Transatlantic Trends 2007

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ransatlantictrendsKeY FIndInGs 2007

www.transatlantictrends.org


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t a a la ic t 2007 Pa


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Key Findings 2007 ................................................................................................................................................................3

Section One: rends in ransatlantic Relations ..................................................................................................................5

Section wo: Global hreats and Rising Powers .................................................................................................................8

Section hree: he European Union as a Global Actor ....................................................................................................12

Breakout: New European Leaders, New Opportunities? ..............................................................................................15

Section Four: Prospects for ransatlantic CooperationAfghanistan and Iran ................. ................... ................... ......17

Breakout: Growing Isolation of urkey ........................................................................................................................21

Section Five: Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................23

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Key Findings 2007

With Angela Merkel as chancellor o Germany, NicolasSarkozy as president o France, and Gordon Brownas prime minister o the United Kingdom, the Europeanleaders most closely identi ied with the transatlantic ri tover IraqGerhard Schrder, Jacques Chirac, and Tony Blairhave le t o ice. All three new leaders have announceda new tone o pragmatic cooperation with the United

States, raising the prospects or a revitalized transatlanticrelationship. What do these changes in leadership prom-ise or U.S.European cooperation? Although relationshave demonstrably improved at the o icial level across theAtlantic, what public opinion landscape will these new lead-ers inherit? Are the European publics prepared to supportcloser relations ahead o the 2008 U.S. presidential elections?How supportive is public opinion o closer cooperation onissues that have remained contentious between the UnitedStates and Europe?

While these new European leaders have declared theirwillingness to work with the United States, the primary

oreign policy issue in the United Statesthe war in Iraqis largely absent rom the transatlantic agenda, and the pros-pects or cooperation on two major areas where the UnitedStates and Europe are working togetherA ghanistan andIranremain uncertain. In this years ransatlantic rends survey, we explore support or reconstruction and combat-ing the Taliban in A ghanistan. In addition, we devote closeattention to public perceptions o the threat o a nuclear Iranand policy options should diplomacy ail. At the same time,

we analyze threat perceptions o global issues such as inter-national terrorism, energy dependence, immigration, andglobal warming. We also analyze views across the Atlanticand within Europe toward a more assertive Russia, includ-ing its role in the Middle East and as an energy provider,

especially in light o Januarys temporary suspension o gasshipments to Europe through Belarus.

A ter a period o re lection ollowing the rejection o theproposed constitutional treaty in 2005, European leadersagreed at the EU Council meeting in June on a new mandate

or institutional re orm, with the prospect o a new treaty

be ore European parliamentary elections in 2009. In thisyears survey, we urther examine European views on takingresponsibility or global threats and the deployment o mili-tary troops in a range o scenarios. In addition, we return tothe issue o Turkeys relations with the West. Turkey has seen

ierce debates about the role o the military in public li e andthe place o Islam in its secular democracy, at a time whenaccession negotiations with the EU remain di icult.

ransatlantic rends is a comprehensive annual survey o American and European public opinion. Polling was

conducted in the United States and 12 European countries:Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland,Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the UnitedKingdom. The survey is a project o the German MarshallFund o the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo,with additional support rom the Fundao Luso-Americana,Fundacin BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

KEy FiNdiNgS OF ThiS SurvEy iNCLudE 1 :

n Energy dependence and international terrorism were

among the threats by which Americans and Europeanselt most likely to be personally a ected. Americanselt most likely to be personally a ected by energy

dependence (88%), an economic downturn (80%), andinternational terrorism (74%). Europeans elt most

1 Unless otherwise noted, Europe-wide percentages re er to the E12, except in sections one, three, and our where we discuss long-term trends,and in questions where we examine the opinions o current EU members.


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4 | T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 7

likely to be personally a ected by global warming(85%), energy dependence (78%), and internationalterrorism (66%).

n Eighty-eight percent o Europeans agreed thatthe European Union (EU) should take greaterresponsibility or dealing with global threats, andamong those, the majority (54%) elt that the EUshould do so in partnership with the United Statesrather than on its own.

n Among Europeans who support greater EUresponsibility or dealing with international threats,the highest support was or spending more money onaid or development (84%), ollowed by increasing theuse o trade to in luence other countries (74%), andcommitting more troops or peacekeeping missions(68%). Only 20% supported committing more troops

or combat actions in general.

n Solid majorities o Europeans (64%) and Americans(64%) supported contributing troops to internationalreconstruction e orts in A ghanistan. Yet Europeansand Americans di ered on whether to commit troops

or combat operations against the Taliban, with theapproval o 68% o Americans and 30% o Europeans.

n Eighty-three percent o Americans and 68% o Europeans agreed that a nuclear Iran would lead to

urther proli eration in the Middle East. Similarly,54% o Europeans believed that a nuclear Iran has thepotential to threaten Europe. I Iran was to acquirenuclear weapons, Americans (82%) and Europeans(68%) agreed it would supply nuclear weapons toterrorists.

n Should diplomatic e orts ail to prevent Iran romacquiring nuclear weapons, most Americans andEuropeans agreed that diplomatic pressure should beincreased, but they di ered over keeping the option o using military orce. Forty-seven percent o Americans

elt that diplomatic pressure should be increased whilemaintaining the option o military orce, compared to just 18% o Europeans.

n When asked about recent developments in Russia,79% o Americans and 65% o Europeans expressedgreatest concern about Russias role in providingweapons to the Middle East. Within the United States,there was little di erence between Democrats andRepublicans on Russia.

n Large majorities o Europeans (71%) continued to agreethat it should be the role o the European Union to helpestablish democracy in other countries, while support

or democracy promotion among Americans has allenover the past three years rom 52% in 2005 to 45% in2006 to 37% in 2007.

n Only 36% o Europeans viewed U.S. leadership in worlda airs as desirable, a igure virtually unchanged rom2004, and the percentage o Europeans who approvedo President Bushs international policies remainedaround 20 percentage points lower. This suggests that,while views o the United States are in luenced by views o the Presidents policies, Europeans continue todistinguish between them.

n When asked how they elt transatlantic relations will bea ected by the U.S. presidential election in 2008 regardlesso who is elected, 46% o Europeans elt that relations willstay the same, compared with 35% who elt relations willimprove and 6% who elt relations will get worse.

n Turkish eelings toward the United States andEuropean Union continued to cool. On a 100-pointthermometer scale, Turkish warmth toward theUnited States dropped rom 20 degrees in 2006 to 11degrees in 2007, and toward the European Union rom45 degrees to 26. Turkish eelings toward Iran alsocooled this past year rom 43 degrees to 30.

n

Europeans thought it ar more likely that Turkey willeventually join the EU: 56% o Europeans believedTurkey will join, compared with just 26% o Turkishrespondents.


