THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AFTER THE SWMIT STEVE SMITH

The Summit meeting between Pres ident Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 19-21 November 1985 received s u r p r i s i n g l y o p t i m i s t i c t reatment i n the B r i t i s h Press. I n co,7mon w i t h much o f the Western press, B r i t i s h media coverage before the Summit focussed on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the two ind i v idua ls usher ing in a new era o f US-Soviet re la t i ons . A f t e r the event, i t was w ide ly por t rayed as a g rea t success w i t h the acceptance a t face va lue o f the two leaders ' statements t h a t they wished f o r arms con t ro l . The argument o f t h i s paper i s t h a t the prospects o f agreement a re low, and t h a t the Summit, p r e c i s e l y because i t concentrates on i nd i v idua ls , i s a mis leading focus f o r any eva lua t i on o f the arms c o n t r o l agenda.

I n f a c t , i t i s wor th beginning by n o t i n g t h a t the Summit was por t rayed i n a ra the r d i f f e r e n t way i n the US press. A comparison o f the repo r t s i n the Guardian and the Times w i t h those o f the Washington Post and the New York Times ind ica tes t h a t there was much more scept ic ism i n the US about the e f f e c t o f the

- Summit on arms c o n t r o l and the impact o f the meeting on US-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . Indeed, according t o a s t o r y c a r r i e d i n the New York Times: 'American o f f i c i a l s grew so concerned about the outcome o f the Summit meeting t h a t a "blow-up scenario" was devised t o l i m i t p o l i t i c a l damage i n case the meeting co l lapsed a t the f i n a l ceremony.' (Weinraub, 1985, p 1). Apparently, the j o i n t statement issued on the l a s t day o f the Summit (21 November) was on ly agreed a t 4.30am t h a t day. d i f f e rences between the two s ides were so wide t h a t considerable compromises were necessary i n order t o a r r i v e a t a f i n a l agreed j o i n t statement. This, o f course, w i l l no t su rp r i se anyone who knows the h i s t o r y o f US-Soviet arms c o n t r o l , bu t i t i s a p i c t u r e o f events t h a t bears l i t t l e resemblance t o the p u b l i c p resenta t ion , and management, o f the Summit.

The

I n order t o assess the prospects f o r superpower arms con t ro l a f t e r the Summit i t i s necessary t o go back t o the reasons why the l a s t se t o f t a l k s broke down (For a d iscuss ion o f the progress o f arms con t ro l from 1972-1984, see Smith, 1984). The US and the Soviets, having reached agreement on a SALT I I Treaty i n 1979, d i d no t t a l k about f u r t h e r arms c o n t r o l f o r the f i r s t e ighteen months o f the Reagan admin is t ra t ion . Pres ident Reagan came t o power arguing t h a t the US was lagging i n the arms race, and t h a t i t needed t o b u i l d up i t s s t rength so as t o be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o negot ia te. (Paradoxica l ly , a comparison o f the s t r a t e g i c forces of the two sides i n 1980 and 1985 ind4cates t h a t the Soviets have a c t u a l l y improved t h e i r r e l a t i v e warhead standing, ye t the US i s now sa id t o be i n a p o s i t i o n o f s t reng th from which t o negot ia te ! ) . even tua l l y became involved i n two sets o f arms con t ro l negot ia t ions : START (S t ra teg i c Arms Reduction Talks) concerned w i t h s t r a t e g i c systems, and INF ( In termediate Nuclear Forces Talks) which was concerned w i t h thea t re nuc lear systems. and Pershing I I systems t o Europe i n November 1983. The Soviets claimed t h a t they would no t r e t u r n t o the nego t ia t i ng t a b l e u n t i l these systems were removed.

