The Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Critical Legal Studies · The Neoliberalism and the Crisis of...

Rev.DireitoPráx.,RiodeJaneiro,Vol.9,N.4,2018,p.2229-2250.PhilippeOliveiradeAlmeidaDOI:10.1590/2179-8966/2017/7420|ISSN:2179-8966

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TheNeoliberalismandtheCrisisofCriticalLegalStudiesOneoliberalismoeacrisedosCriticalLegalStudies

Philippe Oliveira deAlmeida11UniversidadeFederaldeSantaCatarina,Florianópolis,SantaCatarina,Brasil.E-mail:[email protected]

Thearticlewassubmittedon16/02/2017 andapprovedon21/11/2017.

ThisworkislicensedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0InternationalLicense.


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Abstract

Theobjectiveof thispaperistoanalyzethefactors that led to the decline of

CriticalLegalStudiesfromthe1990s.Atfirst,wewillanalyzetheemergenceofcritical

theories of Law in the 1960s.Wewill then investigate the emergence of postmodern

legalmovements,placingCriticalLegalStudies inthisprocess.Finally,wewillevaluate

theimpactofneoliberalismontheworkofCriticalLegalStudies.

Keywords:CriticalLegalStudies;Postmodernlegalmovements;Neoliberalism.

Resumo

OobjetivodestetrabalhoéanalisarosfatoresquelevaramaodeclíniodosCriticalLegal

Studies a partir da década de 1990. Em um primeiro momento, analisaremos o

surgimento das teorias críticas do Direito na década de 1960. Em seguida,

investigaremosodespontardosmovimentosjurídicospós-modernosnorte-americanos,

situandoosCriticalLegalStudiesnesseprocesso.Finalmente,avaliaremosoimpactodo

neoliberalismosobreaobradoscrits.

Palavras-chave: Critical Legal Studies; Movimentos jurídicos pós-modernos;

Neoliberalismo.


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1Introduction

ThisstudyaimstoofferahistoricalreconstitutionoftheriseandfallofNorthAmerican

Postmodern LegalMovements, specially theCritical Legal Studies. First, itwill analyze

the dawn of Critical Legal Studies within the context of postmodern Critical Legal

Thinking (as opposed to the hegemonic view of Legal Education). In sequence, it

explorespossible reasons forcrits (namegiven toparticipantsofCritical Legal Studies

movement) recrudescence. Although situated in the Anglo-Saxon Legal System

(characterized mainly by customs and precedents as sources of Law), the crits

movement provides important insights that can be used by legal scholars in the

Romano-Germanic Legal System (characterized mainly by positive codifications and

doctrine).

Nowadays,onelivesundeniablyinamomentof ideologicalcrisis.Sincethefall

oftheBerlinWall,neoliberalismhassoughttoimposeitselfastheonlyfeasibleethosin

a globalized context,marked by both the decay of dictatorial political systems in the

Second and Third Worlds and the affirmation of cultural diversity. The progressive

intelligentsia strove toadjust itself to the demoliberal system and to the logic of the

market1, adoptingparadigmsof "weak reformism,"2 suchas thosepromotedby social

democracy.However,advancingconservatism(stimulatedbytheeconomicrecession)is

a sign that the paradigms of "savage capitalism" and "capitalismwith a human face"

spreadover the last few years arenot enough to afford theneedsof thepopulation.

Therefore, the failureof theSovietUniondidnotrepresentthe"endofhistory,"3 the

triumph of theUnited States, and thepax americana achievement. Nevertheless, the

theoreticalindigenceofestablishedpoliticalparties(right-wingedandleft-wingedinthe

political spectrum) prevents the community from enjoying new models of social

organizationableofovercomingtheaporiasoftheDemocraticRuleofLaw.

Legal education has its share of the blame in this process: presenting the

normative order as an autopoietic, rational and necessary system, devoid of

contradictions or gaps (and not as the result of contingent and reversible political

1 ZIZEK, Slavoj. 2001. ‘Did somebody say totalitarianism? Five interventions in the (mis)use of a notion.’London;NewYork:Verso,chapters2and3.2 SINGER, André V. 2009. ‘As raízes sociais e ideológicas do Lulismo.’Novos Estudos/CEBRAP, São Paulo.Avaliableat:<http://www.scielo.br/pdf/nec/n85/n85a04.pdf>,acessedon:sept.02,2016.3 HORTA, José Luiz Borges et. al. 2012. ‘A era pós-ideologias e suas ameaças à política e ao Estado deDireito.’Confluências,Niterói,vol.14,n.02,p.120-133.


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decisions, commitments assumed in the struggle for power), law schools eventually

convinced their students that this would be the best (or "least worst") of possible

worlds, the inevitable consequence of a logical evolution. This process explains the

success,inrecentyears,ofdoctrinessuchastheEconomicAnalysisofLaw,whichseeks

to naturalize the most harmful characteristics of the bourgeois legal order and to

represent man as "eternal rational utilities maximizer"4. In such a scenario, it is

necessarytorehabilitatecriticallegalthinkinginordertofosterthetransformativeand

emancipatory dimension of Law. Considered by many as the most radical view of

postmodern legal movements, Critical Legal Studies can bring fundamental

contributionstothetransformationofthecurrentinstitutionalarrangement.

