The Future u.s. Military Presence in Asia Pub75

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TH E FUTURE U.S. M I L I TARY PRESENCE

I N ASI A:

L ANDPOWER AND TH E GEOSTRAT EGY

OF AMERI CAN COM MI TM ENT

Rober t H . Scales, J r .

L ar r y M . Wor tzel

Ap r i l 6, 1999



The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect the offi cial policy or posit ion of t he Depart ment ofthe Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thisreport is cleared for public release; distr ibution is unl imi ted.

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FOREWORD

Aft er lunch with a member of Congress, during which wediscussed views in the Congress about the U.S. militarypresence in Asia, I remarked to Major General Robert H.Scales, Commandant of the Army War College, that itseems prudent to examine alternat ive st rategic futures forU.S. security in the Asia-Pacific. In some parts of theCongress, I noted, support for a continued forward-

stationed presence was waning; articles were appearingfr om Amer ican academe cr i t ical of t hat presence in Japanand Korea; and in t he event of some form of r econcil iat ion onthe Korean Peninsula, the continued stationing of U.S.forces there could be called into question. As we sketchedout a potent ial future U.S. presence in Asia, st retching fromAlaska through Hawaii to Guam, General Scales remarkedthat this would be a terr ible outcome that would undermine

the peace and stabil i ty of the region. U.S. forces in Asia, heargued, are stationed in places where there is a nexus ofvital U.S. interest and historical zones of conflict.

In the months following that discussion, separately ortogether, the authors pursued this topic with securitythinkers from military strategy institutes in Vietnam,China, Korea, Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore and

Aust ralia. I n some cases we t raveled to those places. Thearguments herein also were considerably improved bycomments from General (Retired) Robert Sennewald,Professor Rober t Scalapino, and Professor Ar thur Waldron,for which the authors thank t hem.

The resul t of t hese explorati ons int o the fut ure st rategiclandscape in Asia is this monograph. I ts thesis is simple,and reflects not only the considered beliefs of the authorsbut the consensus of many military strategists in theAsia-Pacifi c: A forward-stat ioned U.S. mi l i tary presence inthe region, even in the event of Korean reconciliation, isvital to U.S. interests and to maintaining peace and

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stabi l i ty. A “vi r tual” or “f ly-by” presence does not do the job.Should the United States isolate itself and withdrawmi l i tari ly from Asia, i t would be disast rous for the stabi l i ty

of the region and for the security of the United States.However, just as i t is up to secur i ty thinkers in t he UnitedStates to make that case to the American people and theCongress, it is important that the governments of thenat ions where U.S. forces are stat ioned make the same caseto their ci t izens in a publ ic dialogue.

LARRY M. WORTZELColonel, U.S. ArmyDirector , St rategic Studies Inst i tute

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BI OGRAPH I CAL SKETCHESOF TH E AUTH ORS

ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., a Major General in the U.S.Army, has been Commandant of t he U.S. Army War Collegesince August 1997. He graduated from the United StatesMil i tary Academy and subsequent ly earned a Master ’s andPh.D. in History from Duke University. He is also agraduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the

Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is principalauthor of Certain Victory , the official Army account of t heGulf War. Firepower in Limited War , a history of firesupport in post-World War II conflicts, is his latest work.Prior to hi s present assignment , General Scales was DeputyChief of Staff for Base Operations and t hen Deputy Chief ofStaff for Doct r ine at Headquart ers Training and Doct r ineCommand.

LARRY M. WORTZEL, a Colonel in the U.S. Army, isDi rector of the Strategic Studies Inst i tute, U.S. Army WarCollege. He is a Military Intelligence Officer and ForeignArea Officer concent rating on China and East Asia. He is agraduate of the Armed Forces Staff Col lege and the ArmyWar Col lege. Colonel Wor tzel has served in infant ry units,on the Department of the Army Staff, and in the Office of

Secretary of Defense. He earned a Ph.D. in Pol i t ical Sciencefrom the Universi ty of Hawaii in 1984 and has served twotours of dut y as a mi l i tary att aché in China. Colonel Wortzelis the author of three books: Class in China (GreenwoodPress, 1987), China’s Military Modernization (GreenwoodPress, 1988), and Contemporary Chinese Military History (Greenwood Press, October 1999). He is also the author ofseveral ar t icles on China and Asian secur i ty.

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TH E FUTURE U.S. M I L I TARY PRESENCEI N ASI A:

L ANDPOWER AND T H E GEOSTRAT EGY

OF AMERI CAN COMM I TM ENT

For more than 50 years, count r ies around the wor ld havelooked to the United States for international leadership.Most Asian governments welcome a U.S. presence in theregion to help preserve security and stability. They know

that an American presence does not mean an occupyingforce since, if asked, the United States leaves.1 Thesecountries are reassured by a more or less continuouspresence of U .S. forces in a way t hat the temporary passageor int ervent ion of expedit ionary forces wi l l not accompl ish.The credibility and deterrent effect of a soldier (sailor,airman, or marine) on the ground represents commitmentand stabil i ty. Face-to-face cont act and “boots on the ground”are the only ways to defeat the “tyranny of distance” andreall y effect event s on land in support of U .S. int erests.

The nexus of vi tal U .S. interests in Asia is in Nor theastAsia because of the presence of five traditionally warringpowers there: North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, andChina.

There are some who bel ieve that to map out a st rategicfuture in the next century, the U.S. military must beprepared to draw back to a security zone extending fromAlaska through Hawaii to Guam. This would involvedismantling the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.2 Otherst rategic thinkers around Asia and in t he Uni ted States, incont rast , recognize the benefi ts of maintaining U.S. forcesin Korea and Japan.3 Michael O’Hanlon, a Fellow in the

Foreign Pol icy Studies Program at the BrookingsInstitution, notes that keeping forces in the region helpsretain influence for Washington.4 The U.S. presence,

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O’Hanlon maintains, serves as a deterrent againstinstabil it y in Nor theast Asia.5

This article will argue that for the United States toisolate itself and withdraw militarily from Asia would bedisast rous for the stabi l i ty of t he region and for the secur i tyof t he Uni ted States. The point is made in t he paper that arobust land presence in Nor theast Asia provides a st rategicweight into the 21st century. A U.S. withdrawal fromNortheast Asia would leave a major void in the strategicarchitecture that would lead to a serious arms race,compet i t ion for contro l o f the Korean Peninsula,competition for control of the sea and air l ines ofcommunication in t he western Pacifi c, and would probablycreate a nuclear arms race. The United States needs abalanced military presence in Asia, including air, sea, andland forces.