The two sides

But these two sets o f t a l k s broke down when the US in t roduced Cruise

By then, o f course, a new issue was rece iv ing p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n , and t h i s was Pres ident Reagan's 23 March 1983 announcement o f the S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e ( S D I ) which became b e t t e r known as the 'S ta r Wars'. Since then, most media a t t e n t i o n has concentrated on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between S D I and arms c o n t r o l , so t h a t the c r u c i a l issue i s seen as being whether o r no t the Pres ident i s w i l l i n g t o make concessions. N a t u r a l l y t h i s i s a c r i t i c a l issue f o r the eva lua t ion of the prospects f o r arms con t ro l , b u t t o a s i g n i f i c a n t ex ten t i t i s

4. Steve Smith

a l s o a m is lead ing one because i t c a r r i e s w i t h i t t h e assumption t h a t i f o n l y SDI c o u l d be removed from t h e scene, then arms c o n t r o l would be r e l a t i v e l y easy t o achieve.

L e t us assume t h a t S D I was n o t on t h e agenda: would i t be reasonable t o expect t h a t t he US and t h e Sov ie ts c o u l d reach agreement r e l a t i v e l y q u i c k l y ? Wz'l?, what b e d e v i l l e d t h e START and INF t a l k s was a s e t o f issues t h a t were s u f f i c i e n t l y impor tan t t o p reven t agreement w i t h o u t t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n o f SDI ( T a l b o t t , 1984). A t START, t h e US was p r i m a r i l y concerned t o do t w o t h i n g s : f i r s t , t o l i m i t s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e S o v i e t I C B M ( I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e ) f o r c e ( f rom one o f about 6000 warheads t o one o f 2500 warheads) and t o do so i n a way t h a t r e q u i r e d cutbacks i n S o v i e t heavy ICBMs ( t h e S S 1 8 ) . T h i s r e f l e c t e d a c e r t a i n v iew o f t h e n u c l e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p , one t h a t saw t h e g r e a t e s t danger coming f rom any v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f US land-based f o r c e s ; second, t o preserve US modern i sa t i on p lans , so t h a t T r i d e n t 0-5 and, more i m p o r t a n t l y , ALCMs (Air-Launched Cru i se M i s s i l e s ) cou ld be developed as envisaged.

was d i v i d e d i n t o two phases, t h e f i r s t o f which would t a k e b o t h s ides down t o 5000 warheads on a maximum o f 850 m i s s i l e s , w i t h no more than 2500 warheads be ing deployed on ICBMs. The second phase would l i m i t C ru i se b u t i n r e t u r n f o r l i m i t a - t i o n s on the amount o f throw-weight on b o t h s i d e s ' m i s s i l e s ( t o t h e l e v e l o f US throw-weight ) . Not o n l y d i d t h i s proposal a l l o w t h e US t o modernise as planned w h i l s t r e q u i r i n g the Sov ie ts t o d i s m a n t l e most o f t h e i r I C B M fo rce , b u t i t a l s o envisaged t h e S o v i e t s r e l y i n g more on t h e i r SLBM (Submarine-Launched B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e ) f o rce , an area i n which they have h i s t o r i c a l l y p laced a ve ry smal l percentage o f t h e i r warheads (about 20-25 p e r c e n t ) . Sov ie ts cou ld n o t reach t h e 5000 warhead l i m i t i f they c u t back t o 2500 warheads on ICBMs, s i n c e t h e i r SLBMs were n o t h e a v i l y MIRVed ( M u l t i p l e Independent ly Ta rge tab le Re-entry V e h i c l e s ) . each s i d e c u t back on t h e SALT I I c e i l i n g s by about 20 p e r cent. But t h i s was t o be dependent on a ban on any new US Forward Based Systems (such as Cru i se and Pershing 1 1 ) and a ban on any C r u i s e m i s s i l e s over 600 Km. T h i s o f f e r was n o t acceptable t o t h e US s i n c e i t f a i l e d t o address t h e key i ssue o f ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y and was a l s o l i n k e d t o t h e non-deployment o f C ru i se and Pershing I I , which by then had become a l i t m u s t e s t f o r t h e NATO A l l i a n c e .

