The Eritrean Conflict: -Ethiopian Border Part 1-Events’ ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia October 1998 By Marc Michaelson May 6,1998 was a fateful day for Ethiopia and Eritrea, the impact of which will be felt for years to come. The events that took place on that day near Badime, a village near the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, have seriously damaged relations between the two countries. Their once-friendly leaders are no longer talking, cooperation between their governments has ceased, and tension is rising be- tween their peoples. The euphoria of peace lasted only seven years, having now dissipated into a new round of fighting, destruction and displacement. Old wounds have been reopened, and tragically, history is repeating itself. As with much of the current conflict, the two governments’ official ver- sions of May 6th are somewhat different. According to Ethiopia, a few Eritrean’ military officials attempted to cross the border with their weapons. The Ethio- pian authorities insisted they leave their guns on the Eritrean side of the bor- der. They refused and opened fire on the local police and militia; a shoot-out ensued and both sides sustained casualties. In the Eritrean account, the small Eritrean delegation was en route to discuss border issues with local Ethiopian authori- ties. Such discussions were commonplace. But on that da say the Eritreans, the Ethiopian militia shot down three Eritrean military officers in cold blood. The precise events of May 6th are disputed, but ultimately who fired first, who provoked whom, who was right and who was wrong, are irrelevant. May 6th was a trigger event. The deaths of those three Eritrean mih’tary officials set off a domino-like reaction of attacks and counter-attacks, claims and counter-claims. The Eritrean Account: Re-Taking Ethiopian-Occupied Territory According to the Eritrean government, Ethiopia has been administering significant tracts of Eritrean territory, specifically in the Badime and Aliteina areas, since Eritrea’s independence in 1993. However, in the interest of main- taining strong relations with Ethiopia and pursuing imperatives of reconstruc- tion and development, the Eritrean authorities decided not to push the border issue. Relations between the two governments were close, and Eritrea assumed that eventually they would negotiate and finalize the border demarcation. Over the past few years, Eritreans living in border towns complained of mistreatment at the hands of Ethiopian authorities. Despite these complaints, the Eritrean government issued no formal protests to the Ethiopian government until August 16, 1997. On that day, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki wrote to This is the first of a two part series on the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict. Part 1 describes the conflict events and peace initiatives from both Ethiopian and Eritrean perspectives. Part 2 explores the background and causes of the conflict.
Transcript
The EritreanConflict:
-Ethiopian BorderPart 1-Events’
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia October 1998
By Marc Michaelson
May 6,1998 was a fateful day for Ethiopia and Eritrea, the impact of whichwillbe felt for years to come. The events that took place on that day near Badime,a village near the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, have seriously damaged relationsbetween the two countries. Their once-friendly leaders are no longer talking,cooperation between their governments has ceased, and tension is rising be-tween their peoples. The euphoria of peace lasted only seven years, havingnow dissipated into a new round of fighting, destruction and displacement.Old wounds have been reopened, and tragically, history is repeating itself.
As with much of the current conflict, the two governments’ official ver-sions of May 6th are somewhat different. According to Ethiopia, a few Eritrean’
military officials attempted to cross the border with their weapons. The Ethio-
pian authorities insisted they leave their guns on the Eritrean side of the bor-der. They refused and opened fire on the local police and militia; a shoot-outensued and both sides sustained casualties. In the Eritrean account, the smallEritrean delegationwasenroute to discussborder issueswithlocal Ethiopian authori-ties. Such discussions were commonplace. But on that da say the Eritreans, theEthiopian militia shot down three Eritrean military officers in cold blood.
The precise events of May 6th are disputed, but ultimately who fired first,who provoked whom, who was right and who was wrong, are irrelevant. May6th was a trigger event. The deaths of those three Eritrean mih’tary officials set off adomino-like reaction of attacks and counter-attacks, claims and counter-claims.
The Eritrean Account: Re-Taking Ethiopian-Occupied Territory
According to the Eritrean government, Ethiopia has been administeringsignificant tracts of Eritrean territory, specifically in the Badime and Aliteinaareas, since Eritrea’s independence in 1993. However, in the interest of main-taining strong relations with Ethiopia and pursuing imperatives of reconstruc-tion and development, the Eritrean authorities decided not to push the borderissue. Relations between the two governments were close, and Eritrea assumedthat eventually they would negotiate and finalize the border demarcation.