Th e Eur opean Exampl e.

In Europe, the American participation with NATO torelieve the chaos in the Balkans was welcomed in partbecause the resident s of Europe perceive the Uni ted Statesto be an honest broker with no designs on territory. Whenthe Soviet Union collapsed and Germany reunited, thegovernments of France, Germany and England privately,consistent ly and persistent ly asked to keep a U.S. mi l i tarypresence on the continent.6 A senior German militaryofficial, during a visit with the Chief of Staff of the U.S.Army in 1991, explained that the United States mustcommit i tsel f t o maintaining a ground presence of at least acorps to be credible in Eur ope and to reassur e NATO.7 TheGermans believed that, given their history, they wouldnever reall y be t rusted by the rest of Europe, but that thecontinued presence of U.S. forces on their soil reassured

their neighbors that Germany would not again be a threat t othe continent. Recently George Kennan, the architect ofAmerican Cold War strategy, recalling the debate in theUnited States about a divided and disarmed Germany in

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1949, reminded us of the insecurity in Europe aboutGermany:

. . . the doubt that the remainder of the Eur opean communitywould ever easily or fully accommodate itself to the spectacleof Germany as the great power of t he European mainland; andthat unless and until these other Europeans could feelcomfor table in their relationship to them. 8

The debate by the early 1990s was not over whetherthere should be an U.S. presence in Germany, but aboutwhat size force represented a credible presence for the

United States to maintain in Europe.9 In the end, U.S.planners and their NATO colleagues determined that tomaintain a “fully capable, fully staffed corps-sized forcewith accompanying air forces, naval forces, logistics,communications, other command, cont rol and intel l igence”assets to ensure a “solid force” required about 100,000troops.10 Maintaining a forward presence allowed U.S.forces the flexibil i ty t o “conduct major independent combat

operations in Europe on shor t not ice,” while the use of a ful lysupported (corps-sized) force was “an accepted symbol of ameaningful mi li tary cont r ibut ion t o NATO.”11 A lower forcelevel would have depr ived the Uni ted States and it s NATOall ies of “an operational ly effect ive, nat ional ly independent ,and pol i t ically weighty force in Europe.”12 Lower force levelswould also have meant that the United States could notrespond rapidly to other contingencies in the region,

including Africa, without seriously degrading its commit-ments in NATO.13

The Appl i cat i on of t he Eur opean Exp er i encefor Asi a.

The lessons of the utility and durability of the U.S.military presence in Europe have application worldwide,

especially in Asia. There is not the sort of traditionalbalance of power in Asia that exists in Europe, making theU.S. presence essential to keep a balance.

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I n Asia, the debate over the ut i l i ty of Amer ican bi lateralall iances and the presence of U.S. forces, for some, is st i l l on-going.14 The presence of the U.S. military is still welcome,

despite some popular dissent.15

Many in Asia believe thatan Amer ican mi l i tary presence inhibit s the r ise of a powerthat could dominate either the mainland of cont inental Asiaor the mar it ime l ines of communication t hrough the SouthChina Sea. The people of Asia are concerned about Chinaand i ts future potent ial st rength.16 But l ike the Eur opeans,who are watchful of Germany, Asians are mindful of historyand have not forgotten Japan, the Sino-Japanese War

(1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), t he creat ionof a puppet state in Manchuria in 1931, the invasion ofChina in 1937, and Wor ld War I I .17 U.S. fr iends and al l ies inAsia do not openly talk about the fact that a U.S. presence inJapan inhibits i ts remi l i tari zation, but many people in Asiaare thankful that the stationing of American forces inNor theast Asia serves that purpose.18 While China publiclystates it s pr incipled object ion to the stat ioning of forces on

foreign soi l , privately Chinese leaders acknowledge that theAmerican presence in Japan acts as a guard againstremilitarization.19 These same Chinese leaders privatelyacknowledge that the presence of U.S. ground forcesstabi l izes the Korean peninsula.20

Meanwhile there is Russia, now bankrupt, with itsAsian forces looking for their next meal. Russia’s arms

industry is sel l ing what i t can in Asia and the equipment isgood. Russia’s scientists are helping China get stronger.However, one should not be complacent because of Russia’scur rent problems. Remember that the Nazi ’s undertook therearmament of Germany in about 1935. By 1941 they hadcruise missi les, long-range guns, high per formance aircraft(jets by the end of the war), high endurance submar ines, andnerve gas. Despite the state of Germany’s economy in 1935,

3 years after giving his mil i tary the go-ahead, Hit ler had theworld at war. Moscow’s forces are not robust in r eadiness atpresent, but with its military forces in the Far East

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balanced around a solid mix of ground, air, naval andsubmar ine forces, Russia is st i l l a player in Nor theast Asia.

A Danger ous Al t er nat i ve Fut ur e.

Visualize what the strategic landscape might look likewithout an U.S. presence in Northeast Asia: U.S. forceswould probably be anchored along a line stretched fromAlaska, through H awai i , to Guam. I f t his sor t of Amer icanwi thdrawal left any confidence in a t radit ional al ly, perhapsthere would be pre-positioned supplies in Australia.21

Deployment t imes by sea to the main shipping li nes in t heregion would be longer, and the ground presence, whichreall y demonstrates the depth of the Amer ican commitmentto the region, much t hinner . The sea lines of communicationbeyond the “first island chain” in t he western Pacific wouldprobably be part of an expanded security perimetercont rol led by China. (The “fi rst island chain” is defined asthe waters west of t he Japan, the Ryukyu I slands, Taiwan,

the Philippines and Borneo.)22

This is important becausetoday, China’s “brown water” navy has a sea-denial missioninside the “first island chain,” which defines China’s l i t toral.China’s marit ime object ives, however , are to develop a Navythat can cont rol the South Pacific and Western Pacifi c out towhat China has called the “second island chain” st retchingfrom Alaska to the Marianas, through the Fiji Islands toAust rali a. People’s Republic of China (PRC) cont rol of this

area would subject cr i t ical mari t ime l ines of communicati onopen for free, uninhibited navigation to an expanded sea-denial role by China’s submarine and surface fleetssupported by shore-based (and even by then carrier-based)air craft . I f Russia recovers from its cur rent economic woes,i t too would become a major actor in a race for pr imacy in t heWestern Pacific.

