg-son & Wood, 1998, and Murray et al., 2009) tapped how quicklyparticipants identified positive and negative traits in their partner.Participants were told that single words would appear on thescreen and that they had to indicate yes/no whether each word,either a person descriptor such as warm or an object descriptorsuch as car, could ever possibly be used to describe their partner.For the practice trials, they responded to 15 person and 15 object

descriptors. If participants responded incorrectly on the practicetrials (e.g., responding “no” to warm or “yes” to car), they receivedan error message.6 For the target trials, participants responded to120 person and 120 object descriptors. The focal words were 35positive traits (e.g., understanding, passionate, knowledgeable, for-giving, compassionate, competent, smart, skilled) and 30 negativetraits (e.g., thoughtless, judgmental, unkind, complaining, lazy,clumsy). The target trials also included 12 acceptance (e.g., ac-cepted, loved) and 15 rejection words (e.g., blamed, unloved)among fillers. The words were presented in a random order.Reaction times were recorded in milliseconds.

Results

We analyzed the data for the target participants because wethreatened reflective trust only for these participants. To create theimplicit partner-valuing measure, we first subjected reaction timesto each word to a logarithmic transformation (Fazio, 1990). Foreach trait, we then averaged response times for correct responsesmade within 3,000 ms (Murray et al., 2009). Next, we created anindex of partner valuing by averaging standardized reaction timesto positive and negative traits (reversed), such that shorter latenciescaptured greater partner valuing (i.e., quicker to identify positivetraits and slower to identify negative traits). We then conducted ahierarchical regression, predicting this index from the main effectsof impulsive trust (i.e., IAT, centered), self-regulatory capacity(1 � glucose, �1 � no glucose), and reflective trust condition(1 � uncertain, �1 � control), entered on the first step; thetwo-way interactions, entered on the second step; and the three-way interaction, entered on the third step.7

Implicit partner valuing. Table 1 reveals the expected three-way Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity � ReflectiveTrust interaction. Figure 3 presents the predicted scores (in zscores) in the experimental conditions for participants one standarddeviation below and above the mean on impulsive trust. Next weexamined the two-way Self-Regulatory Capacity � ReflectiveTrust Condition interactions for participants low and high onimpulsive trust. This revealed the expected opposite Self-Regulatory Capacity � Reflective Trust interactions for partici-pants low, � � �.47, t(23) � �2.10, p � .05, and high, � � .79,t(23) � 3.10, p � .01, on impulsive trust.

We then examined the simple effects of reflective trust condi-tion. As expected, when impulsively distrusting participants hadnot consumed glucose, they devalued a faultfinding partner; theywere slower to identify valued traits in their partner when theirpartner seemed to provide a long (vs. short) list of their faults, � �.99, t(23) � 3.14, p � .01. But when they had consumed glucose,impulsively distrusting participants overrode this response; they

5 We utilized pleasant versus unpleasant words as the contrast categorybecause impulsive trust involves overall evaluative associations to thepartner. However, we would expect to find parallel results with anycontrast category that provoked normatively strong evaluative associations(e.g., positive vs. negative affect words).

6 As the task required “yes” responses to all person descriptors (as thesewords could all be used to describe the partner in some circumstance),reaction times to positive and negative words were not confounded with“yes” versus “no” responses (Dodgson & Wood, 1998).

7 We did not find any consistent, significant moderating effects ofgender in Study 1 or 2, and thus, we collapse across gender in reporting theresults.


were just as quick to value in the uncertain reflective trust as thecontrol condition, � � .03, t(23) � 1. In contrast, when impul-sively trusting participants had not consumed glucose, they valueda critical partner; they were quicker to identify valued traits in theirpartner when they believed their partner had provided a long (vs.short) list of their faults, � � �.81, t(23) � �2.97, p � .01. Butwhen they had consumed glucose, impulsively trusting participantsactually devalued a critical partner; they tended to be slower toidentify valued traits in their partner when they believed theirpartner had provided a long list of their faults, � � .79, t(23) �1.82, p � .08.

Manipulation check. We averaged time spent waiting for thepartner and the manipulation check items (all transformed to zscores). Participants in the uncertain reflective trust conditionbelieved their partner listed more worrisome faults (M � .14) thancontrol participants (M � �.67).

Discussion

Study 1 provided encouraging support for our hypotheses de-spite the limited power afforded by the small sample. For impul-sively distrusting people who were more susceptible to this warn-

Table 1Summarizing the Regression Analyses in Study 1

Predictor

Rx traitsa Manipulation checka

� t � t

Reflective trust (1 � uncertain, �1 � control) .12 �1 .68 5.16��

Glucose (1 � yes, �1 � no) �.17 �1 �.22 �1.66�

Impulsive trust �.37 �2.05�� .33 2.48��

Impulsive Trust � Glucose �.13 �1 �.23 �1.39Impulsive Trust � Reflective Trust �.45 �2.22�� .05 �1Reflective Trust � Glucose .09 �1 �.11 �1Reflective Trust � Glucose � Impulsive Trust .60 3.44�� .21 �1.32

a Degrees of freedom: first (27), second (24), third (23).� p � .10. �� p � .05. �� p � .01.

-0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4Uncertain Reflective Trust

Control

Low Impulsive Trust

No Glucose Glucose

High Impulsive Trust

Glucose No Glucose -0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4 Uncertain Reflective Trust

Control

Figure 3. Implicit partner valuing as a function of impulsive trust, reflective trust, and glucose consumption.


ing signal because they had not consumed glucose, having reasonto question their partner’s caring automatically decreased partnervaluing. But supplementing self-regulatory capacity with glucoseallowed impulsively distrusting participants to override this self-protective response. However, they did not actually value theirpartner more, as we expected. In contrast, for impulsively trustingpeople who had not consumed glucose, having reason to questiontheir partner’s caring automatically increased partner valuing. Butwhen impulsively trusting people had their self-regulatory re-sources supplemented by glucose, they overcompensated for thissafety signal and valued their partner less when they had reason toquestion their caring.

Study 2

Study 1 suggested that increasing self-regulatory capacity al-lows people with reason to question their partner’s caring todiscount the safety signal supplied by impulsive trust. Study 2afforded a conceptual replication of this dynamic with explicitmeasures of relationship promotion. We again increased self-regulatory capacity by administering glucose. We threatened re-flective trust by leading participants to imagine depending on theirpartner in situations that posed greater or lesser likelihood of theirpartner disappointing them. We then measured relationship pro-motion through feelings of closeness, the ascription of valued traitsto the partner, and the willingness to depend on the partner. Forimpulsively distrusting participants, we expected uncertainty aboutthe partner’s caring to decrease relationship promotion when par-ticipants had not consumed glucose and to increase relationshippromotion when they had consumed glucose. However, for impul-sively trusting participants, we expected uncertainty about thepartner’s caring to increase relationship promotion when partici-pants had not consumed glucose and decrease relationship promo-tion when they had consumed glucose.

Method

Participants. One hundred twenty people currently involvedin exclusive relationships participated. Participants were instructedto fast for 3 hr prior to the experiment. Five participants weredropped for not following study instructions, leaving 115. Partic-ipants averaged 19.5 years in age (SD � 2.8); relationships aver-aged 16.7 months (SD � 17.1).

Procedure. Participants believed they would be participatingin two separate studies on consumer preferences and interpersonalrelationships. Participants first completed demographic questionsand the partner-specific version of the IAT utilized in Study 1.Participants in the supplemented resources condition then con-sumed a 2-ounce Berry Blast liquid glucose shot (Miller et al.,2010). Participants in the control resources condition consumed a2-ounce shot of Mi0 drink flavor. All participants then spentapproximately 8 min completing a consumer preferences survey toafford sufficient time for the glucose to be metabolized.

Next, all participants imagined themselves in five scenarios inwhich they might be hurt by expressing trust in their partner. Forinstance, participants imagined that their partner lied to them andthen had to rate how willing they would be to forgive their partner,an expression of trust. In the uncertain reflective trust condition,the supplementary details emphasized the chance of being hurt

by the partner (e.g., the partner lied about something important). Inthe control condition, the supplementary details minimized thechance of being hurt (e.g., minor lie). Participants then completedthe dependent measures among fillers, were debriefed, and werethanked.

Dependent measures.Closeness. This four-item scale (� � .91) tapped feelings of

closeness to the partner (e.g., “I am closer to my partner than anyother person in my life,” “I feel extremely attached to my partner,”“I would choose to spend time with my partner over anyone elsein my life”). Participants responded to these items on 9-pointscales (1 � not at all true, 9 � completely true).

Perceptions of partner. This 20-item scale (� � .90), adaptedfrom Murray, Holmes, and Griffin (1996), asked participants todescribe their partner’s interpersonal virtues (e.g., kind and affec-tionate, warm, patient) and faults (e.g., controlling and dominant,thoughtless) on 9-point scales (0 � not at all, 9 � completelycharacteristic); negative traits were reverse scored.

Risking interdependence. This 20-item scale (� � .90),adapted from Murray et al. (2008), tapped the willingness todepend on the partner (e.g., “distract me from worries when I’munder stress,” “help me manage problems I might have at work orschool,” “decide how much time we spend together”). Participantsindicated their willingness to depend on their partner in these waysusing 7-point scales (1 � not at all willing, 7 � very willing).

Manipulation check. Participants rated their willingness totrust and approach their partner in each of the five hypothetical riskscenarios an acute index of reflective trust.

Results

We created a composite index of relationship promotion (� �.71) by averaging responses to the closeness, partner perceptions,and risking dependence scales (each transformed to a z score). Onthe first step of the regression, we entered the main effects ofimpulsive trust (i.e., IAT, centered), self-regulatory capacity (1 �glucose, �1 � no glucose), and reflective trust condition (1 �uncertain, �1 � control). We then entered the two-way interac-tions and three-way interaction on subsequent steps. We discussonly the highest order effects in Table 2.

Relationship promotion. The regression predicting the com-posite revealed the expected, significant three-way ImpulsiveTrust � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Reflective Trust interaction.Figure 4 presents the predicted scores. The two-way Self-Regulatory Capacity � Reflective Trust interaction was significantfor participants low on impulsive trust, � � .31, t(106) � 2.33,p � .05, and opposite, but not significant, for those high onimpulsive trust, � � �.09, t(106) � 1.

When more impulsively distrusting participants had not con-sumed glucose and thus had more limited self-regulatory resourcesavailable, imagining situations where they stood a good chance ofbeing hurt decreased relationship promotion; they tended to valuetheir relationships less in the uncertain reflective trust than thecontrol condition, � � �.32, t(106) � �1.66, p � .10. But whenthey had consumed glucose and thus had greater self-regulatorycapacity available, impulsively distrusting participants tended tovalue their relationships more in the uncertain reflective trust thanthe control condition, � � .31, t(106) � 1.64, p � .10. Althoughin the expected direction for impulsively trusting participants, the


simple effects of reflective trust were not significant in the no-glucose, � � .04, t(106) � 1, and glucose, � � �.14, t(106) � 1,conditions.

