The Effects of Populist Rhetoric:The Dynamics of Attention-Seeking from

Inside and Outside of GovernmentPaper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Session in Munster (D), 2010

Mirjam RyserUniversity of Bern and the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

mirjam.ryser@ipw.unibe.ch

DO NOT CITE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

AbstractWhat are the effects of populist communication within a setting wherepopulist parties hold seats in the executive branch? Little is knownabout the effects of populist communication and the strategies of pop-ulist parties in public office. In this paper, we approach the phe-nomenon of populist communication from a political psychologicalperspective and argue that appeals to the emotions of fear and en-thusiasm inherent in populist rhetoric boost attention. Data collectedin an experiment within a 2009 campaign on the highly controversialinitiatives against the construction of minarets and against arms ex-ports in Switzerland allow us to test for the effectiveness of left wingoutsider and right wing insider populist communication. We measurethe effects of manipulated populist scripts on a) subjects’ attention, b)information seeking, and c) persuasion with regard to candidate choiceand issue voting. We find that a) outsider left wing populism tends toincrease attention, but older people tend to be more attentive to suchemotional appeals; b) traditional right wing populism decreases sub-sequent interest in the initiatives, especially in the older population;c) younger people are prone to vote for right wing populist candi-dates and in line with such messages. Authoritarian predispositionsin the youth have an effect only on their candidate choice. Our resultssuggest that future research on political communication might benefitfrom considering different personality characteristics in experimentalsettings.

Thanks to all of the participants of the online survey. My special thanks to SkylerCranmer, Marco Steenbergen, Todd Hartmann, David Blatter.

1

Introduction

Political communication is a rising subfield within the study of populism. Schol-ars have examined diverse topics, such as populist party programmes (e.g. DeRaadt et al., 2004), the discourse of a given party (e.g Armony & Armony, 2005),and the media as a central forum for populists (e.g. Calhoun, 1988; Mazzoleni,2003). More recently, research on continental European populism has expandedthe scope of analysis from right wing parties to the entire party spectrum (e.g.Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Ryser, 2010). These contributions are important sincethey teach us about the logic underlying populist ideology (Hakwins, 2009), thediverse populist strategies different parties apply (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), andabout the contextual dependency of populism (Ryser, 2010). Despite this emerg-ing literature addressing the agenda-setting side of populist communication, littleis known about the effects of such rhetoric: we do not know whether, how, andunder which circumstances populist rhetoric is more likely to persuade individuals,or influence their attitudes.

The contribution of the present study is to address the underdeveloped fieldof the effects of populist rhetoric. Building on the emotions and political commu-nication literature from a functionalist perspective (e.g. Lazarus, 2001), we arguethat populist rhetoric usually appeals to different emotions, namely anxiety andenthusiasm. This argument is based on a growing, although US-centric, literatureon political communication, which demonstrates the importance of emotions inpolitical communication (Brader, 2005; 2006; Marcus et al., 2005). This studyis particularly salient because it contributes to the under-researched setting, inwhich a populist party is an established member in the executive branch: we an-alyze campaigns of two 2009 referenda against the construction of minarets andarms exports in Switzerland where a so-called populist party, the Swiss People’sParty, holds seats in the executive. Particularly interesting is the fact that thereferendum against the construction of minarets was mainly initiated by membersof the right wing Swiss People’s Party, while the referendum on arms exports wasmainly launched by opponents in the radical left. Thus, these cases provide theunique opportunity to assess and compare the effects of populist communicationof a populist party in public office to outsider populism and to contrast rightist vs.leftist populism. This study is the first of its kind in so far as it conducts an ex-periment with populist speeches as a treatment. Experiments are well establishedmethods that provide causal inferences and are especially well suited to the studyof emotions, since they capture short-term responses that often escape awareness(Brader, 2006: 76) and can hardly be measured by standard survey techniques.

We begin with a description of the two referenda in order to provide somebackground information and show that they fit the purpose of this study. Second,we discuss the existing literature regarding the question of how individuals mightbe influenced by populist rhetoric and derive expectations. Specifically, this sectiondescribes the mobilization potential of populism, defines populism and its relation

2

to emotional appeals and argues that emotions influence information processingand persuasion. Third, we explicate the research design and methods. We thendiscuss the results, and conclude with an assessment of the results of the study.

Popular initiatives in Switzerland: against the

construction of minarets and against arms ex-

ports

The popular initiatives1 in Switzerland against the construction of minarets anda ban on arms exports from Switzerland were voted on November 29th, 2009.The minaret initiative contained an amendment banning the construction of newminarets and was accompanied by a far-reaching, emotional campaign which re-ceived wide spread attention both domestically and internationally. For example,the right wing launched a controversial poster campaign showing a scarfed womanin front of a Swiss flag from which minarets rise like missiles. Campaigning washeavily marked by cultural arguments, pitting “genuine Swiss” against “foreignislamic” values. However, the acceptance of this initiative by 57.5 percent of thevoters ran against the tendency of Swiss initiatives not to receive the required ma-jority of both voters and cantons to pass into law. The result also ran against mostof the expectations and predictions of Swiss pundits (e.g. gfs.bern, Longchamp etal., 2009). The Federal Department of Justice and Police explained the acceptanceof the vote with marked fears and uncertainties among the population (cp. FederalDepartment of Justice and Police, 2009). Retrospectively, opinions of commenta-tors on the referenda continued to diverge. Some commentators debated the roleof younger women who were assumed to be mobilized by populist appeals to aperceived threat of Islam towards women. Other studies pointed out that peoplewith little education and partisans of middle parties were among the decisive voterdemographics in support of the initiative (Hirter & Vatter, 2010). Still others sug-gested that high levels of support for the ban among conservative ideologues, thelower class, and the rural population contributed decisively to the outcome (Moser,2009: 3).

In contrast, the debate about the proposed arms exports ban received less pub-lic attention, although the pro and contra side launched substantial campaigns.Arguments of the proponents centered around the humanitarian values of Switzer-land and the danger of the arms industry, while opponents emphasized the dangerof job losses. The failure of the initiative with only 31.8 percent of yes votes waslargely attributed to the lack of mobilization beyond leftist voters (Hirter & Vatter,

1The political system of Switzerland differentiates between the direct-democratic in-struments “referendum” and “initiative.” The former can be used to abort certain legis-lation by the government. The latter refers to proposed legislation initiated by a certainnumber of signatures from Swiss citizens.

3

2010).These cases present a splendid opportunity to examine the effects of populist

rhetoric. First, as already mentioned, the initiative against the construction ofminarets passed in a landslide, while the initiative banning arms exports failed.Retrospectively, we may attribute this result to success and failure in campaigningrespectively. However, we do not know much about the specific mechanisms andeffects of political communication and on what point particular messages succeedor fail. Such subtile mechanisms are difficult to detect with self reports in surveyresearch. However experimental manipulation offers an avenue to measure thisparticularities. In this paper, we will test the effects and contributions of populistrhetoric, by testing individual party messages.

Second, the two initiatives allow us to assess the efficacy of left vs. rightwing populism. The popular vote on arms exports was initiated by the leftistoutsider alliance Bundnis gegen Kriegsmaterial-Exporte consisting of members ofdifferent parties from the extreme left wing (such as the Alternative Liste (AL)and the young socialists (JUSO)) and organizations, such as the GsoA (Groupfor a Switzerland without an Army) which can be considered as extreme left pop-ulist. This provides an opportunity to study left wing populism, which is generallystronger among outsider parties (cp. Mudde, 2004: 549). In contrast, the minaretinitiative was launched by a committee, consisting mainly of members of the pop-ulist incumbent Swiss People’s Party.2 Furthermore, this initiative seems to be inline with the current spirit of populist right wing parties, in so far as muslims havebecome one of their special “enemies” (Mudde, 2007: 78ff).

Third, these cases afford us the opportunity to study the efficacy of populistdiscourse by an incumbent party (Swiss People’s Party) and an outsider coali-tion (Bundnis gegen Kriegsmaterial-Exporte), which has not been addressed byresearch so far. While populism has been considered a short-term phenomenon,the incorporation of populist parties in executive branches such as the Lega deiTicinesi (LDT), and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in Switzerland, or the ForzaItalia (FI) in Italy, presents a new challenge for research. The few theories onpopulist communication examining their relationship with the media, have beenmostly based on the assumption that the populist party will fail (e.g. Stewartet. al., 2003). Only a few studies consider the setting of populist incumbent par-ties (e.g. Albertazzi, 2009; Ivarsflaten, 2008). Fewer studies contribute to thequestion of whether and how other parties react to populist incumbent parties.Mudde (2004: 563) argues that the established parties will pursue a strategy ofsimultaneous inclusion and exclusion. They try to exclude the populist actorsfrom incumbency, but will include populist issues and communication in order to“fight off the challenge.” Indeed, Ryser (2010) finds in her empirical analysis ofpolitical speeches that populist rhetoric is not only a prerogative of the right wingSwiss People’s Party, but that christian-democrats are also likely to employ this

214 out of 16 committee’s members are in the Swiss People’s Party. The remaining 2are in the christian-conservative party Eidgenossisch-Demokratische Union (EDU).