Japan, under the geostrategic alternative presented inthe paragraph above, would no longer be adequatelyassur ed of the U.S. commitment to Asian secur ity. BecauseTokyo could not allow its mari t ime l ines of communicati on

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to be dominated or controlled by interrupting freedom ofnavigation and denying use of the sea, it would probablyexpand Japan’s own naval patrol areas and strengthen its

naval, air , and ground forces. This would alarm the rest ofAsia and revive the memories of World War II. Korea,whether reconci led in a confederation, reunified or divided,mistrusting of both China and Japan, would probablyexpand i ts own mil i tary in ant icipat ion of t he potent ial forconflict with, or between, its neighbors. Southeast Asiancount r ies, wary of a cer tain mil i tary bui ldup by China or aresur gent Russia and t he corresponding response by Japan,

would probably bui ld their own mi l i tary forces, i f they couldafford to do so. The Asia-Pacifi c region would be a far moredangerous, less stable and secure place than it is todaywi thout the presence of U .S. forces. Moreover, much of whatChina claims as it s mari t ime ter r i tory in t he South ChinaSea would come under the cont rol of t he naval forces of t hePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Th e Nuclear Di mensi on: St abi l i t y v er susPro l i fera t ion.

The presence of American military forces in the regionwas one of the reasons that U.S. nuclear deterrence wasextended to our all ies in K orea and Japan. As in Europe, thestationing of U.S. conventional forces provided a deterrentoption that is reinforced by the nuclear dimension.

Amer ican nuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcomein Northeast Asia for its contribution to security andstability in the region. China’s military strategists maycomplain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China;but they acknowledge in private discussion that withoutextended deter rence, as provided for in t he U.S.-Japan andU.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might

develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit.

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China’s leaders even realize that without the defensiveconvent ional arms provided to Taiwan by the Uni ted Statesunder the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 , Taiwan mightdevelop nuclear weapons. Japanese military strategists

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express their own concerns about South Korea.24

Threatened by the probability that North Korea hasdeveloped a nuclear capability, without the protection of

U.S. extended deterrence, the South would probablyrespond in kind by developing its own weapons. CertainlySout h K orea has the requisite technological level to developnuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of theKorean peninsula, because the Nor th already has a nuclearcapability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed peninsula.Tokyo might then reexamine its own commitment todefense relying on convent ional weapons wi th the suppor t

of the Japanese populace. Strategic thinkers in China andJapan acknowledge that the continuation of extendeddeterrence might inhibit Japan from going nuclear in such acase.25 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, two Ameri cans, makethis same argument: “. . . Japan’s leaders would be lesslikely to develop a nuclear arsenal as a hedge againstKorean pressure.”26 Strong U.S. diplomacy combined withcontinued extended deterrence, argue some of Korea and

Japan’s strategic thinkers, might convince the regime incharge of a reunified Korea to dismant le whatever devicesthe Nor th has buil t instead of improving them.

An H i st or i cal Per spect i ve.

There are zones of confl ict in Asia that stand out thr oughhistory. In Nor theast Asia, the Korean Peninsula is referred

to by Japan and K orea as a “dagger and a bridge”: a bridgeacross int o Manchur ia and the Russian Far East for Japan,and a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan i f used by China,Russia, or Korea. Korea’s history with China and Japan isworthy of note. As earl y as the 3rd century BC, the nor thernpart of the Korean peninsula and Manchuria (northeastChina) were merged. The Korean Choson state, in 194 BC,had a capital at what is now Pyongyang and was a Sinocized

state whose bureaucracy and records were very much likeChina’s, and lasted unt i l 12 AD. Again, from the 6th centuryforward, the records and administrative system of Koreawere Confucian in nature. Korea also was under consider-

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able Chinese influence in the 10th and 11th centuries.Japan invaded Korea in 1592, effect ively occupying much ofthe peninsula. In 1593, Chinese military forces drove the

Japanese out of Pyongyang, but Japan sent in forces instrength again in 1597. It was only in 1598, after a longseries of negotiations, that Japan withdrew from thePeninsula.27 I n 1894, 1904, 1931, and 1937, Japan at tackednorth, over the Korean Peninsula to occupy fi rst Manchur iaand the Russian Far East , then nearl y all of eastern Chinain Wor ld War I I .

Fur ther south, inside the “first island chain” of the EastChina Sea in 1873, China and Japan clashed over theLiuqiu Islands (the Ryukyus) and over Taiwan itself.Conflict in this area involved not only competition forcontrol over land and resources, but because of the islandchains and st rait s involved, had (and cont inues to have) asignificance for sea lines of communication vital for trade.This historical competition between China and Japan is

reflected today in the dispute over cont rol of the Senkaku (orDiaoyu) Islands. Both countries (and Taiwan) claim theSenkakus, which are about 200 mi les west Okinawa and 80miles from the end of the Okinawa Island chain.28 Japanretained control of the islands after returning Taiwan toChina after World War II, and China wants to restore itscontrol over what it sees as one of its historical territories.The Senkakus are five islands, all uninhabited; the largest

of which i s 2.5 mi les long and 1 mi le wide. The islands havepotential economic significance (for undersea mineralr ights and fishing r ights in sur rounding waters), but in thesecurity realm they are more important. China needs theislands to complement its forward basing and area-denialnaval st rategy in l i t toral waters. This would be analogous inthe East China Sea to the role served by the Paracel I slandsin t he Sout h, alr eady in China’s hands since 1974, when t he

PLA Navy invaded them and kicked out the forces of theRepublic of Vietnam.29 Possession of the islands alsopermi ts China to flank Taiwan and dominate the waters tothe south of the contested island.

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The question that other countries in the Asia-Pacificregion must ask is why does Japan continue to press itsSenkaku claims? One explanation, of course, is that the

potential fishing and mineral rights alone are significantenough to make the islands impor tant to Tokyo. Of course,those countries of the Asia-Pacific region that remainsensitive over Japan’s World War II history may view theisland claims as a means to suppor t future power project ionin t he event that Japan would remi l i tari ze. China, for whichJapan’s history of aggression on the Asian mainland ispart icularly neuralgic, is one of the count r ies most sensit ive

to this possibil i ty, but so is Korea.So long as all of t he par t ies are amenable to dialogue and

do not resor t to force, the Senkakus are an ir r i tant that theUnited States must watch, but they are not a strategicmatter important to the secur i ty of t he Uni ted States.

