The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics Viewed from a Historical...

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Hartmut BehrPolitics Viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective

The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession

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The European Union in the Legacies ofImperial Rule? EU Accession Politics

Viewed from a Historical ComparativePerspective

HARTMUT BEHRUniversity of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

International Relations benefits from historical comparative research.Although a historical comparative method can be fruitfully applied tothe study of the European Union (EU), it is rarely undertaken. In thisarticle, EU accession politics, particularly its 2004 enlargement, iscompared with 19th century standards of civilization developed byEuropean states concluding treaties with non-European nations. Thisarticle argues that EU accession politics operates in the legacies of19th-century imperial rule. Understanding the EU in terms of an(new) empire might enrich the discussion of the perception and cat-egorization of the EU as an international order.

KEYWORDS empire EU accession politics EU enlargement globalization international law standards of civilization

1. The Definition of Standards of Civilization in 19th-century

International Law and EU Regulations on Accession andMembership

1.1. Introduction

The accession politics of the EU and the standards of civilization developedby European nations in the 19th century evince strong commonalities.Nineteenth-century standards of civilization decided which non-Europeannations were eligible to interact with European nations; and, if a nation was

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perceived as eligible (or civilized), the method of interaction. Internationallaw, which actually was European international law in the legacies of

Christianity and 16th- and 17th-century legal theories (i.e. Justus Lipsius,Hugo Grotius), became globalized in the 19th century when an increasingnumber of international treaties were contracted with non-Europeannations.1 Thus an international society steadily evolved, until in the Leagueof Nations a reasonable number of states (28 permanent, another 35 joinedor withdrew at various times)2 was united and at present nearly all nations

worldwide (currently 192) are included in the United Nations. The glob-alization of international law, however, did not rest upon equality betweenEuropean and non-European states. On the contrary, non-European states had

to incorporate distinct legal, administrative and political elements into their sys-tems to be regarded as legally and politically compatible with Europeanstatehood. Three general features underlie the politics of standards of civ-ilization: first, the general self-perception of European states as those whoauthoritatively define the standards; second, regulations which define differ-ent steps and paces of cooperation between European and non-Europeanstates; and finally a geopolitical model projecting a world order withEuropean states at the centre and zones of less politically developed states atthe peripheries.

All three features are also an integral part of EU accession politics. From theTreaties of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) as well asfrom secondary EU law, commonalities can be elaborated between EU acces-sion politics and the 19th century. Fundamental political principles and theacquis communautaire of the EU define standards to which non-membershave to adapt their political and legal systems if they aspire to membership.Later a diverging pace of integration emerges which distinguishes betweencandidate states as well as between EU member states themselves (Europe onpurchase). Finally, we observe a geopolitical projection of core EU memberstates and peripheral zones on the outside.

1.2. Conceptual Remarks

To inquire more deeply into these commonalities a discussion of the 19th-century standards of civilization will be undertaken in the next section,followed, in section 3, by an examination of EU Treaties. This study takes upthe idea of Comparative Historical International Society developed by theEnglish School (see Buzan, 2001; with an emphasis on the EU, Diez and

Whitman, 2002; Czaputowicz, 2003) to strengthen historical comparative

research, not only for supplementing the great part of EU studies, whichmostly follow institutionalist approaches and are a-historical (see Aspinwall andSchneider, 2000), by qualitative research but also for highlighting historical

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continuities, commonalities and shifts in the creation of international society.Each comparative analysis has to ask for the tertium comparationis of the

objects compared. The objective of each comparison is twofold: first, to inquiredeeper into the characteristics which the studied objects have in common andsecond, to elaborate specific differences (differentia specifica) between them.

Applied to the study of the EU system of rule, and 19th-century internationallaw, this means that both cases have certain features in common which relateto, and stem from, the problem of recognition in International Politics andInternational Law (as the tertium comparationis). As Hedley Bull notes, inter-national society rests upon collective recognition (Bull, 1977), thus there mustexist standards of recognition which are the basis for interaction; furthermore

these standards have to become binding for others who are not yet part of theinternational society. Recognition in international society refers to principlesthat prevail within a majority of states [belonging to that international soci-ety] as well in the relations between them, as Martin Wight concludes(Wight, 1977: 153; see also Wight, 1969: 103). Hans-Martin Jaeger demon-strates that the debate on international recognition in the modernnation-state

world goes back to Hegel (Jaeger, 2002; critically Brooks, 2004).3 Focusingon 19th-century Europe we get, however, an ambivalent picture: whereas onthe one side we face a nearly consecutive history of warfare and conflict amongEuropean nations, on the other side we see the emergence of a Europeaninternational society. Thereby a huge proliferation of new international organ-izations was brought about as well as, during the last decades of that century,a working balance of power system (which, too, rested upon a minimum ofmutual recognition and shared norms, as elaborated in Bull and Watson, 1984,and by Watson, 1992).4

Another aspect of recognition becomes relevant when we focus on therelations between European nations and those who are (perceived as) out-side. Here we have to realize a tradition of not only political, but also legalinequality and hierarchical thinking which can be traced throughout the cen-

turies until the present in the EU system of rule. Taking this comprehensivebackground into consideration, this article focuses on political and legalpractices of, and thoughts on, recognition as they can be comparatively iden-tified as common between 19th-century international law and EU accessionpolitics, both dealing with outside nations.5

