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p a p e r s e r i e s
The G20, emerGinG Powers,and TransaTlanTic relaTions
Stefan A. Schirm Transatlantic Academy Fellow
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2011 ransatlantic Academy. All rights reserved.
No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means without permissionin writing rom the ransatlantic Academy. Please direct inquiries to:
ransatlantic Academy 1744 R Street, NWWashington, DC 20009
1 202 745 3886F 1 202 265 1662E A@gm us.org
Tis publication can be downloaded or ree at http://www.transatlanticacademy.org.
Transatlantic Academy Paper SeriesTe ransatlantic Academy Paper Series presents research on a variety o transatlantic topics by staf, ellows, andpartners o the ransatlantic Academy. Te views expressed here are those o the author and do not necessarily represent the view o the ransatlantic Academy. Comments rom readers are welcome; reply to the mailing ad-dress above or by e-mail to A@gm us.org.
About the Transatlantic AcademyFounded by the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF), the ZEI -Sti ung Ebelin und GerdBucerius, the Robert Bosch Sti ung, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the ransatlantic Academy serves as a orum or a select group o scholars rom both sides o the Atlantic and rom di erent academic andpolicy disciplines to examine a single set o issues. Working together rom a transatlantic and interdisciplinary perspective, Academy ellows use research, publications, and ideas to make policy-relevant contributions topolicy debates acing the transatlantic community. In addition, the Academy has received early support romthe ransatlantic Program o the Government o the Federal Republic o Germany through unds o the Euro-
pean Recovery Program (ERP) o the Federal Ministry o Economics and echnology. Te Compagnia di SanPaolo joined as a fnancial partner in May 2009.
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he G20, Emerging Powers, and ransatlantic Relations
ransatlantic Academy Paper Series
May 2011
S A. S *ransatlantic Academy Fellow
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he G20, Emerging Powers, and ransatlantic Relations 1
In light of the global crisis,the G20 isa necessary and innovativeachievement.
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The Global Economic Crisis
and the G201
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ransatlantic Academy2
Have the decadesof cooperationamong the G7countries tiedthem together
in the G20?
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he G20, Emerging Powers, and ransatlantic Relations 3
The G20 hasmoved beyond thecushioning of thecrisis towards apost-crisis agenda.
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Efficiency and Legitimacy of the G202
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ransatlantic Academy4
The G20sefficiency canbe enhanced
by transforming it into a Global
Economic Council.
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The specific G20criteria and thevoting procedureswill continue to stir controversies, butthe representationand, thus, thelegitimacy of theG20 would be
greatly enhancedby modeling itsrepresentational
structures similarly on thoseof the IMF.
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Emerging Powers and Transatlantic
Countries in the G203
On mostcontentious
issues, some of the industrializedcountries aligned
with some of the emerging
economies in adhoc groupings
on both sides of the respective
policy divide.
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While the UnitedStates resentedthat others wouldbenefit from its
stimulus, Germany,China, and Brazilwere especially concerned withthe U.S. policy of quantitativeeasing.
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The G7 countriesUnited Statesand Germany
were situated inopposing camps
[on the currency issue] in the sameway that the BRIC
countries Chinaand Brazil found
themselves onopposite sides.
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The watered- down substance,the elongatedimplementationdeadline, andthe questionablecompliance of participating countries,especially China,does not bodewell for the effectsof Basel III.
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The changes inthe executive
board led to arift between the
United Statesand European
member countries.
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The United Stateswould largely benefit in thelong-term from atransformationof the SDR into apossible reservecurrency.
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Transatlanticcountries found
themselves inopposing ad hoc
groupings inmost instances.
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Policy Recommendations
for the Transatlantic Countries4
Transatlanticcountries should
support a further integrationof emerging countries intoa rules-basedinternationaleconomicorder and usethis processto negotiateand expandthese rules.
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T b G A , Au ,B z , C , C , F , G , I ,I , I , J , M x , Ru , S uA b , S u A , R ub K , u k ,U K , U S , EuU .
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, 9- .4 O V C , H /S k .
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6
S S , 56-57.7 G .8 Qu Wall Street Journal N v 3, .9 Qu Te Economist , T ,N v , .
S S 9 .
S W .
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S N /A uk R u M3, .5 Qu S v /W u .6 S B B -Qu . .
Endnotes5
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ransatlantic Academy16
A C u ( ), D D v : C F R , W , DC.
B -Qu , A , J P -F , YuY ( ), R IM S : S C S ,B u P C bu / 3, M .
B , F ( ), W b u ,Financial imes F b 6, 8.
B , M k R. ( 7), Bu B k
BRIC W ? F U.S. F P S D bu P , Asian Perspective 3 :4, 5 - 75.
C , J G. ( ), N R P. W I u E P
H W u Hu G b G v ,Foreign Affairs 89: 5, S /O .
C , G R ku ( ), WC C Ru G b O ?,heWashington Quarterly 33:4, 9- 38.
G , ( ), G b v ,Financial imes, O 6.
H , N M Su ( 8),S C b : H US v P R ,heWashington Quarterly 3 :4, 43-57.
H , P A. D v S k ( ) ( .),Varieties of Capitalism. he Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage , Ox :Ox U v P .
H , A F. B u D. J ( ), HD R P R ?,Survival 5 :6, 63-88.
H , J ( ), A j b GOv u uransatlantic ake F b u 8, G
M Fu U S , WDC
H , J ( ), S v MuR v H u G b EG v C u ,Paper Series G M Fu U SW , DC, M .
Ik b , J G. ( 8), R C Fu u W : C L b
Su v v ?,Foreign Affairs, 87: , 3-37.
Ov D v I u (ODI) ( G : C BRICK
v ,Policy Brief , L , M .
P k, S ( ), G S : O u M EMu , A Century Foundation Report ,N Y k.
P -R I v ( ), R I M S : A CA F C u
:// . . / /bj / - 7.P -R _I
v _ _ _R -J _ 8.
N , Ab j A x A uk (BRICS b k -u
u , R u A 4.
R u M 3, , G SC G SDR, ://
u . / / / 3/3 / -USBJB 4 59 33
R , R ( ),he New Brazil , WDC: B k I u P .
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