In t he Sout h China Sea, there are also areas that havethe potent ial to be flash points for confl ict . The confl ict ing

claims over the Spratly Islands have led to clashes in thepast 10 years, pr incipall y between China and Vietnam, butalso between China and the Phil ippines.30 Only recent ly hasthe United States taken a position on the importance ofavoiding conflict in the waters contiguous to the Spratlys,since 67 percent of t he oi l suppl ies for China and Japan passthrough the area and a maritime conflict in the Spratlyscould spil l over , affect ing commerce.

Back on the cont inent of Asia, the Sino-Vietnam borderis another historic zone of conflict. Since the 9th century,Chinese emperors have attempted to exercise suzeraintyover Vietnam wi th varying degrees of success.31 In the mid-to-late 19th century the French occupied the area andfought China. In 1979, China attacked Vietnam not onlyover border claims, but also because at the t ime Hanoi had

several divisions poised to attack over the Cambodianborder into Thail and.32 Practically speaking, however, theSino-Vietnam border is of no strategic importance to theUni ted States. Thail and, on t he other hand, is an ally of t he

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United States, which made China’s actions againstVietnam in 1979 welcome to Washington. After the U.S.defeat in Vietnam, there would not have been much

domestic support for American involvement in SoutheastAsia so soon aft er the Vietnam War.

This tour d’horizon of Asia was a useful exercise topinpoint the areas of greatest st rategic int erest and concernfor the United States. If the Sino-Vietnam border is not acritical strategic interest for the United States, it is quiteclear that the South China Sea and the Straits of Malaccaare. In Northeast Asia, the nexus of the Korean Peninsulaand Japan are most cr i t ical t o Amer ican interests.

Why I s K or ea of St r ategic Imp or t ance?

“What i f” exercises are useful in at tempt ing to decipherthe implications of alternative courses of events. In 1990,what if the American ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie,had taken a strong position about U.S. concerns over thesovereignty of t he borders of Kuwait in her demarchés to thegovernment of I raq? What i f she had told Saddam Husseinthat the United States places great importance on thepreservat ion of peace and stabi l i ty in the Persian Gulf andthat the borders of another state are inviolable? What ifAmbassador Glaspie had advised the President to back upthat statement wi th the deployment of an intervent ion forceof a brigade, even a batt ali on, of t he 82nd Airborne Divisionto Kuwait , backed up by naval and air forces, before Saddamacted? Would Saddam Hussein have invaded as he did?Using regionally based forces for “Strategic Preclusion” isan important option for the United States, an optionparticularly relevant in Asia because of the distancesinvolved.

In 1950, the national security apparatus in the United

States did not think that either Taiwan or the KoreanPeninsula was very important. Reflecting the opinions ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, on January 12, 1950, in a speech atthe National Press Club in Washington, Secretary of State

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Dean Acheson described a security cordon in Asia thatexcluded Korea and Taiwan.33

When Acheson excluded the Korean peninsula fr om thesecur ity cordon, the Soviet Union infer red that the Uni tedStates did not care to get involved in Asia. Suppose Achesonhad said that the Uni ted States took a st rong int erest in t hepreservation of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula?What if he had backed those statements up with thedeployment of a task force immediately? We do not know theanswer to these quest ions; but we do have the advantage oflooking back and making our decisions today informed bythem. In 1950, Acheson did not think that the Peninsulawas of security concern to the United States, even in thecontext of our containment pol icy. Aft er the Nor th K oreanattack, the Peninsula became important mainly in thecontext of the containment strategy against Communismand the Soviet Union. The title of Acheson’s speech,however , deserves to be repeated. His words about the U.S.

commitment to i ts presence in Asia are relevant today: “. . .we can only help where we are wanted.”34 At present , theUnited States has some 37,000 troops on the Peninsula toprovide that help.

We can fi nd a number of impor tant reasons for the needto ensure the sur vival of an independent , democratic SouthKorea beyond the legacy of the Cold War. One must firstconsider the impact of any confl ict in Northeast Asia on the

economy not only of South Korea, but also for theneighboring countries and the rest of East Asia.35 SouthKorea’s bilateral t rade wi th Japan in 1996 was $47.2 bi l l ion,U.S.-Korean bilateral trade was $49 billion in the sameyear, and U.S.-Japanese t rade was $187 bil l ion.36 These aresubstant ial components of the regional economy that wouldbe ser iously disrupt ed by cr isis. Japan r eceived 22.7 percentof i ts impor ts fr om the Uni ted States in 1996, and 27 percent

of its exports went to the United States. In the same year,22.7 percent of South K orean imports came fr om t he Uni tedStates and 21 percent fr om Japan, whi le 16.7 percent of i tsexports went to the United States and 12.2 percent to

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Japan.37 In short, entering Korea in 1950 was a decisionmade based on a broader strategy designed to containCommunism.38 Today, however, Korea and the rest of

Northeast Asia are vital parts of a regional and inter-nat ional secur ity and t rade system, the disrupt ion of whichwould have a serious impact on the United States andNor theast Asia.

I t is not only Korea that we must consider when we thinkabout the fundamental importance of nor theast Asia for theUnited States. It is difficult to separate the securitysi tuat ion in K orea from t he region in general, and we mustnot forget that the int erests of four of t he worl d’s (and Asia’s)major powers coincide in Nor theast Asia: the Uni ted States,China, Japan, and Russia. Therefore, our securityrelationships there, which are so closely linked, dominateU.S. secur i ty think ing about Asia.

Economics and trade are vital, but internationalstanding and pr inciple are also impor tant to the Amer ican

standing as an internat ional leader. Remaining aresponsible member of t he Uni ted Nations Secur i ty Counci land a responsible partner in Asia requires a crediblesecurity presence in the region. The national securitystrategy of the United States commits the nation to anapproach that “recognizes that we must lead abroad if weare to be secure at home.”39 The U.S. commitment to EastAsia and the Pacifi c is to maintain a force of approximately

100,000 U.S. mi l i tary personnel in t he region.40 Whi le doingso, the Uni ted States int ends to enhance i ts t reaty all ianceswith Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and thePhil ippines as the foundat ion of an Amer ican secur ity r olein the region.41 This statement begs the quest ion, however,of why the United States can fulfill its vision for securitywi th a pol icy of “places not bases” in some areas, renouncingpermanent base rights for access agreements, and not in

Northeast Asia? The answer is clear: In Nor theast Asia, butin Korea especially, the size and proximity of the threatdemands an immediate response. This can only be providedby “boots-on-the-ground.” Confidence in the Uni ted States