Manipulation check. Participants reported less willingness totrust their partner in the high- (M � 3.6) than low-risk (M � 4.2)versions of the relationship situations used to threaten reflective trust.

Discussion

For impulsively distrusting people who had not consumed glu-cose and thus were relatively susceptible to this warning signal,

uncertainty about the partner’s caring decreased relationship pro-motion. These participants tended to value their relationships lessafter imagining scenarios in which they stood a reasonable chanceof being hurt by their partner. But when these impulsively dis-trusting participants had their self-regulatory capacity supple-mented by glucose, uncertainty about the partner’s caring tended toincrease closeness. Unexpectedly, we did not find any significanteffects of reflective trust for impulsively trusting people regardlessof glucose consumption, although the effects were in the predicteddirection.

Table 2Summarizing the Regression Analyses in Study 2

Predictor

Closeness compositea Manipulation checkb

� t � t

Reflective trust (1 � uncertain, �1 � control) �.02 �1 �.30 �3.38��

Glucose (1 � yes, �1 � no) .06 �1 .04 �1Impulsive trust .10 1.03 �.09 �1.05Impulsive Trust � Glucose .05 �1 .01 �1Impulsive Trust � Reflective Trust �.02 �1 .08 �1Reflective Trust � Glucose .11 1.16 .03 �1Reflective Trust � Glucose � Impulsive Trust �.20 �2.11�� .02 �1

a Degrees of freedom: first (110), second (107), third (106). b Degrees of freedom: first (111), second (108),third (107).�� p � .05. �� p � .01.

-0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3


Control

Low Impulsive Trust

No Glucose Glucose

High Impulsive Trust

Glucose No Glucose -0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4 Uncertain Reflective Trust

Control

Figure 4. Closeness as a function of impulsive trust, reflective trust, and glucose consumption.


Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 both suggested that increased self-regulatorycapacity allows people to discount the warning signal supplied byimpulsive distrust. But impulsively trusting people who had theirself-regulatory capacity supplemented by glucose only overrodethis safety signal in Study 1. By turning to real-life interactions, wehoped to resolve this discrepancy and provide a more complete testof the trust-control model.

In Study 3, both members of married or cohabiting couplescompleted Time 1 measures of impulsive trust (i.e., the partnerIAT), self-regulatory capacity (i.e., dispositional self-control,working memory capacity), and relationship-promotive sentiments(i.e., closeness, commitment). Each participant then completed anonline survey each day for 14 days. These diaries provided dailyindices of reflective trust (i.e., perceptions of a partner’s caring andlove) and relationship-promotive behavior (e.g., providing support,doing communal favors, not being selfish). At the end of the diaryperiod, couples returned to the lab to complete Time 2 measures ofimpulsive trust and closeness. One year later, each member of thecouple completed Time 3 online measures of commitment to indexchange in this relationship-promotive sentiment.

The design of Study 3 afforded multiple advantages. First,assessing reflective trust and relationship-promotive behavior on adaily basis provided a real-life analogue to the dynamics observedin the glucose experiments. Namely, does greater self-regulatorycapacity allow people to override the automatic impulse to trust (ordistrust) when they feel unusually uncertain of their partner’scaring? When impulsively distrusting people were short on self-regulatory capacity and likely to heed the warning signal suppliedby impulsive trust, we expected daily increases in uncertaintyabout the partner’s caring to decrease relationship-promotive be-havior. But when impulsively distrusting people were high onself-regulatory capacity and able to override this warning signal,we expected daily uncertainty about the partner’s caring to in-crease relationship promotion. In contrast, when impulsively trust-ing people were short on self-regulatory capacity and likely toheed the safety signal supplied by impulsive trust, we expecteddaily increases in uncertainty about the partner’s caring to increaserelationship-promotive behavior. But when impulsively trustingpeople were high on self-regulatory capacity and likely to overridethis safety signal, we expected increases in uncertainty to decreaserelationship promotion.

Second, obtaining daily reports from each member of the coupleallowed us to examine the dyadic processes specified in the trust-control model. Namely, does Gayle respond differently to Ron’sacute doubts about her caring when Ron is more or less likely todiscount his automatic trust signal? Feeling safe in a partner’shands can invite positive self-fulfilling prophecies to occur be-cause Ron’s willingness to trust and connect to Gayle gives her theopportunity to be responsive and act in the relationship’s welfare.Conversely, expecting Gayle to be uncaring heightens Ron’s hes-itations around her, which can then provoke her later disaffection(Downey et al., 1998; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Murray et al.,2003). Therefore, we also expected people’s relationship-promotive behavior and sentiments to mirror partners’ tendenciesto heed (vs. override) their automatic impulse to trust (or distrust)in the face of uncertainty. For instance, we expected actors torespond to partners’ drops in reflective trust by distancing when

partners were high on impulsive trust but possessed sufficientself-regulatory capacity to cross-examine and then invalidate theirautomatic impulse to trust. That is, when feeling uncertain, animpulsively trusting, high-resource partner should show nonverbalor verbal signs of discomfort and hesitation that the otherperson (i.e., the actor) ultimately confirms through his or herown behavior.

Third, the longitudinal assessments allowed us to forecastchanges in closeness and commitment. Such sentiments supply themotivation to protect the relationship’s welfare (Agnew, VanLange, Rusbult, & Langston, 1998; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003;Rusbult et al., 1991). Therefore, predicting long-term changes incloseness and commitment from impulsive trust, self-regulatorycapacity, and daily reflective trust afforded a conceptual replica-tion of the glucose and diary studies. For impulsively distrustingpeople, we expected greater uncertainty to predict declines incloseness and commitment for those low on self-regulatory capac-ity, but not for those high in self-regulatory capacity. In contrast,for impulsively trusting people, we expected greater uncertainty topredict declines in closeness and commitment for those high onself-regulatory capacity, but not for those low on self-regulatorycapacity.

Finally, Study 3 also allowed us to explore why people who arehigh on self-regulatory capacity override the impulsive trust signal.Self-regulatory capacity gives people license to cross-examinetheir immediate associations to partners and situations (Gawronski& Bodenhausen, 2006). The capacity to do such a fact-check mayoften invalidate one’s automatic inclinations in ways that supplythe motivation to correct and override the automatic trust signal.

First, most people have a mixed store of relationship memories(Zayas & Shoda, 2012). Therefore, when people high on self-regulatory capacity cross-examine automatic evaluative associa-tions to their partner, conflicting beliefs and memories are likely tobe especially salient (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). For in-stance, in the midst of a conflict, Gayle might check her automaticimpulse to distrust to Ron against her positive beliefs and memo-ries. In contrast, Sally might check her automatic impulse to trustHarry against her negative beliefs and memories. If such biasedmemories surface, the partner’s current behavior should contrastwith these salient memories, making the behavior appear morebenevolent for the impulsively distrusting and more worrisome forthe impulsively trusting. Consequently, impulsively distrustingpeople who are high in self-regulatory capacity should be lessvulnerable to doubts about their partner’s caring when their partnerbehaves badly (because fact-checking makes positive beliefs andmemories salient). However, impulsively trusting people who arehigh on self-regulatory capacity should be more likely to questiontheir partner’s caring when their partner behaves badly (becausefact-checking makes negative beliefs and memories salient). Wetested this differential sensitivity hypothesis through the dailyassociation between Ron’s self-reported behavior toward Gayleand her perception of his caring. Together, these measures af-forded an index of people’s reflectively trusting construal of on-going events, one that we could predict from their combined levelsof impulsive trust and self-regulatory capacity.

Second, in situations that provoke uncertainty, people high onself-regulatory capacity might also check their automatic evalua-tive response to the situation itself against other beliefs and mem-ories. For instance, when high self-esteem people have sufficient


self-control resources available, they reconstrue reasons to distrusttheir partner as benign (Cavallo et al., 2012). Therefore, for peoplehigh in self-regulatory capacity, overriding the specific impulse totrust (or distrust) their partner might be a symptom of a generaltendency to question and then invalidate initial associations tosituations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). If highs readilyinvalidate automatic associations to situations as they occur (e.g.,“My partner didn’t really mean to hurt me”), such reconstrualshould change the very basis of the accumulated experiences thatcondition impulsive trust.

For people high on self-regulatory capacity, the capacity toreconstrue the behavioral evidence base should disrupt or slow theevaluative conditioning process. Consequently, for highs, cumula-tive objective changes in the evaluative tone of their partner’sbehavior should be slower to condition congruent changes in theirautomatic associations to their partner. However, people low onself-regulatory capacity are not similarly equipped to rewrite his-tory as it happens (Cavallo et al., 2012). Consequently, for lows,cumulative changes in the objective valence of their partner’sbehavior should be faster to condition congruent changes in im-pulsive trust over time. Obtaining measures of partners’ behaviorduring the diary period and pre- and postdiary measures of impul-sive trust allowed us to test this differential conditioning hypoth-esis. Both of the proposed mechanisms for the override effect areconsistent with the APE model but, to our knowledge, have not yetbeen articulated or tested (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006,2011).

Method

Sample. One hundred fifty-four couples in marital or cohab-iting relationships participated. Twelve couples were dropped be-cause they failed to complete the study or completed fewer than 7days of diaries, leaving 142 couples (136 married, four engaged,two cohabiting). Their mean age was 36.3 years, their averagerelationship duration was 6.9 years, and the majority (64%) hadchildren. Each couple received $150 in payment. Participantscompleted daily diaries within the allowable time for 87% of thediary entries (i.e., between 5:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.). Only diariescompleted within the allowable daily time frame were included inthe analyses.

Procedure. To recruit the sample, we placed advertisementsin the classified sections of local newspapers. Interested couplescontacted the laboratory and were screened for eligibility (i.e., 18years of age, married 15 years or less or cohabiting at least 2 butno more than 15 years, and living in the same residence, i.e., notcommuting). At Time 1, each member of the couple separatelycompleted background measures in the laboratory, including theIAT measure of impulsive trust described in Study 1, acomputation-span task assessing working memory capacity, a dis-positional measure of self-control, and measures of closeness andcommitment (among others). The research assistant then intro-duced the procedures for completing the diary. Participants learnedthat they would receive a personalized web-link to the diary eachday by e-mail, that they should complete the day’s diary as closeto going to bed as possible, that their responses were confidential,and that they should not discuss their diaries with one another. Atthe end of the diary period (Time 2), couples returned to thelaboratory and completed the IAT measure of impulsive trust and

the measures of closeness (among others). One year later (Time 3),each member of the retained couples was e-mailed a link to asurvey containing the measure of commitment (among others). Atleast one member of 107 couples and both members of 98 couplescompleted the yearly follow-up at Time 3.