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In April 2007, the United States hosted the annualU.S.-EU summit in Washington, DC, where Americanand European leaders sought to demonstrate improvedrelations at the working level with agreements on economiccooperation and climate change. U.S. President George W.Bush declared, The closer that the United States and theEU become, the better o our people become.2 German

Chancellor Merkel observed that a very close, very strategically oriented transatlantic partnership is in ourmutual interest.3 And in a speech commemorating the 60thanniversary o George C. Marshalls speech announcing theMarshall Plan, Daniel Fried, assistant secretary o state orEuropean and Eurasian a airs, declared, There is no closerpartnership in the world than that between the UnitedStates and Europe.4 Yet there has been a persistent gapbetween improvement at the o icial level and at the level o public opinion. A companion survey to ransatlantic rendsreported in 2006 that 40% o European parliament mem-

bers and 38% o European Commission o icials believedthat U.S.European relations had improved, compared withonly 16% o the public.5 Have the publics begun to perceiveand share the sense o improvement which their leadersobserve? Do they expect a change in relations with a newU.S. administration in 2009?

EurOPEANS rEMAiN CriTiCAL OF u.S. LEAdErShiP

A majority o Europeans remained critical o U.S. leadershipin world a airs. Fi ty-eight percent o Europeans viewedU.S. leadership in world a airs as undesirable, compared

with 36% who saw it as desirable. A ter a sharp drop in2003, these igures have been largely unchanged since 2004,representing a reversal o proportions o positive and nega-

tive views ound in 2002. O the countries surveyed, only the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Romania hadmore respondents who viewed U.S. leadership as desirablethan as undesirable. The greatest drop was in Germany,which ell rom 68% o respondents who viewed U.S. leader-ship as desirable in 2002 to 38% in 2007. In this period,the decline was 26 percentage points in Italy, 24 percentage

points in Poland, 23 percentage points in the Netherlands,and 20 percentage points in France. Within the UnitedStates, support or U.S. leadership in world a airs remainedstrong, with 78% o Democrats and 93% o Republicanswho viewed U.S. leadership as desirable.

Section One: rends in ransatlantic Relations

2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/in ocus/eusummit/2007/index.html3 April 30, 2007, remarks to US Chamber o Commerce4 http://usin o.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=wash le-english&y=2007&m=July&x=20070702111533idybeekcm0.68243045 European Elite Survey, 2006. See http://www.gips.unisi.it/circap/ees_overview or ull data and analysis.

Chart 1

P e r c e n t

EUROPEAN VIEWS OF U.S. LEADERSHIPVS. VIEWS OF PRESIDENT BUSH

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3021

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18 17

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Desirability of U.S. leadership


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EurOPEANS MOrE CriTiCAL OF PrESidENT

ThAN OF uNiTEd STATES

Europeans continued to di erentiate their views o President Bushs handling o international policies romtheir views o U.S. leadership in global a airs. WhileEuropean attitudes toward Bushs international policiesremained critical (77% disapproval compared to 17%approval), a 20-point gap has persisted between their viewso Bush and their views o U.S. leadership in world a airssince 2002. In the United States, a majority o Americans(60%) disapproved o President Bushs handling o inter-national policies, a igure largely unchanged rom last year,with 87% o Democrats and 26% o Republicans disapprov-ing. (See chart #1)

irAQ WAr ANd PrESidENT MAiN rEASONS

FOr dECLiNE

When asked to choose the most important actor behindthe decline in relations between the United States and

Chart 2

MAIN REASON FOR DECLINE IN U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

P e r c e n t

MANAGEMENTOF THE WAR IN IRAQ

TREATMENT OFPRISONERS AT

GUANTANAMO BAY

U.S. NOT PARTICIPATINGIN THE KYOTO TREATY

PRESIDENT BUSHHIMSELF

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39 Europe 12 United States

Europe, Europeans were divided between the manage-ment o the war in Iraq (38%) and President Bush himsel (34%). The highest percentages o respondents who elt thatthe war in Iraq was the main reason or the decline were

ound in Poland (53%) and Italy (42%), while the highestpercentages who elt the decline in relations stemmed romPresident Bush himsel were reported in the Netherlands(42%) and Germany (41%). Only our percent o Europeanrespondents elt the main reason or the decline was thetreatment o prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, whereas 11% eltthe main reason was the United States not participating inthe Kyoto treaty on global warming. Americans were alsodivided over the main reason or the decline, with 38% who

elt that the main reason was the war in Iraq (a view sharedby 56% o Republicans), and 39% who elt it was PresidentBush himsel (a view shared by 59% o Democrats).(See chart #2)


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PLurALiTy OF EurOPEANS ThiNK 2008 ELECTiON

WONT ChANgE rELATiONS

Forty-six percent o Europeans elt that transatlantic rela-tions will stay the same ollowing the U.S. presidentialelection in 2008 regardless o who is elected, comparedwith 35% who elt relations will improve and 6% who eltrelations will get worse. The highest percentage o respon-dents who elt relations will improve was in France (51%),and the highest percentages who elt relations will remainthe same were in Germany (54%) and Spain (52%). Whilethe majority o Europeans believed that relations either willimprove or could be mended, 19% elt that relations havesimply become too strained to recover, with the highestpercentages in Portugal (33%), Spain (29%), and Poland(27%). (See chart #3)

AMEriCANS MOrE OPTiMiSTiC ON rELATiONS

AFTEr 2008

In the United States, 42% o respondents elt transatlanticrelations will improve a ter the 2008 elections regardlesso who is elected, compared with 37% who elt relationswill stay the same. Fi ty-eight percent o Democrats eltthat relations would improve compared with 26% o Republicans, whereas a majority o Republicans (54%) eltthat relations would stay the same. Only 11% o Americans

elt that relations have become too strained to recover.