4

rhetorical strategy. So far, results have been mixed, but seem to indicate thatgovernmental incorporation of populist parties does not inevitably lead to theirmoderation as proposed by some (e.g. Meny & Surel, 2002). In particular, in thecase of the Swiss People’s Party a strategy of “opposition within government” ispursued (Albertazzi, 2009). Thus, questions about whether and how parties adapttheir communication strategies once in government and how other partisan andoutsider actors react to this challenge have remained widely unanswered. Thus,our suggested approach to the study of political communication is to broaden thescope of analysis from the populist actor itself to the interdependency of actorsacting, reacting, and inter-acting with one another.

Individuals’ reactions to populist messages

Mobilization and populist issues

The mobilization potential of populism is suggested by its very definition and canbe easily seen in populist campaign efforts. The political communication literaturegenerally treats populism as a political communication strategy, thus allowingfor the possibility that populist rhetoric might be employed by different partiesand cover different issues (e.g. Jagers & Walgravae, 2007). While definitions ofpopulism vary (cp. Weyland, 2001), inclusion in an in-group and exclusion of anout group are generally considered intrinsic components of populism. An in-group(“the people”) is commonly portrayed as homogenous and under attack by oneor several out-groups (“the others”) (e.g. Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008a: 3;Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 322). This definition does not restrict the use ofpopulist rhetoric to right wing parties; it allows it to be used across the ideologicalspectrum (e.g. Taggart, 2000). For example, left wing populists might conceive ofthe working-class (“the people”) as being threatened by economic elites and rightwing populists might portray native born citizens (“the people”) as being invadedby immigrants and criminals.

The political efficacy of appeals to cultural traits is supported not only by workon populism, but also by a broad literature on public opinion, European Integra-tion, and election studies (e.g. Bornschier, 2005; Kriesi, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2005;Statham & Koopmans, 2009). Kriesi (2005) evaluates the defense of the nationalsovereignty as a response to globalization and argues that mobilization based oncultural traits is much easier than economics. This is so because national identityconstitutes the smallest common denominator, whereas globalization’s “losers” areheterogenous and hard to unify. Thus, it is not surprising that immigration is-sues generally top the agenda of right wing populist parties. However, Stathamand Koopmans (2009: 461) take issue with the tendency of Kriesi (2005) to re-duce Euroscepticism to cultural nationalism by pointing out that the idea of ahomogenous, national civic community with common values corresponds more toa civic-nationalism than to xenophobia. This national civic community is more

5

likely to appeal to a cross-class population and not to a specific voter segment.This refinement of Kriesi (2005) does not diminish the importance of culturalcues in populist communication and according mobilization, but rather sustainsit. However, recent research in political psychology also demonstrates that notevery group cue mobilizes citizens equally (Brader et al., 2008).

The populist Swiss People’s Party successfully mobilizes voters using debateson asylum and immigration issues which attract a considerable amount of publicattention (Albertazzi, 2009). For example, while the the Swiss People’s Party’sleader Christian Blocher had a seat in the executive in 2006, the party proposedlegislation tightening asylum and immigration laws, and a leftist attempt at areferenda to overturn the legislation failed (cp. Ryser, 2010). After the dismissalof Christoph Blocher from the Federal Council in 2007, the party launched severalcampaigns which attracted attention beyond the borders of Switzerland. The mostvisible of these campaigns were a referendum to accelerate the expulsion of foreigncriminals (this legislation is currently under parliamentary processing) and thenow infamous (and successful) initiative banning the construction of minarets.

By contrast, leftist organizations have been less successfully in mobilizing vot-ers so far. The Bundnis gegen Kriegsmaterial-Exporte is an issue organizationwhich launched the initiative against arms exports. It is composed primarily ofindividuals with partisan ties to the extreme-left wing and/or ties to other ecolog-ical or humanitarian organizations. The principal mobilization force within thisorganization, the GSoA (Group for a Switzerland without an Army), mobilizesvoters around the issue of army disbandment; the GSoA has often proposed leg-islation calling for the compete dissolution of the Swiss military. The GSoA hasbeen substantially less successful than the Swiss People’s Party in terms of initia-tive turnouts. That said, they were able to collect enough signatures to launchseveral, ultimately unsuccessful initiatives to abolish the Swiss army.

The fundamental question raised by this discussion is “Why do individualsreact to populist rhetoric?” Based on the arguments that cultural appeals areinextricable from populist communication and themes around immigration andintegration seem to mobilize voters successfully, we expect that cultural issues andappeals related to the minaret initiative affect individuals to a stronger degreethan the humanitarian and economic issues related to the arms initiative. We alsohypothesize that party communication by the incumbent populist party affectsvoters to a higher degree than outsider populist communication by the left wing.In the following, we argue that emotional appeals – defined by Brader (2006:68) as “any communication that is intended to elicit an emotional response fromsome or all who receive it” and taken here to be an essential feature of populistcommunication - attracts attention and does much to sway voters.

6

Populist rhetoric and affective persuasion

Emotional appeals are an essential part of populist rhetoric. While scholars datingback to Aristotle emphasized that emotional reactions to rhetoric are crucial topersuade people (cp. Neblo, 2007: 39), many contemporary scholars argue thatemotions - especially politics of fear - are an essential part of populist communi-cation. Such populist communication seeks to elicit enthusiasm in order to definethe in-group and mobilize voters (Canovan, 1999; Meyer, 2006: 81; Mudde, 2007:63ff; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008a: 2). However, studies elucidating the func-tion of emotions in populism are conspicuously absent from the literature (Ryser,2010). We argue here that populist rhetoric appeals simultaneously to emotions ofenthusiasm and threat. As defined above, populism fosters inclusion by creatingan in-group; this manifests in communication by appeals to emotions of enthu-siasm. Since the in-group is portrayed as under attack by some sort of enemy,populist rhetoric frequently uses threat devices. While it is certainly the intent ofpopulist parties to persuade voters, the efficacy of such rhetoric is unclear. For-tunately, social and political psychology provides a voluminous literature on howemotional appeals stimulate attention and contribute to persuasion. As such, wedraw heavily on this literature in order develop a theory of emotive appeals inpopulist rhetoric. In so doing, we must consider the effects of affective appeals oninformation processing (attention) and persuasion.

Information processing and persuasion

A well-established literature emphasizes the crucial role of emotions in informa-tion processing as well as the consequential persuasion and mobilization of citizens(Hutchings et al., 2006: 166). In the introductory chapter of their seminal politicalpsychological work “The Affect Effect,” Neuman and colleagues (2007) compile anon-exhaustive list of 23 named theories, concepts and models addressing the rela-tionship between cognition and emotion. While it is impossible to give an adequatereview of those works in a single paper, many of these approaches draw heavily, orare explicitly based, on a dual-process approach. This approach posits that indi-viduals process information either in an effortful and motivated way in which theyevaluate messages based on relevant content or that they process information in anon-systematic, low-effort way and pay little attention to the contents of commu-nications. In the latter situation, so-called peripheral cues, such as the rhetoricalstyle or attractiveness of the message sender, become increasingly important (fora summary see Wirth & Schramm, 2005).

But what is the role of emotions when individuals are confronted with poli-tics? The seminal theory of Affective Intelligence by Marcus and colleagues (2000)distinguishes between two distinct emotional systems in information processing:the dispositional and the surveillance system. The theory posits that the disposi-tional system encourages issue approach and operates on the positive dimension of“enthusiasm,” relying on routine information and fostering interest in a given cam-

7

paign. In contrast, the surveillance system is guided by issue avoidance and thenegative dimension of “anxiety,” directing citizens away from longstanding beliefsand simultaneously enhancing their motivation to learn. In such situations indi-viduals tend to yield to the force of arguments and persuasion may be facilitated(cp. Huddy et al., 2005).

However, the theory of Affective Intelligence tells us little about the effects ofcampaign communication and emotional reactions (Hutchings et al., 2006: 167).Only few studies experimentally examine the effect of campaigns and according in-dividual reactions. The studies which do, examine only candidate voting by manip-ulating anxiety and enthusiasm separately (e.g. Brader, 2005; 2006). Specifically,Brader (2005) finds that enthusiasm fosters interest in campaigns and stimulatesvoting, but has no effect on the recall of campaign related messages or persuasion.The author finds a reverse pattern for fear appeals. However, it is less clear howmixed emotions – typical in populist rhetoric – influence information processingand lead to persuasion. Political psychology has long conceived of emotions as abipolar structure where individuals are assumed to move away from one pole whenapproaching the other. Only recently have researchers recognized the individuals’potential for simultaneously experiencing positive and negative feelings towardthe same object (Neblo, 2007; Oceja & Carrera, 2009; Steenbergen & Ellis, 2006).Nonetheless, the question of what the behavioral consequences of mixed emotionsare, has not been answered. A functionalist perspective, such as that maintainedby Lazarus (2001), provides us with some hints: according to his argument emo-tions are interdependent, and thus, their labels “positive” and “negative” are oftenmisleading. A “positive” emotion, such as hope, can only occur in the presenceof the “negative” experience of threat (Lazarus, 2001). For example, expecting anupcoming knee surgery, we feel threatened, but simultaneously hopeful that thesurgery will go smoothly. Applying this idea to a concrete populist message meansthat the appeal to negative emotions should catch our attention and allow theparty to make its point persuasively (Kern, 1989, cited in Brader, 2006: 155 refersto this strategy as “get’ em sick, get’ em well”). Thus, conceiving of populismas an attention-booster, we hypothesize that populist messages generally elicit ahigher degree of attention and thus, foster issue approach.