Background measures.Self-control. This 13-item scale (� � .85), developed by

Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004), tapped the capacity toexert self-control and resist temptation (e.g., “I am good at resist-ing temptation,” “I do certain things that are bad for me, if they arefun” (reversed), “I am able to work effectively toward long-termgoals”; 1 � not at all, 5 � very much).

Working memory capacity. A computation-span task used byHofmann et al. (2008, p. 966) assessed working memory capacity.A set of equations (ranging from four to eight equations andinvolving a mixture of addition and subtraction; e.g., 3 � 5 � 8,11 � 7 � 5) was presented sequentially on the computer screen for3 s, followed by a 1-s interstimulus interval. Participants had toremember the result of each equation and enter the presentedsequence of results (e.g., 8, 5) at the end of the set. While engagedin this task, they also had to judge each equation as true or falsewithin the 3-s window of stimulus presentation by pressing theappropriate key. Thus, participants had to memorize the sequenceof results while being engaged in a distracting secondary task.They completed two practice and 10 test trials. The index was thesum of correctly entered sequences weighted by the number ofequations in each set.

Inclusion of other in the self. Participants selected which ofseven progressively overlapping circles best characterized theirrelationship with their partner (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992).

Closeness. This four-item scale (� � .91) tapped feelings ofcloseness to the partner (e.g., “I am closer to my partner than anyother person in my life”; 1 � not at all, 9 � completely true).

Commitment. This three-item scale (� � .89), shortened fromRusbult et al. (1991), tapped intentions to sustain the relationship(i.e., “I want my relationship to last a very long time,” “I amcommitted to maintaining my relationship with my partner,” “Iwould feel very upset if our relationship were to end in the nearfuture”; 1 � do not agree at all, 9 � agree completely).

Daily diary. The daily diary asked participants to indicatewhich of 82 events had happened each day (yes/no) and to ratehow well 42 items characterized their feelings each day on a7-point scale (1 � not at all, 7 � especially). The event categoriesincluded successes/failures at work, interactions with the spouse,and managing household/family responsibilities. The feelings cat-egories included self-evaluations, perceptions of the partner’s car-ing, perceptions of the partner, and evaluations of the relationship.The presentation of the events and feelings items was randomizedeach day to minimize habitual responding. We describe onlyutilized items.

Felt acceptance. This three-item scale (� � .86) provided thedaily index of reflective trust as it indexed daily variations in trustin the partner’s caring and love (i.e., “My partner . . . loves me,”“. . . accepts me just as I am,” “. . . sees the best in me”).

Own rejecting behavior. This nine-item index tapped howoften participants identified themselves as engaging in rejectingbehavior toward the partner (e.g., “I snapped or yelled at mypartner,” “I criticized or insulted my partner,” “I ignored or did notpay attention to my partner”). For all behaviors, we assigned a 1 to


occurred events and a 0 to nonoccurred events and then summedthese scores to provide a continuous index of the behavior inquestion on each day.8

Own selfish behavior. This four-item index tapped how oftenparticipants ignored their partner’s needs (e.g., “I did what Iwanted to do instead of what my partner wanted me to do,” “I didnot do something I told my partner I would do,” “I got in mypartner’s way”).

Own comforting behavior. This seven-item index tapped howoften participants supported their partner (e.g., “I helped my part-ner solve a problem,” “I listened to and comforted my partner,” “Icomplimented or praised my partner,” “I made my partner laugh”).

Own communal behavior. This 10-item index, adapted fromClark and Grote’s (1998) index, tapped how often participantssacrificed for their partner (e.g., “I did something I did not want todo because my partner wanted me to do it,” “I searched forsomething my partner had lost,” “I went out of my way to run anerrand for my partner,” “I repaired something my partner haddamaged or broken,” “I packed a snack/lunch for my partner totake to work or school”).

Partner’s rejecting behavior. This 10-item index tapped howoften participants identified their partner as engaging in rejectingbehavior (e.g., “My partner snapped or yelled at me,” “My partnercriticized or insulted me,” “My partner ignored or did not payattention to me”).

Felt closeness. This item indexed summary feelings of close-ness to the partner (i.e., “How close did you feel from your partnertoday?”).

Results

In proceeding, we first describe the self-regulatory capacitycomposite. We then test our hypotheses about daily variation inrelationship-promotive behavior and long-term changes in close-ness and commitment. Finally, we proceed to the analyses thathelp explain why people high on self-regulatory capacity mightoverride their automatic impulses to trust or distrust.

Creating an index of self-regulatory capacity. Self-regulationtheorists argue that exercising self-control draws on an assemblageof potentially independent cognitive and motivational processes(Friese et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2008; Hofmann, Schmeichel,Friese, & Baddeley, 2011; Pronk et al., 2011; Schmeichel, Vohs, &Duke, 2011). This definition makes the assumptions underlyingformative, rather than reflective, measurement models appropriateto indexing self-regulatory capacity (Bollen & Lennox, 1991;Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 2008; Diamantopoulos &Siguaw, 2006; Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Jarvis,MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003; MacCallum & Browne, 1993;Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). In reflective measurement models,the underlying construct (e.g., self-esteem) causes the indicators(e.g., responses to self-esteem items), and consequently, the indi-cators are strongly correlated. In formative measurement models,the indicators cause the construct, and consequently, correlationsamong the indicators are not expected (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw,2006).

Because increases in dispositional self-control and workingmemory capacity increase self-regulatory resources and not viceversa (e.g., Friese et al., 2009), we applied the logic of formativeindicators to index self-regulatory capacity. We averaged standard-

ized responses to the self-control and working memory capacitymeasures because each of these measures captured a distinct aspectof self-regulatory capacity. (Responses to these measures were notsignificantly correlated for either men or women.) Combiningdistinct aspects of self-regulatory capacity into one index bettercaptures the underlying construct than either measure would inisolation because the index allows distinct contributors to theunderlying construct to be substitutable (Diamantopoulos &Siguaw, 2006). For instance, on Monday and Tuesday, Ron mightdraw self-regulatory strength from his capacity for self-control,whereas on Wednesday and Thursday, he might draw resourcesfrom working memory capacity. By indexing self-regulatory ca-pacity through the overall index, we can capture this potentialsource of variability in determining the resources a person hasavailable in any given situation.9

Daily variation in relationship-promotive behavior. Obtainingdaily reports from both members of the couple allowed us toexamine the intra- and interpersonal dynamics specified in thetrust-control model (Paths E–F in Figure 1). Namely, we canexamine the effect of Gayle’s uncertainty on daily variation in herown relationship-promotive behavior as well as the effect of herpartner Ron’s uncertainty on daily variation in Gayle’srelationship-promotive behavior. In the parlance of dyadic dataanalysis, the intrapersonal effect of Gayle’s uncertainty on her ownbehavior corresponds to an actor effect. The interpersonal effect ofRon’s uncertainty on Gayle’s behavior corresponds to a partnereffect (Kenny, 1996).

Because we obtained reports from both members of the couple,we could also utilize two different perspectives to examine theeffect of Gayle’s uncertainty on her own relationship-promotivebehavior (i.e., the actor effect hypotheses). We utilized (a) part-ners’ outsider perspective on actors’ relationship-promotive be-havior and (b) actors’ insider reports on their own relationship-promotive behavior. In the first model we present, we use partnersas informants on actors. Examining partners’ perceptions of actors’rejecting behaviors allowed us to assess whether the predictedchanges in actors’ relationship-promotive behavior (the intraper-sonal effect specified by Path E in Figure 1) are strong enough tobe evident to the partner. These observer reports thus provide aconservative analogue to the experiments because Ron is now thejudge of changes in Gayle’s relationship-promotive behavior. Inthe second model we present, we use actors as informants onthemselves. Examining actors’ self-reports of their ownrelationship-promotive behavior allowed us to predict daily vari-ation in actors’ behavior as a function of their own daily reflective

8 On a given day, we had no expectation that participants who reportedengaging in one type of rejecting behavior would necessarily also engagein other such behaviors. For this reason, we do not report internal consis-tencies for the behavior categories (McNulty & Russell, 2010).

9 Hofmann, Friese, and Roefs (2009) echoed this reasoning, through theassertion that “in order for impulse control to be effective, it may besufficient if participants are high on either executive attention (assessedwith the operation span task we utilized), inhibitory control, or affectregulation. However, individuals high on all three factors may have aparticular advantage in situations under which a particular factor is im-peded by situational circumstances. For instance, high distraction in theface of temptation may be especially detrimental for executive attention tounfold its controlling influence while inhibitory control and affect regula-tion could still be marshaled in the serve of impulse control” (p. 434).


trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity (the intraper-sonal or actor effect specified by Path E in Figure 1). Also, actors’self-reports on their own relationship-promotive behavior allowedus to predict daily variation in actors’ behavior as a function ofpartners’ daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatorycapacity (the interpersonal or partner effect specified by Path F inFigure 1).

Partners’ perceptions of actors’ rejecting behavior. Usingthe multilevel modeling program MLwiN (Goldstein et al., 1998),we modeled our data as a three-level nested structure with day atthe lowest level, person at the second level, and gender withincouple at the highest level. This approach simultaneously estimatesone regression equation for women and one for men, controllingfor the dependence between dyad members. It also allows tests ofgender differences and pooling of coefficients in their absence.10

We predicted changes in partners’ perceptions of actors’ reject-ing behavior (e.g., “My partner snapped or yelled at me”) from (a)an average level term, B0, an intercept that varies across people;(b) partners’ perceptions of actors’ behavior on the prior day, B1,a fixed effect that captures stability in perceptions; (c) actors’reflective trust on the prior day, B2, a fixed effect that captures theassociation between actors’ felt acceptance yesterday and partners’perceptions of the actor today; (d) the main effects of actors’impulsive trust and self-regulatory capacity, B3 and B4, respec-tively; (e) the two-way interactions between actors’ impulsive trustand self-regulatory capacity, B5, actors’ reflective trust on the priorday and impulsive trust, B6, and actors’ reflective trust on the priorday and self-regulatory capacity, B7; (f) the predicted three-wayinteraction between actors’ reflective trust on the prior day, im-pulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity, B8; and (g) two errorterms, one that reflects the deviation of each partner’s averageperception of the actor from the overall average and one thatreflects each partner’s daily deviation from his or her mean on Y.11

In estimating all of the multilevel models, we centered the dailylevel predictors on each person’s mean for that variable. Signifi-cant effects for daily level variables (e.g., reflective trust) capturethe effects of being high versus low relative to one’s own mean.Feeling less accepted than usual (i.e., below one’s own mean)captures relative drops in reflective trust, an index that has anaturalistic parallel to the uncertainties activated through the ma-nipulations used in Study 1 and 2. We centered the between-personvariables (i.e., impulsive trust, self-regulatory capacity) on thesample means for women and men, respectively. Main effectsreflect the effect of being high versus low relative to the samplemean for one’s gender (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).