The US proposal

Not o n l y t h i s , b u t t h e

I n c o n t r a s t , t h e S o v i e t s proposed a t START t h a t

A t t he INF Talks, t h e i n i t i a l US p o s i t i o n was t h a t o f t h e z e r o o p t i o n , which c a l l e d f o r t h e d i s m a n t l i n g o f a l l S S b s , SS5s and SS2Os i n r e t u r n for t h e non-deployment o f C ru i se and Persh ing I I . The problems w i t h t h i s were t h a t i t r e q u i r e d the Sov ie ts t o d i s m a n t l e a l l INF fo rces , n o t o n l y those i n Europe, w h i l s t n o t l i m i t i n g c e r t a i n NATO f o r c e s t h a t were w o r r y i n g t o the Sov ie ts . i n c l u d e B r i t i s h and French s t r a t e g i c systems. The S o v i e t s responded w i t h an o f f e r t h a t proposed t h e r e d u c t i o n o f INF t o 600 on each s i d e by 1985, then t o 306 by 1990. But t h i s i nc luded French and B r i t i s h systems, and t h e i r a i r c r a f t as w e l l as t h e i r s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s ; hence, g i v e n t h e planned i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e Mirage 2000N and t h e Tornado, no US systems c o u l d be p laced i n Europe w i t h i n these t o t a l s . The two s ides remained f a r a p a r t throughout t h e t a l k s , d e s p i t e the 'Walk i n t h e Woods' i n J u l y 1982 when K v i t s i n s k y and N i t z e ( t h e c h i e f Sov ie t and US n e g o t i a t o r s ) n e a r l y a r r i v e d a t an agreement o n l y f o r i t t o be r e j e c t e d f i r s t i n Washington (Pentagon p ressu re ) , then i n Moscow. The f i n a l p o s i t i o n s o f the two s ides were, on t h e sur face, q u i t e c lose : t h e U S o f f e r e d a warhead t o t a l f o r INF systems o f 420; t h e S o v i e t s proposed a l i m i t o f 140 launchers. The f a c t t h a t t h e SS20 has 3 warheads makes the o f f e r s i d e n t i c a l on t h e numbers o f warheads (420), b u t t he c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e was t h a t t h e Sov ie ts i n s i s t e d t h a t UK and French systems had t o be i nc luded and t h a t no Pershing I 1 o r Cru i se deployment cou ld occur. The START and INF Ta lks i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r e were f i v e major issues on which t h e two s i d e s fundamenta l ly d isagreed: (a) t h e des tab i 1 i s a t i o n represented by S o v i e t 'heavy ' m i s s i l e s (ss18); (b) t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f p l a c i n g l a r g e percentages of fo rces on ICBMs; (c) t h e r o l e o f UK and French systems i n any I N F

Nor d i d i t

The Prospect f o r Arms ControZ Af ter the Swnmit 5.

agreement; (d) t h e r o l e o f US FBS i n INF and s t r a t e g i c t a l k s ; (e) t h e d e s t a b i l i s i n g n a t u r e o f Pershing 1 1 .

O f these, the l a s t has been over taken by events, s i n c e 108 Pershing I t s a re now deployed i n West Germany. To these must be added the major issue o f S D I , as w e l l as t h e problem o f S o v i e t compliance w i t h arms c o n t r o l and the associated US requirement f o r an unambiguous capabi 1 i t y t o v e r i f y any agreement. W h i l s t i t i s undeniable t h a t SDI i s t h e major s tumbl ing b lock, and one can say t h a t no o v e r a l l agreement w i l l emerge w i t h o u t an agreement on l i m i t i n g S D I , there a r e now a number o f o t h e r problems t o be faced a t Geneva, An i n i t i a l p o i n t e r t o these d i f f i c u l t i e s i s t h a t b o t h s i d e s agreed t h a t t h e t a l k s a r e n o t to be seen as a resumption o f t h e START and I N F n e g o t i a t i o n s . For the Soviets , t h e t h r e e se ts o f t a l k s (on INF, S t r a t e g i c , and Defens ive Systems) a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d . Thus Sov ie t statements c o n t i n u a l l y p o i n t t o the Gromyko-Schultz statement of 8 January 1985, i n which they aqreed t h a t the t h r e e areas would be 'cons idered and . - resolved i n t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p ' ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Hera ld Tr ibune, 15 March 1985, p 2). The US p o s i t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t i n t h a t t h e t a l k s may lead t o agreement i n any one area w i t h o u t agreement i n any of t h e others.