Besides attention, information seeking is another important aspect of individ-ual information processing and is an antecedent of persuasion. So far, we haveargued that populist messages will generally attract attention. However, from afunctionalist perspective, attention is directed towards the claims of the populistmessage; this renders the consultation of other information sources redundant.This argument is supported by literature on populism and authoritarianism, whichemphasize the mobilization potential of populist parties (e.g. Canovan, 1999; DiTella, 1997). The vast literature on authoritarianism suggests that in threaten-ing situations, certain individuals are more likely to search for security from aspowerful perceived others in order to reduce fear and insecurity (e.g. Feldman &

8

Stenner, 1997; Oesterreich, 2005).3 Although such reactions are associated with anauthoritarian personality structure, such predispositions are assumed to be com-mon in regions where populist parties are popular (Di Tella, 1997). Therefore, wehave good reason to suspect that populist rhetoric fosters a tendency to rely on itssender, especially for individuals with higher authoritarian predispositions; thusrendering the need for subsequent information gathering unnecessary. Consequen-tially, the populist sender will attract more voters and is generally more persuasivethan a non-populist sender.

While most of the experimental studies in political communication and psychol-ogy which examine information processing have neglected to take age differencesinto account,4 studies of populism acknowledge that its “unconventional style ofcampaigning also tends to draw in younger, less politically aware, and traditionallyapathetic voters” (Heinisch, 2003: 124). The importance of age related patterns issupported by studies of emotion by consumer research. Recent findings show thatthe motivation of elderly individuals approaching information and the way theyprocess information differs considerably. Older people tend to focus more on af-fective than factual information and their attentive ability, memory, and capacityto process information is generally decreased (Drolet et al., 2007: 212; Isaacowitzet al., 2000; Williams & Drolet, 2005: 344). Scholars such as Hashtroudi et al.(1994: 160) and Isaacowitz et al. (2000) even link the combination of inefficientinformation processing and the enhanced importance of values and experiences inolder people to a stronger incorporation of irrelevant (emotional) information inworking memory. In line with that finding, Williams and Drolet (2005) show thatolder consumers recall more information from affective ads. It has also been ac-knowledged that the propensity of individuals to accept mixed emotions differ withcharacter traits such as culture and age (Basseches, 2005). Specifically, older agegroups tend to synthesize and acknowledge conflicting emotions to a higher degreethan younger adults. Why this effect occurs remains an open question (Williams& Aaker, 2002), but it has been suggested that individuals’ maturation seems topartially explain this pattern (Williams & Drolet, 2005: 344). As such, we expectage-realted differences in our results.

3Similarly, some authors argue that populist right wing parties are largely supported byinsecure individuals (Mudde, 2007: 223). However, a clear separation from authoritarianpredispositions seems to be difficult due to endogeneity.

4Age differences have been examined in related subfields. Scholars, such as Visserand Krosnick (1998) and Krosnick and Alwin (1989) found differences in attitude strengthaccording to life stages; though they point out the complexity and object dependency of thephenomenon. However, the finding that early adulthood is a “period of relative plasticity”is consistent across various studies (Visser and Krosnick, 1998: 1407). Also Sears (1986:523) argues in his characterization of college students that their traits vary systematicallyfrom other age groups and that those individuals possess stronger information processingskills.

9

Methods

Overview

To evaluate our hypotheses, we conducted an experiment with Swiss citizensshortly before the votes on minarets and arms exports in November 2009. Sub-jects were exposed to a treatment condition after having completed a pretest whichincluded measures such as political attitudes, authoritarian predispositions, somedemographics and current mood among others. An additional battery of questionswas presented to the subjects after the experimental exposure.

Sample

Subjects were recruited through several venues, such as emails, facebook, stu-dent’s listserves, corporate listserves, snowball sampling, and an announcement ona Swiss version of Craig’s list (www.gratis-inserate.ch). The subjects were giventhe opportunity to participate in a lottery, competing for cash prices and movietickets. A total of 671 participants (Swiss citizens over 18) completed the onlinesurvey experiment. Of these subjects, 90 were dropped because they left the surveybefore receiving the treatment, leaving us with a final sample of 581 subjects.

While an experimental setup provides us with high internal validity due tothe random assignment of a treatment, the question of external validity has tobe considered. While the sample is similar to the Swiss population of 2009 onthe key demographic dimension of gender (47.8 percent males and 52.2 percentfemales vs. 49.2 percent males and 50.8 percent females in the Swiss population),there are notable differences in education (49.3 percent of the sample had at leasta bachelor’s degree compared to 24.9 percent of the Swiss population) and age(sample mean of 32.89 vs. a population mean of 41.2 years at the end of 2008)(Bundesamt fur Statistik, 2009).

Experimental manipulation

We use populist speech as a treatment. As argued above, the combination ofconflicting emotions are expected to be an effective means of communication interms of boosting attention and persuasion. Participants completing the surveywere randomly assigned to one of eight treatment conditions; an additional groupserved as a control group. The eight treatment conditions result from manipulatingeach pro and contra side of the two initiatives with a populist tone (2 x 2 x 2design). Manipulating the contra side is necessary due to possible negativitiyeffects.

The populist scripts were designed according the populist technique of fosteringfear and a subsequent creation of a sense of unity among the perceived in-group.The treatments were loosely inspired by a viral video named “Heaven or Hell”produced by the Swiss People’s Party before the federal elections in 2007. This

10

video reflects the populist’s strategy: footage of youth and immigrants rioting isfollowed by images of an idealized Switzerland with showing beautiful landscapes,goats, and festivities. The treatments scripts were edited so that they containedthe same number of arguments. We manipulated the style of argumentation andpopulist cues (for an example, see Table 1; for a full translation of the scripts, seethe Appendix). The arguments were selected from each pro and contra camp of thetwo popular votes and were adapted to fit the populist style. Each script containstwo arguments, one referring to threats to the Swiss constitution, the other tophysical or financial threats. The arguments were derived from the websites ofboth of the initiative committees and their opponents.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Manipulation check

Following the advice of Brader (2005), we included a battery of questions towardsthe end of the survey in order to check whether and to what degree the treatmentelicited emotions. Assessing the arousal of emotions is important, as the liter-ature has increasingly emphasized that distinct emotions may result in differentbehavioral reactions (e.g. Steenbergen & Ellis, 2005).5 Usually, self-reports areused because one cannot infer the type and intensity of emotion experienced onthe basis of behavioral or physiological measures (Wirth & Schramm, 2005: 12).However, there are also some warnings warranted. First, much of our experiencesare unconscious and a reliable and veridical assessment is difficult (Lodge et al.,2006: 28). Second, emotions are not recalled equally. According to a review byWirth & Schemer (2005: 21), there is evidence to suggest that positive emotionsare recalled better than negative ones. Individuals also tend to underestimate theintensity of mixed emotions (Aaker et al., 2008) and age is likely to influence theirreports (cp. Isaacowitz, 2000).

TABLES 2a, 2b, 3 ABOUT HERE

Tables 2a and 2b present the entire sample’s means for different emotions bypopulist scripts as well as the results from an ANOVA testing all populist scriptsagainst their placebos. The negatively loaded emotions (i.e. anxiety, threat, worry,and anger) are experienced to a higher degree by individuals exposed to a populistscript. Of the three positively loaded emotions (i.e. enhancement, enthusiasm,and hope), populist scripts elicit on average significantly less hope. Differencesaccording to age groups and issues, are reported in the Appendix.

5We conducted a pre-test in which scripts were randomly distributed among a smallstudent sample (N = 13). We found that 9 out of 13 populist scripts elicited a self-reportedemotional reaction compared to only 5 out of 13 non-populist messages (Mpfeeling =1; Mnpfeeling = 0.5; t = −2.6458, p = .0033).

11

Building on attribution theory (Fletcher and Ross, 1985), we also included aquestion asking which objects specific emotions are directed at; the idea here is thatdifferent stimuli might generate different emotions (e.g. Marcus et al., 2005: 170).Table 3 shows that party communication can elicit emotions towards objects whichthe messages do not allude to. Specifically, emotions are often directed towardsthe sender of the message itself. The fact, that emotional messages draw attentionto personal characteristics instead of more substantial political issues is not a newfinding (cp. Marcus et al., 2005: 19). Significant differences between the populistscripts and their placebos are only found for worry (p < .05). Populist scripts seemto elicit worry against the message sender to a higher degree than their placebos,while the placebos tend to elicit emotions towards contents of the scripts (i.e. arms,muslims, initiatives).

In sum, the self-reported emotional arousals caused by populist messages seemto rather tap into what are often labeled “negative” emotions . However, they donot necessarily need to follow the intended direction of the message, since emotions- especially worry - are sometimes directed towards the party itself.

Results

This paper tests whether emotional appeals by populist parties inside and outsideof the executive branch (which we call insider and outsider populism respectively)affect behavioral reactions in the population differently. Three aspects of behav-ioral reactions towards populist speeches are considered. The first, the extent towhich subjects recall the content of the presented messages measures whether pop-ulist scripts foster citizens’ attention. Second, we measure information seeking inorder to assess whether or not subjects were motivated to search for additionalinformation. Both of these measures are important antecedents for persuasion.Third, this study assesses the persuasiveness of populist messages.