Table 3 contains the model estimates. As expected, the three-way interaction predicting partners’ perceptions of actors’ reject-ing behavior from actors’ reflective trust on the prior day, actors’impulsive trust, and actors’ self-regulatory capacity was significant(i.e., the intrapersonal or actor effect corresponding to Path E inFigure 1). Figure 5 presents the predicted scores. The two-wayActors’ Reflective Trust on the Prior Day � Actors’ Self-Regulatory Capacity interaction was significant for actors low onimpulsive trust (b � .196, SE � .063, z � 3.11, p � .01) andopposite, but not significant, for actors high on impulsive trust(b � �.046, SE � .064, z � �.72).

When impulsively distrusting actors were high on self-regulatory capacity, experiencing acute drops in reflective trustpredicted relative increases in their relationship-promotive behav-

ior.12 That is, partners perceived these actors as being less reject-ing on days after these actors felt less accepted than usual (i.e.,after a relative drop in reflective trust) as compared to days theyfelt more accepted (b � .199, SE � .068, z � 2.93, p � .01). Butwhen impulsively distrusting actors were generally low on self-regulatory capacity, feeling less certain of their partner’s caringand love tended to increase rejecting behavior, albeit not signifi-cantly (b � �.068, SE � .051, z � �1.33). In contrast, whenimpulsively trusting actors were low on self-regulatory capacity,acute drops in reflective trust predicted relative increases in theirrelationship-promotive behavior. That is, partners perceived suchimpulsively trusting actors as behaving in less rejecting ways ondays after actors felt less accepted as compared to high-acceptancedays (b � .132, SE � .057, z � 2.32, p � .05). The protectiveeffect of being impulsively trusting disappeared for actors high onself-regulatory capacity (b � .071, SE � .072, z � .99).

Actors’ reports on own relationship-promotive behavior.Next we turn to actors’ perspective on their own relationship-promotive behaviors. We created a composite index ofrelationship-promotive behavior by summing standardized re-sponses to the own comforting behavior, own communal behavior,felt closeness, own rejecting behavior (reversed), and own selfishbehavior (reversed) scales. We then predicted Gayle’s reports ofher own behavior from her own daily reflective trust, impulsivetrust, and self-regulatory capacity as well as from her partnerRon’s daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatorycapacity. Thus, actors’ reports on their own behavior allowed us totest both the actor (Path E, own relationship-promotive behavior)and the partner (Path F, partner relationship-promotive behavior)effects in the trust-control model (see Figure 1).

The logic of the multilevel model we analyzed followed thelogic we outlined for predicting perceptions of the partner’s re-jecting behavior. But this time, we simultaneously predictedchanges in actors’ daily relationship-promotive behavior from fourclasses of terms: those indexing day-to-day change in behavior;those indexing the hypothesized effects of actors’ own daily re-

10 This approach is essentially identical to the data structure used in theclassic studies by Barnett and colleagues (e.g., Barnett, Marshall, Rauden-bush, & Brennan, 1993; Barnett, Raudenbush, Brennan, Pleck, & Marshall,1995; Raudenbush, Brennan, & Barnett, 1995), except that it exchanges theuse of multiple dummy variables to indicate gender for the use of amultivariate command that controls how effects are estimated simultane-ously for men or women within a couple. We present separate coefficientsfor men and women when the deviance tests for separate coefficients aresignificant (�2 3.84, p � .05).

11 We specified the lagged effect of yesterday’s reflective trust as fixedrather than random because focused tests of cross-level interactions havegreater power to detect between-person variation in slopes than the devi-ance test of random slopes (LaHuis & Ferguson, 2009; Snijders & Bosker,1999). We did not include the partner effects in the estimation of this modelbecause they were not theoretically relevant. The partner effects index thecross-day association between partners’ daily reflective trust and percep-tions of actors’ rejecting behavior as a function of partners’ impulsive trustand self-regulatory capacity. These paths index Ron’s sensitivity to per-ceiving Gayle as rejecting on days after he felt more uncertainty, not howhe behaves in response to his or her uncertainty. Including these effects didnot change the reported effects.

12 The test of the simple effect for reflective trust is the test of the simpleslope relating felt acceptance on the prior day to the dependent measure.We depict the predicted scores in bar rather than line graphs to provide aconceptual parallel to the presentation of the results of the experiments.


flective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity on theirown relationship-promotive behavior (i.e., actor effects, Path E);those indexing the hypothesized effects of partners’ daily reflec-tive trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity on actors’relationship-promotive behavior (i.e., partner effects, Path F); andthose indexing error. The left-most column in Table 4 lists theterms we included in the estimate of this multilevel model.

Actor effects. The hypothesized three-way interaction be-tween actors’ daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity predicting changes in actors’ own relationship-promotive behavior was significant for women, but not for men(i.e., the intrapersonal or actor effect corresponding to Path E inFigure 1). Figure 6 presents the predicted scores for changes inwomen’s relationship-promotive behavior as a function of their

Table 3The Multilevel Model Predicting Partners’ Daily Perceptions of Actors’ Rejecting Behavior in Study 3

Partners’ perception of actors’ rejectingbehavior today

Predictor b (SE) z

Intercept .697 —Yesterday’s behavior .008 (.019) 0.42Actors’ reflective trust yesterday

Men �.002 (.042) �0.05Women .141 (.041) 3.44��

Actors’ self-regulatory capacity �.043 (.061) �0.70Actors’ impulsive trust �.009 (.076) �0.12Actors’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity .147 (.108) 1.36Actors’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Impulsive Trust .014 (.059) 0.24Actors’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Self-Regulatory Capacity .048 (.041) 1.17Actors’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust �.230 (.088) �2.61��

�� p � .05. �� p � .01.

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1Uncertain Reflective Trust

High Reflective Trust

Low Impulsive Trust Actors

Low Self-Regulatory

Capacity Actors

High Self-Regulatory

Capacity Actors

High Impulsive Trust Actors


Capacity Actors

Low Self-Regulatory

Capacity Actors

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Uncertain Reflective Trust


Figure 5. Partners’ perceptions of actors’ rejecting behaviors today as a function of actors’ reflective trust onthe prior day, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity.


reflective trust on the prior day, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity. The two-way Daily Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity interactions were opposite for women low inimpulsive trust (b � �.465, SE � .159, z � �2.92, p � .01) andhigh in impulsive trust (b � .226, SE � .171, z � 1.32).

When more impulsively distrusting women were generally lowon self-regulatory capacity and thus susceptible to this warningsignal, drops in reflective trust decreased relationship-promotivebehavior. That is, these women behaved less well after days theyfelt less accepted than usual than after days they felt more accepted(b � .442, SE � .153, z � 2.89, p � .01). But when impulsivelydistrusting women were high on self-regulatory capacity and thusable to override this warning signal, daily drops in reflective trustlost this inhibitory effect (b � �.121, SE � .153, z � �0.79). Incontrast, when impulsively trusting women were low on self-regulatory capacity, yesterday’s drops in reflective trust predictedtoday’s increased relationship-protective behavior (b � �.346,SE � .198, z ��1.75, p � .10). But when impulsively trustingwomen were high on self-regulatory capacity, feeling less acceptedyesterday lost its capacity to promote today’s relationship-promotive behavior (b � .011, SE � .170, z � 0.07).

Partner effects. The hypothesized three-way interaction be-tween partners’ daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity predicting changes in actors’ self-reportedrelationship-promotive behavior was significant across gender(i.e., the interpersonal or partner effect corresponding to Path F inFigure 1). Figure 7 presents the predicted scores for changes inactors’ behavior as a function of partners’ reflective trust on theprior day, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity. The two-way Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity interactionswere opposite and significant for partners low in impulsive trust(b � �.427, SE � .120, z � �3.56, p � .01) and high in impulsivetrust (b � .299, SE � .128, z � 2.34, p � .05).

When impulsively distrusting partners were low on self-regulatory capacity, partners’ daily drops in reflective trust pre-

dicted declines in actors’ relationship-promotive behaviors. Thatis, actors tended to behave less well on days after such impulsivelydistrusting partners felt less accepted than usual as compared todays when they felt more accepted (b � .233, SE � .096, z � 2.43,p � .05). But when more impulsively distrusting partners werehigh on self-regulatory capacity, relative drops in reflective trustpromoted actors’ relationship-promotive behaviors. That is, actorstended to behave better on days after these partners felt lessaccepted as compared to days they felt more accepted than usual(b � �.347, SE � .135, z � �2.57, p � .05). When impulsivelytrusting partners were high on self-regulatory resources, dailydrops in reflective trust predicted declines in actors’ relationship-promotive behaviors. That is, actors behaved less well on daysafter such impulsively trusting partners felt less accepted thanusual than on days after they felt more accepted (b � .245, SE �.140, z � 1.75, p � .10). But when impulsively trusting partnerswere low on self-regulatory capacity, daily drops in reflective trustpredicted actors’ increased relationship promotion, albeit not sig-nificantly (b � �.158, SE � .119, z � �1.33).

Two-week changes in closeness. We created a compositeindex of closeness by standardizing and averaging responses to theinclusion of other in self and closeness scales (� � .74). We usedstructural equation modeling (SEM) to predict 2-week changes incloseness. SEM accommodates the dyadic structure of data fromcouples, estimates actor and partner effects, and estimates pooledeffects across gender (Kenny, 1996). We separately predictedactors’ later closeness from actors’ initial closeness; actors’ aver-age daily reflective trust (i.e., felt acceptance) over the diaryperiod; actors’ impulsive trust; actors’ self-regulatory capacity; thetwo-way Actors’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity,Impulsive Trust � Daily Reflective Trust and Self-RegulatoryCapacity � Reflective Trust interactions; and the hypothesizedthree-way interaction. We also included the parallel partner vari-ables predicting changes in actors’ closeness. Table 5 lists thepredictors and corresponding path coefficients. Although not

Table 4The Multilevel Model Actors’ Daily Relationship-Promotive Behaviors in Study 3

Actors’ relationship-promotivebehavior today

Predictor b (SE) z

Intercept �.033 —Yesterday’s behavior .082 (.021) 3.91��

Actors’ reflective trust yesterday .020 (.064) 0.31Actors’ self-regulatory capacity .596 (.154) 3.87��

Actors’ impulsive trust .342 (.189) 1.81�

Actors’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity �.243 (.294) �0.83Actors’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Impulsive Trust �.121 (.129) �0.94Actors’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Self-Regulatory Capacity �.118 (.083) �1.42Actors’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust

Women .674 (.252) 2.67��

Men �.006 (.226) �0.03Partners’ reflective trust yesterday �.002 (.059) �0.03Partners’ self-regulatory capacity .336 (.156) 2.15��

Partners’ impulsive trust .294 (.185) 1.59Partners’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity �.172 (.293) �0.59Partners’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Impulsive Trust .098 (.119) 0.82Partners’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Self-Regulatory Capacity �.046 (.082) �0.56Partners’ Reflective Trust Yesterday � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust .682 (.173) 3.94��

� p � .10. �� p � .05. �� p � .01.


listed, the models included estimates for the intercepts, correla-tions among exogenous variables, and correlations between theresiduals.13

The expected three-way interaction between actors’ own dailyreflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity pre-dicting changes in actors’ closeness was significant for women, butnot men (i.e., the intrapersonal or actor effect corresponding toPath E in Figure 1). The three-way interaction between partners’daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacitypredicting changes in actors’ closeness was significant acrossgender (i.e., the interpersonal or partner effect corresponding toPath F in Figure 1).