Chart 3

PROSPECTS FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER THE 2008 U.S. ELECTIONS

P e r c e n t

Europe 12 United States

WILL IMPROVE WILL GET WORSEWILL STAY THE SAME

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Section wo: Global Treats and Rising Powers

The United States and Europe continue to con rontongoing violence in the Middle East, as well as newchallenges in energy security and rising powers such asRussia and China. According to a recent U.S. NationalIntelligence Estimate, the threat rom Al Qaeda has grownin the past year, noting potential threats rom radical cellsin both Europe and the United States. Last summers oiled

train bombing in Germany has been ollowed by increasedthreat alerts and has provoked vigorous debate throughoutEurope on the ability o governments to respond to suchthreats. German Minister o the Interior Wol gang Schublesparked controversy by warning that his country was notimmune rom attack. The danger level is high, he said.We are part o the global threat by Islamist terrorism.6 Thecar bomb attack at the Glasgow Airport in Scotland, as wellas recurrent arrests o terror suspects in Italy and Spain, hasprompted ongoing debate about the threat o terrorism onboth sides o the Atlantic.

Although President Bush has declared that the United Stateshas strong working relationships with Russia and China,contentious issues remain on the transatlantic agenda withboth countries.7 Americans and Europeans have questionedRussias role as an energy provider a ter a dispute that ledRussia to temporarily suspend the delivery o oil to Europethrough Belarus in January 2007, echoing a similar disputewith Ukraine the year be ore. In response to debates abouta potential U.S. missile de ense system in Poland and theCzech Republic, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister

Sergei Ivanov surprised many when he declared that Russiawould consider targeting its nuclear missiles at Europe. Asmembers o the UN Security Council, Russia and Chinahave signi icant in luence over the issues on the transat-

lantic agenda, including sanctions on Iran over its nuclearprogram, inal status or Kosovo, and action in Dar ur.

AMEriCANS ANd EurOPEANS ShArE CONCErNS

OvEr ENErgy dEPENdENCE, TErrOriSM

Energy dependence and international terrorism are amongthe threats by which Americans and Europeans elt most

likely to be personally a ected. Americans elt most likely to be personally a ected by energy dependence (88%), aneconomic downturn (80%), and international terrorism(74%). Europeans elt most likely to be personally a ectedby global warming (85%), energy dependence (78%), andinternational terrorism (66%). Overall, Americans reporteda higher threat perception than Europeans on every threatbut global warming. (See chart #4)

OvErALL riSE iN EurOPEAN ThrEAT PErCEPTiONS

While Americans generally reported higher threat per-

ceptions, Europeans reported larger changes since 2005.On international terrorism, the European average rose 16percentage points (compared with virtually no change inthe United States), with an increase in ive countries. OnIslamic undamentalism, the European average increased15 percentage points (compared with +7 percentage pointsin the United States), with rises in nine countries. Onimmigration, the European average rose 14 percentagepoints (compared with +9 percentage points in the UnitedStates), with increases in 10 countries. On global warm-ing, the European average increased 12 percentage points

(compared with +7 percentage points in the United States),with rises in 10 countries.

6 http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/05/11/germany.security/index.html7 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070605-8.html


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EurOPEANS LESS ThrEATENEd By ECONOMiC

dOWNTurN

The threat o a major economic downturn was the only issue on which the European average ell, by nine percent-age points (the United States reported virtually no change).Eight European countries reported decreases, with thesharpest drops in France (20 percentage points), Poland(18 percentage points), and Germany and the Netherlands(16 percentage points). In Europe, only Spain reported asigni icant increase in the threat o an economic downturn(+11 percentage points).

gErMAN ThrEAT PErCEPTiONS riSE TO

EurOPEAN LEvELS

Since 2005, the most dramatic changes in threat percep-tions have occurred in Germany, where 70% o Germans(+32 percentage points since 2005) elt likely to be person-ally a ected by international terrorism. In 2007, 57% o

Germans (+28 percentage points since 2005) elt likely to

be personally a ected by Islamic undamentalism, and74% (+26 percentage points since 2005) elt likely to bepersonally a ected by immigration. These changes broughtGerman views closer to the European averages than in 2005,when threat perceptions in Germany on international ter-rorism and Islamic undamentalism were the lowest amongthe countries surveyed. Large increases in the perception o these threats were also seen in Italy and Spain.

AMEriCANS WiLLiNg TO rEduCE ENErgy

dEPENdENCE EvEN iF PriCES riSE

Fi ty- our percent o Americans elt the best approach toensuring a stable supply o energy was reducing energy dependence on other countries even i energy prices wouldrise sharply at home. Twenty- our percent o Americans

elt the best approach was increasing cooperation withenergy-producing countries even i their governments

Chart 4

IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS, HOW LIKELY ARE YOU TO BEPERSONALLY AFFECTED BY THE FOLLOWING THREATS?

