The Four Indian Tenet Systems on Voidness (Emptiness)

Introduction

Last night we started our discussion of voidness, so now we have a bit of a background to go on.[See:Advice for Studying Voidness (Emptiness).]What we saw – just very, very briefly – is that voidness is obviously very difficult to

understand, and it requires a great deal of positive force, and concentration, and preparation, and strong motivation to really want to understand it, based on seeing how absolutely essential it is. That in the beginning we just might get a general idea, we might not really understand too much, but that is okay, that’s how everybody begins. And that slowly, slowly, over time, and putting in a lot of work on it, eventually it will get clearer and clearer. We also saw that the way that it is studied among the Tibetans is through graded levels of understanding.

Different Buddhist Traditions Have Different Interpretations

We’re going through what’s called the Indian Buddhist tenet systems, or philosophical systems based on Buddhist teachings, which Buddha taught to help different people of different dispositions and different stages of development. And as Atisha put it so nicely, everything that Buddha taught is intended for our own gradual development by stages – not just for these stupid people over there, but I don’t need it. And we saw that – as Shantideva, the great Indian master, pointed out – that if we can work with certain common themes that you find in all of these systems, then if we can get an understanding of it in a simpler system, we can use that same analogy to get a deeper understanding. And we saw that the example that Shantideva uses, which is the most common and probably important example, is the example that everything is like an illusion and yet, nevertheless, it functions. And we saw that the most basic example of this is that from one point of view things are solid – body, chair, and so on – but that’s really just the superficial appearance because, when we look at it deeper, everything is made of tiny little atoms. So it is like an illusion that our body is solid and the chair is solid but, nevertheless, we don’t fall through the chair, even though these are two collections of atoms with lots of space in-between. And we shouldn’t leave it at just the level of: “Well, it’s a miracle that I don’t fall through the chair!” We need to try to understand what is meant here by “reality” and things being “like an illusion.” We shouldn’t belittle or trivialize this initial level, because actually to really digest that emotionally and deal with our lives with that understanding is already very, very advanced.

So, as I forewarned you a little bit last night, dealing with voidness is dealing with a great deal of material on a graded level. We might not understand terribly much at this point, but one of the things that can be helpful from visiting teachers, such as myself, is to give some material that then we can work on with our resident teacher here over the next months to try to go deeper and deeper. So that’s what I propose to do this evening. So fasten your seatbelts. And be patient.

We talked about the tenet systems from the Indian Buddhist philosophy – in general, there are four. Two are Hinayana schools, two are Mahayana. These names are Vaibhashika and Sautrantika – those are the two Hinayana schools; they’re from a different brand of Hinayana than Theravada, so don’t at all confuse it with the teachings that you have of Theravada in Southeast Asia. A different brand of Hinayana. There were eighteen schools of Hinayana, Theravada was just one. These are subdivisions of another one [Sarvastivada] that stayed mostly in North India. The two Mahayana ones are called Chittamatra, which means “mind-only,” and Madhyamaka, which means “middle way”). Within Madhyamaka there are two subdivisions: Svatantrika and Prasangika.

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And, to make things even more delightfully complicated, each tradition of Tibetan Buddhism has a different interpretation of all of these. So this evening we will just speak about Gelugpa. And within Gelugpa, unfortunately or fortunately, to make it more useful for developing the mind, there are different textbooks used in the different monasteries and they have slightly different interpretations of many of the points. I will follow just one of those, that of most of my teachers – it’s the textbook tradition called Jetsunpa. And that’s what’s used by the Geshes in Sera Jey monastery and in Ganden Jangtsey monastery.

I point this out because you really should be aware of this. Geshe Sopa comes from Sera Jey, the same textbook tradition. So does Serkong Rinpoche, my teacher. At Loseling, in Mexico City, the Geshe uses a different textbook system [Panchen]. So sometimes you might hear different explanations from the Geshes from different monasteries. You shouldn’t get confused by that; try to keep everything in its proper place. It’s just a little bit different, not a lot different, but a little bit different on certain points. There’s actually four different Gelugpa textbook traditions. Jeffrey Hopkins’s books follow yet another of these [Kunkyen], and Michael Roach follows yet another one [Tendarma]. So be aware that there are differences. As I say, this is very useful, actually, because if there was just one explanation then that’s dogma, and you don’t really learn, you don’t get challenged by trying to figure out, “Well, why did they say what they said? Why do they have these differences?” and so on.

Voidness Is an Absence of Impossible Ways of Existing

In the discussion of our unawareness or ignorance, what happens is – as I said in our discussion of mind and mental activity – we are always making mental holograms of things; that’s how we know them. And among these mental holograms, often there is the appearance of something that is impossible. And our unawareness is either: “I didn’t know that it was impossible” or “I thought it was possible,” like the difference between: “I didn’t know that there were no apples on the table” or “I thought there were apples on the table.” So the deepest thing that we have to get rid of is thinking that there are apples on the table, when there aren’t – thinking that this appearance of something impossible actually refers to something real. That’s what we really have to get rid of.

Voidness is saying that there is no such thing; that is what voidness is all about – an absolute absence. There is no such thing as an actual real reference to this appearance of something impossible. So we’re talking – if we put it in Western terms – about projections of fantasy. They’re not referring to anything real. And in a different type of terminology, what’s impossible is an impossible “soul.” So there is an impossible “soul” of persons and an impossible “soul” of all phenomena. And each school progressively asserts what is impossible. So the impossible “soul” is slightly different in the different schools; it gets more and more profound. And so we have to realize that although it appears, it’s impossible – that this is not referring to anything real. We have to negate it with the understanding of voidness – there is no such thing, even though it appears.

The Hinayana schools only talk about an impossible “soul” of persons: ourselves and everybody else. And the Mahayana schools speak, in addition, of an impossible “soul” of all phenomena. The Hinayana schools say that to achieve liberation, or enlightenment, all you have to do is get rid of this belief in an impossible “soul” of persons. The only real difference with the Buddha is that for enlightenment you need to know all phenomena, but there is nothing discussed in terms of getting rid of some impossible “soul” or impossible things about phenomena. In Hinayana they say a Buddha has to get rid of any wrong ideas that a Buddha has, but it’s not presented in the same way as in Mahayana, in terms of voidness.

Then the Mahayana schools say that to achieve liberation you have to get rid of the grasping for this impossible “soul” of persons, but for enlightenment you also have to get rid of grasping for

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an impossible “soul” of all phenomena. And Prasangika says, well, actually you need to get rid of this grasping for an impossible “soul” of both persons and all phenomena to achieve liberation, and actually what is impossible about both is exactly the same – the other Mahayana schools say that it’s different. The other Mahayana schools say that what is impossible about persons and what is impossible about all phenomena are different. Obviously, persons are part of all phenomena, so eventually you have to understand that about persons too. But to achieve liberation you have to understand something impossible about persons, which is less profound. So to achieve enlightenment, according to Prasangika, what you have to get rid of are the habits of unawareness that make these impossible appearances – and that you do after you have gotten rid of this grasping. The other Mahayana schools say you can get rid of the two together, gradually all the way.

The Gross Impossible “Soul” of Persons

Let’s talk about the impossible “soul” of persons first. A “person” (gang-zag, Skt. pudgala) is what we would call any individual mental continuum. That mental continuum is going to be connected with physical elements of a particular life form. There is nothing inherent in a mental continuum that makes it always a human or an animal, or male or female, or anything like that. We would also call an insect a “person.” It’s not inherently an insect – it’s a mental continuum that in this particular lifetime happens to have the aggregates of an insect. Now this is very profound, if you get into it, in terms of rebirth. It is not Alex the human is now reborn as Fifi the poodle. But in this mental continuum is one lifetime as Alex a human and then another lifetime as Fifi the poodle. There is a big difference in terms of how you view rebirth.

Now there are two levels of an impossible “soul” of persons: gross and subtle. Prasangika has yet a third one. The first of the levels, the gross level or coarse level of what is called the “grasping for an impossible ‘soul’” here is the doctrinally based grasping for an impossible “soul.” So this is very, very specific. This is based on learning about and accepting and believing in the doctrines taught by a non-Buddhist Indian philosophical system. Now, of these eight [non-Buddhist Indian] schools, seven of them, like Buddhism, accept karma and rebirth. Rebirth going on and on and on, over and over and over again, on the basis of karma. This is assumed. There is only one school, the hedonists, that don’t accept karma and rebirth, and they are called the nihilists – “let’s have a good time because at the end of this lifetime that’s it.”

