THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEBATE IN F.N.E.Q. · tél. : (514) 286-224 6 introduction THE STRUCTURES: 1. th...

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FNEQ

CSN OCTOBER 1981

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEBATE IN F.N.E.Q.

"Structures in the service of

union democracy^'

Summary

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9c a n n é e O c t o b e r

g r a p h i c c o n c e p t i o n : I.ajcunesse-Petil

T y p e s e t t i n g : Composition Solidaire

Lithography: Inier-iiiho

p u b l i s h e d b y : L a F é d é r a t i o n N a t i o n a l e d e s E n s e i g n a n t s Q u é b é c o i s ( C S N ) 1601 r u e d e L o r i m i e r M o n t r é a l H 2 K 41V15 t é l . : ( 5 1 4 ) 2 8 6 - 2 2 4 6

introduction

THE STRUCTURES: 1. the present structures

2. the problems

3. our proposals

4. our present structures and negotiation

5. possible solutions 11

in conclusion 16

introduction A debate in our general

assemblies on the Federation's structures may. in this period of cutbacks and upcoming contract talks, appear to be very secondary, h might even be seen as a red herring by some.

There are in fact members who feel that the pressing and central issue of the day is the whole orientation of unionism as practiced by FNEQ and the CSN. For us, both questions are of equal importance, and in any event so closely inter-related that discussion of one necessarily involves the other.

It should nevertheless be clear, in the light of the many problems that

FNEQ has had to face over the past few years, that we have to put our heads together to reevaluate our methods and come up with means of making sure that the real decision-making power on the various issues FNEQ and the CSN are confronted with lies squarely in our local general assemblies. Union democracy requires broad debate throughout the membership, the only power of the individual member being the power of his or her arguments on a given question. It obviously takes more than a vote or a slogan to generate solidarity and mobilize people. iVe don't want to minimize the polarization between

different ideological positions that has occured here and there in the past, but this debate is important enough to warrant an effort, and our differences should in no way prevent it from taking place.

Decision-Making and Négociations

In 1972 FNEQ did away with its sectorial structures and adopted the form of organization we have today—an executive, a "Bureau

fédéral" elected by the "Conseil fédéral", and a "Conseil" with proportional representation. The.

WbêKÊM

1972 Constitution is incomplete, however: during négociations, the Federation has to set up special structures along side the usual ones.

In 1972, the "Bureau fédéral" fulfilled a double function as negotiating commet tee and direct representative of the local unions involved in the talks.

In 1976, the Cegeps were the only group negotiating with the Common Front. The "39" Committee was in control of the Cegep talks and the "Bureau fédéral" was next to inoperative.

The 1979 round involved the private colleges, the Cegeps and the universities, each group having its own controlling structure linked to the other through a liaison commitee. In addition to these bodies, the regular structure (the "Bureau fédéra!" and the "Conseil

fédéral") was given a supervisory role so that di.mgreements between the groups could be arbitrated if and when they arose.

The major lessions to be drawn from the balance sheet are that the coordination of demands and strategy between the groups should be first and foremost the responsibility of the individual groups themselves, and that under no circumstances should the fact that the "big fish" generally outvotes the "little fish" be mistaken for an attempt at liaison. Neither the "Bureau" nor the

"Conseil" should make decisions that one or the other of the groups should make together in the framework of a coordinated initiative. On the contrary, not "substituting" for either of the groups leaves them the necessary latitude to seek and agreement on a common platform. This is the way the "CCNSP" (public sector negotiations coordinating committee) has operated for years, and it seems to be the only way to proceed. Solidarity is not an easy thing to build, but solidarity we must have, and we won't get it simply through a majority vote.

Another conclusion from the balance sheet is that we have to avoid overlapping jurisdictions between the regular structures and the negotiation structures once the latter have been voted on. By making sure that the sole responsibility for negotiations lies with the negotiation structures, we will avoid the problems we encountered during the 1979 talks. It's in everyone's interest to prevent an institutionalized struggle for power between the two sets of structures once talks are underway.

Debate Recognized as Necessary

After a long discussion in June 1981, FNEQ's "Conseil fédéral"

decided to organize a broad consultation through the general assemblies on changes to the present structures of the Federation. The consultation will deal with an expansion of the "Bureau fédéral" to allow for direct representation of each union at that level, and with the advisability of integrating tahe negotiation structures into the new ' 'Bureau fédéral' '.

This document is intended as a clear overview of how the present structure operates, the kind of problems encountered, and the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed changes.

What the Debate is About

Becau<ie people have arrived at different conclusions on the basis of their analyses and evaluations of our past experience, this debate involves a number of conflicting conceptions. The proposals contained herein are by no means seen as the definitive answer to each and every question. Nor do we have any illusions about having solved the political problems of the Federation, which was not and could not be our purpose. What we have tried to do is to foster better conditions for union democracy in our ranks. It is up to the membership to decide where we go from here.

