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The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and HistoricalAnalysisAuthor(s): Jack S. LevyReviewed work(s):Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 219-238Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association

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Internationaltudies uarterly1984)

28, 219-238

The Offensive/Defensive

alance of

Military Technology: A Theoretical and

Historical Analysis

JACK S.

LEVY

The Universityf Texas at Austin

Thisstudy xamines arious ttempts o define he oncept f he ffensive/defen-

sive

balance of military

echnology,o trace the theoretical onsequences f an

offensiver defensivedvantage, nd to measure r classifyhebalance

for he ast

eight enturies.t is concluded hatthe ast two tasks

re

flawed

ecause of the

ambiguity f the concept f

the offensive/defensivealance. Thereare multiple

definitionsnd multiple ypotheses,

ut hese renot nterchangeable,articularly

between he pre-nuclear

nd nuclear

ras,

where

he concept

means omething

fundamentally

ifferent.

ypotheses ppropriate

for

one

definition

may

be

implausible r tautological

or nother. t is concludedthat thenotionof the

offensive/defensive

alance

is

too

vague

and

encompassing

o be useful

n

theoretical

r

historical

nalysis, utthat ome f he ndividual

ariables hat ave

been

incorporated

nderthisbroader

onceptmay

themselves

e

useful.

Much

more analysis s needed,however, o demonstrate hat theseconceptshave

important heoreticalonsequences.

The literature on international relations and military history

contains numerous

references o

the offensive r

defensivebalance

of

military

echnology

nd its

mpact

on

war. Historians often haracterize

a

particular

era

as

favoring

he offense

r the

defense,

and theorists

often

hypothesize

that

technology favoring

the offense

ncreases

the

likelihood of

war or contributes to

empire-building.

More

generally,

it

has

been

suggested

that the

history

of

warfare and

weaponry

can

be viewed

in

terms

of

the

interplaybetweentheoffense nd thedefense Snow, 1983:83). These analysesare not

generallymeaningful, owever,

because they

re

rarelyguided byany explicit

definition

of the

keyconcept

ofthe

offensive/defensive

alance.

The

concept

tself

as been

defined

in a

variety

f

ways

which

are

often ontradictory nd

which confuse he

meaning

of the

hypotheses

n

question. Attempts

o

classify

he balance

historically

re also inconsistent.

These inconsistencies

re

obscured by

the failure of both

the theoretical and historical

literature o

acknowledge

and

build

upon

earlier

scholarship

nd also

by

the

absence

of

any general

review

ofthe

iterature.

As a

result,

ittle

s

known about the

offensive/defen-

sive balance and

its

mpact

on war.

Author's

ote: his

research

was

supported y

a

Fellowship

or

ndependent tudy

nd Research rom

he

National

Endowment

or

heHumanities.

wish o thank

HarrisonWagner, liff

Morgan,RogerBeaumont,

and

theeditors

f

SQfor

their elpful

omments

n

earlier ersions f

this

rticle.

0020-8833/84/02

219-20

$03.00

?)

1984 nternational

tudiesAssociation

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220

The

Offensive/Defensive

alance

fMilitary

echnology

Much more work needs to be done ifthe concept of the

offensive/defensivealance is

to

have

any utility

for

explaining

international conflict.

This

work must

begin

with a

critical assessment of the existing

iterature n

order to synthesizeand evaluate the

numerous but disparate

and

generally superficial

treatmentsof the

concept.

Three

aspects of the problem which are integrally related but which are often treated

separately

in

the literature

must

be

incorporated: hypothesis

construction, oncept

definition,

nd historicalmeasurement.

The

Hypotheses

One of the first ttemptsto generalize about the consequences

of

either

n

offensive

r

defensive

alance

was that of Clausewitz

(1976: 293), who suggested

hat the

uperiority

of the

defense may

leave

both sides

with

no incentive to attack and thus 'tame the

elementary impetuosity

of War.'

More explicit propositions were made

by

the

proponents of the qualitative principle' in the 1920s and 1930s. Their argument that

offensive nd defensive

weapons

can

be distinguished nd that the former

and only

the

former) hould be abolished was based on the explicit assumption

that offensive ut not

defensive

weapons

are conductive to

war,

an

assumption shared by most of the

participants at the 1932 League of Nations Conference

for the Reduction and

Limitation of Armaments (Wheeler-Bennett, 1935; Boggs,

1941). Hart, for example,

wrote that 'any strengthening f the defensive at the expense

of the offensive

s a

discouragement

to

aggression' (1932: 72).

A

more systematic ttempt

to

delineate the consequences ofthe offensive/defensive

balance

of

military echnology

was

suggestedby Wright

n his classic A

Study f

War. He

argues

that

the

superiority

f

the

offense

enerally

results

n

the

following:

n increase n

theprobabilityofwar; political expansion, unification, nd empirebuilding;a decrease

in

the number of states

in

the

system; and

shorter

duration and

lower

costs

of wars.

Superiority

fthe

defense,

n the other

hand,

results

n a

strengthening

f ocal areas

and

thus facilitates

evolts,

he

disintegration

f

empires,

nd

the

decentralization of

states;

an increase in

the number

of

states;

decrease

in the decisiveness of wars and their

importance forworld politics; strategies

f

protracted talemates and

mutual

attrition,

which result

n

wars of

onger

duration and

greater

destructiveness

Wright,

1965:

129,

292-93,

673, 797,

1520). Similarly,

Andreski

1968:75-76) argues

that

other

hings eingequal,

the

predominance

f the attackover

defence ends

o

diminishhenumber f

ndependent overnments

ithin

given

rea and

towiden

the reas under heir

ontrol, nd/or

acilitateshe tighteningfcontrol verthe

areasalreadyundertheir omination;while the superiorityf defence ends o

produce pposite esults.

One

can

find

similar

generalizations

in

Quester's

Offense

ndDefense n the nternational

System1977). He writes that: Offensesproduce war and/orempire; defenses upport

independence and peace' (p. 208). When the offense olds the

advantage 'both sides are

primed

to

reap advantages by pushing into each other's

territory,and)

war

may

be

extremely ikely

whenever

political

crisis

erupts' (1977: 7).

Offensive

superiority

s

conducive to

empire

and

a 'final

political

decision' while defensive

uperiority

eads

to

political independence

and

prolonged

wars

(1977:8,31,208).

Quester recognizes

the

complications

introduced

by

nuclear

technology,

nd

argues

that

the

capability

for

a

counterforce offensive

encourages

war

while

a

countervalue

offensive

capability

promotes peace (1977:69).

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JACK S. LEVY

221

Gilpin also devotes attentionto the relationshipbetween the offense nd the defense.

He argues that: 'Military

innovations

that tend to favor the offense ver the defense

stimulate

territorial

xpansion

and

the

political

consolidation of nternational

systems

by empires

or

great powers' (1981:61). Gilpin

also

argues

that the

offensive/defensive

balance affects he costs ofchangingthe status uo, nd that thehigher he coststhe fewer

incentives

for

war

(1981:60-62).

This is similar to Bean's

(1973:207) argument

that

defensive superiority

ncreases

the

costs of

conquest

and

consequently

reduces

the

number of conquests, thoughthose thatdo occur take longer.The strong mplication

s

that defensive

uperiority

educes the

likelihood of war.

Jervis provides the most systematic

effort o

trace

the

theoretical impact of

the

offensive/defensive

alance on the ikelihood of war.

Using

the

conceptual

device of the

security dilemma, Jervis (1978:188-190) identifies

a

number of related linkages

between

offensive

uperiority

nd

war. Most

importantly, ffensive uperiority

ncreases

the benefits rom

triking

irst

nd increases the

costs of allowing the adversary to

strike

first. his increases in turn the incentives to strikefirst nd therefore he likelihood of

war. Defensive superiority educes both the benefits o the attacker who initiates war

and the costs to the defenderwho waits and absorbs the first low, leaves neither ide

with

an

incentive to strike first, nd thus reduces the likelihood of war (Quester,

1977:211).

The

likelihood

of war

is also increased by the erroneous perception of

offensivedvantage.

Second, offensive uperiority ontributes o arms races, which are themselves ssumed

to

ead to war. The expectation that war will be frequent nd shortplaces a premiumon

high evels of existing rmaments and on a quick response to an adversary's ncreases n

armaments. When the defense is superior, however, inferior orces are sufficient or

deterrence.

Defensively uperior weapons may further rovide

a

dampening effect n

the

arms

race

because

in

such

a

situation securitydoes not require the matching of the

adversaryarm for arm. Third, Jervis argues that offensive uperiority ncreases the

incentive to seek alliances in advance (Osgood, 1967:81), which contributes to

polarization, tensions, nd

an

increased probability of

war.'

It

can

also be argued that

all

of

the destabilizing dimensions of the spiral model, including the psychological

dynamics

that

reinforce hem Jervis, 1978:67-66), work to the fullest xtentwhen the

offense

s

superior.