So the question really is, well, what is it that is going from lifetime to lifetime under the force of karma? Or what is it that is just going on in this lifetime? These other schools are asserting an impossible “soul” that does that, and Buddhism says no, there is no impossible “soul.” If you hear about, and learn about, and accept and believe in one of these theories about an impossible “soul” – that’s what they are talking about, that type of grasping for an impossible “soul.”

What are the qualities of this impossible “soul?” And all these Indian schools accept in common and say that there are three qualities. Besides those three qualities they have differences, but they all, in common, say the impossible “soul” has three qualities. One just says that it’s only in this lifetime. First of all the soul is static, doesn’t change; it’s not affected by anything. Second one is that it is a partless monad. So either it is one with the universe, no parts, atman is Brahman – this type of Brahmanic belief, pre-Hindu. Or that it is a tiny little monad, like a spark of light or something like that. So that’s usually translated as “permanent and one.”

The third quality is that it is separate from the body and the mind and the emotions (the aggregates). So this type of soul either possesses the body, mind, and emotions, or it controls them, it’s the boss, like a machine, or it inhabits them – or, obviously, it could be some combination of these three. “Now I am in this body, this soul, and I possess this body and mind, and I am going to use it and control it, and I live in my head.” And then this separate “me,” this

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separate “soul,” flies off from this body and mind, and now is going to inhabit another one which it will possess as mine and use it and control it – push the buttons inside.

Now some parts of this we might automatically think, we might automatically feel like. But the whole package – which is what they are talking about here – the whole package, that’s something that you wouldn’t just automatically think. An animal certainly wouldn’t automatically think this. You have to be taught that by some doctrinal systems. That’s why it’s called “doctrinally based.” Now this is what you have to get rid of first. And this type of soul, according to the seven schools, not the hedonists, is the one that can be liberated from rebirth. Then it is liberated from the illusion that it is separate, and now it is, according to the Hindu and Brahmanic views, one with the universe. And, based on this belief, we get what’s called “doctrinally based disturbing emotions and disturbing attitudes.” So we get very attached to our view, our religion, and we get very defensive about it, and we get angry with anybody that disagrees or challenges us – maybe we even go to war over it – and we can get very arrogant about it, and we get many disturbing attitudes based on this belief – like grasping for this body to be “mine,” or something of our body or our mind to be “me.” This is “my” car – these types of thing. That sort of impossible “soul.” This is “my” religion, “my” church; this is “my” whatever. And then there’s also a disturbing attitude that such a soul is eternal, or this disturbing attitude of grasping for ascetic practices to be the path to liberation – like if you torture yourself, and whip yourself, and standing on one foot for a year – so this is going to bring you liberation.

So although we might not have the full-fledged Indian version of this, if you look at some of our Western religions and beliefs there is a lot that is very similar, isn’t there. So either we are complete hedonists – live for this lifetime, have as much fun as you can, make as much money as you can. Or, although we don’t believe in rebirth over and over and over again, there is rebirth in heaven or hell – and that’s according to slightly different versions of karma: reward and punishment based on actions. And that there is an eternal “soul” that’s separate from the body and mind that’s going to go flying off to this. And perhaps if we torture ourselves and whip ourselves that will help us to get to liberation in heaven more quickly. And we certainly get disturbing emotions based on such beliefs – that our belief is the best, superior, and we go to war with great hatred and anger against anybody who disagrees. Before, we had the hedonists – “I’m going to live forever, and it’s separate from this body because I never get old, and just have as much fun as I can.”

So when we realize that this is impossible, that there is no such thing as this type of soul – that’s not what I am; I am not just this gross impossible “soul” – so what do we know after that? This is very important in the understanding of voidness. You always have to look at, well, what do we know after something has been negated? [It’s a] person, that’s a “me,” that’s the “me” that actually exists in our persons, individual mental continuums. So there’s a person, “me” – the name you can give it – and everybody uses that type of idea, whether you have a word for it or not. So “me”; what is “me?” I am something that is imputed on the aggregates – the body, mind, and emotions. The five aggregates, I’ll just say very quickly here, that’s the body and mind. So it’s imputed on it, it’s labeled on it – I’ll explain that in a minute. So if the basis – that’s what we call “me” – now, if the basis is nonstatic (we saw that all the aggregates are changing all the time), what’s imputed on it has to also be nonstatic – it can’t be static. And because the basis has parts, what’s imputed on it (“me”) can’t be a partless monad – that also has to have parts. And because it’s imputed, that means that it’s not independent of a body and mind. Non-Buddhist schools would say it’s independent, could be separate.

Mental Labeling

So we have to understand, it is very important, what we mean by imputation or mental labeling. There are three things involved: The basis for imputation – that would be the body, the mind, the

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emotions (the five aggregates). Then there is the mental label – this is the word, or category, or concept “me.” Now that mental label, that’s not me; that’s a word or concept. The third thing is the object designated by the label. It is what the word or concept “me” refers to; the object designated by the label is me.

This is obviously something you are going to have to work with, so I am just throwing it out now. I’ll give a simple example: This collection of three hundred and sixty-five and a quarter days, that’s a basis for labeling, for imputation. The mental label by which we put it together and organize it so we can talk about the whole thing is the mental label “year.” But a “year” – that’s only a category, that’s only a word. A year is not a category or a word. A year is something, isn’t it? So what does the label “year” designate? What’s designated by it is an actual year. It’s equivalent to, it’s what you call, three hundred and sixty-five and a quarter days, in order to deal with the whole thing. But it is not just the word – it’s what the word signifies, what it means. So here you have the basis, and here you have the word (the mental label), and then what the mental label refers to – me. Well, that’s like an illusion. It seems to be static, and without any parts, and independent, and so on – but that’s like an illusion. That’s a complete false illusion. But even just that it is mentally labeled and it’s just what is designated by a word – that’s like an illusion, isn’t it? And yet it functions – I see, I hear, I know, I walk, I do things – it functions.

Let’s state it differently; it wasn’t so clear, the way that I said it. The impossible “me,” the coarse impossible “me,” the gross “soul” – that is an illusion; that doesn’t function at all. That is an illusion, the impossible “me.” But the actual me, which is designated by the label “me” on the basis of the body and mind, that is like an illusion. So here we have to work with another level – of things being like an illusion. I’m like an illusion and yet I function; I do things. So be careful here. The false “me,” the impossible “me” – that is an illusion. The actual me – that’s like an illusion, and yet it functions. And another very important point to know about mental labeling: labeling does not create the object designated by the label. It doesn’t matter whether you call it “me” or not, there’s the actual me. You don’t need the label. The label doesn’t create it. The label doesn’t create a year. Before there was the word or concept “year,” were there years? Yes. The word “year” didn’t create it. The earth went around the sun. And you could call it “year.” “Year” is applicable to that, but it doesn’t create a year.

The Subtle Impossible “Soul” of Persons

Now the subtle impossible “me.” This is the one that automatically arises. You don’t have to be taught this; animals have it too. Whether or not we know that the self is imputed on the aggregates, it doesn’t matter. Whether we think that there is this impossible “soul” or we know that there is no such thing, it doesn’t matter, because this is more subtle. So without having to be taught, it appears to us that a person can be known self-sufficiently. That means that it can be known without the body, the mind, or the emotions, or something appearing simultaneously.

Let’s put this into the type of image and language we have been using these last days, that of a mental hologram. It automatically appears, the mental hologram of just “me” – or, at least, we think it does. It feels as though there is a hologram of just “me,” without it being a hologram of body, mind, emotions, or something, also appearing, and me being what can be imputed on it. This is what it seems like, this is what we believe. Let me give examples: “I don’t know myself very well,” or “Oh, now I know myself very well.” – as if “myself” were something that I could know independently of knowing my body, or knowing my mind or my emotions, and knowing myself in terms of that. That’s very subtle, but actually very profound.

“Do you know Maria?” “Yes, I know Maria.” – as if Maria were something that you could know. But we don’t say, “I know Maria’s body,” unless we’ve had relations, but you know what I mean. When we think, “I know somebody,” we just think that we know this person. What is it that we know? It’s as if we could know Maria self-sufficiently, without simultaneously at least

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having a mental hologram of her name. You can’t think of Maria. How do you think of Maria? Either it has to be with a mental hologram of what she looks like, the sound of her voice, the name – something. You can’t just think Maria or just see Maria, that you could know her self-sufficiently, without a basis appearing.