Over the past few years, Eritreans living in border towns complained ofmistreatment at the hands of Ethiopian authorities. Despite these complaints,the Eritrean government issued no formal protests to the Ethiopian governmentuntil August 16, 1997. On that day, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki wrote to
This is the first of a two part series on the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict. Part 1describes the conflict events and peace initiatives from both Ethiopian and Eritrean
perspectives. Part 2 explores the background and causes of the conflict.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi protesting theEthiopian army’s occupation of Adi-Murug (Bada) ineastern Eritrea in July 1997, dismantling the existing Eri-trean administration and installing a new Ethiopian ad-ministration. In the letter, Isaias suggested the two sidestake rapid action to demarcate the bolder. Meles’ responsea few days later explained that the Ethiopian army hadentered the areatopursueAfaroppositionelementswhoweredestabilizing the region. Ultimately, the two Sides agreedto revive a high-level joint committee to resolve the borderissues.
The Eritreans claim there were other border incur-sions in the Badime area, and that authorities of the north-ern Ethiopia province of Tigray were pushing the borderprogressively deeper into Eritrean territory. For the Eri-treans, the May 6th incident was the proverbial straw thatbroke the camel’s back. The Eritrean Defense Force, seem-ingly prepared for just such an operation, attacked Ethio-pian positions in Badime on May 12th and assumed con-trol of the area. Eritrea explains these operations as re-taking control of Eritrean territories that Ethiopia hadwrongfully occupied earlier.
aimed at protecting Eritrean territory from Tigrayanaggression.
The Ethiopian Account: Eritrean Invasion
The Ethiopian explanation of events is much simpler.According to Ethiopia, the Eritrean attacks on May 12thwere an invasion, pure and simple.
Ethiopian government officials assert that "the bor-ders between Ethiopia and Eritrea are not fully delim-ited and demarcated," and that there havebeen "disputedlocalities. "5 However, for the most part, they haveavoided discussing any incursions or specific events oc-
curring before May 6th. The bottom line is that Ethiopiawas administering these lands prior to May 6th. The dis-puted territories had always been under the jurisdictionof Ethiopia during the periods of Italian and Britishcolonial rule of Eritrea right through to Eritrean indepen-dence and statehood.
The Ethiopian government says that an Eritrean del-
Eritrea maintains that all of itsforces (except those in Zalanbessa3) aremobilized on Eritrean territory, accord-ing to internationally recognized bor-ders. They assert that the border wasclearly demarcated in three colonialtreaties between Ethiopia, Italy andBritain in the early years of this cen-tury. Eritrea denies the accusation thatit is occupying Ethiopian land; and haschallenged the Ethiopian governmentto present maps with geographical co-ordinates showing the "invaded" areas.The Eritrean government has accusedthe Ethiopian government of being ex-pansionist, as evidenced by a 1997Ethiopian map of Tigray province thatincludes small chunks of Eritrean landwithin Ethiopia. For Eritrea, the mili-tary operations beginning onMay 12thare explained as strategically defensive,
1997 Ethiopian Map of Tigray Province
Eritrea’s international border(R)!4 Tigray Administrative Zone
Eritrean territory claimed by Ethiopia
The Afar are a herding people numbering around 100,000 who inhabit the Denakil Desert, which straddles the easternEthiopia/Eritrea border. Nationalistic as well, they have been agitiating for independence since the overthrow of the monar-chy by Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1975.
Eritrea acknowledges that Zalanbessa was Ethiopian territory. Since assuming control of the town in early June, Eritrea hasheld it for "strategic purposes."
Eritrean President Isaias cited these treaties in a television interview on May 27th: "The entire borderline between Eritrea andEthiopia was demarcated through three separate international treaties made between Italy, Britain and Ethiopia (bilateral andtrilateral) on July 10,1900; MaY 15 1902 and May 16, 1906 respectively. (Panafrican News Agency report, May 28, 1998)
Statement by H.E. Ato Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs To The Diplomatic Community in Addis Ababa,"On The Military Aggression by Eritrea," 19 May 1998.
