Consortium for Verification Technology
TheIranNuclearDeal:Whereweareandouroptionsgoingforward
FrankvonHippel,SeniorResearchPhysicistandProfessorofPublicandInternationalAffairsemeritus
ProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurity,PrincetonUniversityConsortiumonVerificationTechnologyAnnualMeeting
UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor29November2017
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Outline
• TheDeal
• ChangingU.S.policy
• Strengtheningthenonproliferationregime
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Redlines
• IranwouldnotgiveupeitheritsenrichmentprogramoritsArakreactor.
• PresidentObama:Iranwouldhavetobeatleastayearawayfrommakingenoughhighlyenricheduraniumorseparatingenoughplutoniumtomakeabomb.
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Arakreactordesign:40à20MWt,naturalU–>LEUfuel,8à1kgPu/yr productionspentfueltobeshippedtoRussia
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Number of installed centrifuges: Iran escalates, pauses, the Deal*
Nov. 2003
Nov.2004
Nov. 2005
Nov.2006
Nov. 2007
Nov.2008
Nov. 2009
Nov.2010
Nov. 2011
Nov.2012
Nov. 2013
Nov.2014
JCPOA
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
Centrifuges
Installed IR-1Operational IR-1Installed IR-2M
10 YEARS
Installed
Operating
IR-2Ms(~ 5 SWUs/yr)
10,000
20,000
2010 2015
Ahmadinejad Rouhani
G.W. Bush Obama
ArmsC
ontrolTo
day
*Bas
ed o
n IA
EA re
ports
Stuxnetcomputer virus
Restraint
2005
5
Trump
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Iran’sstocksofLEU
Nov.2012
Nov. 2013
Nov.2014
June 2015
8,000 kg
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
a n t t p w s s
N T s d n
15 YEARS
UF6 gas
All forms ~ 1/5 of LEU feed to produce one bomb quantity of HEU.
Enough LEU feed to produce ~5 bomb quantities of 90% enriched uranium.
8,000 kg
300 kg
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VerificationIAEAhasissued9reports onIran’scompliancewiththeDealatitsdeclarednuclearsitesduring2016-17andhasreportednosignificantviolations.
Focusofthecritics,includingUSAmbassadortotheUN,NikkiHaley,hasbeenonthefactthattheIAEAhasnotbeeninspectingmilitarysitesinIrantoverify thatIranisnot:• Doingcomputermodelingofnucleardevices,• Workingonmulti-pointdetonationofexplosivesanddiagnostic
equipmentforsuchexplosions,or• Workingonexplosively-drivenneutrongenerators.IAEApositionisthatsuchinvestigationsrequirenewandcredibleindicationsofbannednuclearactivities.USdoesnotclaimtohavesuchevidence.
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ComplaintsabouttheDeal
• Durationlimited.Between2025-40,IranrevertstonormalstatusplusAdditionalProtocol,themaximumtransparencyrequiredofanormalcountry.
• Iran’sballisticmissileprogram.Sanctions butnolimitsagreed.• Iran’sactivitiesintheregion:Hamas(Gasa strip),Hezbollah
(Lebanon),Houthis(Yemen)…• Israel,SaudiArabiaandperhapsU.S.wouldpreferregimechange
inTeheran(weforgetthatthecurrentregimewasestablishedinreactiontoourregimechangein1953)
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IInn UU..SS..,, IIrraann DDeeaall iiss aann eexxeeccuuttiivvee aaggrreeeemmeenntt (not a treaty) with Iran, China, European Union, France, Germany, Russia and the UK
Accordingto,theIranAgreementReviewActof2015,ifthePresidentdoesnotcertifyevery90daysthatthesuspensionofU.S.nuclearsanctionsis“appropriateandproportional…tothemeasurestakenbyIran”and“vitaltothenationalsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStates”CongresscantaketheU.S.outoftheDealbyamajorityvotewithin60days.Afterthat,actionbytheSenatewillbesubjecttothefilibusterrule(60%majorityrequired).