Even though we might know that I am imputed on the aggregates; nevertheless, automatically it appears as though I can know “me” self-sufficiently. I can know “myself.” I can see “myself” in the mirror. You see yourself in the mirror? Sure, I see myself in the mirror. That’s my body. Now I do see myself in the mirror, but I see myself in the mirror on the basis of the body appearing in the mirror – we feel that it’s “myself”; it’s not that it’s just a body.

So we have many expressions that reveal this automatic way of thinking: “I am not feeling like myself today,” “I am out of touch with myself,” “I am looking for my true self,” “Be yourself.” And that’s automatically how we think and how we feel. And, of course, based on believing this, that this appearance of a subtle impossible “soul,” that we get automatically arising disturbing emotions: attachment (in terms of myself and others), and anger, and so on. This is the automatically arising type. Animals have that too.

 So this actual me, it’s like an illusion. It’s not only imputed but it is imputably knowable, it’s

not self-sufficiently knowable, it’s imputably knowable. It’s imputed, but more than that, it is imputably knowable. The basis is imputed on the aggregates (the body and mind). And, in addition, it is only imputably knowable. Something, some basis appearing. It is not like the body – aside from the relation of the whole and parts, which is a whole other discussion. It is not like the body, that you can just see the body. So it is like an illusion; nevertheless, it functions. And we do see ourselves in the mirror; it’s not that we are looking at somebody else or even a dead body.

Now that’s more subtle – it’s like an illusion, yet it functions. And according to all the non-Prasangika schools, if you understand just that much – that this is impossible, no such thing – and you get that nonconceptually, and you get really, really familiar with that so that you have that every single moment of your existence, then you gain liberation. You don’t gain liberation just when you’ve had it nonconceptually for five minutes or four hours. That’s not enough. You have to have it always. So when you get it always, then you’re liberated.

What Establishes That Something Exists?

This is difficult enough to understand, obviously. So now the question is, well, just with that much understanding, well, what type of actual self do we have? Who is “me”? What is “me”? So now we get into this thing of – what’s usually spoken of in terms of – how do things exist. This is a misleading translation. That’s not really the issue. The issue is much more subtle than that. The issue here is what establishes or proves that something exists: how do you know something exists? We are not talking about what makes it exist. We’re talking about what – it’s the word “establish” (sgrub) – what proves that it – it’s the same word as “prove” and the same word as “affirmation,” the affirmation phenomenon – what affirms, what proves, what establishes that it exists? “Exist” means that it is validly knowable. What establishes that it’s validly knowable – that’s it’s not just garbage, an illusion.

So this is what Mahayana is talking about with voidness. It is saying that, well, there are certain things that you might believe establish or prove that something exists, but that is impossible, that doesn’t prove it. Voidness is the total absence of – in terms of phenomena – it’s the total absence of this being what proves that it exists. That’s not only in Prasangika, that’s all Mahayana. But it gets more and more subtle, what they are refuting. The manner of establishing that something exists gets more and more subtle – I mean the impossible manner that they are refuting. That, you’ll have to chew on for a while. But this is what voidness is all about, if you want to be

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precise. This is what they are actually talking about, otherwise it’s too vague: “the way of existing” – that’s not precise.

Now let’s go back to Hinayana. Vaibhashika and Sautrantika talk about what establishes that various things exist. Everybody says, except Prasangika, that what establishes that something is validly knowable is that there is something on the side of the object that makes it a validly knowable object. This is what I have been describing for years as a solid line around it that makes it specific – not something else – that makes it a specific, validly knowable object. That would be equivalent to a line around it. This table doesn’t just merge into the background as part of one big soup. What proves that it exists is that, well, yes, on its side there’s some line around it that individualizes it from everything else. That’s general – everything has that, everything that we could validly know. There’s only one characteristic feature, the most basic characteristic feature, the individual characteristic feature of something – it’s just that it’s an individual knowable object. It doesn’t merge into everything else. Including “me” – that has a line around it. And, in addition, the referent object for the label, for the word for it, can be found. There’s the table! There’s a line around it. There’s the table. “Me.” There’s a line around “me” – I’m not merging into the wall or becoming you. So the referent of that word “me” can be found, on the side of the object. So this, in general, everybody accepts about everything, except Prasangika.

Vaibhashika

Now Vaibhashika says, “Let’s get more specific.” That, of course, establishes that something exists, proves that it exists. But what really proves that everything exists is that it functions, performs a function. Because it does something. And the most basic thing that everything does, including static phenomena, is serve as an object to be validly known. And so because it functions, that proves it exists. (My “invader from the fifth dimension” doesn’t function, doesn’t exist.) It functions, so that I can validly know it. That proves that it exists.

It makes sense – all of these positions make sense. So even the actual “me” is like that. There is a line around it, making it separate from everything else; and it makes it a knowable object; and it functions. That proves that I exist. I do things, I see things, I see you – that proves that I exist. And that “me” can be found. Where? In the aggregates, somewhere in the aggregates, the collection of the whole aggregates – well, that’s “me.” Although that’s the basis but, nevertheless, you can find it. The basis serves as an example for it; that’s where you can point to.

Sautrantika

Now Sautrantika says that, well, we have to differentiate between objective phenomena (rang-mtshan) and metaphysical phenomena (spyi-mtshan). So what we understood about Vaibhashika, well, that’s just talking about objective reality – what functions, what we would say is “real.” Body, mind, persons – those are real. That’s objective reality. And, well, metaphysical phenomena – what are those? Those are these categories, static categories that we were talking about. These categories, Sautrantika says, well, sure, they have a line around them. The category “table” is not the category “chair.” And here they start to get into a hint of Prasangika but, after this, everybody steps back from it. But they say that these categories, well, you can’t find a referent object of the category “tables.” So what establishes that the category “tables” exists? What proves that it exists is that it is applicable, it can be mentally applied; it can be mentally labeled on individual tables. Individual “me’s”, they’re objectively real. The actual “me,” according to Sautrantika – that’s real, it functions. I function, I do things – that proves that I exist, even though it’s like an illusion. Even though the “me” is imputed on the aggregates and even though it is not self-sufficiently knowable. But if we talk about the category “me,” the category “persons,” well, that’s a category. But what proves that it exists is that it can be applied

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to many, many different persons, many different “me’s”; everybody calls themselves “me.” Whether or not anybody labels it, it doesn’t matter.

Now we get to the Mahayana schools. Now we start talking about impossible ways of proving that something exists. That’s impossible, although it might appear as though it is like this. Now we are getting into the impossible “soul” of a person.

One thing that I left out, and I have to go back: In the Sautrantika, it says, well, come on, you can’t talk about the collection of the aggregates as being what you find, the basis of labeling, for “me” – what you can point to. You can say, well, it’s mental consciousness, because mental consciousness, that’s really what goes from lifetime to lifetime. The thing is, you have to find something that is always available, to be the basis for labeling. So what’s always available is mental consciousness, so that’s where you can find the “me.” That’s where you can point to the referent object of the word “me.”

Chittamatra

Now we get to Chittamatra and Mahayana. Chittamatra says, “Well, yes, we agree what you have to get rid of – the impossible gross and subtle ‘souls’ the way that’s defined in Hinayana. You get rid of that type of grasping, you’re liberated. But to gain enlightenment, you have to understand the voidness of all phenomena.” Chittamatra says, “Well, there’s two levels here. What is an impossible way of proving that validly knowable phenomena exist? What’s impossible is that when we know something – when there’s a mental hologram of something, the mind produces a mental hologram – that the object that appears is coming from its own independent external source.”

What proves that something exists? Hinayana would say, “Well, the thing exists objectively out there without my seeing it, before I see it.” So the source of that mental hologram is coming from the thing that was there before, plus from my karma. Now the question is: “How do you know that?” How do you know that it objectively exists out there before you know it? That is impossible. How do you know that, in a room where there is absolutely nobody, that there’s furniture, that there’s a bed in there? What proves that it’s there? The only thing that would prove that it’s there is you open the door and look. It is only when you actually have a mental hologram, or somebody else goes into the room, that it proves that it exists. You can’t prove that it exists by saying, “Well, it’s objectively there before anybody knows it.” So there is no objective reality.

For example, there’s a donkey in the middle of the room and we’re sitting in a circle around it, and everybody takes a picture with a Polaroid camera. Every picture is different. Well, what does the donkey really look like? It’s not objective. It’s not that it looks like something separate from anybody looking at it. That’s impossible. All you can say is that the sources of the appearance of things are from karmic tendencies. So this is the source of the object that appears in the mind – that’s the source of the hologram, basically. And the knowing of the hologram comes from a karmic tendency. And that’s all you can say that it comes from. And, of course, we have shared karma, collective karma. So we’re all in the same room, but what we’re seeing is not the same; nobody is seeing the same thing. But we would say – this is like an illusion – we would say we’re all in the same room; so collectively we’re all in the same room, but what we’re experiencing, what we’re seeing, what we’re hearing, are all very individual mental holograms.