Actor effects. Figure 8 presents the predicted scores forchanges in women’s closeness as a function of women’s dailyreflective trust, self-regulatory capacity, and impulsive trust. Thetwo-way Daily Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity in-teraction was significant for women low in impulsive trust (stan-dardized b � �.19, z � �2.55, p � .05), but not for women highin impulsive trust (standardized b � .03, z � 0.50). When impul-sively distrusting women were low on self-regulatory capacity,uncertain reflective trust predicted declines in closeness (standard-ized b � .31, z � 3.09, p � .01). But when impulsively distrustingwomen were high on self-regulatory capacity, uncertain reflective

trust lost this capacity to inhibit closeness (standardized b � �.05,z � �.46). The simple effects of reflective trust were not signif-icant for impulsively trusting women low (standardized b � .05,z � .53) or high on self-regulatory capacity (b � .14, z � 1.34).

Partner effects. The two-way Daily Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity interaction was opposite for partners low inimpulsive trust (standardized b � �.07, z � �1.31, p � .19) andhigh in impulsive trust (standardized b � .13, z � 2.42, p � .05).For impulsively distrusting partners, uncertain reflective trust pre-dicted declines in actors’ closeness for partners low on self-regulatory capacity (standardized b � .09, z � 1.22) and increasesin actors’ closeness for partners high on self-regulatory capacity(standardized b � �.04, z � �.44), although neither simple effectwas significant. For impulsively trusting partners, uncertain reflec-tive trust predicted declines in actors’ closeness for partners highon self-regulatory capacity (standardized b � .25, z � 2.86, p �

13 In the SEM model we analyzed, we also included these actor andpartner effects specified as predictors of Time 1 closeness (and commit-ment). We do not present the results predicting initial feelings becausepredicting change affords more causal precision.

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Low Impulsive Trust Women

Low Self-Regulatory

Capacity Women


Capacity Women

High Impulsive Trust Women


Capacity Women

Low Self-Regulatory

Capacity Women

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Figure 6. Women’s relationship-promotive behavior today as a function of women’s reflective trust on theprior day, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity.


.01), but not for those partners low on self-regulatory capacity(standardized b � .00, z � 0.04).

Year changes in commitment. Table 6 contains the predic-tors and coefficients for the SEM model predicting changes inz-transformed commitment. The three-way interaction betweenactors’ daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatorycapacity predicting changes in actors’ commitment was significantfor women, but not men (i.e., the intrapersonal or actor effectcorresponding to Path E in Figure 1). The three-way interactionbetween partners’ daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, self-regulatory capacity predicting changes in actors’ commitment wassignificant across gender (i.e., the interpersonal or partner effectcorresponding to Path F in Figure 1).

Actor effects. Figure 9 presents the predicted scores forchanges in women’s closeness as a function of women’s dailyreflective trust, self-regulatory capacity, and impulsive trust. Thetwo-way Daily Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity in-teractions were opposite for women low in impulsive trust (stan-dardized b � �.19, z � �1.66, p � � .10) and high in impulsivetrust (standardized b � .31, z � 2.61, p � .05). When moreimpulsively distrusting women were low on self-regulatory capac-

ity, uncertain reflective trust predicted declines in commitmentover time (standardized b � .43, z � 3.30, p � .01). But whenimpulsively distrusting women were high on self-regulatory ca-pacity, such uncertainty lost its capacity to inhibit closeness (stan-dardized b � .20, z � 1.29). For impulsively trusting women,uncertain reflective trust tended to predict increases in commit-ment for those low in self-regulatory capacity (standardized b ��.13, z � �1.05) and declines in commitment for those high onself-regulatory capacity (b � .11, z � 0.75), although neithersimple effect was significant.

Partner effects. The two-way Daily Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity interaction was significant for partners highin impulsive trust (standardized b � .36, z � 3.56, p � .01), butnot for those low in impulsive trust (standardized b � .04, z �0.46). When impulsively trusting partners were low in self-regulatory capacity, uncertain reflective trust predicted relativeincreases in actors’ commitment over the year (standardized b ��.24, z � �2.22, p � .05). But when impulsively trusting partnerswere high in self-regulatory capacity and likely to override theautomatic impulse to trust, uncertain reflective trust predicteddeclines in actors’ commitment over the year (standardized b �

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Low Impulsive Trust Partners

Low Self-Regulatory

Capacity Partners


Capacity Partners

High Impulsive Trust Partners


Capacity Partners

Low Self-Regulatory

Capacity Partners

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Figure 7. Actors’ relationship-promotive behavior today as a function of partners’ reflective trust on the priorday, impulsive trust, and self-regulatory capacity.


.46, z � 3.37, p � .01). The simple effects of reflective trust werenot significant for impulsively distrusting partners low (standard-ized b � .05, z � .46) and high on self-regulatory capacity (b �.14, z � 1.00).

Why override? Differences in sensitivity to uncertainty.We argued that people high in self-regulatory capacity often over-ride automatic impulses to trust (or distrust) because checking thisinclination’s validity typically uncovers contradictory evidence. Ifsuch biased memories surface, they should color the construedmeaning of the partner’s behavior in trust-relevant situations. Thatis, they should color how much (or how little) people think thebehavior reveals about their partner’s caring and love. For theimpulsively distrusting, the partner’s bad behavior should predictstronger drops in reflective trust (i.e., perceived caring) for peoplelow rather than high on self-regulatory capacity (if people high onself-regulatory capacity counter the meaning of recent bad behav-ior with positive memories). But for the impulsively trusting, thepartner’s bad behavior should predict stronger drops in reflectivetrust for people high rather than low on self-regulatory capacity (ifpeople high on self-regulatory capacity reinforce a recent badbehavior with negative memories).

To test this hypothesis, we utilized partners’ self-reports on theirown relationship-promotive behavior as the objective reality to beconstrued (i.e., the composite index of own comforting behavior,own communal behavior, felt closeness, own rejecting behavior[reversed], and own selfish behavior [reversed] scales). We thenexamined the daily association between actors’ reflective trust andpartners’ self-reported relationship-promotive behavior as a func-tion of actors’ impulsive trust and self-regulatory capacity. Spe-cifically, we predicted actors’ reflective trust today from (a) anaverage level term, B0; (b) actors’ reflective trust on the prior day,

B1; (c) partners’ self-reported relationship-promotive behavior to-day, B2; (d) actors’ impulsive trust and self-regulatory capacity, B3

and B4, respectively; (e) the two-way interactions between actors’impulsive trust and self-regulatory capacity, B5, between partners’behavior and actors’ impulsive trust, B6, and between partners’behavior and actors’ self-regulatory capacity, B7; (f) the predictedthree-way interaction between partners’ relationship-promotivebehavior, actors’ impulsive trust, and actors’ self-regulatory ca-pacity, B8; and (g) the appropriate error terms. We also includedactors’ daily reports on their own relationship-promotive behavioras a control variable to ensure that actors’ daily reflective trust wasnot simply a reflection of their own behavior.14

Table 7 contains the coefficients. The expected three-way Part-ners’ Relationship-Promotive Behavior Today � Actors’ Impul-sive Trust � Actors’ Self-Regulatory Capacity interaction predict-ing reflective trust today was significant for women, but not men.The Partners’ Relationship-Promotive Behavior � Actors’ Self-Regulatory Capacity interactions were opposite in sign for womenlow (b � �.024, SE � .015, z � �1.60, p � .11) and high onimpulsive trust (b � .022, SE � .013, z � 1.69, p � .10).

When impulsively distrusting women were low in self-regulatory capacity, their partner behaving less well predictedstrong daily declines in their reflective trust in their partner (b �.091, SE � .016, z � 5.69, p � .001). But when impulsivelydistrusting women were high in self-regulatory capacity and able

14 We did not include the partner effects in the estimation of this modelbecause they were not relevant to our hypotheses. The partner effects indexthe daily association between actors’ own relationship-promotive behaviorand reflective trust as a function of partners’ levels of impulsive trust andself-regulatory capacity.

Table 5Summarizing the Structural Equation Modeling Analyses Predicting Changes in Closeness in Study 3

Actors’ later closeness

Predictor Standardized b z

Actors’ initial closeness .69 17.08��

Actors’ average reflective trust .14 3.15��

Actors’ self-regulatory capacityWomen .08 1.68�

Men �.16 �3.42��

Actors’ impulsive trust .03 0.81Actors’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity �.04 �2.15��

Actors’ Average Reflective Trust � Impulsive Trust .03 0.69Actors’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity �.08 �1.28Actors’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust

Women .10 2.05��

Men �.01 �0.13Partners’ initial closeness �.01 �0.29Partners’ average reflective trust .09 1.95�

Partners’ self-regulatory capacity �.01 �0.24Partners’ impulsive trust �.03 �0.98Partners’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity �.10 �2.86��

Partners’ Average Reflective Trust � Impulsive TrustWomen .13 2.68��

Men �.06 �1.12Partners’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity .04 1.23Partners’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust .11 2.81��

Note. Comparative fit index � 1.00, root-mean-square error of approximation � .00, �2(25) � 24.61, ns.� p � .10. �� p � .05. �� p � .01.


to override the automatic impulse to distrust, this sensitivity touncertainty was less pronounced (b � .059, SE � .018, z � 3.28,p � .01). In contrast, when impulsively trusting women were lowin self-regulatory capacity, their partner behaving less well lefttheir daily reflective trust completely unscathed (b � �.001, SE �.017, z � �.06). But when impulsively trusting women were highin self-regulatory capacity, their partner behaving less well pre-dicted declines in their daily reflective trust (b � .032, SE � .015,z � 2.13, p � .05).