Dur ing the f i r s t two rounds o f t h e t a l k s a t t e n t i o n was focussed on the p o s s i b i l i t y o f any movement i n t h e p o s i t i o n s of the two s ides on S D I . round (12 March-23 A p r i l 1985) was l a r g e l y concerned w i t h the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f each s i d e ' s views i n each o f t h e t h r e e areas; t h e second round (30 May-16 J u l y 1985) saw l i t t l e n e g o t i a t i n g , a l though the S o v i e t n e g o t i a t o r s began t o t a l k ( i n f o r m a l l y ) about some ' i d e a s ' they had f o r agreements. One o f these was t h a t they were prepared t o o f f e r s i z e a b l e percentage r e d u c t i o n s on t h e i r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i n r e t u r n f o r a ban on S D I . The Sov ie ts i n d i c a t e d t h a t they d i d n o t mean t o imply t h a t research should be banned; s i n c e such a ban c o u l d n o t be v e r i f i e d , research cou ld go ahead. A l l t h a t they wanted t o exc lude was t h e t e s t i n g o f S D I components. Asked for examples o f what wou?d be p r o h i b i t e d , they r e p l i e d by l i s t i n g a l l for thcoming US t e s t s of any space-re la ted system (eg. the US A n t i - S a t e l l i t e system! )

The f i r s t

The c r i t i c a l p o i n t about t h i s exchange i s t h a t i t revea ls the e x t e n t o f the disagreement on S D I between t h e two sides. suggest t h a t t h e two s ides a r e moving towards compromise o r agreement ( f o r example i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between research and t e s t i n g ) . mere ly removes t h e argument t o another l e v e l , t h a t o f a d i s t i n c t i o n between the t e s t i n g o f a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e i n a l a b o r a t o r y and t h e t e s t i n g c f t h a t p r i n c i p l e w i t h i n a component o r sub-component o f an SDI - re la ted system. the US has refused t o accept any l i m i t a t i o n on SDI- re la ted research, w h i l s t t h e S o v i e t Union has de f ined t h a t which i s a l lowed i n so narrow a way t h a t i t , i n e f f e c t , bans a n y t h i n g o u t s i d e o f a l a b o r a t o r y . Given t h a t t h e whole purpose o f Pres ident Reagan's S D I p r o j e c t a t the present i s t o see whether the techno log ies seem l i k e l y t o make d e f e n s i v e systems p o s s i b l e , i t i s o n l y by t e s t i n g components o r sub-components t h a t t h i s judgement can be made. S i m i l a r l y , most S D I research money i s now going i n t o computer systems, e s p e c i a l l y new forms o f s i l i c o n ch ips , and sof tware: such research c l e a r l y cannot be l i m i t e d t o the t e s t i n g o f p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . The Reagan-Gorbachev Summit d i d n o t h i n g t o r e s o l v e t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , and t h e Summit very n e a r l y broke up w i t h o u t an agreed statement on p r e c i s e l y t h e issue o f S D I . However one looks a t t h e arms c o n t r o l agenda over the nex t few years, S D I appears t o be the major h u r d l e t o agreement.