So now we’re getting much more subtle here. Everybody sees me, but they are seeing something different. What appears is coming from their side, from the side of the mind. But you can’t say that I exist only in each person’s mind. What appears comes from their mind. If I only existed in your heads, then there would be as many Alex’s as there are people in the room – this is absurd. So it’s like an illusion that you’re all seeing the same person sitting here. And yet you

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can all see me. I’m talking to you – everybody hears something different and remembers something different. It’s like an illusion. Woo-woo-woo.

But still they say that there is a solid line around me and you can find me. What you find the person or find yourself as, they say it’s alayavijnana, it’s the storehouse consciousness, the foundation consciousness. I will not go into what that is because that’s a long discussion, but that’s more subtle than the mental consciousness. It’s what carries the karmic tendencies, and that’s why it’s very important. This is what is specified here.

Now Chittamatra has something else here, which is also going a little bit in the direction of Prasangika. We have the second, the more subtle type of impossible “soul” of all phenomena. The Hinayanas say that what establishes that something exists is the characteristic mark that just makes it a knowable thing, like a line around it, from the side of the object. The image I use which I think is helpful is that there are hooks, characteristic marks, of any name that you could validly apply to it, on the side of the object. So, like there is a hook somewhere within me; because of that hook, which is a hook for the word or the label “Alex” or for “Alexander” (that’s another hook), and another hook for “Alejandro,” and another hook for “Berzin,” and another hook for “Fifi the dog,” and another hook for “person,” and another hook for “nice person,” and another hook for a color – a hook for every quality and every name in every language that establishes that I’m Alex or that I’m Alejandro, or that I’m a nice person or a person, that establishes it. And Chittamatra says, “Come on, no way! Things would be so crowded with hooks. No, there’s no hooks on the side of the object. That names and qualities and so on are just applicable. It’s not that there is a hook on the side that allows you to hang the name on it.”

This is not so farfetched, the Hinayana point of view. I mean, how is it that you can give different names for things, and then different languages? This is a “table,” this is a “mesa,” this is a “piece of junk,” this is an “antique,” this is “beautiful,” this is “ugly.” How is it that you can apply all these words to it and they are all valid? It’s not just arbitrary. This is a “dog” – no, it is not a dog. So there has to be appropriate hooks in there. So you can have relative judgments: it’s a “piece of junk” or a “beautiful antique” – both can be applied, but not “dog.” So what is this? Is this a table or is this a mesa? It’s an interesting question. And on which side is it a table or a mesa – is it on the side of the object or on the side of the mind that is labeling it? What proves that it is a table? What proves that it is a mesa? So you see why you really have to, in order to understand what Buddhism is talking about with voidness, you really have to understand this concept of what proves it exists as something. What proves that it exists at all? Chittamatra says, sure, on the side of the object there’s a line around it that makes it knowable; but what establishes it as being a table or a mesa, well, that’s in terms of the mental labeling. But it’s not merely a mental label, because it actually functions. It is not that we’re mentally labeling it, making it a knowable object – that’s not just mentally labeled, according to Chittamatra. It’s something on the side of the object that establishes that; it’s not just that it can be mentally labeled a knowable object. It is a knowable object – from its own side – even though it is just appearing out of karma.

So let’s summarize this. Here we have the karmic tendencies, often called the “seed.” Karmic tendencies producing a mental hologram. And from the side of that object that’s been produced, the appearance – we’re talking about the appearance – the appearance has come from the side of the mind. Now what’s appeared has a solid line around it. But what I call it, that’s something else. That’s coming from – there is nothing on the side of the object that’s there that allows you to hang the words on them. Independent of whether I know it or not, it always comes out with a line around it. But it functions. That also establishes that it’s real – not like a category – if I put the paper on top of it then the table holds it.

Okay, it’s taking a little bit of time, but I think let’s complete this then you have the whole picture to work with. So this Chittamatra is extremely profound, actually. And what is the real

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importance of it, in terms of our progression here, is that now from Chittamatra we understand that the appearances of things are coming only from the side of the mind. So it’s like an illusion that it is coming from out there. If we can deal with that, then that prepares us for Prasangika, which is saying, “Hey, that’s not quite right!” Chittamatra says the appearance is not proven or established from the side of the object; it’s only established from the side of the mind. So if we can understand that, and work with that, then that sets the way for us to be able to understand that what proves that something exists is not at all from the side of the object – it’s totally from the side of the mind. And so it prepares us. It’s easier to understand.

Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Now onto Svatantrika Madhyamaka. Earlier, all the other schools are saying, “Well, only some things are imputed.” Madhyamaka comes along, both divisions of Madhyamaka, and says, “Hey, no, what establishes that everything exists is that it is imputed, it’s imputable; it can be labeled.” So everything can be imputed. What’s impossible is that it has unimputed existence. What’s impossible is that it objectively exists: it functions and that proves that it exists, independent of that it can be mentally labeled. They [the two Madhyamaka divisions] say, “No, no, no, it’s all imputed on parts, and so on. Everything – a table is imputed on the parts and causes, and all these sorts of things.”

So now we have imputation being a much larger thing. It is not just imputing names and categories, it is imputing everything. Because, remember, the others were saying that the line around it, that’s not imputed. Chittamatra was saying, “Hey, come on, only the names are imputed, the categories; but the line around it, hey, that’s there, on the side of the object.”

So, now, Madhyamaka says that what proves that things exist is they can be labeled, they can be given a name. A knowable object. The non-Madhyamaka are saying that you don’t have to impute that something is a knowable phenomenon – it has a line around it. It has a line around it. The line is not something which is imputed on it. The line is there. And that establishes that it can be known.

I’ll have to revise that. This is very delicate, so please be patient. I’ll say it again:Let’s forget about the line. Things are objectively real, so whether or not you give a name to it,

or anything like that, that doesn’t establish that it exists. They do exist. It’s only names – I mean it’s only categories that are imputable. The actual table is not imputable, this table. The category “table,” well, that’s imputable. How do I know that there’s a table? Well, it’s not just because I can label it “table.” There is a table, it functions. Excluding categories – categories, well, they don’t function, it’s just that they can be applied. So Madhyamaka says you can’t establish that something exists independent of a name or a concept. I know that there are tables because I can label tables; it is what the concept refers to, the name refers to.

Now Svatantrika says what establishes that things exist is that you can give them names, but there is still a line around things, and there are even hooks on things. Things don’t exist independently of – how can you establish that tables exist independent of the concept “table”? You can’t. The earlier schools say that you can establish that tables exist independent of the concept “table” – well, that’s impossible. What are you talking about? What are you establishing? It can only be established in terms of words. How do I know these tables exist? Well, because there’s the word “table.” What are tables? It’s what the word refers to. If there wasn’t the word “table,” how would I know that there are tables? It is like an illusion that it exists independent – that what establishes it is independent of a label.

Svatantrika says it can’t just be by that itself; there has to be something on the side of the object as well. A line around it and a hook for “table,” and so on. So it’s the two working together, interdependent with each other: there’s a word “table” and there’s something on the side of the object that makes it a table. There is something on the side of me that makes me “me” and not

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“you.” Something on my side. Something on the side of this person driving a car and beeping and trying to pass me on the road that makes this person an idiot. Of course he’s an idiot in terms of the concept “idiot,” but there absolutely is something on the side of this person, wrong with him, that makes him an idiot – so that I can actually call him an “idiot” because he is driving like an idiot.

Something special – what kind of special thing that makes me unique in me? So Madhyamaka says, “Come on, it’s only in terms of the concept that you can say he is an ‘idiot.’” Svatantrika says there has to be something [also] on the side of the object. And in terms of “me,” you can actually find me. What makes me specially me? And here they go back to the mental consciousness, so that’s the basis – you can always find it, you can always point to it – that’s me. The referent object for the name can be found, you can point to it. It’s on the side of the object. [You can point to the mental consciousness as the findable basis that has the characteristic feature of a “me.”]

