The European Union and the Challenge of the Khilafah
From the Root to the Causes: the Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir
(DRAFT PAPER)
Elisa Orofino and Serena Timmoneri*
Homegrown radicalism stands as a serious and actual threat for the European Union (EU), which
appears in constant alarm for the activities of radical Islamist groups, especially within its territory.
Dangerous aggregations like ISIS, al-Muhajiroun, Boko Haram are well-known and feared throughout
the EU. Nevertheless, the idea of re-establishing the Khilafah (Caliphate or Islamic State), rejecting
the West as a whole (in terms of economic, political and social model) and going back to “pure Islam”
dates back to the early 1950s. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT- the Liberation Party) can be considered as a
forefather of current Islamic radical movements. Founded in Palestine, in 1953 by the Islamic judge
and scholar Taqquiddin an-Nabhani, HT has been preaching for decades about the necessity to bring
the Caliphate back, to live abiding the shari‘ā and to reject what they define as the “Western system”.
The group is still very active and popular all over the world, Europe included, and it has inspired
several groups (also terror ones) the EU needs to deal with today. In spite of the normative efforts –
such as the 2005 Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism – the EU seems
quite far from achieving an effective strategy against this threat. This paper aims at contributing to the
debate on Islamist groups in the West, taking HT as Test Case, and focusing on how they challenge
the EU in the two macro areas of values and security.
Introduction
Relentlessly, the European Union (EU) needs to deal with a great variety of issues that threaten its
member states. Among them, homegrown terrorism stands out for its complexity. Mostly perpetrated
by second and third generation Muslims, these attacks are carried out by citizens of the EU who have
developed a harsh aversion towards their country and the so-called “western culture”. Several steps
lead the individual to this extremely violent approach and certainly radicalization is an essential one.
In fact, radicalization can be defined as “what happens before the bomb goes off” (Neumann 2008,
p.4), stressing how it is important to address this phenomenon first in order to fight terrorism. Well
aware of the current alarm, the EU is on the forefront to curb radicalization through a number of
initiatives, touching several fields and involving different actors. Notwithstanding EU’s efforts, recent
attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) have stressed how the problem of violent extremism is still
* Elisa Orofino PhD Candidate - University of Melbourne - Asia Institute 2,3, Sidney Myer Asia Centre,
University of Melbourne, Swanston St & Monash Road, Parkville VIC 3010 Melbourne (Australia) - + 61
415035250 - [email protected]
Serena Timmoneri PhD Candidate - University of Catania - Department of Social and Political Sciences, Via
Vittorio Emanuele II 8, 95131 Catania (Italy) - +39 3487105390 - [email protected]
an emergency and radical Islamist groups play a pivotal role in pushing individuals towards a black
and white vision of the world where the “West” is the oppressor and the “Muslims” are the victims
(Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2016).
In order to analyse the challenge issued by Islamist groups to the EU, the authors decided to select
Hizb ut Tahrir as a Test Case. The choice of this particular movement appears to be very significant
for a number of reasons. Firstly, Hizb ut-Tahrir (literally “Liberation Party”) stands out as a brilliant
example of longevity and persistence. Founded in 1952 by Mohammed Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, an
Islamic scholar and judge, the group stood out as a response against western occupation of the Middle
East and the creation of the state of Israel after World War II. Therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir (henceforth,
HT) is by nature against the political, economic and social models promoted by western states. The
group is one of the oldest movements still active not only in the Middle East but also in the West and
it was able to survive persecutions, bans and political-religious hostility, becoming stronger over the
years.
The second reason concerns the spectrum of HT’s activity. The Hizb has a massive presence both in
the virtual world (through the major social networks as well as by means of websites, blogs, chats,
fora, and videos) and in the real one. Activists and leaders constantly organize lectures, debates,
information sessions as well as spreading leaflets and fliers in several public spaces, such as mosques,
universities, and clubs. Thirdly, HT is a sui generis actor. Defined by the founder as a “party”, HT
combines a strong political rhetoric with radical religious ideas. Notwithstanding its being a party, HT
supports a resilient anti-integration agenda, which prevents its members from running in elections,
voting, and exercising any form of active citizenship in a non-Islamic system.