The common features identified see 1.1. are atypical in the study ofinternational politics, particularly in EU studies. They derive from theor-etical concepts well established, however in an interdisciplinary and multi-paradigm perspective. Pierre Bourdieu (1991) and Michel Foucault (1980,

1991) sensitized us to the idea that political power depends on a definingauthority proclaiming political and legal standards which function as appar-ently objective and which have to be accepted for participating in the game

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of power. This conceptual approach applies to feature (1) mentioned above. Thefeature of different paces of recognition and eventual cooperation feature

(2) is a sub-aspect of the aforementioned since it describes a certainmodality of wielding power over recognition and cooperation. Applying in feature (3) geopolitically informed concepts finally derives from thesuggestion, developed by Critical Geography,6 that each society, nationaland international, is underpinned by geographical conceptions of politicalspace. Those conceptions are the carrier of distinct power perceptions andambitions, while they argue that geographically, thus ostensible objectivelygiven, conditions would determine state relations. However, geopoliticalprojections are never politically neutral or geographically objective, rather

they are socially and politically constructed, they serve as an analytical con-cept for the study of how political power relations are conceptualized andargumentatively espoused. In this function, geopolitical discourses can beregarded and analysed as a further instrument of constructing and exercisingauthoritative knowledge (also Foucault on geography, 1980: 6377;Bourdieu on space, 1991: 163251).

Identifying these features as common features does not, of course, denyparticular differences between the EU system of rule and 19th-century inter-national law, nor does it deny that there are additional examples in historyand current international politics which might evince comparable features.Divergences between compared objects as well as between them and furtherhistorical and current politics do not generally serve as counter-examplesagainst the conclusions drawn from the comparison as long as the objectiveof the comparative analysis is clear. This is not an arbitrary ruling-out offurther examples. Rather it is a logical consequence of each comparativemethod that further valid examples (or counter-examples) must be located

within the foci of the study. The objective of the comparative analysis hereaims at inquiring into the above mentioned common features in order toelaborate historical continuities which might finally enhance our under-

standing and a political typology of the EU.The conclusions drawn from this study are: first, to be more careful in

terming the EU a political order sui generis or pointing to its uniquenesswhile we will see that its system of rule is embedded in the legacies of 19th-century imperial rule from which it has inherited political ideas and practices.7

The EU is about becoming a new empire, concentrating political power andwealth (especially from an outside perspective), extending its borders to theEast and defining and enacting universal standards of statehood.8 Second,analysing the EU from an International Politics perspective opens the focus

for the EUs relationships to the outside world. The 2004 enlargementserves as such a focus when the EU entered into relations with states whichhad been part of an outside world (also Boeroecz, 2001; Sher, 2001).


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The interdisciplinary benefit of this approach is that it interlinksInternational Politics and International Political Theory with International

Law. As Stanley Hoffmann determines the function of international law toorganize the coexistence of the various units (Hoffmann, 1961: 212), inter-national law is the modality which governs how political units coexist andinteract internationally. It hence should be perceived as a core part of Inter-national Politics (also Buzan, 2001: 480, 486, who emphasizes the import-ance of bridging International Politics, History and Law).9

2. The European Standards of Civilization: Three Features

2.1. Defining Standards

Throughout the 19th century we observe the intensification of a develop-ment that has its roots in the 16th century when European states, mostlycolonial powers like Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and Great Britain,started to discover the world and extended their political influence beyondthe borders of Europe. While most non-European states became subordinateto European rule another consequence began to take shape, too, namely theentry of non-European states into international society. Even if most of therelations were founded on military power and economic exploitation byEuropean states, non-European states became subject to international law,especially when these relations became more codified and formalized in the19th century. Most observers argue that it was not until 1914, however, thatthe legal aspects of international relations became globalized, and not before1960 that formal equality was accomplished with UN Resolution 1514 (XV)of the United Nations General Assembly10 which abolished political, eco-nomic and social inequality as a criterion for legal relations among states (seeFisch, 2005: 1, 4, 7).11 Throughout this development an international stand-ardization process of states systems of rule can be observed. Before non-

European states were recognized as legally equal partners, however, theirprogress in realizing those standards in their domestic politics was strictlyobserved by European states (see Gong, 1984: 2).

Contrary to culturalnotions of civilization,12 the primary criteria in 19th-century international law reflected the norms of European liberalism andstatehood as they had become politically solidified in most European statesduring the 19th century and that were founded in 16th- and 17th-centurypolitical philosophy and European Enlightenment. The most essential require-ments for non-European states to access the European system were: guaran-

teeing basic human rights (i.e. life, dignity, and property, as well as freedom ofreligion, of travel and commerce) to their own nationals and to foreigners; effi-ciency in running the state, its bureaucracy, and its legal system; statehood