Prasangika Madhyamaka

Now it’s only when you have gotten that far in your understanding, in terms of gradually getting to this point, that now you can go to Prasangika. You have already understood that the “me” is imputed and can’t be known by itself. You know about appearances. You know about categories. You know, in general, about mental labeling. And you know about these hooks, and so on. Prasangika says even within the context of mental labeling, there is nothing on the side of the object that establishes it, that proves that it exists. What establishes that there’s a table? Well, the fact that there is the concept of “table,” the fact that there’s a word “table,” and that it is applicable. It’s not from the side of the object that we know that it is validly applicable – it is only from the side of the mind that you know whether it is a valid implication or not. So whether it is correct or not, whether it is valid or not, is established by – I mean, let’s not go into that, but different criteria from the side of the mind.

If we understand this correctly, then we know that the label “me” doesn’t create me. And I can know me – of course, we have to know the body, and these things, in order to know me. And we can know things without giving them names; you can know things nonconceptually. But what establishes, what proves that things exist is that, well, there are names and concepts for them – they are what those names and concepts refer to. However, what they refer to – that referent object of the name or concept – can’t be found. Everybody else said that you can find it on the side of the basis, you can find it as the mental consciousness, or something, the collection of the parts – you can find it. “No, no, no – you can’t find a referent object. It’s only with names and concepts. You can’t find it on the side of the object.”

This is really getting subtle there. So it’s an illusion that it can be found. It’s an illusion – I mean, it appears like that – but it’s an illusion that what’s designated by the label can actually be pointed to and found as the basis. Because the basis is labeled on its parts, and that is labeled on its parts, and it goes on forever, yet everything functions – like an illusion.

I don’t expect, and so you shouldn’t expect, that you understood everything that we’ve covered this evening. But what I’ve tried to do is give you a good chunk of material, in perhaps a little bit more precise way of explaining, so that you have a lot of food to chew on. And from this we can also appreciate that Prasangika is very, very, profound. It’s not this trivialized thing, “Well, can you find the ‘me’ up your nose or in your armpit?” – the subtlety of what they’re talking about.

So I won’t ask for questions, because you really need to let this settle. This is for future use, this material. Slowly, step by step, over a long period of time. This is just a little bit of a hint of how you proceed because, obviously, I simplified it. And I can’t pretend that I understand all of this fully, not at all. I am just presenting to you my present understanding of it. And I think you

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can also appreciate that it is not very easy to put into clear words, and the way that it is usually given is totally in jargon.

So let’s end with a dedication. We think whatever understanding we have gained, may it go deeper and deeper, grow and grow, and act as a cause for reaching enlightenment for the benefit of all.

Major Indian Authors and Texts for Studying the Four Buddhist Tenet SystemsFrom the traditional point of view of the Indo-Tibetan form of Mahayana Buddhism, Buddha himself taught four major tenet systems (grub-mtha’, Skt. siddhanta) to suit the dispositions and

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capacities of different disciples. Hinayana had eighteen schools and within one of them, Sarvastivada (Thams-cad yod-par smra-ba), two of the tenet systems emerged: Vaibhashika (Bye-brag smra-ba) and Sautrantika (mDo-sde-pa). The other two appeared within Mahayana: Chittamatra (Sems-tsam-pa) and Madhyamaka (dBu-ma-pa). Other names for Chittamatra are Yogachara (rNal-‘byor spyod-pa) and Vijnanavada (rNam-par shes-pa tsam-du smra-ba). Although other Hinayana schools, for instance Theravada (gNas-brtan smra-ba, Skt. Sthaviravada), have their own distinctive set of assertions, they are not counted among the tenet systems.

Various Tibetan masters have identified and named differently subdivisions within each of the four traditional Indian tenet systems. There is little evidence, however, that these subdivisions existed in India. The most important of them is the subdivision of Madhyamaka into Svatantrika-Madhyamaka (dBu-ma rang-rgyud-pa) and Prasangika-Madhyamaka (dBu-ma thal-‘gyur-pa). Also significant, according to Gelug, is the division within Svatantrika-Madhyamaka between Yogachara-Svatantrika (rNal-byor spyod-pa’i dbu-ma rang-rgyud-pa) and Sautrantika-Svatantrika (mDo-sde-pa’i dbu-ma rang-rgyud-pa).

From a historical point of view, various Indian masters specialized in and taught these systems as separate Buddhist traditions. The fact that some of them were transmitted to China as individual schools corroborates this fact.

In the Indian Mahayana Buddhist monasteries, such as Nalanda, monks studied all four traditions. The Tibetans have followed this custom, with different subjects and texts taught from the points of view of different tenet systems.

The Four Major Tenet Systems

Tibetans study Vaibhashika in the context of special topics of knowledge (chos mgon-pa, Skt. abhidharma), specifically the lower system of abhidharma (mngon-pa ‘og-ma), as formulated by Vasubandhu (dByigs-gnyen).

Vasubandhu wrote A Treasure-House of Special Topics of Knowledge (Chos mngon-pa’i mdzod, Skt. Abhidharma-kosha).

They study Sautrantika in the context of valid cognition (tshad-ma, Skt. pramana), as formulated by Dignaga (Phyogs-kyi glangs-pa) and Dharmakirti (Chos-kyi grags-pa).

Dignaga wrote A Compendium of Validly Cognizing Minds (Tshad-ma kun-las btus-pa, Skt. Pramana-samuccaya).

Dharmakirti wrote A Commentary to (Dignaga’s “Compendium of) Validly Cognizing Minds” (Tshad-ma rnam-‘grel, Skt. Pramana-varttika).

Tibetans study Chittamatra in the context of the higher system of abhidharma (mngon-pa gong-ma), as formulated by Asanga (Thogs-med). They supplement this with further aspects of valid cognition in Dharmakirti’s Commentary to (Dignaga’s “Compendium of) Validly Cognizing Minds.”

Asanga wrote An Anthology of Special Topics of Knowledge (mNgon-pa chos kun-las btus-pa, Skt. Abhidharma-samuccaya).

They study Madhyamaka in general as presented in the works of Nagarjuna (Klu-sgrub). Nagarjuna wrote Root Verses on the Middle Way, Called Discriminating

Awareness (dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab, Skt. Prajna-nama-mulamadhyamaka-karika), and many other texts.

The Two Divisions of Madhyamaka

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Tibetans study Svatantrika-Madhyamaka in general in the context of far-reaching discriminating awareness (sher-phyin, Skt. prajnaparamita, perfection of wisdom), as formulated by Maitreya (Byams-pa).

Maitreya wrote A Filigree of Realizations (mNgon-rtogs rgyan, Skt. Abhisamaya-alamkara).

They study Prasangika-Madhyamaka through the works of Chandrakirti (Zla-ba grags-pa), Aryadeva (‘Phags-pa lha), Shantideva (Zhi-ba lha), and Buddhapalita (Sang-rgyas bskyangs).

Chandrakirti wrote A Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s “Root Verses on) the Middle Way” (dBu-ma-la ‘jug-pa, Skt. Madhyamaka-avatara).

Aryadeva wrote Four Hundred Verse Treatise (bZhi-brgya-pa, Skt. Catuhshataka). Shantideva wrote Engaging in Bodhisattva Behavior (sPyod-‘jug, Bodhisattvacarya-

avatara). Buddhapalita wrote A Commentary to (Nagarjuna’s) “Root Verses on the Middle Way,

Called Discriminating Awareness” (rTsa-ba shes-rab-gyi ‘grel-ba, Skt. Mulamadhyamaka-vrtti).

The Two Divisions of Svatantrika-Madhyamaka

Tibetans study Yogachara-Svatantrika through the works of Shantarakshita (Zhi-ba ‘tsho), who first brought Indian Buddhism to Tibet, and his disciples Kamalashila (Ka-ma-la shi-la), who defeated the Chinese monk Hoshang at the Samyey debate, and Haribhadra (Seng-ge bzang-po).

Shantarakshita wrote A Filigree of the Middle Way (dBu-ma rgyan, Skt. Madhyamaka-alamkara) and A Compendium of Principles (De-kho-na-nyid-kyi bsdud-pa, Skt. Tattva-samgraha).

Kamalashila wrote Stages of Meditation (sGom-rim, Skt. Bhavanakrama) and Illumination for the Middle Way (dBu-ma snang-ba, Skt. Madhyamaka-aloka).

Haribhadra wrote A Commentary (to Maitreya’s “Filigree of Realizations”), Clarifying the Meaning (‘Grel-ba don-gsal, Skt. Sphutartha).

They study Sautrantika-Svatantrika through the works of Bhavaviveka (Bhavya) (Legs-ldan ‘ byed).

