The Fisheries Co-management Experience in the Sultanate of

Oman: Challenges and Prospects

Hamed Al-Oufi & Younis Al-Akhzami*

Department of Marine Science and Fisheries Sultan Qaboos University

*Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Oman

Most centralized management systems are not sustainable especially in developing countries

Why?

High transaction costs

Lack of incentive

Transaction costs

Transaction costs are grouped on the basis of the sequence of fishery management decision -4 stages (Hanna, 2003):

• 2 ex ante stages

Information gathering and management program

design

• 2 ex post stages

Implementation and enforcement

The cost of generating information on stocks do not vary with management structure

Other costs will vary with the management structure and with the relative position of users and government in making decisions

When regulations are legitimate, compliance is likely to be high, thus enforcement costs decrease

Incentives

Most centralized management systems place limit on output, creating an incentives for fishermen to compete.

Competitive race for fish has led to rising cost of fishing effort and dissipation of rent

Strategy Co-operateDefect

Co-operate

3 ,3-1 ,4

Defect4- ,10 ,0*

Fisherman 2

Fisherman 1

* Nash

equilibrium

There is more incentive for user-groups to achieve optimal exploitation when they can control access to the fishing grounds and when their tenure to the fishery is ensured

Incentives

Co-managementis a collaborative and participatory

process of regulatory decision-making between:

• Representatives of user-groups• Government• Research institutions • Other stakeholders

What is Co-management?

• As a concept is new in fisheries (25 -30 years only)• As a practice it has existed in fisheries for decades and in some fisheries for centuries

Lofoten Islands, Norway. Functioning successfully for 100 years

Senate Al-Bahar (Oman) a local fisheries management institution based on traditional conventions and informal social sanctions that existed for 100 years

Examples of co-management in practice around the world

Lake kariba, Zambia implemented for the Zambian gill-net fishery in 1994

San Migual bay, Philippines implemented in 1991 to address overfishing and conflicts

Lofoten Islands, Norway. Functioning successfully for 100 years

Coastal fisheries, Japan

Coastal fisheries, Turkey

Characteristics:

• small scale

• 30,000 fishermen

• 12,000 vessels (5-10 m LOA)

• ranked second after oil

• landings 120 MT/years

Management system:

• State control CPR

Oman Fisheries

1. Before 1970 Community basedmanagement (Senate Al-

Bahar)

2. 1970 -1997 State control CPR

3. 1997-present State control CPR & Government-

sponsored co-management institutions

Fisheries Management System

1. Management system before 1970 Community based management (Senate Al-

Bahar)

Coastal fisheries in Oman were managed by an indigenous management institution known as Senate Al-Bahar (code of the sea)

Senate Al-Bahar was evolved several hundred years by fishermen to:

• Manage and restrain the take of fish from the resources• Control the activities of fishermen on land and at sea

Senate Al-Bahar is chaired by a charismatic leader with good credibility and experience

Responsibilities of the institution:• devised local accords to address common problems • address technological externalities and assignment problems • devised rules to conserve important fishery from depletion.

1. Management system before 1970 Community based management (Senate Al-

Bahar)

Under this management system, coastal fisheries exploitation was sustainable because:

1. Boundaries were identified

2. Access to the fishery was controlled by users

3. The institution’s role and rights were recognized by the political and the legal systems

(the institution comply with Ostrom, E. (1990) design principles)

1. Management system before 1970 Community based management (Senate Al-

Bahar)

• In 1970s, a Fisheries Development Program was initiated to develop the sector

• Royal Decree RD53/1981 and Ministerial Decision, MD3/1982 which is known as the Fisheries Act of 1981

• Fisheries management was the responsibility of the government both national and regional

2. 1970-1997 (State control CPR)

• Local management institutions were steadily eroded with community authority and rights were superseded by the government control

• Management measures (regulatory instruments) have been ineffective to promote sustainable development and management

2. 1970-1997 (State control CPR)

By early 1990s, inshore resources of the Sultanate have witnessed the symptoms of overfishing, e.g.,

Kingfish fishery

Lobster fishery

Abalone fishery

Other demersal species

During late 1990s, the problem of the fishery continue to worsen and alternative methods of resource use and management were explored

2. 1970-1997 (State control CPR)

Since 1997, 25 local management institutions were established in each town with support from the Government

3. 1997-present

State control CPR & Government-sponsored co-management institutions

Co-management implemented to promote the tradition of Senate Al-Bahar in fisheries management

These committees are responsible to:

• monitor compliance

• review fisheries regulations

• resolve conflicts

• work toward needed fishery management decisions

The government retains final authority for decisions, but consults with Senate committees

3. 1997-present (State control & co-management)

Structure of management committees in each coastal town:

Chair : Wali (local governor)

Members :

Shura counsel member (1)

fishermen’s representative (500:1)

Ministry representative (1)

3. 1997-present (State control & co-management)

Local committees meet 4 times a year

Since its establishment in 1997, a number of fisheries regulations were reviewed

Managers hoped that fisheries regulations would be considered legitimate by fishermen to promote higher compliance

3. 1997-present (State control & co-management)

Challenges

Little progress has been achieved in the way coastal fisheries are managed

Timeframe for the institutions to evolve is from 5 to 10 years (early to make a decision)

3. 1997-present (State control & co-management)

Government-sponsored institutions – officially recognized but ineffective since it does not represent fishermen

Local management committees are facing some difficulties because:

• Chaired by a Wali (governor) who is, in most cases, has no interest in fisheries

• Members are selected by local political elites

• Fishermen representation is limited

• Lack of power

• Irregular meetings

• Some are not functioning

Thank you