For the above-mentioned reasons, HT stands out as a very good example of Islamic revivalism in a
radical form. The group’s rejection of the so-called “western system” (an-Nabhani, 2002), the public
despise of western foreign policy as a tool of oppression and its vivid claim of bringing the Caliphate
(Khilafah or Islamic State) back are often considered as threats to the European Union (EU) and its
member states. The danger is often associated to HT’s ability to inspire jihadist ideas and to push
individuals towards terror groups, working as a conveyor belt to terrorism (Baran, 2004).
Is this argument real? Are HT and other intellectual Islamist groups in Europe dangerous? How do
Islamist groups challenge the EU? This paper aims at answering these questions, contributing to the
debate on Islamist groups in the West, focusing on how they challenge the EU in the two macro areas
of values and security. Data used for this study were gathered from a number of sources. Firstly,
through a six-months period fieldwork in London (the headquarters of HT in Europe) and Sydney.
Other relevant figures were collected through the analysis of the specific literature up-to-date, HT’s
media releases, along with EU’s official reports and normative sources.
1. Islamic Revivalism conquers Europe
It was not until the late 1970s and 1980s that Muslim communities around the world were impacted by
a significant wave of Islamic revivalism (Hamid, 2016). Several factors have contributed to this new
trend, such as international crises. Popular examples are the Gulf War (1991), the conflicts in Bosnia
(1993-95) and Chechnya (1994), along with the everlasting Palestinian struggle with Israel. In all
these contexts, a great number of Muslims was murdered and the international non-Muslim
community did not seem to devote much attention (Hamid, 2016). These episodes pushed a number of
young intellectuals to question what “being a Muslim” meant, developing a sense of solidarity towards
the suffering global ummah (Islamic religious community).
Being Islam a community-oriented religion, the will of acting in favour of “their people” started to
spread among Muslim communities in Europe, differentiating from the kind of Islam first generation
immigrants brought with them. In fact, Islamic revivalism comes along with a “politicized Islam,”
very opinionated on the hottest national and international main issues, wanting to act against a system
considered as oppressive to Muslims (Warner et al. 2012). Furthermore, the need for an accurate
religious education in the language of the host country and the will to raise an intellectual class who
could fight an intellectual battle led to a rupture with traditional mosques, where poor learning
methods accompanied by corporal punishments were very common (Hamid, 2016). As a result,
European Muslims living in the 1980s and 1990s were inclined in seeking a different religious identity
than the one of their parents, standing for their rights and speaking up for injustice (Vertovec &
Rogers, 1998; Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000; Cesari 2002; Saint-Blancat, 2004; Peek, 2005; Hamid, 2011).
This process of revivalism and religious awakening was also fostered by the migration to Europe of a
number of young Middle Eastern intellectuals. They were usually persecuted in their home countries
and had to escape because their bold declarations against Arab rulers, mostly defined as apostates and
puppet rulers (Karagiannis & Mccauley, 2006). This is the case of Farid Kassim, Dr. Mohammed al-
Massari, Abu Mohammed and Omar Bakri Mohammed, who were the key-figures of Hizb ut-Tahrir
branch in Britain in the 1990s (Taji-Farouki, 1996). HT was not the only group operating in the UK at
that time. In fact, together with the Young Muslims (YM), Young Muslim Organization (YMO) and
the Jamiyya Ihya’ Minhaj as Sunnah (JIMAS), they were the main protagonists of Islamic activism in
the West (Hamid, 2011). A common characteristic among these groups was the necessity of re-
Islamising Muslim youth, liberating them from false belief and from the influences of kuffar
(unbelievers) concepts. Each of them claimed to have the truth, wanting to teach young Muslims their
religious duties, which appeared deeply intertwined with political action. With regard to HT, the
leadership of the movement embezzled the quranic verse 3:104 stating, "Let there be among you a
group that invites to the good, orders what is right and forbids what is evil, and they are those who are
successful" ("Hizb ut-Tahrir Official Website ", 2016).
Furthermore, slogans such as “Islam is the Solution” became quite popular in Europe during the 1990s
(Hamid, 2016). Islam was politicised and it started to be more of an ideology rather than a religion.