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understood as government assigned to a defined territory;13 capacity for self-defence; and fulfilment of the obligations of international diplomacy. These

standards were explained and justified by international lawyers, mostly British,who published in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Thomas E. Holland (18351926), for instance, associated civilization with well-organized states (Holland, 1933: 117); and John Westlake(18281913) identifies civilization with the principle ubi societas ibi ius estand notes, Without society no law, without law no society. When we assertthat there is such a thing as international law, we assert that there is a soci-ety of states: when we recognise that there is a society of states, we recognisethat there is international law (Westlake, 1914: 2). He further denotes

civilized statehood as the states ability to organize self-defence, what he per-ceives not only as a military capacity but also as a test for political organiza-tion (Westlake, 1914: 103). The principle of organizing self-defence hasbeen not only of theoretical relevance. Its political significance is demon-strated by the argument why Brazil was not admitted to the first HaguePeace Conference in 1899: Europe did not believe that Brazil had a reason-able army or self-defence capacity. Invitation to international conferencesand public international unions was, however, very important for non-European states attempting to access international society, even if they didnot enjoy full status but had to accept observers status at first. Membershipof the 1868 International Telegraph Bureau and of the 1874 General PostUnion was seen as an important step to facilitate international communica-tion and thereby to achieve steady integration into international society.14 Ofcourse, full legal equality had to be earned by non-European states, and theirneed to fulfil the requirements of civilization was thereby a driving force fordomestic reforms to adapt to European standards of statehood. As long asthey had not been modernized and did not meet European standards, they

were subjected to unequal treaties.

2.2. Different Paces of Cooperation and Unequal Treaties

Treaties between European and non-European states are termed unequalwhen non-European states were required to grant specific rights to foreignnationals and government officials, which then again have not been grantedto them by European states. As those inequalities were imposed upon non-European states in the first treaties they entered into with Western nations,it was only gradually that the inequalities were renounced and relations werebased on legal equality. We hence observe different paces of accession of

non-European states into European international society. In this regard,John Westlake argued that Our international society exercises the right ofadmitting outside states to parts of its international law without admitting


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them to the whole of it (Westlake, 1914: 82). Pascal Fiore (18371914)noted that it will never be possible for civilization to extend uniformly over

all parts of the world, and a legal community will never be brought to real-ization equally and uniformly with all states (Fiore, 1918: 101). In answer-ing the question of whether or not there is an universal law of nations, Henry

Wheaton (17851848) wrote that the public law has always been, andstill is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or those ofEuropean origin, and he notes a distinct difference between European lawof nations and that of other races of mankind (Wheaton, 1936: 1920). Atthe same time, however, he perceives possible transformations of those otherraces of mankind so that they could become adapted to civilized standards

and eventually gain access to international society. Three factors of adapta-tion would be necessary:

The State to which international law is to be extended must have a form of civ-ilization which renders it able to apply the rules of that law, and it must be incommunication with the States already enjoying it; it must further be preparedto accept the rules of law binding for it; and the other States must agree toaccept the new member of the Family of Nations. (Wheaton, 1936: 30)

Wheatons argument comprises another relevant aspect, which concerns thetransformation of uncivilized into civilized states. His argument represents

the belief in progress and modernization typical of 19th-century positivism.The reform of their traditional systems and their transformation into full mem-bers of the international society required that non-European states abolishgreat parts of their traditional political order. This request symbolizes aprogressive belief in education and political socialization. Accordingly, a stateis thought to be able to convert its former character into a new personality.15

Wight notes that from this doctrine of legal positivism, which has been for twocenturies the orthodoxy of international legal philosophy, it follows that thesubjects of international law can only be independent states. The only interna-

tional persons are these collective persons of whom it is postulated that theyhave a moral nature analogous with that of individuals (Wight, 1969: 93).

Based on the idea of progressive human development, (the) Westernerstaught an essentially unilinear model of cultural progress based on Europeancivilization (Gong, 1984: 34). However, we also observe the opposite ap-proach: Lassa Francis L. Oppenheim argued that a state can also enter withits birth really of right into the membership of the Family of Nations(Oppenheim, 1905: 108) and consequently does not face any requirementsfor accession. The perception behind this argument stems from another tra-

dition in 19th-century political and social thought which emphasizes the nat-ural membership of an individual in a certain society and adheres to biological,cultural and spiritual fixation.16 Such status from birth, or being naturally


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gifted with civilization, is, however, construed as limited to European polit-ical entities.

The most important instrument of unequal treaties between European andnon-European states was extraterritoriality, when European states imposedlegal regimes within the territory of non-European states. Those regimesgranted them rights, superior to local law, over their own nationals who hadtaken up residence there, mostly for the purpose of trading. European nation-als were thus removed from the legal power of non-European nationalauthorities. The first treaties enacting extraterritoriality were signed withChina in the 1840s and became a model for others, signed with Japan, Siam,

Vietnam, and Korea during the second half of the 19th century (see Gong,

1984: 19). According to Rodney Gilbert, extraterritoriality did not grant fullrecognition to non-European states as full subjects of international law butassigned them a partial status (Gilbert, 1929). It was the candidates obliga-tion to foster domestic change and to advance their political and legal systemsuntil they were assessed as being capable of guaranteeing security to foreignnationals, as modernized and as commensurable with European standards.Gilbert also points to the possibility of different paces of adaptation by non-European states to international law. It was Japan who first regained full con-trol over her domestic politics when, in 1899, the European treaty powersrenounced their extraterritorial privileges and Japan profited from full recog-nition.17 The different paces of the emergence of a worldwide internationalsociety as well the varying speed of the accession of non-European states isemphasized by Joerg Fisch when he notes, Europe became the model for the

world, and the European example gradually replaced the previous diversity oflegal and diplomatic relations (Fisch, 2005: 4).18

2.3. Geopolitical Projections

Nineteenth-century international law and standards of civilization were not

only based on the defining authority of European states and the belief sys-tems of positivism and modernization, but also on geopolitical concepts.