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by its all ies is bui l t on t roops and leaders who are embeddedin the culture where they are stationed, know their allies,and operate with their allies. The stakes are higher in

Northeast Asia because of the history of conflict there,because of our all iance commitments, and because there areno other secur i ty ar rangements to serve as st rategic glue.Maintaining forward-stationed forces are critical to thesecommitments.42

In Southeast Asia, the Five-Power Defense Agreement(FDPA) has served as a multilateral security mechanismsince its inception in 1971. Linking the United Kingdom,Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, theFPDA provides that

. . . In the event of any form of armed attack externallyorganized or suppor ted, or the threat of such an att ack againstMalaysia or Singapore, their governments would immediatelyconsult together for the purpose of deciding what measuresshould be taken jointly or separately in relation to such an

att ack or threat.43

Originally conceived as a very necessary securitymeasure to reassur e the newly i ndependent Singapore thatMalaysia would not attack it, the FDPA also served toensure that neither Singapore nor Malaysia had anythingto fear from an aggressive or confrontational Indonesia.There is st i l l a naval base and air field at Penang, Malaysia,

that al lows the Brit ish, the New Zealand, and theAust rali an armed forces to maintain a forward presence ofoperating forces in the area. Thus, with the interlockingalliances between the United States and Australia (theANZUS Pact ), the Uni ted States and the Uni ted Kingdom,and the FPDA, the South Pacific is a reasonably secureplace. The U.S.-Thailand, U.S.-Philippine, and Australia-Indonesia security agreements only reinforce that

security.44

No similar set of interlocking agreementsensures the security of American allies in Northeast Asia.Our t reaty commitments and secur ity all iances in the nor thare bi lateral.

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Kor ean Reconci l i at ion or I nt egr at i on.

There is probably no country in Northeast Asia that

really wants to see the near-term reunification of thepeninsula. China would prefer to maintain a buffer stateindefinitely. Chinese strategists from ancient times to thepresent have always treasured buffer states and havereferred to Korea using the analogy of “lips to teeth,”indicating that Manchuria would be exposed without abuffer on the peninsula.45 Korean indust r iali sts would liketo take advantage of what would be a cheap, easily

trainable, ethnically homogenous labor pool in the north.46

They are restrained, however, by what they see as thepotent ial costs of reuni fication. Having studied the Germancase in t he early 1990s, which depleted for a t ime the coffersof West Germany, stretched its economy and its politicalsystem, and having assessed the effects of the currentfinancial crisis in Asia, South Korean corporations aretaking a measured approach to the north. Military and

secur i ty groups in Sout h K orea, who stand to lose much i fthere was no tension between the two states, also tend todiscourage int egrat ion.47 Al though reunification is less of aforegone conclusion than it seemed in 1995, even withPresident Kim Dae-Jung’s “sunshine policy” any form ofintegrat ion or confederat ion wi l l demand secur i tysafeguards unt i l the threat goes away.48

Japan has a major stake in the Korean Peninsula aswell. A reunified Korea might follow the course of historyand develop a close relationship to China instead ofconduct ing a truly independent foreign pol icy. Aft er all , forcenturies Korea was a tributary state of China. Thiseventuality would increase Japan’s security concerns.Moreover, a reunified Korea might seek to st rengthen i tsel fmi l i tari ly, including developing a nuclear option.

14



What a Fut u r e U.S. Pr esence i n N or t heast Asi aMi gh t L ook L ik e.

The U.S. commitment to maintaining 100,000 t roops inAsia was reit erated in t he October 1998 National Secur i ty Strategy . The genesis of that force level is linked to thedecision to keep 100,000 troops in Europe. If the Koreanpeninsula reunifies or somehow reconciles, the UnitedStates may not need the same type or capability of aforward-stationed presence in Asia that is there today. Newstrategic glue may be useful. The security equation then

should focus on the capabilities of U.S. forces, not thenumbers.49

Our individual bilateral relationships in Northeast Asiaprovide an adequate basis to maintain a presence overseas. TheUnited States as the pivot of a security organization inNortheast Asia permits closer relations with Japan and Korea,supports a continued U.S. presence and supports extendeddeterrence. These “bilaterals” could evolve, however. One can

envision a combined command in Northeast Asia, wi th UnitedStates, Korean, and Japanese forces linked in a singleheadquarters sharing staffs. Regardless of where commandover such an organization rests, in the event of a crisis or adeployment, national forces would have to be commanded bythat nation’s senior officer in the organization. However, suchan arrangement is common, and was built into the coalitionsformed for the Gulf War in 1990-91. It is also part of the currentUnited Nations Command arrangements in Korea. The moredifficult issue is not the question of command, which is easilynegotiated, but the question of out -of-area use and deployment ,especially if “strategic preclusion” or some form of preempt ion iscontemplated. If such a mi litary organization is no longer aimedat a specific threat, what does it do? In Europe, NATO hasalready come to grips with this question. Obviously, however

low the likelihood might be, the chance of conflict in theAsia-Pacific region still exists. But even without a generalconflict, the combined forces could also address transnationalsecurit y problems, whether i n r egion or out of r egion (that isin Southeast Asia).

15



There could be serious constitutional constraints onout-of-area deployments or operations by Japanese forces,but good prior planning and a sharing of roles in staffs

would permit this. Even in Cambodia, Japan managed tosend a few Army offi cers by att aching them to the Uni tedNati ons. In the event of a humani tari an cr isis in the region,all of the forces could probably respond. But if there wassome reason to send combat forces in response toaggression, it might only be the uni ts of the Uni ted States,or in combinat ion with Korea, that responded.

The size of the U.S. presence as part of a combinedcommand would also have to be negotiated. Clearly, adivision of infantry on the Korean Peninsula might not benecessary. But the United States would need a crediblecontingency force balanced among air, naval, and groundforces.

The United States must be prepared militarily for avariety of tasks, not only in Nor theast Asia, but also in the

Asia-Pacifi c. Par t of this task is accompl ished by t radit ional“engagement activities” in the conduct of preventivedefense. These activities are not conducted independent ofthe Asia-Pacific strategy, and will remain part of thatstrategy now and in the future. Continued, repetitiveexchanges and visits pay off and complement forward-stat ioned forces.50 These act ivi t ies help to ensure that theU.S. presence is welcomed by our all ies and accepted by the

populations of the host-countries. Whether as part of amult inat ional all iance, operating wi th a second count ry, oroperating independently, the military presence in Asiamust be capable of doing traditional military things, likefight ing and winning maneuver wars. But al l of the mil it aryforces in the region, whether U.S. or allied, must also berobust enough to carry out other missions, includingnoncombatant evacuat ion operations (NEO); humani tarianand disaster relief missions; de-mining; peacekeeping orpeace enforcement; resolving serious, destabilizing urbanunrest ; addressing confl icts over resour ces; and addressing

16



problems that are part iall y law enforcement matters, suchas smuggl ing and drug trade.