Q u i t e o f t e n t h e i r p u b l i c p r e s e n t a t i o n s

Yet, i n r e a l i t y t h i s

Broadly speaking,

Despi te t h e SDI f a c t o r , b o t h s ides have made f i r m proposals a t the n e g o t i a t i o n s . On 3 October M i k h a i l Gorbachev o u t l i n e d t h e Sov ie t o f f e r . The major f e a t u r e s o f t h e proposal are: (a) a 50 p e r cent r e d u c t i o n i n s t r a t e g i c launchers; (b) a maximum o f 6000 s t r a t e g i c warheads; (c ) no more than 60 per cent o f these warheads t o be on any one l e g o f the s t r a t e g i c t r i a d (ICBMs, SLBMs,

Steve Smith 6 .

Bombers); missiles; p r o g r a m (Av ia t i on Week and Space Technoloqy, 14 October 1985, p 21).

Id) a ban on long-range c r u i s e m iss i l es ; (e) a ban on new types o f (f) a l l of these t o be cont ingent on a te rmina t ion o f the US SDI-

Two p o i n t s a re noteworthy about t h i s proposal : f i r s t , i t i s , by Soviet standards, a very rad i ca l one, e s p e c i a l l y s ince i t requ i res the Soviet Union t o cut back i t s land-based I C B M f o rce from 6400 t o 3600 (60 percent o f 6000). One wonders t o what ex ten t t h i s proposal a t t r a c t e d the support o f the Soviet m i l i t a r y . The second p o i n t i s t h a t there are many fea tures t h a t make i t u n a t t r a c t i v e t o the US: the most obvious i s t h a t i t requ i res the h a l t i n g o f the S D I programme. But there are o ther very ser ious quest ions tha t , were S D I t o disappear overn igh t , would s t i l l make agreement very d i f f i c u l t . The most problemat ic o f these der ives from the Soviet d e f i n i t i o n o f ' s t r a t e g i c ' : i t r e f e r s t o any system o f one s ide t h a t can h i t the t e r r i t o r y o f the other . Thus, US systems i n Europe are t o be included w i t h i n the t o t a l s , whereas Soviet systems w i t h the same range are no t s ince they cannot h i t US t e r r i t o r y . Secretary o f State, George Schultz, argued i n San Francisco on 14 October 1985 t h a t a major problem was tha t the proposal included no commitment to reduce the SS18 , which he saw as the 'most d e s t a b i l i s i n g ' nuclear system: i n shor t , the proposal d i d n o t address the major concern o f the US, t h a t of s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y (Schul tz, 1985). The Soviet ban on new m i s s i l e s would ban the MX and the small ICBM (Midgetman), b u t a l l o w the a l ready- tested SS24 and SS25. Further, the Soviet d e f i n i t i o n o f ' s t r a t e g i c ' would fo rce the US t o choose between European and s t r a t e g i c systems. f i g u r e includes short-range a t t a c k m i s s i l e s and g r a v i t y bombs, which, g iven US forward bases i n Europe, means t h a t a l a rge number o f these US weapons would be a f fec ted , bu t few Soviet ones.

F i n a l l y , the 6000 warhead

The US responded w i t h a proposal tab led on 1 November 1985. This was based on f o u r p r i n c i p l e s : deep cuts , no f i r s t - s t r i k e advantage, defensive research, and no cheating. The main elements o f t h i s proposal were: (a) reduct ions t o a 1 i m i - t o f 4500 reyent ry veh ic les (warheads); (b) reduc t ion t o a maximum o f 3000 warheads on ICBMs; (c) reduc t ion o f 50 per cent i n the h igher throw-weight f i g u r e possessed by each s ide ( the Soviet f i g u r e , as they have 11.9 m i l l i o n pounds com- pared t o a US f i g u r e of 4.4 m i 1 1 i on pounds); (d) 1 i m i t of 1500 long-range ALCMs f o r each side; (e) reduct ions o f s t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s t o about 1250-1450 on each side; heavy m iss i l es ; number o f US systems deployed on 31 December 1985 (140), w i t h Soviets reducing SS2Os t o t h i s l e v e l ; ( i ) freedom t o mix INF systems (Pershing and Cruise) w i t h i n l i m i t o f 140; ( j ) research t o cont inue on S D I , w i t h 'open labo ra to r ies ' proposed by US; (k) Soviets t o s top impeding US v e r i f i c a t i o n o f arms c o n t r o l agreements, and t o reverse cu r ren t course o f non-compliance.