P e r c e n

t

ENERGY

DEPENDENCE

MAJOR

ECONOMICDOWNTURN

INTER-

NATIONALTERRORISM

IRAN

ACQUIRINGNUCLEARWEAPONS

IMMIGRANTS/

REFUGEES

ISLAMIC

FUNDAMEN-TALISM

GLOBAL

SPREADOF DISEASE

EFFECTS

OF GLOBALWARMING

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are undemocratic. Thirteen percent supported applyingdiplomatic pressure even i this increases tensions withenergy-producing countries. Within the United States, thelargest percentages o Democrats (49%) and Republicans(54%) agreed that the best approach among the threeoptions was to reduce dependence on energy-producingcountries. By contrast, Europeans were more divided, with38% pre erring to reduce energy dependence and 31%pre erring to increase cooperation. Among Europeans,the highest percentages o respondents who pre erred toincrease cooperation with energy-producing countries eveni their governments are undemocratic were in Romania(50%), Poland (45%), and Slovakia (40%). (See chart #5)

ShArEd CONCErNS ABOuT MOrE

ASSErTivE ruSSiA

When asked about their eelings o warmth toward Russia,Americans and Europeans showed little change rom lastyear, with Americans slightly warmer at 48 degrees than

Europeans at 42 degrees on a 100-point thermometerscale. Yet majorities on both sides o the Atlantic expressedconcerns about recent developments in Russia. Seventy-nine percent o Americans and 65% o Europeans expressedconcern about Russias role in providing weapons to coun-tries in the Middle East. Seventy- ive percent o Americansexpressed concern about the weakening o democracy inside Russia (compared with 57% o Europeans), and 59%o Europeans and 58% o Americans expressed concernabout Russias role as an energy provider. Sixty-nine percento Americans and 56% o Europeans expressed concernabout Russias behavior toward its neighbors. Germansreported greater concerns than the European average on allthese issues, ranging rom +19 percentage points over theEuropean average on the weakening o democracy insideRussia to +11 percentage points on Russias behavior towardits neighbors. Within the United States, there was littledi erence between Democrats and Republicans in theirconcerns about Russia. (See chart #6)

Chart 5

PREFERENCES FOR ENSURING A STABLE SUPPLY OF ENERGY FROM ENERGY-PRODUCING COUNTRIES

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REDUCE DEPENDENCE,EVEN IF PRICES RISE

INCREASE COOPERATION,EVEN IF COUNTRIES ARE

UNDEMOCRATIC

APPLY DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE,EVEN IF TENSIONS INCREASE

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MOrE AMEriCANS ANd EurOPEANS SEE ChiNA

AS AN ECONOMiC ThrEAT

Americans and Europeans viewed China in economic termssimilarly, with 54% o Americans and 48% o Europeansseeing China as more o an economic threat, compared to36% o Americans and 35% o Europeans who saw Chinaas more o an economic opportunity. By contrast, moreAmericans (50%) than Europeans (32%) viewed China as amilitary threat. Among Europeans, the highest percentages

Chart 6

CONCERNS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA

P e r c e n t

RUSSIAS ROLE ASAN ENERGY PROVIDER

RUSSIAS BEHAVIORTOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS

THE WEAKENING OFDEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

RUSSIAS ROLE INPROVIDING WEAPONSTO THE MIDDLE EAST

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79 Europe 12 United States

who viewed China as an economic threat were in France(57%), Italy (55%), and Portugal (55%), and the highestpercentages who viewed China as a military threat were inPoland (44%), France (37%), and Germany and the UnitedKingdom (36%). Within the United States, Democrats andRepublicans shared similar views o China in economicterms, but ewer Democrats (47%) than Republicans (61%)saw China as a military threat.


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Section Tree: Te European Union as a Global Actor

A ter a two-year period o re lection, Europeanleaders agreed at the EU Council meeting in June ona compromise concerning aspects o the proposed con-stitutional treaty, with the prospect o a new treaty be oreEuropean parliamentary elections in 2009. Uncertainty about our uture treaty has cast a shadow o doubt overour ability to act. Now those doubts have been removed,

declared European Commission President Jos ManuelBarroso.9 The re orm treaty will ocus on a longer mandate

or the EU president, stronger capacities in oreign a airs,and voting rights. Yet what vision do the publics have or anincreased global role or the European Union? Do they sup-port a European Union that would work in partnership with

the United States or would they pre er the European Unionto act independently? Many European countries have troopsdeployed in a number o crisis situations, including moni-toring the cease ire in Southern Lebanon and peacekeepingin A ghanistan. The European Union is preparing to deploy its largest civilian mission in Kosovo pending an agreementon inal status at the UN Security Council. How willing are

Europeans to support the use o orce abroad?

EurOPEANS PrEFEr TO AddrESS ThrEATS

iN PArTNErShiP WiTh uNiTEd STATES

Virtually unchanged rom last year, 77% o Europeans and73% o Americans viewed strong leadership by the EU in

9 http://www.f.com/cms/s/c8880 8c-228b-11dc-ac53-000b5d 10621,dwp_uuid=a 8307da-1822-11dc-b736-000b5d 10621.html

Chart 7

SHOULD THE EU ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL THREATS INDEPENDENTLYOR IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES?

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BULGARIA ROMANIA PORTUGAL POLAND ITALY GERMANY NETHER-LANDS

UNITEDKINGDOM

EU 11 SPAIN SLOVAKIA FRANCE

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Chart 8

EUROPEAN APPROVAL FOR GREATER EU RESPONSIBILITY IN DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL THREATS

P e r c e n t

SPEND MORE MONEY ONAID FOR DEVELOPMENT

INCREASE USE OFTRADE TO INFLUENCE OTHER

COUNTRIES BEHAVIOR

COMMIT TROOPSFOR PEACEKEEPING

COMMIT MORE TROOPSFOR COMBAT ACTIONS

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world a airs as desirable (within the United States, 79%o Democrats and 68% o Republicans supported strongEU leadership in world a airs). Eighty-eight percent o Europeans agreed that the EU should take greater respon-sibility or dealing with global threats, and o those, amajority (54%) elt that the EU should take greater respon-sibility or global threats in partnership with the United

States, compared with 43% who elt it should addressproblems independently. (See chart #7)