There are numerous historicalexamples which are said to illustrate he destabilizing

consequences

of

offensive uperiority.2 erhaps the most widely cited is World War I.

The perceived advantages of the offense (Hart, 1932:72; Farrar, 1973; Quester,

1977:103; Jervis, 1978:190-191) created enormous pressuresforearly mobilizations,

which

were

widely

believed

to make war inevitable

(Fay, 1928: II,

ch.

X; Levy, 1983b).

Israel's preemptivestrikeagainst Egypt in 1967 may have been encouraged by the

perceived advantages

of the

offense.

The

stability

of the nuclear balance

is

widely

believed

to derive from the absence of incentives to strike

first,

ncentives

which are

reduced by the existence of invulnerable retaliatory capabilities and

countervalue

potential.

While

many

of

the

hypothesesregarding

the

consequences

of

the

offensive/defensive

balance

are

inherently lausible,

there are critical

analytical problems

which must be

resolved before hey

an

be accepted

as

meaningful r valid. These problems

have to do

with the theoretical

ogic

of the

hypotheses,

the

definition

of

the

offensive/defensive

balance,

and the

empirical validity

of

the

hypotheses.

The hypothesis hat the likelihood of war is increased when the military echnology

favors the offense s theoretically plausible only on the basis of the rather strong

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222 The

Offensive/Defensive

alance fMilitary

echnologv

assumption that decisionmakers correctly

perceive the offensive/defensivealance.

However, it s perceptionsofone's psychologicalenvironment hat determinedecisions,

not the objective' operational environment

Sprout and Sprout, 1965). The assumption

of accurate perceptions is thereforeopen to question. The inherent difficulty f

determining heoffensive/defensivealance and thealleged tendencyofthemilitary o

prepare for the

last war

rather than

the next one may result in some profound

misperceptions. t is widely agreed, for example,

that in 1914 military technology

favored the defense Hart, 1932: 75; Fuller,

1961:

ch. 8-9; Montgomery, 1983:472) but

that most decisionmakers perceived that

it favored the offense. It was not the

offensive/defensive alance that intensifiedworst-case analysis and increased the

incentives for preemption, but decisionmakers' perceptions of that balance. If the

offensive/defensivealance is not defined

n terms f the perceptionsof decisionmakers

(and in most conceptualizations it is not so defined), then the hypothesis s technically

misspecified.Hypothesis regarding the consequences

of war, on the other hand, are

properlydefined n termsof the objective'

balance.

The second problem relates to the definition f the offensive/defensivealance. What

does it

mean to say that the offense

s

superior

to thedefense, r viceversa? his will be

treated at length

in

the following section,

but one point should be made here. An

hypothesisregarding the offensive/defensivealance has no explanatory power unless

that

concept

can

be nominally and operationally

defined independently of its

hypothesized effects. or example, Wright

1965:796-97)

states that

... it

s

difficultojudgethe elative ower

f he ffensivend defensivexcept y

a

historical

udit to

determine hethern thewhole,

n a

given

tate

f

military

technology, ilitary

iolence

ad or had

not

proved

usefulnstrumentf

political

change.... Duringperiodswhendissatisfiedowershave,

on the

whole,gained

their

ims

by

resort o

rms,

t

may

be

assumed,

n the evel f

rand trategy,

hat

thepower f he ffensiveas beengreater. uring heperiodswhen hey avenot

been ble todo

so,

t

may

be

assumed

hat he

power

f he

grand trategic

efensive

has been greater.

It would be tautological to use this conception

of the

offensive/defensive

alance to

predict to the military uccess

of the

aggressor,

hough

t

would be

legitimate

o

predict

to the

frequency

of

war.

Similarly,

it is

meaningless

to

hypothesize

that offensive

superiority

ncreases the incentive

to

strike

first

f

the

offensive/defensive

alance

is

defined

by

the incentive

to

strike

first.

he

separation

of

hypothesis

onstruction

rom

concept

definition

nd

the absence

of

rigorous

definition

has increased

the

dangers

of

tautological propositions.

The failure o subject thesehypotheses o

systematic mpirical testing

s another

major

problem. Most attempts to identify the

offensive/defensivedvantage

in

various

historical ras are not guided by an explicit

definition f

the

concept,3

nd

rarely

s there

a

demonstration hat

a

given balance had an effect

n the

frequency

fwars

occurring

r

on

the decisions for

particular

war. The apparent

a

priori lausibility

of

a

particular

hypothesismay derive more from ts

tautological

construction

han

from ts

correspon-

dence with

reality.

n

the absence

of

a

more

thorough analytic

treatment nd

a

more

systematic mpirical analysis the validity

of ny

ofthese

hypotheses

annot be

accepted.

Definitions of the Offensive/Defensive

Balance

Use

of the

concept

of

offensive/defensivealance to

refer o a

variety

of different

hings

has led to a great deal of confusion.Theoretical propositionswhich are meaningfulor

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JACK

S.

LEVY

223

interesting or

one use of the termmay not be very meaningful

or nother,and for his

reason the various usages of the concept

must be identified nd examined.

Concern here

is with the offensive/defensiveistinction

with respect to military

technology nd perhaps tactics4 ut

not with respectto policy. The question

ofwhether

national policy is offensive aggressive) or defensive is not unimportant, but is

analyticallydistinct nd not directly

elevant to the hypotheses urveyed

arlier.

These

propositions all

suggest that there

is something about military technology

tself hat

affects he ikelihoodor nature of

war, and that what is mportant

s whether echnology

gives an advantage to the offense

r defense. This relativeadvantage

may be one of

several

variables

affecting the likelihood of war

by affecting policy, but itself s

analytically distinctfrompolicy.

The offensive/defensive

alance of military echnology

has been defined

primarily n

terms f the ease of territorial onquest,

the characteristics f armaments,

the resources

needed by the offense

n order to overcome the defense,

nd the ncentive

to strike irst.

TerritorialConquest

The most common use of the concept

of the offensive/defensivealance

is based on

territorial onquest

and the defeatof enemy forces.

Quester (1977:15) states that the

territorial fixation then logically

establishes our distinction between

offense and

defense.'

Jervis

1978: 187) argues that an offensive

dvantage means that it is easier to

destroy

the other's army and take its territory

han it is to defend one's

own.' 'The

essence of defense,'

on

the other

hand, 'is keeping theother side out of your

territory.

purely defensiveweapon is one that

can do this without

being able to penetrate the

enemy's and' (1978:203).

A

defensive

dvantage means that it is easier

to protect

nd

hold than

it

is

to move

forward, destroy,

and take'

(Jervis,

1978:187). Wright

(1

965:

793)

includes these notions

of

defeat

of

enemy

forces

nd territorialeizure n

his

rathercomplex definition:

On

a

tactical

eveltheoffensiver

defensive

uality

f unit

may

be estimated

y

considering

ts

utility

n

an

attack pon

n

enemy

nit

ike

tself

r

n an

attack

pon

some

other oncrete

nemy bjective,

uch

as

territory,ommerce,

r morale.5

A

primary purpose

of

protectingterritory,

f course,

is the

protection

of

people

and

property.What is perhaps implicit

in the above definitions

s

made

explicit by

Tarr

(1983):

'Defense

refers o

techniques

and

actions,

both

active and

passive,

to

repel

attack,

to

protect

people

and

property,

o

hold

territory,

nd to minimizedamage bythe

attacker.'

This

linkage

of territorial

onquest

to

population

defense

creates

a

problem,

however. While territorialdefense

was sufficient or the protection

of

people

and

propertyn the pre-nuclear era (or at least in the era before trategicbombardment),

that s no

longer

true.

As

Schelling 1966:

ch.

1)

and others

have

noted,

the

uniqueness

of

the

nuclear

age

lies

in

the fact that

the

defeat

of the

adversary's

military

forces and

territorial

enetration

are no

longer necessary

for the destruction of his

population

centers.

The

destruction

f

population

and

the coercive

power

that t makes

possible

are

no

longer

contingentupon militaryvictory.

For

this reason

the

protection

of

territory

(from nvasion)

is analyticallydistinct

rom he

protection

of

population.

The inclusion

ofboth

n a

definition

fthe

offensive/defensive

istinction

nly

creates confusion

unless

the

use of hat

concept

s

explicitly

estricted

o the

pre-nuclear ra),

for he

hypothesized

effects

f

an

'offensive'

dvantage

are

precisely

the

opposite

forthe two

concepts.

The

likelihood of

war

presumably

ncreases

as

territorial onquest

becomes

easier,

because

theprobabilityofvictory ncreases while itsexpected costs decrease. But theabilityto

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224

The

Offensive/Defensive

alance

of

Military

Technologv

destroy nemypopulation and industrial

enters ontributes

o

deterrence

n the

nuclear

age, and therefore t

decreases

the likelihoodof war (or

at least

nuclear

war).