"Background to and Chronology of Events on the Eritrean Aggression Against Ethiopia", Ethiopian Ministry of ForeignAffairs, 23 June 1998.
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egation led by Minister of Defense SebhatEphrem was actually en route to AddisAbaba to conduct meetings when thefighting broke out on May 6th. The JointCommittee met on May 9th, discuss-ing the border issue and the Badimeincident. Despite plans to consolidatethe agreements on May 10th, the Eri-trean delegation left that morning with-out informing their Ethiopian counter-parts.
Then, Ethiopia claims, on May 12th,the country’s territorial integrity was fla-grantly violated. Three Eritreanbattalionswith tanks arrived in Badime, and Ethio-pia was caught by surprise it had noregular military troops in the border area,only local peasant militia and police. TheEritreans forcefully occupied Ethiopianlands in an effort, say the Ethiopians, "tocreate new facts on the ground." Ethiopian troops near disputed Aliteina border
The Ethiopian positions: That the border dispute andthe invasion are two separate issues. That Ethiopia main-tains a willingness to submit the border dispute to a thirdparty for peaceful settlement. That this cannot be doneuntil the invasion is entirely reversed. That Eritrea mustlearn that aggression is unacceptable and will not be ap-peased in any way. That resorting to the "rule of thejungle" by attacking first and negotiating second is in-tolerable. That in the civilized post-cold-war world,governed by international laws and norms, govern-ments must not be allowed to use military force in
violation of another country’s national sovereignty.
Border Battles
Fighting continued intermittently throughout Mayand early June. A series of battles took place on threefronts along the border Badime, Zalanbessa, Aliteina,and Burie. Both sides accused the other of expansionistaggression, vowing to defend their national integrity andsovereignty at all costs.
Eritrea accused Ethiopia of escalatingthe conflict and spreading the fighting tonew sites. It asserted that Ethiopian forceslaunched attacks "on the 22nd, 23rd and25th May in the Setit area (near Badime);on May 31st in the Alga-Aliteina areas"and on "June 3rd and 9th in the AmbeseteGeleba area" (near Zalanbessa).
Eritrean local militia just north of the Mereb River
Ethiopia, for its part, accused Eritreaof attacking Zalanbessa onJune 9th, ErdeMattios (near Badime) on June 10th, andBurie (along the Assab road) on June 11th.Ethiopia claims that all of these attacks wererepelledandthatEritreanforceswererouted,sustaining 10,990 casualties including 4,100dead. The Eritreans have refused to releasecasualty figures, preferring in the traditionof their long liberation struggle, a quieterapproach. Both sides have claimed victo-ries in these early battles, and point to in-dependent observers who confirm theirclaims. On the ground, Eritrea retains
Press Release, Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 1998.
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control ofnearly all the disputed territories. Ethiopia saysits initial military successes prevented Eritrea from en-
croaching even further into Ethiopian territory.
Initially, the conflict was confined to ground skir-mishes along the border. On June 5th the fighting esca-lated as both sides conducted air attacks in urban areasquite far from the border. Again, who struck first remainsa bone of contention. According to Ethiopia, Eritreabombed Mekelle twice, "deliberately targeting a civilianneighborhood and hitting an elementary school in ses-
sion,, killing 51 people. The Ethiopians then retaliatedbybombing military targets at the Asmara airport. Aweeklater, Eritrean planes bombed the town of Adigrat, de-stroying a grain store and barely missing the Addis Phar-maceutical Factory, one of the large new enterprises pop-ping up in the major towns of Tigray Province.
The Eritrean account blames the Ethiopians forstriking from the air first. At 2:00 p.m. on June 5th, theysay, two Ethiopian Air Force fighter planes bombed ar-eas in southern Asmara nearthe airport. In retaliation, at4:00 p.m. Eritrean warplanesattacked Mekelle, the capitalof Tigray Province. Eritreaclaims Ethiopia attacked againat 2:30 p.m. on the same dayand at 9:40 a.m. on the follow-ing day. Two Ethiopian MIG-23 fighter planes were shotdown; one of the captured pi-lots was Col. Bezabieh Petros.History repeats itself. In May1984, Col. Bezabieh was alsoshot down and taken as a pris-oner of war by the Eritreans.At that time he was fightingon behalf of the Derggovernment of MengistuHaile Mariam.