SuPPOrT FOr Eu rOLE iN dEvELOPMENT, TrAdE,

ANd PEACEKEEPiNg

O Europeans who agreed that the EU should take greaterresponsibility or dealing with international threats, thelargest support was or the EU spending more money onaid or development (84%), ollowed by increasing the useo trade to in luence other countries (74%), and committingmore troops or peacekeeping missions (68%). Only 20% o Europeans, however, supported committing more troops orcombat actions in general. Among Europeans, the largestsupport or peacekeeping missions was in Spain (82%),France (80%), and Portugal (78%). While only a minority view, the largest support or committing combat troopswas in the United Kingdom (35%), France (27%), and theNetherlands (26%). (See chart #8)

SuPPOrT FOr TrOOPS iN dArFur, BALKANS,

LEBANON, BuT NOT TO COMBAT TALiBAN

Majorities in Europe expressed their willingness to committroops or a range o operations: 79% supported provid-ing humanitarian assistance in Dar ur, 67% supportedmaintaining peace and order in the post-con lict Balkans,66% supported contributing to international reconstruction

e orts in A ghanistan, and 59% supported monitoring acease ire in Southern Lebanon. Approval dropped con-siderably, however, when asked about support or combatoperations against the Taliban in A ghanistan, with the sup-port o only 31% o Europeans. (See chart #9)

NEW Eu MEMBErS BECOME MOrE WiLLiNg TO

ABidE By Eu dECiSiONS

When asked i their country should abide by an EU deci-sion to use military orce, even i they disagree, 42% o Europeans agreed, compared with 55% who disagree.Compared with last year, the largest increase in those whoagreed with this statement was ound among new EU mem-bers, with 67% o Romanians (+20 percentage points), 49%o Bulgarians (+13 percentage points), and 36% o Slovaks(+9 percentage points). Agreement in Poland remained virtually unchanged at 51%. (See chart #10)


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Chart 9

EU APPROVAL FOR COMMITTING TROOPS

P e r c e n t

TO PROVIDEHUMANITARIAN

ASSISTANCEIN DARFUR

TO MAINTAIN PEACEAND ORDER INPOST-CONFLICT

BALKANS

TO CONTRIBUTE TOINTERNATIONAL

RECONSTRUCTIONIN AFGHANISTAN

TO MONITOR ANDSUPPORT ACEASEFIRE

IN LEBANON

TO CONDUCT COMBATOPERATIONS AGAINST

THE TALIBAN INAFGHANISTAN

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Chart 10

IF THE EU DECIDES TO USE MILITARY FORCE, AGREE TO ABIDE BY EU DECISIONS

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2006 2007

EU 11 POLAND SLOVAKIA BULGARIA ROMANIA

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In his acceptance speech, new French PresidentSarkozy declared, I want to tell [our American friends]

that France will always be on their side when they need

it, but I also want to tell them that friendship means

accepting that your friends may think differently. 10

Similarly, German Chancellor Merkel sought to improve

relations between Germany and the United States,

developing a closer working relationship with President

Bush while raising concerns about Guantanamo Bay

and climate change. With Gordon Brown as prime min-

ister of the United Kingdom, a new slate of European

leaders has replaced those in power during the crisisover Iraq in 2003. What will this mean for transatlan-

tic relations, for a renewed European Union, and for

cooperation on global issues? How do their publics

view transatlantic relations and related issues such as

Russia, China, and energy?

FrENCh, gErMAN, ANd BriTiSh rEMAiN CriTiCALOF BuSh POLiCiES

The French and German publics were close to the

average European view of U.S. global leadership, with

only 28% of French and 38% of Germans viewing U.S.

leadership as desirable (compared with 50% of British

respondents). All three publics were deeply critical of

President Bushs handling of international policies, with

only 12% of French, 13% of German, and 16% of British

respondents approving of the his policies. In the past

year, there has been little change in the views of German

and British respondents about U.S.-European relations;71% of German and 87% of British respondents said

that relations have either remained the same or gotten

worse. Among the French, however, there has been a

slight but significant seven percentage-point increase in

both those who said relations have improved and those

who said relations have remained the same, and a 15

NEW EurOPEAN LEAdErS, NEW OPPOrTuNiTiES?

10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6631125.stm

Chart 11

SHOULD THE EU ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL THREATS INDEPENDENTLYOR IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES?

P e r c e n t

EU 11 GERMANY UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

54

43

58

40

55

4339

58

In partnership Independently


18/28


percentage point decrease in those who said relations

have worsened.

FrENCh MOST SKEPTiCAL OF PArTNEriNg WiThThE uNiTEd STATES

While the publics in all three countries overwhelmingly

supported EU global leadership, they differed on whether

the EU should address international threats in partner-

ship with the United States or independently. Fifty-eight

percent of the German and 55% of the British publics

agreed that the EU should address threats in partner-

ship with the United States, in comparison with only

39% of French respondents (the European average was

54%). By contrast, 58% of French respondents felt the

EU should address problems independently from theUnited States. (See chart #11)

dECLiNiNg SuPPOrT FOr NATO iN ALL

ThrEE COuNTriES

Majorities of the French, German, and British publics

continue to view NATO as essential to their countrys

security, consistent with the European average of 53%,

but support has fallen in all three countries since 2002.

In Germany, support for NATO fell from 74% in 2002 to

55% in 2007, and in the United Kingdom support has

declined from 76% in 2002 to 64% in 2007. In France,

support for NATO has seen a smaller decline, from 61%

in 2002 to 55% in 2007. (See chart #12)

diFFEriNg viEWS ON SECuriNg ENErgy

More British (49%) than German (40%) and French

(38%) respondents agreed that the best way to

ensure a stable supply of energy is to reduce

dependence on energy-producing countries, even if

energy prices would rise at home. They also differed

on whether to increase cooperation with energy-

producing countries even if their governments are

undemocratic, with 37% of Germans agreeing that

they should, compared with 30% of French and 25%

of British respondents.

gErMANS ANd BriTiSh MOrE CONCErNEd

ABOuT ruSSiA

Seventy-three percent of the German and 64% of the

British publics expressed concern about Russias role asan energy provider, compared with 46% of French respon-

dents (and 59% of Europeans and 58% of Americans).