There is no clear road map to accompl ish t his task. Nor isthere a ground swel l of popular opinion in t he Uni ted Statesor in Nor theast Asia for forming a new st ructure wi th newmissions. But ser ious st rategic thinkers in Korea and Japanhave begun discussing these matters. To a certain extent,they are far ahead of their col leagues in the Uni ted States inshaping the future. This type of dialogue is necessary, infact cr i t ical, and should be par t of our cooperati ve mi l i taryintercourse.

In Tokyo and Seoul, defense thinkers are asking U.S.strategists how such a future force might be structured.51

They are fixed on the continued promises by the UnitedStates that a strength of 100,000 will be maintained, asrestated in t he 1998 National Secur i ty Str ategy . But Asiansecurity planners are aware that the broad trend inWashington is toward basing more forces in t he cont inental

United States, and they are concerned that the financialcr isis in Asia has reduced the capacity of Japan and K orea tocont inue financial support for the U.S. mil i tary presence inthose countries. The fact is, significant security changessuch as the resolution of tension on the Korean Peninsulawill lead to a restructuring of the U.S. presence. A futurepresence in Asia must be capabil i t ies-based, li ke the cur rentU.S. secur i ty st rategy. Amer ican planners and their all ies

in Tokyo and Seoul wi l l need to work together to determinewhat mi l i tary capabil i t ies are needed in t he region and whythey are needed.

The most important factor wi l l be that any future force orpresence be balanced. It must be capable of performing avariety of missions where based, and out-of-area withinAsia. Whether an Army combat division will be needed on

the Korean Peninsula in the future is a matter open fordiscussion. But certainly any future force must havestrategic weight based on the enduring presence of landpower. A “vi r tual” presence or power ful “f ly-by” just won’t do

17



the job. It must be capable of some form of traditionalmaneuver war and forced entry. This means that, as aminimum, a U.S. Army combat br igade and part of a Mari ne

Expeditionary Force must remain in region. These forceswill require adequate sea and air lift to move them, andadequate protect ion fr om host i le air craft and missi les. TheUni ted States must be able to dominate the air at potent ialpoints of confl ict and must maintain a robust naval force topatrol the sea lines of communication. Major logisticalfacilities will be needed to supply Army, Naval, and AirForce units. The potential for humanitarian and disaster

relief operations will require at least an Army engineerbrigade and a medical brigade. Our forces must getadequate intelligence support, requiring an array ofintelligence collection platforms, analytical organizations,and a mil i tary intel l igence brigade. A major command andcont rol headquar ters must remain i n the region. Whetherthat is a sub-unified command like U.S. Forces Korea, ofcour se, depends on the situat ion and any new, t hree-nation,

combined mi l i tary headquar ters that may form. The need tobe able to conduct humani tarian operations, disaster rel ief,and possibly for the evacuat ion of noncombatants in case ofdomestic unrest in the region will probably require amilitary police brigade and a robust psychologicaloperati ons (or informat ion warfare) organization.

Conclusions.

The U.S. strategic framework in the Pacific has threeparts: peacetime engagement, as described above, whichincludes a forward presence; crisis response, which buildson forward-stat ioned forces, the “boots-on-the ground”; and,if necessary, fighting and winning any conflict that mightdevelop. The mechanisms to carry out this strategicframework are embedded in the regular contacts and

engagement activities that the United States carries outwi th fr iends and all ies in t he region.

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What t he future wi l l l ook l ike in Asia wi l l be determinedlargely on what happens on the Korean Peninsula. I t couldbe changed by such eventualit ies as a resurgent,

expansionist , or nat ionalist ic Russia. But the dialogue thatis taking place among strategists in Seoul and Tokyo needsto be broadened to include the United States. I t also mustbecome a publ ic debate. The “t yranny of di stance” r equi res aU.S. mi l i tary presence, and the governments of Korea andJapan must involve their own voters in a civil debate,set t ing for th t he case for a new secur i ty st ructure. This isimportant not only for domestic political reasons in Asia,

but because the Amer ican people need to know that there isa civi l debate about the subject among their all ies, and thatthe alliances that have kept Asia safe, peaceful andprosperous for 55 years are still useful, welcome, andhealthy.

ENDNOTES

1. The evidence of this comes from the U.S. willingness to leaveThailand when asked in the 1970s and the U.S. departure from thePhil ippines in 1991 based on a decision by t he Phi l ippine Senate not torenew the bases agreement. See Larry M. Wortzel, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security Without an American Umbrella,Carl isle, PA: Strategic Studies Insti tute, 1996; Jul ius Caesar Parrenas,“The Philippines: Reaping the Fruits of Reform and Stability,”Southeast Asian Affairs, 1997 , Singapore: Insti tute of Southeast AsianStudies, 1997, pp. 233-244.

2. Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keene, “East Asia Security: ThePentagon’s Ossified Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4,July/August 1995, pp. 103-114.

3. In what he character izes as “Chalmers Johnson’s diatr ibe against‘military colonialism’ in Asia,” Ezra F. Vogel argues strongly for theU.S.-Japan alliance. Ezra F. Vogel, “The Case for U.S. Troops inOkinawa,” Asian Studies Newsletter , Vol. 44, No. 1, January 1999, p. 11.

4. O’Hanlon, “Keep U.S. Forces in Korea After Reunification,” pp.5-6; see also Gilman, “A Pacific Charter,” pp. 5-7.

5. O’Hanlon.

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6. “The general consensus on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean,"according to Don Snider , was that “U.S. forces should remain in Europebecause of their unique cont r ibut ions to t ransatl ant ic poli t ical cohesion,as well as their more direct contribution to regional security and

stabi l i ty.” See Don M . Snider , “U.S. Mil itary Forces in Europe: How LowCan We Go?,” Survival , Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, p. 24. See alsoWalter Hahn, “The U.S. and NATO: Strategic Readjustments,” Global Affairs , Fall 1991, p. 68. Hahn cites especially Josef Joffe, who opinesthat the U.S. presence “denationalized” security and defense amongNATO‘s members, whereas a Conference on Security Cooperation inEurope (CSCE)-based security architecture would revive old rivalriesand “re-nationali ze” t he cont inent wi th the potent ial effect of making itgo mi l itary. See Joffe, Forum fuer Deutschland: “Die Rol le Deutchlands

in Europa,” Bonn: Die Welt, 1990.