Independent sourceshave confirmed that Ethiopialaunched the first air strikes.The attack, however, targetedonly military installations atthe Asmara airport. The Eri-trean retaliation in Mekelle hitthe Ayder Primary Schoolcompound not once but twice,in a residential area contain-ing no evident military facili-ties. The resulting deaths of qi-vilians, especially childreh,created enormous outrageamong the Ethiopian people
SUDAN
ERITREA
AsmaraGash-Seti’,. DecamhareArea ’M
Gondar
and is still being used as propaganda footage on Ethio-pian television four months later.
Trade, Transport and Communication Links Severed
The border conflict has adversely affected the econo-mies of both countries. Immediately following the out-break of hostilities, trade relations were severed. OnMay13th, just a day after the Eritrean attacks on Badime, theEritrean port of Assab, Ethiopia’s main commercial out-let to the world, was shut down and Ethiopia quicklyshifted its shipping business to neighboring Djibouti.Once again both sides have blamed the other for shut-ting down the Assab port. With the border closed, how-ever, there was no route by which goods could pass, sokeeping the port open would have been meaningless.
All other major trade between the two countries hasalso ceased. This is extremely significant, since Eritreais heavily reliant on the importation of Ethiopian agri-cultural products, especially grains. For Ethiopia, the pri-
Afiteina Area
SAUDIARA
OMAN
:. Assab
AfarBud
-:::: DJI
Djibouti
’i’ 0 150km NX,,,
Only small levels of contraband trade in basic commodities has continued at certain spots along the border.
4 MM-4
mary economic burden derives from the clo-sure of the Assab port, the shift to Djiboutihaving increased the cost ofboth imports andexports.
On May 13th, Ethiopian Airlines termi-nated all flights to Eritrea, and air travel di-rectly between the two countries ceased.Shortly thereafter, on May 22nd, the Ethio-pian Telecommunications Authority cut allphone links from Ethiopia to Eritrea and leftjust a few lines open in the other direction(which could be accessed only by dialing theexpensive international exchange).
The many social and economic links be-tween the peoples of Ethiopia and Eritreahave thus been rapidly and drastically re-duced. Previously, the two economies werecloselyintegratedandinexpensivetransportationand communications services enabled people tomaintaindosecontact. Now,theeconomies havebeen rapidly disengaged, and the populations have be-come increasingly isolated from one another.
Deportations and Other Abuses
As rains intensified in mid-June border areas mud-died and ground fighting came to a gradual halt. U.S.President Bill Clinton spoke with both Meles and Isaiasby telephone, and on June 15th both agreed to suspendair strikes. Clinton urged the two nations, both of which
Classroom at Ayder Primary School in Mekelle damagedby Eritrean shelling on 5 June
are considered important U.S. allies in the region (Clintondeclared them part of the "African Renaissance" duringhis trip to East Africa earlier this year, to make concertedefforts to reach a peaceful settlement.
Although the shelling subsided, prospects for peacebecame more, not less, remote.
OnJune 12th Ethiopia systematically began to deportEritreans, claiming they were spies and support of the
EPLF’s (Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front)aggressionby covert means and monetarycontributions. The deportees havebeen de-tained and then sent by bus to the borderarea where they cross by foot, sometimesat night. As of this writing, more than30,000 Eritreans have been forcibly ex-pelled, although the Ethiopian govern-ment denies the numbers are this high.Much to the chagrin of the Ethiopian au-thorities, the deportations have been con-demnedbyUN Commissioner on HumanRights Mary Robinson and the U.S. StateDepartment. The deportation policy hassewn ill-feeling between Eritreans andEthiopians, escalating the political borderconflict into a more personalized battle.Even once the border dispute is resolved,the deported will harbor bitterness and an-
ger at their treatment.