It is because of

the distinction etween

deterrence nd

defense Snyder,

1961: 14-16)

that the

meaning of

the offensive/defensive

alance

may differ

n

the nuclear and

pre-nuclear eras. Whereas in the pre-nuclear era both deterrence and defense were

based on the

capacity to defeat the armed forces of the

enemy,

that is

only

truefor

defense

in

the nuclear

age,

for

deterrence

is

ultimately

based

on countervalue

punishment.The

use of

military

orce or he

purpose

of

defeating

nemy

armed forces

s

analytically distinct from the use

of

force for coercion

(Schelling,

1966:

ch.

2).

Consequently,

traditional

hypotheses

Wright

and

others) regarding

the

effects

f

the

offensive/defensive

alance of

military

technology

are not

necessarily applicable

for

nuclear powers at the

strategic

level. Neither the

concepts

nor

the

hypotheses

are

interchangeable.6

Now let us return o the

territorial

onception

of

the

offensive/defensive

alance. Our

earlier discussion

leads

to the

question

of

what,

besides

the

numbers

of

troops

or

weapons,contributes o the defeatof nemyforces nd conquestof erritory.ne answer

is

provided

at

the

tactical

level,

based

on

movement towards the

armed

forces,

possessions, r

territory

fthe

enemy.

A

condition

ofrelative

passivity

nd

immobility

n

waiting

for

the

enemy

to attack defines the

strategic

and tactical

defensive

Wright,

1965:807).

Clausewitz

(as quoted

in

Boggs,

1941

68)

states:

What is defense n

conception? he

warding off a blow. What

is then its

characteristic

ign? he state f

xpectancyor ofwaiting or his

low).

.

by this

sign

lone

can the

defensive

e distinguishedrom he

offensivenwar....

Clausewitz

also

writes:

In

tactics

every

combat, great

or

small,

is

defensive

f

we leave

the nitiative o theenemy, nd waitforhisappearance on ourfront' as quoted inBoggs,

1941:68).

Both offensive

nd defensivemodes ofwar

on thetactical evel are

necessary, f

ourse,

for

the achievement

of either

offensive r

defensiveobjectives. The

pursuit

of

any

offensive

oal requires

a

supportingdefense,and the

defense alone can never

bring

victory

but

only

stalemate. Mahan

refers o 'the

fundamental

principle

of naval

war,

that

defense

s

insured

only

by offence' Boggs, 1941:

70). Clausewitz writes that an

absolute defense s

an

'absurdity'

which

completelycontradicts he dea

of

war'

(Boggs,

1941: 7

1).

At

some

point

it

is

necessary

to

seize the

tactical offensive n order to

avoid

defeat.7 Thus

the

familiar

maxim: the

best defense

s

a

good offense. t

is

necessary,

however, to

distinguish between the

strategic and tactical

levels.

A

general

fighting

offensivelyn strategic ermsneeds onlyto invade and thenhold territory o enable him

to

adopt

the tactical

defensive

Strachan, 1983).

It

may be

strategically dvantageous

to

maneuver the

enemy nto a

position

n

which he is

forced to take the

tactical offensive

under

unfavorable conditions.As the

elder Moltke

stated

n

1865,

our

strategymust be

offensive,

ur tacticsdefensive'

Dupuy,

1980:

200).

In

addition,

military acticsmay be

offensive

n

one

theater

and

defensive n

another.

The

Schlieffen

Plan,

for

example,

required

a

holding

action

against

Russia in

the east in

order to move

against France

in

the west.

Nevertheless,

with

certain

types

of

weapons

systems

more movement

and

tactical

mobility

is

possible

than with

others. It is

difficult o measure

movement

historically

while

controllingfor

non-technological

factors,8 owever.

This

leads us to

the

question

of

whether the

offensive/defensive

alance

can

be defined

by

the

characteristics fweapons systems hemselves.

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JACK

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225

Tule

CharacteristicsfArmaments

While

nearly

all

weapons

can

be used

for

itherthe strategic r tactical

offensive r the

strategicor tactical defensive,

he question is whether there are some

weapons systems

which contribute disproportionatelymore to one than to the other.As stated by the

Naval Commission of

the League of Nations Conference

for the Reduction and

Limitation of Armaments

1932-1936)

(Boggs, 1941:82).

Supposing

ne state ither ) adopts policy

f rmed

ggression

r

b)

undertakes

offensiveperations gainst

nother tate,

what re the

weapons

which, yreason

oftheir pecific haracter,

nd

without rejudice o their

efensiveurposes,re

most ikely o enable that

policyor those perations o be brought

apidly o a

successfulonclusion?

Hart (1932:73) argues that certain weapons 'alone make it possible

under modern

conditions to

make a

decisive

offensive gainst a neighboring country.' What are the

characteristics f such weapons?

Both Fuller and Hart identifymobility, triking ower, and protection s the essential

characteristics f

an

offensiveweapon (Wright, 1965:808). Striking

power (the impact

of

the blow)

is

not alone sufficient.

A

mobile

gun contributes

more to the tactical

offensive

han an

immobile one,

and its penetratingpower is further nhanced if t is

protected. But protection is

even more important for the defense. Mobility and

protection re inverselyrelated,

for t is easier to protect mmobileweapons and wait

passivelyfor he enemy to attack.The offensive alue of the medieval

knightultimately

was

negated by

the

heavy

armor which

protected

him

but restricted

is

mobility.

Thus

Dupuy and Eliot (1937:103) give particular emphasis

to

the

offensive dvantages of

mobility and striking power,

noting that they too may be in conflict. Boggs

(1941:84-85) argues

that 'the

defense disposes especially

of

striking power

and

protection, oa lesserdegreeofmobility,while the offense ossessesmobility nd striking

power,

and

protection

to

a

lesser

degree.'

He concludes that mobility

s the central

characteristic of

an

offensive

weapon and argues that

'armament which greatly

facilitates he forward movement of the attacker might be said

tentatively o possess

relatively greater offensivepower than weapons which contribute

primarily to the

stability

of the defender'

(Boggs,

1941

85).

Our later

survey

of

attempts by military

historians

o

identify he offensive/defensive

alance

in various historical ras

will show

that tactical

mobility

s

the

primary

criterion used

to

identify

n

advantage

to the

offense.

In terms

of the characteristics

f armaments, then, tactical mobilityand

movement

toward

enemy

forces nd

territory

re the

primary

determinants f he

offense,

t least

n

land warfare; protectionand holding power contributemore to the defense. Other

weapon

characteristics

uch as

strikingpower, rapidity

of

fire,

and the range

of

a

weapons system

do

not

contribute

disproportionately

to either the offense

or the

defense.9Much more work needs to be done here, however, because

of the lack of

precision

of some of these concepts.

The classification f weapons systemsby

theircontribution

o

mobility

nd tactical

movementtoward

enemy

forces nd territory

s much

less

useful

or

naval

warfare.

This

was

evident

from he

proceedings

ofthe

League

ofNations Conference

or he Reduction

and Limitation of

Armaments,

where

theproblems

and

disagreements onfronting

he

Naval Commission were even more serious

than those

confronting

he Land Commis-

sion

and

where technical

arguments

were even

more

likely

to follow

the

flag (Boggs,

1941: 50-60). The United States, among others, eclared that thequalitativedistinction

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226

The

Offensive/Defensive

alance

fMilitary

echnologv

could not be applied to navies. Hart, a proponent of the qualitative principle n general,

restricted t to the materials of and warfare Boggs, 1941: 50, 81). The main problem

with attempts to apply these principles of mobility and tactical movement to naval

warfare

s the

absence of

anythingcomparable

to the territorial tandard

occurring

n

land warfare.The command of he seas, the ultimateobjective ofnaval warfare Mahan,

1957),

can be

served by passive

as well as

aggressive ction,

for he neutralization of

the

enemy fleet by

a

blockade may serve the same function as its defeat. Moreover,

aggressive ction toward the enemy fleetdoes not always result n battle, for n inferior

navy can often void battle without sacrificingmajor territorial bjectives, unlike and

warfare.

Application of the territorially-based

riterion

f tactical mobility

o aerial

weapons

systems raises the question of whether the offensive

r

defensive character

of

these

weapons

is

determined ndependently

of

land

warfare or

by

their contributionto the

defeatof nemyground forces nd territorial onquest. Many aerial weapons systems o

contribute

to

the tactical offensive n the ground because of their strikingpower,

mobility, nd surprise for example, in theNazi blitzkrieg). et air power also has an

independent capability to destroythe enemy's war making industrial capabilities, and

hence contributes o deterrence n the nuclear age. This deterrent ffect f air power

takesplace independently f ts effect n thetacticaloffensive n the ground but cannot

easily

be

incorporated into

a

conception of the offensive/defensivealance based on

tactical mobility.

Some armaments

that

traditionally

have been considered as

defensive nd

therefore

assumed to be 'stabilizing' (in the sense that theydiscourage aggression and reduce the

likelihood

of

war)

are

often considered to be destabilizing

in the

nuclear age.