2CriticalTheoriesofLaw

AccordingtoAntônioCarlosWolkmer,criticaltheoriesofLaw5havebeguntoemergein

EuropeandtheAmericassincethe1960s,infaceoftheinabilityofnormativistdoctrines

to respond to elementary questions - notably of moral and ideological nature -

indispensabletocomprehendthelegaluniverse6inforceduringthatperiod.Itsrisewas

4AsumofthetheoreticalassumptionsheldbyEconomicAnalysisofLawcanbefoundin:POSNER,Richard.2007.‘Problemasdefilosofiadodireito.’TraduçãoJeffersonCamargo.SãoPaulo:MartinsFontes.5WolkmerdefinesCriticalTheoriesofLawasfollows:“Inthisway,onecanconceptualizecriticaltheoryastheoperativepedagogical instrument (theoretical-practical) that allows a historical takeof consciousnessfor stagnant and mythical subjects, triggering processes that lead to the formation of social agentspossessingarationalized,anti-dogmatic,participatoryandtransformativeworldview.Itisaproposalthatisnot based on abstractions, onpriori reasoning of pure and simplemental elaboration, but on historical-concrete experience, on daily insurgent practice, on conflicts and social interactions, and on essentialhumanneeds.”Looselytranslationof:“Dessemodo,pode-seconceituarteoriacríticacomooinstrumentalpedagógicooperante(teórico-prático)quepermiteasujeitosinertesemitificadosumatomadahistóricadeconsciência, desencadeando processos que conduzem à formação de agentes sociais possuidores de umaconcepção demundo racionalizada, antidogmática, participativa e transformadora. Trata-se de propostaquenãopartedeabstrações,deumaprioridado,daelaboraçãomentalpuraesimples,masdaexperiênciahistórico-concreta,dapráticacotidianainsurgente,dosconflitosedasinteraçõessociaisedasnecessidadeshumanas essenciais” (WOLKMER, Antônio Carlos. 2002. ‘Introdução ao pensamento jurídico crítico.’ SãoPaulo:Saraiva,p.05).6AsWolkmerdescribes:“Thebeginningsofthecritical legalmovementweredeveloped inthe late1960sthrough the influence of European legal scholars on ideas arising from the Soviet legal economy (Sucka,Pashukanis), onGramsci's retelling ofMarxist theory byAlthusser's group, on Frankfurtian critical theoryandonFoucault’sarchaeologicalthesesofpower.Affectedbyneo-Marxistandcounterculturetheories,themovementbegantocall inquestionthesolid juspositivistwayof thinkingthatprevailed inacademiaandinstitutionalbodies.Thus,inthefieldoflaw,investigationswerecarriedoutbydemythologizingtraditionaland dogmatic legality and introducing sociopolitical analyzes of the legal phenomenon, enabling amoredirect interaction between Law, State, power, ideologies, social practices and interdisciplinary criticism.”Looselytranslationof:“OsprimórdiosdomovimentodecríticanoDireitoforamgestadosnofinaldosanos60, através da influência sobre juristas europeus de ideias provindas do economicismo jurídico soviético


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driven by the decolonization of Africa and Oceania, the demonstrations against the

VietnamWar,thesocialcustomsrevolutionandthecounterculture.Events,suchasthe

rise of hippies communities, confronted the imposed Law from an imaginary Law

perspective:beforebeinglived,thelegalsystemwasconceivedand,atthatmoment,it

was imperativetocall intoquestionthetheoreticalframeworkoftraditionaldoctrine7.

Kelsen'sdefinitionofthelegalnormasacoercivecommandaimedatsocialpacification

begins tobequestioned8.Gradually is restored theperceptionconforming towhich in

the collective life exists a diverse range of spontaneous forms of conflicts resolution,

beyondpositiveLaw9.Thereby,somescholarsbecomemoreawaretothehistoricialand

politicalviewsofLaw(movingawayfromthebeliefofatranscultural“legalrationality”,

capableofjustifyingjurisdictionaldecisionsatanytimeorplace).

Wolkmer refers to a transcontinental wave of legal criticism, "heterogeneous

pluralityofinsurgentmovements,"whichdespiteproceduraldifferences,facescommon

gnosiologicalandpolitical-ideologicalproblems: inanefforttorescuethesociopolitical

sense of the Law, all these currents will oppose legal positivism, jusnaturalism and

sociological realism. The three main approaches to the legal phenomenon that have

developed in the history of Western civilization share the common effort to "de-

ideologize" the jurisdictional activity, to interpret it as a technical (the belief that the

sentence would represent a syllogistic operation, etc.) or prudential activity (the

practical reason, theAristotelianphronesisapplied to the lawsuit). LegalDogmatism is

based on "founding fictions of truth" - such as the belief according to which legal

knowledgewouldbeneutralandimpartial,standingabovetheconflictsofinterestthat

cross thesocialbody.For thecritical theoriesofLaw, thedesacralizationofnormative

(Sucka, Pashukanis), da releitura gramsciana da teoriamarxista feita pelo grupo de Althusser, da teoriacríticafrankfurtianaedastesesarqueológicasdeFoucaultsobreopoder.Omovimentoafetadoportesesdeinspiração neomarxista e de contracultura começava a questionar o sólido pensamento juspositivistareinantenomeioacadêmicoenasinstânciasinstitucionais.Projetavam-seassim,paraocampodoDireito,investigaçõesquedesmistificavamalegalidadedogmáticatradicionale introduziamanálisessociopolíticasdo fenômeno jurídico, aproximandomais diretamente o Direito do Estado, do poder, das ideologias, daspráticassociaisedacrítica interdisciplinar”(WOLKMER,AntônioCarlos.2002. ‘Introduçãoaopensamentojurídicocrítico.’SãoPaulo:Saraiva,p.16).7ARNAUD,JeanAndré.1991.‘Utopiadosanos70eDireitodeFamíliaContemporâneo.’TraduçãodeSílvioDonizeteChagas.Contradogmáticas:RevistaInternacionaldeFilosofiaeSociologiadoDireito,SãoPaulo,n.09,p.10-21.8KELSEN,Hans.2009.‘TeoriapuradoDireito.’TraduçãodeJoãoBaptistaMachado.SãoPaulo:EditoraWMFMartinsFontes.9Withregardtothecontemporaryrediscoveryofaparastatal (andevenanti-state)normativeorder, it isimpossiblenottomentiontheclassicstudyofSanto's:SANTOS,BoaventuradeSouza.1977.'Thelawoftheoppressed:theconstructionandreproductionoflegality'.Pasargada.Law&SocietyReview,vol.12,n.01,p.05-126.


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mythshasrevealeditselfasanecessarystageinaffirmingtheprimacyofpolitics,thatis,

the revelation of legal discourse as a discourse of power, operationalized by specific

groupsinordertomaintaintheirownambitions.

