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Consortium for Verification Technology

TheIranNuclearDeal:Whereweareandouroptionsgoingforward

FrankvonHippel,SeniorResearchPhysicistandProfessorofPublicandInternationalAffairsemeritus

ProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurity,PrincetonUniversityConsortiumonVerificationTechnologyAnnualMeeting

UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor29November2017


Outline

• TheDeal

• ChangingU.S.policy

• Strengtheningthenonproliferationregime

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Redlines

• IranwouldnotgiveupeitheritsenrichmentprogramoritsArakreactor.

• PresidentObama:Iranwouldhavetobeatleastayearawayfrommakingenoughhighlyenricheduraniumorseparatingenoughplutoniumtomakeabomb.

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Arakreactordesign:40à20MWt,naturalU–>LEUfuel,8à1kgPu/yr productionspentfueltobeshippedtoRussia

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Number of installed centrifuges: Iran escalates, pauses, the Deal*

Nov. 2003

Nov.2004

Nov. 2005

Nov.2006

Nov. 2007

Nov.2008

Nov. 2009

Nov.2010

Nov. 2011

Nov.2012

Nov. 2013

Nov.2014

JCPOA

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

Centrifuges

Installed IR-1Operational IR-1Installed IR-2M

10 YEARS

Installed

Operating

IR-2Ms(~ 5 SWUs/yr)

10,000

20,000

2010 2015

Ahmadinejad Rouhani

G.W. Bush Obama

ArmsC

ontrolTo

day

*Bas

ed o

n IA

EA re

ports

Stuxnetcomputer virus

Restraint

2005

5

Trump


Iran’sstocksofLEU

Nov.2012

Nov. 2013

Nov.2014

June 2015

8,000 kg

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

a n t t p w s s

N T s d n

15 YEARS

UF6 gas

All forms ~ 1/5 of LEU feed to produce one bomb quantity of HEU.

Enough LEU feed to produce ~5 bomb quantities of 90% enriched uranium.

8,000 kg

300 kg

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VerificationIAEAhasissued9reports onIran’scompliancewiththeDealatitsdeclarednuclearsitesduring2016-17andhasreportednosignificantviolations.

Focusofthecritics,includingUSAmbassadortotheUN,NikkiHaley,hasbeenonthefactthattheIAEAhasnotbeeninspectingmilitarysitesinIrantoverify thatIranisnot:• Doingcomputermodelingofnucleardevices,• Workingonmulti-pointdetonationofexplosivesanddiagnostic

equipmentforsuchexplosions,or• Workingonexplosively-drivenneutrongenerators.IAEApositionisthatsuchinvestigationsrequirenewandcredibleindicationsofbannednuclearactivities.USdoesnotclaimtohavesuchevidence.

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ComplaintsabouttheDeal

• Durationlimited.Between2025-40,IranrevertstonormalstatusplusAdditionalProtocol,themaximumtransparencyrequiredofanormalcountry.

• Iran’sballisticmissileprogram.Sanctions butnolimitsagreed.• Iran’sactivitiesintheregion:Hamas(Gasa strip),Hezbollah

(Lebanon),Houthis(Yemen)…• Israel,SaudiArabiaandperhapsU.S.wouldpreferregimechange

inTeheran(weforgetthatthecurrentregimewasestablishedinreactiontoourregimechangein1953)

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IInn UU..SS..,, IIrraann DDeeaall iiss aann eexxeeccuuttiivvee aaggrreeeemmeenntt (not a treaty) with Iran, China, European Union, France, Germany, Russia and the UK

Accordingto,theIranAgreementReviewActof2015,ifthePresidentdoesnotcertifyevery90daysthatthesuspensionofU.S.nuclearsanctionsis“appropriateandproportional…tothemeasurestakenbyIran”and“vitaltothenationalsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStates”CongresscantaketheU.S.outoftheDealbyamajorityvotewithin60days.Afterthat,actionbytheSenatewillbesubjecttothefilibusterrule(60%majorityrequired).