Air

defenses, nti-ballisticmissiledefenses, nd even civil defenses re considered under the

prevailing strategicdoctrine

to be

destabilizing because by protectingpopulations they

threaten to undermine deterrence.This reinforces ur earlierpoint that thehypothe-

sized consequences of military echnology avoring he offense or the defense) may not

be interchangeablebetween thenuclear and pre-nuclear eras.

The

definition

of the

offensive/defensivealance,

in

terms of the

characteristics

f

armaments,raises other questions

as

well.

One is whether t is

possible

to define the

offensive/defensive

haracter of

a

weapon by

its intrinsic

performance

haracteristics

alone, apart from the prevailing doctrine that determines its

use. For

example,

essentially

he same tank that

was used in much ofWorld War

I

as

protected

fire

upport

was used

in

World War

II

as the

organizing

element of

mobile

offensive

arfare

Fuller,

1945:

ch.

VI).

The

offensive

haracter of

Napoleonic

warfare

was

due

far

more to the

innovative tactics of Napoleon than to weapons systems themselves (Howard,

1976:75-76; Preston and Wise, 1979:189-191).1o It must be concluded that the

offensive r defensive

haracter

of

weapons system

must

be

defined

by

both ts

ntrinsic

characteristics nd the

tactical doctrine

which determines

ts

use.

What

is

important,

of

course,

s

not the characteristics

f

an

individual

weapon,

but

rather the

aggregate impact

of

all

weapons systems

n a

given

arsenal. How

is

a

given

mixtureof

armaments,designed

fordifferent

urposes

and

deployed

for

use

in

different

theaters n

land, sea,

and

air,

to be

aggregated

so

that

their

net

effect

n

the

offense nd

defense

can be classified?

This overall

impact

cannot be determined

apart

from

the

composition

of

an

enemy's weapons systems

nd

the

terrain

where

the

combat takes

plaoe.

The offensive alue of the

tank,

for

xample,

was reduced

by

the

development

of

new anti-tank technologies

in

the early 1970s. To complicate

matters

further,

most

hypotheses relating to the offensive/defensive alance treat that concept as a

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JACK

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227

systemic-level ttribute (the hypotheses that offensive uperiority ontributes to an

increased frequency fwar and to empire-building, or xample). They suggest hat at a

given time the offensive/defensivealance can be characterized by a single value

throughout the system. The balance must be aggregated not only over all weapons,

functional oles, nd theaters or given state, but also over all states n the system. his

is difficult iven differentialevels of ndustrialization nd militarypower, uneven rates

of

technologicaldiffusion,

nd

doctrinal differencesmong

various

states

n

the

ystem.

Some of these problems are minimized, however, f the focus s restricted o the eading

powers

in

the system, because they are often comparable

in

terms of power

and

technology.

RelativeResources xpended

Gilpin distinguishes

between the

offense and the defense

in

terms of

an

economic

cost-benefit

ramework. To speak of

a

shift

n

favor of the offensemeans that fewer

resources han beforemust be expended on the offense n order to overcome the defense'

(Gilpin, 1981: 62-63). Gilpin goes on to say that the defense s said to be superior fthe

resourcesrequired to capture territory re greater than the value of the territorytself;

the offense ssuperior

f

he cost ofconquest is ess than the value ofthe territory'p. 63).

Clearly the second definition oes not followfrom he first.Whereas the first ses the

relativecosts of overcoming the defense t two different imes nd independentlyof the

resulting enefits, he second definition ntroduces n entirelynew concept-the actual

value

of

the

territorial onquest itself. he value ofterritorial onquest is undoubtedly an

importantvariable leading to war but it s analyticallydistinct rommilitary echnology

and

ought to be treated separately. Under Gilpin's second definition he hypothesis

becomes

equivalent to

the

statement that

a

positive (expected) utility

of

territorial

conquest

increases

the ikelihood

of war. This

may

be true

Bueno

de

Mesquita, 1981),

but it is not the hypothesisunder consideration here. Moreover, the definition fthe

offensive/defensivealance by theutility

f

territorial onquest reduces to

a

tautology

the

hypothesis

hat offensive

uperiority

ncreases the

utility

f territorial

onquest.

One of the two

conceptualizations

of

the

offensive/defensive

alance

suggested by

Jervis

s more

consistent

with

Gilpin's first

ormulation.

Jervis (1978:188) poses

the

question

as

follows: Does

the

state

have to

spend

more or less

than one dollar

on

defensive orces o offset

ach dollar

spent by

the

other ide

on forces hat

could be used to

attack?' That

is,

what is

the

relative

marginal utility

f

devotingmilitary pending

to the

offense

rather

than

to the

defense?

This

approach

is

potentially valuable,

but

it is

incomplete. It defines

what it

means

to

say

that the offense

or

the

defense)

has an

advantage,

but

fails

to

provide any

criteria

for

pecifying

what

constitutes he offense

r

the defense n the first lace. The marginalutilities annot be compared untilthe offense

and

defense

re

first

efined,

nd until this

s done the

concept

is not

particularly

useful.

The

definition

f

the

offensive/defensive

alance

by

the relativeresources hatmust

be

expended

on the offense

n

order to overcome the defense can be

conceptualized

in

another

way

and related

to

the

conception

based on territorial

onquest.

This refers o

attack/defense atios rather

than

military spending.

What ratio

of

troops

does

an

attacker need

in

order to overcome an

enemy defending

fixed

positions?

This notion

s

mentioned but not

developed by Quester (1977:212):

'The

significant mpact

of

defensive

or

offensive

technology

shows

up

in

the

minimum

ratios

of numerical

superiority equired

for uch an offensive.'

t

follows

he same

logic

as

Foch's comment

regardingthe power

of the offensive

rior

to World War I:

'Formerlymany guns

were

necessary to produce an effect. Today a few suffice' (Montross, 1960: 686). The

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228

The

Offensive/Defensive

alance

fMilitary echnology

conventional wisdom s that the offense eeds at least a three-to-one dvantage, but the

point here

is

that this ratio varies as a function f existingmilitary echnology nd the

tactical doctrineguiding ts use. The offensive/defensivealance is thendefined

s

being

inversely roportional to the minimumratio offorcesneeded by the attacker n order to

overcomean adversarydefending ixedpositions.'2The greatertheminimumratio,the

greater the advantage of the defense.

It is important o note here that the minimumratio fforcesneeded by the attacker

n

a

particular

era is

analytically

distinct from the relative

numbers

f forces

actually

possessed by

two adversaries

in

a

particular

situation. The

probability

of

victory

s

a

function of both. To say that the balance of military technology (as

a

function

of

attack/defense atios) favors he offense oes notmean the attacker slikely o win. That

would be true

only

f

the attacker

actually possessed

the

requisite

number of

troops

n

a

particular situation.

The problem arises as to what ratio should be used

as a

baseline,

the

zero-point

indicating the transitionfrom a defensive advantage to an offensive dvantage. The

most obvious ratio is one to one, but that is widely regarded as favoring he defense.'3

While it

would not be technically ncorrect to say that the balance always favors the

defense because the attacker always requires numerical superiority,this is neither

interestingnor useful. If the offensive/defensivealance is defined as attack/defense

ratios, t s preferable o conceive ofthis n relativerather han absolute terms. t is useful

tospeak

of hifts

n

the balance and tocompare the balance at differentimes,but

not

to

speak

about the

absolute state

of

the balance. Thus the hypothesis hould technically

state that the higher the minimum ratio of forcesneeded by the attacker

in

order to

overcome

an

adversary defendingfixed positions, the

lower

the

likelihood

of

war.'

This conception of the offensive/defensivealance is more useful than the others

surveyed bove,

at least for and warfare.

The attack/defense atio

could be measured

n

one of two ways. It could be determined empirically froman analysis of a varietyof

battles

n

a

given era,

with

theforce atios nd results etermined or ach

and

some

kind

of

average computed.

The

problem,

of

course,

would be the need to control for

asymmetries

n

geography, roop quality, and doctrine.Alternatively, he ratio could be

conceived

in

perceptual

terms nd measured

by

the

perceptions

of

military

nd

political

elites

of

what

ratio

of forces is

necessary

for either

attack

or defense.

While this

informationsnot readily available it mightbe inferred rom n examinationof the war

plans

of

the leading states. The methodological problems involved

in

either

of

these

approaches are quite serious, however.

The

ncentiveo Strike irst

One of thequestionsasked byJervis 1978:188) of the offensive/defensivealance is the

following:

With

a

given nventory

f

forces, t

s

better o attack

or

to

defend? s there n

incentive to strike

first r

to

absorb the other's blow?' This conceptualization

is more

flexible han earlier criteriabased on tactical mobility nd characteristics f armaments

because

it

can

incorporate

considerations

of

deterrence

and be

applied

to

the nuclear

age. It creates some problems, however, which Jervismay recognizebut does notfully

develop.

For

one

thing,

the

hypothesis hat

a

military echnologyfavoring

the

offense

increases the incentive to strike first s reduced to a tautology and hence carries no

explanatory power. In focusing ttentionon the inkage between the ncentive to strike

first nd war,

4

it gnores the more basic question ofwhat conditionscreate an incentive

to

strikefirst. hese antecedent conditions

possess

the

greatest xplanatory power

and

operate throughtheintervening ariable of the incentiveto strikefirst. his leads to a

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JACK

S.