THE STRUCTURES

1 FNEQ's Present structures

The "Conseil fédéral"

T h e "Conse i l f édé ra l " , with p r o p o r t i o n a l represen ta t ion of each m e m b e r un ion plus represen ta t ion of the " B u r e a u fédéra l a n d the Execut ive ( a b o u t 175 delegates in all), is the highest body of the Fede ra t ion . T h e " C o n s e i l " , which ope ra te s in the same m a n n e r as a general assembly , has the p o w e r to decide on all ma t te r s , give m a n d a t e s a n d elect the F e d e r a t i o n ' s representa t ives . It meets at least th ree t imes a year .

The "Bureau fédéral"

Between meet ing of the "Conse i l f é d é r a l " , the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " acts as the in te rmedia te dec i s ion -mak ing body . T h e " C o n s e i l " sets the n u m b e r of " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " m e m b e r s a n d elects them to represent the va r ious regions a n d the va r ious levels of the educa t iona l system. W h e n the " C o n s e i l " is no t in session, the

" B u r e a u " e x e r c i s e s its va r ious prerogat ives , except in ma t t e r s re lat ing to a f f i l i a t ion , the cons t i tu t ion , d issolu t ion of the Fede ra t i on and dues . T h e " b u r e a u " is " r e spons ib l e fo r p r o v i n d i n g leadersh ip fo r the F e d e r a t i o n " .

The Executive T h e Execut ive , m a d e u p of f o u r

m e m b e r s since the last meet ing of the "Conse i l ' , is elected by the lat ter for a two-year te rm. T h e cons t i tu t ion def ines it as the executive of the " B u r e a u f édé ra l " , with a m a n d a t e to carry out the decis ions of the " C o n s e i l " a n d the " B u r e a u " . It is expressly respons ib le for m a n a g i n g a n d c o o r d i n a t i n g o u r services, and collectively plays its s u p p o r t i n g role in leading discuss ions , in F N E Q ' s var ious commi t t ee s and assemblies a n d par t i c ipa t ing in the C S N ' s commi t t ees , the F e d e r a t i o n ' s services and the c o o r d i n a t i o n of con t rac t ta lks (Art ic le 25).

Present structure

Conseil

fédéral

• The "Conseil" includes representatives from all FNEQ unions (private colleges, Cegeps, Universities) plus the "Bureau fédéral" & the Executive

• Representation is proportional (about 175 delegates)

• Statutory minimum of 3 meetings a year

Bureau • Comprises 20 members elected by the "Conseil" to

represent the regions and levels of the education system

• The "Bureau fédéral" exercices the powers of the "Conseil" betv\een "Conseil" meetings, except as regards dues, affiliation, dissolution

• T h e E x e c u t i v e : - m a d e u p o f f o u r m e m b e r s - is t h e e x e c u t i v e o f t h e " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " - c a r r i e s o u t t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e " B u r e a u " a n d

t h e " C o n s e i l "

fédéral

• Comprises 20 members elected by the "Conseil" to represent the regions and levels of the education system




Exécutif









2 The problems

An Overburdened "Conseil"

Although in practice the "Consei l fédéra l" has met a least five times every year, it has been unable to digest all of the incoming in format ion f rom the CSN and the Federa t ion , appoin t all of the representatives at F N E Q ' s disposal within the CSN, discuss p rob lems with services and staff relations, or receive all of the reports f r o m the many CSN bodies and committees . As was the case with the vocat ional t ra in ing issue, it has of ten been up to the " B u r e a u " to take a final posi t ion, even af ter debate in the general assemblies.

In the present state of affairs , the "Consei l fédéra l" cannot possibly deal with all of the quest ions on which F N E Q is called upon to take a s tand, both for lack of time and because we are usually faces with very short deadlines for consult ing our members .

Some unions do not participate

The Cegep unions fo rm the largest g roup within F N E Q and play a p redominan t role in the "Consei l fédéra l" . The fact that Cegep members and delegates tend to see the " C o n s e i l " as a Cegep assembly may be par t of the explanat ion of the absence of o ther unions. The unions that d o not par t ic ipate in the "Conse i l " must be encouraged to get involved again. We have to identify and distinguish the needs of each g roup and level of the school system so that F N E Q can take them into considerat ion to the extent that its limited resources allow.

The "Bureau fédéral"

An Expanded Executive

The many ma jo r responsibilities of the "Bureau fédéra l" , and its

powers under the const i tu t ion, explain in large part why the Executive (which is the executive of the " B u r e a u " ) plays such an impor tan t leadership role.