Wolkmer identifies fourmajormethodologicalaxesof critical legal thinking:a)

theAssociationCritiqueduDroit;b) theAlternativeUseofLaw; c) theEpistemological

Approaches to Legal Pluralism; and d) Critical Legal Studies. Founded in the United

States in the late 1970s, the Critical Legal Studies movement assembled

phenomenology, social historicism, legal realism, frankfurtian Marxism, French

structuralism and interdisciplinary analysis. In the face ofCommon Law, it assumed a

demystifying stance: aimed to break with the classical rationality of Western legal

culture. Itsmanysupporters includeMortonHorwitz,DuncanKennedy,MarkTushnet,

Karl Klare, Robert Gordon, Peter Gabel, Mark Kelman, Richard Abel, Thomas Heller,

DavidTrubek,WillianSimonandMangabeiraUnger.Atthispoint,abriefpictureofthe

genesisandstructureofCriticalLegalStudiesmaybeofsomevalue.

3Post-ModernLegalMovements

Traditionally refractory to political and social tensions, American law schools were

eventuallyaffected(indegree,ofcourse,inferiortothatofothercollegespaces)bythe

vanguards of the 1960s and 1970s. The Socratic Method10, proposed by Chistopher

ColumbusLangdellattheendofthenineteenthcentury,dominatedthelegaleducation

scenarioalmost incontestably. Supportedbya formalistperspective -which sought to

stimulate"legalreasoning"instudents,itsetasidemoralandpolitical-ideologicalissues

associatedwith thenormativeuniverse - theSocraticmethod seemed tobe themost

appropriate fora liberal cosmovision. It shared thebelief that forevery legalproblem

there would be a single adequate, technical and accessible solution to any rational

subject.Initsquestion-and-answergame,itwouldstimulatehierarchy,paternalism,and

10 The Socratic Method espoused by the American law schools has little relation with the maieuticsdevelopedbySocratesinClassicalAntiquity.Itisbasedonthecasestudy:byanalyzingemblematiccommonlawcasesbeforetheclasses,thestudentsundergodailyoralassessmentsmadebytheteachers.Inthisway,they must learn to identify the essential elements of the investigated precedents, by debugging thefundamentalprinciplesthatrulethelegalsystem.


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alienation11.Inthewakeofcountercultureandstudentinsurgencies(stimulatedbythe

CivilRightsMovementandthereactionagainsttheVietnamWar),IvyLeaguestudents

andyoungteacherswillrevoltagainsttheestablishedpedagogicalmodel12.

Inthisway,"postmodernlegalmovements"(inthedefinitionofGaryMinda)are

born, marked by eclecticism, diversity, fragmentation, competition and rivalry.

Postmodernism is defined, first of all, by the refutation of the idea, disseminated in

ClassicalModernity,thatallindividuals,regardlessoftimeandplace,wouldbeendowed

withthesamementalstructure:theself,transparenttoitself,(cogito,ergosum),could

thus serve as a starting point for the elaboration of an objective knowledge

(undoubtable, clear and distinct)13. Modern rationality, aspiring to impose the same

exactingdemandsofmathematics andphysicsuponall thedimensionsofhuman life,

willseekintheepistemicsubject(whichpermanentlybendsitself,fosteredbycertainty

about its own mental representations) a solid foundation for the construction of

knowledge.Therationalistandempiricistramificationsofmodernphilosophy,inspiteof

theiruncountabledivergences,areunited intheattempttorecognize inthe(solipsist)

self the source of universal truth. The collapse of this perspective, stimulated by the

awarenessthatdifferentformsofsubjectivationandrationalityarepossible(ifwetake

intoaccountthepluralityofexistingcultures),willguideWesternintellectualitytowards

thepostmodern.Itwouldbedecisive,bytheway,theclaimthatthe"greatnarratives"

(theeffort to interpret the trajectoryofhumanitywithin the frameworkof aunivocal

analyticalgrid)wouldhaveended.Theveryquestionofquiddity–whichmeansquidest,

"what is," the essence - remains committed, in an age that embraces moderate and

11 Inanautobiographicalwork,ScottTurow(bestknownfordetectivenovels) recallshisexperiencesasalawstudentatHarvard,denouncingtheoppressiveteachingdidacticsinspiredbyLangdell’s influence.SeeTUROW,Scott.1977.‘Oprimeiroano:comosefazumadvogado.’TraduçãodeA.B.PinheirodeLemos.SãoPaulo: Record. Criticismof the Socraticmethod is also the starting point for themovieThe Paper Chase[1972,USA,directedbyJamesBrigdges]: thefilmfinds inEdward"Bull"Warren(oneof themost famousteachersofHarvardhistory),an inspiration toplay thecharactherofProfessorKingsfield,whocondensesthevirtuesandvicesofLangdell'stechnique.12KALMAN,Laura.2005.‘Lawschoolandthesixties:revoltandreverberations.’ChapeHill:TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaPress.13Ahistoricalaccountofthegenesisof'postmodernism'conceptisprovidedbyANDERSON,Perry.1999.‘Asorigensdapós-modernidade.’TraduçãodeMarcusPenchel.RiodeJaneiro:JorgeZaharEditor.AnefforttodemarcatethehistoricalevolutionofthepostmodernmovementcanbefoundinSALVI,RosanaFigueiredo.2002.‘Movimentopós-modernoecultura:periodizandoediscutindosuasfases.’Semina:CiênciasHumanaseSociais.Londrina,vol.23,p.79-92.Acritiqueofthepostmodernideology- inanattempttoreconstructmetanarratives, relegated by postmodernism - is developed in MAYOS, Gonçal. 2008. ‘L’alienaciópostmoderna.’ Barcelona: DeBarris. Available at:<http://www.ub.edu/histofilosofia/gmayos/PDF/Alienaci%F3%20PostmodernaUPEC.pdf>.Acessedon:may,02,2015.


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radical formsofepistemicandmoralrelativism.There isnosingletruth,asthere isno

pre-establishedsetofbasicvaluessharedbyallmen.

In this scenario, Minda highlights five aspects that, appearing almost

simultaneously, compete for space inAmerican lawschools:a)LawandEconomics;b)

CriticalLegalStudies;c)FeministLegalTheory;d)LawandLiterature;ande)CriticalRace

Theory.Despitethecountlesstheoreticalandpracticaldifferences,thesecurrentsshare

similar pluralistic, contextual and non-essentialist conceptions of Law. The element of

faith,typicallymoderninaself-transparentandself-legitimatingjuridicalconsciousness,

the basis for the construction of a legal order based on coherence and integrity, is

rejectedbythefivegroups,whichiswhytheyareassociatedtothepostmodernism14.