Accordingly, the political world is divided into geographically projectedzones of centreperiphery models. Geopolitical imaginations distinguishhierarchically between states and their geographical locations which are con-sidered as more and or less vital for the conduct of international politics

whereby each geopolitical imagination places itself at the centre. As arguedby the school of Critical Geography, geopolitical imaginations and projec-tions incrementally represent power ambitions and are biased by power

politics. Even if claiming geographical neutrality, they are never objective,or neutral.19 This understanding of geopolitics applies to the 19th-centurypolitics of standards of civilization.


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The afore-mentioned T.E. Holland, for instance, posited a charmed circleof civilized nations surrounded by other nations with various, but gradually

declining, degrees of civilization on the outside that those who would be civ-ilized, the Europeans, should modernize according to their standards. A simi-lar geopolitical feature with regard to the 19th century is observed by Wight(Wight, 1946) who argues that there is a concentric circle model in the scopeof 19th-century international law. Among the most influential writer in 19th-century geopolitics was Halford Mackinder (18611947), who distinguishesbetween a fundamentally opposed and essentially different Western and EasternEurope, and he terms Western Europe the real Europe. Those differences

would not be obvious having regard just to geographical factors, but much

more with regard to civilization. He perceives a superiority (of WesternEurope) due to its higher civilization (Mackinder 1942: 106), and concludesa natural unity of Western Europe against both Eastern Europe and the rest ofworld. Thereby he connotes civilization with both types of attributes dis-cussed above: on the one side, Western European civilization would be madeby the political and legal systems of its nations and their historical traditionsthat were traceable to Roman law and elements of imperial political orderin the Middle Ages. On the other side, Western European civilization wouldappear to be composed of the essential characteristics of their single ethnicnations (see Mackinder, 1942: 86). In Mackinders geopolitical vision, geog-raphy is, however, not the paramount factor which gives shape and characterto ethnic nations and states. The contrary is the case, namely that civilizationand assumptions about historically grown naturalness of states correspond

with projections about the political significance of their geographical condi-tions (for details see Mackinder The Geographical Pivot of History, 1942).Those assumptions and projections merge into an ontological and power-legit-imizing view of international politics.

As mentioned earlier, the UN General Assembly Res. 1514 (December1960) abolished the notion of civilization in international law. However,

civilization appears to remain an important feature in international politicsuntil the present day, since political thought reinforcing international recog-nition is similar to that found in the 19th century (see Donnelly, 1998). EUaccession politics, especially of the 2004 enlargement, serves as one example.

3. The EU System of Rule Compared

3.1. Acquis Communautaire and EU Standardization

The European standards of civilization survive in EU accession politics, both

as a political practice when admitting new members as well as a normativelegal framework. The key regulation for new members was laid down in theconclusion of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Title VIII, Article 49 which


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determines that each European state can apply for membership in theEuropean Union,20 under the condition of observing and guaranteeing the

basic political principles laid down in Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Treaty:the states must guaranteefreedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law,as well as the basic political rights of the Rome Convention of Human Rightsand Basic Freedoms of 4 November 1950. Title VIII, Article 49 further spec-ifies that with each state applying for membership distinct accession treatiesmust be contracted.21 The European Council in Copenhagen concretized theregulations for accession and passed the Copenhagen criteria in 1993.

The paramount request was institutional stability to guarantee democraticrule of law and basic human rights; second, a free market economy had to be

established, including the capacity to withstand economic competition in theUnion; and third, the new states were required to take care of all obligationsof membership as well as of the objectives of the political and economicUnion. The third criterion aims at the adoption of the acquis communau-taire. According to Rainer Gildeggen, the requirement for new memberstates to adopt the acquis communautaire is a consequence of customary lawfollowing the conviction that the accession of new states does not imply, andshould never result in, renegotiations of the EU treaties but is just an admis-sionof membership (Gildeggen, 2003: 3). As customary law, the determina-tion that new states can access the Community/Union only in its presentstate was first practised when in 1970 and 1972 Denmark, the UnitedKingdom and Ireland accessed the European Communities, and it was re-affirmed during the accessions of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986),and Finland, Austria and Sweden (1995). Until the accessions of 2004became effective, the acquis communautaire steadily developed, and in 2001encompassed some 90,000 pages of regulations by the Commission, as wellas the precedents of the European Court of Justice over the last 50 years; all

joint declarations and conclusions of the Union regarding common foreignand security politics and home and justice affairs; all international agreements

of the Union with third countries; all intergovernmental agreements amongsingle member states of the Union; and finally, all principles ofprimaryEUlaw stemming from the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice.22

These principles and practices, which are of both political and legal charac-ter, underscore the twofold partly political, partly legal nature of theacquis. Applicant states have to adhere to and adopt all treaties and theirpolitical, economic and social objections without reservation, as well as alldeclarations and resolutions which have ever been passed by the Commission,the Council, and the European Court of Justice since the Treaty of Rome in

1957.23 The adoption of the acquis and the EUs basic political principlescauses applicants not only to transform macro-political and macro-economicstructures, they also have to reform their bureaucracies and their judicial


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systems, including the education, or re-education of human resources. Inorder to monitor and evaluate the specific efforts undertaken by applicant

states, and to assess the progress of their transformations until they meet WestEuropean standards, the EU Commission has institutionalized a gradual pro-cedure for applicant states of moving forward, or not, in their status of becom-ing members.