The political aspects of the faith became very popular and able to mobilize masses. An example is
Hizb ut-Tahrir “Khilafah Conference” at Wembley Arena in 1994, which attracted more than 10.000
participants from around the world. This event can be considered as one of the major rallies of
Muslims ever held outside the Middle East (Maher, 2013). Islamist groups also provided that sense of
family and belonging very significant to all those individuals who felt “disenfranchised” from the
main society and their relatives (Lynch, 2013). This term refers to those people who experience
marginalization, which is a feeling of alienation from both the parents’ culture and the host country
one (Culhane 2004). In providing a holistic ideology that encompasses all realms of life, Islamist
groups offer a “personal sense of safety, security and self-worth” (Costanza, 2012, p. 19). The new
awareness of belonging to worldwide community, based on the same faith and values works as a
catalyst for mobilisation and creates strong bonds encompassing nations and distances (Hamid, 2016).
In this context, being a Muslim is not a matter of concern – as it usually is when living in a Western
country – but it is something to be proud of. In fact, many Islamist groups point out the decline
pervading western societies (high rates of suicides, divorces, drug and alcohol addiction), highlighting
the strength of Islam as a deen (a way of life) promoting good moral values (such as parental respect)
and a healthy life-style (Geaves, 2010).
For these reasons, being a “western Muslim” sounds haram (forbidden) to the ears of Islamists, who
see the two worlds as clashing and never meeting. Nevertheless, many Muslim intellectuals have
spoken about the emergence of a new elite of western Muslims, who have managed to reconcile their
Islam with their western identity. That is the case of the reformist thinker Tariq Ramadan who
expressed powerful arguments in favour of an inclusive vision of Islam in Europe in his two books
“To be a European Muslim” (2013) and “Western Muslim and the Future of Islam” (2003).
Hizb ut-Tahrir, as all Islamist groups, promotes a simplistic black and white vision of the world,
which highlights the non-reconcilable relationship between Islam and the West based on a set of
arguments (Savage, 2014). The incompatibility of values stands out as a common topic in Islamist
rhetoric and it is often used as a way to challenge the EU, promoting the idea of western values as
dangerous (fostering moral decline) against the perfection of Islamic ones. This dichotomy will be
explored into details in the next paragraphs.
2. Challenging Values: Being Muslim vs Being European
2.1 Defining the Terms of the Challenge
Since the adoption of the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to
Terrorism (2005), the EU assumed that the best way to fight terrorism was to prevent it in the first
place. Given the evident relationship between terrorism and radicalization, the EU started to elaborate
different plans and strategies to tackle this complex phenomenon. Major initiatives focused on
promoting a multicultural society and on welcoming the integration of immigrants. For instance, the
EU declared 2008 the Year of Intercultural Dialogue, working hard to establish a dialogue not only
between Europeans, but also with immigrants from third countries. This initiative has also encouraged
a closer contact among different cultural and ethnic backgrounds in order to demolish the idea of
clashing civilizations. In fact, the EU assumed that a direct interaction would help to dismantle the
inaccurate perception of Muslims as dangerous, emphasizing that the vast majority of European
Muslims do not accept extremist ideology; instead they espouse the values of peace and tolerance (EU
Commission 2008).
In 2015, the Commission and Education Ministers signed the Paris Declaration on promoting
citizenship and common values of freedom, tolerance, and non-discrimination through education. This
document called for renewed efforts to reinforce common core values within the EU to a more
inclusive society through education. Youth were identified as key actors, recipients of new educational
programs devoted to foster their growth as active and responsible members of a multicultural society.
One year later, the EU focus on values has also been re-stated as a priority by the recent Stronger EU
Action to better tackle violent radicalization leading to terrorism (2016), pointing out education and
the development of EU common values as two key areas of intervention.
As the EU works against the alleged incompatibility between the West and Islam, building a common
ground, Islamist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir build much of their rhetoric on the binary construction of
concepts that are regarded as not compatible, such as “us vs them”; “right vs wrong”, “licit and
forbidden” (Tajfel, 1981). This narrow approach aims at enhancing the value of the in-group over the
out-group, fostering a bad image of the latter (Savage, Khan, & Liht, 2014). This monistic view is also
applied when assessing the concept of “Western Muslims.” In fact, HT argues that Muslims are
simply “Muslims” and cannot be refereed as “westerners” under any circumstance (Badar, 2016;
Hizbut-Tahrir, 2002a). Their belonging and identity are not linked to a territory but to a faith, a deen,
which is shared by the global ummah. Therefore, HT fosters the idea of Muslims as been exiled in the
West, in a context they do not belong to, constantly longing for the Caliphate as home (Sinclair,
2010).