Bhavaviveka wrote Heart of the Middle Way (dBu-ma’i snying-po, Skt. Madhyamaka-hrdaya) and its autocommentary Blaze of Reasoning (rTog-ge ‘bar-ba, Skt. Tarkajvala).

The Four Indian Buddhist Tenet Systems Regarding Illusion: A Practical Approach

Alexander BerzinMunich, Germany, November 2002

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Contents

BACKGROUND THE TENET SYSTEMS AS A GRADED PATH FOR MEDITATION THINGS EXISTING LIKE AN ILLUSION METHODOLOGY THE LACK OF AN IMPOSSIBLE “SOUL” OF A PERSON PHENOMENA EXISTING LIKE AN ILLUSION o Methodology o Vaibhashika o Sautrantika o Chittamatra o Svatantrika Madhyamaka o Prasangika Madhyamaka CONCLUSION

BackgroundIn the Indian Mahayana Buddhist monasteries, such as Nalanda, monks studied four systems of Buddhist tenets. Two – Vaibhashika and Sautrantika – were subdivisions of the Sarvastivada school within Hinayana. The other two – Chittamatra and Madhyamaka – were subdivisions within Mahayana. The Tibetans have followed this custom, but have made further subdivisions within these four systems. For example, within Madhyamaka, they have differentiated Svatantrika Madhyamaka from Prasangika Madhyamaka. Within Svatantrika Madhyamaka, the Gelug school has further classified Indian authors as Yogachara Svatantrika or Sautrantika Svatantrika. The various non-Gelug schools have subdivided Madhyamaka in yet other ways.

[See:Major Indian Authors and Texts for Studying the Four Buddhist Tenet Systems.]

Further, various masters within each Tibetan lineage have interpreted the assorted Indian Buddhist tenet systems differently. In general, Sakya, Kagyu, and Nyingma share an earlier interpretation. Regarding Madhyamaka, this earlier interpretation relies especially on the Yogachara Svatantrika slant of the two Nalanda masters who introduced Indian Buddhism to Tibet: Shantarakshita and Kamalashila. Because of that, non-Gelug has a great deal of Chittamatra terminology in its presentation of tantra. Tsongkhapa, relying on the works of another Nalanda master, Buddhapalita, radically reinterpreted the tenet systems, especially Sautrantika and Prasangika. Gelug follows his interpretation.

We can see some of the differences in these two main lines of interpretation with just a few examples. For instance, non-Gelug asserts that Svatantrika and Prasangika do not differ in their explanations of the objects nullified by voidness, the emotional and cognitive obscurations, and the stages of ridding ourselves of them. The differences between these two divisions of Madhyamaka lie mainly in the approach toward logic and whether or not any positive assertions can be made about anything. Gelug asserts that these two divisions of Madhyamaka have different assertions concerning the objects nullified by voidness, the emotional and cognitive obscurations, and the stages of ridding ourselves of them. Thus, non-Gelug accepts the Filigree of Realizations (mNgon-rtogs rgyan, Skt. Abhisamaya-alamkara) presentation of the stages of the path for all of Madhyamaka, whereas Gelug accepts it only for Svatantrika and identifies an extremely different Prasangika presentation. Likewise, non-Gelug accepts the basic Sautrantika presentation of cognition theory, while Gelug asserts a different Prasangika presentation of it as the deepest explanation.

Even within Gelug, however, various masters have presented several details differently. We shall restrict our discussion here to the general Gelug presentation.

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The Tenet Systems as a Graded Path for MeditationRegardless of interpretation of the features of each tenet system, the Tibetan masters have taught the Indian systems as graded steps in meditation, which are then to be applied to daily life. When studying the sections on discriminating awareness in Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s “Root Verses on) the Middle Way (dBu-ma-la ‘jug-pa, Skt. Madhyamaka-avatara) and Shantideva’s Engaging in Bodhisattva Behavior (sPyod-‘ jug, Skt. Bodhisattvacarya-avatara), then, it is important not to see the refutations of non-Prasangika systems in them as directed primarily at winning debates against proponents of other systems. They are intended to help us go deeper in our own understanding.

The methodology is to narrow in on the most sophisticated explanation, as when first learning Newtonian physics, then refining it with Einstein’s theory of relativity, and then refining that with superstring theory. Each theory is relatively true and is functional; they differ merely in accuracy.

Therefore, it is important to try to understand each set of tenet systems one at a time and to try to see reality through each of their views. We must avoid thinking that any of them are stupid. After all, Buddha gave the general principles for each of them and the great Indian masters elaborated their details. Thus, they each have valid sources and were all intended for helping people to overcome suffering. Moreover, we need to proceed through the theories in the proper order, without skipping any. To skip the less sophisticated systems and jump immediately to the more profound ones usually renders the more profound theories trivial.

The method for going deeper in our understanding derives from Shantideva. He wrote that a debate is possible only when the two proponents accept an example in common, such as all things being like an illusion, and both accept as well the conventional functioning of cause and effect, despite all things being like an illusion. This is true in meditation as well, as we try to gain ever-deeper understandings. Let us use this example of all things being like an illusion and let us speak on an introductory rough level.

Things Existing Like an IllusionThe point of the analogy of things being like an illusion is that an illusion appears to be real, but does not actually exist in the manner in which it appears to exist. For example, a striped rope may be the basis for the illusion that it exists as a snake. The rope appears to exist as a snake, but it does not actually exist in that way. Nevertheless, the basis for the illusion, namely the rope appearing deceptively to be a snake, functions to scare us. You cannot say that what the illusion seems to be, namely the snake itself, scares us, because the snake does not actually exist, although the appearance of what resembles a snake occurs and therefore exists. The illusion is the appearance of the snake arising on the basis of the rope. The rope itself is not the illusion; the rope, as it appears to a deceived mind, is merely like an illusion.

In short, the basis for the illusion and the appearance of the illusion both exist and both function. What the illusion appears to be does not exist and does not function.

The same analysis applies to a difficult situation in life that appears to exist like an insoluble problem. The difficult situation can cause us to lose our jobs, for example; but its appearance of existing as an insoluble problem is like an illusion. The difficult situation and its appearance as an insoluble problem exist, but insoluble problems do not exist. There is always some solution for a difficult situation, even though it might not be an ideal one.

MethodologyTo work with the example of things being like an illusion, we need to recognize something in our everyday lives that in some way is like an illusion and yet which functions. We need to find an

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example. Once we can recognize and really accept this personal example, we can then deepen our understanding of what the illusion is. How do we deepen our understanding? Take the example of love. We have an idea of what love means. We learn a new definition and then see how that works. If it works better, we may be convinced to accept the new definition.

We can apply the example of things existing like an illusion both to individual beings (persons) and to phenomena in general. Let us first see how it is applied to individual beings.

The Lack of an Impossible “Soul” of a PersonAll Buddhist tenet systems accept the conventional existence of a self, “me.” The conventional “ me,” however, seems to exist in a way that does not correspond to how it actually exists. The conventional “me” seems to exist in the manner of an impossible “soul” (bdag, Skt. atman). A self that exists in this false way is known as the false “me,” the “me” that is to be refuted. Thus,

the conventional “me” is like an illusion and it exists, the appearance of a false “me” is the illusion and it exists, what would correspond to the illusion – an actual false “me” – does not exist.

If we have been taught and believe one of the non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems, we would experience doctrinally-based grasping for a false “me.” Like an illusion, the conventional self (“ me”) would appear to us as a “soul,” having a true identity as an unaffected (permanent), monolithic entity that exists separately from the body and mind (the five aggregates) as the boss, the controller, the observer, or the inhabitant of them. Even if we have not studied such non-Buddhist theories in this lifetime, nevertheless, based on study in previous lives, the self would appear to us as if it existed that way, and it would feel like that. After all, doesn’t it seem as though the speaker of the voice in our heads is a “me” that is separate from our bodies and minds? However, this is like an illusion in the sense that the self does not exist in the way that it appears to exist. Yet, despite being like an illusion, the conventional self functions. I can eat; I can experience suffering; I can gain liberation from suffering.

Once we have eliminated this impossible manner of existence to be nullified (refuted), we need to identify what is left in its place. In this case, we are left with a self that is

not unaffected by things, but is affected by them and thus changes from moment to moment;

is not monolithic, but has facets or parts; is not separate from the body and mind, but is imputed (mentally labeled) on them.