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PresidentTrump’spositionOn13October2017,hedeclaredthatthesuspensionofU.S.nuclear-relatedsanctionswasnot“appropriatedandproportionate”tothemeasurestakenbyIran:
“IamdirectingmyadministrationtoworkcloselywithCongressandouralliestoaddressthedeal’smanyseriousflawssothattheIranianregimecanneverthreatentheworldwithnuclearweapons.Theseincludethedeal’ssunsetclausesthat,injustafewyears,willeliminatekeyrestrictionsonIran’snuclearprogram…
“intheeventwearenotabletoreachasolutionworkingwithCongressandourallies,thentheagreementwillbeterminated.Itisundercontinuousreview,andourparticipationcanbecancelledbyme,asPresident,atanytime.”
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TheresponseofU.S.partnersintheDeal
"TheIraniannationhasnotandwillneverbowtoanyforeignpressure,”-- PresidentofIran
“Preservingthe[Irannucleardeal]isinoursharednationalsecurityinterest.”-- PresidentofFrance,ChancellorofGermany,PMofUK,
reopeningnegotiations“isanonstarterandtryingtogetitisadeadend.”-- France’sAmbassador
“noregionalissuethatwehavewithIranthatwouldnotbeevenmoredifficulttohandleifIranpossessednuclearweapons.”–EUAmb.
“Wealreadyhaveonepotentialnuclearcrisis.Wedefinitelydonotneedtogointoasecondone.”– EUForeignMinister
“Ifit’snotbroke,don’tfixit."– RussianDeputyForeignMinister“thisdealisimportanttoensuringtheinternationalnuclearnonproliferationregimeandregionalpeaceandstability”– ChinaFM
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NotjustanIranproblem• Anynationalenrichmentorreprocessing(plutonium-separation)programisapotentialnuclear-weaponproliferationproblem.
• Wetrustsomecountries(Germany,Netherlands,Japan)butnotmostothers.[JapanhasenoughseparatedPufor1000nuclearweapons.]
• WehavehadconfrontationsoverArgentina,Brazil,India,Japan,Pakistan,SouthAfrica,SouthKoreanenrichmentand/orreprocessingprogramsin1970s.N.Koreastartingin1990s.Iran,S.Koreatoday.
• FortheU.S.,the“goldstandard”foranon-weaponstateisforittohavenoenrichmentandnoreprocessingcapacity.Sofar,onlytheUnitedArabEmirateshavecommitted–conditionally– tothisstandard.
• Agenericsolutionisneeded.
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Reprocessingnoteconomic.Whynotbanit?
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Reprocessing in countries with power
reactors
U.S. has opposed spread of reprocessing since 1974, when India used Atoms-for- Peace reprocessing to obtain plutonium for weapons.
Fortunately, Iran is not interested in reprocessing.
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Multinationalize enrichment?
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URENCO (Germany, Netherlands, UK)Large nationalSmall national (not enough for 1 GWe)
220
<1
<1
<1
<13560
150
Civilian Enrichment
Capacity measured in
1 GWe LWR units
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Verificationbenefitsofmulti-nationalization
Urenco hasfocusedonlyonassuringbestpracticesareshared.
Initialthoughtsonhowtobuildinmoremulti-nationaltransparency• Control-room/maintenancepersonnelofmixednationalities.• Personnelinvolvedincentrifugemanufactureandinstallationfrom
othercountrieswithcentrifuge-designexpertise.• Sensitivitiesaboutindustrialintelligenceonoperationsshouldbe
balancedwithneed(asinIran)forinternationalconfidencethatnoundeclaredmaterialisbeingenriched.
• RegionalverificationorganizationssuchasEuratom andABACCalsohaveconfidence-buildingbenefits.
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LinkageofnonproliferationtodisarmamentIncreasingly,however,keynon-weaponstatesaredemandingthattheweapon-statesmovefurtheronnucleardisarmament(CTBT,FMCT,de-alerting,nofirstuse,deepercuts...)beforetheywillundertakefurthernonproliferationcommitments
• Argentina,Brazil unwillingtosignuptoAdditionalProtocol(AP).• Egypt unwillingtoratifyCWC,BWCuntilIsraeldoes• Iran unwillingtoacceptpermanentrestrictionsbeyondAP• SouthAfricaunwillingtoeliminateitslegacystockofHEUfromits
dismantlednuclearweapons.• TreatyonProhibitionofNuclearWeaponsvotedforinJulyby122
non-weaponstates.Weneedpoliticalaswellastechnicaladvances.
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