Following Frederick Cooper and Laura Ann Stoler, these monitoring andevaluation procedures can be compared with the tradition of imperialbureaucracy in the nineteenth century that occupied itself with classify-ing people and their attributes; with censuses, surveys, and ethnographies;

with recording transactions, marking space, establishing routines, and stan-

dardizing practices (Cooper and Stoler, 1997: 11). This comparison revealsa common feature of European politics of standardization in the 19th cen-tury and EU politics, including its underlying political thought. It empha-sizes the construction and organization of authoritative knowledge, which hasbeen analysed by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu as a means employed bypowerful political actors to pre-construct reality and to formulate a particular

vision of the political world in order to act upon it. The more such construc-tions are politically formalized and institutionalized, which is the case in thehighly dynamic EU system, the better it serves the execution of real power.24

The surveys, progress reports and opinions on each membership candidatepublished on the EU web-page prior to their accession in May 2004, exem-plify such practices of authoritative classifying.25

The accession procedure developed by the Commission comprises threesteps: After the applicant state has submitted his membership application,there is a first introductory step, based upon Europe Agreements/ Association

Agreements which are international treaties in which the applicant statedeclares its willingness to standardize with EU norms and law; in a secondphase, based upon Accession Partnerships, the applicant state commits itselfto precise obligations with regard to specific means for democratization,

economic stabilization and industrial development;26 in a third step, mem-bership proceeds under the condition that all transformation efforts havebeen evaluated positively. However, there are interim regulations until thenew member state accomplishes full membership status. This procedureis similar to unequal treaties which were typical of 19th-century inter-national law. This will be examined further in this section; but first, however,patterns of political thought on modernization will be discussed in order toinquire further into commonalities between 19th-century and EU standardsof civilization.

After the Treaty of Maastricht and the Copenhagen criteria laid down theprinciples and guidelines for accession, the Treaty of Amsterdam reinforcedthose principles on which the Union is based. Two years later, the European


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Council met at Laeken. The Presidency Conclusion of this meeting may bethe most important document for studying the features of political thought

which stand behind the accession politics. The Council celebrated its sum-mit as a millennium meeting which apparently was not just a reference tothe date, but also because of a deeply-held belief in modernization and thecivilizing mission of the EU which is communicated from its Conclusion. Aninterpretation of this Conclusion suggests the idea that the European inte-gration process is the result of a linear development, which proceeds accordingto a logic incremental in European history. Interpreting Guenther Verheugen,Commissioner for the 2004 Eastern Enlargement, suggests that the policy-makers of the European integration process believe in metaphysics and his-

torical necessity.The division of Europe has always been artificial. The failure of the liberal revolu-tions in the nineteenth century [did the liberal revolution, e.g. succeed inGermany in the nineteenth century? HB], the devastating wars Europe has wit-nessed in the twentieth century and the Communist regimes created two separateEuropes [sic!], which must be joined. (Verheugen, 2000)

According to this belief the proper moment in history has arrived to over-come the artificiality of two Europes and to redeem the historical duty to(re-)unify Europe. EU states thereby claim their leadership in reuniting the

continent and modernizing its Eastern parts. And as Romani Prodi, Presidentof the European Commission from 1999 to 2004, deems civilization to besolely an accomplishment of West Europe, Eastern Enlargement appears not

just as a political and historical, but also as a moral obligation to share cul-tural, economic and political achievements (Prodi, 2000).

In this context a (hi-)story of modernization is constructed which wouldrescue the applicant states from backwardness. Modernization is construednot just as having taken place in Western Europe alone, but as being anacquirement of West European history. It is said that Europe is thecontinent

of human values, the Magna Charta, the French Revolution, the fall of theBerlin Wall, and finally of the (European) re-unification. The chance forthose states who are not yet members of the EU to attain full civilization wasthus granted by the EU and by the cultural and political successes oftheirpast. This may be even more narrowly construed to mean those states in

which the quoted historical developments took place and which are per-ceived as the legitimate heirs of those achievements, namely Germany, France,and Great Britain. Accordingly, the evaluation reports of the Commission,paragraph 9 of the Laeken Presidency Conclusion, exhorts the candidate

states to proceed in achieving the necessary standards, especially with regardto their bureaucratic and judicial systems, for advancing in their membershipnegotiations.


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3.2. Uneven Development and Graduation of Membership

The integration of old and new EU member states knows different levels

of cooperation in two regards: first, the degree of cooperation between par-ticular member states according to Part One, Title IV, Article K.15, 1, of theTreaty of Amsterdam. Second, those member states which newly accessedthe Union in 2004 are, according to the accession treaties, conceded interimregulations for accomplishing even stronger standardizations, especially withregard to their economies, before they can enjoy full membership rights.