Lack of Direct Control Over the Federation by Locals Between Assemblies

At present , the members of the "Bureau fédéra l" and the Executive are elected by the "Conse i l " . They cannot be manda ted by a local union, because they don ' t represent a given local. They are responsible for mainta ining liaison with the unions, but basically in an in format iona l capacity. While the " b u r e a u " certainly has its impor tance , its limits also become rapidly apparen t , especially in those per iods—which means o f t en—when concrete action is required af ter the in format ion has been made available.

The result is that between "Conse i l " meetings, the general assemblies have no direct control

Since November '76, FNEQ fielded 21 "Conseils fédéraux". Each and every time (exception made of November 7 7 and March 78) more than 50% of the local unions of sec-tors other than CEGEP did not attend the "Conseil fédéral". On the other hand, more than 85% of the CEGEP's local unions did attend Conseil fédéral.

Furthermore, since November '76, at least 35% and sometimes 50% of all the local unions of the Federation were absent or represented by only one delegate (the high point of this situation being January '77 "Conseil fédéral" where more than 66% of the local unions were in that particular situation).

over the " B u r e a u " or the Executive.

Lack of Support Mechanism for the "Conseil"'s Initiatives

Equally if not more impor tan t is the fact that , if action is required a round a pedagogical issue in the Cegep's , for example , the "Bureau fédéra l" does not have the necessary in format ion f r o m the general assemblies, and even if the in format ion is available, the " B u r e a u " is hardly in a posit ion to impose an action plan by phoning the locals. This has the effect of paralysing the union response.

In a si tuat ion like this, it would be possible to call a School and Society session, but these sessions do not have the necessary s tatus to decide on action proposals .

The same si tuat ion prevails when it comes to mat te rs that concern

the applicat ion of the collective agreement .

Lack of Follow-up Between ''Conseil" Meetings

As far as the Executive is concerned, it is not in contact with the unions as a whole between meetings of the "Conse i l " . And, if the "Conse i l " adop t s an action plan affect ing the locals, the Executive has no o ther means of knowing what is going on in each union than to call them up on the phone. . .

Incomplete Transmission of Information to the Unions

A significant a m o u n t of time is devoted at every "Bureau fédéra l" meeting to the reports of the various CSN bodies and

committees , the majors issues and problems (strike f u n d / F D P , relations with the CSN employees ' un ion , the general coord ina t ing commit tee for negotiat ions, the public sector coord ina t ing committee) , and to problems with F N E Q unions and posit ions to be taken on one quest ion or ano ther under discussion in par lementary commission (the right to strike, human rights...). . The list could go on.

This in format ion , which gives a general picture of what is happening in F N E Q ans the CSN, could be given out at regional meetings. Preferably, however, information should be transmitted directly to the representative of each union.

Regional meetings even on an occasional basis are not possible in all regions no mat ter how devoted "Bureau fédéra l" members may be.

3 Our proposals:

direct representation on the "Bureau fédéral"

The m a j o r change proposed by the Executive and the "Bureau fédéra l" at the last "Conse i l " meeting wat to broaden the "Conseil" so as to give every union one representative of its own choice.

Each union would be able to express its opinion and be consul tated on all of the quest ions that F N E Q has to deal with as a federat ion and a CSN affiliate.

It would also be easier and quicker for the locals to share informat ion on their respective s i tuat ions and posi t ions on various quest ions, and especially on issues in which informat ion plays an impor tan t role in gett ing people mobilized (the effects of cu tbacks or the piecemeal appl icat ion of inst i tutional analysis, for example).

A n d , all of the unions would have an oppor tun i ty to air their views on debates or on CSN posit ions that should be discussed in the " B u r e a u " or the "Conse i l " but of ten never get on to the " C o n s e i r " s agenda.

All in all, the unions would have a direct say in a whole area of the life of the federat ion that is quite beyond their control at the present time. N o mat ter how well in formed it is, a "Bureau fédéra l" elected by the "Conse i l " is no subst i tute for direct representat ion.

The Debate

Objection: A " B u r e a u " with 60 members would obviously not opera te as it would if there were only 20 members . (This is not necessarily a bad thing.)

Observation: The CSN's "Bureau confédéra l" , on which the federat ions and "conseils cent raux '

are directly represented, has approximate ly the same n u m b e r of par t ic ipants . Its debates are conducted thoroughly and properly, and decisions are made within satisfactory deadlines. Mat te rs are rarely referred to the Executive.

Objection: The demands on the time of the representatives of each union could be cons iderable—somewhere in the vicinity of three days per month under normal circumstances.

Observation: True , but such is the price of democracy. Otherwise, the assemblies would be indirectly appoin t ing some 20 members elected by the "Consei l fédéra l" to look af ter their interests.

Objection: It the unions don ' t delegates to the "Conseil fédéra l" , whose meetings are less f requent , they will surely not send anyone to the "Bureau fédéra l" either, thereby rendering the " B u r e a u " unrepresentat ive.