Attention to populist messages

Do subjects pay more or less attention to populist messages? If yes, are there anydifferences in effects between insider and outsider populist discourse? As arguedabove, populist messages do appeal to emotions, and since emotional events are re-called better compared to neutral ones (Klauer, 2004, cited in Wirth & Schramm,2005: 20), we expected to find that recall is enhanced by populist message contents.

In order to measure recall, we counted the recall of arguments (keywords) andsplit them into quartiles ranging from 1 to 4. Comparing the populist to all non-populist scripts, cross-tabulations do not reveal statistically significant differencesat first glance. Although recent experimental studies in political communicationhave only begun to focus analysis on different age groups, we provided theoreticalmotivation above for such focus (e.g. Drolet et al., 2007). As such, we split

12

the sample according to whether the subjects were 30 years old or younger.6 Apreliminary calculation shows that younger individuals recall information from thescripts generally better on average than subjects in the older sample (the averageof the younger subset’s five point scale interest scale is 2.54; the one from theolder subset is 2.01; F = (1, 452) = 21.90; p < 0.0001).7 This finding is in linewith Sears’ (1986) argument that younger individuals possess stronger informationprocessing skill.

Considering the idea of age related patterns in the context of populist com-munication reveals differences between populist and non-populist messages. Asshown in Table 4, older individuals process populist scripts more carefully thannon-populist scripts (F = (1, 160) = 2.741; p < 0.1).8 As can also be seen, youngerindividuals process populist scripts and their placebos in similar fashions.

Consider now the question of whether insider and outsider populist communi-cation affects individuals differently. Table 5 shows that scripts tailored towardsconvincing individuals to vote in favor of the initiative against the export of arms,fosters vigilance to a significantly higher degree than their placebos for the entiresample (mean of 2 vs. 2.4; F = (1, 137) = 4.79; p < 0.1). In contrast, populistscripts in favor of the initiative against the construction of minarets do not leadto different attentional reactions.9

The results indicate that populist communication is not equally effective. In-stead, it seems to be the case that issues and individual characteristics affectthe efficacy of populist rhetoric. We find that emotional cues foster attention,especially in older individuals, as predicted by findings from consumer research(Williams & Drolet, 2005). Additionally, populist outsider (left wing) messagestend to generally catch the public’s attention to a higher degree. A possible ex-planation might be the difference in the salience of the actual campaigns: thecampaign on the minaret initiative received considerably more media attentionthan the one banning arms exports (cp. Hirter & Vatter, 2010).

6This subsample also differs in terms of an enhanced political interest: on a 4 pointscale (ranging from 0 to 3) the average of the older sample amounts to 2.6, compared tothe younger sample’s average of 2.2 (F = (1, 520) = 34.50; p < 0.0001). The correlationof enhanced political interest with increasing age is a well-established finding in literature(Hirter & Vatter, 2010: 3).

7Although the data do not allow us to measure individuals’ exposure time to the treat-ment, the older subset spent significantly more time completing the survey (31 minutes)than the younger subset (27 minutes) (F = (1, 520) = 4.00; p = 0.06).

8Considering the different issues, with the exception of the initiative against the con-struction of minarets, where we do not find statistically significant differences, the olderage-group is more attentive to populist messages.

9Considering the two age groups, the described pattern holds. However, we find, in-terestingly, that populist communication can also lead to a reduction in individual’s at-tention. Populist scripts opposed to the initiative against the export of arms lead to areduced attention in individuals, equal or below 30 years (means of 2.7 vs. 2.2 respectively;F = (1, 61) = 4.00; p < 0.1).

13

TABLES 4, 5 ABOUT HERE

Information seeking

A second individual reaction towards political messages is the subsequent arousalof interest and a desire to search for additional information. The extent to whichan individual decides to search for further information on a given subject gener-ally depends on emotional reactions (e.g. Brader, 2005; Marcus et al., 2005). Weincluded a measure at the end of the experiment which asked individuals whetherthey wished to receive an information packet concerning the upcoming vote. As ar-gued above, we expect that populist messages foster a passive attitude in the needto search for additional information due to the reliance on the populist senderbecause the sender portrays himself as a provider of security (e.g. Oesterreich,2005). Indeed, the results displayed in Table 6 support this claim: populist mes-sages generally decrease interest. While roughly 60 percent of the subjects whowere exposed to a populist manipulation indicated a desire for further information,68 percent of the placebo group did so (note that exactly 50 percent of the controlgroup (N = 62) reported interest in additional information).

That much said, considering the four groups exposed to different types ofpopulist manipulations leads to more nuanced findings: the manipulated scriptsin favor of the initiative against the construction of minarets are the only scriptswhich elicit statistically significant differences in interest. While 53 percent of theindividuals receiving a populist treatment indicated a desire for more information,72 percent of the corresponding placebo group made such an indication (Table 7).

In line with previous research (e.g. Sears, 1986), younger individuals are gen-erally more inclined to search for additional information than older individuals:68 percent of the younger individuals requested further information while only52 percent of the older sample did so (Pearson Chi-Square (1, 521) = 12.4; p =0.001). The results suggest again that populist messages have differential effects onyounger and older populations. While there was barely an impact on the youngersubset,10 we find similar (significant) differences within the older subset as we dofor the entire sample on the minaret initiative.

In sum, populist messages in favor of the anti-minaret initiative foster passiv-ity towards further information; particularly in older individuals. The literatureon authoritarianism suggests that individuals tend to rely solely on the populistsender (e.g. Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Oesterreich, 2005). However, self-reportedemotional attributions suggest that worry is associated with populist messages’senders (cp. Table 3).

TABLES 6, 7 ABOUT HERE10The closest effect to a conventional threshold is found for the initiative against the

initiative against arms export (81 percent of 37 individuals exposed to a non-populist scriptrequested further information, while 64 percent of 25 individuals exposed to a populistmessage made such an indication; Pearson Chi-Square (1, 62) = 2.3; p = 0.13).

14

Persuasion

We measured two aspects of persuasion: whether subjects consider the messagesender as worthy of support by vote and whether they would vote in line with hismessage.

TABLES 8a, 8b, 9 ABOUT HERE

The first question we should address is whether participants would vote for theparty who they assumed had posted the message. Subjects did not know whichparty composed the message, but were asked after the presentation of the scripts,whether or not they would vote it. Pitting the populist against the non-populistscripts does not reveal a statistically significant pattern (not reported).11 However,splitting the sample by age group and issue leads to further insights: subjects 30or under show significant but varying patterns in differences between the populistscripts and placebos for both initiatives (see Table 8a and 8b, note that based onthe limited data available, the results have to be interpreted cautiously. Note alsothat the high percentage of votes opposed to the initiative against the construc-tion of minarets and in favor of the initiative against arms exports is related tothe voting behavior of the over-educated sample). The results shown in Table 8asuggest that populist scripts for the anti-minaret initiative lead to more supportfor the initiative compared to placebos. The opposite pattern is revealed in Table8b: the populist versions of the scripts for the arms export ban initiative fosterless party support than their placebos. While it is not surprising that youngerindividuals tend to be prone to persuasion, it remains an open question how wemight explain this reverse effect on the different issues. According to theory, sub-jects with authoritarian personalities seem to have stronger reactions to populism(e.g. Mudde, 2007: 219ff). There is much debate about the measurement of au-thoritarianism and its relation to different ideologies. We included an establishedmeasure of child-rearing values (cp. Feldman & Stenner, 2003), as we believe itto capture authoritarian predispositions unrelated to expressed ideological prefer-ences. Table 9 displays estimates of a logistic regression for the younger subset.This regression includes, some controls and an interaction term with a measure forauthoritarian predisposition and minaret-populism. The interaction term revealsa significant effect, while the same application to the initiative against arms exportdoes not yield a significant pattern. This suggests that younger individuals withhigher authoritarian predispositions confronted with populist cultural scripts aremore likely to vote for the sender party. However, the same mechanism does notapply to left wing outsider populism (not reported), where subjects evaluate a non-populist communication style as more convincing for party support independentof authoritarian predispositions.

11Also analyzing the populist messages by the different voting issues does not reveal anystatistical significant differences.

15

The second question we address is whether individuals vote in line with the pre-sented message contents. Combining all populist scripts and pitting them againsttheir placebos does not reveal significant differences. Again, the division by agegroups matters: Table 10a suggests that younger people are more likely to votein line with the populist messages compared to their placebos. Conversely, Table10b shows that this pattern does not hold for the older age group. This result isin line with theory, which emphasizes the plasticity of younger individuals (e.g.Sears, 1986).

Next, we examine the different effects of the initiatives in the entire sample.While the scripts for the initiative against arms exports do not elicit any statis-tically significant differences in reported voting compared to their placebos (notreported), we find significant differences for the scripts in favor of the initiativeagainst the construction of minarets. Table 11 reports that individuals exposedto such populist scripts are generally more likely to vote in favor of the initiativethan individuals exposed to a placebo. Applying the same model to the age sub-sets shows that this pattern only applies to the younger age group (see Table 12aand 12b). We included the same covariates in a logistic regression model as before(see Table 13), although we use a variable measuring whether subjects vote in linewith the party message (self report) as the dependent variable. However, the esti-mate for the interaction term between authoritarian predispositions and exposureto a populist script in favor of the minaret initiative falls far from a conventionalstatistically significant threshold. The result that authoritarian predispositions in-teracted with exposure to the populist anti-mineret message contribute positivelyto party choice but not for issue voting might be an important first finding forfurther experimentation.12

In sum, populist messages seem to be more persuasive for younger subjects.We also discovered that the salient right wing populist communication during thecampaign in favor of the initiative against the construction of minarets tends tobe more persuasive compared to its left wing counterpart, which, however, tendsto boost attention. The finding that specific messages with emotional languageinduce different behavioral reactions within an emotionally loaded campaign isremarkable and highlights the importance thereof: emotional language combinedwith salient heuristics - in the present case minarets - leads to different behavioralreactions than a placebo script referring solely to a heuristic itself.