Both determinations bring about a gradual classification of EU memberstates. With regard to the encouragement of closer cooperation, there arestates who integrate their policies more intensively then others and thereby

accelerate their pace of integration. Consequently others decide to maintainmore national sovereignty rights and not to participate fully with commonEU policies. An example is the reservations expressed by the UK, Ireland, andDenmark when joining the Schengen Agreement on free movement of EUcitizens, as well as the refusal of certain member states to join the Euro-zone.On the other hand, there are the new member states of 2004. Whereas it canbe regarded as tolerant and supportive for new members that the EU grantsthem, for instance, development programmes and customs facilities duringinterim periods before they have to face full economic competition, further

regulations can be understood as setting up inequalities and exercising con-trol. One example which epitomizes such inequalities between new and oldEU member states is the regulation which stipulates that citizens of the newmember states do not enjoy the full rights of free movement within the EUfor the first seven years after their accession, even if they fully incorporated theTreaty of Amsterdam and the Schengen acquis codified therein.27

The Treaty of Amsterdam states in Article 2.1. that (from) the date ofentry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen acquis shallimmediately apply to the thirteen Member states with the exception of the

UK, Ireland, and Denmark; and Article 8, focusing on the applicant states,concludes that (for) the purposes of the negotiations for the admission ofnew Member States the Schengen acquis shall be regarded as an acquis

which must be accepted in full by all States candidates for admission. TheSchengen Agreement and the Schengen Convention are thus examples ofboth a closer cooperation among old EU member states and unequaltreaties with new member states. Between the lines of the EU political dis-course we can read the main argument for this inequality enacted uponthe new member states. It becomes, for example, obvious in the discussionsabout the extraterritorial status of Kaliningrad that the Western European states

were afraid of huge immigrations if the Eastern European states were grantedthe right of free movement for their citizens (see Veser, 2002; Muentel, 2002).


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The Schengen Agreement, however, is not only an example for unequaltreaties, but furthermore exemplifies geopolitical projections in EU politics.28

3.3. Geopolitical Projections of Europe West and East

It is the third country regulation of EU asylum politics which provokesa geopolitical interpretation. In the annexes of the Treaty of Amsterdam(C. Protocol) EU member states are perceived as safe countries of originand each member state enjoys full credibility within the Union to negotiateand conclude agreements with third countries as long as they respectCommunity law and other relevant international agreements. Accordingly,

treaties have been contracted in which non-EU member states are recog-nized as safe countries of origin. Thus a twofold graduated zone of non-asylum becomes erected, constituted first by EU member states, and secondby those states with which EU member states established agreements accord-ing to which they are recognized as safe.

The term safe country has an implication which needs further discussion:the abolition of border checks withinthe Union resulted in an enforced pro-tection of external EU borders (Behr, 2005). Consequently EU memberstates restricted their national asylum politics parallel to the creation of theSchengen area. As the main instrument to restrict asylum regulations is toprevent potential asylum seekers from even entering ones national territory,EU member states used the safe country definition by concluding treaties

with third countries, defined as safe, in which their treaty partners have beenobliged to take back asylum seekers who entered EU territory. Paragraph 40of the Laeken Presidency Conclusion of 2001 explicitly required EU memberstates, with a special focus on the new members, to conclude such treaties

which include repatriation agreements. Some years before, both the Treaty ofAmsterdam, Title III, Article 63, and the Presidency Conclusion of Tampere,October 1999, charged the Commission in order to replace the Dublin

Conventions I and II with the responsibility to develop new restrictiveinstruments for how to deal with asylum applications submitted by a nationalof a third country.

Following this requirement, the Austrian government had launched an ini-tiative to adopt a Council Resolution which would define the criteria fordetermining states which qualify as safe third countries. These countriesshould additionally take responsibility for asylum applications by a nationalofanycountry who enters the EU through their borders (2003/C 17/06;January 14, 2003). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) criticized this initiative, as well as two papers directly developedby the Commission called Revisiting the Dublin Convention (SEC (2000)522) and Evaluating the Dublin Convention (SEC (2001) 756), because


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of their determinations that that state should be responsible for the asylumapplication in which the application was first submitted. This state, however,

according to the Dublin Conventions I and II, and as enforced by theAustrian initiative, can assign this application to yet another country if thatcountry could also be considered as safe. The UNHCR critique empha-sized the possibility that by bilateral and multilateral treaties a system ofdeportation might emerge by which it can happen that some refugeesare expelled from one state to another until they are eventually passed intothe country from which they originally had to flee. This apprehension wasrealistic, as such treaties concerning repatriation measures have indeed beenconcluded (Glatzl, 1997).

This treaty system established geographical areas of asylum and non-asylum,covering EU as well as non-EU member states. This framework thus representsa centreperiphery model, consisting of a core of EU member states (theSchengen states), around which there is a second circle of prospective memberstates. Further on the outside there is a third circle of neighbouring states with-out any prospect of membership in the European Union, and eventually followsthe rest of the world. This model describes a concentric system of exclusion,lawful within the treaties: The most exclusive border controls are undertakenby the Schengen states; their neighbouring states (the new as well as theprospective member states of the EU) are to incorporate the Schengen acquis;a third circle of states (like the CIS states and Mediterranean North Africa)should concentrate on transit control and combating crime, mainly organizedillegal immigration. Outside this third circle lies the Greater Middle East, Chinaand sub-Saharan Africa, which should focus on countering domestic push-factors of international migration.29 The fulfilment of these obligations andexpectations has profound consequences for states in the periphery of theSchengen states since potential EU membership, economic cooperation anddevelopment grants depend on evaluations of their enforcement of the men-tioned policies and on whether or not they match their particular assigned role

in this geopolitical cordon sanitaire.30 As some commentators argue, theestablishment and enforcement of such a treaty framework makes the EU afortress, while a geopolitical process is started wherein the European Union rethinks (and refashions) the question of its border to its immediate hin-terland by a multidimensional system of dependence (Boereocz, 2001: 15;Juennemann, 1999; Ugur, 1995).