LEVY 229

related problem: there are numerous factorsbesides technology nd doctrine

affecting

the incentive

to

strike

first, ncluding geographic constraints and diplomatic and

domesticpolitical considerations, actorswhichalso have an independent effect n

war.

If the

offensive/defensivealance

is

defined

s

the ncentiveto strike irst, hen tbecomes

confounded with these other variables and it becomes impossible to distinguish heir

independent effects. he incentiveto strike irsts best conceptualized as an intervening

variable

leading to

war and as the

product

of several

distinctvariables, one ofwhichis

military echnology

nd doctrine. One

key

ssue is to

elaborate the aspects ofmilitary

technology

r doctrinewhich affect he ncentives

o

strike

irst, ut

this

annot be fully

analyzed here.

It

is

mportant

o

distinguish

he ncentiveto strike irst rom

therconcepts that have

also been used to define

the

offensive/defensivealance. The incentive to strike

first

should

not be confused

with

aggressive policy, which is influencedby a wide range of

variables. A state

may

have

revisionist mbitions but be constrained by a

military

technologyfavoring he

tactical

defense, s well as by other variables. Or, a state with

purelydefensiveambitionsmay rationally initiatewar ifit perceives that through a

preemptive trike t can minimize ts osses against an assumed aggressor.The distinction

between the incentive to strike first nd seizing territory s particularly ikely

to be

confused.'5 These are clearly distinct for naval and air warfare (particularlyin

the

nuclear

age) but

the difference

s

more

profound.One may simultaneouslyhave a policy

of

notstriking irst nd strategy f ctive defense nd territorial enetration nthe

event

that

war does

break out.

This was

Bismarck's policy

in

the 1870s and 1880s

(Langer,

1964)

and

perhaps

Israel's

in

1973. Germany'sSchlieffen

lan

called forpassivedefense

(holding ground)

in

the East and

rapid

territorial

penetration

in northern France

regardlessof

who

initiated

the

war.

The failure o recognize thesedistinctions nly creates confusion nd may result

n

the

incorrectuse of hypothesesdesigned for other purposes. Hypotheses appropriate for a

territorially-based

efinition

f the

offensive/defensive

alance

of

militarytechnology

may not be

valid for

definition ased on the ncentive to strike irst.While the

ease of

territorial

eizure

may

shortenwars and lower their osts

(Wright, 1965:673),

this

may

not

necessarily

e truefor he ncentive

to strike

irst. or is

an

incentiveto strike irst

n

the

nuclear

age likely

to have the same

consequences

as an

attack/defense

atio which

favors

the offense. urther, t is not clear that the incentive to strike

first

tself

has the

same causes or

consequences

in

the

pre-nuclear period

as it does

in

the

nuclear

age,

though

this

might

be an

interesting

rea forfutureresearch.

The same

types

f

problems arise with respectto the various otherconceptualizations

of the

offensive/defensive

alance

examined

above.

The concept

has been defined

n

terms fthe defeatof nemyarmedforces, erritorialonquest, protection fpopulation,

tactical

mobility,

the characteristics f

armaments, attack/defense atios,

the relative

resources

xpended

on the offense nd the

defense,

nd the ncentive o strike irst.

hese

separate

definitions

are

often not

interchangeable,

and

hypotheses

based on one

definition re often either

implausible

or

tautological

for another

definition.

This

is

particularly

rue for

pplications

of

theoffensive/defensive

alance to

the

nuclear

age.

Because

the

most advanced

weapons

of this

ra

are

used

primarily

or oercive

purposes

and

the

weapons

of earlier eras were used

primarily

o

engage enemy

armed

forces,

he

concept

of

the

offensive/defensive

alance

of

military technology may

mean

entirely

different

hings

n

the

two different ituations.

Certainly

one reason for the confusion

and

ambiguity among

these

hypotheses

s

the

fact that

they

are based on common

concepts such as 'offense', aggressor', and 'initiator'which have ordinary anguage

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230

The

Ofensive/Defensive

alance

fMilitaryechnology

meanings apart frommore precise

technical meanings.This is

all the

more

reason

why

any attempt to use such

a

concept must firstdefine

it

explicitly

and be very clear

regarding preciselywhich hypotheses

re relevant.

Classification of the Offensive/Defensive

Balance in History

The third ection of this rticle

surveys varietyof efforts

o classify he offensive/defen-

sive balance of

military

technology

n

the Western

internationalsystem

over

the

last

eightcenturies.

6

This

survey

will

be usefulbecause ofthe absence of ny previous

review

of this

body

of literature

and

because

of the

general

failure

of earlier studies to

acknowledge

or build

upon

each

other.

More

importantly,

t

may

reveal whether r not

theconcept has acquired

an informal

definition

n

its

empirical

application,

in

spite

of

the

conceptual ambiguity

demonstrated

above. While the

concept

of the

offensive/de-

fensivebalance ofmilitary echnologyhas taken

on a

variety

of

meanings,

the

question

arises as to how that

concept

has been used

in

attempts o classify he offensive/defensive

balance in past historical eras. If different uthorities have generally used the

offensive/defensive

alance to

mean

the same

thing even

in

the absence of any formal

nominalor operational definition), nd iftheyhave generally

greed on the state of the

balance

in

various historicaleras, then it can be concluded

that the ambiguity of the

concept

has not

precluded

its effective se

in

empirical analysis. Consistentusage

and

agreement by

various

authorities

on

the

state of

the balance

in

different istoricaleras

would permit intercoder

agreement' to be used as the basis for accurate historical

measurement provided thesemeasurements re independent).'7

Lack of agreementon

classification, owever,

would suggest hat the collectiveudgmentofauthorities annot

be used as

the

basis formeasurement. t would also

support

the earlier conclusion

that

the

offensive/defensive

oncept needs to be definedmuch more explicitly

nd

rigorously

before t can be used in historicalanalysis.

There is ittledissentfrom

he view that the ate Middle Ages

was characterized by the

ascendancy

ofthe defense ver the offense

n

war. The Crusades

had

stimulated

revival

in military rchitecture, nd advances

in

the art of fortification

utpaced increases in

destructive

power

and

improvements

n

siege

tactics

(Fuller,

1945:68; Montross,

1960: 161-163; Ropp, 1962:20;

Nef,

1963:185; Wright,

1965:795, 1525; Osgood,

1967: 43; Brodie

and

Brodie, 1973:31; Bean,

1973:

207;

Preston

and

Wise,

1979:

68-69,

78,

81; Gilpin, 1981:62;

Montgomery, 1983:166-171).

As

a

result, only

a small

percentage

of

sieges

were

successful

Montgomery,

1983:

169).

The

defensive

power

of

the new concentric stone castles was reinforced

by logistical

considerations. Armies

could not be maintained

in

the field for

ong periods

and

invading

armies could not

easily bypassthe feudal castles (Bean, 1973:218). In addition,thereplacementofchain

mail by plate armor to protect the knight greatly reduced

his mobility (Montross,

1960:163;

Preston and

Wise, 1979:85)

and

the

pike-phalanx

system

was

becoming

increasingly nvulnerable tocavalry charge (Bean, 1973: 206).

It has also be argued that

the

success

of the

English

with the longbow increased

the tactical

superiority

f the

defense

Dupuy, 1980:88), presumably

because its

range

made it more difficult

or he

offense o close. For these

reasons,

ll of

the above authorities ccept

Oman's

(1

953:

356)

argumentthat by 1300 the defensiveobtained

an

almost complete

masteryover the

offensive.

8

lJy he mid-15thcenturyfire

ower had moved from n auxiliaryrole to one where t

was

central and decisive (Howard, 1976:33). Developments

in heavy artillery ed to a

sharp resurgence of offensive superiority. This was symbolized by the seige of

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JACKS. LEVY

231

Constantinople

n

1453,

where the

greatest

of all medieval

fortifications

as reduced

by

the Turks

n

less than two months.Dupuy (1980: 107) argues

that

by

the end of the

15th

century artillery

had made medieval fortifications bsolete.

In

addition, greater

mobility, nd hence greater offensive apability,

of this

artillery

s evidenced

by

the use

of horse-drawn rtillery nd chains of wagon forts' s mobile fortificationsmploying

bombards (Montross, 1960:189; Brodie, 1973:51; Quester, 1977:47-48; Dupuy,

1980: 100).

Small firearms

lso

began

to

have

a

significant

ffect n battle at the end of

the 15thcentury, ominating

over the

pike

and

leaving

the armored

knight

vulnerable

and lessening

his local defensive effectiveness

Nef, 1963:29; Quester, 1977:48-49).