Eritrean deportees being registered at a makeshift reception center in Decamhare Hypersensitive to the condemnation
Press Release, Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 May 1998. Previously phone communication between Ethiopia andEritrea was relatively inexpensive since existing national links were maintained following Eritrea’s independence. In June,these local links were shut down by Ethiopia. It is now impossible to call Eritrea from Ethiopia. Calls to Ethiopia from Eritreaare still possible using international country codes, but this is prohibitively expensive for most people.
Institute of Current World Affairs
Scars healing on the back of Gebremedhin Tsegaye-Tesfaye, an Ethiopian beaten by Sawa-trained
military youth in Decamhare, Eritrea
Ethiopia received for its deportation policy, the Eritreangovernment has sought, at all costs, to avoid the percep-tion that it is deporting Ethiopians. This has created adifferent, but also troubling, problem forEthiopian nationals wishing to return toEthiopia, since manyhavebeen denied exitvisas.1 The Eritrean government has em-phasized that Ethiopians are welcome tostay in Eritreamany who wish to leavemust state that they are doing so voluntar-ily, and must travel to the border with ICRC(International Committee of the Red Cross)accompaniment, These measures notwith-standing, the Ethiopian government hascontinuously labeled Ethiopian returneesas "deportees."
tionals, if they do in fact exist, have teen carefully con-cealed and hidden from foreign journalists and expatri-ates. The Eritrean government has repeatedly stated thatEthiopians are free to continue to work and live in Eritrea,and those who harass or mistreat them in any way willbe prosecuted.
While no convincing evidence of systematic andpolicy-sanctioned mistreatment of Ethiopian nationals inEritrea has been uncovered, their living conditions ofEthiopians have seriously deteriorated. Many casual la-borers who were working as maids and constructionworkers have lost their jobs. Without shelter or employ-ment, these people are forced to live on the streets. Manyhave gathered outside the compound of the EthiopianEmbassy in Asmara, hoping to receive assistance to re-turn home.
There also have been some serious cases of mistreat-ment, including rapes and beatings. Many of these abuseshave apparently been committed by young graduates ofEritrea’s Sawa national military training camp. While theseappear to be isolated incidents rather than government-sanc-tioned abuses, they are still extremely serious; if the Eritreangovernment is to make good on its pledge to protect Ethio-pian nationals, the perpetrators of these crimes will need tobe identified, tried and punished accordingly.
While Eritrea felt slighted by the internationalcommunity’s coverage of the border conflict and peaceproposals that favored Ethiopia, Ethiopians have ex-pressed outrage at the condemnation they have receivedfrom international humanitarian groups over the depor-
Ethiopia, for its part, has leveled nu-merous charges that Ethiopian nationalsare being subjected to detention, tortureand rape in Eritrea. They assert that Eritreahas enacted a covert policy of forcibly dis-missing Ethiopian nationalsfrom their jobsand evicting them from their homes. Anyexplicit Eritrean government policiesaimed at the repression ofi Ethiopian na-
Aregash Hailu (far right) and herfamily, lifelong residents ofZalanbessa,were displaced by thefighting and are now living in Adigrat, Ethiopia.
10 Recently, this has been changing. In late September and early October, the Eritrean authorities started issuing more exitvisas, and larger numbers of Ethiopians have begun returning to Ethiopia.
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tation issues. As such, both sides feel the other has ma-nipulated the press, and that they’ve been treated un-fairly by outside observers.
Perhaps most dangerously, the deportations and largedisplaced populations11 have distracted attention fromthe ultimately more pressing and threatening prospectof renewed fighting. Rather than focusing on creativemeans for resolving core border-conflict is-sues, the international community has spentmost of its time and resources responding tothe pressing humanitarian needs of those de-ported and displaced. Should the fighting re-sume, a much larger humanitarian disasterwill ensue, overshadowing the skirmishes inMay and June.
porary third-party administration in the disputed areas,but never Ethiopian administration.