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PresidentTrump’spositionOn13October2017,hedeclaredthatthesuspensionofU.S.nuclear-relatedsanctionswasnot“appropriatedandproportionate”tothemeasurestakenbyIran:

“IamdirectingmyadministrationtoworkcloselywithCongressandouralliestoaddressthedeal’smanyseriousflawssothattheIranianregimecanneverthreatentheworldwithnuclearweapons.Theseincludethedeal’ssunsetclausesthat,injustafewyears,willeliminatekeyrestrictionsonIran’snuclearprogram…

“intheeventwearenotabletoreachasolutionworkingwithCongressandourallies,thentheagreementwillbeterminated.Itisundercontinuousreview,andourparticipationcanbecancelledbyme,asPresident,atanytime.”

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TheresponseofU.S.partnersintheDeal

"TheIraniannationhasnotandwillneverbowtoanyforeignpressure,”-- PresidentofIran

“Preservingthe[Irannucleardeal]isinoursharednationalsecurityinterest.”-- PresidentofFrance,ChancellorofGermany,PMofUK,

reopeningnegotiations“isanonstarterandtryingtogetitisadeadend.”-- France’sAmbassador

“noregionalissuethatwehavewithIranthatwouldnotbeevenmoredifficulttohandleifIranpossessednuclearweapons.”–EUAmb.

“Wealreadyhaveonepotentialnuclearcrisis.Wedefinitelydonotneedtogointoasecondone.”– EUForeignMinister

“Ifit’snotbroke,don’tfixit."– RussianDeputyForeignMinister“thisdealisimportanttoensuringtheinternationalnuclearnonproliferationregimeandregionalpeaceandstability”– ChinaFM

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NotjustanIranproblem• Anynationalenrichmentorreprocessing(plutonium-separation)programisapotentialnuclear-weaponproliferationproblem.

• Wetrustsomecountries(Germany,Netherlands,Japan)butnotmostothers.[JapanhasenoughseparatedPufor1000nuclearweapons.]

• WehavehadconfrontationsoverArgentina,Brazil,India,Japan,Pakistan,SouthAfrica,SouthKoreanenrichmentand/orreprocessingprogramsin1970s.N.Koreastartingin1990s.Iran,S.Koreatoday.

• FortheU.S.,the“goldstandard”foranon-weaponstateisforittohavenoenrichmentandnoreprocessingcapacity.Sofar,onlytheUnitedArabEmirateshavecommitted–conditionally– tothisstandard.

• Agenericsolutionisneeded.

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Reprocessingnoteconomic.Whynotbanit?

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Reprocessing in countries with power

reactors

U.S. has opposed spread of reprocessing since 1974, when India used Atoms-for- Peace reprocessing to obtain plutonium for weapons.

Fortunately, Iran is not interested in reprocessing.


Multinationalize enrichment?

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URENCO (Germany, Netherlands, UK)Large nationalSmall national (not enough for 1 GWe)

220

<1

<1

<1

<13560

150

Civilian Enrichment

Capacity measured in

1 GWe LWR units


Verificationbenefitsofmulti-nationalization

Urenco hasfocusedonlyonassuringbestpracticesareshared.

Initialthoughtsonhowtobuildinmoremulti-nationaltransparency• Control-room/maintenancepersonnelofmixednationalities.• Personnelinvolvedincentrifugemanufactureandinstallationfrom

othercountrieswithcentrifuge-designexpertise.• Sensitivitiesaboutindustrialintelligenceonoperationsshouldbe

balancedwithneed(asinIran)forinternationalconfidencethatnoundeclaredmaterialisbeingenriched.

• RegionalverificationorganizationssuchasEuratom andABACCalsohaveconfidence-buildingbenefits.

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LinkageofnonproliferationtodisarmamentIncreasingly,however,keynon-weaponstatesaredemandingthattheweapon-statesmovefurtheronnucleardisarmament(CTBT,FMCT,de-alerting,nofirstuse,deepercuts...)beforetheywillundertakefurthernonproliferationcommitments

• Argentina,Brazil unwillingtosignuptoAdditionalProtocol(AP).• Egypt unwillingtoratifyCWC,BWCuntilIsraeldoes• Iran unwillingtoacceptpermanentrestrictionsbeyondAP• SouthAfricaunwillingtoeliminateitslegacystockofHEUfromits

dismantlednuclearweapons.• TreatyonProhibitionofNuclearWeaponsvotedforinJulyby122

non-weaponstates.Weneedpoliticalaswellastechnicaladvances.

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