Observation: It is less of a problem to find a single delegate for the "Bureau fédéra l" , all the more so because it is in the interest of all of the unions, including those like the private school and university locals who feel powerless in the "Consei l fédéra l" , to have f i rs thand access to in format ion on the activities of F N E Q and the CSN between "Conse i l " meetings.

Objection: If the "Conse i l " is unable to get through all of the business on its agenda , and the " B u r e a u " runs into the same problem, the powers of the Executive would only increase.

Observation: T h e role of the Execut ive would change to a certain extent , but no in all l ikel ihood because the " B u r e a u " would end up re fe r r ing decis ions tha t a re within its ju r i sd ic t ion . T h e Execut ive 's role would change because it would be directly responsible to the representa t ives of all of the un ions for the m a n d a t e s its receives f r o m the " B u r e a u " o r the " C o n s e i l " . Th i s means increased con t ro l over the Execut ive by the locals. The re would be an increase in the i m p o r t a n c e of the Execut ive, bu t not in its power , i na smuch as its init iat ives wou ld be directed at the locals as a whole . T h e only t r ans fe r

of power wou ld be to the general assemblies .

Objection: T h e role of the " C o n s e i l " would be changed . A f t e r all of the un ions have arr ived at a posi t ion in the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " , it would be ha rde r t h a n it is n o w to m a k e changes in the " C o n s e i l " , where represen ta t ion is p r o p o r t i o n a l .

Observation: T h a t is correc t . T h e " C o n s e i l " wou ld increasingly tend to be an assembly where the deba te s on o r i en t a t i on t ake place. T h e " B u r e a u " wou ld work within the guidel ines set by the " C o n s e i l " .

Objection: C o u l d n ' t the " B u r e a u " with direct r ep resen ta t ion be

advan t ageous ly replaced by regional i n f o r m a t i o n meet ings o r even regional represen ta t ion?

Observation: It is a fact tha t o t h e r f ede ra t ions have a " B u r e a u " with direct regional r ep resen ta t ion , bu t this means tha t the un ions have to be o rgan ized in regional assemblies . In F N E Q ' s case, some regions a re comple te ly d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to o t h e r s — t h e M o n t r e a l region a lone wou ld end up dec id ing the pos i t ions of the federa t ion . Besides which , the o t h e r f ede ra t ions have so m a n y locals tha t au " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " with direct r ep resen ta t ion would be unfeas ib le .

„A ''Bureau fédéral" with direct representation

"Conseil fédéral" • Same powers and mode of representation as now

• Same powers and mode of representation as now

"Bureau fédéral" • approx. 60 members

• meetings once a month

• all unions in direct contact with F N E Q on all questions

• approx. 60 members



CEGEP: PRIVA TE COLLEGE: UNIVERSITY: • 1 r e p r é s e n t e r • 1 r e p r é s e n t e r • I r e p r é s e n t e r

p e r u n i o n p e r u n i o n p e r u n i o n







FNEQ Executive • 4 members

4 Our present structures and négocia-tions

1. The constitution protects the autonomy of each union in négociations...

" In part icular , each union retains its a u t o n o m y for the purposes of setting dues and deciding on the content and the acceptance or rejection of its collective agreement . " ( F N E Q Cons t i tu t ion , Article 8)

There are also restrictions imposed by Bill 55 on the organizat ion of the part ies in public sector négociations;

" T h e clauses negot ia ted and approved at the nat ional level deal with all of the mat ters conta ined in the collective agreement contempla ted in section 2. They provide, however, that certain mat ters may be subject of a r rangements within the meaning of section 4, or of clauses negociated and approved at a local or regional level in accordance with section 5 . "

Consequent ly , the same a u t o n o m y as referred to above applies to the group, which negotiates a single collective agreement .

This is why the regroupment within the public sector negociat ing commet tee ( C C S N P - C S N ) and the C S N - C E Q - F T Q C o m m o n Fron t is on a volontary basis.

2. Parallel Structures Unavoidable Under Present Set-Up

It is clear that the "Consei l f édéra l " cannot ultimately make a decision in the place of an assembly or a regroupment of unions, volontary or otherwise, either on the proposed contrac t or on the content of the final agreement . The powers of the "Conse i l " are limited by the const i tut ion to general negotiat ion policies. The "Bureau fédéra l" must logically conf ine itself to the same area.

" T h e "Consei l fédéra l" is the highest au thor i ty within the Federa t ion . It determines the federa t ion 's general policies on educat ion and objectives for negot ia t ion, as well as the federa t ion 's syndical, social and political pr ior i t ies ." (Article 10 of the Cons t i tu t ion)

The regular s t ructures of the federa t ion—the " C o n s e i l " and the " B u r e a u " — a r e therefore not negotiat ion s t ructures even in the sense of a regroupment . Before each round of talks, separate , parallel s t ructures have to be set up for the unions negotiat ing as a g roup . We then have to clarify role of the regular bodies.