Thus a drastic change

in

the offensive/

efensivebalance is said to occur close to

1450

(Fuller, 1945:81-87; Montross, 1960:193-95; Nef, 1963:185-186; Wright, 1965:294;

Bean, 1973:207; Quester, 1977:47-49;

Preston and

Wise, 1979:91-92; Dupuy,

1980:99, 106-107; McNeill, 1982:83; Montgomery, 1983:224).

There

is much debate

regarding

how

long

this

period

of offensive

uperiority

asted.

Wright (1965:294-295, 795) argues

that it lasted for two centuries until

1648,

a

view

supported byNef (1963:185) and Quester (1977:49). Wright 1965:294-95) pointsto

the ncrease

in

mobility

f

nfantry enerated by

the

gradual

abandonment of medieval

armor;

the

disappearance

of

pikemen,halberdiers,

nd

heavy cavalry;

and

the

adoption

throughoutEurope

of

Turkish

Janissary tactics,

with armies

equipped

with cutlass and

longbow

and

supported by lightcavalry

and

artillery.Mobility

was

furtherncreased

n

the first

alf

of he 17th entury

fterGustavus

Adolphus reduced theweightofweapons,

introduced the light field gun

and

the concept of mobile massed artilleryfire, and

adopted

a

more

flexible

tactical

organization (Dupuy, 1980:137-38; McNeill,

1982:123).

These arguments re rejected by other authorities

who

instead argue that the science

of

fortificationoon overcame the new

developments

n

artillery, eading

to a shift

ack

to the defenseby 1525 or so (Hale, 1957:274; Montross, 1960:211, 250-54; Bean,

1973:208; Howard, 1976:35;

Prestonand

Wise, 1979:106; McNeill, 1982:90; Montgo-

mery, 1983:224). Dupuy

and

Dupuy (1977:455) argues:

'A

16th-century ortress,

f

provided with adequate stocks of food

and

ammunition, was

as

impregnable as the

13th-century astle

had been

in

its

day.'

Thus there s no consensus as

to whether the

balance of

military echnology hroughout

most of the 16th

century

nd the

first

alf

of

the 17th

century

favored the offense r the defense.

Authorities enerally gree

that for

nearly century

fter

1650

the balance of

military

technology ay

with the defense.'9

This was

largely

due to the

development

of a new

science

offortifications

y

Vauban and other

military ngineers

n

the ate

17th

century

(Guerlac, 1969).

These elaborate fortifications

ecame

increasingly

nvulnerable to

artillery, nd frontal ssault became nearly mpossible. This was the age ofgeometric

warfare,

f

position

and maneuver

ratherthan

pitched

battle.

Military operations

were

centered

around fixed fortifications

nd were restricted

y poor logistical systems

nd

short

upply lines,

and

guns

were deficient

n

range, accuracy,

and

penetratingpower

(Preston

and

Wise, 1979:142-44; Dupuy, 1980:144).

Vauban also

developed

the

science

of

siegecraft

with his

system

of

approaches by parallels,

but

such

systems

generally

remained one

step

behind

systems

f fortifications.

The balance did not turn

against

the defense until 1789

(Nef, 1963:185; Wright,

1965:295; Osgood, 1967:46; Howard, 1976:55; Quester, 1977:57;

Preston and

Wise,

1979:142-143).

This

view is

inconsistent, owever,

with the

general characterization

of

the warfare

f Frederick the Great as offensive

n

nature,

based on

Frederick's

emphasis

on the decisiveness fthebattle rather han staticmaneuver,hiswillingness o takerisks,

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232

The

Offensive/Defensive

alance

of

Military Technology

his use of the oblique order as a tactical device, and his emphasis on mobility Dupuy,

1980:148-154). Preston

and

Wise (1979:147-149)

recognize this and say simply that

Frederickdiffered rom he norm of 18th-century arfare.

The hesitancy o characterize

the military

balance

during

this

period

as offensive robablyderivesfrom he fact that

Frederick's nnovations were primarily actical and strategic atherthan technological,

and because most historiansdescribingthemilitarybalance focus on the latter rather

than the

former.

Still,

it

cannot be denied that Frederick

demonstrated

what was

possible given the technology of the time. The recognition

by many that Frederick

constitutes n exception to

the static

character

of

18th-century

arfare

uggests hat

the

characterization

of

the

entire

18th-centurymilitary

balance

as

defensive

s

open

to

question.

The

Napoleonic period presented

a

similar set of problems; Napoleonic warfarewas

characterized by mobility

nd the

tactical offensive

ut thishad little o do withmilitary

technology

tself

Howard, 1976: 76). Preston

and Wise (1979: 189) argue that n some

respects Napoleon was an 'arch-reactionary toward

new weapons and technological

progressn the material ofwar' and that his successescame through 'more efficient se

of well-known

weapons.'

The

offensive haracter

ofNapoleonic warfare derived from

the generalship of Napoleon

and

his changes

in military organization, strategy, nd

tactics, ncluding the democratization of war and mass mobilization. The divisional

formation,

he

employment

of

ight nfantry, he use of the column of attack instead of

the ine,

a

more flexibleuse

of

artillery n the battlefield

o gain a superiority f fire t a

given point, and the logistical advantages of living

offthe country were particularly

important

n

contributing o mobility (Fuller, 1961; ch. 3; Hart, 1964: ch. 8; Ropp,

1962:98-102; Howard, 1976; Quester, 1977:ch.

7; Preston and Wise, 1979:ch. 12;

Strachan, 1983:

ch.

4).

These

authorities often

refer to the offensive haracter of

Napoleonic

warfarebut do not trace it to

the balance

of

military echnology tself.

Fewjudgments aremade regardingtheoffensive/defensivealance for he first alfof

the 19th

century,perhaps

because of the relative absence of

European

war

during

that

period. By mid-century,

r

by

1870

at

the

atest,

the balance

had

shifted

n

favorof the

defense,

which continued

through

World War I. Reference

s

made to the

holding power

of

entrenchments,

arbed

wire,

the machine

gun,

thebreech-loading rifle, hedifficulty

of frontal assualt

and

closing

with the

enemy,

and

to

the

generally

static nature of

warfare

as demonstrated

in

the American Civil

War,

the Russo-Turkish

and

Russo-Japanese Wars,

and others. As summarized by Boggs (1941: 76-77), beginning

with

the American Civil War and

extendingthrough World

War

I

there

was

a

trend

'toward enormous increase

in

the

masses of men under arms,

and

in

the range,

casualty-producing capacity,

and

rapidity

of fire

of infantryweapons,

without

any

counteractinggrowth n the means ofadvancing of thisfire.'This conclusion, ncluding

the view

that the

objective'

balance favored the

defense

n

1914,

is

supported by

Hart

(1932:72, 75),

Millis

(1956:167),

Montross

(1960:633,

649),

Fuller

(1961:chs. 8-9),

Ropp (1962:162), Wright (1965:1525),

Brodie and Brodie (1973:131-56),

Howard

(1976:103, 105),

Preston and Wise

(1979:266), Dupuy (1980:195, 199), Gilpin

(1981:62),

and

Montgomery (1983:441, 458, 472).

Some of these authorities

oncede,

however,

that

the

railroad

and the

development

of

motorized transport

and then the tank all

contributed

to

mobility

and

helped

the

offense,

s demonstrated

by

the

wars ofBismarck

Wright,1949:186,

Brodie and

Brodie,

1973:

148-50). Quester (1977:ch. 8) suggests

hat for

this

reason there

was for time a

net advantage

to

the offense.

Montross

(1960:649) rejects

thisview

and

argues

that the

offensive revailedin 1870because 'intelligent efensive acticswere seldomemployed.'

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JACK S. LEVY

233

A more seriousproblem s

raised by the gap

between the objective' balance ofmilitary

technology asjudged retrospectively y historians) nd

the balance as perceived by the

military nd political leaders of the time. This gap

widened shortly fter he American

Civil

War, the defensive lessons of which were

resisted by professional soldiers

(Montross, 1960:633; Fuller, 1961 ch. VI; McNeill, 1982:242). By the turn of the

century

Foch

and the French school (Possony

and Mantoux, 1969) epitomized the

viewpoint prevailing at the

time that military echnologyfavored the

offense,

nd

this

belief

structured the

war

plans

and

influenced the behavior of

the great powers

(Montross, 1960:685-88; Hart, 1973:72;

Quester, 1977:80; Jervis,

1978:190-91;

Dupuy, 1980:216;

Montgomery, 1983:441; Strachan, 1983:105-6).

The

French

Army

Field

Regulations of 1913 stated that 'the French

Army.. .admits

no law but

the

offensive' Tuchman,

1962:151).

Most

authorities

urrently rgue

thatthe

objective'

balance favored the defense.Vyvyan (1968:165)

argues:

'Never has the

dogma

of the

offensive een

more

prevalent; never,

because of

the

lead of

firepower

over

tactical

mobility,has that dogma

been less applicable.' Because of thisgap between

perceptions

and reality nd because of theambiguityregardingtheroleofperceptions ndefinitions

of

theoffensive/defensive

alance, the period prior toWorld War I becomes

difficult o

classify

n

termsof

the

offensive/defensivealance.