Furthermore, our findings suggest different relationships and functions of au-thoritarian predispositions. Authoritarian predispositions seem to affect the youngersubset’s candidate choice, but not issue voting. These results are suggestive, butreplication with different subject samples is necessary to establish a robust result.

TABLES 10a, 10b, 11, 12 ABOUT HERE

12For scripts either opposed to the initiative against the construction of minarets oropposed to the initiative against arms export, we do not find any significant differences,neither for the whole sample nor for any of the two subgroups.

16

Conclusion

We took a first step in analyzing the effects of outsider and insider populist com-munication. The simultaneous 2009 votes on the two initiatives – against theconstruction of minarets and against arms exports in Switzerland – allowed usto examine such effects. The initiative against the construction of minarets waslargely promoted by insider right wing populist communication, while the initia-tive against arms exports provided us with a case of left wing outsider populism.We collected data from an online experiment shortly before the vote and manip-ulated scripts of populist speeches based on arguments within a real-world cam-paign. Highlighting the role of emotions in populist communication and designingour research accordingly, we examined three behavioral reactions towards populistmessages. Our results revealed subtile mechanisms of individuals’ reactions. Wefound that populist messages do not affect voters equally, but issues and traits(age and authoritarian predispositions) matter. It appears that outsider populist(left wing) messages tend to catch the public’s attention to a higher degree thaninsider populism; a result that we suspect to be affected by different levels of me-dia attention and individual’s saturation with populist right wing discourse in thereal world. Our results also indicate that populist messages foster attention espe-cially in individuals over 30; a finding which is supported by marketing research(Williams & Drolet, 2005). However, right wing insider populist communicationon the initiative against the construction of minarets fosters disinterest, especiallyin older individuals. We could not conclusively answer, whether this pattern is me-diated by the more intense attention older individuals typically dedicated to themessage, or the emotional language used by minaret-proponents in the real-worldcampaign and over-saturation of such discourse, interacted with the enhanced po-litical interest of older individuals, which fosters apathy. While the results of thisstudy suggest a special influence on the older subset with regard to informationprocessing, we cannot say conclusively that heightened attention persuades indi-viduals subsequently. Younger individuals tend to vote more for and in line withthe populist sender advocating the initiative against the construction of minarets.A first attempt to explain such reactions with individuals’ traits, suggests thatauthoritarian predispositions help to explain candidate’s choice, but not issue vot-ing. This shows that populist communication need not necessarily ties to markedauthoritarian predispositions in order to affect issue voting. This might be animportant clue for explaining differences in candidate and issue voting; it may alsobe the case that anti-immigrant parties do not have an entrenched constituency(Mudde, 2007: 225).

Experimental methods are a fruitful means by which to detect the subtle mech-anisms of emotions, inherent in populist rhetoric, which cannot be detect by surveyresearch. Though we have taken an important first step, many questions remain.Our results suggest that future studies in populist communication should focuson traits, such as age and gender. With regard to gender, Mudde’s (2007: 113)

17

review of micro-explanations for right wing populist support shows that while thepopulist party tends to have a largely male electorate, the attitudes of womentend to be even more xenophobic than those of men. In order to disentangle thegender related mechanisms of information processing and persuasion in populistmessages, further experimentation is necessary.

Overall, our results reflect the realized outcome of the 2009 vote in Switzerland.However, our results also allow refinements in terms of how populist communica-tion works within this setting. Leftist outsider populism tends to boost attention,but does not appear to be persuasive. We do not mean that the mainly leftistproponents exclusively used such a populist communication style, but rather weshowed that when applied, it does not lead to persuasion on average. The reversepattern is true for right wing insider populism. If we take the finding of Hirter &Vatter (2009) that the minaret initiative was supported mainly by lower educatedindividuals seriously (assuming that populist communication was indeed prevalentduring the campaign), our estimates of the effects of right wing insider populismare rather conservative due to the overeducated sample and the restriction to test-ing only one message.

18

References

Aaker, Jennifer, Drolet, Aimee & Dale Griffin (2008). Recalling Mixed Emotions.Journal of Consumer Research. 35: 268-278.

Albertazzi, Daniele & Duncan McDonnell (2008a). Introduction: The Sceptre andthe Spectre. In: Albertazzi, Daniele & Duncan McDonnell (eds.). Twenty-FirstCentury Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy. Hampshire andNew York: Palgrave Macmillan. 1-11.

Albertazzi, Daniele & Duncan McDonnell (2008b). Conclusion: Populism andTwenty-First Century Western European Democracy. In: Albertazzi, Daniele& Duncan McDonnell (eds.). Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre ofWestern European Democracy. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.217-223.

Armony, Ariel C. & Victor Armony (2005). Indictments, Myths, and CitizenMobilization in Argentina: A Discourse Analysis. Latin American Politics andSociety. 47(4): 27-54.

Basseches, Michael (2005). The Development of Dialectical Thinking as an Ap-proach to Integration. Integral review. 1: 47-63.

Bornschier, Simon (2005). Unis contre la mondialisation? Une analyse de laconvergence programmatique des partis populistes de droite europeens. Revueinternationale de politique comparee. 12(4): 415-432.

Brader, Ted (2005). Striking a Responsive Cord: How Political Ads Motivateand Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions. American Journal of PoliticalScience. 49(2): 388-405.

Brader, Ted (2006). Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appealsin Political Ads Work. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Brader, Ted, Valentino, Nicholas A. & Elizabeth Suhay (2008). What TriggersPublic Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and ImmigrationThreat. American Journal of Political Science. 52(4): 959-978.

Bundesamt fur Statistik (BFS) (ed.) (2009). Demografisches Portrat der Schweiz.Ausgabe 2009. Neuchatel: Office federal de la statistique (OFS).

Calhoun, Craig (1988). Populist Politics, Communications Media and Large ScaleSocietal Integration. Sociological Theory. 6(2): 219-241.

Canovan, Margaret (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces ofDemocracy. Political Studies. XLVII: 2-16.

19

De Raadt, Jasper, Hollanders, David & Andre Krouwel (2004). Varieties of Pop-ulism. An Analysis of the Programmatic Character of Six European Parties.(Working Papers Political Science No. 2004/04). Amsterdam: Department ofPolitical Science, Vrije Universiteit.

Di Tella, Torcuato S. (1997). Populism into the Twenty-First Century. Govern-ment and Opposition. 32: 187-200.

Drolet, Aimee, Williams, Patti & Loraine Lau-Gesk (2007). Age-Related Dif-ferences in Responses to Affective vs. Rational Ads for Hedonic vs. UtilitarianProducts. Marketing Letters. 18(4): 211-221.

Federal Department of Justice and Police (ed.). Popular InitiativeAgainst the Construction of Minarets. (Federal Council press confer-ence on the popular vote of 29 November 2009. Last modification:29.11.2009). Switzerland: Federal Department of Justice and Police.http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/dokumentation/red/2009/2009-11-29.html. Viewed: 16 January 2010.

Feldman, Stanley & Karen Stenner (1997). Perceived Threat and Authoritarian-ism. Political Psychology. 18(4): 741-770.

Hashtroudi, Shahin, Johnson, Marcia K., Vnek, Norbert, & Susan A. Ferguson(1994). Aging and the Effects of Affective and Factual Focus. Psychology andAging. 9(1): 160-170.

Hawkins, Kirk A. (2009). Is Chavez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse inComparative Perspective. Comparative Political Studies. 42(8): 1040-1067.

Heinisch, Reinhard (2003). Successs in Opposition - Failure in Government: Ex-plaining the Performance of Right Wing Populist Parties in Public Office. WestEuropean Politics. 26(3): 91-103.

Huddy, Leonie, Feldman, Stanley, Taber, Charles & Gallya Lahav (2005). Threat,Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies. American Journal of PoliticalScience. 49(3): 593-608.

Hutchings, Vincent L., Valentino, Nicholas A., Philpot, Tasha S., & Ismail K.White (2006). Racial Cues in Campaign News: The Effects of Candidate Strate-gies on Group Activation and Political Attentiveness Among African Americans.In: Redlawsk, David P. (ed.). Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political InformationProcessing. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 165-186.

Isaacowitz, Derek M., Susan Turk-Charles, & Laura L. Carstensen (2000). Emo-tion and Cognition. In: Fergus Craik & Timothy Salthouse (eds.). Handbook ofAging and Cognition. (2nd edition). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 593- 631.

20

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth (2008). Populists in Power. Attitudes Towards ImmigrantsAfter the Austrian Freedom Party Entered Government. In Deschouwer, Kris(ed.). New Parties in Government: In Power for the First Time. London: Rout-ledge/ECPR Studies in European Science.