Similarly, 67% of the German and 64% of the British pub-

lics expressed concern about Russias behavior toward

its neighbors, compared with 56% of French respondents

(and 56% of Europeans and 69% of Americans).

FrENCh, gErMANS, ANd BriTiSh diSAgrEE ON

ChiNESE ECONOMy

The French, German, and British publics viewed the

threat of Chinas economy markedly differently. Fifty-seven percent of French respondents saw China as

more of an economic threat than an economic opportu-

nity, compared with 51% of German and 40% of British

respondents (and a European average of 48% and 54%

of Americans). By contrast, the three publics agreed

on whether China is a military threat, with only 37% of

French, 36% of German, and 36% of British respondents

saying that China is a military threat (compared with the

European average of 32% and 50% of Americans).

Chart 12

P e r c e n t

NATO STILL ESSENTIAL

61

5657 58

59

7473

70

61

5655

76

64

65

6264

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

FranceGermanyUnited Kingdom

70


19/28


Section Four: Prospects for ransatlantic CooperationAfghanistan and Iran

A ghanistan and Iran are the two most prominentoreign policy issues on which the United States andEurope are working together, but the prospects or uturecooperation remain uncertain. Although many Europeancountries contribute to the International Security AssistanceForce as part o NATO, debates over the renewal o themandate to commit troops provoked a crisis within the

Italian government and promises to be di icult in Germany this all. At the same time, countries like the UnitedKingdom and Denmark are gradually increasing their trooppresence in A ghanistan ollowing their redeployment

rom Iraq. The United States and Europe (led by France,Germany, and the United Kingdom) have maintained acommon position toward Iran using targeted economicsanctions administered by the UN Security Council, whichhas previously passed two resolutions and is consider-ing a third. Although there are disputes about the extentand progress o Irans nuclear program, EU Commission

President Barroso has said, We share the same views, basi-cally, about how to deal with Iran.11

Yet in both cases it is unclear how American and Europeanpublics will respond to the prospect o military orce in the

uture i violence continues in A ghanistan and sanctionsare seen to ail in Iran. Di erences in diplomacy on Iranarise when American policymakers emphasize that alloptions are on the table, although to date Americans andEuropeans have emphasized that a military strike is not cur-rently under consideration. The possible threat to Europe

rom a nuclear Iran has added to discussions about thedeployment o a U.S. missile de ense system in Poland andthe Czech Republic.

EurOPEANS ANd AMEriCANS SuPPOrT

rECONSTruCTiON iN AFghANiSTAN

Large majorities o Europeans (64%) and Americans (64%)supported contributing troops to international reconstruc-tion e orts in A ghanistan, including 71% o French, 69%o British, and 57% o German respondents. The highestsupport among Europeans was ound in Spain (81%), the

Netherlands (75%), and Portugal (73%), with the lowestsupport in Bulgaria (39%), Slovakia (44%), and Turkey (50%). Within the United States, 73% o Republicans and57% o Democrats supported contributing troops to inter-national reconstruction e orts in A ghanistan. (See charts#13 and 14)

11 U.S.-EU Summit, April 30, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070430-2.html

Chart 13

P e r c e n t

APPROVAL OF TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN

TO CONTRIBUTE TOINTERNATIONAL

RECONSTRUCTIONEFFORTS

TO CONDUCT COMBATOPERATIONS AGAINST

THE TALIBAN

0

20

40

60

80

64 64

30

68



20/28


EurOPEANS hALF AS LiKELy TO SuPPOrT TrOOPS

TO COMBAT TALiBAN

Europeans and Americans did not agree, however, aboutcommitting troops or combat operations against theTaliban, with the approval o 68% o Americans on theone hand and 30% o Europeans on the other. AmongEuropeans, the largest support came rom the UnitedKingdom (51%), the Netherlands (45%), and France (36%).In the United States, Democrats showed nearly the samelevel o support or both combat (56%) and reconstruction(57%), while Republican support was higher or combat(86%) than or reconstruction (73%).

iNCrEASEd diPLOMATiC PrESSurE BuT

diFFErENCE OvEr OPTiON OF FOrCE ON irAN

Seventy-two percent o Americans and 59% o Europeanselt likely to be personally a ected by Iran acquiring nuclear

weapons. When asked which strategy they would mostavor should diplomatic e orts ail, majorities o both

Chart 14

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR COMMITTING TROOPS TO RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN

P e r c e n

t

SPAIN NETHER-LANDS

PORTUGAL FRANCE ITALY UNITEDKINGDOM

EUROPE 12

ROMANIA GERMANY POLAND TURKEY SLOVAKIA BULGARIA

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

81

7573

71 70 6964

6157

5450

44

39

Approve

Americans and Europeans agreed that diplomatic pressureshould be increased but di ered on whether the option o

military orce should be ruled out. Forty-seven percent o Americans elt that diplomatic pressure should be increasedand the option o military orce should be maintained,compared with 32% who elt the option should be ruledout. By contrast, only 18% o Europeans elt the option o military orce should be maintained, compared with 47%o Europeans who elt that the option should be ruled out.Although a minority view, among Europeans, the highestsupport or maintaining the option o military orce wasin the Netherlands (28%) and the United Kingdom (26%).(See chart #15)

AgrEEMENT ThAT NuCLEAr irAN WOuLd LEAd

TO PrOLiFErATiON Or TErrOriSM

When asked what is likely to happen should Iran acquirenuclear weapons, 83% o Americans and 68% o Europeansbelieved that other countries in the Middle East would


21/28


Chart 15

SHOULD DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIESWOULD YOU MOST FAVOR TO PREVENT IRAN FROM ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

P e r c e n t

ACCEPT THAT IRANMAY DEVELOP

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAINTAIN THE PRESENTLEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC

PRESSURE ON IRAN

INCREASE DIPLOMATICPRESSURE ON IRAN

BUT RULE OUT THE USEOF MILITARY FORCE

INCREASE DIPLOMATICPRESSURE ON IRAN

AND MAINTAIN THE OPTIONOF USING MILITARY FORCE

0

20

40

60

7 6

19

11

47

32

18

47


decide that they should have nuclear weapons as well.Eighty-two percent o Americans and 68% o Europeansalso believed that Iran would supply nuclear weaponsto terrorists. In contrast, 43% o Americans and 52% o Europeans believed that Iran would use nuclear weapons orde ensive purposes only.