The interwarperiod

presents similargap between the analysis of

militaryhistorians

and

the perceptions

of

statesmen. Most military

historians rgue that by 1930 or so the

military echnology avored

the offense Hart, 1932: 76; Millis, 1956:

252-53;

Montross,

1960:

774; Fuller, 1961: ch. 12; Wright, 1965:

300-301; Gilpin, 1981: 62)

20

The

speed,

mobility, nd striking owerof

the armored divisionwithtacticalairsupporthad a

great

advantage over fielddefenses nd minorfortifications.

he new warfare

was

character-

ized

by fluidity nd speed,

deep penetrations, nd broad encirclements. he

stalemate

of

World

War

I

had been

transformed

nto

the blitzkrieg

f

World War II. Most observers t

the time, however, perceived that the military technology favored the defense

(Montross, 1960:766-67;

Wright, 1965:795; Gibson, 1969; Alexandroff

and Rose-

crance, 1977; Quester, 1977:

ch. l11;Jervis,978:192-93). This view was

disputed by the

leading proponents of armored warfare (Fuller,

de Gaulle, Guderian, and Tukha-

chevski)

but

theirview

was of

the

minority.21

Thus the balance

of

military echnology

n

the interwar

period

becomes difficult o

classify.

It is seen

that militaryhistorians nd others have evaluated

the

offensive/defensive

balance

of

the

last eight centuries

of

the Western nternational

system

n

terms

of

the

contribution f

weapons systems o tactical mobility

nd

territorial

enetration.

This

is

in

spite of their ack of formal

definition f the concept and the variety

of

theoretical

perspectives

urveyed earlier. This implicit agreement

on

the

appropriate

criterion

no

longer exists, given the decline in the dominance of land warfare and the rise of

deterrence based on

nuclear

punishment.

Because

of

the

lack of consensus

on the

meaning

of

theoffensive/defensivealance

in

the nuclear

age,

it would

not be usefulto

survey attempts to classify he balance during this

period.

Let

us now summarize the

extent

of

intercoder

agreement' regarding

the

offensive/defensive

alance

of

military

technology

for the

previous

eight

centuries.

There

is

unanimous agreement among the references

ited that the

period

from

1200

to

1450

was

characterized

by

defensive

uperiority

nd that the

period

from

1450

to

1525

was

characterized

by offensiveuperiority.

he

authorities

re

split

on the

1525

to 1650

period. There is complete

agreement that

the defensewas

superior

from

1650

to 1740.

Some

argue

that

this

defensive superiority ontinues until 1789, though

Frederick's

emphasison thetacticaloffensiveeads sometoassert heoppositeand others o make no

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234

The

Offensive/Defensive

alance f

Military

echnology

specific

valuation. The 1789

to

1815

period

is

generally regarded

to favor theoffense

but because

of nnovations n tacticsratherthan armaments.

Little

attention s

given

to

the

1815-1850 period.

The next

hundred

years pose

a

problem

because

of the

gap

between

the

objective

and

perceived

balance and the uncertain

conceptual statusof the

latter.These authorities enerally gree thatfrom1850 to 1925or so thebalance favored

the defensebut

that

nearly

all

statesmen

perceived

that

t favored the offense

rom1870

to 1914.

Similarly,

rom

1930

to 1945 the balance favoredthe offense ut that the

actors

themselves

perceived

that it favored thedefense.

A rough calculation shows the followingdegree

of consensus

among

our

authorities.

Of the 450 years

from

1495-1945,22 only

two

periods totaling

55

years

claim a definite

consensus of offensive uperiority.

Two

periods totaling

at most

130

years

claim

a

consensus

ofdefensive

uperiority.

our

periods constituting

minimum

of

265

years

are

uncertain, either because ofdivergingviews,

or because

of

the diametric

opposition

of

the evaluations

of

actors

and

analysts

and

the

ambiguous

conceptual

status

of

perceptions

n

definitions

f

the

balance.23 The

inescapable

conclusion

sthatthere xists

considerable divergenceofopinion among leading authoritiesregardingtheoffensive/

defensivebalance duringthe

ast five enturiesof the modern

era,

and

that

a method

of

'intercoder agreement' cannot be used to provide a basis forclassification

during this

period.

This

analysis suggests that the concept

of

the offensive/defensive

alance of

military echnologyneeds more theoretical ttention nd operational

definition efore t

can be

applied to systematic mpirical analysis.

Conclusions

The

concept

of

the offensive/defensivealance of military echnology

has been defined

in the literature n terms of the defeat of enemy armed forces, he ease of territorial

conquest, protection

of

population, tactical mobility, he characteristics f armaments,

the

relative

resources

xpended

on the

offense

nd

the defense,

nd

the ncentive

o

strike

first. have suggested an alternative definition based on attack/defense atios: the

offensive/defensive

alance is

inversely roportional to the ratio

of troops needed by

an

attacker to overcome an enemy defendingfixed positions.

While

many

of

these

individual

concepts may

be

useful,

they mean fundamentally

differenthings nd are not nterchangeable.This is particularly ruefor he nuclear era,

where

the end

of

the predominance of and warfare and the emergence

of deterrence

based

on

nuclear

punishmenthas clouded the offensive/defensive

istinction. ince the

dominant weapons inthe pre-nuclear ra were used primarily or he defeatof dversary

armed forces,whereas the most advanced weapons in the nuclear era are used by the

leading powers primarily or oercion and bargaining, definitionsfthe offensive/defen-

sive

balance that mightbe useful n the nuclear age may not be useful

n the pre-nuclear

era,

and

vice-versa.he concept ofthe ncentive o strike irst, hich

s often

sed

to

define

an

offensive

dvantage today, s not the ame as tactical mobility,which s widely

used to

define

an

offensive dvantage in earlier times.

The inclusion of fundamentally different oncepts under

the umbrella of the

offensive/defensivealance has created considerable confusion n

the iterature.Because

these

different oncepts are not interchangeable, theoreticalpropositions egarding the

causes

or

consequences of an offensive r defensive advantage

may be useful for one

definition

ut implausible for

nother.,

Weapons characteristics hat are stabilizing i.e.,

reduce the likelihood of war) in one era may be destabilizing n another. Hypotheses

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JACK S. LEVY 235

designedtoexplain

the

consequences of

a

military echnology avoring

actical

mobility

are not necessarily pplicable to

a

militarytechnology which creates

an

incentive to

strikefirst.

The ambiguityof the concept ofthe offensive/defensivealance is not ust a

function

ofthe nuclear/pre-nuclear istinction.Even concepts restricted o land warfare n the

pre-nuclear era have differentmeanings and may have different heoretical

conse-

quences. Our survey of attempts

by military historians and others to identifythe

offensive/defensivealance

in

various historical eras is relevanthere. In spite of

the

common focus on land warfare, there is remarkably little consensus

among these

authoritiesregarding the state of

the offensive/defensivealance in mostperiods.This

suggests

that

far

more

conceptual

clarification and

rigorous operational definition

are

necessary

before the

offensive/defensive

istinction can be useful

in

historical

analysis.

To conclude, the concept

of

the offensive/defensivealance is too vague and

encompassing

to

be useful

n

theoretical

nalysis.24Many

of

the ndividual variables that

have been incorporated nto themore general idea may themselves e useful,however.

Few would doubt the utility or

deterrence heory fthe concept ofthe ncentive o strike

first, orexample, and the

concept

of

attack/defense atios suggested here deserves

further xploration. Much more

conceptualization is necessarybeforethese ndividual

variables

can be

effectively

sed

in

empirical analysis,however.

There

is already

a

body

of

theoryregarding

the

consequences

of

an

incentive

to strikefirst.What is needed are

comparable theories regarding

the

consequences

of

military technologies

which

contribute o tactical

mobility

r to

the ease

of

territorial

onquest,

or which

reduce the

ratio of forces needed by the attacker

to

overcome

an

adversary defending

fixed

positions.

nteraction effects etween these

separate

variables also need

to

be

explored.

Further heoreticaldevelopmentof

thiskind s necessary,because

in

its absence there

s

littlereason to believe that these ndividual conceptshave an important mpact on war,

and thereforeittle

reason to

use

these concepts

in

empirical analysis.

Notes

1. The theoreticaliteraturesdivided nthe uestion f

whetherlliances ontribute

owar

or

topeace.

The

empirical videncesalsomixedBuenode

Mesquita nd Singer, 973;Levy,1981).Norhave he inkages

between rmsraces nd warsbeen thoroughly

stablishedWallace, 1979).

2.

Here

destabilizing'

s used to mean an increase n the ikelihood r

frequency

f

war.

3. The most notable exceptionhere is Quester

(1977), thoughthe connection etweenhis nominal

definitionsnd historical lassificationss

notalways lear.