Negotiation structure and regular structure during last round of negotiations

(1979-1980)

Conseil fédéral"

Bureau fédéral"

Executive

General Assembly

PRIVATE COLLEGE

UNIVERSITY

Negot. Negot. Committee Committee

Liaison committee

Negot. Committee

• each group represented

• Executive present

Executive negotiation structure decides on bargaining objectives

"Consei l" and "Bureau" supervise talks

Executive may receive mandates from both structures

3. Some Background on the Problems Encountered

The " federa l i za t ion" of F N E Q ' s s t ructures (or the aboli t ion of ou r previous sectorial f o r m of organiza t ion) was adop ted in J u n e 1972 af te r Bill 19 had put an end to the general strike, affect ing both the private colleges and the Cegeps. The S P E Q (Syndicat professionnel de l 'État du Québec) had just wi thdrawn f rom F N E Q , leaving the S P U Q (Syndicat des professeurs de l 'Université du Québec) as the only F N E Q union representing university teachers.

The 1972 round had been prepared jointly by the three sectore—the private colleges, the Cegeps and tlie SPEQ—which presented a single contract proposal and a t tempted to negotiate at the same table. Since management rejected the idea of a single table negot ia t ion, each sector held a limited number of bargaining sessions carried out by a commit tee with a core of permanent members , to which other negotiat iors were added depending on the sector involved. At the time, the "Consei l fédéra l" regrouped the three sectorial executives and F N E Q ' s Executive, and made a n u m b e r of impor tan t decisions, including the decision to call for a decree, without polling the sectorial assemblies.

It was in the same spirit of unity that each sector voted to disband as a distinct entity with the Federa t ion .

When Bill 19 also imposed a decree on the private colleges that were negotiat ing as a g roup under the name of "Syndicat professionnel des ense ignants" (SPE), the problem of getting management to accept a single negotiat ing table in the fu tu re

disappeared with the dissolution of the SPE.

1975-1976

The lessons learned f rom the 1972 talks led to the creat ion of a new negotiat ing s t ructure for the Cegeps: the " 3 9 " Commit tee . The new st ructure ensured direct control over bargaining by the assemblies, but excluded the "Bureau fédéra l" f r o m the process. The " B u r e a u " was, however, conscious that this would be the case when it r ecommended that the " 3 9 " Commi t t ee be established.

Al though it proved effective for the Cegep negotiat ions, the " 3 9 " Commit tee took up almost all of the time of the president , and the daily life of the federa t ion revolved a round the progress of the talks of F N E Q ' s largest g roup . The other unions , members of the regular bodies, were less than pleased with the si tuat ion.

The private colleges, which were not subjected to the principle of c o m m o n negot iat ions in the public sector imposed by Bill 46, decided to s tar t negotiat ing on their own. The benefits on the first C o m m o n Front had not been readily apparent for all.

The Executive's Role in Coordinating Negotiations

Another quest ion arose af ter the Cegep talks in 1976: given that the time of the president had been completely taken up (and that of the general secretary to a lesser extent) by the negotiat ions, wow could the Executive play its coordina t ing role if the three

groups found themselves bargaining simultaneously?

1978-1979: Experiment with the Liaison Committee

The " B u r e a u " recommended that the " C o n s e i l " name one person per negotiat ing commit tee (Cegeps, private colleges and universities) in charge of the political aspects of the process, and reserved responsibility for liaison for the Executive through a commit tee whose manda te was " t o coordinate the negotiat ions and make the necessary recommenda t ions to each g r o u p of un ions" (Minutes of the J u n e 1978 "Consei l"meet ing) .

In reality, the Executive was absent f rom the negotiat ing commit tee and played its coordina tory role f r o m the outside, as foreseen in the document the " B u r e a u " submit ted to the "Conse i l " in J a n u a r y 1977. The problem was that either the Executive plays a real leadership role dur ing talks or leadership would come f r o m elsewhere, with the danger of growing tension between the regular s t ructure and its const i tuents ( " B u r e a u " and "Conse i l " ) on the one hand , and the negotiat ion s t ructure and its const i tuents (negotiat ion commit tee , the R L N * and the assemblies) on the other .

10

5 Possible solutions

A.

A new "Bureau fédéral" in which each group handles its own negotiations:

For the purposes of negotiat ions, the "Bureau fédéra l" with direct representat ion would be broken down into its consti tuent parts , the latter becoming the level in charge of bargaining for each regroupment , whether volontary of required by law.

In this way, the regular structure would also be the negotiation structure in the case of the Cegep, private college and universty union, if they negotiate as a regroupment.