7. COL Wortzel, as an assistant to the Director of the Army Staff,served as note-taker for this discussion.

8. George Kennan, “A Letter on Germany” (to Professor GordonCraig, July 28, 1998), The New York Review, December 3, 1998, pp. 21.See also Gordon Craig, “XXXXXX,” Foreign Affair s , Jul y-August 1998for the art icle that led Kennan to remember the deep concerns in Europeover German unification.

9. The 1998 National Secur ity Str ategy uses the terms “forces andequipment st rategicall y stat ioned or deployed forward ” t o descr ibe theU.S. force presence overseas. A National Security Strategy for a New Century , Washington, DC: The Whi te House, October 1988, p.12. (Citedhereafter as National Secur i ty Strategy.)

10. Colin Powell, “The American Commitment to EuropeanSecurity,” Survival, Vol 34, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 7-8.

11. Richard L. Keigler , The Future U.S. Mi l i tary Presence in Europe ,Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992, p. ix. See also Wil l iam T.Johnsen and Thomas-Durel l Young, Defi ni ng U.S. Forwar d Presence in Europe: Getting Past the Numbers , Carlisle, PA: Strategic StudiesInsti tute, 1992, pp. 10-12.

12. Keigler , p. xi. By operationall y effect ive, Keigler meant a ful lysupported corps, which equated to about 100,000 personnel. Hereasoned that any force needed to be nat ional ly independent so that , ifrequired, it could deploy out of area or act on the orders of the U.S.President.

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13. The U.S. European Command, EUCOM, under the UnifiedCommand Plan, shares responsibility for securing U.S. securityinterests in part s of Afr ica with the Cent ral Command. Therefore, it iscr i t ical t o have nat ional ly independent forces in case EUCOM is call ed

upon t o meet i ts missions in Afr ica.

14. This point is made eloquently by Representative Benjamin A.Gilman, A Paci fi c Charter : A Blueprint for US Pol icy in the Paci fi c in the 21st Centur y , Washington, DC: The Her itage Foundation, 1997; “JapanPolicy: Between Guns and Economics,” The Economist , November 28,1998; Robert A. Scalapino, “Toward a New World Order,” Asia-Pacific Review , Vol. 5, No. 2, 10th Anniversary I ssue, 1998, pp. 7-17; Ro-MyungGong, “Northeast Asian Security and Korea’s Relations with its

Neighbors,” Korea and World Affai rs , Vol. XXI , No. 2, Summer 1997, pp.173-182; Ryu Yamazaki, “Review of the Guidelines for Japan-USDefense Cooperation: A Japanese Perspect ive,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. IX, No.2, Winter 1997, pp. 27-44.

15. The Governor-elect in Okinawa (November 13, 1998) supportedkeeping U.S. bases on t he island. He was elected over a candidate thatwanted U.S. forces out . Susan M. Schafer, “Cohen Urges Asian Al l ies toSupport U.S. Troops,” Paci fi c Stars and Str ipes , November 1, 1998, p. 1;Clinton’s Asia tr ip in mid-November.

16. China’s only major open ocean naval deployment in modernt imes was an 18-ship task force to the area of the Fi ji I slands in supportof an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) test in May 1980.Xiandai Junshi , Contemporary Military Affairs , June 1980, pp. 13-15.See also Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth, eds., China as a Great Power: Myths, Real i ties, and Chal lenges in the Asia-Paci fi c Region, NewYork: St. Martins Press, 1995; Joseph S. Nye, “China’s Re-emergenceand the Future of the Asia-Pacific,” Survival,Winter 1997-98, pp. 65-79;

John W. Garver, “China’s Push to the South China Sea: The Interact ionof Bureaucratic and National Interests,” The China Quarterly,December 1992, pp. 999-1026; Larry M. Wortzel, ed., China’s Mi l i tary Modernization: International Implications , New York: GreenwoodPress, 1988, pp. 27-66, 159-192; Larry M. Wortzel, “China PursuesGreat Power Status,” Orbis , Spring 1994, pp. 157-176; Larry M.Wortzel, China’s Military Potential , Carlisle, PA: Strategic StudiesInstitute, 1998.

17. An excellent discussion of the positive role played by theU.S.-Japan Al l iance may be found in Tsuchiyama Ji tsuo, “The Role ofAlliance in the Post-Cold War East Asia: A Case of the U.S.-JapanAlliance,” a paper prepared for the International Workshop of theUS-ROK Al l iance, October 5-7, 1995; Hanhyu Park, “Between Caut ion

21



and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in thePost-Cold War Per iod,” The Korean J our nal of Defense Anal ysis , Vol. X,No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 121-140. A useful exploration of the uti l i ty ofmultilateralism versus bilateralism is in Tae-Am Oh, “Toward a New

Phase of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region:Limited Multilateralism or Issue-Based Regionalism,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. IX, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 137-164.

18. In 1990, then Major General H enry C. Stackpole I I I , commanderof Marine Corps bases in Japan at the time, raised a furor in Japanesenewspapers when he said that “No one wants a rearmed, resurgentJapan, so we are a ‘cap in t he bott le,’ if you wil l .” General Stackpole wenton to say that “none of Japan’s neighbors want a rearmed Japan, so i f we

were to pull out of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, it would be adestabi l izing factor in Asia.” The Washi ngton Post , March 27, 1990, pp.A14, A20.

19. See China’s Nati onal Defense , July 28 1998, Information Officeof the State Council of the PRC; and Chi Haotian, “Dali JiaqiangGuofang he Jundui Xiandaihua Jianshe,” [exert great strength inbu i ld ing nat iona l defense and mi l i ta ry modern izat ion andconstruction], Qiu Shi , No. 15, August 1998, pp. 13-19. Chi Haot ian is ageneral in the People’s Liberation Army, the Minister of NationalDefense, and a vice chair man of the Communist Par ty Cent ral M il i taryCommission.

20. The co-authors had thi s theme repeated by senior officers of theChinese People’s L iberation Army and by defense intellectuals in Chinaduring their visit there in August 1998. This was a recurrent themeheard by Colonel Wortzel during his tour of duty as Army Attaché inChina (1995-97).