In fact, modern legal theorists believe in the existence of 'right answers' and

'rightinterpretations'.ApplyinginstrumentalrationalitytotheLaw,theyexpecttogive

legal knowledge "scientific objectivity." Theirworks aremarkedby great dichotomies:

subject/object; Law/society; substance/process; core/penumbra etc. Grotius, for

example,emulatinggeometryreasoning,intendstoconstructaNaturalLawthatwould

subsist"even ifGoddidnotexist", that is,aself-evidentnormativesystem,capableof

sustainingitselfexclusivelybyitsrationality.TherewouldbeatranssocialorderofLaw,

not linked with cultural values, but composed of rules, principles and doctrines. By

meansofdeontic logic(inconceptualmodelssuchasLangdell's)orbypracticalreason

(innormativemodelssuchasthatelaboratedbyOliverW.Holmes'slegalrealism,which

replacedformalismwithpragmaticinstrumentalism),thejuristwouldbeabletoaccess

suchorder.

In the 1970s, this paradigm began to collapse, being replaced by newmodels

capableofcoordinatingLawandculture:

Theproblem[in the1970s]wasthat traditional legalanalysishadfailedtorecognize that law contributes to the construction of social reality.Traditionalanalysisoflegalproblemsadopteda‘naive’understandingoftherelationshipbetweenlawandculture.Mostlegalscholarsassumedthatthe

14 As Minda affirms: “Postmodernism is an aesthetic practice and condition that is opposed to ‘GrandTheory’,structuralpatterns,orfoundationalknowledges.Postmodernlegalcriticsemploylocal,small-scaleproblem-solvingstrategiestoarisenewquestionsabouttherelationoflaw,politicsandculture.Theyofferanew interpretative aesthetic for reconceptualizing the practice of legal interpretation” (MINDA. 1996.‘Postmodernlegalmovements:LawandJurisprudenceattheCentury’sEnd.’NeyYork:NYUPress,p.03).


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directive force of legal rules had an independent existence, such that lawcouldfunctionautonomouslyofculture.15

As argued by Arthur Austin, detractor of "postmodern legalmovements," the

trajectoryof law schools in the1970swas characterizedby the strugglebetween the

"empire," the Establishment, largely sponsored by liberal white men, and the

"outsiders”, the coordination of crits, feminists, and critical race theorists16.Fem-Crit-

Black: from different approaches, the three currentswould united in the intellectual

populism,inpoliticalcorrectionandinrejectionofcardinalpreceptsoflegaleducation

(analyticalevaluation, rationality,objectivity)17.Thehybridof thesescholarswouldbe

for the purpose of conceiving law schools primarily as platforms for social change.

Believinginthemalleabilityofinstitutions,postmodernlegalmovementsembracedthe

challengeofrewritingsocialhierarchies.

Among thepostmoderncritiquesof traditional legal thinking, thoseemanating

from Critical Legal Studies may have been the most emphatic ones. The movement

expandedquickly in the1980s,withacceptanceamong its followersofmainproposal

lines suchas curricular reform,university support, and financial assistance from large

organizations. For crits, juspositivism, instrumental rationality and liberalism are

inseparable. Therefore, one can only effectively commit to combating any of these

vectorsifheacceptstheneedtobreakwiththeothers.Itisacompletecritiqueofthe

ethical and dianoetic assumptions of themodernworld. This is the perspective that,

againsttheunambiguouswayofthinking(efforttonaturalizeandlegitimizethecurrent

order), will lead the movement to postulate the absolute historicity of any social

structure. Mass democracy and free market are not inevitable needs of reason, but

contingent choices, which can (and should) be revised. Liberal opponents of Critical

LegalStudiesseeinthemovementa"pathologicalphenomenon,"asortof"PeterPan

15MINDA. 1996. ‘Postmodern legalmovements: Law and Jurisprudence at the Century’s End.’ Ney York:NYUPress,p.64-65.16 AUSTIN, Arthur. 1998. ‘The Empire strikes back: outsiders and the struggle over legal education.’ NewYork;London:NewYorkUniversityPress.17“Young,bright,withegostomatch,theCritssawlawasthegatewaytopower,whichhadbeenexploitedby the Empire to engage in class oppression. The ostensible objectivity of the legal system protects amarket systemthatmarginalizes theunderclass,particularlyminoritiesandwomen.Laws,decisions,andregulations are indeterminate, full of choices and options that are denied the oppressed. The solution:toppletheEstablishment,breakupthemonopolyonobjectivity,andinstitutecommunitarianism”(AUSTIN,Arthur.1998.‘TheEmpirestrikesback:outsidersandthestruggleoverlegaleducation.’NewYork;London:NewYorkUniversityPress,p.02).


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Syndrome":drivenbyhiddenreligiousaspirations,thecritswouldrefuseto"mature"-

which, froma liberal standpoint,means givinguphopeof social justice andembrace

speculativecapitalism18.Itshouldnotbesurprisingthatthegroup’sprogramhasoften

beenlabeledasutopianism19.

4CriticalLegalStudies

The Critical Legal Studies Movement - "the gang of leftists from the 60s and young

peoplewithnostalgiaforeventsof15yearsago",asdescribedbyDuncanKennedy,one

of itsmain articulators - interprets the jurist not as keeper, but as architect of social

building20. In an authentically democratic community, legal knowledgemust assist the

population in establishing institutions that in fact represent the potential of citizens.