All of the tenet systems accept that a further nullification of a more subtle impossible way of existing is necessary. What now needs to be nullified is that such a self (an affected, constantly changing, non-monolithic entity imputed on the aggregates) exists as something that is self-sufficiently knowable. This is because even after we have nullified the object to be refuted, the self still automatically appears to be self-sufficiently knowable. In other words, it appears to be something that can be known by itself, without a basis for its imputation being known simultaneously. No one has to teach us that. For example, we want someone to love “me,” not simply to love me for my body, my intelligence, or my money. Such a “me,” we imagine, could be cognized with love, all by itself, without a body, a mind, or possessions also being cognized with love at the same time. It automatically feels as though there is such a “me,” although this is like an illusion, and we long for it to be loved.

[See: Introduction to Voidness (Emptiness) and Mental Labeling. See also:The Distinction between Self-sufficiently Knowable Phenomena and Imputedly Knowable Phenomena.]

Note that we automatically feel that there is a “me” that can be known self-sufficiently even when we also imagine that this “me” exists as an unaffected, monolithic entity separate from the body and mind, controlling them as their inhabitant and boss. Such a “me” is, of course, like an

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illusion. Much more subtle and difficult to realize, however, is that an affected, constantly changing, non-monolithic “me” imputable on a body and mind also cannot be known on its own.

Once we have refuted and eliminated this subtler impossible manner of existence, we realize that the conventional “me” can only be imputedly known. We are now left with a conventionally existent self, a “me,” which is an affected, constantly changing, validly knowable phenomenon imputable on a body and mind, but which cannot be cognized without some facet of its basis for imputation also being simultaneously cognized. However, it still feels as though such a “me” is truly and findably existent (inherently existent). In other words, it still feels as though there is some findable characteristic feature on the side of such an imputably knowable “me” that, by its own power, makes this person truly and uniquely “me” and not someone else. It feels as though there must be something findable that allows for a correct labeling of this individual stream of continuity of aggregates as “me.” All tenet systems accept such an inherently existent “me,” except for Prasangika.

Prasangika asserts that this mode of existence is also impossible and that such a “me” is also like an illusion. Once this impossible mode of existence is nullified, we are left with a conventional “me” that merely arises dependently in terms of mental labeling. It is merely what the label “me” refers to, when labeled on the basis of an everchanging individual stream of continuity of five aggregates. In other words, the conventional “me” is merely an affected, constantly changing, non-monolithic phenomenon, imputable on an individual continuum of aggregates. It cannot exist separately from those aggregates (separately from a body and mind); it is not a boss, controller, or inhabitant of those aggregates; and it cannot be known on its own, separately from those aggregates. Moreover, its existence is not established by some inherently findable characteristic features on the side of the aggregates that allow the “me” to be correctly imputed (labeled) on those aggregates. Rather, the “me” is established (proved) as something conventionally existent merely by the fact that it is validly imputable on the aggregates. Like an illusion, the self appears to exist in a manner other than that. Nevertheless, despite its deceptive appearance and despite its being devoid of the impossible manner of existence that it appears to have, “I” still function.

Phenomena Existing Like an IllusionEven before we understand the Prasangika position regarding how the self is like an illusion, if we can understand the non-Prasangika view of this, we can start to apply the analogy of an illusion to other phenomena as well. This is important because the self does not exist in isolation from other phenomena. The self experiences phenomena. It is affected by unawareness (ignorance) and thus experiences deceptive appearances of the phenomena of samsara. It can also be affected by discriminating awareness or understanding, and thus the self can experience liberation. Therefore, it is important to understand how phenomena exist. Although, except for Prasangika, the various tenet systems do not assert as a true cause of samsara unawareness about how phenomena exist, nevertheless samsaric beings still have unawareness or confusion about it. (Note that the Mahayana tenet systems, except for Prasangika, all assert unawareness of how phenomena exist to be a cognitive obscuration preventing omniscience, not an emotional obscuration preventing liberation. The Hinayana tenet systems do not even assert a set of obscurations preventing omniscience.)

As we have seen, when focusing on the self (“me”), which is imputed on the aggregates, the aggregates need to appear to the consciousness. Therefore, although the main focus for gaining liberation is on ridding ourselves of the unawareness concerning how the “I” exists; nevertheless, if we have confusion about the appearance of the aggregates that must appear when focusing on “me,” that confusion will cause problems. For this reason, we must also gain a correct understanding of the two truths concerning all phenomena that might appear among the

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aggregate factors of each moment of our experience. This is the case even in the Hinayana systems, which do not assert a voidness of all phenomena.

If we understand that the aggregates that appear simultaneously when we cognize “me” are like an illusion, we might still think that there is a “solid” “me,” existing and knowable separately from these aggregates that are appearing. This could happen if we have not already understood that the self is like an illusion. Therefore, we need to understand the voidness of the self first, before we go too strongly into deconstructing the deceptive appearances of phenomena.

On the other hand, once we have an initial understanding that the self is like an illusion, devoid of impossible ways of existing, our understanding of the aggregates also to be like an illusion reinforces our understanding regarding the self. After all, if the basis for labeling something is not solid, but is like an illusion, how can something labeled on it be solid? It, too, must be like an illusion.

MethodologyOne way to approach the understanding of the illusion-like aspects of phenomena is through stages indicated by the progressively more subtle assertions of the Indian Buddhist schools of tenets. Although this approach is not found traditionally, I would suggest that we could follow the same structure as above regarding the illusion-like aspects of the self. With this approach, we would narrow in on an increasingly more sophisticated understanding of the illusion-like aspects of phenomena through the refutation and nullification of increasingly more refined impossible modes of existence.

This approach is based on the assertions of the two truths – superficial and deepest – in each tenet system. In the Hinayana systems, the two truths are two sets of true phenomena. Although superficial (conventional, relative) true phenomena conceal deepest true phenomena, the superficial phenomena are not traditionally regarded to be like an illusion in Hinayana. In the Mahayana systems, on the other hand, the two truths are two facts about every phenomenon; and since the superficial truth about something conceals its deepest truth, superficial truths are considered to be like an illusion. In order to make a system of analysis that spans Hinayana and Mahayana, the untraditional approach suggested here looks in a Mahayana way at the two truths in Hinayana. In other words, it looks at the two true phenomena asserted in Hinayana as if they were two truths about one phenomenon – the aggregates – and aims to give the insight that all levels of superficial truth about the aggregates are like an illusion.

[See: The Two Truths in Vaibhashika and Sautrantika. See also:Cognition of the Two Truths in the Gelug Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Prasangika Systems.]

VaibhashikaThe five aggregates refer to the changing factors that comprise each moment of our daily experience. They consist of forms of physical phenomena, ways of being aware of things, and certain functional abstractions (such as impermanence) imputable on them.

Forms of physical phenomena that we experience, such as objects we see or feel, appear to be solid. This is like an illusion, however, because they are actually a collection of tiny particles. Their appearance as a solid entity is only their superficial (conventional) truth. Their deepest (ultimate) truth is the collection of particles that comprise them.

This understanding can help us enormously. Although Vaibhashika does not assert that the superficial truth about something is like an illusion, nevertheless we can apply this analogy to help us overcome suffering.

For example, when we see a scratch-mark on our car and become upset and angry, we can deconstruct the car and the scratch-mark into its component atoms. What then is the object of our anger? The solidity of the car and of the scratch-mark is like an illusion. On the deepest level, the

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car and the scratch-mark are just collections of atoms. Are we angry with the atoms? When we feel a pain in our back, are the atoms of our back causing us the pain?

When the appearing object for focusing on “me” is the aggregate factors of the experience of seeing a collection of atoms, the anger accompanying that moment is lessened, and it becomes easier to understand the lack of that “me” existing as a solid “soul.”

Similarly, speech that we hear is made up of the sounds of individual syllables. The sound of each syllable that we hear exists for just a moment and then no longer exists. Thus, the sound of the entire sentence existing all at once as a solid entity is like an illusion. Only the sound of one syllable at a time actually exists. Thus, when we hear a sentence of insult directed toward us, which syllable of it is the object causing us anger?

Thus, the first important insight from Vaibhashika regarding the phenomena that we experience in samsara is that they are made of tiny parts. The second concerns impermanence.

Situations that we encounter – whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral – appear to be permanent, in the sense of being static, unchanging. It is as if we enter a situation (such as feeling hurt because of being rejected by someone), take a photograph of it, and the picture of that frozen moment captured in the still photo is the actual situation. This is like an illusion. No situation exists in the impossible manner of a still photograph. Understanding this helps us to overcome suffering.