One high-rankingAmerican diplomatwho took partin the facilitation process believes the team made a ma-
jor mistake. The peace plan favored the Ethiopian posi-tion, while invalidating Eritrean claims. Making mattersworse, this diplomat asserts, was heavy-handed U,S. pres-
Peace Efforts
On May 17, Vice President Paul Kagameof Rwanda arrived in Addis Ababa to begina process of shuttle diplomacy. He was soonjoined by United States Undersecretary ofState for African Affairs Susan Rice and a U.S.delegation. For 12 days the American-Rwandanteam shuttled betweenAsmara andAddis Ababa, meeting with leaders, assess-ing the situation, and trying to negotiate botha rapid end to the fighting and a process forresolving the border dispute peacefully. A ship offloading containers at Djibouti’s port. Following closure of
Eritrea’s Assab port, Ethiopia shifted its trade outlet to neighboring Djibouti.On May 29th, the U.S.-Rwanda Peace
Plan was unveiled. It contained the following main pro-visions:
1) Disengagement in Badime by:a) deployment of an Observer Mission
(organized by Rwanda)b) withdrawal of Eritrean forces to pre-May 6th
positionsc) return of the civil administration in place
before May 6d) investigation into the events of May 6th
2) Binding delimitation and demarcation of the bor-der on the basis of colonial treaties and internationallaw by a Technical Team involving the UN Cartog-raphy Office.3) Demilitarization of the border areas to reducetensions
OnJune 4th, Ethiopia accepted the U.S.-Rwanda pro-posal. Eritrea, while commending the facilitation team,found provision lc unacceptable. Eritrea would notevacuate Eritrean territories and allow the retm’n of Ethio-pian administration. That would effectively amount toan Eritrean admission that the lands are legitimatelyEthiopian. Eritrea could accept demilitarization and tem-
sure on the United Nations, OAU (Organization for Afri-can Unity, EC (European Community), and IGAD (Inter-GovernmentalAuthority on Development) to endorse orotherwise support the U.S.-Rwanda Plan, effectively sti-fling other initiatives. Rather than successfully movingthe disputants toward peace, the U.S.-Rwanda plan ulti-mately kept the parties apart, cementing them in theirpositions and squelching the emergence of otherplans. Ethiopia insisted on U.S.-Rwanda as the onlyfeasible path to peace, and the Eritreans were furthermarginalized.
With the peace process stalled, the Eritreans coun-tered on June 18th with a proposal of their own. The Eri-trean plan focused onbinding demarcation of the borderby the UN Cartographic Office within six months. In theinterim period, the plan proposed internationally-ob-served demilitarization of the disputed areas and an un-specified ad hoc arrangement for their temporary admin-istration. No one responded formally to the Eritrean pro-posal, and Ethiopia has held firm full Eritrean with-drawal and return of the status quo ante are non,nego-tiable preconditions to any discussion on resolving theborder questions. The Ethiopian government once againcriticized Eritrea for blatant military aggression, and
The number of people displaced by the fighting on both sides of the border is said to number approximately 300,000.
Institute of Current World Affairs 7
questioned the logic of attacking and then proposingdemilitarization.
There were a few other piecemeal efforts to rejuve-nate a peace process. Informal consultations and shuttlediplomacy missions have been conducted by UgandanPresident Yoweri Museveni, Egyptian President HosniMubarak, Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, and evenLibyan President Muammar Qaddafi. None of these ini-tiatives were able to break the tense stalemate that hasprecariously held throughout the rainy season.
Djiboutian President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, act-ing in his capacity as Chairman of IGAD, the Horn ofAfrica’s sub-regional institution responsible for economiccooperation and conflict management, also visited bothAddis Ababa and Asmara. The revitalization of IGADduring the past few years was, ironically, pushed mostvigorouslyby Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, the Execu-tive Secretary of IGAD, Dr. Tekeste Ghebray, is an Eri-trean, and the Secretariat (particularly the political sec-tions) are primarily staffed by Ethiopians and Eritreans.Further complicating PresidentAptidon’s efforts was theconsiderable economic benefit Djibouti has derived as aresult of the conflict. Whenwarbroke out, Ethiopia couldno longer use Eritrean ports. Needing a trade outlet tothe Red Sea, Ethiopia turned to Djibouti, significantlyboosting portbusiness for the small Francophone nation.