Thus, itneedstocommit to innovationbyexploiting theutopiancounterfactualitiesof

the system. InfluencedbyAmerican legal realismand theLawandSocietymovement,

thecrits attempt topresent themselvesasa thirdwaybetween liberal formalismand

Marxist-Leninistdeterminism,ScyllaandCharybdis.UnlikeOrthodoxMarxism, theydo

not comprehend Law as an epiphenomenon of the class struggle, devoid of its own

density.Between "base"and "superstructure", "modeofproduction"and "symbolsof

culture", "factual domain" and "normative domain", there are complex and

multidirectional relationships. In thisway, the critiqueof Lawnotonly tearsaway the

imaginaryflowersthatconcealthecurrents(touseMarx'sterminology),buteffectively

producestransformativepoliticalactions.Bygivingmeaningtosocialinteractions,world

18 LouisB. Schartzwill reject themovementwith the followingwords: “At the level of style, the authorsseemedaddictedtojargon,shallowpsychologizing,amoralisticpreachiness,andthepracticeofcitingeachotherincestuouslywhennotcitingselectedpaladinsofpoliticalscience,sociology,andpsychologysuchasHegel,Marx,Engels,Durkheim,Weber,Piaget,andMarcuse.Thehighmoraltonewasoftencompromised,however,byaweakness formisrepresenting law, fact,orhistorywhenevernecessary tosave thechosenpoliticalthesis”(SCHWARTZ,LouisB.1984.‘WithgunandcamerathroughdarkestCLS-land.’StandfordLawReview,PaloAlto,vol.36,n.01/02,p.414).19“IftheCriticalscholarsaremakingthepointthatutopianfantasyistheonlyalternativetoconventionallegal thought, then they are making the strongest possible pragmatic argument for maintaining ourconventions”(JOHNSON,PhilipE.1984.‘Doyousincerelywanttoberadical?’StandfordLawReview,PaloAlto,vol.36,n.01/02,p.247-291).FromJohnson'spointofview,crits’rejectiontomodernlegalorderis,atthesametime,nihilisticandmystical.According to thisauthor,beyondthe limits setby thedemo-liberalsystem, there is nothing. Thus, those who reject the institutionalized model necessarily move towardsanomie.20 EMERSON, Ken. 1990. ‘When legal titans clash.’ The New York Times, april, 02, 1990. Avaliable:<http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/22/magazine/when-legal-titans- clash.html?pagewanted=all>.Acessedonjuly,31,2016.


2239

views can sustain practices of domination. When one emancipates oneself from the

illusionarynecessityofexistingsocialarrangements,thepillarsoftheorderinforceare

shaken. Hegemonic legal consciousness is reifying: by presenting itself as a deductive

andautonomousscience,itservesasamaskforexploitationandinjustice.Exposingthe

complexityandthenormativeandadministrativecontradictionsofLaw,critsopenthe

waytoapost-liberalsociety21.

Lawschools,directedtodogmaticdisciplines,imposethemissionoftrainingfor

judicial activity (through the doctrinal analysis), not to produce knowledge about the

history,themeaningandtheimpactofthejuridicalinsociallife.Theyarefundamentally

technical-professional22.Boththeconservativeandthe liberalviewsreducetheLawto

aninstrumentalknowledge.Forconservatives,humansarecollaborativeandsupportive

creaturesbynature, soLawmust interfereonlywhenorganic linksbreak.For liberals,

socialcooperationrelationsare,infact,meansforthepursuitofindividualinterests,and

itisuptolawmakerstoharmonizethemultiplesubjectiveambitionsofthecommunity

members. Ineithercase, the jurist’s role is reduced tominimizing thedamagesof the

"socialfactory"conflictinordertokeepintactthecurrentdominantstructure.Farfrom

representinganeutralandobjectiveknowledge,LegalDogmaticsistodaycommittedto

liberalism(thetacit theoreticalbackgroundof forensicpractice).AsFrankMungerand

CarrollSeronnote:

ThePressureswithinProfessionallawschoolsengageintheperpetuationofconventional legal research are great. In fact, prestige and tenure areearnedonthebasisofhowwellonedoesthistypeofresearch.Notonlyisthereenormouspressuretobeconventional,itmustalsoberecognizedthatdoctrinalanalysisisintrinsicallyamethodofresearchthatlegitimatesliberallegalism.23

Legal dogmatics conceive the "normative authority of Law" as an undeniable

fact. Therefore, one does not inquire the ideological assumptions according towhich

liberallegalismstructureisseemedasinevitable.Takingasastartingpointa"mapping

21 KENNEDY, Duncan. 2014. ‘The globalisation of Critical Discourses of Law: thoughts on David Trubek’sContribution.’ In: BÚRCA, Gráinne de et al (Org.). Critical Legal Perspectives on global goernance: liberamicorumDavidM.Trubek.OxfordePortland:HartPublishing.22 TRUBEK,DavidM.1983. ‘A strategy for legal studies: gettingBok towork.’ Journal of Legal Education,Ithaca,vol.33,n.04,p.586-593.23MUNGER,Frank;SERON,Carroll.1984.‘CriticalLegalStudiesversusCriticalLegalTheory:acommentonmethod.’Law&Policy,Cambridge,vol.06,n.03,p.262.


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of legal doctrine"24, committed to exposing the current use of Law in oppressive and

alienatingrelationships,critsseektoblurthedistinctionbetweenprofessionalpractice

andtransformativepractice.Thefalseimpartialityoflegaldogmaticsseekstoconvince

that the distinction between politics and Law would be like the distance between

definingandoperatingasystem.Politicianscreatethebodyofnorms;juristsonlyapply

it.CriticalLegalStudiesseektodemonstratethattheboundariesbetweendefiningand

operatinganormativesystemare flexible inawaythat the legalscholar isnotonlya

server, but also amemberof the community that produces the legal order25. In fact,

crits’perspectiveisaparticipativeone:theymilitateforotherstoseeLawasthefruitof

collective creation and, therefore, struggle for the constitution of communities with

non-hierarchical interests. Crits redefine the concept of Law, distancing itself from

doctrinaltradition26.