Jagers, Jan & Stefaan Walgrave (2007). Populism as Political CommunicationStyle: An Empirical Study of Political Parties’ Discourse in Belgium. EuropeanJournal of Political Research. 46(3): 319-345.

Kriesi, Hanspeter (2005). The Mobilization of the Political Potentials Linkedto European Integration by National Political Parties. (Paper presented at theConference on ”Euroscepticism”, at the Pulitzer Hotel, Amsterdam, July 1 and2, 2005).

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Grande, Edgar, Lachat, Romain, Dolezal, Martin, Bornschier,Simon & Timotheos Frey (2005). Globalization and the Transformation of the Na-tional Political Space. Six European Countries Compared. (Cahier de recherche.Working Paper).

Krosnick, Jon A. & Duane F. Alwin (1989). Aging and Susceptibility to AttitudeChange. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 57: 416-425.

Lazarus, Richard S. (2001). Relational Meaning and Discrete Emotions. In:Scherer, Klaus R., Schorr, Angela & Tom Johnstone. Appraisal Processes in Emo-tion: Theory, Methods, Research. New York: Oxford University Press. 37-67.

Lodge, Milton, Taber, Charles & Christopher Weber (2006). First Steps Towarda Dual-Process Accessibility Model of Political Beliefs, Attitudes, and Bevhav-ior. In: Redlawsk, David P. Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political InformationProcessing. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 11-30.

Longchamp, Claude, Golder, Lukas, Agosti, Stefan, Tschope, Stephan & JonasKocher (2009). ”Minarett-Initiative”: Ja nimmt zu. Nein unverandert starker.Initiative fur Kriegsmaterial-Exportverbot: Ablehnung zeichnet sich ab. Bern:Gfs.bern. Forschung fur Politik, Kommunikation und Gesellschaft.

Marcus, George E., Sullivan, John L., Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth & Daniel Stevens(2005). The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrin-sic Anxiety on the Formation of Political Tolerance Judgments. Political Psychol-ogy. 26(6): 949-963.

Marcus, George E., Neuman, Russell W. & Michael Mackuen (2000). AffectiveIntelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago and London: The University ofChicago Press.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro (2003). The Media and the Growth of Neo-Populism inContemporary Democracies. In: Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, Stewart, Julianne &

21

Bruce Horsfield (eds.). The Media and Neo-Populism. A Contemporary Com-parative Analysis. Westport: Praeger. 1-20.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro (2008). Populism and the Media. In: Albertazzi, Daniele& Duncan McDonnell (eds.). Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre ofWestern European Democracy. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.49-64.

Meny, Yves & Yves Surel (2002). The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism. In:Meny, Yves & Yves Surel (eds.). Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Hamp-shire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 1-21.

Meyer, Thomas (2006). Populismus und Medien. In: Decker, Franz (ed.). Pop-ulismus. Gefahr fur die Demokratie oder nutzliches Korrektiv? Wiesbaden: VSVerlag fur Sozialwissenschaften. 81-96.

Moser, Peter (2009). Minarettinitiative und Regierungsratsersatzwahl. Eine Anal-yse der Zurcher Resultate der Urnengange vom 29.11.2009. (Statistik.info 12/09).Zurich: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zurich.

Mudde, Cas (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition. 39: 541-563.

Mudde, Cas (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press.

Neblo, Michael A. (2007). Philosophical Psychology with Political Intent. In:Neuman, Russell W., Marcus, George E., Crigler, Ann N. & Michael MacKuen.The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior.Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 25-47.

Neuman, Russell W., Marcus, George E., Crigler, Ann N. & Michael MacKuen(2007). Theorizing Affect’s Effects. In: Neuman, Russell W., Marcus, George E.,Crigler, Ann N. & Michael MacKuen. The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotionin Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.1-20.

Oceja, Luis & Pilar Carrera (2009). Beyond a Single Pattern of Mixed EmotionalExperience. Sequential, Prevalence, Inverse, and Simultaneous. European Journalof Psychological Assessment. 25(1): 58-67.

Oesterreich, Detlef (2005). Flight into Security: A New Approach and Measureof the Authoritarian Personality. Political Psychology. 26(2): 275-297.

Ross, Michael & Garth J.O. Fletcher (1985). Attribution and Social Perception.(Chapter 15). In: Lindzey, Gardner & Elliot Aronson (eds.). The Handbook ofSocial Psychology (3rd ed., Vol. 2). New York: Random House. 73-122.

22

Ryser, Mirjam (2010). Populist Communication: An Empirical Study of Contex-tual Differences in Switzerland. (Under review).

Sears, David. O. (1968). The Paradox of De Facto Selective Exposure WithoutPreferences for Supportive Information. In: R. Abelson, W. J.Revision, McGuire,T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (eds.). Theories ofCognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook. Chicago: Rand-McNally. 777-787.

Sears, David. O. (1986). College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of aNarrow Data Base on Social Psychology’s View of Human Nature. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology. 51(3): 515-530.

Statham, Paul & Ruud Koopmans (2009). Political Party Contestation OverEurope in the Mass Media: Who Criticizes Europe, How, and Why? EuropeanPolitical Science Review. 1(3): 435-463.

Steenbergen, Marco R. & Chris Ellis (2006). Fear and Loathing in AmericanElections: Context, Traits, and Negative Candidate Affect. In: Redlawsk, DavidP. (ed.). Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing. New York:Palgrave Macmillan. 109-134.

Stewart, Julianne, Mazzoleni, Gianpietro & Bruce Horsfield (2003). Conclusion:Power to the Media Managers. In: Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, Stewart, Julianne &Bruce Horsfield (eds.). The Media and Neo-Populism. A Contemporary Compar-ative Analysis. Westport: Praeger. 217-238.

Taggart, Paul (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Visser, Penny S. & Jon Krosnick (1998). Development of Attitude Strength Overthe Life Cycle: Surge and Decline. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.75 (6): 1389-1410.

Weyland, Kurt (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Studyof Latin American Politics. Comparative Politics. 34(1): 1-22.

Williams, Patti, & Aaker, Jennifer L. (2002). Can Mixed Emotions PeacefullyCoexist? Journal of Consumer Research. 28: 636-649.

Williams, Patti, & Drolet, Aimee (2005). Age-Related Differences in Responsesto Emotional Advertisements. Journal of Consumer Research. 32: 343-354.

Wirth, Werner & Holger Schramm (2005). Media and Emotions. CommunicationResearch. 24(3): 3-39.

23

Tables

Table 1. Example populist and placebo script in favor of the initiative against the construction of minarets.

Populist script Placebo script

"We want to ban minarets! Minarets pose a major threat

to our country. Islam increasingly crowds out the central

values of the Swiss tradition, such as liberty and

individual esteem. Our constitution, which is carried by

the people, is being trampled by Sharia law!

"Minarets should be banned from Switzerland. Islam

impinges on the central traditional values of

Switzerland, such as liberty and individual esteem.

Sharia law is not compatible with the constitution.

Minarets bookmark our landscape: Islam has arrived

and wants to play a central role in public life! Islam

threatens our country and society: worldwide, people

are suppressed, robbed, or killed in the name of Islam.

Minarets bookmark the landscape and symbolize the

spread of Islam.

Our party defends and protects the values of our

citizens and proclaims a unified culture. Let's look to a

bright future! Together we can beat every minaret. Let's

foster a culture of liberty and equality! Vote with us and

the people "yes"!"

Our party values cultural protection. It also fosters

liberty and equality. Thus, vote "yes"."

24

Table 2a. Validation emotional contents of populist vs. placebo scripts (Means of self-reports).

Anxiety Threat Worry Anger Enhancement Enthusiasm Hope

Placebo scripts Mean 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.7

N 229 229 228 227 226 227 226

Std. Deviation 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.7 1.0

Populist scripts Mean 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.6

N 213 213 214 214 212 213 212

Std. Deviation 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8

Total Mean 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.7

N 442 442 442 441 438 440 438

Std. Deviation 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.9

Table 2b. Validation emotional contents of populist vs. placebo scripts (ANOVA of self-reports)..

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

Anxiety * Populism Between Groups 2.8 1 2.8 4.36 0.04

Within Groups 277.7 440 0.6

Total 280.5 441

Threat* Populism Between Groups 2.7 1 2.7 3.29 0.07

Within Groups 361.0 440 0.8

Total 363.7 441

Worry* Populism Between Groups 3.0 1 3.0 2.56 0.11

Within Groups 517.1 440 1.2

Total 520.1 441

Anger* Populism Between Groups 4.3 1 4.3 3.22 0.07

Within Groups 580.9 439 1.3

Total 585.2 440

Enhancement* Populism Between Groups 0.1 1 0.1 0.05 0.83

Within Groups 560.9 436 1.3

Total 561.0 437

Enthusiasm* Populism Between Groups 0.8 1 0.8 1.50 0.22

Within Groups 231.0 438 0.5

Total 231.8 439

Hope * Populism Between Groups 2.8 1 2.8 3.19 0.08

Within Groups 377.2 436 0.9

Total 380.0 437

Note: Significant differences in means (ANOVA) are shaded as follows: p <.01 (grey), p <.05 (fair grey), p<0.1 (dotted).

25

Table

3.

Att

ribution o

f dis

tinct

em

otions (

counts

of

self-r

eport

s a

nd c

olu

mn p

erc

enta

ges).