That was the recommendat ion made by the Executive and the " B u r e a u " to the J u n e " C o n s e i l " meeting, where it was decided;

" T h a t the locals be asked to debate the fol lowing topics in general assembly: • direct representat ion for the

"Bureau fédéra l" • the s tatus q u o for the

"Consei l fédéra l" • the pert inence of integrating

or not integrating the negotiat ion s t ructure into a new "Bureau fédéra l" with direct representa t ion ."

Let 's have a look at the advantages and disadvantages involved in point no 3 above.

(1) Advantage: Integrat ion would tie negotiat ions to the other aspects of the daily life of the Federat ion and the CSN, and the " B u r e a u " would deal with the whole range of the Federa t ion 's business.

Disadvantage: Representatives on the " B u r e a u " would have significant and varied responsibilities ranging f r o m negotiat ions to pedagogical issues.

Observation: One way or another , all of the dossiers end up back in the general assemblies. There are limits to the a m o u n t of work a union can accomplish.

The present indirect representat ion set-up can result in a situation where some unions don ' t even get a min imum of informat ion on a n u m b e r of topics discussed by the "Bureau fédéra l" dur ing the negotiat ion period.

We cannot of course deny that informat ion is hard to disseminate even when it is received by a mem ber of a local's executive, but that is a problem of ano ther order .

(2) Advantage: The exchange between the groups of informat ion on the state of negotiat ions and the locals would p romote solidarity.

Disadvantage: The talks of one of the groups could hinder the work of the " B u r e a u " , especially in the case of Cegep negotiat ions. Rules on q u o r u m would have to be adop ted .

We could consider using the same general q u o r u m rule as the one in effect for the CSN' s "Bureau confédéra l" (one third of the member groups) , and add the addi t ionnai condi t ion that one

11

th i rd of the representa t ives of each nego t i a t ing g r o u p mus t be present .

Observation: Awarenes s of the cond i t ions prevai l ing in each un ion , which is easier with direct r ep resen ta t ion , is a crucial e lement in bu i ld ing sol idar i ty on a b o r d e r basis. T h e size of the " C o n s e i l " and the n a t u r e of its deba tes d o not lend themselves to rais ing tha t consc iousness in the s ame way.

If the Cegeps a re the un ion un ions nego t ia t ing as a r e g r o u p m e n t , the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " would still meet to hand le cu r r en t business , deba te s within the C S N , the p r e p a r a t i o n a n d execut ion of " C o n s e i l " meet ings a n d decis ions, etc. Locals wou ld be able to share i n f o r m a t i o n on the p rogress of talks, which doesn ' t h a p p e n in the present s t ruc tu re .

(3) Advantage: T h e nego t i a t ion s t ruc tu re would be the s a m e as the regular s t ruc tu re , thereby e l imina t ing any d a n g e r of con t r ad i c to ry m a n d a t e s .

Disadvantage: Loca l may not wan t to a p p o i n t the s a m e person to h a n d l e b o t h cu r ren t bus iness and nego t ia t ions ,because of w o r k l o a d , spec ia l iza t ion , a n d o t h e r cons idera t ions .

Observation: The re is no t reason why we c o u l d n ' t immedia te ly foresee sepa ra t e meet ings of the " b u r e a u " a n d the nego t i a t ing g roups . Loca ls could then a p p o i n t two d i f fe ren t representa t ives , one for cu r ren t bus iness a n d one f o r negot ia t ions . A l t h o u g h their votes might be c o n t r a d i c t o r y in cer ta in cases, the s i tua t ion w o u l d be clar if ied when the genera l assemblies a re cal led u p o n to m a k e

a f inal decis ion. Wi th o u r present se t -up , a confl ic t be tween the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " a n d a nego t i a t ing c o m m i t t e e might well, fo r example , p r o v o k e a crisis a n d the res ignat ion of one of the two. T h e consequences wou ld be u n p l e a s a n t indeed.

(4) Advantage: T h e par t ies present in the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " cou ld also m a n d a t e the f ede ra t ion to act in their n a m e with respect to the app l i ca t ion of the collective agg remen t . At the present t ime , only the Cegep ' s sector ia l w o r k s h i p may m a n d a t e F N E Q to represent it at meet ings of the n a t u r e with m a n a g e m e n t representa t ives , o r to a d o p t policies on app l i ca t ion . N o t e tha t the sectorial w o r k s h o p s have n o s t a t u r o r y wha t soever .

Regard less of the so lu t ion we choose , the p r o b l e m will have to be solved one way o r a n o t h e r .

Alternative â

"Bureau fédéral" with direct representation and each group negotiating for itself. Structures are integrated

"Bureau fédéral ti

CEGEP 1 r e p . p e r u n i o n

PRIVATE COLLEGE

1 r e p . p e r u n i o n

UNIVERSITY 1 r e p . p e r u n i o n

Negot. Com.

Negot. Com.

Negot. Com.