The discrepancy between Legal Dogmatics and Critical Legal Studies is (as

numerousscholarshavepointedout)similartothatwhichseparatestheologiansfrom

religionsociologists.Critsproposeamethodofnon-doctrinalstudy,whichanalyzesthe

Law "from the outside”27. They hold the belief that the task of the juristmust be to

showthe legalorderrationality- theresultofcontingentcommitments(derivedfrom

passions,not from logic) assumedby legislators. For someopponents, theywouldbe

likepriestswithoutreligion,livingfroma"crisisoffaith”,oratheisticteachersinSunday

Schools.Thisisthepoint,itshouldbenoted,thatpolarizedthedebatefosteredbythe

release of Paul D. Carrington’s controversial paper "Of Law and the River"28: is it

possible to teach Law without believing in the legal order? Should students be

24MUNGER,Frank;SERON,Carroll.1984.‘CriticalLegalStudiesversusCriticalLegalTheory:acommentonmethod.’Law&Policy,Cambridge,vol.06,n.03,p.258.25“Ifthevictoriesofthecivilrightsmovementaretobeattributedtointrasystemicpractice,thencallingoutthetroops,grouptrespass,intentionallyprovocativemassdemonstrations,violationsofjudicialinjunctions,and public defiance of magistral authority are integral parts of the system” (SIMON, William H. 1984.‘Visionsofpracticeinlegalthought.’StandfordLawReview,PaloAlto,vol.36,nº.01/02,p.499).26 “In thedoctrinal tradition, the ‘science’of lawwasdefinedas thestudyof rulesandprinciples, largelythroughanalysisof cases.As JohnHenrySchlegelhaspointedout, thisdefinitionof theprovinceof legalstudygavethelawprofessoraclearandexclusivedomainwithintheuniversityforhiswork:Nootherfieldcouldclaimcompetencetostudy‘purelaw’.(…)Itisonlynaturalthatwhenthenondoctrinalrebelssoughttoescapefromthisapproach,theyhadtoseekanewdefinitionoftheirdomainofstudyanddevelopandalternative set of methods. An alliance with the social sciences offered one solution to this problem”(TRUBEK,DavidM.1984.‘Wheretheactionis:CriticalLegalStudiesandEmpiricism.’StandfordLawReview.PaloAlto,vol.36,n.01/02,p.584).27 TRUBEK, David M. 1984. ‘Where the action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism.’ Standford LawReview.PaloAlto,vol.36,n.01/02,p.587.28Relatedtothispaper,PeterW.MartinmadeawidedigestwrotebyauthorslikeRobertW.Gordon,PaulBrestandPhilipJohnson.SeeMARTIN,PeterW.1985.‘”Oflawandtheriver”,andofnihilismandacademicfreedom.’JournalofLegalEducation,Ithaca,vol.35,nº01,p.01-26.


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encouraged to nurture respect for the judicial system? For Carrington, the aim of

Critical Legal Studies is not to deny the existence of Law, but to show that the legal

order, far frombeinganaturalphenomenon, is a social construction that serves toa

wide rangeof purposes and can be contemplated in newandunfamiliarways29. In a

reviewofMarkKelman'sAGuidetoCriticalLegalStudies,EugeneGenovesewillblame

the crits for disseminating disbelief, fostering a total politicization of social life in an

efforttointerpretall intermediaryinstitutionsbetweentheindividualandthestateas

spheresmarkedbypowerrelations30.CriticalLegalStudiesadeptswouldrespondthat

thispoliticaldimensionofsociallifewasnottheirowncreation-sociallifeisessentially

politicalinitsimmanentnature31.

5Deconstructionandutopia

Many, supportive or contrary to the movement, will say that crits, though skilled in

framingobstacles,arehesitantinproposingalternatives.ForOwenM.Fiss,forexample,

the Critical Legal Studies movement would be nothing more than a "radicalism for

yuppies",which,rejectingthenotionofLawasacommonideal,thegrammarofpublic

morality,wouldbelinkedtonihilismandnegativism.Fissdoesnotsupportcrits’thesis

that theLawwouldnotbeable toprovide"correctanswers" (inhisview, theprimary

functionof legal knowledge is toguide theactivityof judges)32.Genovese, inhis turn,

arguesthattheconceptsof"participatorydemocracy"and"equity",repeatedlyinvoked

by crits as opposed to the liberal order, remain captiously uncertain33. The utopian

imagination of the movement would not be able to become executed in feasible

projectsandwouldbelostintheautophagicdeconstructionofreason.ThisisalsoStuart

Russel’s perception, according to which the Critical Legal Studies would be less a

29MARTIN,PeterW.1985.‘”Oflawandtheriver”,andofnihilismandacademicfreedom.’JournalofLegalEducation,Ithaca,vol.35,nº01,p.24.30GENOVESE,EugeneD.1991.‘CriticalLegalStudiesasradicalpoliticsandworldview.’YaleJournalofLawandHumanities,NewHaven,vol.03,n.01,p.147.31TUSHNET,Mark.1990.‘ACriticalLegalStudiesPerspective.’ClevelandStateLawReview,Cleveland,vol.38,n.01,p.137-151.32FISS,OwenM.1986.‘Thedeathofthelaw?’CornellLawReview,Ithaca,vol.72,n.01,p.01-16.33GENOVESE,EugeneD.1991.‘CriticalLegalStudiesasradicalpoliticsandworldview.’YaleJournalofLawandHumanities,NewHaven,vol.03,n.01,p.147.Theauthordoesnotrealizethattraditionallegalthinkingisalsosometimesvague,utopian,andnotconcrete.Evenapragmatictheory,suchastheEconomicAnalysisof Law, isbasedonconjectures: afterall, itassumes, butdoesnotprove, that individualsalways seek tomaximizetheirowninterests.


2242

jusphilosophical school than amethodological procedure for criticizing the analysis of

WesternPhilosophyofLaw:

TheCLS[CriticalLegalStudies]approachthusexposestheillegitimacyofourlegal system and allows us to consider a different legal philosophy. Thecritique is,however,muchmore fullydevelopedthanthe formulationofacoherentalternativetheorytoliberallegalism34.

This observation is by no means unfounded: a substantial part of the

intellectualsassociatedwiththemovement iscommittedtothepracticeoftrashing,a

form of analysis, which, inspired by Derrida's deconstructionism, seeks to expose the

mystification techniques underlying legal formalism. It is a tactic to destabilize

rationalizations, showing that legal education is not a scientific activity, rather, it is a

formofadvocacy:

Takespecificargumentsveryseriouslyintheirownterms;discovertheyareactuallyfoolish([tragi]-comic);andthenlookforsome(externalobserver’s)order (not the germ of truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherentchaoswe’veexposed35.