21. Assuming that our current defense treaty with Australiaembodied in the ANZUS Treaty remains intact and that the people ofAustralia remain tolerant of the pre-posit ioned U.S. equipment there.Jane’s Defense Weekly , Vol. 30, No. 24, December 16, 1998, p. 25; U.S.Navy, Office of Naval I ntell igence, Map 0036513.

22. This was a concern of General Douglas MacAr thur ’s even beforethe Korean War. See James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World , New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998, andNoel Annan, “Dean of the Cold War,” The New York Review , November19, 1998, pp. 11-17.

23. The concept of extended deterrence is embedded in the twotreaties and is part of the basis for the U.S. refusal t o agree to a “no fir st

22



use” policy on nuclear weapons in the region. Another reason t hat theUnited States eschews a “no first use” policy is that, while the UnitedStates has forsworn the use of chemical and biological weapons, othernations have not . This al lows the United States to retain the deterrent

opt ion to respond to biological or chemical at tacks asymmetr icall y, withother weapons of mass destruction.

24. Discussion with Japanese Defense Agency official, September11, 1998.

25. Michael O’Hanlon, “Keep U.S. Forces in Korea After Reuni-fication,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. X, No. 1,Summer 1998, pp. 5-10.

26. Barry Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S.Grand Strategy,” Internati onal Secur i ty , Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97,pp. 15-16.

27. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reishauer, and Albert M. Craig,East Asia: Tradition and Transformation , Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1973; John King Fairbank, China: A New History , Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1992.

28. The Japanese claim is best set forth in The East Asian Secur i ty Situation.

29. See John Garver, “China’s Push to the South China Sea," The China Quar ter ly , December 1992, pp. 999-1026. See also Greg Austin,China’s Claims in the South China Sea , Canberra: Austr alian NationalUniversity, 1998.

30. See Greg Aust in, China’s Ocean Frontier , Canberra: Allen and

Unwin, 1998; Larry M. Wortzel, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Secur i ty Wi thout an American Umbrel la , Carl isle, PA: Strategic StudiesInstitute, 1996.

31. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History , New York: Viking Press,1983; Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, A History of East Asian Civilization , Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

32. Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981, Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1982.

33. James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World , New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998, pp. 220-23,268-69.

23



34. Dean Acheson, “Relations of the People’s of the United Statesand the People’s of Asia: We Can Only Help Where We are Wanted,”Vi tal Speeches of the Day , January 12, 1950, p. 5.

35. East Asian Strategic Review, 1997-1998 , Tokyo: The NationalInstitute for Defense Studies, 1998, p. 22-25.

36. The Europa World Book, 1998 , 2 Volumes, London: EuropaPublications Limi ted, 1998.

37. Ibid .

38. See NSC 68, which set forth our containment policy, and itsantecedents, the “X” cable from Moscow by George Kennan and hisart icle “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Foreign Affai rs , Vol. 25, No.4, July 1947, pp. 566-589. This seminal piece outlined the basis of thecontainment policy.

39. National Security Strategy , p. 1. See also National Military Strategy of the Uni ted States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era , Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs ofStaff, 1997 (cited hereafter as National M i l i tary Strategy ).

40. The rationale for this 100,000-man strength is based on thesame logic as informed the debate in Europe as much as it is in avoidingthe perception t hat the Uni ted States places less importance in Asia as apotent ial major theater of war. Asians remember that i n World War I I ,the Asia-Pacific Theater was relegated to second place in the Allied“win-hold-win” strategy, which called for a holding act ion in Asia whi lefi rst defeating Germany in Europe.

41. National Secur i ty Str ategy , pp. 41-42.

42. Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair , U.S. Navy, Commanderin Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, to the House Armed ServicesCommittee, March 3, 1999. http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/ 106thcongress/99-03-03blair.htm

43. See Phil l ip Methven, The Fi ve-Power Defense Ar rangement and Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States , Canberra: Strategicand Defense Studies Center, Australi an Nat ional University, 1992. TheFPDA was established in November 1971.

44. Australia had long been wary of I ndonesia, t reating that nationas a potent ial t hreat. In r esponse to the bell icose act ions by China in t heSouth China Sea, Australia and Indonesia concluded a cooperativesecur ity agreement in 1996.

24



45. This was the analogy used in justifying the Chineseparticipation in the Korean War in 1950. Larry M. Wortzel, “ChinaSeeks Traditional Great Power Status,” Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring1994, pp. 157-175. The concept is explained on p. 159.

46. According to an Associated Press report of November 1, 1998,Hyundai Corporation, South Korea’s largest conglomerate, recentlyconcluded a deal wi th t he North t o operate a tour ist si te in DiamondMountain off the North Korean coast , which Hyundai hopes wi l l att ract2,000 domestic tourists from the South a day. Hyundai will pay theNorth $906 million over a 6-year period for the right to develop theisland. See The Washington Post , November 1, 1998, p. A26.

47. Discussions in Seoul, August 24-28, 1998.

48. For a discussion of the “sunshine policy” in the context ofsecurity issues, see Victor D. Cha, “Is There Still a Rational NorthKorean Option for War?” Secur i ty Dialogue , Vol. 29, No. 4, December1998, pp. 477-490, especially the discussion on pp. 483-485.

49. Here, a review of the post-Soviet debate in Europe is useful. SeeJohnsen and Young,Defi ni ng U.S. Forward Presence in Europe: Getting Past the Numbers , pp. 4-10.

50. Joseph W. Prueher, “The Asia-Pacific Region: A U.S. PacificCommand Perspect ive,” remarks at the 1997 Pacifi c Symposium, Apr i l28, 1997, Honolulu, Hawaii . http://www.pacom.mi l/ref/sst—01.htm

51. Interviews in the United States and Seoul, August andSeptember 1998.

25



U.S. ARM Y WAR COL L EGE

Major Gener al Rober t H . Scales, J r .

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUD I ES I NSTI TUT E

DirectorColonel L ar r y M . Wor t zel

Acti ng Di r ector of Resear ch

Pr ofessor Dou glas C. L ovelace, J r .

Authors

Major Gener al Rober t H . Scales, J r .

Colonel L ar r y M . Wor t zel

Dir ect or of Publ icat i ons and Pr oduct i on

M s. M ar i anne P. Cow li ng

Pub li cat i ons Assi st antMs. Ri t a A. Rummel

*****

Composit ion

M r s. M ar y J ane Semp le

Cover Ar t i st

M r . J ames E. K i st ler

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