2.2 Clashing Values
The analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir discourses works as a perfect kaleidoscope to get into the main
arguments raised by Islamist groups on the alleged incompatibility between western values and
Islamic ones. In this paragraph, the authors will not only focus on democracy and personal freedoms
as values but also on western foreign policy, the War on Terror and western agenda as the direct
consequences of western values and as key arguments raised by Islamist groups to enhance the
existence of an unbridgeable gap between the West and the Muslims.
With regard to democracy, HT considers it as undoubtedly haram (forbidden). The reasons behind this
conception lie on the assumption that the sovereignty of people is per se a forbidden notion, colliding
with the main Islamic assumption of submission to Allah as the sole legislator. In fact, the word
“Islam” means submission to God alone. The submission to God is legitimate because He is just, His
law (shari‘ā) is perfect and pushes human beings to live a good life (an-Nabhani, 2007). At the same
time, HT highlights the perversion of human mind and desires, considering the submission to a system
based on people’s will as nothing but catastrophic. In fact, democratic systems allow the establishment
of parties that call for things that are forbidden by Islam, such as “drugs liberalization, abortion, use of
women as sexual objects”, pushing the whole society towards immorality and decay (Hizb ut-Tahrir,
1996, p.19).
Based on the above-mentioned premises, HT also criticizes the concept of “personal freedom”, very
important to European liberal countries. In HT’s view, personal freedom allows every person to live
his private life as he wishes, practising sexual perversion, eating and drinking whatever he wants as
long as he behaves lawfully, whose definition changes according to the specific historical period (Hizb
ut-Tahrir, 1996). Under the flag of personal freedom, several practices considered by HT as immoral
have spread in the West.
“Men and women live together without any legal relationship, and even men and
women have partners of the same sex and establish abnormal relationships amongst
themselves under the protection of the law. The personal and sexual perversions that
prevail in the Capitalist societies result from personal freedom, which has also led to
unbelievable conflicts. Pornographic magazines and movies, sex phone lines, and
nude bars are just a few examples of the abnormalities and perversions which the
Capitalist societies have degenerated to as a result of personal freedom.” (Hizb ut-
Tahrir 1996, p.32)
According to HT, these tolerated and encouraged libertarian haram behaviours are the origin of a
great number of social plagues in the West. HT’s activists often use official data – such as the
Eurostat’s ones – concerning the high-rate of suicides, divorces, drug use, alcoholism and mental
diseases affecting western countries, instilling in the minds of their interlocutors the desire to escape
the imminent collapse, through the implementation of an effective counter-model, based on HT’s
vision of the state and Islam (The Revival Production, 2013). For these reasons, HT calls its members
to vigorously hold on their Islamic life, their way of doing family, their division of roles between men
and women and their submission to shari‘ā to avoid a kuffar contamination and the following decline.
Another significant argument used by HT to challenge western and European states concerns the side
effects of their foreign policy. In fact, the Hizb fully shares the idea that “what governments call
extremism is to a large degree a product of their own wars” (Kundani, 2014, p. 35).
…“The long history of western violent occupations around the world, the support to
tyrant despots for economic reasons, the invention of arms of mass destruction and the
rise of a wealthy 1st World on the blood of a massacred 3
rd World are all examples of
western misconduct, affecting Muslims’ hearts and minds” (Badar, 2015).
Uthman Badar, HT Australia spokesperson, boldly pronounced these words mirroring the official
position of the group concerning western foreign policy. According to HT, the role played by western
states as exploiters and colonizers has left indelible marks together with the will to react against
western presence in the Arab world. For these reasons, HT links the tragic attacks in western states to
their misconduct rather than to religious extremism: “Political grievances and the continuous moral
outrage suffered by Muslims are the main triggers towards terrorism, rather than a radical vision of
Islam. Most of the terrorists are not regular with their prayers and have a scarce knowledge of Islam”
(Badar, 2015).
More recently, HT argued that the War on Terror has worsened the situation of Muslims living in the
West. After 9/11, Muslims have become the “dangerous other”, fostering new attitudes such as
Islamophobia, i.e. a growing anxiety and fear in the society towards Muslims, regarded as potential
terrorists (Satter, 2010). Also “securitization” stands out as a backlash of the War on Terror. In fact, it
is defined as “the process of state actors transforming subjects into matters of security: an extreme
version that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security” (Buzan, Wæver, and de
Wilde 1998, p. 25). With regard to Muslims, these extraordinary means imply a number of restricting
measures, such as having imams’ speeches controlled, banning religious groups presenting a more
textual approach to their religion and the demonization of the words radical and extreme. At the same
time, daily facts of new deaths in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, along with “the rise of new alleged
peace missions in which more western states are involved do nothing but re-enforcing HT’s
propaganda of western efforts to spread its hegemony, subjugating Muslims, under the flag of peace
and security” (Woman 2, HT Britain, personal communication, December 2, 2015).