( f ) a ban on the modernisat ion o f o ld , o r the b u i l d i n g o f new, (9) a ban on a l l mobi le ICBMs; (h) a l i m i t on INF a t the

This proposal con f ron ts the Soviets w i t h a number o f s i g n i f i c a n t problems, the most c lear -cu t being tha t i t a l lows S D I t o continue. This, i n and o f i t s e l f , seems l i k e l y t o be enough t o prevent any agreement, bu t even w i thout the problem o f S D I there remain deep d i f f e rences between the two sides. For example, the US demands a massive cut-back i n Soviet throw-weight and the prevent ion o f any modernisat ion of the Soviet heavy m i s s i l e force. Cer ta in l y the two sides do not seem t h a t f a r away on the bas ic o u t l i n e o f a l i m i t a t i o n on s t r a t e g i c warheads (6000-4500) nor on the numbers al lowed on ICBMs (3600-3000), bu t they do d i f f e r on what these f igures would a l low. For the US the ob jec t i s t o r e s t r i c t Soviet heavy miss i les ; f o r the Soviet Union the aim i s t o prevent the modernisat ion of the US I C B M force. S i m i l a r l y , the US wants t o ban the most recent m i s s i l e s i n the Soviet I C B M fo rce ( the SS24 and SS25), c la iming tha t because they are mobile they create la rge v e r i f i c a t i o n problems. The proposals on s t r a t e g i c systems are q u a n t i t a t i v e l y c lose, but q u a l i t a t i v e l y r e f l e c t the p o s i t i o n s adopted a t the START ta lks . Although the warhead t o t a l s look very s i m i l a r (6000 t o 4500) the

The Prospect f o r Arms Control A f t e r t h e Summit 7.

two s ides a r e s t i l l f a r a p a r t on what counts as s t r a t e g i c ; what counts as a warhead; whether B a c k f i r e i s t o be inc luded; whether ALCMs should be banned; whether m i s s i l e throw-weight i s t o be l i m i t e d ; and whether mob i le m i s s i l e s should be a l lowed. My b e l i e f i s t h a t these d i f f e r e n c e s a r e so v a s t t h a t even w i t h o u t S D I they would be s u f f i c i e n t t o p revent agreement.

The one area i n which a consensus may emerge i s INF, where t h e Sov ie ts seem t o have accepted t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an agreement i n o n l y one area o f the t a l k s . On 15 January 1986 Gorbachev o f f e r e d a p l a n t o remove a l l n u c l e a r weapons by t h e year 2000; t h i s would s t a r t by t h e US and t h e Sov ie ts t a k i n g t h e i r INF systems o u t o f Europe (but a l l o w i n g S o v i e t SS2Os to remain t a r g e t e d a g a i n s t Asia),, e i t h e r France or t h e UK ( thus r u l i n g o u t T r i d e n t ) , and a commitment by these two governments n o t t o modernise t h e i r nuc lear forces. The US responded on 24 February 1986 w i t h a three-year p l a n t o remove US and Sov ie t INF, b u t t h i s r e f e r r e d t o a l l INF ( n o t j u s t those i n Europe), and refused any r e s t r i c t i o n on French and UK modern isa t ion p lans. I n essence, then, t h e problems t h a t plagued the INF Ta lks remain, d e s p i t e s u p e r f i c i a l s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h e two s ides.