SLiM MAJOriTy OF EurOPEANS BELiEvE NuCLEAr

irAN WiLL ThrEATEN EurOPE

In addition, 54% percent o Europeans believed that, i Iranacquired nuclear weapons, it would be likely to threatenEurope. Among Europeans, the highest level o agreementwas in Poland (70%), Turkey (59%), and Germany (56%).The most skepticism was ound in the Netherlands, where58% believed it is unlikely a nuclear Iran would threatenEurope, and in France, where 55% believed it is unlikely.Sixty-seven percent o Americans believed that a nuclear

Iran would threaten Europe, with 60% o Democrats and81% o Republicans who agreed. (See chart #16)

dEMOCrATS SPLiT ON MAiNTAiNiNg ThE OPTiON

OF FOrCE WiTh irAN

Within the United States, Democrats and Republicans alsoagreed that, should diplomacy ail to prevent Iran romacquiring nuclear weapons, pressure should be increased,but they di ered on whether to rule out the option o the use o orce. Democrats were roughly divided, with40% who elt the military option should be ruled out and35% who elt it should be maintained. By contrast, 65%o Republicans elt the option o military orce should bemaintained while 20% elt the option should be ruled out.


22/28


Chart 17

P e r c e n t

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

2005 2006 2007

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

76

43

64

35

53

31

Republicans Democrats

Chart 16

HOW LIKELY WOULD A NUCLEAR IRAN THREATEN EUROPE?

P e r c e n

t

POLAND TURKEY GERMANY ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN EUROPE 12

UNITEDKINGDOM

BULGARIA ROMANIA SLOVAKIA FRANCE NETHER-LANDS

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

70

5956 55 54 54 5454

5250

43 4240

SuPPOrT FOr dEMOCrACy PrOMOTiON FALLS

iN ThE uNiTEd STATES

Large majorities o Europeans (71%) continued to agree thatit should be the role o the European Union to help establishdemocracy in other countries, while only 37% o Americansagreed that it should be the role o the United States.Support or democracy promotion among Americans has

allen over the past three years rom 52% in 2005 to 45%in 2006 to 37% in 2007. Within the United States, support

or democracy promotion has allen in both parties, withRepublican support declining rom 76% in 2005 to 53% in2007 and Democratic support declining rom 43% in 2005to 31% in 2007. (See chart #17)


23/28


grOWiNg iSOLATiON OF TurKEy

Last years Transatlantic Trends asked if Turkey wasturning away from the West, noting declining support

for EU membership, continued criticism of U.S. and EU

global leadership, and declining support for NATO. While

U.S. General Joseph Ralston was welcomed last year

as special envoy to Turkey to address violence on the

border with Iraq, U.S.Turkish relations remain strained

over the issue. Relations with the European Union took

a negative turn when the EU suspended eight of the

35 chapters in accession negotiations and new French

President Sarkozy reaffirmed his opposition to Turkeys

EU membership. Turkey has held contentious debatesthis year about the role of the military in public life in

the lead-up to parliamentary and presidential elections.

While the governing AK Party increased its percentage

of the popular vote, returning it to power in a parliament

that also includes nationalist and Kurdish par ties, its

nomination of Abdullah Gl for president highlighted

tensions within Turkish society about secularism and

democracy.

TurKEy COOLiNg TOWArd ThE u.S. ANd Eu

BuT ALSO TOWArd irANTurkish feelings toward the United States and European

Union have continued to cool, with warmth toward the

United States dropping from 20 degrees in 2006 to

11 in 2007 on a 100-point thermometer scale, and

from 45 degrees to 26 toward the European Union.

Younger Turks aged 1824 continued to show slightly

warmer feelings than the national average toward both

the United States (15 degrees) and European Union

(28 degrees). In contrast to last year, which saw an

increase in warmth toward Iran, Turkish feelings toward

Iran have cooled from 43 degrees to 30. Comparedwith both Americans and Europeans, Turkish respon-

dents also show the coolest feelings toward Russia and

China. (See chart #18)

TurKEy MOST CriTiCAL OF u.S. ANd EuLEAdErShiP

Turkish respondents continued to have the most criti-

cal views of U.S. and EU leadership in world affairs,

with 74% of Turkish respondents who viewed U.S.

leadership in world affairs as undesirable, an increase

of five percentage points since 2006. For the first

time, a majority (54%) also viewed EU leadership as

undesirable, an increase of seven percentage points

since 2006. Similarly, only three percent approved of

President Bushs handling of international policies and

83% disapproved.