A further argument used by HT to challenge western states is the alleged “hidden agenda” behind
western foreign and immigration policies, aimed at forcing the assimilation of Muslims (Badar, 2015).
In fact, HT claims that the continuous alarm of terrorism has defined Muslims as the threat (Mustafa,
2016). This image, usually sponsored by western media, has led to a division of Muslims into two
broad categories, i.e. good Muslims and bad Muslims. The individuals belonging to the first category
are those who generally abide western laws without complaining, who are happy with the western life
style, who do not get involved in religious and political arguments, who mostly live their Islam in their
hearts at the spiritual level, embodying the perfect stereotype of the “moderate Muslim”. At the same
time, those Muslims who complain about western policies, who openly show their resentment towards
authorities, who are in favour of a radical vision of Islam (much more linked to Scriptures and to the
model of the Prophet) and want the application of shari‘ā are regarded as extremists and potential
terrorists. HT works hard to challenge this western-sponsored vision of good and bad Muslims,
presenting a number of reasons to de-construct this narrative.
Firstly, in HT’s view, the concept of “moderate Muslims” does not exist in Islam. In fact, “Islam is not
just a religion, but it is a deen, i.e. a way of life. Today, Islam is the same revealed to Prophet
Mohammed 1400 years ago and needs to be accepted in toto as it was at the beginning” (Uthman
Badar, HT Australia, personal communication, April 5, 2016). Those who accepts parts of it, those
“who pick and choose what it is confortable to put in practice are not real Muslims” (Man 3, HT
Britain, personal communication, 20 October, 2015). According to HT, being a Muslim means to go
back to the sources of Islam, to be educated on the system of Islam (mostly through an-Nabhani’s
writings) and to shape everyone’s life on the Prophet’s model (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2002). For this reason,
HT’s members are proud to be “radical” in the sense of being very linked to the roots of their religion,
accepting no compromise. For instance, they support the idea that western states are illegitimate for
Muslims and therefore they do not engage in any sort of political activity, such as voting or running in
elections (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 1996) . This attitude is widespread among HT’s acolytes also in countries
like Australia, where not voting involves sanctions.
Secondly, and related to the first argument, HT claims that European governments are using the terror
threat and the migrants crisis to induce fear among the population and push Muslims in the EU to
adopt a “state-sponsored version of Islam” (Bsis, 2015). In fact, on the one hand, European states
stand as alleged promoters of freedom of speech and religion; on the other hand they set the
boundaries of these freedoms by means of an indirect propaganda against Muslims. HT argues that it
is well known that activities in the main mosques are controlled, together with all the Islamic groups
and associations (Badar, 2015; Bsis, 2015; Mustafa, 2016). Furthermore, the great wave of
immigration from the Middle East, along with the growing presence of home-grown terrorists in the
West, has fostered a message conveyed by western media and governments that Muslims should be
less Islamic and more secular to be accepted as “good neighbours and friends.” They should be more
open to conform to western values and lifestyle, holding less to their heritage accepting the western
one as many other ethnic groups migrating into specific western countries have done. Through HT’s
lens, this narrative pushes Muslims away from Islam, inducing them to lose their Islamic identity in
favour of a mixed western one.
As a result, HT strongly supports an anti-integration agenda that sees being a Muslim as separate and
opposite to being European. For this reason, the Hizb continues to criticize European governments and
their policies; it continues to use the Khilafah flag (mostly associated with the violent Islamic State in
Syria and Iraq) regardless of any stereotype and it hardly condemns terroristic acts (as most
representatives of Muslim community in the EU do), rather focusing on the outcomes of European
colonial powers’ actions over the centuries. Again, the leitmotiv characterizing the whole process is
the dichotomy between the wickedness of West and the righteousness of Islam.
3. Challenging Security: A Conveyor Belt for Terrorists?
Islamist groups issue another remarkable challenge to the European Union in the field of security.