An

xie

tyTh

reat

Wo

rry

An

ger

En

han

cem

en

tEn

thu

sia

sm

Ho

pe

Pla

cebo

Populism

Pla

cebo

Populism

Pla

cebo

Populism

Pla

cebo

Populism

Pla

cebo

Populism

Pla

cebo

Populism

Pla

cebo

Populism

Party

811

11

11

713

15

22

58

04

58

18.6

%32.4

%27.5

%33.3

%10.6

%29.5

%25.4

%40.0

%10.6

%21.1

%0.0

%19.0

%12.2

%24.2

%

In

itia

tive

52

30

14

56

21

01

19

9

11.6

%5.9

%7.5

%0.0

%21.2

%11.4

%10.2

%3.6

%2.1

%0.0

%5.3

%4.8

%22.0

%27.3

%

Messag

e c

on

ten

t 6

56

411

37

64

31

11

1

"vio

len

ce"

14.0

%14.7

%15.0

%12.1

%16.7

%6.8

%11.9

%10.9

%8.5

%7.9

%5.3

%4.8

%2.4

%3.0

%

Messag

e c

on

ten

t 3

47

45

33

11

10

00

1

"cu

ltu

re"

7.0

%11.8

%17.5

%12.1

%7.6

%6.8

%5.1

%1.8

%2.1

%2.6

%0.0

%0.0

%0.0

%3.0

%

Oth

er

15

712

11

18

15

14

13

33

25

15

14

23

10

34.9

%20.6

%30.0

%33.3

%27.3

%34.1

%23.7

%23.6

%70.2

%65.8

%78.9

%66.7

%56.1

%30.3

%

Evalu

ati

ve c

om

men

ts6

51

311

514

11

31

21

34

14.0

%14.7

%2.5

%9.1

%16.7

%11.4

%23.7

%20.0

%6.4

%2.6

%10.5

%4.8

%7.3

%12.1

%

To

tal

43

34

40

33

66

44

59

55

47

38

19

21

41

33

100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%100.0

%

Note

: The s

ignific

ant

diffe

rences o

f "w

orr

y"

are

shaded in f

air g

rey (

p <

.05)

(fair g

rey)

(Pears

on C

hi-

Square

(3,

110)

= 9

.091;a

p =

0.0

28).

a 0

cells (

,0%

) have e

xpecte

d c

ount

less t

han 5

. The m

inim

um

expecte

d c

ount

is 6

,40.

26

Table 4. Effects of populist scripts on vigilance crossed by age groups.Under or equal 30 years Above 30 yearsMean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation

Placebo scripts 2.6 150 1.0 2.0 88 0.9Populist scripts 2.5 141 1.1 2.2 73 1.0Total 2.5 291 1.1 2.1 161 1.0Note: ANOVA for individuals under or equal 30 years: F = (1, 291) = 0.21; p = 0.7; for individuals above 30 years: F = (1, 161) = 2.7; p = 0.1.

Table 5. Effects of populist scripts on vigilance crossed by issues.Pro against arms exports Pro against the construction of minaretsMean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation

Placebo scripts 2.0 62 1.0 2.1 63 1.0Populist scripts 2.4 76 1.1 2.3 62 1.1Total 2.3 138 1.1 2.2 125 1.0Note: ANOVA for individuals exposed to arms' scripts: F = (1, 138) = 4.8; p = 0.03; for individuals exposed to minarets' scripts: F = (1, 125) = 1.3; p = 0. 3.

27

Table 6. Information seeking after exposure to populist and placebo scripts (counts of self-reports and column percentages).Placebo scripts Populist scripts Total

No information seeking 77 88 16532.0% 40.4% 35.9%

Information seeking 164 130 29468.0% 59.6% 64.1%

Total 241 218 459100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 459) = 3.5; p = 0.06. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 78,4.

Table 7. Information seeking after exposure to populist and placebo scripts in favor of the initiative against the construction of minarets (counts of self-reports and column percentages).

Placebo scripts Populist scripts TotalNo information seeking 15 28 43

27.8% 47.5% 38.1%Information seeking 39 31 70

72.2% 52.5% 61.9%Total 54 59 113

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 113) = 4.6; p = 0.03. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20,6.

28

Table 8a. Persuasion to vote for the sender party in younger subsample after exposure to scripts in favor of the initiative against the construction of minarets (counts and cell percentages).

Placebo scripts Populist scripts TotalNo 33 25 58

94.30% 75.80% 85.30%Yes 2 8 10

5.70% 24.20% 14.70%Total 35 33 68

100.00% 100.00% 100.00%Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 68) = 4.7; p = 0.03).1 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,9.

Table 8b. Persuasion to vote for the sender party in younger subsample after exposure to scripts in favor of the initiative against arms exports (counts and cell percentages).

Placebo scripts Populist scripts TotalNo 8 22 30

26.70% 45.80% 38.50%Yes 22 26 48

73.30% 54.20% 61.50%Total 30 48 78

100.00% 100.00% 100.00%Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 78) = 2.9; p = 0.01). 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11,6.

the initiative against arms export (counts and cell percentages).Estimate Std. Error Z value P value

Intercept -1.6 2.5 -0.65 0.52Education -0.65 0.48 -1.38 0.17Income 0.27 0.23 1.2 0.23Sex 2.77 1.28 2.16 0.03Minarett Populism -0.69 1.4 -0.5 0.62Autoritarian Pred. -1.1 1.29 -0.86 0.39Min. Pop. : Aut. Pred. 2.4 1.42 1.68 0.09

Table 9. Estimates of a logistic regression on vote for message sender after exposure to scripts in favor of

Note: N = 59; AIC = 50.6; significant treshold are shaded as follows: p <.01 (grey), p <.05 (fair grey), p <0.1 (dotted).

29

Table 10a. Voting in line with populist and placebo scripts in the age group "under or equal to 30 years" (counts and column percentages).Placebo scripts Populist scripts Total

Vote not in line with scripts 78 57 13556.10% 44.20% 50.40%

Vote in line with scripts 61 72 13343.90% 55.80% 49.60%

Total 139 129 268100.00% 100.00% 100.00%

Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 268) = 3.8;a p = 0.05. a 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 64,0.

Table 10b. Voting in line with populist and placebo scripts in the age group "above 30 years" (counts and column percentages).Placebo scripts Populist scripts Total

Vote not in line with scripts 44 36 8052.40% 53.70% 53.00%

Vote in line with scripts 40 31 7147.60% 46.30% 47.00%

Total 84 67 151100.00% 100.00% 100.00%

Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 151) = 0.027;a p = 0.9. a 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31,5.

Table 11. Voting in line with populist and placebo scripts in favor of the minaret initiative (counts and column percentages).Placebo scripts Populist scripts Total

Vote not in line with scripts 46 38 8483.6% 69.1% 76.40%

Vote in line with scripts 9 17 2616.4% 30.9% 23.60%

Total 55 55 110100.0% 100.0% 100.00%

Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 110) = 3.2;a p = 0.07. a 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13,0.

Table 12a. Voting in line with populist and placebo scripts in favor of the minaret initiative according to age group "under or equal to 30 years" (counts and column percentages).

Placebo scripts Populist scripts TotalVote not in line with scripts 29 19 48

93.5% 65.5% 80.00%Vote in line with scripts 2 10 12

6.5% 34.5% 20.00%Total 31 29 60

100.0% 100.0% 100.00%Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, N = 60) = 7.4.a P = 0.007. a 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,8.Chi-Square Tests

Table 12b. Voting in line with (populist) scripts in favor of the minaret initiative according to age group "above 30 years" (counts and column percentages).

Placebo scripts Populist scripts TotalVote not in line with scripts 15 17 32

78.9% 70.8% 74.40%Vote in line with scripts 4 7 11

21.1% 29.2% 25.60%Total 19 24 43

100.0% 100.0% 100.00%Note: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 43) = 0.37;a p = 0.55. a 1 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,9.

Table 13. Estimates of a logistic regression on vote in line with scrtips in favor of the minaret initiative.Estimate Std. Error Z value P value

Intercept -5.1 2.92 -1.74 0.08Education -0.48 0.51 -0.94 0.34Income 0.04 0.25 0.16 0.87Sex 4.12 1.78 2.32 0.02Minaret Populism 0.7 1.86 0.38 0.7Autoritarian Pred. 0.72 0.85 0.85 0.39Min. Pop. : Aut. Pred. 1.64 1.34 1.23 0.22Note: N = 59; AIC = 46.3; significant treshold are shaded as follows: p <.01 (grey), p <.05 (fair grey), p<0.1 (dotted).

30

Appendix

Manipulation check

Since certain patterns might be covered by combining the different populist scripts,we split the sample into subsets. Considering the different issues, we find thatpopulist scripts in favor of the initiative against the construction of minarets elicitmore enthusiasm (although barely significant; the p-value of anxiety amounts to0.13; see Table Aa and Ab). Splitting the sample in subsets according to age (seeTable Ba and Bb) additional to enhancement, hope (p = 0.11) and threat (p =0.12) are to a higher degree reported after being exposed to a populist script (notethat not a single emotion of the older age group, i.e. above 30 years old, is closeto significant threshold).13

Populists scripts in favor of the initiative against the export of arms do not elicitsignificantly more emotions than their placebos (Table C).