4. Conclusion

The previous discussions have elaborated three common features betweenEuropean states in the 19th century and the EU dealing with entry into andmembership of its legal body. The historical comparative perspective revealed


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that the historic terminology of civilization turned into human rights,democracy, rule of law and free markets, whereby the features of thought

which ground and legitimize the very politics largely remained the same. Theconstant politics are (1) defining authoritatively political standards of inter-national cooperation and membership as well as setting up requirements fortheir fulfilment, (2) unequal treaties, and (3) geopolitical strategies. Commonto the politics of standard of civilization in the 19th century, the EU per-ceives the political and economic accomplishments of its member states asuniversal norms for every system of rule. This universality is constructed anti-thetically while describing the applicant states and Eastern Europe as back-

ward zones whereas the EU appears as a modernized, safe political and

economic heaven. This construction seeks to ground the geopolitical divisionof Europe East and West in some objective indicators of relative economicand political development. Moreover, the EU member states claim superior-ity over the idea of European unification. They make themselves appear to bethe creator of Europe and assert an ultimate authority over the European idea.

As Adam Burgess demonstrates, France, Germany and the United Kingdomcrystallize withal as a pioneer group (Burgess, 1997; also Wolff, 1994). Study-ing the EU from a historical perspective and as a new empire, leads to furtherquestions for extended research, such as: What are the dynamics and devel-opments of historic empires and can any lesson be drawn on the state andfuture of the EU? Is there a paradox of exhaustion by expansion, a question

which is stipulated by the ratification crisis of the EU constitutional draft andwhich suggests deeper historical analysis focusing comparatively on the fate ofthe Roman, Persian or Byzantine Empires?31According to Ole Wver, theEU appears to be an empire where applicants queue to be imperialized, hence

we can further ask: Does the EU represent an empire of its own kind with aunique dynamic when the periphery tends to dominate the centre? (see

Wver, 1997). For analysing the EU system of rule in terms of an empire,the question should also be asked: Does EU language politics facilitate an

imperial creation of mind?, as argued by Robert Phillipson (Phillipson, 1992,2002). Before further applying the concept of empire in studying the EU,however, this concept requires further discussion relating to the questionsmentioned. Contributing to this discussion while questioning the notion ofthe EU as a political order sui generis by pointing out to historical politicaland legal legacies of the EU system of rule, constitutes the intention andobjective of this article.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Mathias Ruffert, Peter Jones, Stefan Gaenzle, Talya Sheinkman andthe referees of the European Journal of International Relations for their comments


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on earlier drafts of the manuscript; I also want to thank Dietrich Jung and his colleaguesfrom the Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, as well as his stu-dents from the Department of Sociology at the University of Copenhagen for theirinspiring critiques while I was lecturing on the topic on November 28 and 29, 2005.

Notes

1. See Gessner and Budak (1998); Grant (1999); Benton (2002); Graham (2005).2. See the online-collection of League of Nations protocols and conference docu-

ments: http://www.indiana.edu/~league/(accessed 3 March 2005), and http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/league/background.html(accessed 3 March 2005).

3. In a more general perspective, the debate on international recognition can betraced back to Thomas Acquinas and his Summa contra gentiles, which can beread as a political-philosophical treatise on inter-cultural dialogue and the mutualrecognition of cultures. It could also be argued that the question of recognitionpredominated the main principles of the Westphalian Peace Treaties, which canbe understood as a request for states mutual recognition of their sovereignty andterritorial integrity. The argument in favour of starting a discussion about inter-national recognition with the advent of the 19th century and Hegel marksthat outset is the emergence of a new type of political order at that time,namely the nation-state. Thereby the problem of recognition developed into a

new stage as the nation-state is underpinned by a political ideology which uni-versalizes its own political and cultural principles and thus inevitably projects ahierarchical international order; instructive in this regard are the condemnationsof national ideologies and national politics of Niebuhr (1960, chapter IV) andMorgenthau (1962: 56, 60).

4. In an historical perspective see also Rousseau (1977: 13), who argues that evenwar rests upon a minimal mutual recognition between the war-waging parties(states) insofar as certain rules of warfare are recognized, and harming those rules

would be regarded as a violation of the law of war. See further Hedley Bull(1969: 60) who argues: To make war against a state in order to compel it to con-

form to the rules is still to treat it as part of the system.5. I will not deal with socialization patterns of international recognition.6. See Ashley (1987); Dalby (1991); OLoughlin and Heske (1991); Walker (1993);

Agnew (2003).7. According to Ronald Horvarth imperial rule is a form of intergroup domination

wherein few, if any, permanent settlers from the imperial homeland [the EU, in ourcase; HB] migrate to the colony (1972: 47). Domination is hereby defined as thecontrol over a territory and/or the behaviour of others, which often operates byadministrative apparatuses (1972: 50). This definition throws an interesting light onthe EU. Even if not a mainstream discussion, there is an emerging debate about

colonialism and the EU, which suggests that theoretical and empirical studies onthe nexus of European integration and European identity need to pay much closerattention to questions pertaining to colonialism and decolonization (Hansen,