Anthony Chase's stancemay serve as an example. In the author's view, legal

language-likeordinarylanguage-isfraughtwithambiguity.Thescholarcommittedto

anti-formalist orientation needs to expose the indeterminacy, contradiction, and

marginalityof legaldiscourse, revealinghow theapparent technicalityof jurisdictional

activity conceals class interests: “(…) law is an open-textured and infinitely

“manipulable”system(atleastattheleveloflanguageandtheunderstoodmeaningsof

words)wherebyvirtuallyanyjudicialresultcanbe“logicallyjustified”onanygivensetof

facts”.36

The trashing is notmeant to be positive or edifying - it projects, on the legal

orderofliberalism,thelookthatastructuralistethnographerwoulddevotetothemyths

andritesofasilviculturalpopulation.Opposingtotheexegesiscommonlydefendedby

34 RUSSELL, J. Stuart. 1986. ‘The Critical Legal Studies challenge to contemporary mainstream legalphilosophy.’OttawaLawReview,Ottawa,vol.18,n.01,p.22.35KELMAN,MarkG.1984.‘Trashing.’StandfordLawReview,PaloAlto,vol.36,n.01/02,p.293.36CHASE,Anthony.1986. ‘Whatshoulda lawteacherbelieve?’NovaLawReview,Davie,vol.10,n.02,p.412.


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Legal Dogmatics (of a reconstructive and justifyingmatrix), trashing is presented as a

purely descriptive procedure, a catalog ofmicro-practices. Already in the firstCritical

Legal Studies conference in 1977, this "cynical" perspective of Law was perceived by

somecritsassuspicious.

Outlining a Critical Legal Studies typology, Kelman differentiates between

utopian and analytic approaches37. For him, analytical researches (among which the

trashing increases) forms an extensive part of crits’ theoretical production.Trashers -

the authorwill say - are skeptical ofmajor theories,which they see as naturalization

(universalization) attempts of contingent constructs. However, there are at least two

notable examples in the utopian specification movement: Peter Gabel and Unger,

philosophers that Kelman defines as anti-trashers38. Although conceiving himself as a

trasher, Kelman stresses the need for Critical Legal Studies to construct utopias,

otherwise theywillbeswallowedupby inertiaorcomplacency.Thedeconstructionof

liberalism can not be seen as an end in itself: it must be directed towards the

preparation of an alternative system. Trashing operates as a function of utopian

thinking.Here,Ungeroccupiesaprominentplace,onaccountofhisabilitytotransform

thenegativityofcriticismintothepositivityofvision-aconstructivetheory,apolitical

programthatassemblescrits’diffuseexpectations39.

6NeoliberalismandthecrisisofCriticalLegalStudies

Inthe1990s,aneoliberalwavetookoverAmerican lawschools.TheHarvardcasewill

beemblematic:undertheleadershipoftheFederalistSociety,theinstitutionwilldismiss

37KELMAN,MarkG.1984.‘Trashing.’StandfordLawReview,PaloAlto,vol.36,n.01/02,p.330.38GenovesearguesfortheexistenceofanirreconcilablecontradictionbetweenUngerandtheothercrits.The Brazilian legal philosopher would be the only one to recognize the need of a new metaphysics tosupporthisprogramofdismantling liberal ideology.TherewouldbeacleavagebetweentheCriticalLegalStudiesasaradicalpolicyandCriticalLegalStudiesasaworldview.Intheauthor'swords:“AlongshadowfallsbetweenUnger’sstimulatingexplorationsofthepropertyquestionandstatepowerandthepoliticallyincoherent stand of CLS as a movement” (GENOVESE, Eugene D. 1991. ‘Critical Legal Studies as radicalpoliticsandworldview.’YaleJournalofLawandHumanities,NewHaven,vol.03,n.01,p.155). 39GODOY,ArnaldoSampaiodeMoraes.2007. ‘OCriticalLegalStudiesMovementdeRobertoMangabeiraUnger:umclássicodafilosofiajurídicaepolítica.’RevistaJurídicadaPresidência,Brasília,vol.08,n.82,p.49-63.


2244

a substantial portion of teachers associated to Critical Legal Studies40 from its

administrativebody.ThefactisthatinseverallegaleducationcentersintheWest,the

sameprocesswilltakeplaceinanefforttorestraincriticaltheoriesofLaw.Assuggested

inthe introductiontothispaper,neoliberalismpresented itself,whenconfrontedwith

socialist decline, as the only feasible alternative, the anti-utopian utopia that would

reflectaneraofdisenchantment.Notafewlegalscholarsheldthisproposal,recovering

a formalist and dogmatic view of Law. Crits will be disarmed in the face of this new

juncture,whencountlessintellectualswillproclaimtheemergenceofapost-ideological

time.

In 2009, Peter Gabel will list some factors that, in his opinion, would have

contributedtothecollapseoftheCriticalLegalStudies.Bytheway,theauthorteaches:

Inmyview,CLS“stopped”,orperhaps“paused,”aboutfifteenyearsagobecause it lost trackof thisspiritualandmoral foundation.Onereason for this was the dissipation of the socialmovements of thespiritualdimensionvisibletoCLSteachersandwritersandaudibletoourlistenersandreaders.AsecondreasoninfluencingthedissipationofthemovementsthemselveswasthecollapseofsocialismandtheMarxism that had supported it, which for 150 years provided theprincipalmethaphorforthemorallytranscendentcommunalhorizonagainst which the shortcomings of the present society had beenmeasured.Athirdfactorintimatelyboundupwiththeothertwowasthe rise of the New Right as a conservativemoral response to thesocial challengeanddisruption that themovementsof the ‘60shadintroduced into public space, with the Reagan Revolutionchampioning that the movements of the ‘60s had introduced intopublicspace,withtheReaganRevolutionchampioningderegulation,anattackonentitlementprograms,andanoriginalist,new-federalistconstitutionalismthatsoughttodelegitimatethepublicsphereitselfasanarenaofcollectivemoralaction.41

Speaking of that, what would characterize Gabel’s "moral and spiritual

foundation" of Critical Legal Studies, which would have been degraded by the

neoliberalismconsolidation?Inaword:utopianism.ForGabel,theUtopianspirit isthe

40Aboutthesubject,see:HICKSJR,GeorgeW.2006.‘TheconservativeinfluenceoftheFederalistSocietyontheHarvardLawSchoolstudentbody.’HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy,Cambridge,vol.29,nº02,p.623-718.41GABEL,Peter.2009.‘CriticalLegalStudiesasaspiritualpractice.’PepperdineLawReview,Malibu,vol.36,n.95,p.528.