Why override: Differential conditioning? In justifying theoverride hypotheses, we also argued that people high on self-regulatory capacity might also invalidate automatic evaluativeassociations to situations as they occur. If that is the case, objectivechanges in the partner’s behavior should be more likely to condi-tion congruent changes in people’s automatic evaluative associa-tions to their partner for people low on self-regulatory capacitythan for people high on self-regulatory capacity. To test thishypothesis, we estimated a SEM model predicting actors’ laterimpulsive trust from actors’ initial impulsive trust, actors’ self-regulatory capacity, partners’ self-reported relationship-promotivebehavior (averaged across days), and the interaction between ac-tors’ self-regulatory capacity and partners’ relationship-promotive

behavior. We also included estimates for the intercepts, correla-tions among exogenous variables, and correlations between theresiduals.15

Table 8 lists the predictors and corresponding path coefficientsfor the paths predicting changes in impulsive trust. Notably, auto-matic evaluative associations to the partner were remarkably stableover time given the notorious unreliability of implicit measures(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Such stability suggests thatpartner IAT responses do indeed capture people’s more chronicevaluative responses to their partner, an assumption that is basic toour conceptualization of impulsive trust. As expected, the Actors’Self-Regulatory Capacity � Partners’ Relationship-Promotive Be-havior interaction was also significant. When actors were low onself-regulatory capacity, their partner’s objective behavior condi-tioned congruent changes in actors’ level of impulsive trust. Spe-cifically, partners engaging in more relationship-promotive behav-

15 We did not include the partner effects in the estimation of this modelbecause they were not relevant to our hypotheses. The partner effects indexthe association between actors’ own average relationship-promotive be-havior and later impulsive trust as a function of partners’ self-regulatorycapacity.

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Figure 8. Women’s later closeness as a function of women’s average daily reflective trust, impulsive trust, andself-regulatory capacity.


ior during the diary period predicted actors’ more positive, laterautomatic evaluative associations to their partner (standardizedb � .28, z � 4.00, p � .001). However, when actors were high onself-regulatory capacity, their partner’s objective behavior had nosignificant effect on actors’ evaluative associations to their partner(standardized b � .01, z � 0.01).

Discussion

Study 3 replicated and extended the results of the glucosestudies by demonstrating the short- and long-term intra- and in-terpersonal effects of being more or less likely to override theimpulsive trust signal in the face of uncertainty about the partner’scaring and love.

A warning signal. When impulsively distrusting people wereshort on self-regulatory capacity, and susceptible to this warningsignal, today’s drop in reflective trust decreased tomorrow’srelationship-promotive behavior. First, impulsively distrustingwomen who were short on self-regulatory capacity describedthemselves as engaging in less relationship-promotive behavior ondays after they experienced stronger acute concerns about theirpartner’s caring and love. Second, partners also tended to perceiveimpulsively distrusting actors who were low on self-regulatorycapacity as behaving in colder, more rejecting ways on days afteractors experienced greater acute uncertainty about their partner’scaring. Third, for impulsively distrusting women who were short

on self-regulatory capacity, experiencing uncertain reflective truston a daily basis predicted significant declines in their feelings ofcloseness to the partner over 2 weeks and significant declines intheir commitment over 1 year. Fourth, uncertain reflective trustalso had the hypothesized self-fulfilling effects when impulsivelydistrusting partners were also short on self-regulatory capacity.Namely, when impulsively distrusting partners were short on self-regulatory capacity, actors responded to partners’ daily drops inreflective trust by engaging in less relationship-promotive behav-ior themselves, perhaps reciprocating their partner’s hesitationsand actions.

In contrast, impulsively distrusting people who were high onself-regulatory capacity overrode this warning signal. Unliketheir self-regulatory compromised counterparts, they sustainedrelationship-promotive behavior and sentiment in the face ofdoubts about their partner’s caring and love. First, for impul-sively distrusting women who were high on self-regulatorycapacity, daily drops in reflective trust lost their capacity toinhibit the next day’s relationship-promotive behavior. Second,partners actually perceived impulsively distrusting actors whowere high on self-regulatory capacity as behaving in less coldand rejecting ways on days after actors experienced greateruncertainty about the partner’s caring. Third, for impulsivelydistrusting women who were high on self-regulatory capacity,experiencing uncertain reflective trust on a daily basis lost its

Table 6Summarizing the Structural Equation Modeling Analyses Predicting Changes in Commitment in Study 3

Actors’ later commitment

Predictor Standardized b z

Actors’ initial commitment (z-transformed)Women .51 6.37��

Men .18 2.00��

Actors’ average reflective trust .20 3.23��

Actors’ self-regulatory capacity .03 0.53Actors’ impulsive trust �.02 �0.39Actors’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity

Women �.07 �1.03Men .25 2.98��

Actors’ Average Reflective Trust � Impulsive Trust �.06 �0.93Actors’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity .03 0.58Actors’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust

Women .20 2.63��

Men �.12 �1.25Partners’ initial commitment

Women �.14 �1.79�

Men .11 1.12Partners’ average reflective trust .11 1.93��

Partners’ self-regulatory capacityWomen .07 1.13Men �.08 �0.96

Partners’ impulsive trust �.11 �1.93��

Partners’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity .02 0.25Partners’ Average Reflective Trust � Impulsive Trust

Women �.06 �0.83Men .09 1.10

Partners’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity .17 2.84��

Partners’ Average Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust .14 2.13��

Note. Comparative fit index � .98, root-mean-square error of approximation � .04, �2(21) � 26.47, ns.� p � .10. �� p � .05. �� p � .01.


capacity to undermine later closeness and commitment. Uncer-tainty also had the hypothesized self-fulfilling effects forresource-rich partners. When impulsively distrusting partnerswere high on self-regulatory capacity, actors responded to part-ners’ acute reflective trust uncertainties by engaging in morerelationship-promotive behavior themselves.

A safety signal. When impulsively trusting people werechronically short on self-regulatory capacity and thus suscep-tible to this safety signal, today’s drop in reflective trust in-creased tomorrow’s relationship-promotive behavior. First,partners perceived actors who were impulsively trusting andlow on self-regulatory capacity as behaving in less cold, lessrejecting ways on days after actors experienced greater drops inreflective trust. Second, impulsively trusting women who werelow on self-regulatory capacity described themselves as engag-ing in more relationship-promotive behavior on days after theyexperienced greater drops in reflective trust. Third, actors alsoreported relative increases in commitment over the year whenimpulsively trusting partners experienced greater uncertaintyabout actors’ caring but lacked the self-regulatory resourcesneeded to override an automatic impulse to trust.

In contrast, when impulsively trusting people had the self-regulatory resources available to override this safety signal, suchuncertainty about the partner’s caring and love lost its capacity toincrease relationship promotion. Instead, it seemed to inhibit suchbehavior and sentiment. First, actors tended to engage in lessrelationship-promotive behavior in response to partners’ dailydrops in reflective trust when partners were impulsively trustingand high on self-regulatory capacity. Second, when impulsivelytrusting women who were high in self-regulatory capacity reporteduncertain reflective trust on a daily basis, they experienced signif-icantly greater declines in commitment over the year than therelative gains experienced by uncertain, but impulsively trustingwomen who were low on self-regulatory capacity. Third, actorsalso reported significant declines in both closeness and commit-ment when their impulsively trusting partner experienced greateruncertainty about their caring yet had the self-regulatory capacityavailable to override the impulsive safety signal.

Why override? Study 3 also helped address the paradox ofwhy people who are high on self-regulatory capacity override theautomatic impulse to trust (or distrust). First, self-regulatory ca-pacity seemed to change impulsively trusting and distrusting wom-

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Figure 9. Women’s later commitment as a function of women’s average daily reflective trust, impulsive trust,and self-regulatory capacity.


en’s construal of their partner’s behavior. Specifically, for impul-sively distrusting women, being high in self-regulatory capacityprotected them against precipitous declines in daily reflective trustwhen their partner behaved less well. But for impulsively trustingwomen, greater self-regulatory capacity predicted increased vul-nerability to declines in reflective trust on days when their partnerbehaved less well. Such differential appraisal suggests that self-regulatory capacity allows people to check the automatic impulseto trust or distrust against conflicting beliefs and memories (ren-dering the partner’s behavior more worrisome for the impulsivelytrusting and less worrisome for the impulsively distrusting). Sec-ond, through simple processes of conditioning, one might expect apartner’s good behavior to condition more positive associationsand a partner’s bad behavior to condition more negative associa-tions to the partner. It did for people low on self-regulatorycapacity; their partner engaging in more relationship-promotivebehavior predicted their more positive automatic association totheir partner. But the evaluative tone of their partner’s behavior didnot condition congruent changes in impulsive trust for people highon self-regulatory capacity. Such differential conditioning suggeststhat people high in self-regulatory capacity might be in the habit ofinvalidating automatic associations to situations, including their

automatic impulse to trust. We return to these issues in the GeneralDiscussion.

Meta-Analytic Summary

The predicted three-way interaction pattern was strikingly con-sistent across studies. However, the two-way Reflective Trust �Self-Regulatory Capacity interaction was not always significantfor both impulsively trusting and impulsively distrusting people.To gauge the reliability of the override effect for both groups, weconducted a meta-analysis. We utilized the Stouffer combined test(Rosenthal, 1978) to aggregate across the relationship-promotionmeasures from Study 1 (i.e., reaction times to traits), Study 2 (i.e.,closeness composite), and Study 3 (i.e., the partner’s reports on theactor’s rejecting behavior). We chose this index from the diarystudy because it provides the most conservative analogue to theexperiments (because Ron needs to perceive changes in Gayle’sbehavior for the predicted effects to emerge).

As expected, the three-way interaction between impulsive trust,reflective trust, and self-regulatory capacity was significant acrossstudies (z � 4.50, p � .001). The Reflective Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity interaction was opposite and significant for

Table 7The Multilevel Model Predicting Actors’ Daily Reflective Trust From the Partner’s Relationship-Promotive Behavior in Study 3

Predictor

Actors’ reflective trust today

b (SE) z

Intercept 5.83 —Yesterday’s reflective trust .112 (.017) 6.59��

Partners’ relationship-protective behavior today .044 (.006) 7.33��

Actors’ relationship-protective behavior todayWomen .130 (.008) 16.30��

Men .099 (.008) 12.38��

Actors’ self-regulatory capacity .118 (.077) 1.53Actors’ impulsive trust �0.15 (.099) �1.52Actors’ Impulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity .031 (0.14) 0.22Actors’ Impulsive Trust � Partners’ Relationship-Protective Behavior Today

Women �.061 (.018) �3.39��

Men �.020 (.013) �1.54Actors’ Self-Regulatory Capacity � Partners’ Relationship-Protective Behavior Today .005 (.007) 0.71Actors’ Self-Regulatory Capacity � Impulsive Trust � Partners’ Relationship-Protective Behavior Today

Women .044 (.021) 2.10��

Men �.018 (.018) �1.00

�� p � .05. �� p � .01.