We can understand this illusion on two levels. The first is the illusion that the situation will last forever in the manner that appears in the still photo. When we refute that, we are still left with the still photo, and merely the understanding that some time in the future the situation will end. Until then, however, it seems as though the situation will remain basically the same. This too is like an illusion. Each moment, the situation is changing and drawing closer to its end. This is its subtle impermanence.

Moreover, the circumstance that heralds the final end of the situation, such as meeting someone else, appears to be the cause of the ending of the situation of feeling hurt. This, however, is also like an illusion. The actual cause for the end of the situation of feeling hurt is the fact that the situation arose in the first place; and its arising is due to a collection of many causes.

SautrantikaOnce we can deconstruct the appearance of what we experience in terms of the illusion that it is solid, will last forever, and does not change from moment to moment, the Sautrantika insight helps us to go further.

Why do the illusion-like phenomena we experience cause us problems? Not everyone has problems with the same objects or situations, so it must have something to do with our minds. The superficial truth about these objects is the projections that we cast on them. For example, we project onto the scratch-mark the image of it being a disaster – the worst thing in the world, the biggest crime of the century. This mode of existing, however, is like an illusion.

The deepest truth is just the objective reality of the object. It is just a scratch-mark, made of a collection of atoms, and it is impermanent. The cause of the car becoming damaged was the fact that the car was manufactured. The other car bumping into it was just the circumstance of the damage appearing. The Sautrantika insight to separate projections from objective reality, then, draws us closer to understanding the relation between our perception, our problems, and objective facts.

ChittamatraThe Vaibhashika and Sautrantika insights concern the phenomena we experience, which are the basis for labeling “me” – I am experiencing them in five aggregates. Even with these insights

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about them, we still face the danger of blaming our problems on objective reality. With the Vaibhashika understanding, we clear away our misconceptions that things are solid and permanent. With the Sautrantika understanding, we go further and clear away all other projections. However, we are still left with objective reality, sitting “out there,” and waiting for us to come along so that it can cause us problems. Even if we understand that our karma causes us to encounter these phenomena of objective reality, we may still feel that objectively real phenomena are the causes of our problems.

Chittamatra helps us to turn our focus to our own minds and the confusion that flows with it as the causes of all our problems. Thus, it is like an illusion that the objects we encounter are sitting “out there,” around the corner, waiting for us to come along and to cognize them. We have to understand that we actually perceive cognitive appearances.

The Vaibhashika and Sautrantika presentations prepare the way for understanding this. According to Vaibhashika, we see external objects directly, not through any cognitive appearance. According to Gelug Sautrantika, we see external objects through transparent cognitive appearances, which are cognitive representations of the objects. According to non-Gelug Sautrantika, we never actually see external objects, because moment A of the object causes the cognitive appearance of it to arise in moment B. In moment B, moment A no longer exists. Thus, although there are external objects, we only see cognitive appearances of them.

[See:Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition: Gelug Presentation.]

Chittamatra emphasizes the fact that the cognitive appearances that we see and the sense consciousness that sees them both come from the same natal source, namely from the same seed of karmic potential on our mental continuums. In fact, all that we see are cognitive appearances, and they are like an illusion, in that they appear to arise from actual objectively existing objects out there, waiting to give us pleasure or pain. However, they do not exist in that impossible way. The onus or blame for all the appearances that we experience lies on our own individual and shared karma. We cannot blame our suffering on external situations or on other persons.

Although the appearance of external objective reality is like an illusion, nevertheless the illusion-like sense objects we cognize do function. We know they function, because moments of experiencing results from them arise, such as eating and then feeling full. Cause and effect still work, though like an illusion.

Svatantrika MadhyamakaThe Chittamatra view helps us to understand that the mode of appearance of the sense objects that we experience is not established from the side of objects, but from the side of the mind that cognizes them. Thus, the appearances of sense objects that we cognize are established from the mind. This is the case even after we have cleared away false notions that these appearances are solid (not made of atoms or parts) and that they are permanent, and after we have also cleared away all other conceptual projections as well. Thus, there is no excuse for blaming our problems on something or someone “out there.”

Chittamatra, however, asserts that only the sense objects we experience are like illusions. It is like the example of realizing that a movie is like an illusion, but insisting that the projector of the movie must be real in order to project it. Thus, Chittamatra does not apply the analogy of an illusion to the consciousness that sees sense objects – although that consciousness may seem to be partless and to have projected identities such as being “so smart” or “so bad.” Therefore, with just a Chittamatra understanding, we can still be attached to our minds, or be angry with them.

We need to go deeper to understand that not only the mode of appearance of objects, but the mode of existence of objects is established by the mind. Moreover, we need to understand this in relation not only to sense objects, but also to the consciousness that perceives them and to all other phenomena as well.

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This brings us to the insight of mental labeling (imputation). All tenet systems other than Prasangika, assert that the existence of all phenomena is established by their own individual defining characteristics on their own sides and which are not merely imputable there. Svatantrika agrees that there is something on the side of validly knowable phenomena that establishes their existence. However, these findable defining characteristics cannot establish the existence of validly knowable phenomena by their own power alone. It may appear as though these findable characteristics on the side of phenomena establish the existence of the phenomena by themselves, but this appearance is like an illusion. It is only the fact that validly knowable phenomena can be validly labeled (imputed) on the basis of these findable characteristics that establishes the existence of validly knowable phenomena.

Consider the following. If we think that a dog is a cat and then we label it “cat,” does that make the dog into a cat? Svatantrika explains that it is only because certain animals possess the defining characteristics of a cat findable somewhere in them on their own sides that these animals can serve as valid bases for labeling them “cat.” Otherwise, the labeling of anything as anything could be valid. But, because a dog does not possess the findable defining characteristics of a cat, labeling it a cat is not a valid mental labeling.

Thus, with the Svatantrika insight, we understand that a combination of external and internal factors establishes the existence of phenomena. This insight allows the analogy of being like an illusion to apply to all phenomena, both nonstatic and static (permanent and impermanent), not just to sense objects.

Prasangika MadhyamakaWith the Vaibhashika understanding, we have deconstructed the illusion-like appearance of sense objects and consciousness being solid and permanent. With the Sautrantika understanding, we have cleared out other projections from them as well. Further, with the Chittamatra understanding, we have cleared out the misconception that the appearances of sense objects are established from their own sides. They are established by the karmic potentials of the minds that cognize them. With the Svatantrika understanding, we have cleared out the further misconception that the existence of any validly knowable phenomenon is established exclusively from its own side. The existence of any validly knowable phenomenon is established through a combination of something findable on its own side and mental labeling.

According to Prasangika, however, although all phenomena appear to have findable characteristic features on their own sides that establish their existence as “this” or “that” in conjunction with them being labeled “this” or “that,” this is like an illusion. If there were such findable features, they could lead to attachment and grasping to them. We could still place the blame for our problems on external objects or on a “me” – there must be something inherently wrong in me, making me no good. The true cause of our problems, however, is the mind’s making deceptive appearances of impossible modes of existence and the unawareness and grasping that come from that.

Because the deceptive appearances of impossible modes of existence are produced by the mind, the mind needs to stop projecting them. If the existence of objects as “this” or “that” were established by something from the side of the objects – even in conjunction with mental labeling – this could shift the focus of attention away from the mind’s confusion as the source of our problems. It could shift it to analyzing only externally to find the inherent characteristic features of objects that make the objects what they are so that we can mentally label them correctly. Therefore, we need to understand existence established by mental labeling alone.

The existence of any phenomenon, according to Prasangika, is established merely by the fact that it can be validly imputed (labeled) on a basis for imputation (basis for labeling). What the label refers to cannot be found on the side of the basis for imputation. Not even the defining

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characteristic features of what the label refers to can be found there. What establishes that the labeling of the phenomenon is a valid labeling – consequently, what establishes that the phenomenon that the label refers to is an existent phenomenon that is validly knowable – are merely criteria from the side of the mind:

The label needs to be a well-known convention. The label needs not to be contradicted by a mind that validly cognizes the superficial

truth of the phenomenon. The label needs not to be contradicted by a mind that validly cognizes the deepest truth of

the phenomenon.

ConclusionThe Indian Buddhist tenet systems present graded levels of understanding not only of how things exist like an illusion, but also of how cognition works and of many other important aspects of life. When studying these systems, it is important to avoid thinking that they are merely dry theories. They provide essential material for meditation to gain ever-deeper understandings. The purpose for gaining these understandings is not for acquiring intellectual knowledge. It is for applying them to everyday life in order to overcome our individual problems and to enable us to help others most effectively by bringing us enlightenment.

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