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2002: 483). Hansen perceives the benefit of historical comparative studies to elab-orate the historical trajectory of EU politics and of how the EU employs conceptions of history in its current endeavour to foster and disseminate a sense ofEuropean identity in the Union (2002: 485). As beneficial as Hansens approachmight be to generate new theoretical perspectives on the EU, it seems, however,more appropriate to understand the EU system of rule as imperialand not as colo-nial since colonialism includes intergroup domination in which settlers in significantnumbers migrate permanently to the colony from the colonizing power (Horvarth,1972: 46) which neither was nor is the case in the EU. Imperial politics of dom-ination, espoused by administrative power, is characterized by (1) defining authori-tatively the political and cultural standards others have to follow as well as by (2)geographical, gradual hierarchical projections of centreperiphery models (whichseem to be intrinsic to all empires; see the historical studies on empires in Bauer,1980; Voegelin, 1974; Sinopoli, 1994; Eisenstadt, 1963). Sinopoli givesa definition of empires, which corresponds with the elaborated results on the EUsystem of rule as it is discussed in this article. She notes: Numerous definitions ofempire can be found They share in common a view of empire as a territoriallyexpansive and incorporative kind of state The diverse communities that consti-tute an empire typically retain some degree of autonomy Territorial expansionthrough conquest and [or] incorporation is the defining process in the creation ofgeographic and demographic space of empire. The process of imperial expansionoften begins in a period of regional fragmentation and weakness, following thecollapse of earlier centralised political systems (Sinopoli, 1994: 160, 162).

8. Regarding the criteria of concentration of power and concentration of wealth, seeGills (2005: 8).

9. Instructive here are as well Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello andStepan (1998).

10. Art. 3, GA Res. 1514 (1960).11. The development towards legalequality in international relations is indicated, for

instance, from the first to the second The Hague Conference 1899 and 1907: whereas at the 1899 conference only 26 nations had been invited while 59claimed sovereignty and wished to be invited, in 1907 44 of 57 nations claimingsovereignty had been invited, with the others at least permitted to join the decla-rations. For details see The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, translationof the original texts; prepared in the Division of International Law of the CarnegieEndowment for International, Buffalo, NY, 2000; The Hague International PeaceConference: Protocols of the Eleven Plenary Meetings of the Second Peace Conference,

Held at The Hague 1907, Harrison and Sons, London, 1908.12. See Rachwal and Slawek (2000); Bierstedt (1997); Kramer (2001); Stocking (1982).13. For a discussion on the functions of territoriality for the modern state system see

also Kratochvil (1986); Ruggie (1993); Behr (2004b).14. A list of international organizations established in the 19th century as well as a

comprehensive record of IGO Memberships listed by nations in Wallace andSinger (1970).

15. This political belief is most prominently articulated by Auguste Comte(18751877, 1865, 1975); also Simon (1963).


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16. See, among others, Mann (1973), as well the references mentioned in note 13.17. For further details see Jones (1931).18. See also Martin Wight (1969: 102) discussing the feature of uneven develop-

ment in, and of, international society and quoting T.J. Lawrence, Principles ofInternational Law (Macmillan, 7th edition, 1925) about grades and degreesamong subjects of international law.

19. See Henrikson (1999), as well as references above in note 6.20. This determination requires some concrete idea about European and non-

European states, and suggests, whether intentionally or not, a geopolitical visionof Europe (see below in 3.3). The problem of defining Europe already exists inthe accession regulation of the Treaty of Rome, 1957, Art. 237, which deter-mined: Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community.

21. See Negotiations on Accession by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia to the European Union,Treaty of Accession, Brussels, 3 April 2003, AA 2003.

22. See Communication from the Commission, A Project for the EuropeanUnion, Brussels, May 22, 2002, COM [2002] 247 final. In this regard itis important to distinguish between primary and secondary EU law: whereas therequirement for prospective member states to adopt to all of the above-mentioned EU properties (the acquis) is just secondary law as this requirementrelates to the Presidency Conclusion of Copenhagen in 1993, only the basicpolitical principles laid down in Title VIII and Article 6, Treaty of Maastricht areprimary EU law. And just as primary EU law is compulsory in legal terms, it canbe concluded that the requirement for standardization by adopting the acquisis of a political nature. It is as such not obligatory in legal terms, but is, however,of undoubtedly political weight.

23. See Bluebook of the Commission, Brussels, February 1995.24. Foucault (1980, 1991); Bourdieu (1991); also Diez (1999).25. See: EUROPE Enlargement: Candidate Country; http://europa.eu.int/

comm/enlargement/candidate.htm (accessed 3 March 2005). Also Kovacs (2001);Kovacs and Kabachnik (2001).

26. For more details see the PHARE-programmes of the EU Commission.27. Another example of such inequalities communicates from the Protocol annexed

to the Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration 23, which projects the planning of aconference on the future of the Union to which all member states will be invited;the new member states, even if they have finished their accession negotiations,

will, however, receive only visitors status.28. This discussion does not intend to elaborate similarities between EU and 19th-

centuryasylum politics, but rather uses EU asylum politics as an example toinquire into the question of geopolitical thought in EU accession politics. It isthus geopolitical thought which is the compared feature.

29. For further details see Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how bestto implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom,security and justice, 3 December 1998; http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33080.htm (accessed 5 February 2005) and http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/


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http://europa.eu.int/http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/http://ejt.sagepub.com/http://ejt.sagepub.com/http://ejt.sagepub.com/http://ejt.sagepub.com/http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/http://europa.eu.int/


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cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/13844.EN8. htm (accessed 21 December2004).

30. See van Buuren (1999); Ansell and Di Palma (2004); on EU-mediated geopoli-tics see also Mouritzen/Wivel (2005).

31. On the latter in relation to the EU see Engelbrekt (2002).

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