Table 8Summarizing the Structural Equation Modeling Analyses Predicting Changes in Impulsive Trustin Study 3

Predictor

Actors’ later impulsive trust

Standardized b z

Actors’ initial impulsive trust .48 9.58��

Partners’ average relationship-protective behavior .14 2.70��

Actors’ self-regulatory capacity �.05 �1.03Actors’ Self-Regulatory Capacity � Partners’ Average Impulsive Trust �.14 �2.75��

Note. Comparative fit index � 1.00, root-mean-square error of approximation � .00, �2(21) � 16.23, ns.�� p � .01.


both impulsively distrusting (z � 4.27, p � .001) and impulsivelytrusting people (z � �2.05, p � .05). When impulsively distrust-ing people were low in self-regulatory capacity, threats to reflec-tive trust significantly decreased relationship-promotive behavior(z � �3.34, p � .01). But when impulsively distrusting peoplewere high in self-regulatory capacity, threats to reflective trustsignificantly increased relationship-promotive behavior (z � 2.58,p � .05). In contrast, when impulsively trusting people were lowin self-regulatory capacity, threats to reflective trust significantlyincreased relationship-promotive behavior (z � 3.02, p � .01). Butwhen impulsively trusting people were high in self-regulatorycapacity, threats to reflective trust tended to decrease closeness,although this particular reversal was not significant across studies(z � �0.78). Nonetheless, in the diary study, robust effectsemerged for the partners of people who were impulsively trustingbut high in self-regulatory resources. These partners reported sig-nificant declines in closeness and commitment.

General Discussion

Romantic partners must tread a careful balance between trustingone another too much and trusting one another too little. Priortheory and research typically characterized uncertainty about thepartner’s caring (i.e., uncertain reflective trust) as the harbinger ofdysfunctional relationship interaction and dissatisfaction (Murray,Holmes, & Collins, 2006). However, the trust-control model ofrelationship promotion presented in Figure 1 specifies that uncer-tainty about a partner’s caring can motivate more or less rela-tionship promotion depending on one’s automatic impulse totrust and the self-regulatory resources one has available toquestion such inclinations.

Impulse and Control: The Dynamics of RelationshipPromotion

The studies suggest that acute uncertainty about a partner’scaring increased relationship promotion when people could notoverride impulsively trusting sentiments and when they had thecapacity to override impulsively distrusting ones. In contrast,uncertainty about a partner’s caring decreased relationship promo-tion when people could not override impulsively distrusting sen-timents and sometimes when they could override impulsivelytrusting ones.

Heeding the warning signal. For impulsively distrusting peo-ple, acute uncertainty about the partner’s caring decreased rela-tionship promotion when self-regulatory capacity was limited.Finding that automatic attitudes shape behavior when there is littlecapacity or opportunity to override such a signal is central to theMODE model of the attitude behavior relation (Olson & Fazio,2008). We found consistent evidence for this hypothesized assim-ilation effect across studies. In Study 1, impulsively distrustingparticipants who had not consumed glucose were slower to iden-tify valued traits in a critical partner than control participants.When we primed the risks of depending on one’s partner in Study2, impulsively distrusting participants who had not consumedglucose also reported less closeness than controls. In daily inter-actions in Study 3, impulsively distrusting women who were shorton self-regulatory capacity engaged in more self-protective, lessrelationship-promotive behavior on days after they experienced

acute concerns about their partner’s caring and love. Impulsivelydistrusting women who were short on self-regulatory capacity alsoreported significant declines in closeness over 2 weeks and incommitment over 1 year. The latter finding attests to the corrosiveeffect that heeding more negative automatic attitudes can have onrelationships. Moreover, people tended to perceive impulsivelydistrusting partners who were short on self-regulatory capacity asbehaving in colder, more rejecting ways on days after these part-ners felt more uncertain. The distrusting inclinations of peoplewith limited self-regulatory resources also had the expected self-fulfilling effects. People engaged in less relationship-promotivebehavior in response to their partner’s acute drops in reflectivetrust when their partner lacked the self-regulatory resources nec-essary to override their automatic impulse to distrust.

Overriding the warning signal. When self-regulatory re-sources were abundant, impulsively distrusting people overrodethis warning signal. Finding this override effect supports basicpredictions from the APE model about the importance of self-regulatory capacity in allowing a validity or fact-check on one’sautomatic evaluative associations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,2006). The meta-analysis revealed consistent evidence for thisoverride effect across studies. Indeed, when people high on self-regulatory resources felt uncertain of their partner’s caring, theyoften overcompensated for their automatic impulse to distrust andinstead strengthened their connection, evidencing a contrast effect.In Study 1, impulsively distrusting participants who had theirself-regulatory capacity supplemented by glucose resisted the ten-dency to devalue their partner, evidenced by those who had notconsumed glucose. In Study 2, impulsively distrusting peoplewhose self-regulatory resources were supplemented overcompen-sated. They felt closer to their partner when primed with the risksof dependence.

In Study 3, spouses even detected such compensation in thedaily behavior of impulsively distrusting but self-regulatory-resource-rich partners. That is, partners perceived impulsivelydistrusting actors who were high on self-regulatory capacity asbehaving in less rejecting ways on days after actors experiencedgreater acute uncertainty about how much they were loved. Suchrelationship-promotive reactions to uncertain reflective trust alsohad the hypothesized self-fulfilling effects. People reacted to theirpartner’s acute uncertainties about their caring by engaging inmore relationship-promotive behavior when paired with impul-sively distrusting partners who had the self-regulatory resourcesavailable to override their automatic impulse to distrust. Moreover,when impulsively distrusting women who were high on self-regulatory capacity experienced more uncertainty about their part-ner’s caring on a daily basis, they nonetheless maintained theirfeelings of closeness and commitment over time. Such resiliencelikely emerged in part because impulsive distrust in this samplereflected some degree of uncertainty about safety that needed to beresolved rather than an active state of distrust.

Heeding the safety signal. For impulsively trusting people,acute uncertainty about the partner’s caring increased relationshippromotion when self-regulatory capacity was limited, again con-sistent with the MODE model (Olson & Fazio, 2008). The meta-analysis revealed a significant assimilation effect across studies. InStudy 1, impulsively trusting participants who had not consumedglucose automatically valued a critical partner more as comparedto control participants. In Study 3, partners perceived impulsively


trusting actors who were low on self-regulatory resources as be-having in less rejecting ways on days after these partners experi-enced greater doubts about how much they were loved. Impul-sively trusting women who were low on self-regulatory capacityalso engaged in more relationship-promotive behavior on daysafter they experienced greater drops in reflective trust. Suchrelationship-promotive reactions to uncertainty also had one nota-ble self-fulfilling effect. In Study 3, actors reported relative in-creases in commitment over the year when they were paired withimpulsively trusting, low-resource partners who experienced moreuncertainty about actors’ caring on a daily basis.

Overriding the safety signal. When impulsively trusting peo-ple had the self-regulatory resources available to override theirautomatic impulse to trust, uncertainty about the partner’s caringinstead undermined the relationship. This pattern lends support tothe APE model prediction that self-regulatory capacity allows fora validity check on one’s automatic associations (Gawronski &Bodenhausen, 2006). In Study 1, impulsively trusting participantswho had consumed glucose tended to be more hesitant to valuetheir partner as compared to controls. In Study 3, people alsoengaged in less relationship-promotive behavior in response totheir partner’s daily drops in reflective trust when their partner wasimpulsively trusting but possessed the self-regulatory resourcesneeded to override this inclination. When impulsively trusting,high-resource women experienced more uncertainty about theirpartner’s caring on a daily basis, they also reported significantlygreater declines in commitment than women who were likely toheed the automatic impulse to trust experienced. Moreover, peoplereported greater declines in both closeness and commitment whentheir partner was impulsively trusting but had the self-regulatoryresources available to overcorrect for this impulse in the face ofuncertainty. Predicting long-term change in one partner’s senti-ments and behavior from the other person’s social cognitive trustdynamics presents novel but hopefully persuasive evidence for thestrength of the effects.

Why override? People high in self-regulatory capacity typi-cally have the resources available to check the validity of theirautomatic associations against other beliefs and memories(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). It is this capacity to fact-check that might supply the motivation to override and overcom-pensate for the impulsive trust signal.

First, in situations where the partner’s caring is uncertain, self-regulatory capacity seems to provide the resources needed tovalidate one’s chronic automatic evaluative associations to thepartner. For impulsively trusting people, we reasoned that check-ing on the validity of more positive evaluative associations islikely to make negative beliefs and memories especially salient. Incontrast, for impulsively distrusting people, checking on the va-lidity of more negative evaluative associations is likely to makepositive beliefs and memories especially salient. Study 3 revealedsuggestive evidence for this supposition for women. For impul-sively distrusting women, greater self-regulatory capacity de-creased their vulnerability to uncertainty about their partner’scaring when their partner behaved less well. But for impulsivelytrusting women, greater self-regulatory capacity predicted in-creased vulnerability to uncertainty about their partner’s caringwhen their partner behaved less well. Such differential sensitivitysuggests that people high in self-regulatory capacity checked theirautomatic impulse to trust or distrust the partner against conflicting

beliefs and memories (rendering the partner’s behavior less wor-risome for the impulsively distrusting and more worrisome for theimpulsively trusting).

Second, in situations where the partner’s caring is uncertain,self-regulatory capacity also seems to supply a more generalmotivation to discount one’s evaluative impulses. The evaluativetone of their partner’s behavior did not condition congruentchanges in impulsive trust for people high on self-regulatorycapacity over a 2-week period. However, it did for people low onself-regulatory capacity; their partner engaging in morerelationship-promotive behavior predicted their more positive laterautomatic association to their partner. Simple conditioning princi-ples suggest that the rewards and costs of interacting with one’spartner should condition congruent changes in impulsive trust(Murray et al., 2010). The absence of such a conditioning effect forpeople high in self-regulatory capacity suggests that they mightdiscount their evaluative associations to situations as a matter ofhabit. Indeed, having self-regulatory resources in abundance seemsto allow people to change the meaning of events as they occur ina way that disrupts evaluative conditioning. While we exploredthis mechanism to account for the current contrast effects, thesefindings may also prove generative for social cognitive theories ofautomatic attitude formation (Wilson et al., 2000).