Another initiative, this one by the OAU, waslaunched in Ouagadougou at a Burkina Faso meeting ofHeads of State in early June. Since all other facilitationefforts had been unable to draw the disputants into ne-gotiations, the OAUbegan to look like the last hope for apeaceful settlement. A team of foreign ministers (fromBurkina Faso, Zimbabwe, and Djibouti) was designatedto conduct an assessment of the conflict, and to put for-ward recommendations for adoption and presentationby their Heads of State at a later date. The mission vis-ited both Ethiopia and Eritrea in late June, collecting dataand assembling their report. Bolstering the OAU initia-tive, on June 26th the United Nations Security Counciladopted Resolution 1177 (1998) expressing "strong sup-port" for the OAU process and urging it to follow upquickly.
Unfortunately, the "African Renaissance" lauded byPresident Clinton was unraveling elsewhere as well. Themounting crisis in Congo postponed initial OAUpresen-tation of its findings, and logistical complications causedanother delay. The meetings have now been rescheduledfor early November in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. TheEthiopian-Eritrean conflict presents a major challenge tothe OAU, which in recent years had established a well-staffed office responsible for conflict prevention, mitiga-tion and resolution. Again, the odds may be stacked
against bold action, as the OAU’s headquarters are lo-cated in Addis Ababa. It may thus be difficult for theOAU to push its host government (and the Eritreans) tomake tough compromises in the interest of peace.
As the parties await the OAU findings, the Ameri-cans have come forward with one more effort to revivediscussions. President Clinton sent former National Se-curity Advisor Anthony Lake to Asmara and AddisAbaba on October 7-8 in the hope thathe could help breakthe impasse. The topics and outcomes of Mr. Lake’s ini-tial consultations have been carefully guarded. It is there-fore difficult to determine whether or not progress wasmade.
The two governments’ positions, while not far apart,have solidified over time, making the prospects for com-promise increasingly unlikely. Both sides agree thatEritrea will need to pull its military back to pre-May 6thpositions; both agree that the border must be delimitedand demarcated by a third party. The major hitch is theissue of temporary administration of the disputed areas.Ethiopia insists that its administration be returned toBadime; Eritrea says Ethiopia will never again adminis-ter "Eritrean" lands. And so the stalemate holds.
Final Remarks
Both sides have dug in, and are refusing to budgefrom their positions. Both profess to want peace, but nei-ther appears prepared to make the tough compromisesnecessary to get there. Pride and stubbornness are reign-ing supreme, while common sense and national self-in-terests are sacrificed. Now the rains have ceased, mili-taryprocurements and troop mobilization are nearly com-plete, and front-line trenches have been expanded alongmost of the common border. In some places, battalionsare positioned just a few hundred meters from each other.
All of the hard work and accomplishments of recon-struction and rehabilitation during the past seven yearsmay soon be sacrificed. Large enterprises may be de-stroyed, new roads blown apart, fertile farmlands laidwith landmines. Young recruits may slaughter each otherover national pride and to uphold the lofty principles ofsovereignty and territorial integrity. If the OAU and othermissions fail to bring about significant progress on thepeace front, all eyes will turn to the war front.
Both countries are supremely confident in their abil-ity to obtain a military victory. Such confidence appearsmisplaced. More likely, a protracted war will ensue, withdestructive consequences for both countries. There maybe temporary territorial gains, but an enduring resolu-tion and firm border demarcation can only be obtainedat the table, not on the battlefield.