Executive

each group responsible for its own negotiations

"Bureau fédéral" acts as liaison committee if the 3 groups are negotiating at the same time

if 1 group is negotiating alone, it assumes responsibility for its talks and the "Bureau fédéral" takes care of the rest of the fedération's business

12

B.

The new ''Bureau fédéral": One structure for current business, another for negotiations

T h e " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " wi th direct r ep resen ta t ion wou ld not be involved in any way in negot ia t ions , which wou ld fall

u n d e r the m a n d a t e of the " 4 0 " C o m m i t t e e , a n d o the r s if necessary , The re wou ld be t w o s t ruc tures : one for regular business , the o the r fo r negot ia t ions .

Advantages: T h e r e wou ld be n o ques t ion of the s a m e pe r son being s imul taneous ly a m e m b e r of the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " a n d in cha rge of nego t ia t ions locally.

Disadvantage: Smal l locals would need t w o delegates du r ing

negot ia t ion per iods , which is u n d o u b t e d l y a s t rain on resources . M o r e ser ious s t i l l—the p r o b l e m of para l le l i sm could potent ia l ly raise its ugly head aga in , to say n o t h i n g of the added f inancia l b u r d e n .

Alternative

"Bureau fédéral" with direct representation; two structures: one for regular business another for negotiations

Regular business

a Conseil fédéral"

Negotiation

General Assembly

"Bureau fédéral" PRIVA TE

CEGEP COLLEGE UNIVERSITY

I r e p . 1 r e p . 1 r e p . p e r u n i o n p e r u n i o n p e r u n i o n

CEGEP


PRIVA TE COLLEGE


UNIVERSITY


Negot. Committee

Negot. Committee

Negot. Committee

Executive Executive • The "Bureau fédéral" takes no part in

negotiations • Meetings of the two substructures can be

called for the same time in different places.

13

c. The ''Bureau fédéral" unchanged, hut clearly delineated from the negotiation structure

If we leave the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " as its s t ands , we have to avoid any conf l ic t ing ju r i sd ic t ions a n d responsibi l i t ies be tween it a n d the negot ia t ion s t ruc tu re , which means es tabl ish ing clearly a n d in advance :

1. tha t there must be no over lap-p ing powers , or m e m b e r s with responsibi l ies in b o t h areas ;

2. tha t the Execut ive has a very spe-cific role to play.

1 o be more precise:

1. As soon as preparations for

negotiations begin, it wou ld be the sectorial w o r k s h o p tha t repor t to the " C o n s e i l " o n the c o m m i t t e e s and ind iv idua ls they have a p p o i n t e d a n d on the t imetable for negot ia t ions . T h e w o r k s h o p s ' vote on con ten t w o u l d c o m e later.

Once the c o n t e n t of the d e m a n d s has been es tabl ished ans the nego t ia t ing c o m m i t t e e elected, the R L N would take over all responsibi l i ty fo r nego t i a t ions until there is an ag reemen t to be r e c o m m e n d e d fo r ra t i f ica t ion by the assemblies .

Advantage: Th i s a r r a n g m e n t w o u l d e l iminate the possibil i ty tha t con t r ad i c to ry m a n d a t e s on the s ame ques t ion could be given to the f ede ra t i on (Execut ive) by the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " , on the one h a n d , and by the R L N on the o the r . T h e respective roles wou ld be clar i f ied.

Disadvantage: The re is n o t h i n g to prevent the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " o n the sectorial w o r k s h o p s f r o m wan t ing to get involved in the

nego t ia t ions a n d actual ly d o i n g so, despi te o u r desire to avoid ove r l app ing activit ies.

Question: T h e R L N d o not ope ra t e on the pr inciple of p r o p o r t i o n a l r ep resen ta t ion in m a k i n g their decis ions. W h a t wou ld h a p p e n if, as was the case last t ime, s o m e un ions w h a t to call a session of the sectorial w o r k s h o p a f t e r the p roposa l se t t lement has been rejected?

W e d o n ' t wan t to see a s t ruc tu re like the sector ia l w o r k s h o p subs t i tu t ing f o r the " 4 0 " C o m m i t t e e once ta lks a re u n d e r w a y . In D e c e m b e r 1980, the decis ion to call the w o r k s h o p in to session was t aken by the " B u r e a u f édé ra l " . T h e w o r k s h o p ' s incurs ion into the area of ac t ion s t ra tegy was hardly a r e s o u n d i n g success—only two un ions out of for ty voted fo r its s t r ike p roposa l . T h e sector ia l w o r k s h o p d idn ' t change the course of nego t ia t ions in any way , bu t it d id m a k e the taks of the " 4 0 " C o m m i t t e e m o r e diff icul t .