4. For this eason am not oncerned erewithBoggs' 1941:63-72) distinctionetween he ffensivend

defensiven thegrand trategicevel',whichhe sees s basedon a 'political' r Clausewitzian heory f

war.Boggs uggestshat

n

this evel he

ffensive/defensive

istinction

s

based

on

the

political bjectives

toward

which

militaryperations

re

conducted,

nd that he

concept

s

generally

efined his

way by

military heorists:The differenceetween

ffensivend defensives

a

differencen objectives, ot a

differencen themeans mployed o reach he

objective.' Boggs, 941:72). This conceptualization ot

only nvolves he analytical roblem

f

distinguishing

n

principle etween offensive'

nd

'defensive'

policies which ary

rom

heater o theater nd

during he ourse f war) and the normouslyifficult

methodologicalroblemsnvolved

n

determiningstate's bjectivesr ntentions.t

also

confoundshe

two

mportantoncepts

f

hemotivations

f

tatesmen

nd

the

ffensive/defensivealance,

nd

deprives

the atter

f

ny ndependentmeaning.

5. Several spects

f

Wright's efinitionre open to

question.

he offensiveharacter f

weapon ystem

cannotbe udged onlyby ts ffectivenessgainst

n

enemy

nit ike

tself,

s

examples

f

ubmarines

r

antitank eapons learly

ndicate.

Wright's ocus

n

commerce

s

the bject

fnaval

warfarep. 793)

can

be questioned

n

thegrounds hat he

primary

imof

eapower

s

thedefeat

f

he dversary'savalforces

(Mahan, 1957). Nor s thenotion f n attack nenemymorale ery seful.

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236 The Offensive/Defensivealance of MilitaryTechnology

6. Similarly, t is not

at

all clear that territorial onquest and defeat

of

enemy forces hould both be included

in a single definition, or they do not necessarily go hand

in

hand. One obvious problem concerns naval

and air warfare,where the defeat

of

enemy forcesmay be directed toward control

of

ea

lanes or control of

the air, but certainly

not

territorial onquest per

e. Even

in

land

warfare,however,

one can

conceive

of a

strategy f deep territorial enetration that aims to bypass enemy military orcesrather than defeat them

(see, for xample, Vigor, 1983), or

a

strategy imed to defeat enemy forceswithout seizing territory. he

latter

is

also relevant to the nuclear age,

for a

counterforce trategymay be aimed at destroying nemy

forces

for

ts

own

sake and independently

of

both territorial ontrol or even coercion.

7.

When Clausewitz

(1976:114) argues repeatedly that the defense

is

the stronger form of warfare, he

conceives of defense

not

n

static terms

s

the warding off f blows, but rather as a dynamic conception of a

holding action until conditions are ripe for a counter-offensive Boggs, 1941: 71; Howard,

1983:

54).

8.

One

objective

indicator

of such

movement

is

the relative rates

of

advance

of

armies

in

different

eriods.

Record (1973),

for

xample,

has

surveyed

historical rates of

armored advance

in

this

century.These

rates

are affected

as much

by

the

numbers

of

troops

on

each

side, geographical terrain,

and

political

considerations

as

they

are

by

the balance

of

military technology,

so that

its use

as an indicator of

the

offensive/defensive

alance

is

open

to

question.

9 Wright 1965: 808) notes that

Fuller also

includes holding power (the ability

to

hold captured territory)

s

an important element

of an

offensiveweapon.

If

newly acquired territory

annot

be held there

s

little net

gain forthe offense,yet by definition t is even more importantfor the defenseto hold territory.Wright

(1965: 808)

also

argues

that

rapidity

of

fire

s

another weapons characteristic

that

provides

an

advantage

to the defense,

but it is

not clear whether

this

generalization applies beyond the case of the machine gun

and the static warfare

of

the late 19th and

early 20th centuries.

In

addition, Wright (1965: 808) argues

that

the range

of a

weapon

contributes a net

advantage

to

the defense because it keeps the offense t

a

distance and restricts

ts

mobility.

But

long-range weapons may contribute equally to the penetrating

power ofthe offense y weakening defensivefortifications rom distance. Boggs (1941:86), for xample,

argues

that

while heavy

mobile

artillery ontributes o both the tactical offensive nd defensive, ts triking

power against enemy fortifications ominates, thereby favoring the offense. More generally, Fuller

(1945:9) argues

that

range

is

the dominant

characteristic of

an

offensiveweapon.

10.

A

more esoteric

example

of tactical

doctrine

precluding

the

optimal

use

of

available

military echnology

can be

found

in

McNeill

(1982:9-11).

The Asians' use of war chariots as

fighting latforms

s

well

as for

transport

ncreased their

mobility

nd

firepowerbeginning

n

the

18th

century C,

but

the

Europeans

lost

these offensive dvantages because of doctrinewhich led them todismountfrom he chariots and fight n

foot as

infantry.

11. Note that

the

greater

the extent to

which

the

offensive/defensive

alance

is

affected

by

doctrinal

considerations,

the

less

its

utility

s

a

systemic-level oncept.

12.

One obvious

problem

here

is

what is

meant

by 'overcoming

an

adversary'.

Here

I

mean the

minimum

ratio of

forcesnecessary

to

give the attacker

a

higher probability

of

winning

than

losing, recognizing

that

stalemate

is

also

a

possible

outcome.

Other

definitions re

possible,

of

course

(a 50%

chance

of

victory,

r

of

avoiding defeat,

for

xample), but the specificcriterion

s

less mportant

than its consistent

pplication.

It

is

recognized,

of

course, that we must make the ceteris aribus assumption

in

order to

control for

asymmetries

n

terrain, ogistics, morale, training, and leadership, which are also important.

13. The fact that

a one-to-one ratio

is

widely regarded to be insufficient or attack provides a basis

for

an

interpretation of the common argument that the advantage in war always lies with the defense

(Clausewitz, 1976:114, 128; Machiavelli, Discourses,

k

3,

ch.

XLV; Dupuy, 1980:326).

To

say

this does

not mean, however, that the extentofthe advantage to the defense s constant.

14. The

theoreticalconsequences

of an

incentive to strikefirst ave been thoroughlyexplored by deterrence

theorists

Ellsberg, 1960; Schelling, 1960; Wagner, 1983).

15.

This

point

was

emphasized

to me

by

Harrison

Wagner.

16. This

survey begins

n

the ate Middle

Ages

because

references

o the

offensive/defensive

alance

in

earlier

times are

few

and

scattered,

as are

references

o

non-Western

systems.

17.

This

assmes that

the authorities consulted reflect representative ample

of

viewpoints

and

they

make

independent

evaluations of the

offensive/defensive

alance over time.

Admittedly,

here

may

be

some bias

in

the authorities consulted

in

the

following urvey,

for ll

are

Anglophones

who deal

primarily

with and

warfare

and

basically ignore

naval

and

air

considerations. The

land focus is not

a

problem,

for most

theoretical

treatments

f

the

offensive/defensive

alance define

t in

these

terms.

Nor is

there

good

reason

to believe that continental

military

historians would

reach

fundamentally

different

conclusions,

particularly

since

they

also would

tend

to

ignore naval

and air considerations. More

serious, however,

is

the

question

of

independent

measurement.

Presumably,

there

is some

reciprocal

and cumulative

relationship between these authorities, o that their classificationsofthe offensive/defensivealance are

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JACK

S.

LEVY

237

not truly ndependent. This is particularly likely given the absence of rigorous nominal or operational

definitions uiding their nalyses. It is

n

this ense that

a

greater variety

of

ources might be valuable. The

relative absence

of

explicit references o others' work, however, and the nconsistency f theirconclusions,

suggests that thisproblem is not too serious.

18. Gilpin (1981: 62) argues that the 14thcenturymarked a resurgenceofoffensive apabilities

because

of

the

invention

of

gunpowder and artillery,but

most

would regard

his

view

as

premature by

a

century.

19.

One

exception

here

may

be

Montross (1960:327),

who

implies

that

by

1670 there

may

have

been

'advantages to be gained by strikingfirst'.

20.

One

exception

is

Quester (1977:

ch.

11-12),

who seems to

suggest

that the balance

may

have

favored the

defense.

21. There is considerable evidence

contradicting

the assertion that the entire

German General

Staff

recognized

the

superiority

f

the offensive

Howard, 1976:131-33; Quester,

1977:ch.

12).

22.

The

year

1495 marks

the

origins

of the modern

great power system Levy,

1983a: ch.

2).

The

period before

1495

is

excluded because the

basic

criterion

of a

European sovereign state system

s not

satisfied,

o that

earlier

warfare cannot

easily

be

compared

with

modern

war behavior.

23.

For this

analysis

the

period

1850-1890 is

liberally

creditedto the defense and 1790-1815

is

credited

to the

offense,rather

than

being labelled uncertain. The 1495-1525 period is classified as offensive, nd

the

1650-1740 period

is

classified

s

defensive.The periods 1525-1650, 1740-1850, and 1890-1945 have been

classified as uncertain.

24. More

technically,

the

offensive/defensive

alance is a multidimensional

concept, but theories should

be

based

on

unidimensional concepts if at all possible (Shively, 1974: ch. 3).

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