Adam Smith Albion. A former research associate at theInstitute for EastWest Studies at Prague in the Czech Re-public, Adam is studying and writing about the republicsof Central Asia, and their importance as actors within andwithout the former Soviet bloc. A Harvard graduate (1988;History), Adam has completed the first year of a two-yearM. Litt. Degree in Russian/East European history and lan-guages at Oxford University. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]
Shelly Renae Browning. A surgeon specializing in earsand hearing, Dr. Browning is studying the approaches oftraditional healers among the Aborigines of Australia andthe indigenous peoples of Vanuatu to hearing loss andear problems. She won her B.S. in Chemistry at the Uni-versity of the South, studied physician/patient relationshipsin China and Australia on a Thomas J. Watson Fellowshipand won her M.D. at Emory University in Atlanta. Beforeher ICWA fellowship, she was a Fellow in Skull-Base Sur-gery in Montreal at McGill University’s Department ofOtolaryngology. [SOUTH ASIA]
Chenoa Egawa. An enrolled member of the Lummi In-dian Nation, Chenoa is spending two years living amongmesoAmerican Indians, studying successful and not-so-successful cooperative organizations designed to help theIndians market their manufactures, agricultural productsand crafts without relying on middlemen. A former tradespecialist for the American Indian Trade and DevelopmentCouncil of the Pacific Northwest, Chenoa’s B.A. is in In-ternational Business and Spanish from the University ofWashington in Seattle. [THE AMERICAS]
Paige Evans. A playwright and former Literary Managerof the Manhattan Theatre Club in New York City, Paige islooking at Cuba through the lens of its performing arts.With a History/Literature B.A. from Harvard, she hasserved as counselor at the Buckhorn Children’s Center inBuckhorn, Kentucky (1983-84), as Arts Editor of the Inter-national Courier in Rome, Italy (1985-86), and as an ad-junct professor teaching a course in Contemporary Ameri-can Playwrights at New York University. She joined theManhattan Theatre Club in 1990. [THE AMERICAS]
Whitney Mason. A freelance print and television journal-ist, Whit began his career by founding a newspaper calledThe Siberian Review in Novosibirsk in 1991, then workedas an editor of the Vladivostok News and wrote forAsiaweek magazine in Hong Kong. In 1995 he switchedto radio- and video-journalism, working in Bosnia andKorea for CBS. As an ICWA Fellow, he is studying andwriting about Turkey’s role as nexus between East andWest, and between traditional and secular Islam.
[EUROPE/RUSSIA]
Marc Michaelson. A program manager for Save the Chil-dren in The Gambia, Marc has moved across Africa to theHorn, there to assess nation-building in Eritrea and Ethio-pia, and (conditions permitting) availing and unavailing hu-manitarian efforts in northern Somalia and southern Sudan.With a B.A. in political science from Tufts, a year of non-degree study at the London School of Economics and aMaster’s in International Peace Studies from Notre Dame,he describes his postgraduate years as "seven years’ ex-perience in international development programming andpeace research." [sub-SAHARA]
Jean Benoft Nadeau. A French-Canadian journalist andplaywright, Jean Benoi"t studied drama at the National The-ater School in Montreal, then received a B.A. from McGillUniversity in Political Science and History. The holder ofseveral Canadian magazine and investigative-journalismawards, he is spending his ICWA-fellowship years in Francestudying "the resistance of the French to the trend of economicand cultural globalization." [EUROPE/RUSSIA]
Susan Sterner. A staff photographer for the AssociatedPress in Los Angeles, Susan received her B.A. in Interna-tional Studies and Cultural Anthropology at Emory Uni-versity and a Master’s in Latin American Studies atVanderbilt. AP gave her a wide-ranging beat, with assign-ments in Haiti, Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican bor-der; in 1998 she was a co-nominee for a Pulitzer Prize fora series on child labor. Her fellowship topic: the lives andstatus of Brazilian women. [THE AMERICAS]
TyroneTurner. A photojournalist (Black Star) whose workhas appeared in many U.S. newspapers and magazines,Tyrone holds a Master’s degree in Government and LatinAmerican politics from Georgetown University and has pro-duced international photo-essays on such topics asRwandan genocide and mining in Indonesia (the latternominated for a Pulitzer). As an ICWA Fellow he is writingand photographing Brazilian youth and their lives in ruraland urban settings. [THE AMERICAS]
Daniel B. Wright. A sinologist with a Master’s Degree inInternational Relations from the Nitze School of AdvancedInternational Studies of the Johns Hopkins University,Dan’s fellowship immerses him in southwest China’sGuizhou Province, where he, his journalist-wife ShouGuowei, and their two children (Margaret and Jon) willbase themselves for two years in the city of Duyun. Previ-ously a specialist on Asian and Chinese affairs for theWashington consultingfirm of Andreae, Vick & Associates,Dan also studied Chinese literature at Beijing Universityand holds a Master of Divinity degree from Fuller Theo-logical Seminary of Pasadena, California. [EAST ASIA]
Institute of Current World Affairs 11
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