On the Upside and Downside

The present findings have both strengths and limitations. On theupside, we found the predicted and significant three-way interac-tion between reflective trust, impulsive trust, and self-regulatorycapacity in each of the studies. Furthermore, we found convergentsupport for our hypotheses utilizing manipulated and naturallyoccurring doubts about the partner’s caring. We also found con-vergent support for the moderating power of self-regulatory ca-pacity utilizing both manipulated and naturally occurring levels ofself-control resources. Finally, we examined diverse manifesta-tions of relationship protection, including automatic partner valu-ing, global feelings of closeness, and the actual relationship-promotive behaviors partners evidence in daily interactions and inlong-term changes in feelings of closeness and commitment.

On the downside, we supplemented but did not deplete self-regulatory resources in Studies 1 and 2. We decided upon thisnonparallel manipulation because we wanted to isolate the effectsof supplemented resources and prior research had already exam-ined how depleting self-control resources affects susceptibility tothe impulsive trust signal (Murray et al., 2011). Nevertheless, theassimilation effects we observed in the nonglucose condition inStudies 1 and 2 replicated the cognitive-load effects observed inprior research, raising the possibility that fasting might depleteself-regulatory resources enough to reveal the effects of impulsivetrust.

Second, some effects were not as expected. The boundaryconditions of the model stipulate that the effects of impulsivetrust should be evident in the face of uncertainty about thepartner’s caring. This was clearly the case for the daily inter-actions we assessed in Study 3. We further decomposed thethree-way interactions predicting partners’ perceptions of ac-tors’ rejecting behavior (see Figure 4) and actors’ own approachbehaviors (see Figures 5– 6) into their two-way ImpulsiveTrust � Self-Regulatory Capacity interactions for relatively


uncertain versus certain reflective trust days. As expected, theImpulsive Trust � Self-Regulatory Capacity interaction pre-dicting each of these Study 3 dependent measures was onlysignificant on days after reflective trust dropped. However, inStudy 1, the Impulsive Trust � Glucose interaction predictingimplicit partner valuing was significant for participants in boththe uncertain reflective trust and the control condition. As ourmodel anticipates, more impulsively trusting participants in theuncertain reflective trust, no-glucose condition in Study 1 weresignificantly faster to identify valuing traits in their partner thanless impulsively trusting participants. But impulsively trustingparticipants in the no-glucose/no-threat condition were alsosignificantly slower to identify valuing traits in their partnerthan less impulsively trusting participants. Given the totality ofthe findings, it seems reasonable to regard this latter result as ananomaly. In Study 1, the nonthreat condition was not entirelyneutral because controls still listed important qualities in theirpartner they disliked. However, partners in the nonglucose/nonthreat condition responded in a neutral context (becausethey listed the contents of their room), and as expected, theirimpulsive trust did not predict their implicit partner-valuingresponses.

In Study 3, some predicted effects for one’s own relationship-protective behavior (Path E in Figure 1) were only evident forwomen. Nonetheless, no gender differences emerged in theglucose studies, and most crucial, in the diary study, partnersperceived the behaviors of both male and female actors todiverge in the predicted fashion on days after they experienceduncertain reflective trust (see Figure 4). The expected effects onthe partner’s behavior (Path F in Figure 1) also emerged re-gardless of gender. The gender differences that emerged areconsistent with speculations that women provide a more sensi-tive barometer of relationship functioning (Karney & Bradbury,1995). But given the totality of the data, we are hesitant toconclude that gender fundamentally alters one’s experience ofbeing more or less impulsively trusting (or being partnered withsuch a person).

Across studies, the predicted contrast effects for impulsivelytrusting people who were high on self-regulatory capacity were notalways evident. Impulsively trusting people who were low onself-regulatory capacity drew closer to their partner in the face ofuncertainty. As expected, impulsively trusting people who werehigh on self-regulatory capacity did override this automatic im-pulse to trust. That is, the meta-analytic simple effect of reflectivetrust was not significant for impulsively trusting people who werehigh on self-regulatory capacity. This null effect suggests thatimpulsively trusting, high-resource people successfully suppressedthe automatic inclination to trust. But contrary to the full contrasthypothesis, they did not also overcompensate for this automaticimpulse and actively self-protect. Nevertheless, the partners ofimpulsively trusting people who had the capacity to override thissafety signal still suffered significantly. Their closeness and satis-faction declined over time. These findings suggest that the simplehesitation to follow through on automatic impulse to trust and thenact constructively in the face of uncertainty may itself be sufficientto undermine relationships.

Third, because we did not manipulate impulsive trust, aconfounding variable could account for its effects. For instance,people who make more positive automatic evaluative associa-

tions to their partner might also chronically be higher in reflec-tive trust or higher in satisfaction. If that were the case, theseassociated positive sentiments might actually be conferringresilience (vs. vulnerability). Supplementary measures allowedus to rule out this possibility. In the experiments, participantscompleted premeasures of relationship satisfaction (Studies 1and 2) and trust in their partner’s commitment (Study 2). In thedaily diary study, spouses also completed a global measure ofreflective trust (Rempel et al., 1985) and a global measure ofrelationship satisfaction (Murray et al., 1996). This allowed usto test whether either of these conscious sentiments mimickedthe effects of impulsive trust. Neither chronic reflective trustnor satisfaction consistently and significantly interacted withdaily reflective trust and self-regulatory capacity to predictrelationship-promotive behavior.

The automatic impulse to trust or distrust may possess uniquepower to transform one’s experience of acute uncertainty about thepartner’s caring because automatic evaluative associations to thepartner capture aspects of past interactions that conscious feelingsof trust can miss (Murray et al., 2010). Indeed, people who are lowin self-esteem feel less loved than people who are high in self-esteem even though their partners love them just as much as thepartners of highs (Murray, Holmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose,2001). Consequently, impulsively trusting sentiments may be morelikely to control perception and behavior because such evaluationsare more rooted in experience, at least for people low on self-regulatory resources. Consistent with this logic, more positiveevaluative associations to the partner predict greater relationshipstability regardless of reported satisfaction (LeBel & Campbell,2009; Lee, Rogge, & Reis, 2010). People who feel pressured tojustify their commitments because they are highly invested andhave few alternatives also defensively claim to be satisfied in theirrelationship when automatic reactions to their partner are relativelynegative (Scinta & Gable, 2007).

Impulse Control and Relationship Functioning

Aspects of the model require further refinement. In developingthe model, we reasoned that reflective trust better mirrors short-term changes in trust than impulsive trust because it can be harderto unlearn an automatic evaluative association than a consideredbelief (Gregg et al., 2006). However, automatic evaluative asso-ciations can and do change in response to situation features. Forinstance, Black–White responses on the IAT can shift as featuresof the situation change, such as the race of the experimenter or thestyle of dress of a target of prejudice (Barden, Maddux, Petty, &Brewer, 2004; Han, Czellar, Olson, & Fazio, 2010; Han, Olson, &Fazio, 2006). Fortunately, in Study 3, automatic associations to thepartner on the IAT were remarkably stable over time, suggestingthat our measure of impulsive trust did indeed capture people’smore chronic evaluative associations to their partner (i.e., a generalattitude). The possibility of situation specificity does reveal apotential limitation to the model: More general automatic associ-ations to the partner are not the only associations one has tosituations that raise uncertainty about the partner’s caring, as priorresearch has revealed (Murray et al., 2008). For instance, in arecurrent conflict over finances, Gayle is likely to have automaticevaluative responses to the topic itself that might complement orcompete with her automatic impulse to trust or distrust Ron. In this


light, the findings provide an especially persuasive demonstrationof the importance of generalized automatic associations to thepartner because these global attitudes miss nuance in the associa-tions people have to encountering their partner in specific situa-tions. Including situation-specific associations into the model re-mains a task for future research.

Building on interdependence theory logic (Kelley, 1979), wealso reasoned that one partner acting on the automatic impulse totrust elicits the other partner’s reciprocal willingness to connect(Wieselquist et al., 1999). The daily diary study revealed pro-nounced effects of actors’ social cognitive dynamics on partners’behavior. Such dyadic transmission suggests that people mighteven be able to build positive interaction cycles with impulsivelydistrusting partners if these partners have self-regulatory resourcesavailable to overcompensate for their automatic impulse to dis-trust. Thus, developing models of relationship dynamics that ex-plicitly consider factors that might tax self-regulatory resources,such as daily or chronic stress (Neff & Karney, 2009), mightdelineate when the automatic impulse to trust is most likely tostrengthen relationships and when the automatic impulse to dis-trust is most likely to weaken relationships.

Future research might also explore exactly how the dyadiceffects we observed in Study 3 emerged. Behavioral reciprocityis one possible explanation, though it does not seem to beentirely sufficient to explain all of the effects. For instance, weobserved long-term changes in women’s feelings of closenessand commitment as a function of men’s capacity to overridetheir automatic inclination to trust even though we failed to findany change in men’s own sentiments as a function of thisinclination. This suggests that Gayle’s tendency to distancefrom an impulsively trusting but resource-rich Ron might bemore than a reaction to his overt behavior toward her when he isfeeling uncertain about her caring. Instead, she might be pick-ing up his nonverbal displays (e.g., a flash of anger at herapology) that elicit her hesitation to connect to Ron without himbeing overtly destructive.

Future research might further explore the generality of themodel by examining how the dynamics we observed might shiftin relationships where the automatic or reflective trust signal isnegative, as opposed to uncertain. For instance, in relationshipscharacterized by cycles of reciprocated conflict and negativity,truly negative evaluative associations to the partner might de-velop. In such relationships, people high on self-regulatorycapacity actually might expend self-regulatory resources toensure that they heed the impulsive trust signal, perhaps utiliz-ing such resources to ensure that they are not deceived by theirpartner’s occasional proffers of apologies or kind deeds. Futureresearch might also explore the time course needed to groundimpulsively trusting sentiments in the reality of the partner’sbehavior for people high on self-regulatory capacity. Theoriesof motivated reasoning suggest that reality imposes constraintson people’s capacity to believe what they wish to believe(Kunda, 1990). For instance, Gayle might brush off Ron’sbroken promises the first, second, or even 10th time she expe-rienced them, but with enough evidence, she might be forced toconclude he is not that reliable. Therefore, for people high onself-regulatory capacity, it might take a longer, more sustainedshift in the evaluative tone of their partner’s behavior to con-dition congruent changes in impulsive trust.

Conclusion

In striking a balance between trusting and distrusting one an-other, relationship partners negotiate the complex demands ofinterdependence. Understanding this delicate and ongoing negoti-ation requires knowledge of both the evaluative impulses thatpartners bring to the uncertain situations they face and the self-regulatory resources they have at their disposal.

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Received April 19, 2012Revision received September 4, 2012

Accepted September 10, 2012 �




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The dynamics of relationship promotion: Controlling the automatic inclination to trust.

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