Chart 18

100

90

80

2007

70

60

Neutral 50

40

30

20

10

0

FEELINGS TOWARD OTHERS

42 The Palestinians

86 Turkey

11 U.S.

THERMOMETER READINGSTURKISH FEELINGS TOWARD OTHERS

5 Israel

21 Russia

28 China30 Iran

26 The EU


24/28


Chart 19

HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT TURKEY WILL JOIN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

P e r c e n t

UNITEDKINGDOM

NETHER-LANDS

GERMANY PORTUGAL ITALY ROMANIA EU 11 POLAND SPAIN BULGARIA SLOVAKIA FRANCE TURKEY

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

73 72

6260 60

57 5653 53

45

36

31

26

TurKiSh rESPONdENTS MOrE PESSiMiSTiC ThAN

EurOPEANS ABOuT Eu MEMBErShiP

The percentage of Turkish respondents who view EU

membership as a good thing remains the largest groupbut continued to decline from 54% in 2006 to 40% in

2007, a drop of 14 percentage points. European views

remained largely unchanged from last year, with the

largest percentage of respondents (42%) viewing Turkish

membership as neither a good nor bad thing, compared

with 22% who view it as a good thing and 31% who view

it as a bad thing. France and Germany continued to

have the highest percentage of respondents who view

Turkish membership as a bad thing (49% and 43%,

respectively). When asked how likely it is that Turkey

will join the European Union, 56% of Europeans felt itis likely that Turkey will join, compared with only 26% of

Turkish respondents who agreed. (See chart #19)

CONTiNuEd dECLiNE iN TurKiSh viEWS OF NATO

Turkish support for NATO has continued its decline

since 2004, with Turkish respondents divided almost

equally: 35% of respondents (9 percentage pointsChart 20

P e r c e n t

NATO STILL ESSENTIAL, TURKEY

53 52

44

35

26

32 35 34

21

15

21

31

2004 2005 2006 2007

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Still essentialNo longer essentialDont know/Refuse

from last year) agreed that NATO is still essential for

their countrys security, while 34% said it is no longer

essential, and 31% did not know or refused to answer.

(See chart #20)


25/28


Section Five: Conclusion

Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Gordon Brownmay o er a new spirit o cooperation in transat-lantic relations in Europe, but this years ransatlantic

rends suggests they will need to tread care ully. The Bushadministration and its policies remain deeply unpopular inEurope, even as most among European publics continue toseparate their views o the Bush administration rom those

o the United States more generally. Even in the UnitedKingdom, where we ind the most similar views on many issues such as the use o orce, large majorities disagree withPresident Bushs international policies.

While attitudes on global threats suggest that Americansand Europeans may not see the world so di erently, wemay disagree on how best to handle them. There havebeen notable increases in threat perceptions in Europe oninternational terrorism, immigration, and Islamic unda-mentalism, particularly in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Yet

calls like those made by German Interior Minister Schubleor greater governmental powers have been met by conten-

tious debate over the balance between security, intelligence,and civil liberties. There is strong support on both sideso the Atlantic or contributing troops or reconstruc-tion in A ghanistan, but European support or troops tocombat the Taliban is only hal that o Americans. Andwhile Americans and Europeans agree that a nuclear Iranwould pose a threat, they disagree over whether the military option should be kept on the table.

A European Union reinvigorated by a new treaty o insti-tutional re orm will continue to con ront questions about

its responsibility or dealing with global threats. A majority o Europeans who support the EU taking greater respon-sibility also wish to work in partnership with the UnitedStates. Europeans are willing to commit troops in a rangeo scenarios that include humanitarian assistance in Dar ur,peacekeeping in the Balkans, and monitoring the cease irein southern Lebanon. At the same time, they remain deeply

reluctant about the use o orce or combat operations.Turkey, which shows signs o increasing isolation rom Westand East, remains a contentious issue on the EU agenda. AsTurkish views o EU membership become more skeptical, theEU will continue to debate questions about its own identity.

In the United States, Americans remain divided overPresident Bush, but both Democrats and Republicanssupport strong U.S. leadership in global a airs and showonly modest di erences in threat perception and in dealingwith Russia. Both parties have seen a decline in support

or democracy promotion over the last three years, but theuse o orce remains a dividing issue between the partiesin the United States, as well as across the Atlantic. Lookingahead to the 2008 presidential elections in the United States,

ransatlantic rends indings suggest that U.S.Europeanrelations will not be mended simply by the election o anew U.S. president or by the emergence o a new genera-tion o European leaders. Rather, the con lict in Iraq anddi erences over the use o orce will likely continue to a ecttransatlantic relations beyond the Bush presidency.


26/28


Notes


27/28

MetHOdOLOGY:

NS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted elephone Interviews in all countriesexcept Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and urkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use o ace-to-

ace interviews. In all countries a random sample o approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years o age and older, wereinterviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 4, 2007, and June 23, 2007.

For results based on the national samples in each o the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% con dence that themargin o error attributable to sampling and other random efects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results basedon the total European sample (n=12053), the margin o margin o error is plus or minus one percentage point. Te averageresponse rate or all 13 countries surveyed was 22.7%.

Europe-wide gures are weighted on the basis o the size o the adult population in each country. Unless otherwisespeci ed, comparative data are reproduced rom ransatlantic rends 2003-2006 and/or rom Worldviews 2002 (www.transatlantictrends.org). When processing is complete, data rom the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium or Political andSocial Research at the University o Michigan (ICPSR) and are available to scholars and other interested parties. At the timeo printing, data or years 2002 through 2005 are available through ICPSR. For more in ormation please consult the ICPSRcatalog at www.icpsr.umich.edu.

nOte On eUrOPeAn AVerAGes:

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition o new countries has afectedthe Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically signi cant. Tere ore, or ease o presentation, wehave treated several diferent averages as i they were part o one average: the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part o the EU9, and the E10 average is listed as part o the E12. For additional in ormation on the composition o the Europeanaverages, please consult the table below.

YeAr AVerAGe COUntrIes

2002 EU6 France, Germany, Italy, Te Netherlands, Poland, and Te United Kingdom

2003 EU7 Same as the EU6 with the addition o Portugal

20042006 EU9 Same as the EU7 with the addition o Slovakia and Spain

20042005 E10 Same the EU9 with the addition o urkey

2006 E11 Same as EU9 with the addition o Bulgaria and Romania

2007 EU11 Same as the EU9 with the addition o Bulgaria and Romania

20062007 E12 Same as the E10 with the addition o Bulgaria and Romania

tABLe OF eUrOPeAn AVerAGes:


28/28

A project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, withadditional support from Fundao Luso-Americana, Fundacin BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

www.transatlantictrends.org

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Transatlantic Trends 2007

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