T h i s was l i n k e d t o a US p ledge n o t t o t r a n s f e r any nuc lear systems t o

-

The prospects , t h e r e f o r e , a r e mixed, b u t i n t h e t w o main areas o f the t a l k s a r e d i s t i n c t l y b leak. Why i s t h i s t h e case? There a r e t h r e e reasons, i n ascending o r d e r of importance. F i r s t , d e s p i t e the a t t e n t i o n o f t h e media on S D I , t h e arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e plagued by t h e o l d d i f f i c u l t i e s and d isputes which, a f t e r a l l , had been s e r i o u s enough t o bo th p revent US r a t i f i c a t i o n o f SALT I I and agreement a t t h e START and INF t a l k s . C l e a r l y , f o r Secre tary o f S t a t e Schu l tz and Secre tary o f Defense Weinberger t h e issues o f s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y and v e r i f i c a t i o n / c o m p l i a n c e a r e c r u c i a l ones and no agreement w i l l be acceptable t o them un less these a r e addressed. Since the ways i n which they a r e addressed i n the c u r r e n t US o f f e r f l i e s i n t h e face o f c e n t r a l t e n e t s o f S o v i e t f o r c e p lanning, a p o s i t i v e outcome seems u n l i k e l y . Second, t h e r e i s SDI. As long as t h e Sov ie ts c o n t i n u e t o be so opposed t o i t as t o make any agreement on s t r a t e g i c systems dependent upon a ban on S D I , and as long as Pres ident Reagan cont inues t o be t o t a l l y committed t o i t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o envisage progress i n e i t h e r t h e s t r a t e g i c o r the de fens ive systems t a l k s . As has been argued, Sov ie t statements about t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between research and t e s t i n g seem t o be a change i n p r e s e n t a t i o n only . What does seem c l e a r i s t h a t i f Pres ident Reagan has t o choose between l e a v i n g as h i s s e c u r i t y legacy one o f arms c o n t r o l o r one o f t h e development o f S D I , i t w i l l be t h e l a t t e r t h a t he chooses. T h i r d l y , t h e r e i s t h e c r u c i a l i ssue o f t h e importance a t tached t o arms c o n t r o l i n t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o a v o i d t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t issues a r e se ized on t o show t h a t arms c o n t r o l i s n o t d e s i r a b l e , f o r example S o v i e t v i o l a t i o n s , US adherence t o SALT I I , US views o f t h e 1 i m i t a t i o n s imposed by t h e ABM T r e a t y on S D I research. Whereas f i v e years ago what was needed was t o l i m i t heavy S o v i e t ICBMs, and t h e s t r a t e g i c community was a lmost u n i t e d i n v iewing mob i le s i n g l e - warhead ICBMs as s t a b i l i s i n g , now Secre tary Weinberger denounces the SS25 as d e s t a b i l i s i n g because i t i s a s ingle-warhead mob i le ICBM! i s n o t seen as t h e bes t way t o deal w i t h the Sov ie ts , an3 thus a whole range of arguments a r e brought f o r t h t o show t h e p i t f a l l s e i t h e r o f s p e c i f i c arms c o n t r o l proposals or arms c o n t r o l as a way o f managing US-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . As Richard P e r l e sa id: 'The sense t h a t we and t h e Russians c o u l d compose our d i f f e r e n c e s , reduce them t o t r e a t y c o n s t r a i n t s . . . and then r e l y on compliance t o produce a

I n s h o r t , arms c o n t r o l

s a f e r w o r l d - I don'; agree w i t h any o f t h a t . ' The c u r r e n t Reaqan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p r e f e r s m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y t o arms c o n t r o l

(The Guardian', 1 January- 1985, p 1).

as a way o f s t r i c t u r i n g US-Soviet r e l a t i o n s .