13Examining different emotional reactions according to the two age groups shows thatwith the exception of “anger,” where younger individuals report a higher average (1.2)than the older subset (0.9) F = (1, 435) = 5.9; p = 0.02, differences between age groupsare not statistically significant.

31

Table Aa. Validation emotional contents of scripts in favor of the initative against the construction of minarets (means of self-reports).

Anxiety Threat Worry Anger Enhancement Enthusiasm Hope Placebo scripts Mean 0.55 0.89 1.58 1.65 0.27 0.17 0.23

N 53 53 52 52 51 52 52Std. Deviation 0.774 0.993 1.126 1.219 0.802 0.43 0.614

Populist scripts Mean 0.81 1.03 1.71 1.58 0.78 0.37 0.34N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59Std. Deviation 1.042 1.082 1.204 1.117 1.084 0.763 0.685

Total Mean 0.69 0.96 1.65 1.61 0.55 0.28 0.29N 112 112 111 111 110 111 111Std. Deviation 0.93 1.039 1.165 1.161 0.992 0.635 0.652

Table Ab. Validation emotional contents of scripts in favor of the initative against the construction of minarets (ANOVA of self-reports).

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Anxiety * Populism Between Groups 1.981 1 1.981 2.317 0.131

Within Groups 94.081 110 0.855Total 96.063 111

Threat* Populism Between Groups 0.604 1 0.604 0.557 0.457Within Groups 119.253 110 1.084Total 119.857 111

Worry* Populism Between Groups 0.503 1 0.503 0.369 0.545Within Groups 148.794 109 1.365Total 149.297 110

Anger* Populism Between Groups 0.166 1 0.166 0.122 0.727Within Groups 148.176 109 1.359Total 148.342 110

Enhancement* PopulismBetween Groups 6.98 1 6.98 7.517 0.007Within Groups 100.292 108 0.929Total 107.273 109

Enthusiasm* PopulismBetween Groups 1.103 1 1.103 2.782 0.098Within Groups 43.239 109 0.397Total 44.342 110

Hope * Populism Between Groups 0.324 1 0.324 0.76 0.385Within Groups 46.451 109 0.426Total 46.775 110

Note: Significant differences in means (ANOVA) are shaded as follows: p <.01 (grey), p <.05 (fair grey), p<0.1 (dotted).

Table Ba. Validation emotional contents of sub-sample (below, or equal the age of 30) of scripts in favor of the initative against the construction of minarets (Means of self-reports).

Anxiety Threat Worry Anger Enhancement Enthusiasm Hope Placebo scripts Mean 0.54 0.71 1.53 1.82 0.03 0.15 0.12

N 35 35 34 34 34 34 34Std. Deviation 0.78 0.926 1.134 1.193 0.171 0.359 0.327

Populist scripts Mean 0.75 1.09 1.59 1.63 0.75 0.34 0.34N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32Std. Deviation 0.916 1.027 1.188 1.1 1.164 0.827 0.745

Total Mean 0.64 0.9 1.56 1.73 0.38 0.24 0.23N 67 67 66 66 66 66 66Std. Deviation 0.847 0.987 1.152 1.144 0.89 0.634 0.576

Table Bb. Validation emotional contents of sub-sample (below, or equal the age of 30) of scripts in favor of the initative against the construction of minarets (ANOVA of self-reports).

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Anxiety * Populism Between Groups 0.717 1 0.717 0.999 0.321

Within Groups 46.686 65 0.718Total 47.403 66

Threat* Populism Between Groups 2.407 1 2.407 2.529 0.117Within Groups 61.862 65 0.952Total 64.269 66

Worry* Populism Between Groups 0.068 1 0.068 0.051 0.823Within Groups 86.189 64 1.347Total 86.258 65

Anger* Populism Between Groups 0.65 1 0.65 0.492 0.485Within Groups 84.441 64 1.319Total 85.091 65

Enhancement* PopulismBetween Groups 8.56 1 8.56 12.749 0.001Within Groups 42.971 64 0.671Total 51.53 65

Enthusiasm* PopulismBetween Groups 0.638 1 0.638 1.602 0.21Within Groups 25.483 64 0.398Total 26.121 65

Hope * Populism Between Groups 0.843 1 0.843 2.6 0.112Within Groups 20.748 64 0.324Total 21.591 65

Note: Significant differences in means (ANOVA) are shaded as follows: p <.01 (grey), p <.05 (fair grey), p<0.1 (dotted).

Table C. Validation emotional contents of scripts in favor of the initative against arms exports (means of self-reports). Anxiety Threat Worry Anger Enhancement Enthusiasm Hope

Placebo scripts Mean 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.69 1.37 0.4 0.94N 50 50 50 49 49 50 50Std. Deviation 0.639 0.782 0.926 1.004 1.093 0.67 0.913

Populist scripts Mean 0.46 0.55 1.07 0.93 1.28 0.54 0.83N 67 67 68 68 67 67 66Std. Deviation 0.725 0.803 0.951 1.012 1.098 0.876 0.97

Total Mean 0.44 0.57 1.13 0.83 1.32 0.48 0.88N 117 117 118 117 116 117 116Std. Deviation 0.687 0.791 0.939 1.011 1.092 0.794 0.943

Note: None of the differences in means (ANOVA) are significant (table not reported). With the exception of "anxiety" in the older subset, (placebo scripts (0.2) vs. populist scripts (0.5); F = (1, 41) = 2.9: p = 0.096), none of the differences in means in the subsets is significant.

32

Question wording of manipulated scripts (translationfrom German)

1) Initiative against the construction of minarets

“Right-national groups launched an initiative against minarets. This poses a hugethreat to our country! The initiative breaks with the central values of our Swisstradition, such as anti-discrimination laws and the protection of religious liberties.Our constitution, which is carried by the people, is being trampled: banning sa-cred buildings - no matter of which religion - threatens our consitution.

The initiative also fosters the spread of negative stereotypes about Islam. Al-ready the initiative has caused reactions in the Islamic world! Moderate muslimsare offended and terrorist groups will gain support and come to threaten our coun-try and its people!

Our party defends and protects the values of our citizens and practices respon-sible politics. Let’s look to a bright future! We call for a tolerant society. Let’sfoster a culture of solidarity and diversity! Vote with us and the people “no”!”

“Right-national groups launched an initiative against minarets.

The initiatives breaks with central values, such as the anti-discrimination lawand religious liberties. Banning sacred buildings - no matter of which religion -is not compatible with our consitution. The initiative also fosters the spread ofnegative stereotypes about Islam.

Our party practices responsible politics. It also fosters a tolerant society anda culture of solidarity and diversity. Thus, vote “no”.”

“We want to ban minarets! Minarets pose a major threat to our country. Islamincreasingly crowds out the central values of the Swiss tradition, such as libertyand individual esteem. Our constitution, which is carried by the people, is beingtrampled by Sharia law!

Minarets bookmark our landscape: Islam has arrived and wants to play a cen-tral role in public life! Islam threatens our country and society: worldwide, peopleare suppressed, robbed, or killed in the name of Islam.

Our party defends and protects the values of our citizens and proclaims a uni-fied culture. Let’s look to a bright future! Together we can beat every minaret.Let’s foster a culture of liberty and equality! Vote with us and the people “yes”!”

“Minarets should be banned from Switzerland. Islam impinges on the central tra-

33

ditional values of Switzerland, such as liberty and individual esteem. Sharia lawis not compatible with the constitution.

Minarets bookmark the landscape and symbolize the spread of Islam.

Our party values cultural protection. It also fosters liberty and equality. Thus,vote “yes”.”

2) Initiative against arms exports

“We are against the export of arms from Switzerland to Pakistan! The good repu-tation of our country is threatened. The arms exports threaten the central valuesof the Swiss tradition, such as neutrality and humanity. Our constitution, whichis carried by the people, is being trampled by a policy of arms exportation!

Arms exportation is one of the least secure and most risky business. Our jobsare threatened by this dirty business with dead!

Our party defends and protects the values of our citizens and practices respon-sible politics. Let’s look to bright future! We call for a peaceful society. Let’sfoster a culture of solidarity and peace! Vote with us and the people “yes”!”

“Switzerland should not export arms to Pakistan. Exporting arms breaks withtraditional values, such as neutrality and humanity. Arms exportation is not com-patible with our constitution.

Arms exports is one of the least secure and most risky business.

Our party practices responsible politics. It also fosters solidarity and peace.Thus, vote “yes”.”

“Leftist groups have launched an initiative against exporting arms. This is a majorthreat to our country! The initiative breaks with the central values of our Swisstradition, such as self-determination and independence! Our constitution, whichis carried by the people, is being trampled: the army gets robbed and can’t do itsjob anymore.

These days, we are threatened by increasing unemployment! If the initiativepasses, thousands of additional jobs would disappear and Swiss companies wouldgo bankrupt. The security of our country, economy, and people is endangered!

Our party defends and protects the values of our citizens and believes in aunified culture. Let’s look to a bright future! We stand for security. Let’s foster a

34

culture of liberty and independence! Vote with us and the people “no”!”

“Leftist groups have launched an initative against exporting arms. The initiativeimpinges on traditional values, such as self-determination and independence. Thearmy won’t be able to do its job and the constitution is violated.

The initiative will also lead to increased unemployment.

Our party values the protection of jobs. It also fosters security, liberty, andindependence. Thus, vote “no”.”

35