2245

movement restrained quality, which needs to be rediscovered in order to be reborn.

Gabelbelievesthatsociety’scriticismcannotbesustainedunlessitisbasedonutopian

representations.Accordingtotheauthor:“Asuccessfulcriticalapproachtothepresent-

or,inthecaseoflaw,asuccessfulcriticallegalstudies-requirestheilluminationofthe

injusticeofwhat is, that isanchored ina transcendent intuitionof the Justworld that

ought to be”42. Crits demonstrated fragility, against its opponents, precisely for

abandoningasubstantivevisionofthecommunity.Trashingisananalyticaltechniqueof

deconstruction, destituted of value content. Useful in explaining liberal legalism

weaknesses,ithaslittleuseinpromotingalternativeideologies.Itcandragitsfollowers

intotheSchoolofResentment43,condemningthemtoadeepspiritualemptiness.Thus,

despite of their efforts, the stance of some crits ends up mirroring the worst

characteristics of modern liberal culture: moral displacement, social isolation, lack of

sense...

This is the evaluation thatUnger44 develops in themost recent edition of the

classic The Critical Legal StudiesMovement. Appointed as thementor of the group -

KnowledgeandPolitics45,thefirstworkofthisBrazilianintellectualwillbethemainand

fundamental reference for the studies of crits -, Unger believes that the "utopian

approaches"weretheleastexploredbycriticaltheoriesofLaw,sothattheiconoclastic

face of Postmoderns was not sufficiently complemented by their planner dimension.

Therefore,theycouldnotmobilizesubsequentgenerations,forcingthemintoaction.

7Conclusion

Liberal left-wing, refusing to advocate in the name of absolute values or to unite

totalizing world views (which, in its judgment, would be fatally "totalitarian"), allows

42GABEL,Peter.2009.‘CriticalLegalStudiesasaspiritualpractice.’PepperdineLawReview,Malibu,vol.36,n.95,p.521.43ThetermwasusedbyHaroldBloomtodesignateauthorslimitedtoscholarrun-ins,withpessimisticviewsaboutrevolutionaryprojectsand/orradicaltransformationsofthepoliticalorder(BLOOM,Harold.2010.‘Ocânoneocidental’.TraduçãodeMarcosSantarrita.RiodeJaneiro:Objetiva).44UNGER,RobertoMangabeira.2015. ‘TheCriticalLegalStudiesMovement:another time,agreater risk.’London;NewYork:Verso.45UNGER,RobertoMangabeira.1978.‘Conhecimentoepolítica.’TraduçãodeEdylaMangabeiraUnber.RiodeJaneiro:Forense.


2246

itselftobeseducedbyprocedural (i.e.,empties)conceptionsofdemocracy.Theresult

is,asZizekponders,thelackof"passion":

[…]when leftistsdeplore the fact that todayonly theRighthaspassion, isabletoproposeanewmobilizingimaginary,andthattheLeftonlyengagesinadministration,what theydonot see is the structuralnecessityofwhattheyperceiveasameretacticalweaknessof theLeft.Nowonder that theEuropean project which is widely debated today fails to enflame thepassions: it is ultimately a project of administration, not of ideologicalcommitment.TheonlypassionisthatoftherightistreactionagainstEurope– all the leftist attempts to infuse the notion of a united Europe withpolitical passion (such the Habermas-Derrida initiative in the summer of2003)failtogainmomentum.46

Recovering the utopian dimension of Critical Legal Studieswould be precisely

inflating themwith passion. Against the principle of reality, themark of liberalism, it

wouldrevivetheprincipleofpleasure.Future inthepast:had itnotbeenhinderedby

the rise of neoliberalism, the development ofCritical Legal Studies could have led to

more dense programs of democratic planning and institutional rearrangement. This

path, which was projected beyond the trashing, was still discouraged in its early

moments, remainingasa latent trackthatmustbe followed. InGabel'sview, thisway

couldovercomethestandoffsfacedinthe1990sbycrits.

Unger and Gabel’s attempts to foster social order rearrangements were not

enoughtopreservetheutopianismofCriticalLegalStudies.Toprotectthemselvesfrom

therationalistandfalsifyingapproachestypicalofliberalism,critshaveembraced,more

often than not, irrationalist convictions, viewing with distrust any measure of social

planning.Gabelbelieves that suchanorientationeventuallyweakened thegroup; the

legalscholarlongedfortherestoringofCriticalLegalStudiesasa"spiritualpractice,"a

sourceoffaith:

"We [CLS] reallyweremotivatedby love,but itwas a love thatdarednotspeak its name. And in my opinion, that is because our movement wasinfectedwiththesamefearoftheotherthatunderlaytheinjusticesthatwecriticizedinthewidersociety"47.

46ZIZEK,Slavoj.2008.‘Indefenseoflostcauses’.NewYork;London:Verso,p.101.47GABEL,Peter.2009.‘CriticalLegalStudiesasaspiritualpractice.’PepperdineLawReview,Malibu,vol.36,n.95,p.516.


2247

Although indispensable, trashing (which shakes the belief in the fixity of

institutions) needs to be complemented by utopia, designed to reveal the meaning

(purpose)oftransformativeaction.InGabel'sunderstanding,themainthesisofCritical

Legal Studies, which postulates the imaginary character of categories taken as static,

mustbecloselyrelatedtotherecognitionthateachofusistheuniqueincarnationofa

commonhumanity.Itis,ofcourse,anethicalcall,whichreconnectscriticallegalthinking

totheprincipleofhope,tothebroadtraditionthatprojectsitslongingsforsocialchange

initsfuture.

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Tradução

Jordan Oliveira, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Rio deJaneiro,Brasil.E-mail:[email protected].

Abouttheauthor Philippe Oliveira de Almeida Currently holds a postdoctoral scholarship in the Center of Legal Sciences of theFederal University of Santa Catarina with a PNPD/CAPES scholarship. PhD in LawfromtheFederalUniversityofMinasGerais.MasterandBachelorofLawsfromthesame institution. Bachelor of Philosophy from the Jesuit Faculty of Philosophy andTheology.E-mail:philippeoalmeida@gmail.comTheauthorissolelyresponsibleforwritingthepaper.

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