I n summary, then, S D I remains t h e major s tumbl ing b lock , b u t i t i s by no means t h e o n l y one. Yet t h e p o r t r a y a l o f t h e Summit increased p u b l i c percept ions o f a movement towards arms c o n t r o l agreements p r e c i s e l y because i t saw those

8. Steve Smith

agreements as dependent on the personal r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two leaders. I n do ing so i t b o t h overes t imated t h e importance o f t h e two i n d i v i d u a l s and mistook t h e i r d e s i r e f o r success a t the Summit f o r a d e s i r e f o r a c t u a l p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s on arms c o n t r o l . I t a l s o underest imated the importance o f t h e under- l y i n g issues t h a t had prevented agreement a t START and INF, b e f o r e S D i was announced; i t i s these disagreements t h a t seem l i k e l y t o p revent successfu l n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the remainder o f t h e US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The conc lus ion o f t h i s paper i s t h a t d e s p i t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s on s t r a t e g i c and de fens ive systems, t h e u n d e r l y i n g c o n s t r a i n t i s t h a t o f t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s views on arms c o n t r o l . That view makes the o u t l o o k for arms c o n t r o l a v e r y b leak one.

Key t o Abbreviations

ALCM I C B M I NF M I R V SALT SD I SLBM START

Air-Launched Cru ise M i s s i l e I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e In te rmed ia te Nuclear Forces Ta lks M u l t i p l e Independent ly Targetab le Re-entry Veh ic les S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n Talks S t r a t e g i c Defence I n i t i a t i v e Submarine-Launched B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e S t r a t e g i c Arms Reduct ion Ta lks

References

Schul tz , G (1985), ' S o v i e t Arms O f f e r "Flawed, Sel f -Serv ing ' " : Speech t o 31st Annual Session o f t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c Assembly i n San Francisco, 14 October 1985. Un i ted States I n f o r m a t i o n Serv ice, London, 15 October 1985.

Smith, S (1984), 'US-Soviet S t r a t e g i c Nuclear Arms Cont ro l : From SALT t o START t o Stop' , Arms Cont ro l 5 ( 3 ) , December, 50-74.

T a l b o t t , S (1984), Deadly Gambits (New York, Knopf). Weinraub, B (1985), ' A Summit F a i l u r e "Nightmare"', I n t e r n a t i o n a l Hera ld Tr ibune,

25 November, 1 , 5.

Suggestions f o r Further Reading

For a comprehensive overv iew o f t h e h i s t o r y o f nuc lear arms c o n t r o l see e i t h e r C o i t Blacker and G l o r i a D u f f y (eds), I n t e r n a t i o n a l Arms Cont ro l : Issues and Agreements (Stanford: S tan ford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984) or N a t i o n a l Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Cont ro l : Background and Issues (Washington DC: Nat iona l Academy Press, 1985). The h i s t o r y o f t h e SALT/START t a l k s i s covered by John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story o f SALT (New York: H o l t , R inehar t and Winston, 1973), and by Gerard Smith, Doub le ta lk : The S t o r y of SALT I (NewYork: Doubleday, 1980), f o r SALT I . For SALT I I , see Strobe T a l b o t t , Endgame - The I n s i d e Story o f SALT I I (New York: Harper and Row, 1980). prov ided by Roger Labr ie , SALT Handbook (Washington DC: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1979). START i s covered i n Strobe T a l b o t t , Deadly Gambits (New York: Knopf, 1984). The c u r r e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s i n Geneva a r e covered i n r e g u l a r up-dates

A documentary record o f b o t h i s

i n two j o u r n a l s : A D l U Report (pub l i shed by the Armament and Disarmament In fo rmat ion U n i t a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f Sussex), and Arms Cont ro l Today (publ ished by the A r m s Contro l A s s o c i a t i o n i n Washinqton DC). O f the many o t h e r j o u r n a l s i n t h e area, the B u l l e t i n o f the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s c a r r i e s most- i n t h e way o f contemporary comment on arms c o n t r o l issues. An excel l e n t (a l though somewhat ou t -o f -da te) i n t r o d u c t i o n to arms c o n t r o l can be found i n K e i t h Booth 's chapter , 'Disarnament and Arms C o n t r o l ' i n John B a y l i s e t a l , Contemporary S t ra tegy : Theor ies and P o l i c i e s (London: Croom Helm, 1975, 89-1 1 3 r