Over the last few decades, several prominent figures have attracted European Muslims, presenting the
West as the enemy of Muslims and calling them to a strong opposition.1 Even if some aggregations
have never promoted violent jihad, recent debates show how their anti-integration propaganda, filled
with anti-Western thoughts, might work as a catalyst towards violence acting as a conveyor belt for
terrorists (Bara, 2004, p.68)
Often, HT seems quite ambiguous in its positions and keeps itself in a sort of grey zone in relation to
the use of violence. As declared by Hadiyah Masieh, former HTB member: “HT says it does not
believe in violence, but the violence was never condemned; they just didn't think it would achieve
anything”. 2
At the same time, since its early stages HT has strongly supported jihad as a duty for every Muslim,
just in case of defence or to conquer the occupied territories:
1 Omar Bakri and the Californian convert Hamza Yusuf are two examples of charismatic characters with
extremist ideas mobilizing masses in the West. 2 Sarfraz Manzoor, “Hadiya Masieh: How 7 July bombings made me question my beliefs”, The Guardian, July
4, 2010. Accessed Feb 20th, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/04/hadiyah-masieh-7-july-
bombings
...“Jihad is a religious duty which is obligation for all Muslims, and military service
is compulsory. It is thus a religious duty for every male Muslim of 15 or more to
participate in military training in order to prepare himself for jihad.” 3
On the one hand, this ambiguous position has fostered anxiety from governments and public
authorities in the West, becoming more and more willing to ban the group. On the other hand, HT’s
non-violent official nature has brilliantly worked as a deterrent for several states to outlaw the
movement, fearing a harsh social backlash. In fact, the ban of a mere intellectual group could work as
a pretext for other Islamist groups to incite minorities to oppose a tyrant government, fostering
Islamist propaganda of an on-going conspiracy against Muslims from Western oppressors. For these
reasons, academia and think tanks, such as the anti-radicalism Quilliam Foundation (2014), advised
not to ban HT.
Nevertheless, while declaring itself the ideological vanguard among Islamist movements, HT has
inspired many jihadists who are now involved in violent movements (Baran, 2004). In fact, a person
exposed to HT’s lectures and study circles usually experiences a moral shock (Wiktorowicz, 2005)
due to the awareness of terrible atrocities affecting the ummah in the world. The group also instils in
the minds of its members the idea of an urgent need to act against the oppressors, mostly through an
intellectual fight to bring the Khilafah back. However, some people might consider HT’s approach too
soft or too static and once convinced of the unavoidable clash of civilizations between Muslims and
the West, they decide to join jihadist groups to get into the fight. This is the case of Oman Bakri, one
of the most prominent leaders of HT Britain. In 1996, Bakri abandoned the group because he started
considering it too moderate, despising HT’s new tendencies towards theological plurality, non-violent
attitudes towards jihad and the weak relationship between iman (faith) and action (Abedin, 2005). For
these reasons, Bakri left and founded al-Muhajiroun, a terror movement supporting al-Qaeda and
urging Muslims around the world to fight and destroy the wicked West.
Similarly, July 7/7 London bombers were identified as members of a HT splinter association of HT
Britain (Baran, 2004). Undoubtedly, they were exposed to continuous discourses depicting western
governments as exploiter oppressors against Islam and promoters a social model based on corruption
and moral perversity. The two episodes here mentioned are just popular examples over a number of
unknown ones. As a result, notwithstanding HT’s claim to be a mere intellectual group, fighting
concepts through debates and conferences, it seems to promote a radical ideology that might foster the
use of violence. The latter works as a catalyst to indoctrinate individuals towards extreme views,
making them an easy target for violent organizations, where they can actively fight.
3 “Proposed Constitution for the Islamic State”, Article 56. In Suha Taji-Farouki. A Fundamental Quest: Hizb
Al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate, p. 200.
Well aware of the potential threat of the group as a conveyor belt to terrorism, the EU seems very
committed to limit HT’s influence (along with other Islamist aggregations) within its borders. A set of
initiatives was implemented to spot suspicious behaviours by monitoring the travel to conflict zones
and by examining the issues around admittance and residence of individuals considered “leery”
(Bakker, 2015). The problem concerning the displacement of people in Middle Eastern territories
characterized by war, often used as training areas by jihadist, was also addressed by the European
Commission in its European Agenda on Security (2016), which stresses the importance of travel
prohibitions and the criminalization of travelling to third countries for terrorist purposes.