Since the " B u r e a u f é d é r a l " has a lways had the p o w e r to convene the " C o n s e i l " , the only p o w e r tha t the sectorial w o r k s h o p shou ld have in re la t ion to the " 4 0 " C o m m i t t e e is the p o w e r to m a k e recommandations on content and strategy for negotiations. Th i s is p r o b a b l y the only way to get a r o u n d the d i s a d v a n t a g e po in ted out above .

Question: H o w w o u l d the " C o n s e i r " s role in de t e rmin ing policy fit with the con t ro l over nego t i a t ions left up to the R L N ?

T h e policies a d o p t e d by the " C o n s e i l " are off icial pos i t ions t ha t serve to or ient nego t ia t ions ; they mus t be d is t inguished f r o m the d e m a n d s , a n d a b o v e all f r o m the results of the ta lks themselves . In

pr inciple the un ions shou ld s t and by t h e m , but if they d o n ' t want to , the " C o n s e i l " has the choice but if they d o n ' t coercive measures or to use its h u m a n resources and o rgan iza t iona l f o r u m s to a t t e m p t to convince t h e m . It is a lso possible tha t the un ions a re unab le to stick to a d o p t e d policies in the course of nego t i a t ions because of the re la t ion of forces , in which case the ques t ion is not one of c h a n g i n g the policies, but of c o m i n g back with them at a later da te .

T h e ul t ihia te object ive is to have the bod ies respons ib le for nego t i a t ions ab ide by the nego t ia t ion policies of the Fede ra t ion .

Shou ld the sectorial w o r k s h o p s then be vot ing on the con ten t of the sectorial d e m a n d s , the rbey dup l i ca t ing the w o r k of the " 4 0 " C o m m i t t e e ?

D u r i n g the last r o u n d , dup l i ca t ion severely taxed the energy of the mi l i tan ts involved. O n e o r the o t h e r shou ld hence fo r th m a k e the decis ions on con ten t a f te r the assemblies have been consu l ted . T h e represent ivi ty f ac to r suggests tha t this be left u p to the sectorial w o r k s h o p s .

Application of the Collective Agreement

Given tha t the present o rgan iza t iona l se t -up does no t p rov ide for a s t ruc tu re to m a n d a t e the Fede ra t i on fo r its meet ings with representa t ives of m a n a g e m e n t in the Cegeps , fo r example , we shou ld t ake steps to see to it t ha t the cons t i tu t ion clearly a t t r ibu tes tha t responsibi l i ty to the R L N .

14

(2) Liaison and the role of the executive

D e p e n d i n g on the a l te rna t ive we choose , wha t role shou ld the Execut ive play with respect to each of the negot ia t ion r e g r o u p m e n t s and to their l iaison, if the talks a re c o n d u c t e d toge the r wi thin the f r a m e w o r k of publ ic sector negot ia t ions?

T h e Execut ive ,which is collectively responsible for

c o o r d i n a t i n g nego t i a t ions u n d e r the cons t i tu t ion , mus t obvious ly a p p o i n t one of its m e m b e r s to fo l low any regrouped nego t i a t ions closely, and to act in the n a m e of the Fede ra t i on in a c c o r d a n c e with the m a n d a t e s given by the u n i o n s involved or their representa t ives .

Liaison

If several r e g r o u p m e n t s are ba rga in ing s imul t aneous ly within the f r a m e w o r k of publ ic sec tor negot ia t ions , we will have to fo l low

the principle of seeking an agreement between the groups and exclude the idea of a third pa r ty—inc lud ing the " C o n s e i l " — mak ing any final decis ions in their s tead. T h e Execut ive shou ld defini tely not play this role. It shou ld help to p r o m o t e agreement as the only means of bui ld ing unity in ac t ion .

Alternative C :

The present regular structure and the negotiation structure stand side by side but without overlapping Jurisdictions

Regular structure

a Conseil fédéral"

"Bureau fédéral" (20 memhcrs)

Executive

Negotiation

General Assembly

CEGEP

"40"

PRIVA TE COLLEGE

RLN

UNIVERSITY

RLN

Negot. C'ommittee

Negot. Committee

Negot. Committee

Liaison Committee & Executive

The regular structure transfers all its powers to the negotiation structure The general assemblies have a direct link with negotiations The 20-member "Bureau fédéral" handles all dossiers other than negotiations

15

in conclusion YOU HAVE THE CHOICE BETWEEN:

For regular business

• Direct representation of the "Bureau fédéral" or "status quo'

For the negotiation

• if it is a direct representation :

alternative

The negotiat ion s t ruc ture coincides with the regular s t ructure. Each g roup is responsible for its own negotiat ions.

• if status quo:

alternative B The negotiat ion s t ructure and

the regular s t ructure are two distinct entities, but representat ion on the "Bureau fédéra l" is direct.

alternative C^

The 1979 status quo for the "Bureau fédéra l" and the negotiat ion s t ructure is upheld, but the regular bodies take no part in negotiat ions.

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