Bearing in mind the transnational nature of most Islamist groups, Internet monitoring has been the
focus of EU’s actions for a long time. A good example is the Check the Web initiative (2007) aimed at
intensifying EU cooperation on monitoring and analysing Internet sites in the context of counter-
terrorism to tackle online extremist material (EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator 2007). The EU has
also promoted cooperation with Imams and a toolkit to help those working most closely with young
people to detect and tackle violent radicalization. Furthermore, a proposal to criminalize public
provocation to commit terrorism (EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator , 2008) and a proposal to
counter terrorist propaganda and illegal hate speech online (Stronger EU Action to better tackle
violent radicalization leading to terrorism, 2016) were presented. The latter aims at working with the
IT industry to stop the spread of illegal content inciting to violence, supporting the development of
positive alternative narratives by civil society and develop media literacy so that young people asses
information critically.
Last but not least, the EU is also on the forefront to empower moderate Islamic voices by cooperating
with Muslim organizations and faith groups. The Union is also encouraging the improvement of
imam’s language and citizenship skills, along with the emergence of European imams.
Conclusions
This paper aimed at analysing the challenge posed by Islamist groups to the European Union in two
macro areas, i.e. values and security. The long living Islamist aggregation Hizb ut-Tahrir was chosen
as a case study and it worked as a kaleidoscope to unpack the common Islamist anti-European
narrative of an unbridgeable “clash of civilizations”. The idea of incompatibility between the West
and Islam, along with the group-constructed perception of a constant attack against Muslims, triggers
individuals towards action. The will to defend the global ummah and to change a wicked system can
be carried out as a “war of ideas”, as HT does, but it can also push Muslims towards violent
initiatives, culminating in the membership to jihadi-armed groups.
As a result, the challenge to values and the one to security seem to be strongly intertwined. Islamists’
despise towards western-European values of democracy and personal freedoms in the name of an
alleged irreconcilability with Islam drives Islamist sympathizers towards a progressive alienation from
the mainstream society. This status causes a sense of rejection towards the home country and society
that hinders the individual from experiencing any sort of belonging. Therefore, radical Muslim
identity appears related to a utopian Caliphate where social justice, equality, and accountability are
core characteristics. The EU has undeniably made remarkable efforts to address radicalization,
implementing initiatives covering a number of fields. In fact, normative interventions aimed at
developing a shared set of European values were supported by projects devoted to security and
internet monitoring. Notwithstanding the EU will to address radicalization on multiple fronts, the
communitarian approach seems to be quite weak considering the on-going alarming presence of
home-grown violent radicals within the EU borders.
As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, the battle Islamist groups fight to win young Muslims is
mostly a war of ideas, based on a narrow vision of the world. Most radical aggregations adopt a
monistic approach towards controversial issues, identifying one single set of actions, attitudes, and
ideas as “right”. This behaviour promotes a positive image of the in-group compared to the others,
based on a binary construction were the concepts of “us vs them” are linked with the idea of “halal vs
haram”. On this topic, recent studies by Sara Savage et al. (2014) have pointed out the existence of a
connection between Radicalisation and Involvement in Violent Extremism (RIVE) and low
complexity of thinking. This group of British scholars argue that high level of complexity in thinking
works as a means to prevent radicalization. In fact, Integrative Complexity (IC) can be considered as a
key element to fight radicalization. IC is related to our perception of the social world and tends to be
low in individuals who use dichotomous categories, moderate in subjects who are able to see some
good elements in viewpoints that differ from their own and high when individuals can perceive
connections between different perspectives and values (Savage et al., 2014).
Recent research has shown how people presenting a more complex view of the social world are less
attracted by radical or extreme positions. In fact, they are able to understand other people’s ideas
without perceiving their own as under attack. Increasing the complexity of thought reduces the vision
of contrasting values and the perception of an imminent threat by “the other,” pushing the individual
to a peaceful cohabitation with the out-group. Notwithstanding the need for further research on the
relationship between IC and radical mindsets, the authors acknowledge the validity of IC as a good
practice to address the problem of radicalization, focusing on the mind of the individual as the
essential ground where the battle takes place, suggesting that a possible way to tackle radicalization
might be to help individuals understanding that reality is a complex phenomenon and it is not possible
to reduce it in a simplistic dichotomy.
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